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THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE:

WHEREIN

ALL THE REASON AND PHILOSOPHY OF ATHEISM IS CONFUTED,
AND ITS IMPOSSIBILITY DEMONSTRATED,

WITH A TREATISE CONCERNING

ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE MORALITY.

BY

RALPH CUDWORTH, D.D.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS OF DR. J. L. MOSHEIM,

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN HARRISON, M.A.

WITH A COPIOUS GENERAL INDEX TO THE WHOLE WORK.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

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THE TRUE

INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM

OF THE

UNIVERSE.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER IV.

XX. We now pass from the poets of the Pagans to their philosophers. A modern writer,[1] concerning the religion of the gentiles, affirmeth this to have been the opinion of very eminent philosophers, "That even all the minor gods of the Pagans did exist of themselves from eternity unmade, they giving many reasons for the same." But how far from truth this is, will (as we conceive) appear sufficiently from the sequel of this discourse. And we cannot conclude otherwise, but that this learned writer did mistake that opinion of Aristotle and the latter Platonists, concerning the eternity of the world and gods, as if they had therefore asserted the self-existence of them; the contrary whereunto hath been already manifested. Wherefore we shall now make it unquestionably evident, by a particular enumeration, that the generality of the pagan philosophers, who were Theists, however they acknowledged a multiplicity of gods, yet asserted one only self-existent Deity, or a universal Numen, by whom the world and all those other gods were made. There being only some few Ditheists to be excepted (such as Plutarch and Atticus), who, out of a certain softness and tenderness of nature, that they might free the one good God from the imputa-

[1] He means Edward Herbert Baron of Cherbury, who, in his celebrated work De Religione Gentilium, cap. 14. p. 228. thus writes: At quid si a se ipsis existentiæ Deo summo coæternæ fuerint? quod ita esse, non infimi subsellii philosophi multis rationibus contendentes videre passim licet, "But what if they were self-existent and co-eternal with the supreme God? there being eminent philosophers every where to be met with who maintain by many arguments that this was the case."

tion of evils, would needs set up, besides him, an evil soul or demon also in the world, self-existent, to bear all the blame of them.[1]

And indeed Epicurus is the only person that we can find amongst the reputed philosophers, who, though pretending to acknowledge gods, yet professedly opposed monarchy, and verbally asserted a multitude of eternal, unmade, self-existent deities; but such as had nothing at all to do, either with the making or governing of the world. The reason whereof was, because he would by no means admit the world to have been made by any mind or understanding. Wherefore he concluded:

Naturam rerum, haud divinâ mente coortam,*

"That there was no God the δημιουργὸς or framer of the world." But nevertheless, that he might decline the odium of being accounted an Atheist, he pretended to assert a multitude of gods unmade and incorruptible, such as were unconcerned in the fabric of the world. Wherein first it is evident, that he was not serious and sincere, because he, really admitting no other principles of things in his philosophy, besides atoms and vacuum, agreeably thereunto, could acknowledge no other gods than such as were compounded out of atoms, and therefore corruptible. And thus does Origen declare the doctrine of Epicurus, not indeed as he pretended to hold it, but as, according to the tenor of his principles, he must have held it, had he really asserted any gods at all:† Οἱ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου θεοὶ, σύνθετοι ἐξ ἀτόμων τυγχάνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ συστάσει ἀναλυτοὶ, πραγματεύονται τὰς φθοροποιοὺς ἀτόμους ἀποσείεσθαι, "Epicurus' gods being compounded of atoms, and therefore by their very constitution corruptible, are in continual labour and toil, struggling with their corruptive principles." Nevertheless, if Epicurus had in good earnest asserted such a commonwealth of gods, as were neither made out of atoms, nor yet corruptible; so long as he denied the world to have been made by any mind or wisdom (as we have already declared) he ought not to be reckoned amongst the Theists, but Atheists.[2]

Thales, the Milesian, was one of the most ancient Greek philosophers, who, that he admitted a plurality of gods in some sense, is evident from that saying of his cited by Aristotle:[3] Πάντα θεῶν πλήρη, "All things are full of gods." But that, notwithstanding, he asserted one supreme and only unmade or

[1] Of all these we have several times spoken at great length already.

* Lucret. lib. 3. [Ver. 15.]

† Lib. 4. cont. Cels. p. 169.

[2] On the religion of Epicurus see our remarks above on ch. 2. sect. 2.

[3] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 17. tom. 2. opp. The same saying of his is quoted by Cicero, De Legibus, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 3353, tom. 9. opp. Add Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 1. segm. 27. p. 18.

self-existent Deity, is also manifest from that other apothegm of his in Laërtius:[4] Πρεσβύτατον πάντων ὁ θεὸς, ἀγέννητον γάρ, "God is the oldest of all things, because he is unmade." From whence it may be concluded, that all Thales' other gods were generated, and the offspring of one sole unmade Deity.[5]

Pherecydes Syrus was Thales' contemporary, of whom Aristotle in his Metaphysics[6] hath recorded, that he affirmed τὸ γεννῆσαν πρῶτον ἄριστον, that the first principle from whence all other things were generated, was the best or an absolutely perfect being; so as that in the scale of nature, things did not ascend upwards from the most imperfect to the more perfect beings, but on the contrary descend downwards from the most perfect to the less perfect. Moreover, Laërtius informs us,[7] that this was the beginning of one of Pherecydes' books, Ζεὺς μὲν καὶ χρόνος εἷς ἀεὶ, καὶ χθὼν ἦν, "Jupiter, and Time, and the Earth, always were." Where, notwithstanding, in the following words, he makes the earth to be dependent upon Jupiter; though some reading Κρόνος here, instead of χρόνος, seem to understand him thus, that Jupiter and Saturn, really one and the same Numen, was always from eternity. However, there is in these words an acknowledgment of one single and eternal Deity.[8]

[4] Lib. 1. segm. 35. p. 21.

[5] On the religion of Thales I have already discoursed at length, on ch. 2. sect. 20. If Thales had left us accurate definitions of the words he makes use of, we should be able at this day to judge with more certainty of his religious opinions. But we are nowhere informed, what he meant by θεὸς and θεοί. He has defined God, indeed, to be a nature μήτε ἀρχὴν ἐχὼν, μήτε τελευτὴν, "having neither beginning nor end," according to the testimony of Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 1. sect. 36. p. 22. But this definition is too vague, and is equally applicable to eternal matter as it is to the supreme Deity, whose existence is pointed out by reason. Nor is that better which is given here: "God is unmade and the oldest of all;" which would be willingly adopted by all those who are anxious to refer the origin of things to matter, to the exclusion of a God.

[6] Lib. 12. cap. 4. p. 446. tom. 4. opp. I have already treated largely of this passage above.

[7] Lib. 1. segm. 119. p. 76.

[8] According to the authority of Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 676. Pherecydes expressed himself in all that he left on record on divine matters in an abstruse and recondite style, and concealed his opinions in obscure words; which is proved to be the case both by passages quoted from him in Clemens and by the very exordium of his work as given in Laërtius. However, this very exordium will enable us, if not clearly to understand, at least to form some conjecture respecting, his opinion on the origin of things. Jupiter, time, and the earth, he says, existed from all eternity. I grant, that Jupiter is here the supreme and first cause of all things, omnipotent and all-wise: nor will the words which follow permit us to think otherwise. But to this Jupiter he first makes time, then the earth, to be equal. In affirming that time existed along with God from all eternity, he would appear to have held the stars and heavenly bodies, by whose annual courses ages are formed, to be also eternal. Nor if this were his opinion, which I consider probable, would he be the only one who thought so. But there are some who suppose a certain time to have existed, before that time was, which is produced by the conversion of the world: and as it is uncertain, whether Pherecydes held this opinion, nothing can be decided upon. It is more certain, however, that this man associated eternal matter with his God. For this, beyond doubt,

Pythagoras was the most eminent of all the ancient philosophers, who, that he was a Polytheist as well as the other Pagans, may be concluded from that beginning of the golden verses (though not written by him):

> Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται,
> Τίμα, καὶ σέβου ὅρκον· ἐπειθ' ἥρωας ἁγανοὺς·
> Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥίζων.

Wherein men are exhorted, in the first place, to worship the immortal gods, and that accordingly as they were appointed by law; after them the heroes, and last of all the terrestrial demons. And accordingly Laërtius[9] gives this account of Pythagoras' piety: Τιμὰς θεοῖς δεῖν νομίζειν καὶ ἥρωσιν, μὴ τὰς ἴσας, "That he conceived men ought to worship both the gods and the heroes, though not with equal honour." And who these gods of Pythagoras were, the same writer also declareth: Ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας εἶναι θεούς, "That they were, in part at least, the sun, and moon, and stars."

Notwithstanding which, that Pythagoras acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, which therefore was the original of all those other gods, may partly appear from that prayer in the golden verses, which, whether written by Philolaus or Lysis, or some other follower of Pythagoras, were undoubtedly ancient and agreeable to his doctrine.[10]

is that χθὼν, which he asserts to have existed for ever along with Jupiter. To this he adds: Χθονίη δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο γῇ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζεὺς γέρας δίδοι, "And the earth was called χθονίη, after Jupiter conferred honour upon it." A specimen of the obscure phraseology affected by this philosopher. If the words signify anything, the following, unless I am mistaken, is their purport. That the supreme Deity ordered and disposed that rude mass which existed from eternity, and gave to it the form it now has: after which it was called the earth. I might discourse at greater length on this subject, and explain the doctrine of Pherecydes more copiously, were I disposed to transfer into these pages what is related of him by Clemens: but I fear I may appear to many to have been already too prolix. [Consult Beausobre, Orig. de Manich. p. 327. who treats largely of Pherecydes. The whole of his philosophy is expounded differently from what it usually is by Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, tom. 1. p. 437. See especially Heine's Dissertation on Pherecydes, Histoire de l'Academie des Sciences, Berlin An. 1747. p. 303. which however contains many inaccuracies.]

[9] Lib. 8. segm. 33. p. 514. Herewith compare segm. 23. p. 506. of the same book. The passage of Laërtius which follows occurs segm. 27. p. 509.

[10] These verses v. 61. 62. occur in the poems usually termed *golden*. In my opinion the following translation expresses the sense more accurately than the one here given:

> O Jupiter, multis certe malis homines liberares,
> Si omnibus indicares, quali quisque genio utatur.

As to the learned Doctor's statement, that these golden verses contain the substance of the doctrine professed by Pythagoras, I willingly agree with him, if it be understood of his external doctrine, which he concealed from no one and taught publicly to all. But this philosopher, as is well known, had another secret and hidden doctrine, which he explained only to select disciples, of whose capacity and fidelity he had assured himself: and I deny that this is contained in these verses, as I hope I shall easily prove by and by to any one who is disposed to think otherwise. See Porphyry only, Vita Pythagoræ, p. 39.

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἠ πολλῶν τε κακῶν λύσειας ἅπαντας·
Εἰ πᾶσιν δείξαις, οἵῳ τῷ δαίμονι χρῶνται·

Jupiter alme, malis jubeas vel solvier omnes:
Omnibus utantur vel quonam dæmone monstra.

Upon which Hierocles thus writeth:[1] *Τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς ἔθος ἦν τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις τῷ τοῦ Διὸς, καὶ Ζηνὸς, ὀνόματι σεμνύνειν· δι' ὃν γὰρ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ζῆν, τοῖς πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει, τοῦτον δίκαιον ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνέργειας ὀνομάζεσθαι,* "It was the manner of the Pythagoreans to honour the maker and father of this whole universe with the name of Dis and Zen, it being just, that he, who giveth being and life to all, should be denominated from thence." And again afterwards: *Τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα σύμβολόν ἐστι, καὶ εἰκὼν ἐν φωνῇ δημιουργικῆς οὐσίας, τῷ τοὺς πρώτους θεμένους τοῖς πράγμασι τὰ ὀνόματα διὰ σοφίας ὑπερβολὴν, ὥσπερ τινὰς ἀγαλματοποιοὺς ἀρίστους, διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὡς δι' εἰκόνων, ἐμφανίσαι αὐτῶν τὰς δυνάμεις,* "This very name Zeus is a convenient symbol or image of the demiurgical nature. And they who first gave names to things, were, by reason of a certain wonderful wisdom of theirs a kind of excellent statuaries; they, by those several names, as images, lively representing the natures of things." Moreover, that this Pythagoric prayer was directed to the supreme Numen and king of gods, Jamblichus thus declares in his Protreptics:[2] *Ἐν δὴ τούτοις μία μὲν ἀρίστη παράκλησις εἰς τὴν θείαν εὐδαιμονίαν ἡ μεμιγμένη ταῖς εὐχαῖς καὶ ἀνακλήσεσι τῶν θεῶν, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ βασιλέως αὐτῶν Διός,* "Here is an excellent exhortation of these golden verses to the pursuit of divine felicity, mingled together with prayers and the invocation of the gods, but especially of that Jupiter, who is the king of them." Moreover, the same might further appear from those Pythagoric fragments,[3] that are still extant; as that of Ocellus Lucanus, and others, who were moralists, in which as gods are sometimes spoken of plurally, so also is God often singularly used for that supreme Deity which containeth the whole.

But this will be most of all manifest from what hath been recorded concerning the Pythagoric philosophy, and its making a monad the first principle. It is true indeed, that the writer, De Placitis Philosophorum, doth affirm Pythagoras to have asserted two substantial principles self-existent, a Monad and a Dyad; by the former of which, as God is confessed to have been meant, so the latter of them is declared with some uncertainty, it being in one place interpreted to be a demon, or a

* Salmas. Præf. in Tab. Ceb. Arab.
[1] Comm. in Aurea Carmina, p. 200. ed. Needhami.
[2] Cap. 3. p. 10. ed. Arcerii.
[3] They are published by Dr. Tho. Gale in his Opuscula Veter. Moral. et Mytholog. Amstel. 1688. 8.

principle of evil:[4] Πυθαγόρας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μὲν μονάδα θεὸν, καὶ τἀγαθὸν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς φύσις, αὐτός ὁ νοῦς· τὴν δ' ἀόριστον δυάδα δαίμονα, καὶ τὸ κακόν, &c., "Pythagoras' first principle is God and Good, which is the nature of unity, and a perfect mind; but his other principle of duality is a demon or evil." But in another place expounded to be matter:[5] Πάλιν τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς· σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ εἴδικον (ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς ὁ θεός), ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικὸν (ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρατὸς κόσμος),* "Pythagoras' principles were a monad and infinite duality; the former of them an active principle, mind or God, the latter passive and matter." And Plutarch in some other writings of his declares, that the first matter did not exist alone by itself dead and inanimate, but acted with an irrational soul; and that both these together made up that wicked demon of his. And doubtless, this book, De Placitis Philosophorum, was either written by Plutarch himself, or else by some disciple and follower of his according to his principles. Wherefore this account, which is therein given of the Pythagoric doctrine, was probably infected with that private conceit of Plutarch's, that God and a wicked demon, or else matter, together with an irrational soul, self-existent, were the first principles of the universe. Though we do acknowledge that others also, besides Plutarch, have supposed Pythagoras to have made two self-existent prin-

[4] This passage occurs De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 7. 881. But the learned Doctor is wrong in supposing that the two passages which he here adduces are contradictory to each other, and that in the former Plutarch has not expressed his meaning sufficiently clearly on the dyad of Pythagoras. There is no contradiction between the two. In the former passage Plutarch states, that the dyad of Pythagoras is a demon and evil: but adds, what is here omitted: Περὶ ἣν ἐστι τὸ ὑλικὸν πλῆθος· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁρατὸς ὁ κόσμος, "Which is surrounded with the mass of matter. And this is the visible world." Consequently in this passage he makes the duad of Pythagoras to be matter, in which is concealed a certain wicked and disorderly soul. In the latter again he asserts this dyad to be matter or the visible world. In both therefore he expressly declares the dyad of Pythagoras to be rude and unformed matter: but in the latter he adds, that this matter is animated, and imbued with a certain living but irrational nature. Agreeably to Plutarch's opinion, then, wherever he mentions matter, we are to understand it, not as inanimate, but endowed with a certain irregular and disorderly life; to which opinion, as we have before sufficiently demonstrated, he was much wedded, although after the manner of the academics he came to no positive decision. Compare his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 370, where he explains the doctrine of Pythagoras in the same way. Who is ignorant of its being the custom of the best writers, to name only one of those things which they conceive to be eternally associated together, and at the same time to leave the other to be understood? Plutarch therefore is not to be found fault with, because, having once decided that there perpetually exists in matter an evil mind or demon, which cannot by any means be separated from it, he in some other passage mentions matter alone, and does not at the same time speak expressly of the demon which he supposed to be connected with it. Indeed, this very observation almost leads me to the conviction, that Plutarch himself is the author of the book, De Placitis Veterum Philosophorum, written, though it be, in any thing but neat order, and not always according to strict accuracy and truth.

* Lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 876. tom. oper. 2.]

[5] [Beausobre finds fault with this opinion, Hist. de Manich. p. 32. not.]

ciples, God and matter, but not animate, nor informed, as Plutarch supposed, with any irrational or wicked soul.

Notwithstanding which, it may well be made a question, whether Pythagoras by his Dyad meant matter or no; because Malchus or Porphyrius, in the life of Pythagoras, thus interprets those two Pythagoric principles of unity and duality :* Τὸ αἴτιον τῆς συμπνοίας καὶ τῆς συμπαθείας, καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ὅλων τοῦ κατὰ ταυτὰ καὶ ὁσαύτως ἔχοντος, ἓν προσηγόρευσαν, καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἓν τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχει, ἡνωμένον τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ συμπνοῦν, κατὰ μετουσίαν τοῦ πρώτου αἰτίου· τὸν δὲ τῆς ἑτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μεριστοῦ καὶ ἐν μεταβολῇ καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντος δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσηγόρευσαν, "The cause of that sympathy, harmony, and agreement, which is in things, and of the conservation of the whole, which is always the same and like itself, was by Pythagoras called unity or a monad (that unity, which is in the things themselves, being but a participation of the first cause:) but the reason of alterity, inequality, and inconstant irregularity in things, was by him called a Dyad." Thus, according to Porphyrius, by the Pythagoric Dyad is not so much meant matter, as the infinite and indeterminate nature, and the passive capability of things. So that the Monad and Dyad of Pythagoras seem to have been the same with Plato's πέρας and ἄπειρον, his "finite" and "infinite" in his Philebus; the former of which two only is substantial, that first most simple being, the cause of all unity, and the measure of all things.[6]

However, if Pythagoras' Dyad be to be understood of a substantial matter, it will not therefore follow, that he supposed matter to be self-existent and independent upon the Deity, since, according to the best and most ancient writers, his Dyad was no primary but a secondary thing only, and derived from his Monad, the sole original of all things. Thus Diogenes Laërtius tells us,[7] that Alexander, who wrote the successions of philosophers, affirmed he had found in the Pythagoric Commentaries, ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἁπάντων, μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος, ἀόριστον δυάδα, ὡς

[6] This passage of Porphyry occurs in his Vita Pythagoræ, p. 47. ed. Kusteri. But I have again and again stated it as my opinion, that the junior Platonists, to whose sect Porphyry belonged, are not to be trusted when expounding the dogmas of the old philosophers, inasmuch as they for the most part interpret all ancient doctrines agreeably to their own principles. And as regards this explication of the Pythagoric numbers in particular, I hold it to be altogether foreign to the meaning of the philosopher. For he referred the nature of things to numbers, or had recourse to numbers in explaining physical matters; but I find no record in ancient writers of his having defined moral doctrines or metaphysical notions by numbers. Porphyry on the contrary connects the whole system of numbers as taught by Pythagoras, with those metaphysical subtleties, which abound so plentifully in the books of his master Plotinus. But, to confess the truth, the accounts given by ancient authors of the Pythagoric numbers are so full of obscurity and inconsistency, that in my opinion, musicians, butchers, cooks, gardeners, or any others, might, if so inclined, find the elements of their respective arts in them.

* P. 203.

[7] Lib. 8. segm. 25. p. 507.

ἂν ὕλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι, "that a Monad was the principle of all things, but that from this Monad was derived infinite duality, as matter for the Monad to work upon, as the active cause." With which agreeth Hermias,[8] affirming this to be one of the greatest of all the Pythagoric mysteries, that a Monad was the sole principle of all things. Accordingly whereunto, Clemens Alexandrinus cites this passage[9] out of Thearidas, an ancient Pythagorean,* in his book concerning nature: Ἀ ἀρχὰ τῶν ὄντων, ἀρχὰ μὲν ὄντως ἀληθινὰ, μία· κείνα γὰρ ἐν ἀρχᾷ τέ ἐστιν ἓν καὶ μόνον, "The true principle of all things was only one: for this was in the beginning one alone." Which words also seem to imply the world to have had a novity of existence or beginning of duration. And indeed, however Ocellus Lucanus writes, yet that Pythagoras himself did not hold the eternity of the world, may be concluded from what Porphyrius[10] records of him, where he gives an account of that his superstitious abstinence from beans: Ὅτι τῆς πρώτης ἀρχῆς καὶ γενέσεως ταραττομένης, καὶ πολλῶν ἅμα συνηνεγμένων καὶ συσπειρομένων καὶ συσσηπομένων ἐν τῇ γῇ, κατ' ὀλίγον γένεσις καὶ διάκρισις συνέστη, ζώων τε ὁμοῦ γενομένων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀναδιδομένων, τότε δὴ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς σηπεδόνος, ἀνθρώπους συστῆναι καὶ κυάμους βλαστῆναι, "That at the beginning things being confounded and mingled together, the generation and secretion of them afterwards proceeded by degrees, animals and plants appearing; at which time also, from the same putrified matter, sprung up both men and beans."[1]

[8] Irrisione Philos. Gentilis. sect. 16. p. 225. Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ τούτου συμφυλέται . . . παραδιδοῦσιν ἄλλα μοι δόγματα, ὥσπερ μυστήρια, καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μέγα καὶ ἀπόῤῥητον τὸ, αὐτὸς ἔφη, ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων ἡ μονὰς, "Pythagoras and those of his sect. . . . . teach other opinions, as mysteries, and also this great and hidden one, he himself said, unity is the first principle of all things."

[9] Dr. Cudworth does not cite this passage as it stands in Clemens, but as it is given by Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 5. cap. 24. That this Thearidas was a disciple of Pythagoras is inferred from Jamblichus' Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 36. p. 214. where Θεωρίδης Metapontinus is numbered among the hearers of Pythagoras.

* Strom. 5. p. 611. [p. 728. edit. Potteri.]

[10] Vita Pythagoræ, p. 43. ed. Kusteri.

[1] In explaining the Pythagorean numbers, and investigating their import, it would be easy, were I so disposed, to launch forth into a lengthened and ingenious discussion. But I am deterred by the example of so many men far more learned than myself, who, I perceive, after long and eruidite labours have produced nothing beyond very uncertain conjectures. Jo. Meursius, who in his book De Denario Pythagorico, has collected most of the passages of the ancients respecting these numbers, will convince any one that nothing can be more obscure than the whole subject, and consequently that to spend much time or study in exploring it is the part of a man who makes an unprofitable use of his leisure. I shall therefore content myself with a few observations which I consider may be of assistance to those who wish to read to some advantage the present disputation of Dr. Cudworth. I. The doctrine of Pythagoras himself ought, I think, to be well distinguished from the sentiments and opinions of his disciples, who, beyond all controversy, have foisted not a few things upon their master, which never entered that philosopher's mind. For as Pythagoras committed nothing to writing, and did not openly declare his mind on all subjects, it followed, as might naturally be expected, that each interpreted his philosophy according to his own fancy, and attributed whatever he himself regarded as truths, to the authority of Pythagoras. That

Pythagoras is generally reported to have held a trinity of divine hypostases; and therefore when St. Cyril[2] affirmeth Pythagoras to have called God ψύχωσιν τῶν ὅλων κύκλων, καὶ

this was the case is shown even by the signal want of unanimity among his disciples, who although very often altogether at variance, nevertheless all appeal to Pythagoras, and cease not to ring their Αὐτὸς ἔφα in our ears. Pythagoras himself was especially devoted to geometry and the mathematical sciences. See, besides many others, Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 26. p. 96. cap. 29. p. 134. &c. Hence he described and defined the elements of natural philosophy by geometrical signs and figures, as men generally are wont to apply the art they most understand and follow, even in other sciences. In what manner he did this we may learn from the Timæus of Plato and Chalcidius' Commentary thereon. Add what Macrobius has written in Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 28. and of the moderns what Herbert of Cherbury, among many others, has said on this subject, De Religione Gentilium, cap. 10. p. 89. &c. He was not content, however, with seeking for geometrical proportion in the nature of things, but supposed that the parent and author of nature had regard also to arithmetical proportion. Wherefore, as in numbers the progression is gradual from that which is simple and one to that which is compound and consists of many, so also in this universe he imagined all things to have flowed from one simple nature, and by gradual increase to have become farther removed from that first simplicity: moreover, that all the classes of nature's works, and also the whole of nature, are contained in the number ten, as being the most perfect. Hence the labour devoted by him to the contemplation of nature was directed to this alone, to show in the first place in what manner all other things were made from one, so that the composition continually increased; and secondly to prove, that the architect of nature nowhere proceeded beyond the number ten. By way of a specimen, the better to understand the latter of these, read, and not only read, but digest, the remarks of Jac. Thomasius on the Antichthon of the Pythagoreans in Observation. Halens, t. 4. obs. 19. p. 373. For my part I should not place much value on this system of philosophizing on nature; nor does Pythagoras seem to me to be any better than a musician or a clockmaker who should attempt to accommodate physical science to the precepts of his art, which every one would at once pronounce to be absurd and preposterous. But we are not here inquiring, what sort of a philosopher Pythagoras was, but what was meant by his numbers. Now what bodies and natural things Pythagoras designated by numbers, I consider neither to be known by any one at the present day, nor indeed to have been known by those who formerly delighted in the name of Pythagoreans; who, being ignorant of their master's true meaning, transferred those numbers some to metaphysical, others to moral, and others to I know not what other subjects, and, entangled in endless subtletics and verbal niceties, betrayed their own ignorance by their disputes and dissensions. That this may not appear strange and incredible to any one, I shall briefly show what I observe is not generally known, that, properly speaking, the philosophy of Pythagoras perished with Pythagoras himself, and that those who after his death wished to be regarded as Pythagoreans were scarcely half Pythagoreans, being the followers of this man in name rather than in reality. That the discipline of Pythagoras, his system of instruction, and every thing else connected therewith, were lost to the world at the same time with himself, and revived by no one afterwards, will not be doubted by those who pay even moderate attention to ancient authors. I shall only speak, therefore, of his philosophy, and shall show by the testimonies of the Pythagoreans themselves, that but a slender report of this survived him. Lysis, one of his own scholars, in an epistle to Hipparchus, written after Pythagoras' death, and still extant, signifies his unwillingness to communicate to any one the precepts of his master, and shows at much length that those who called themselves followers of Pythagoras did not represent even the shadow of his disciples. This epistle has been published by Dr. Tho. Gale among others, Opuscula Veterum Mythologica, p. 736. At such a low ebb was the philosophy of Pythagoras not long after his death. What, therefore, do we suppose befell it afterwards? This is made pretty apparent by Porphyry in his life of

[2] Contra Julianum, lib. 1. cap. 30. But Cyril interprets this saying of Pythagoras differently from the learned Doctor, whose explication, obviously at variance with the Greek words, as given by Cyril, will I fancy, be assented to by no one.

πάντων κίνησιν, "the animation of the whole heavens, and the motion of all things;" adding, that God was not, as some supposed, ἐκτὸς τᾶς διακοσμήσεως, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ὅλος ἐν ὅλῳ, "with-

Pythagoras, p. 52. where he confesses that at the decease of the first disciples of Pythagoras, the whole of his philosophy perished, a very few remnants alone having been preserved in the memory of some individuals. I shall cite some of his words: Τῆς δὲ συμφορᾶς οὕτως κατασχούσης τοὺς ἄνδρας, συνεξέλιπε καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἄῤῥητος ἐν τοῖς στήθεσιν ἔτι φυλαχθεῖσα ἄχρι τότε, μόνων τῶν δυσσυνέτων παρὰ τοῖς ἔξω διαμνημονευομένων· οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου σύγγραμμα ἦν, "When the men were overwhelmed with this calamity, the science also perished along with them, hitherto kept concealed in their breasts, except some few things difficult to be understood, which the auditors of exterior admission retained in the memory. For no writing of Pythagoras was in existence." Porphyry immediately adds, that after the death of Pythagoras his surviving scholars, Lysis, Archippus and others, took every precaution to prevent any of his precepts from becoming public. Therefore, if we are to believe him, all the interior and secret philosophy of Pythagoras died along with himself, nor has any portion of it come down to us except what those whom he did not admit to the mysteries retained by heart, and did not themselves understand. And there can be no doubt at all, that what he taught concerning numbers and the whole of physical science belonged to this interior philosophy. From which we may understand how little hope remains to us of recovering the true form and nature of this lost doctrine. But I shall now give another passage of Porphyry's from the same Life, p. 49. which clearly proves that not only the Pythagorean philosophy generally, but in particular his doctrine concerning numbers perished along with himself: Ἡ μὲν δὴ περὶ τῶν ἀριθμῶν πραγμάτεια τοιαύτη τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις· καὶ διὰ ταύτην πρωτίστην οὖσαν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ταύτην συνέβη σβεσθῆναι, "Such was the use of numbers with the Pythagoreans, and on account of this being a sort of first philosophy it so happened that the philosophy itself perished." Porphyry subjoins other reasons, why this species of philosophy was lost, which I now pass over. If the philosophy of Pythagoras perished on account of the doctrine of numbers, which was its ground-work, being mostly neglected, who, I ask, will deny the philosopher's opinion concerning these numbers to have also perished? Wherefore Jamblichus, in the fourth century after Christ, boasted of having restored to light the philosophy of Pythagoras, hitherto neglected and enveloped in thick darkness, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 1. p. 2. ed. Kusteri. Such being the facts, it must be manifest with what truth we stated that there is no reason why any one should bestow much time and labour upon the investigation of these mysteries, and that the later Pythagoreans, who are relied upon as authorities in this question, are unworthy of the slightest consideration. That the exterior discipline of Pythagoras is for the most part known to us, I admit; but the interior we are obliged to form our judgment of from a few words of certain authors, who were themselves unacquainted with it.

II. To come to Pythagoras' *monad* and *dyad* in particular, the written accounts extant in ancient authors respecting these numbers, may themselves even be taken as a proof, that those decide the most wisely who rank the whole of this science of numbers among the things obliterated by time. Not a few of the ancients consider the *monad* of Pythagoras to be God, and the *dyad*, matter, out of which God created the world. Some of these have been cited by the learned Doctor: but many more might be brought forward, if necessary. Consult J. Meursius' book above mentioned, and to the authors adduced by him add among others, Philo Judæus, De Legibus Specialibus, p. 805. and Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 8. segm. 25. p. 507. 508. Neither is the thing altogether destitute of probability, especially if Pythagoras be supposed to have regarded matter as animated with a certain spirit; which, according to some passages of the ancients, would appear to have been the case. For there seems to have been nothing absurd in comparing matter, which is pervaded by a certain spirit, with the number two, and the mind itself, which digested and disposed this rude matter, with the monad or unity. But if we are to believe others not inferior in age, learning, or intelligence, we shall perhaps be disposed to conclude that what the philosopher called a monad, was rude and ill-digested matter, from the modification of which were produced first the four elements, and afterwards all other bodies. We shall adduce some evidence of this. Hermias, Irris. Philos. Gentil. sect. 16. p. 225. says: Ἀρχὴ τῶν πάντων ἡ μονάς· ἐκ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων αὐτῆς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τὰ στοιχεῖα

out the fabric of the world, but whole in the whole," this seems properly to be understood of that third divine hypostasis of the Pythagoric trinity, namely the eternal Psyche. Again, when God is called in Plutarch,[3] according to Pythagoras, αὐτὸς ὁ νοῦς, "mind itself," this seems to be meant properly of his second hypostasis; the supreme Deity, according to him, being something above mind or intellect. In like manner when in Cicero,[4]

γίνεται, "Unity is the beginning of all things; and from the figures and numbers of this the elements are formed." What can a monad be but matter, if the beginnings of things are produced from its various figures? Nicomachus Gerasenus, in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 187. p. 462. after saying that the Pythagoreans held the μονὰς to be ὕλη *in a certain way* (πῶς), thus proceeds: Πάντα χρήματα μιγνὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς, καὶ πανδοχεὺς λοιπὸν, καὶ χωρητικὴ, καὶ χάος, σύγχυσις, σύγκρασις, ἀλαμπία, "That the same in truth mingles all things, and afterwards receives and contains all, and is chaos, confusion, commixture, darkness." Which words, as must be obvious to every one, can only apply to the first matter, from which all other things flowed. Nor to confess the truth, does this opinion appear to me to be absurd or improbable, especially if we are to form our judgment of the philosophy of Pythagoras from the precepts of his followers, particularly Empedocles. What should hinder us from calling that one matter from which all other things emanated, a monad, if we make up our minds to employ numbers on physical subjects? From this one matter proceeded first the dyad, namely, the two primary elements, water and air. From the concretion of water, the earth was gradually produced: from air sprung fire. Thus we have the quaternary number, which Pythagoras, according to the testimonies of many, laid down as the number of the elements. Now, which of the two opinions is to be preferred, I would fain learn from those who fancy themselves to be very sagacious in exploring the doctrines of the ancients. But most assuredly, if they wish to be guided by truth and reason, they will confess that no one at the present day is able to dispel these doubts and difficulties.

III. The learned Doctor's arguments to show that Pythagoras subjected matter to God, or derived it from the divine essence itself, appear to me to possess little weight. The passage of Alexander, in Laërtius, is too obscure to admit of any thing certain being elicited from it. If it proves any thing, it is this, that Pythagoras placed the so-called dyad below the monad. But it does not explain what he meant by monad and dyad. The saying of Hermias, which we have just noticed, is altogether foreign to the point, the monad, according to it, being the matter from which the elements were generated. The meaning of the passage from Thearidas cannot be decided upon with any certainty, owing to its extreme conciseness; neither is it clear, whether this man was expressing his own sentiments, or those of Pythagoras. But the statement of Porphyry, which is the last quoted, if true, is so far from clearing and exculpating Pythagoras, that it shows him rather to belong to those, who suppose men and animals to have been produced, like the plants, from putrid matter, without any assistance of the Deity; which opinion trenches closely upon the gravest impiety towards God. Let us own the truth. We are not at this day in a condition to estimate the whole of the science and discipline of Pythagoras and other philosophers from a few scattered words of ancient authors. As regards Pythagoras especially, the accounts handed down respecting him are so conflicting, and so various and ambiguous, that any one endowed with even a moderate share of talent, might be able to find in them the precepts and principles of all the philosophers that ever existed. To-day, Pythagoras will appear a Cartesian, should any one of that school so desire; to-morrow, should another not grudge the labour, he will pass over to the school of Gassendi; from which again Spinoza and his party will presently drag him forth, and prove him to have belonged to themselves. Such is the weakness of mankind: what it is permitted us to know, we pass by and disregard, while those things which are shrouded in impenetrable darkness, and as it were, in eternal night, although not at all concerning us, we watch over with intense anxiety and labour, as though they were the riches of Attalus.

[3] De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881. This explication also, together with all that is here brought forward, will with difficulty be assented to.

[4] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 2895. tom. 9. opp.

Pythagoras' opinion concerning the Deity is thus represented: Deum esse animum per naturam rerum omnium intentum et commeantem, ex quo animi nostri carperentur, "That God was a mind passing through the whole nature of things, from whom our souls were, as it were, decerped or cut out;" and again: Ex universa mente divina delibato esse animos nostros: this in all probability was to be understood also either of the third or second divine hypostasis, and not of the first, which was properly called by him τὸ ἓν and μό[illegible] and "Monad;" and also, as Plutarch[5] tells us, [illegible] oodness itself." Aristotle[6] plainly affirmeth, tha[illegible] ancient theologers amongst the Pagans made ἔρ[illegible] o be the first principle of all things, that is, the s[illegible] and we have already showed, that Orpheus was o[illegible] when ἔρως πολυτερπὴς and πολύμητις, "delight[illegible] at which is not blind, but full of wisdom and c[illegible] by him to be αὐτοτελὲς and πρεσβύτατον, "self-[illegible] he oldest of all things," it is plain, that he suppos[illegible] hing less than the supreme Deity. Wherefore since Pythagoras is generally affirmed to have followed the Orphic principles, we may from hence presume, that he did it in this also. Though it be very true that Plato, who called the supreme Deity τἀγαθὸν, as well as Pythagoras, did dissent from the Orphic theology in this, and would not acknowledge Love for a name of the supreme Deity; as when in his Symposion in the person of Agatho he speaks thus: Φαίδρῳ πολλὰ ἄλλα ὁμολογῶν, τοῦτο οὐχ ὁμολογῶ, ὡς Ἔρως Κρόνου καὶ Ἰαπετοῦ ἀρχαιότερός ἐστιν· ἀλλά φημι νεώτατον αὐτὸν εἶναι θεῶν, καὶ ἀεὶ νέον, "Though I should readily grant to Phædrus many other things, yet I cannot consent to him in this, that Love was older than Saturn and Iapet; but on the contrary I do affirm him to be the youngest of the gods, as he is always youthful." They who made Love older than Saturn as well as Iapet, supposed it to be the supreme Deity; wherefore Plato here on the contrary affirms Love not to be the supreme Deity or Creator of all, but a creature; a certain junior god, or indeed, as he afterwards adds, not so much a god as a demon, it being a thing which plainly implies imperfection in it. "Love (saith he) is a philosopher, whereas θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ σοφὸς γενέσθαι, ἔστι γὰρ, no god philosophizeth, nor desires to be made wise, because he is so already." Agreeably with which doctrine of his, Plotinus[7] determines, that Love is peculiar to that middle rank of beings called souls: Πᾶσα ψυχὴ,

[5] De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881.

[6] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 267. tom. 4. opp. See ch. 3. sect. 18. and what we have there remarked.

[7] De Bono et Uno, Ennead. 6. lib. 9. cap. 12. p. 768. Compare the same Plotinus in a specific treatise, De Amore, Ennead. 3. lib. 5. p. 291.

'Αφροδίτη· καὶ τοῦτο αἰνίττεται καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης γενέθλια, καὶ ὁ ἔρως ὁ μετ' αὐτῆς γενόμενος· ἐρᾷ οὖν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα ψυχὴ θεοῦ, ἐνωθῆναι θέλουσα, ὥσπερ παρθένος καλὴ πρὸς καλὸν ἄνδρα· ὅταν δὲ εἰς γένεσιν ἐλθοῦσα, οἷον μνηστείαις ἀπατηθῇ, ἄλλον ἀρξαμένη θνητὸν ἔρωτα, ἐρημίᾳ πατρὸς ὑβρίζεται, &c. "Every Soul is a Venus, which is also intimated by Venus' nativity, and Love's being begotten with her: wherefore the soul being in its right natural state loves God, desiring to be united with him, which is a pure, heavenly and virgin love; but when it descends to generation, being courted with these amorous allurements here below, and deceived by them, it changeth that its divine and heavenly love for another mortal one: but if it again shake off these lascivious and wanton loves, and keep itself chaste from them, returning back to its own father and original, it will be rightly affected as it ought." But the reason of this difference betwixt the Orpheists and Plato, that the former made Love to be the oldest of all the gods, but the latter to be a junior god or demon, proceeded only from an equivocation in the word Love. For Plato's Love was the daughter of Penia, that is, poverty and indigency, together with a mixture of Πόρος, or "riches;" and being so as it were compounded of plenty and poverty, was in plain language no other than the love of desire, which, as Aristotle affirmeth, is μετὰ λύπης, "accompanied with grief and pain." But that Orphic and Pythagoric love was nothing else but πόρος and εὐπορία, "infinite riches and plenty, a love of redundancy and overflowing fulness, delighting to communicate itself," which was therefore said to be the oldest of all things and the most perfect, that is, the supreme Deity; according to which notion also, in the Scripture itself, God seems to be called love, though the word be not there ἔρως, but ἀγάπη. But to say the truth, Parmenides' love (however made a principle somewhere by Aristotle[8]) seems to be neither exactly the same with the Orphic, nor yet with the Platonic love, it being not the supreme Deity, and yet the first of the created gods; which appears from Simplicius[9] connecting these two verses of his together in this manner:

Ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τούτων δαίμων, ὃς πάντα κυβερνᾶ,

αὐτὴν καὶ θεῶν αἰτίαν εἶναί φησι, λέγων,

Πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσσατο πάντων·

"In the midst of these elements is that God which governeth all things, and whom Parmenides affirmeth to be the cause of gods, writing thus: God first of all created Love, before the other gods."

[8] Physic. lib. 1. cap. 2. 3. p. 446. tom. 1. opp. Add Metaphysic. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 269.

[9] Comment. in Aristotelis Physica, p. 152. ed Græcæ Aldinæ.

Wherefore by this love of Parmenides is understood nothing else, but the lower soul of the world, together with a plastic nature, which, though it be the original of motion and activity in this corporeal world, yet is it but a secondary or created god; before whose production, necessity is said by those Ethnic theologers to have reigned: the true meaning whereof seems to be this, that before that divine spirit moved upon the waters, and brought things into an orderly system, there was nothing but the necessity of material motions, unguided by any orderly wisdom or method [illegible] is, by love) in that confused and floating chaos.[10]

But Pythagoras, [illegible] d not only call the supreme Deity a Monad, but [illegible] or Tetractys: for it is generally affirmed, that [illegible] himself was wont to swear hereby: though Porp[illegible] blichus and others, write that the disciples of P[illegible] e by Pythagoras, who had delivered to them [illegible] Cabala of this Tetractys. Which Tetractys als[illegible] verses is called πηγὴ ἀενάου φύσεως "the fountain of the eternal nature," an expression, that cannot properly belong to any thing but the supreme Deity. And thus Hierocles:[1] Οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὃ μὴ τῆς τετρακτύος, ὡς ῥίζης, καὶ ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται· ἔστι γάρ, ὡς ἔφαμεν, δημιουργὸς τῶν

[10] That the Pythagoreans attributed great power and importance to the ternary number, and asserted all things to be compounded of three, is shown both from many other passages of ancient authors, collected by J. Meursius, in his Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 5. p. 35. and especially from the clear testimony of Aristotle, De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 610. tom. 1. opp. But I am ignorant, I own, where it is made to appear, that this sect together with their master ranked God also among those things which are comprised in these, nor do I understand upon what foundation the Pythagorean trinity rests for its support. If what most ancient authors inform us of be true, that the reason, why so much importance was attached in this school, to the ternary number, was, because all things have a beginning, middle, and end, we must exempt the Deity from this class of things, to which the triad is sacred, inasmuch as he is without beginning, middle, and end, and is wholly simple and one. As to its being stated that Pythagoras was a disciple of Orpheus, and that Orpheus acknowledged three persons or natures in God, this with me has very little weight. For, supposing Pythagoras to have borrowed his precepts from the Orphic poems; which, however, I consider to admit of dispute, although Jamblichus, De Vita Pythagoræ, cap. 21. p. 127. and others forbid us to doubt it; what is advanced on the subject of the three principles of Orpheus, is, as I have already shown above, so lame and unsatisfactory, that few wise men will be found to assent to it. No greater value do I attach to the testimonies of the junior Platonists, who are wont also to number Pythagoras among the patrons of their three principles. If we are to abide by their authority, we must confound the whole of the doctrines of ancient philosophers, whom they are accustomed to force into their own camp and to make the unwilling champions of their own principles. I pass over what is here advanced respecting the Orphic and Platonic love. For I have already bestowed some attention upon the subject, ch. 3. and, to confess the truth, regard the whole of the accounts on this subject, met with in ancient authors, who neither agree among themselves nor in all instances understand their own meaning, as resembling idle and visionary trifles rather than the opinions and precepts of philosophy. In explaining and elucidating which matters, were a wise man to expend much labour, he would be acting like those who undertake to turn dust into gold, or who construe the words of the sick into infallible oracles.

[1] Comment. in Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ. p. 170. 171.

ὅλων, καὶ αἰτία ἡ Τετρὰς, Θεὸς νοητὸς, αἴτιος τοῦ οὐρανίου, καὶ αἰσθητοῦ Θεοῦ, "There is nothing in the whole world, which doth not depend upon the Tetractys, as its root and principle. For the Tetrad is, as we have already said, the maker of all things; the intelligible God, the cause of the heavenly and sensible God," that is, of the animated world or heaven. Now the latter Pythagoreans and Platonists[c] endeavour to give reasons why God should be called Tetras or Tetractys, from certain mysteries in that number four, as for example; First, because the Tetrad is δύναμις δεκάδος, "the power of the Decad," it virtually containing the whole Decad in it, which is all numbers or beings; but the bottom of this mystery is no more than this, that one, two, three, four, added all together, make up ten. Again, because the Tetrad is an arithmetic mediety betwixt the Monad and the Hebdomad; which Monad and Hebdomad are said to agree in this, that as the Monad is ingenit or unmade, it being the original and fountain of all numbers, so is the Hebdomad said to be, not only παρθένος, but ἀμήτωρ, "a motherless," as well as "virgin number." Wherefore, the Tetrad lying in the middle betwixt the ingenit Monad, and the motherless virgin Hebdomad; and it being both begotten and begetting, say they, must needs be a very mysterious number, and fitly represent the Deity. Whereas indeed it was therefore unfit to represent the Deity, because it is begotten by the multiplication of another number; as the Hebdomad therefore doth not very fitly symbolize with it neither, because it is barren or begets nothing at all within the Decad, for which cause it is called a virgin. Again, it is further added, that the Tetrad fitly resembles that which is solid, because, as a point answers to a Monad, and a line to a Dyad, and a superficies to a Triad, (the first and most simple figure being a triangle;) so the Tetrad properly represents the solid, the first pyramid being found in it. But upon this consideration, the Tetrad could not be so fit a symbol of the incorporeal Deity, neither as of the corporeal world. Wherefore these things being all so trifling, slight, and fantastical, and it being really absurd for Pythagoras to call his Monad a Tetrad; the late conjecture of some learned men amongst us[3] seems to be much more probable, that Pythagoras' Tetractys was really

[2] This applies principally to Hierocles, in whose commentary on the golden verses, the explications of the tetrad, which follow, are propounded.

[3] He means Jo. Selden and Theoph. Gale, who maintained this opinion, the former De Diis Syris Syntag. 2. cap. 1. p. 209. 210. and the latter in a learned book, entitled, The Court of the Gentiles, or a Discourse touching the Original of Human Literature, Oxon. 1672. 4. par. 2. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 147. Perhaps also the same was held by other British writers, whose works have not reached us. Dr. Henry More, a learned friend of Dr. Cudworth's, in the Append. ad Defensionem Cabbalæ Philosoph. Sam. Andreæ Oppositam. cap. 2. p. 124. neither wholly rejects nor adopts the opinion, but takes, as it were, an intermediate station between the advocates of the respective sides.

nothing else but the Tetragrammaton, or that proper name of the supreme God amongst the Hebrews, consisting of four letters or consonants. Neither ought it to be wondered at, that Pythagoras (who besides his travelling into Egypt, Persia, and Chaldea, and his sojourning at Sidon, is affirmed by Josephus, Porphyrius, and others, to have conversed with the Hebrews also[4]) should be so well acquainted with the Hebrew Tetragrammaton, since it was not unknown to the Hetrurians and Latins, their Jove being certainly nothing el[illegible] And indeed, it is the opinion of some philologers,[5] that eve[illegible] Verses themselves, notwith-

[4] Of this opinion are ma[illegible] ng whom will be found, Hugo Grotius, Observat. ad lib. 1. De Ve[illegible] ianæ, p. 72. and J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 2. cap[illegible] ppose Pythagoras to have derived whatever true doctrine he [illegible] d divine things from the Jews. To omit others, Dr. Cudworth' [illegible], Dr. Henry More, in his Cabbala Philosophica, and his defen[illegible] as left no stone unturned, in order to establish the truth of this [illegible], equally talented and erudite, have proved by no mean argume[illegible] e is to be placed upon the accounts respecting Pythagoras' inter[illegible] See J. Alb. Fabricius, ibid. p. 450. who takes the same view. [illegible] passage of Hermippus, in Josephus, which is principally relied [illegible] of the opposite opinion, the learned J. Le Clerc has suggested, that Josephus erroneously read Ἰουδαίων for Ἰδαίων, Not. ad Grotium de Verit. Relig. Christ. p. 72. and in my opinion, not without probability. At all events, it is certain that Pythagoras sojourned among the Idæans in Crete, on which, consult J. Marsham, Canon Chronic. sæc. 10. p. 256.

[5] Their opinion, however, has been criticized at some length by Dr. Hen. More, Append. ad Defensionem Philos. Cabbalæ, cap. 2. p. 125. &c. whose words, as eminently illustrative of this subject, it will not be amiss to quote. Thus, then, he writes: Interea loci non abs re fore puto, eos Philologos aggredi, quorum meminit eruditus auctor Systematis mundi intellectualis, qui juramentum in disticho Pythagorico per Tetractyn sive Tetragrammaton fieri statuunt, hoc est, per Jehovam, nomine Dei pro ipso Deo posito juxta illud Rabbinorum dictum: הוא שמו ושמו הוא, *Ipse nomen suum est, suumque nomen ipse*: ac si sensus istorum verborum:

> Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως,

hic esset: per Tetragrammaton sive Jehovam, qui communicavit se ipsum sive fontem æternæ naturæ nostris animabus, quippe secundum doctrinam Pythagoricam ex mente divina carptis et delibatis. Ad Philologos igitur istos respondeo. Primo tinnulum istud reciprocumque Rabbinorum dictum, sensu politico et forsan magis arcano mysticoque intelligendum, perperam heic et quasi obtorto, quod aiunt, collo, ad fœdissimam solœcismum grammaticum defendendum vel invitum trahi. Neque enim illud dictum Rabbinicum sensu grammatico accipiendum est ad absonas excusandas ἀσυνταξίας, sed ad significandum, ubi nomen Jehovah alicui personæ imponitur, non esse inane nomen in Scriptura, sed rem ipsam subesse: ut, ubi angelus fœderis et dux Israëlitarum Jehovah dicitur, Jehovam ipsum isti personæ subesse innuit, ac re vera fuisse Christum animamve Messiæ æterno Logo conjunctam esse, &c. Ut omittam, nomen et rem, vocari et esse idem frequenter apud Hebræos significare, adeo, ut ex communi isto linguæ Hebraicæ idiotismo dictum illud Rabbinicum multis in locis exponi possit: quem tamen idiotismum omnes syntaxios leges irritas facere, nemo sanus statuerit. Deinde, quod et supra monui, ne Tetragrammaton quidem, multoque minus Tetractys, est nomen Dei, sed Jehovah: adeo ut demirari satis nequeam horum oscitantium Philologorum, qui tam incondita et male cohærentia insomnia orbi litterato propinant, nec Tetractyn sive Τετράδα, perinde atque reliquos numeros Pythagoricos, symbola esse permittunt; (ut certe Hierocles eo loco, urbi ait; Ἔστι γὰρ δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων καὶ αἰτία ἡ τετρὰς, θεὸς νοητὸς, &c. symbolum pro re signata ponit) sed propria nomina volunt esse, immo res ipsas, quorum tantum symbola sunt sive repertoria μνημονευτικά: quum luce profecto clarius sit, Tetractyn

standing the seeming repugnancy of the syntax, it is not Pythagoras, that is sworn by, but this Tetractys or Tetragrammaton; that is Jovah or Jehovah, the name of God being put for

non esse nomen Dei, sed Tetragrammati repositorium dumtaxat, uti et aliorum mysteriorum, quorum sit idoneum symbolum. Ac proinde, quomodo, (ipse nomen suum est, suumque nomen ipse) quum Tetractys nomen ipsius non sit, nedum ipse Deus, crassum illum solœcismum excusare possit, ego quidem nequaquam video. Tertio, si (παραδόντα) essentiæ divinæ animabus humanis communicationem sive μεράδοσιν significare debuisset, vocabulum μεταδόντα, non παραδόντα, adhibitum fuisset, quum usitatissima vocis παραδοῦναι significatio ad doctrinam mysteriorumve traditionem pertineat: quo sensu non ego solum, sed alii plerique omnes hoc in loco accipiunt. Quarto, si παραδόντα idem heic sonet, atque μεταδόντα, et (παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως) ipsam divinam essentiam indigitet, nostris animabus, quippe ex mente divina carptis et delibatis, communicatam, id quidem admodum durum paradoxum est, et doctrinæ Pythagoricæ omnique sanæ sapientiæ contrarium. Dum enim animos nostros ex mente divina carptos esse ac delibatos supponit, mentem divinam supponit discerpibilem, ac proinde, corpoream, adeo ut Philologi isti, qui huic sententiæ favent, philologia multo plus pollere videantur, quam solida ratione aut acumine philosophico. Quinto denique plena formula juramenti Pythagorici sic est:

Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως, ῥίζωμά τ' ἔχουσαν,

quemadmodum reperitur apud Sextum Empiricum, passimque apud alios scriptores: nec probabile est primitus plenum non fuisse distichon; (nisi monostichon solummodo fuerit) cujus igitur sensus hic foret secundum istos Philologos:

Non per Tetractyn, qui animæ nostræ communicavit
Fontem æternæ naturæ, radicemque habentem.

Qui sensus plane mancus est et imperfectus, quum plenus et nativus sensus sit, idemque noster:

Non per eum, qui animæ nostræ tradidit Tetractyn,
Fontem perennis naturæ radicemque habentem.

Hic sensus plenus est, concinnus et perspicuus: alter vero, præterquam quod mancus, falsus est præterea. Neque enim fons æternæ naturæ, Deus utique ipse, radicem habet, unde pullulet, set radix ipsa est rerum quidem omnium. Atque hæc breviter ad confutandam hanc absonam opinionem dictorum Philologorum operæ pretium putabam afferre, quum eruditissimus vir, ad alia properans, eam tantummodo proponere contentus esset, confutationem vero illius ipsi visum sit prætermittere; quippe quam forsan vix dignam confutatione putavit, præsertim si cum simplici nostra juramenti Pythagorici interpretatione conferatur, "Meanwhile it will not, I consider, be foreign to our purpose, to notice those philologers mentioned by the learned author of the Intellectual System of the Universe, who decide that in the Pythagoric distich it is the Tetractys or Tetragrammaton that is sworn by, that is Jehovah, the name of the Deity being put for the Deity himself, according to the rabbinical saying: 'He is his name and his name is He,' as though the meaning of the words in this distich were this: 'By the Tetragrammaton or Jehovah, who hath communicated himself or the fountain of the eternal nature to our souls,' as being according to the Pythagorean doctrine carved and culled out of the divine mind. To these philologers therefore I reply. In the first place, this jingling and reciprocating saying of the rabbins, which is to be understood in a political and probably in a more hidden and mystical sense, is here erroneously and forcibly dragged in to defend the foulest grammatical solecism. For this saying is not to be taken in a grammatical sense to excuse harsh ἀσυνταξίαι, but to signify, when the name Jehovah is applied to any person, that it is not in scripture an idle name, but that the thing itself is understood by it: as, where the angel of the covenant and the leader of the Israelites is called Jehovah, it implies that Jehovah himself was the person understood, and that it was in reality Christ or the soul of the Messiah combined with the eternal Logos, &c. setting aside, that the name and the thing, to be called and to be, with the Hebrews frequently mean the same;

God himself, according to that received doctrine of the Hebrews, שמו הוא הוא ושמו, "that God and his name were all one;" as if the meaning of those words,

> Ναὶ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα Τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως,——

were this: "By the Tetragrammaton or Jovah, who hath communicated [himself or] the fountain of the eternal nature" to our human souls; for these, according to the Pythagoric doctrine,

according to which common idiom of the Hebrew language, that rabbinical saying is in many places to be explained. And yet no sensible man will say that this idiom does away with all the laws of syntax. Secondly, as I have hinted above, not even the Tetragrammaton, much less the Tetractys, is the name of God, but Jehovah: so that I cannot sufficiently admire the carelessness of these philologers, who propose such ill-concocted and inconsistent conceits to the literary world, and do not permit the Tetractys or Τετρὰς, like the other Pythagoric numbers, to be symbols (as Hierocles at least, in the passage, where he says: 'The tetrad, or intelligible God, is the framer and cause of all things,' &c. puts the symbol for the thing signified); but will have them to be proper names, nay, things themselves, of which they are merely the symbols or mnemoneutic repositories: it being as clear as noon-day that the Tetractys is not the name of God, but only the repository of the Tetragrammaton, as also of other mysteries, of which it may be the appropriate symbol. And, therefore, how the saying, 'He is his name and his name is He,' inasmuch as the Tetractys is not the name of God, much less God himself, can excuse this crude solecism, I am at a loss to know. Thirdly, if παραδόντα had been intended to mean the communication of the divine essence to our souls or μετάδοσις, the word μεταδόντα, not παραδόντα, would have been used, as the most common signification of the word παραδοῦναι relates to the teaching or imparting of mysteries, in which sense not I alone, but almost all others, understand it in this passage. Fourthly, if παραδόντα here signifies the same as μεταδόντα, and παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως implies the divine essence itself, communicated to our souls as being delibations of the divine mind, this is altogether a harsh paradox and repugnant to the Pythagorean doctrine and to all sound wisdom. For, by supposing our souls to be carved and cut out of the divine mind, it supposes the divine mind to be divisible, and therefore corporeal; so that the philologers who favour this opinion seem to excel much more in philology than in sound reason or philosophical acumen. Lastly, the full form of the Pythagoric oath is as follows:

> Οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτὺν
> Παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως, ῥίζωμα τ' ἔχουσαν,

as it is found in Sextus Empiricus and every where in other authors: nor is it probable, that in the first instance it was not a complete distich (unless it were only a monostich): the sense of which therefore according to these philologers would be this:

> 'By the Tetractys, who hath communicated to our soul
> The fountain of the eternal nature, and having root.'

Which is obviously lame and defective. We translate as follows:

> 'By him, who hath imparted to our soul the Tetractys,
> The fountain of the eternal nature and having root.'

This sense is full, compact and clear; but the other, besides being defective, is also false. For the fountain of the eternal nature, or God himself, has no root, from which he springs, but is himself the root of all things.——Thus much I have thought it worth while to advance in confutation of the absurd opinion of the philologers above mentioned, as the learned Dr. Cudworth contented himself with simply noticing it in passing without stopping to refute it; considering it probably as unworthy of confutation, especially when compared with our simple interpretation of the Pythagoric oath."

were said to be ex mente divina carptæ et delibatæ,[6] i. e. nothing but derivative streams from that first fountain of the divine mind.[7]

[6] The words are Cicero's, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2895.

[7] If I had much leisure and was willing to consume it to little purpose, I might here commence a long disputation on the Pythagoric Tetractys; might enumerate the vast variety of opinions of learned men respecting it; might comment, as it would be easy to do, upon each of these; and lastly, might advance new conjectures of my own, or, if so disposed, confess the whole subject to be so perplexed and intricate, as to be altogether incapable of explication. But there are grave reasons to dissuade me from this. For why unnecessarily feed my readers with empty air? I shall content myself with a few observations, from which wise and learned men will perceive, that many, perhaps insuperable, difficulties are to be cleared away, before any satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at on this question. I. Those who are desirous of becoming acquainted with the various opinions of the learned on the quaternary number of Pythagoras, may consult Jac. Thomasius, De Exustione Mundi Stoica diss. 21. p. 251. &c. Jo. Meursius, Denar. Pythagoric. cap. 6. p. 45. &c. Theod. Marcilius, Not. ad Aurea Carmina Pythagoræ, p. 345. &c. Luc. Holstenius, Observationes ad Porphyrii Vitam Pythagoræ, p. 28. Henr. More, Append. ad Defensionem Cabbalæ Philosoph. cap. 2. p. 122. &c. J. Fr. Hombergk, De Themide seu Ortu Legis Æternæ, p. 148. &c., and many others, whom it is unnecessary to enumerate. Any one who contemplates so many discordant opinions, will be led by the very inconsistency of learned men to conclude, that the truth here lies at the bottom of a well and cannot easily be drawn out of it.

II. Learned men are right in supposing, that there is nothing from which we shall be better able to ascertain, what this Tetractys or quaternary number was, or to what it was applied by Pythagoras, than the Pythagorean oath, in which the Tetractys was appealed to. Hence those who handle this subject are accustomed to direct their chief efforts to the explication of this oath. But, if I may be allowed to measure the capabilities of others by my own, there are many things to prevent this from being accomplished successfully and without risk of error. In the first place, it is uncertain, how the two verses which contain this oath are to be read. For ancient authors do not exhibit them in the same form, but are incredibly at variance with each other: on which, besides the writers above mentioned, see J. Alb. Fabricius, Notæ ad Sextum Empiricum, p. 332. And who will arrogate to himself the possession of such critical acumen as to think himself qualified to sit in judgment on this controversy, and to determine upon the reading that is to be adopted? For my part, on well considering the matter, I avow my inability to come to any conclusion; nor should I wish to be arbiter in the dispute for example, whether in the first verse ψυχᾷ, as some of the ancients have it, or γενεᾷ, or στέρνοισι, as in Julian, or σοφίας, the reading of Jamblichus, or ζωῆς, that of Methodius, is to be preferred. Nor is the discord less among modern scholars, or more likely to be put an end to, as to the manner in which the words are to be construed and distinguished. Who therefore will be able to settle the meaning of verses, the true reading of which, no less than their construction and distinction, will be subjects of controversy so long as men shall be found willing to engage in it. For suppose us to have reasonable grounds for expectation, that some acute explorer may clear his way out of these critical and grammatical questions, still other and those not slighter difficulties will arise. First of all, it must be ascertained, whether the Pythagoreans swore by the Tetractys itself, or by him who communicated the Tetractys to souls. Whether you take the one or the other of these opinions, you will be able to support it by high ancient authorities. And Jac. Palmerius, I remember, spent much labour upon the solution of this question, Exercitat. ad Græcos quosdam Auctores, p. 228. while Ludolph Kuster, on the other hand, Not. ad Jamblichi Vitam Pythagor. p. 127. considers it to be a matter not worth entering into; because the Pythagoreans were accustomed to swear as well by the Tetractys as by its inventor. Nor do Luc. Holstenius, Not. ad Porphyrii Vitam Pythagor. p. 28. and Theod. Marcilius, Ad Aurea Carmina, p. 344. much dissent from this opinion. For my part, however, there is, I conceive, as much difference between swearing by the Tetractys and by the inventor of the Tetractys, as by the sun and by God who made the sun; nor can I well understand, how the two can be associated together, or both have place in the verses containing this oath. But

Wherefore we shall now sum up all concerning Pythagoras in this conclusion of St. Cyril's:* Ἰδοὺ δὴ σαφῶς, ἕνα τε εἶναι λέγει τὸν τῶν ὅλων Θεὸν, καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν, ἐργάτην τε τῶν αὐτοῦ

I will be liberal, and grant that there is a period put also to this controversy: not even so will all things be plain. If we assent to those, who suppose the Pythagoreans to have sworn by the inventor or author of the quaternion, we shall have again to consider who this inventor was, God or Pythagoras. The former appears more probable, and is the view taken by many very grave authors, both ancient and modern. But it is rejected by almost the whole of those, who commented formerly on the Pythagoreans and their institutions: by Sextus Empiricus, by Hierocles, and many others: who indeed all agree, that the followers of Pythagoras swore by their master. It certainly seems ludicrous, and altogether foreign to the character of wise men, such as those were desirous of appearing, for mortal to swear by mortal, the disciples by their defunct master. But nothing, it may be said, is too gross and absurd for those sometimes to be guilty of, who affect the reputation of superior wisdom. Nor would I venture to determine this dispute, as I am unable to say which side has the balance of testimony in its favour. But come, let us suppose some one able to find his way out of these difficulties also, and a new controversy will then start up, which I doubt whether any one will speedily decide. Haste, ye philologists and grammarians, and consider, what meaning we are to attach to the phrase: to impart the Tetractys to the soul. It is capable, I observe, of two significations. First: to imbue the soul with the doctrine of the Tetractys, whatever this may be. And this exposition is adopted by not a few, the most learned Dr. Hen. More especially. Secondly: to impart to the soul four properties, virtues, or affections: to which opinion, again, a long train both of ancients and moderns are favourable. Which of the two interpretations is the true one, I confess myself to be ignorant; nor in my opinion do those know, who espouse either the one or the other, however anxious they may be to appear to know. If there were any one who could divest our minds of all doubts on this point also, he would still be exposed to new queries, and be asked, what were those four virtues or affections of the soul, or what that doctrine of the Tetractys said to be communicated to souls. On this there are as many opinions as there are heads, and we may as soon expect an agreement among clocks as among those, who have consumed their leisure on this question. Another dispute will arise upon the words παγὰν ἀενάου φύσεως. It is doubtful, whether they are to be referred to him who sent the Tetractys into souls, or to the Tetractys itself. Either can be done consistently with the laws of grammar, and each opinion finds its supporters among learned men. For myself, I remain undecided, not feeling myself influenced by the arguments of either party. Such are the difficulties besetting the opinions of those, who make the Pythagoreans to have sworn by him who imparted the Tetractys to the souls of mortals; difficulties of which I do not find, nor perceive that others more ingenious than myself have found, any solution. Nor again will there be less to perplex us, if we adopt the view of those who consider this sect to have sworn by the Tetractys itself. For not only here also will the chief part of the questions I have just enumerated unceasingly torture us, but we shall moreover be unable to distinguish, in the vast variety of conjectures, what is the nature of that Tetractys which was held so sacred by the Pythagoreans. One affirms it to be God, another the Hebrew name of God, a third the soul of the world, a fourth the first elements of things, a fifth four affections of the soul, and so on. Neither does any one of them bring forward a single argument to justify an unhesitating assent, but all on the contrary follow the phantasms of their own minds alone, and indulge in the vaguest surmises. This discussion I have thought proper to pursue to somewhat greater length, in order to add weight to what I advanced a little above, that the whole doctrine of numbers, as taught by the Samian philosopher is lost; and at the same time to warn learned men not to grow old in the investigation of subjects so involved in uncertainty, or to suppose themselves to know more than they really do; errors which are wont to bring much contempt, as well upon literature and the arts, as upon their professors.

III. As to the conjecture in particular of Selden, Cudworth, and others, that the Tetractys is the name of Jehovah, which consists of four letters, it has already been handled sufficiently by Dr. More in the passage above quoted. In very recent

* Con. Jul. lib. 1. [P. 30.]

δυνάμεων, φωστῆρα καὶ ψύχωσιν, ἤτοι ζωοποίησιν τῶν ὅλων καὶ κύκλων πάντων κίνησιν· παρῆκται δὲ τὰ πάντα παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι κίνησιν λαχόντα φαίνεται, "Behold we see clearly, that Pythagoras held there was one God of the whole universe, the principle and cause of all things, the illuminator, animator, and quickener of the whole, and original of

times also Jo. Fr. Hombergk, De Themide, p. 155. &c. has repudiated it, not to speak of Jac. Thomasius, Georg. Horn and others. It rests solely upon the opinion of those, who suppose Pythagoras to have conversed with the Jews, and to have imbibed their doctrines. From which opinion if all credit and authority be withdrawn, as I have above shown to have been done by learned men, the conjecture itself falls to the ground at the same time.

IV. Lest, however, any one should complain that I am qualified to confound every thing and to depreciate the labours of learned men, but unable myself to drag truth from its hiding-place, I shall now expound my own view of this oath and claim for myself the last place among conjecturers and diviners. In the first place I assume, what Jamblichus in his Theologumena Arithmetica, p. 20. has left on record, that Empedocles was the author of this oath. This Empedocles believed the whole nature of things to consist of four elements. His verses, in which he explains this doctrine, are well known, beginning as follows:

Τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε,

"In the first place hear of four roots of all things."

See Plutarch, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 828. Now this doctrine had been handed down from his master Pythagoras, who is likewise said to have referred all things to four elements. See Diogenes Laërtius. lib. 8. segm. 25. p. 508. And these very elements or principles of things the disciples of Pythagoras were accustomed to call Tetras or Tetractys; which is proved as well by many other things as by these verses preserved by Proclus from the hymn of the Pythagoreans, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 96. and lib. 3. p. 155:

Τετράδ' ἐπὶ ζαθέην, ἣ δὴ τέκε μητέρα πάντων
Ἄτρομον, ἀκάματον δεκάδα κλείουσι μὲν ἁγνήν,

"Till the divine Tetrad existed, which brought forth the mother of all things,
Immoveable, unwearied: they call her the sacred Decad."

The sense is plain: that from the four elements was produced the whole nature of things, which resembles the perfect number or Decad. Empedocles held, moreover, that there is a double soul in man, the one sentient and percipient, the other rational, as we have copiously shown above on ch. 1. sect. 24. The sentient and percipient soul he supposed to have been compounded by God out of the four elements, and hence to be enabled to perceive all those elements placed externally to it. See what we have observed on ch. 1. sect. 14. If all these things be combined and diligently examined together, it will, I conceive, become very probable, that the meaning of this Pythagorean oath was as follows: "We swear by the God, who gave to us a soul, compounded and formed of the four elements, by which we see, perceive, and distinguish all things; which Tetras of elements is the fountain of eternal nature and the alone cause, from which all other things flowed." Certainly if we conclude the Τετρακτὺς in these verses to be the four elements, we shall best understand the meaning of the words, πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως. For, that the Pythagoreans so termed the four first principles of things, is manifest from the passages adduced. Nevertheless, the junior Pythagoreans, I consider, erroneously supposed this oath to pertain to Pythagoras, by whom the Tetras, or doctrine of the Tetras, was first invented. I arrogate nothing, nor do I favour myself so far as to wish every one to adopt this conjecture. I am certain, however, that it is no less probable than the rest of those advanced by learned men on the subject. Let each one enjoy his opinion; for we are not disputing upon a matter of vital importance.

motion; from whom all things were derived, and brought out of nonentity into being."

Next to Pythagoras, in order of time, was Xenophanes the Colophonian, the head of the Eleatic sect of philosophers, who, that he was an assertor both of many gods and one God, sufficiently appears from that verse of his before cited, and attested both by Clemens Alexandrinus,[8] and Sextus the philosopher.

Εἷς Θεὸς ἔν τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστος,

"There is one God, the greatest both amongst gods and men." Concerning which greatest God, this other verse of Xenophanes is also vouched:[9]

Καὶ ἀπάνευθε πονοῖο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει,

"That he moveth the whole world without any labour or toil, merely by mind." Besides which, Cicero[10] and others tell us, that this Xenophanes, philosophizing concerning the supreme Deity, was wont to call it, ἓν καὶ πᾶν, "one and all," as being one most simple Being, that virtually containeth all things. But Xenophanes' theosophy, or divine philosophy, is most fully declared by Simplicius out of Theophrastus, in this manner:* Μίαν δέ τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἤτοι ἓν τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶν, καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον, οὔτε ἄπειρον, οὔτε κινούμενον, οὔτε ἠρεμοῦν, Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαί φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος· ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας, τὴν μνήμην τῆς τούτου δόξης· τὸ γὰρ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ πᾶν τὸν Θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· ὃν ἕνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι· πλειόνων γάρ φησιν ὄντων, ὁμοίως ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ ἄριστον, Θεός· ἀγέννητον δὲ ἐδείκνυεν——καὶ οὔτε δὲ ἄπειρον, οὔτε πεπερασμένον εἶναι· διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν, ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον, μήτε μέσον, μήτε τέλος· περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ, καὶ τὴν ἠρεμίαν· ἀκίνητον μὲν, &c., "Theophrastus affirmeth, that Xenophanes the Colophonian, Parmenides' master, made one principle of all things, he calling it one and all, and determining it to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense) and neither moving nor resting. Which Theophrastus also declares, that Xenophanes in this did not write as a natural

[8] Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. from whom Eusebius quotes this verse, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 13. cap. 13. p. 678. But the learned Doctor is wrong in saying, that it occurs also in Sextus, having been misled by Hen. Stephanus, who states so in his Poësis Philosoph. p. 36. Ægid. Menagius, Comm. in Diogenem Laërtius, p. 400. has through a lapse of memory fallen into the same error, erroneously attributing Clement's own words to Sextus, with whom nothing of the kind is to be found.

[9] But this let others try to find, who have plenty of leisure; as I have in vain looked for it in many ancient authors, including the remains of the poems of Xenophanes collected by Hen. Stephanus in his Poës. Philosoph. p, 35. &c.

[10] Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 37. p. 2315. tom. 8. opp.

* In Aristot. Phys. p. 5. 6.

philosopher or physiologer, but as a metaphysician or theologer only; Xenophanes' one and all being nothing else but God. Whom he proved to be one solitary being from hence, because God is the best and most powerful of all things; and there being many degrees of entity, there must needs be something supreme to rule over all. Which best and most powerful being can be but one. He also did demonstrate it to be unmade, as likewise to be neither finite nor infinite (in a certain sense); as he removed both motion and rest from God. Wherefore, when he saith, that God always remaineth or resteth the same, he understands not this of that rest which is opposite to motion, and which belongs to such things as may be moved; but of a certain other rest, which is both above that motion and its contrary." From whence it is evident, that Xenophanes supposed (as Sextus[1] the philosopher also affirmeth) God to be incorporeal, a being unlike to all other things, and therefore of which no image could be made. And now we understand, that Aristotle[2] dealt not ingenuously with Xenophanes, when from that expression of his, that God was σφαιροειδὴς, or "spheriform," he would infer, that Xenophanes made God to be a body, and nothing else but the round corporeal world animated; which yet was repugnant also to another physical hypothesis of this same Xenophanes, ἀπείρους ἡλίους εἶναι καὶ σελήνας, "that there were infinite suns and moons;" by which moons he understood planets, affirming them to be all habitable earths, as Cicero tells us.[3] Wherefore,

[1] I have no doubt of the name of Sextus being again put by mistake, as nothing of the kind is to be met with in this author. Dr. Cudworth ought to have said Clemens, the only ancient author that I know of, who informs us that Xenophanes taught, ὅτι ἀσώματος ὁ Θεός, Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. Which statement of his, however, Dr. Potter censures in his notes, intimating that it is at variance with Sextus' opinions of Xenophanes. I shall state by and by my own view of this matter.

[2] He is here, no doubt, alluding to what Aristotle says in his book De Xenophanes Zenone et Gorgia, cap. 4. p. 843. 844. which, although properly referring to Zeno, will at the same time apply to Xenophanes, who entertained similar sentiments on this matter. Add however, regarding Xenophanes in particular, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 270. tom. 4. opp.

[3] Who, Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 39. p. 2319. tom. 8. opp. informs us, that Xenophanes held "the moon to be inhabited." He speaks of one moon only, and not, as the learned Doctor supposes, of several. Lactantius attributes the same opinion to this philosopher, Divin. Instit. lib. 3. cap. 23. p. 368. On the other hand, Plutarch, De Placitis Philos. lib. 2. cap. 24. p. 901. and Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 56. relate, that he asserted many suns and moons. These seem to be conflicting statements; and any one, if so disposed, might enter into a controversy, as to which opinion is the more probable. But with all due deference to the learned men, who have canvassed the doctrines of ancient philosophers, the opinion of Xenophanes on a plurality of suns and moons, like most of the dogmas of the old physiologers, has not as yet been properly explained or understood: for when this is known, it will be evident that both statements are in accordance with it, and that he both asserted one sun and moon and an infinity of suns and moons. I will explain, what were the views entertained by this philosopher. Xenophanes supposed, then, that the light which we call the sun is not a permanent and self-existent body, or, to speak more clearly, a *substance*, but an *accident*, a changeable thing, quickly produced and as quickly perishing; in short, a sort of natural phenomenon or cloud, which is at one time col-

as Simplicius resolves, God was said to be σφαιροειδὴς or spheriform, by Xenophanes, only in this sense, as being παντοχόθεν ὅμοιος, "every way like and uniform." However, it is plain,

lected together and at another again dispersed and dissipated. This is shown by the express words both of Plutarch and Stobæus: the latter, Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. p. 55. the former, De Placitis Philosoph. lib. 2. cap. 20. p. 889. Xenophanes, says Plutarch, taught that the sun consists, ἐκ πυριδίων τῶν συναθροιζομένων ἐκ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως, συναθροιζόντων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον, ἢ νέφος πεπυρωμένον, "of fiery particles collected from moist exhalation, which form the sun or a fiery cloud." The same is most clearly stated by Origen in his Philosophumena, cap. 14. p. 96: Τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐκ μικρῶν πυριδίων ἀθροιζομένων γίνεσθαι καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν, "That the sun is produced each day from small fiery particles collected together." He imagined, therefore, moist vapours to ascend each night from the earth and waters into the middle region of heaven, sufficient to produce that light which is said to be the sun's. He supposed, no doubt, that these moist vapours in ascending upwards become continually more rare and subtile, so as to lose all moisture and assume the nature of fire and light: and that this accumulated mass of corpuscles endures for a certain time and by the action of nature is again scattered and dissipated: whereupon the day disappears, and what we call evening succeeds. Hence, being asked his opinion respecting the setting and eclipse of the sun, he hesitated not to reply, that the sun in an eclipse totally perishes. Xenophanes, says Plutarch, De Placit. Philos. lib. 2. cap. 14. p. 900. asserted that an ἔκλειψις, or "eclipse" of the sun, is caused, κατὰ σβέσιν, "by its extinction:" ἕτερον δὲ πάλιν πρὸς ταῖς ἀνατολαῖς γίνεσθαι, "for that a new sun," so I interpret his words, "is always produced as often as one rises." The same Xenophanes, Plutarch adds, in order to give some weight to his opinion, affirmed that there was a time when the sun was absent for a whole month, and that at another such great darkness suddenly took place, as to turn day into night. We are recording, certainly, a very pleasant and enlightened view of natural philosophy: but nothing, I am convinced, can be too ludicrous or absurd to have entered the head of some one or other of the physiologists of former times. For no other reason he denied, as the same Plutarch informs us, the revolution of the sun round the earth, maintaining it to be a light every where diffused, although various. Now Xenophanes, being imbued with this opinion, could not help affirming in a certain sense the existence of innumerable suns. In the first place, he supposed that a new sun was produced every day, and that there were as many suns as days. Secondly, as in his opinion the vapours of the whole globe contribute to the production of this great luminary and these vapours vary according to the variety of the lands from which they arise, so he must necessarily have believed, for instance, the Spaniards, the Gauls, and the Parthians, to be respectively warmed by different suns, and, although there is a certain continuation of light and heat, still, that this light and heat is not every where of the same kind, but made up and composed of different particles. Therefore, he maintained, not so much that there are a multitude of suns or self-existent stars, as that one luminary is variously produced each day, having various parts, and that the portion of the sun which shines upon us is differently constituted from that which illuminates Asia. That nothing here is invented, the words of Plutarch clearly demonstrate: Πολλοὺς εἶναι ἡλίους καὶ σελήνας κατὰ κλίματα τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἀποτομὰς, καὶ ζώνας, "That there are many suns (said Xenophanes) according to the different climates, sections, and zones of the earth." It is now apparent, I think, in what manner Xenophanes could assert the existence both of one and of many suns. It was, in his opinion, one sun, because the whole infinity of parts of this light, which we denominate the sun, were joined and connected together; at the same time, it was manifold and various, because each region itself produced the portion of the light which it used, and therefore had its own sun. However, if what Laërtius has recorded, lib. 9. sect. 19. p. 558. be true, that he maintained an infinity of worlds, his doctrine of many suns will admit, I own, of a different interpretation from this. But it is manifest from Plutarch, that he ascribed many suns to the world which we inhabit: which he must have done in the manner I have stated. His opinions on the moon are not equally clear. Plutarch, ibid. lib. 2. cap. 25. p. 901. informs us, that he held the moon to be νέφος πεπιλημένον, "a condensed cloud." From which he would appear to have entertained the same notion of the moon as of the

that Xenophanes asserting one God, who was all, or the universe, could not acknowledge a multitude of partial, self-existent deities.[4]

sun. But how he could suppose such a condensed cloud to be habitable, is not easy to make out. Perhaps he distinguished between the moon itself and its light, and imagined the moon to be earth, like our own globe, and the light surrounding the moon to be a cloud consisting of vapours. As to the learned Doctor's considering it to be plain even from this opinion of Xenophanes respecting many suns, that Aristotle did that philosopher injustice in saying, that he held only a corporeal God, I confess this is not sufficiently clear. For I cannot see what should prevent him, who holds the existence of many suns, from denying, that there is any other god besides this the visible world.

[4] As the religion and piety of the ancient philosophers generally are matters of controversy among learned men, so also are they at variance as to the opinions of Xenophanes on God and divine things. Already in former times, Jo. Aldobrandinus, besides others, Not. ad Diogenem Laërtium, p. 558. ranked him among the enemies of God; supposing him to have believed in an infinity of worlds, like Anaximander, and as many gods, and, therefore, to have made no distinction between God and the world. With much greater acuteness and ingenuity has he been attacked in our own times by Pet. Bayle, who brings his whole intellectual powers to bear, in order to prove, that Xenophanes was no better than Bened. Spinoza, and did not distinguish nature from the parent of nature, Diction. Histor. et Critiq. tom. 4. art. Xenophanes, not. b. p. 2886. And the authority of this able writer has so weighed with many, J. Fr. Buddeus, J. Christ. Wolf, Val. Ern. Lœscher, and several others, that they have not scrupled to brand this philosopher as an Atheist. Among whom the learned Wolf, Not. ad Origenis Philosophumena, p. 98. censures our author by name on this very account, that he has judged so favourably of Xenophanes. Nevertheless, the learned Jac. Fr. Reimmann dissents from men so eminent, and, Histor. Atheismi, sect. 1. cap. 30. sect. 2. p. 203. brings forward various arguments, although not all of equal force, to prove Xenophanes to have professed a better philosophy, than is commonly supposed. And the illustrious scholar J. Alb. Fabricius, Not. ad Sexti. Empir. Pyrrh. Hypotyposes, p. 59. thoroughly purges him of the charge, asserting point-blank, sensisse Xenophanem, Deum esse mentem æternam, unam et immutabilem, nec generatione obnoxiam nec morti, sed vivam, rationeque ac sensu pollentem usquequaque semper fuisse, et futuram semper, sibique per omnia similem, "that Xenophanes believed God to be eternal mind, one and unchangeable, subject neither to generation nor death, but having always been and always about to be in perfect possession of life, reason, and sense, and like to itself in all things." To confess my own opinion, Xenophanes is not a man about whose principles there is occasion for much dispute. For, as we may learn from his verses in Sextus Empiricus and others, he himself determined upon nothing as certain, but held all things to consist in opinion, which may mislead and deceive us, and consequently did not wish what he advanced to be looked upon as truths. See Sextus, lib. 7. Contra Mathem. p. 379. But those who think thus do not hesitate frequently to change their opinions, and adopt sometimes one thing and sometimes another, according as they are affected in mind or influenced by the senses. However, as some notice is taken by ancient authors of his doctrines, I shall briefly declare my own opinion respecting them. To form our judgment of these doctrines from Simplicius, as the learned Doctor here does, I consider to be unsafe, as the sect to which Simplicius belonged usually made it their chief study to re-model the dogmas of the ancients agreeably to their own notions. The whole dispute, therefore, must be decided upon other testimonies, on which greater reliance can be placed. According to these, then, Xenophanes' sentiments neither appear to have been of that impious character, which would warrant his being classed among the predecessors of Spinoza, nor, on the other hand, so sound and pious, as to evince any very close approximation to the precepts of Christianity. In the first place, he sneered at the public religions of his own time and openly avowed, that nothing could be more absurd than the common fables concerning the gods, as exhibited in the poems of Homer and Hesiod: of which ample proof is afforded by his verses in Diogenes and Clemens Alexandr. Secondly, he held the universe to be eternal, therewith associating mind, likewise eternal, but conjoined with matter and diffused through the whole mass. This eternal mind is the god of Xenophanes. Sextus Empiricus, lib. 1. Hypotypos, cap.

Heraclitus was no clear, but a confounded philosopher (he being neither a good naturalist nor metaphysician), and therefore it is very hard, or rather impossible, to reconcile his several opinions with one another. Which is a thing the less to be wondered at, because, amongst the rest of his opinions, this also is said to have been one, that contradictories may be true;[5] and

33. p. 59. Ἐδογμάτιζε δὲ Ξενοφάνης——ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν συμφυῆ τοῖς πᾶσι, "Xenophanes taught, that the universe is one, and that God is in all things." The same clearly appears from Aristotle's book, De Xenophane, Gorgia, et Zenone, cap. 1. and 2. Now, to show the truth of what we have just advanced respecting the religion of Xenophanes, two things in his Deity must be considered separately. In the first place, he supposed this Deity or eternal mind to have nothing in common with matter and to bear no resemblance to mortals, either as regards body or soul. This is shown both by the verses of Timon, in Sextus as above quoted, p. 59. in which he tells us that Xenophanes asserted "God to be altogether soul," and by a passage of Xenophanes himself in Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 714. in which he openly declares, that God resembles neither the soul nor body of men. Of those which are supplied by Diogenes Laërtius on this subject, I say nothing. And this opinion, if I am not mistaken, separates him from Spinoza, who dreams of men, both as respects soul and body, being parts and members of God, and is perpetually confounding mind and matter. Secondly, he held that this mind was conjoined from all eternity with matter, in which, like a workman, it controls and perfects all things, and that it will always be associated with it. That such was his opinion is clear from every thing which he is said to have taught on the nature of things, as being one, immutable, and eternal. This dogma separates him by a wide interval from those, who entertain that notion of the Deity which reason points out; and classes him in the sect of the Stoics, from whom however, in physical subjects, he totally differed. It remains for me to reply to those who may ask: I. What did he mean, then, by asserting God to be "of a spherical form," σφαιροειδής? II. Did he suppose God to be secrete from all body, or, as Clemens says, ἀσώματος? To begin with the latter, I consider that we can hardly decide any thing upon this subject, as it is unknown to us, how Xenophanes defined *mind* and *body*. That he clearly distinguishes that eternal mind from the gross and rude matter, of which this universe of things, as well as our own bodies, is composed, is unquestionable. But it cannot escape the notice of those, who peruse ancient authors with attention, that those natures which they held to be free from all corporeal concretion, were not, on that account, necessarily regarded by them as simple and pure mind, such as those which we call spirit. What most of the ancients call ἀσώματον, is nevertheless matter, although that the most subtle, as is clearly shown in the example of the Stoics, who abstracted their God from all body and yet asserted him to be fire. And the same opinion, it is very probable, was entertained by this philosopher, as he held that universe which he calls God to be infinitely extended and also to possess a spherical form. As regards the first query, although there are not wanting reasons for supposing, that Xenophanes meant this to be understood not physically, but figuratively, and called God spheriform, in order to express his extreme equability and perfection, still I am led to think otherwise, from the fact, that no one of the ancients has so interpreted this word; on the contrary, we read, that this spherical form of God was opposed by him to the form of men. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 19. p. 558. tells us, that he asserted, οὐσίαν θεοῦ σφαιροειδῆ, μηδὲν ὅμοιον ἔχουσαν ἀνθρώπῳ, "the substance of God to be spherical, and to have nothing in common with man." He therefore contrasted what he considered the true with the false form of the Deity: averring that the human form was falsely attributed to God, and that his true figure was spherical. Now, this opinion would have been any thing but in keeping, if he had opposed a physical and real form, such as that of man, to a metaphysical and figurative one, namely, perfection. Wherefore, I suspect, that Xenophanes supposed the universal nature of things to be of a globular or spherical form. And as he imagined the whole of this sphere to be animated by God and every where full of the Deity, it was consistent with such dogma, that he should suppose the essence or nature, pervading this sphere, to be itself also spherical.

[5] Who has recorded this of Heraclitus, is to me, I confess, unknown: nay, I doubt whether there is any thing of the kind extant. He was wholly devoted to physical

his writings were accordingly, as Plato[6] intimates, stuffed with unintelligible, mysterious nonsense. For first, he is affirmed to have acknowledged no other substance besides body, and to have maintained, that all things did flow, and nothing stand, or remain the same; and yet in his epistles (according to the common opinion of philosophers at that time) doth he suppose the præ and post-existence of human souls in these words: Τάχα καὶ ψυχὴ μαντεύεται ἀπόλυσιν ἑαυτῆς ἤδη ποτὲ ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου τούτου· καὶ σειομένου τοῦ σώματος ἐκκύπτουσα, ἀναμιμνήσκεται τὰ πάτρια χωρία, ἔνθεν κατελθοῦσα περιεβάλλετο ῥέον σῶμα τεθνειὸς τοῦτο, ὃ δοκεῖ, &c., "My soul seemeth to vaticinate and presage its approaching dismission and freedom from this its prison; and looking out, as it were, through the cracks and crannies of this body, to remember those its native regions or countries, from whence descending it was clothed with this flowing mortal body; which is made up and constipated of phlegm, choler, serum, blood, nerves, bones, and flesh." And not only so, but he also there acknowledgeth the soul's immortality, which Stoics, allowing its permanency after death, for some time at least, and to the next conflagration, did deny: Δύσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὸ εἱμαρμένον, ἀλλὰ οὐ ψυχὴ δύσεται· ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον οὖσα χρῆμα, εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναπτήσεται μετάρσιος· δέξονται δέ με αἰθέριοι δόμοι, καὶ πολιτεύσομαι οὐκ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλ' ἐν θεοῖς, "This body shall be fatally changed to something else; but my soul shall not die or perish, but being an immortal thing, shall fly away mounting upwards to heaven; those ethereal houses shall receive me, and I shall no longer converse with men, but gods." Again, though Heraclitus asserted the fatal necessity of all things, yet notwithstanding was he a strict moralist, and upon this account highly esteemed by the Stoics, who followed him in this and other

studies, as is evident even from the testimony of Sextus Empiricus, lib. 7. contra Mathem. p. 371. while moral and dialectic subjects, to which this dogma pertains, were in a great measure neglected by him. The learned Doctor, I do not doubt, had in his mind this precept of his: Τὰ ἐναντία περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν, "that contraries are about the same thing;" which is discoursed of at large by Sextus, Hypotypos. lib. 1. cap. 29. p. 53. But this is a physical precept, and does not mean that "things entirely opposite can be true at the same time." Consult J. Alb. Fabricius, Notes on Sextus, and God. Olearius', diss. 2. De Principio Rerum Omnium ex Mente Heracliti, sec. 6. p. 862. in Stanley's Historia Philosophica.

[6] The passage of Plato respecting Heraclitus here alluded to is, I suspect, the one occurring in the Sympos. p. 321. in which however he is not censuring this obscure philosopher.

[7] This and the following passage occur in Heraclitus' Epistle to Amphidamas, in the Epistol. Græc. published by Eilh. Lubin, Heidelb. 1601.8. p. 54. 55. But I confess I attach no importance to these epistles of Heraclitus. They are the forgeries of some one, who made it his business to introduce Heraclitus as full of Platonic principles, to which however he was a stranger, and obtained his materials from the accounts given in Laërtius of this philosopher's sickness and death. If there were no other proof of this, it would be sufficiently evident from the clearness and perspicuity of these epistles; a virtue which Heraclitus was so far from affecting, that he on the contrary received a surname from the obscurity of his ordinary style.

things; and he makes no small pretence to it himself in his epistle to Hermodorus:[8] Καὶ ἐμοόγε πολλοὶ καὶ δυσχερέστατοι ἆθλοι κατώρθωνται· νενίκηκα ἡδονὰς, νενικήκα χρήματα, νενίκηκα φιλοτιμίαν, κατεπάλαισα δειλίαν, κατεπάλαισα κολακείαν· οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι φόβος, οὐκ ἀντιλέγει μοι μέθη· φοβεῖταί με λύπη, φοβεῖταί με ὀργή· κατὰ τούτων αὐτῶν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστεφάνωμαι, ἐμαυτῷ ἐπιτάττων, οὐκ ὑπ' Εὐρυσθέως, "I have also had my difficult labours and conflicts, as well as Hercules; I have conquered pleasures, I have conquered riches, I have conquered ambition; I have subdued cowardice and flattery; neither fear nor intemperance can control me; grief and anger are afraid of me, and fly away from me. These are the victories for which I am crowned, not by Eurystheus, but as being made master of myself." Lastly, though Heraclitus made fire to be the first principle of all things, and had some odd passages imputed to him, yet notwithstanding was he a devout religionist, he supposing that fiery matter of the whole universe, animantem esse et Deum, "to be an animal and God." And as he acknowledged many gods, according to that which Aristotle[9] recordeth of him, that when some passing by had espied him sitting in a smoky cottage, he bespake them after this manner: Introite, nam et hic dii sunt, "Come in, I pray, for here there are gods also:" he supposing all places to be full of gods, demons, and souls: so was he an undoubted assertor of one supreme Numen, that governs all things, and that such as could neither be represented

[8] In Lubin's Epistol. Græc. p. 50. &c. But I hold this epistle in the same estimation as the one he is said to have written to Amphidamas. It is the production of some one, who was pleased to supply his genius with matter for exercise, and not of the philosopher whom we are speaking of. Dr. Cudworth, however, makes two observations respecting Heraclitus, which seem to me to require some notice. I. He supposes Heraclitus' opinion respecting fate to be inconsistent with his zealous devotion to the exposition of moral doctrines. But this inconsistency will vanish, if that be true which God. Olearius, so deeply versed in such subjects, has shown to be very probable, that the εἱμαρμένη or fate of Heraclitus was God himself, the maker of the universe, Diss. de Igne Rerum Omnium Principio ex Mente Heracliti, sect. 13. p. 853. and Diss. de Rerum Genesi ex Mente Heracliti, sect. 5. p. 860. II. He states that Heraclitus was a strict moralist. To me, however, this appears to be very far from the truth. He almost exclusively devoted himself to the investigation of physical subjects, and scarcely touched upon ethics; a fact that led some formerly to inquire: Εἰ μὴ μόνος φυσικός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠθικὸς φιλόσοφος Ἡράκλειτος, "Whether Heraclitus was only a physical or also a moral philosopher," as Sextus Empiricus informs us, Adv. Mathemat. lib. 8. p. 371. I am aware that the Stoics were reproached by Cicero, and perhaps by others, with having chosen Heraclitus for their guide in their exposition of physical matters; but I know of no ancient author, who has recorded, that the moral precepts inculcated by them were also borrowed from the doctrine of Heraclitus. Neither would this passage from the epistle to Hermodorus, if it were genuine, prove Heraclitus to have bestowed much time and labour upon the illustration of ethics. For he, who boasts of having triumphed over his own vices, is not necessarily to be ranked on that account among moral philosophers. It is one thing to treat of, set forth, and expound moral doctrines, and another to resist and master one's own vicious propensities.

[9] De Partib. Animalium, lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 481. tom. 2. opp.

by images, nor confined to temples. For after he had been accused of impiety by Euthycles, he writes to Hermodorus in this manner:[10] Ἀλλ' ὦ ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, διδάξατε πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τί ἔστιν ὁ θεός, ποῦ δ' ἔστιν ὁ θεός; ἐν τοῖς ναοῖς ἀποκεκλεισμένος; εὐσεβεῖς γε, οἱ ἐν σκότει τὸν θεὸν ἱδρύετε;——ἀπαίδευτοι, οὐκ ἴστε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι θεὸς χειρόκμητος, οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς βάσιν ἔχει, οὐδὲ ἔχει ἕνα περίβολον· ἀλλ' ὅλος ὁ κόσμος αὐτῷ ναός ἐστι, ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἄστροις πεποικιλμένος, "But O you unwise and unlearned! teach us first what God is, that so you may be believed in accusing me of impiety: tell us where God is. Is he shut up within the walls of temples? is this your piety to place God in the dark, or to make him a stony God? O you unskilful! know ye not, that God is not made with hands, and hath no basis or fulcrum to stand upon, nor can be inclosed within the walls of any temple; the whole world, variegated with plants, animals, and stars, being his temple?" And again: Ἆρ' οὐκ εἰμὶ εὐσεβής, Εὐθύκλεις, ὃς μόνος οἶδα θεόν; ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἱδρυσθῇ θεοῦ βωμός, οὐκ ἔστι θεός; ἐὰν δὲ ἱδρυσθῇ μὴ θεοῦ, θεός ἐστιν; ὥστε λίθοι θεῶν μάρτυρες· ἔργα δεῖ μαρτυρεῖν, οἷα ἡλίου· νὺξ αὐτῷ καὶ ἡμέρα μαρτυροῦσιν· ὧραι αὐτῷ μάρτυρες, γῆ ὅλη καρποφοροῦσα, μάρτυς· σελήνης ὁ κύκλος, ἐκείνου ἔργον, οὐρανιος μαρτυρία, "Am I impious, O Euthycles, who alone know what God is? is there no God without altars? or are stones the only witnesses of him? No; his own works give testimony to him, and principally the sun; night and day bear witness of him; the earth bringing forth fruits, declares him; the circle of the moon, that was made by him, is a heavenly testimony of him."[1]

In the next place, Anaxagoras the Clazomenian philosopher comes to be considered, whose predecessors of the Ionic order (after Thales) as Anaximander, Anaximenes and Hippo, were (as hath been already observed) Materialists and Atheists; they acknowledging no other substance besides body, and resolving all things into the motions, passions, and affections of it. Whence

[10] These and the words soon after following are extant in the same epistle to Hermodorus, in Lubin's Epistol. Græc. p. 50. of which I have just expressed my opinion.

[1] Upon the philosophy of Heraclitus I have already discoursed above, on ch 3. sect. 28. and on the Digression concerning a Plastic Nature, sect. 6. to which I have at present nothing further to add. As Heraclitus, even when living, was considered so obscure by most men, that they despaired of being able to ascertain his meaning, nor were those more enlightened on the matter, who in former times read his books, it certainly would be bold and self-conceited in us at this day to take upon ourselves to unravel the whole of his discipline from the very scanty portions of it now remaining, involved as these are in obscurity. On which account, I cannot agree with those who make Heraclitus to have been guilty of inconsistency, and to have advanced many contrary theories. For whether this be the case or not can only be known, when the whole tenor of his philosophy is thoroughly understood, which at this day is impossible. I coincide in the opinion of Cicero, who, De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 14. p. 3067. says: Heraclitum, quoniam, quid diceret, intelligi noluit, omittamus, "Let us pass over Heraclitus, as he was unwilling, that what he said should be understood."

was that cautious advice given by Jamblichus:* Προτίμα τὴν Ἰταλικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν τὰ ἀσώματα καθ' αὑτὰ θεωροῦσαν, τῆς Ἰονικῆς, τῆς τὰ σώματα προηγουμένως ἐπισκοπουμένης, "Prefer the Italic philosophy, which contemplates incorporeal substances by themselves, before the Ionic, which principally considers bodies." And Anaxagoras was the first of these Ionics, who went out of that road; for seeing a necessity of some other cause, besides the material (matter being not able so much as to move itself, and much less if it could, by fortuitous motion, to bring itself into an orderly system and compages;) he therefore introduced Mind into the Cosmopœia, as the principal cause of the universe; which Mind is the same with God. Thus Themistius,† speaking of Anaxagoras: Νοῦν καὶ θεὸν πρῶτος ἐπαγαγόμενος τῇ κοσμοποιΐᾳ, καὶ οὐ πάντα ἀνάψας τῆς φύσεως τῶν σωμάτων, "He was the first (that is, among the Ionic philosophers) who brought in Mind and God to the Cosmopœia, and did not derive all things from senseless bodies." And to the same purpose Plutarch in the life of Pericles: Τοῖς ὅλοις πρῶτος οὐ τύχην, οὐδ' ἀνάγκην, διακοσμήσεως ἀρχὴν, ἀλλὰ νοῦν ἐπέστησε καθαρὸν καὶ ἄκρατον, "The other Ionic philosophers before Anaxagoras made fortune and blind necessity, that is, the fortuitous and necessary motions of the matter, to be the only original of the world; but Anaxagoras was the first, who affirmed a pure and sincere Mind to preside over all." Anaxagoras therefore supposed two substantial self-existent principles of the universe, one an infinite Mind or God, the other an infinite Homoiomery of matter, or infinite atoms; not unqualified, such as those of Empedocles and Democritus, which was the most ancient and genuine atomology; but similar, such as were severally endued with all manner of qualities and forms, which physiology of his therefore was a spurious kind of atomism. Anaxagoras indeed did not suppose God to have created matter out of nothing, but that he was κινήσεως ἀρχὴ, "the principle of its motion," and also τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτία, "the regulator of this motion for good," and consequently the cause of all the order, pulchritude and harmony of the world: for which reason this divine principle was called also by him, not only mind but good; it being that which acts for the sake of good. Wherefore, according to Anaxagoras, first, the world was not eternal, but had a beginning in time; and before the world was made, there was from eternity an infinite congeries of similar and qualified atoms, self-existent, without either order or motion: secondly, the world was not afterwards made by chance, but by Mind or God, first moving the matter, and then directing the motion of it

* Symb. 36. p. 159. [Potius in Orat, protrept. ad philosoph. p. 159. edit. Arcerii.]
† Crat. 15. [P. 317. edit. Harduini.]

so as to bring it into this orderly system and compages. So that νοῦς was κοσμοποιὸς, "Mind, the first maker of the world," and νοῦς βασιλεὺς οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς, "Mind, that which still governs the same, the king and sovereign monarch of heaven and earth." Thirdly, Anaxagoras' Mind and God was purely incorporeal; to which purpose his words recorded by Simplicius are very remarkable:* Νοῦς μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι· ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστίν· εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τέῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτο τέῳ· ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν· ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐμοὶ λέλεκται· καὶ ἀνεκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐόντα ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ· ἐστί γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων, καὶ καθαρώτατον· καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει· καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον, "Mind is mingled with nothing, but is alone by itself and separate; for if it were not by itself secrete from matter, but mingled therewith, it would then partake of all things, because there is something of all in every thing; which things mingled together with it, would hinder it, so that it could not master or conquer any thing, as if alone by itself: for Mind is the most subtile of all things, and the most pure, and has the knowledge of all things, together with an absolute power over all." Lastly, Anaxagoras did not suppose a multitude of unmade minds, co-existent from eternity, and so many partial causes and governors of the world, but only one infinite Mind or God, ruling over all.[1]

Indeed it may well be made a question, whether or no, besides this supreme and universal Deity, Anaxagoras did acknowledge any of those other inferior gods, then worshipped by the Pagans? because it is certain, that though he asserted infinite Mind to be the maker and governor of the whole world, yet he was accused by the Athenians for Atheism, and besides a mulct imposed upon him, banished for the same; the true ground whereof was no other than this, because he affirmed the sun to be nothing but a mass of fire, and the moon an earth, having mountains and valleys, cities and houses in it; and probably concluded the same of all the other stars and planets, that they were either fires, as the sun, or habitable earths, as the moon; wherein, supposing them not to be animated, he did consequently deny them to be gods. Which ungodding of the sun, moon and stars, was then looked upon by the vulgar as nothing less than absolute atheism; they being very prone to think, that if there were not many understanding beings superior to men, and if the sun, moon

* In Arist. Phys. lib. 1. fol. 33. c. 2.

[1] The subject of Anaxagoras and his philosophy, if we except B. Jo. Schmid in a specific dissertation published at Jena, has been discussed the most copiously and acutely by P. Bayle, Diction. Histora. et Critique, tom. 1. v. Anaxagoras, p. 104. &c. after whom I have no remark to offer.

and stars were not such, and therefore in their language gods, there was no God at all. Neither was it the vulgar only, who condemned Anaxagoras for this, but even those two grave philosophers Socrates and Plato did the like; the first[2] in his apology made to the Athenians, where he calls this opinion of Anaxagoras absurd; the second in his book of laws, where he complains of this doctrine as a great inlet into atheism, in this manner:* Ἐμοῦ καὶ σοῦ, ὅταν τεκμήρια λέγωμεν, ὡς εἰσὶ θεοὶ, ταῦτα αὐτὰ προσφέροντος ἥλιόν τε καὶ σελήνην, καὶ ἄστρα καὶ γῆν, ὡς θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα ὄντα, ὑπὸ τῶν σοφῶν τούτων ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἂν λέγοιεν, ὡς γῆν τε καὶ λίθους ὄντα αὐτὰ, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, "When you and I endeavouring by arguments to prove, that there are gods, speak of the sun and moon, stars and earth, as gods and divine things, our young men presently, being principled by these new philosophers, will reply; that these are nothing but earth and stones (senseless and inanimate bodies) which therefore cannot mind nor take notice of any human affairs." Where we may observe these two things; first, that nothing was accounted truly and properly a god amongst the Pagans, but only what was endued with life and understanding. Secondly, that the taking away of those inferior gods of the Pagans, the sun, moon, and stars, by denying them to be animated, or to have life and understanding in them, was, according to Plato's judgment, then the most ready and effectual way to introduce absolute atheism.

Moreover, it is true, that though this Anaxagoras were a professed Theist, he asserting an infinite self-existent Mind to be the maker of the whole world, yet he was severely taxed also by Aristotle and Plato, as one not thorough-paced in theism, and who did not so fully as he ought adhere to his own principles.[3] For whereas, to assert Mind to be the maker of the world, is really all one as to assert final causality for things in nature, as also that they were made after the best manner; Anaxagoras, when he was to give his particular account of the phenomena, did commonly betake himself to material causes only, and hardly ever make use of the mental or final cause, but when he was to seek and at a loss; then only bringing in God upon the stage.† Socrates'[4] discourse concerning this in Plato's Phædo is very well worth our taking notice of: "Hearing one sometimes read (saith he) out of a book of Anaxagoras, ὡς νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, "That Mind was the order

[2] Or rather Plato in the Apology of Socrates, p. 362.
* De Leg. lib. 10. p. 886.
[3] Herewith compare what Dr. Cudworth has written on the same subject above, Digress. on Plastic Nature, sect. 6. together with our own remarks.
† P. 97. Steph.
[4] This, however, is not Socrates' own discourse in Plato, but merely the sum and substance of what he there says at much length.

and cause of all things, I was exceedingly pleased herewith, concluding, that it must needs follow from thence, that all things were ordered and disposed of as they should, and after the best manner possible; and therefore the causes even of the things in nature (or at least the grand strokes of them) ought to be fetched from the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best. But when afterwards I took Anaxagoras' book into my hand, greedily reading it over, I was exceedingly disappointed of my expectation, finding therein no other causes assigned but only from airs, and ethers, and waters, and such like physical and material things. And he seemed to me to deal, just as if one having affirmed, that Socrates did all by mind, reason and understanding, afterward undertaking to declare the causes of all my actions, as particularly by my sitting here at this time, should render it after this manner; because, forsooth, my body is compounded of bones and nerves, which bones being solid, have joints in them at certain distances, and nerves of such a nature, as that they are capable of being both intended and remitted: wherefore my bones being lifted up in the joints, and my nerves some of them intended and some remitted, was the cause of the bending of my body, and of my sitting down in this place. He in the mean time neglecting the true and proper cause hereof, which was no other than this; because it seemed good to the Athenians to condemn me to die, as also to myself most just, rather to submit to their censure and undergo their punishment, than by flight to escape it; for certainly otherwise these nerves and bones of mine would not have been here now in this posture, but amongst the Megarensians and Bæotians, carried thither ὑπὸ δόξης τοῦ βελτίστου, by the opinion of the best; had I not thought it better to submit to the sentence of the city, than to escape the same by flight. Which kind of philosophers (saith he) do not seem to me to distinguish betwixt the true and proper cause of things, and the cause sine qua non, that without which they could not have been effected. And such are they, who devise many odd physical reasons for the firm settlement of the earth, without any regard to that power, which orders all things for the best (as having δαιμονίαν ἰσχὺν, a divine force in it;) but thinking to find out an Atlas far more strong and immortal, and which can better hold all things together: τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, οὐδὲν ξυνδεῖν καὶ ξυνέχειν· Good and fit, being not able, in their opinions, to hold, or bind any thing."

From which passage of Plato's we may conclude, that though Anaxagoras was so far convinced of Theism, as in profession to make one infinite Mind the cause of all things, matter only excepted; yet he had notwithstanding too great a tang of that old material and atheistical philosophy of his predecessors, still hanging about him, who resolved all the phenomena of nature

into physical, and nothing into mental or final causes. And we have the rather told this long story of him, because it is so exact a parallel with the philosophic humour of some in this present age, who, pretending to assert a God, do, notwithstanding, discard all mental and final causality from having any thing to do with the fabric of the world; and resolve all into material necessity and mechanism, into vortices, globuli, and striate particles, and the like. Of which Christian philosophers we must needs pronounce, that they [illegible] good Theists as Anaxagoras himself was, though s[illegible]ied by Plato and Aristotle; forasmuch as he did [illegible]t God to be the cause of motion, but also the [illegible]tor, and methodizer of the same, for the producti[illegible]onious system of the world, and therefore τοῦ εὖ [illegible]ν, "the cause of well and fit." Whereas these [illegible] latter, and only admitting the former, will nee[illegible]ven and earth, plants and animals, and all thin[illegible]n this orderly compages of the world, to have resulted merely from a certain quantity of motion, or agitation, at first impressed upon the matter, and determined to vortex.[5]

XXI. The chronology of the old philosophers having some uncertainty in it, we shall not scrupulously concern ourselves therein, but in the next place consider Parmenides, Xenophanes' auditor and a philosophic poet likewise, but who conversing

[5] That Descartes and his disciples are here glanced at, will be obvious to every one at all acquainted with these matters. How far we are to assent to the learned Doctor will I think be evident from what we have observed above on the Digression on Plastic Nature. As to the rest, the whole of what is here argued respecting the philosophy of Anaxagoras seems to me to be somewhat foreign to the question which our worthy author had proposed, whether or no Anaxagoras, besides the one supreme Deity, acknowledged also many other gods, or worshipped the deities of the Athenians? Dr. Cudworth touches, indeed, upon this question, and seems inclined to agree with those who affirm this, but he afterwards dismisses it altogether without coming to any conclusion; which, however, was necessary for his purpose. The same thing he had done before in the case of Xenophanes. His object is to show, that those who formerly worshipped a plurality of gods, nevertheless at the same time acknowledged one supreme Deity. He ought, therefore, to have shown that Xenophanes and Anaxagoras, whose examples he wishes to avail himself of in this matter, sacrificed both to one and to several gods. In my opinion, neither Xenophanes nor Anaxagoras paid any attention to the deities of the vulgar, especially of the Athenians, acknowledging no other God, except that divine mind which they supposed to govern all things. I should not, however, deny it to be possible, that Anaxagoras, who believed one mind to preside over all things, may have supposed other inferior minds to have proceeded from this supreme mind and to have been appointed by the most high God to the administration of human affairs. But I do not think the same of Xenophanes. I know that this philosopher himself in the verses, which are still extant, makes mention also of gods: nor am I ignorant of its being stated by Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 3111. tom. 9. opp. unum Xenophanem, quum Deos esse diceret, divinationem funditus sustulisse, "that Xenophanes alone, although asserting the existence of gods, altogether rejected divination." But these gods of Xenophanes, I fear, were merely portions of the universe, destitute of life and reason, whom he improperly designated by the name of gods, or such gods as those of the Stoics, which did not differ from the supreme God himself.

much with two Pythagoreans, Amenias and Diochœtes, was therefore looked upon as one, that was not a little addicted to the Pythagoric sect. That this Parmenides acknowledged many gods, is evident from what has been already cited out of him; notwithstanding which, he plainly asserted also one supreme, making him, as Simplicius tells us, *αἰτίαν θεῶν*, "the cause of all those other gods," of which Love is said to have been first produced. Which supreme Deity Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, called, *ἓν τὸ πᾶν*, "one that was all," or the universe; but adding thereunto of his own, that it was also *ἀκίνητον*, "immoveable."[6]

Now, though it be true, that Parmenides' writings being not without obscurity, some of the ancients, who were less acquainted with metaphysical speculations, understood him physically; as if he had asserted the whole corporeal universe to be all but one thing, and that immoveable, thereby destroying, together with the diversity of things, all motion, mutation, and action; which was plainly to make Parmenides not to have been a philosopher, but a madman: yet Simplicius, a man well acquainted with the opinions of ancient philosophers, and who had by him a copy of Parmenides' poems, (then scarce, but since lost) assures us that Parmenides dreamt of no such matter, and that he wrote, *οὐ περὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ στοιχείου, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντως ὄντος*, or, *περὶ τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς*, "not concerning a physical element or principle, but concerning the true Ens, or the divine transcendency:" adding, that though some of those ancient philosophers did not distinguish *τὰ φυσικὰ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπὲρ φύσιν*, "natural things from supernatural;" yet the Pythagoreans, and Xenophanes, and

[6] I do not know it to be the case that Parmenides alone, and not Xenocrates also, asserted that *one* which he called *all* to be at the same time *ἀκίνητον*, or "immoveable." Indeed, I am almost inclined to believe that the whole of the sect commonly called Eleatic was imbued with this dogma. Nor am I without authority for such opinion. Aristotle, in his book, De Philosophia in Eusebius' Præparat. Evangel. lib. 14. cap. 17. p. 756. says expressly: *Τοιαῦτα γάρ τινα πρότερον μὲν Ξενοφάνης, καὶ Παρμενίδης, καὶ Ζήνων, καὶ Μέλισσος ἔλεγον, ὕστερον, δὲ οἱ περὶ Στίλπωνα καὶ τοὺς Μεγαρικούς· ὅθεν ἠξίουν τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἕτερον εἶναι, μηδὲ γεννᾶσθαί τι, μηδὲ φθείρεσθαι, μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν*, "For Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus first asserted these doctrines, and afterwards Stilpo, and the Magarensian philosophers. These supposed, that that which exists is one and that which does not exist is different; and that nothing is generated or corrupted, or in short, moved." I would not deny, however, that there was some difference between the opinions of Xenophanes and Parmenides on this subject and that they did not both call the first principle of all things immoveable in the same way. For Parmenides and Melissus are stated in Aristotle, Sextus, and other ancient authors, to have taken away motion altogether from the nature of things; an opinion which I do not see to have been attributed by any one to Xenophanes. It is usual with most of the ancient authors, few of whom examined the dogmas of the early sects with a due degree of diligence, to represent those, whom they observe to have made use of the same expressions, as entertaining similar opinions: whereas, sometimes those who employ the same terms very widely differ in their sentiments. For, every one who has devoted any attention to the matter must be aware of the utter poverty of almost all languages in expressing the notions and speculations of the mind. Hence, it comes to pass, that we are frequently compelled to designate different ideas by the same words: by which many, who consider things only superficially, are led into the gravest errors.

Parmenides, and Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, did all διακρίνειν, "handle these two distinctly," καίπερ τῇ ἀσαφείᾳ λανθάνοντες τοὺς πολλοὺς, "however, by reason of their obscurity, it was not perceived by many;" for which cause they have been most of them misrepresented, not only by Pagans, but also by Christian writers. For, as the same Simplicius informs us, Parmenides propounded two several doctrines, one after another; the first concerning theological and metaphysical things, called by him ἀλήθειαν, "truth;" the second concerning physical and corporeal things, which he called δόξαν, "opinion." The transition betwixt which was contained in these verses of his:

> Ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
> Ἀμφὶς ἀληθείας· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείους
> Μάνθανε· κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.

In the former of which doctrines, Parmenides asserted one immoveable principle; but in the latter, two moveable ones, fire and earth. He speaking of souls also as a certain middle or vinculum betwixt the incorporeal and the corporeal world, and affirming that God did τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδὲς, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν, "sometimes send and translate souls from the visible to the invisible regions, and sometimes again, on the contrary, from the invisible to the visible." From whence it is plain, that when Parmenides asserted his one and all immoveable, he spoke not as a physiologer, but as a metaphysician and theologer only. Which indeed was a thing so evident, that Aristotle[7] himself, though he had a mind to obscure Parmenides' sense, that he might have a fling at him in his Physics, yet could not altogether dissemble it. For when he thus begins, "There must of necessity be either one principle or many; and if there be but one, then must it either be immoveable, as Parmenides and Melissus affirm, or else moveable, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοὶ, "as the Naturalists or Physiologers;" he therein plainly intimates, that when Parmenides and Melissus made one immoveable the principle of all things, they did not write this as Physiologers. And afterwards he confesses, that this controversy, whether there were one immoveable principle, does not belong to natural philosophy, but to some other science. But this is more plainly declared by him elsewhere,[8] writing concerning Parmenides and

[7] Physic. Auscultat. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 446. tom. 1. opp.

[8] De Cœlo, lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 668. I consider these three passages of Aristotle, however, to be insufficient to exculpate Parmenides and not be of such weight as to induce us to believe that his *one* and *all* was a nature altogether separate from this universe and that motion, which according to the concurrent testimony of all writers he denied, was not the motion of the universe, but some other. I. As to Aristotle's here opposing physiologers to Parmenides and Melissus, this amounts to nothing. For by physiologers Aristotle means those ancient philosophers before Socrates, who had occupied themselves exclusively with the investigation of physical

Melissus after this manner: Εἰ καὶ τ' ἄλλα λέγουσι καλῶς, ἀλλ' οὐ φυσικῶς γε δεῖ νομίζειν λέγειν, τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄπτα τῶν ὄντων ἀγέννητα καὶ ὅλως ἀκίνητα, μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἑτέρας καὶ προτέρας, ἢ τῆς φυσικῆς ἐπισκέψεως, "Though it be granted that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise said well, yet we must not imagine them to have spoken physically. For this, that there is something

things and neglected all other departments of science: to which number neither Parmenides nor Melissus belonged. This is evident from innumerable passages of the Stagirite, of which I shall quote only one, Metaphys. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 276. Οἱ μὲν οὖν καλούμενοι Πυθαγόρειοι ταῖς μὲν ἀρχαῖς καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ἐκτοπωτέρως χρῶνται τῶν φυσιολόγων, "Those called Pythagoreans employ the first principles and elements in a more remote sense than the physiologers." Here the philosopher contrasts the physiologers with the Pythagoreans, and in doing so, acknowledges at the same time, that the latter taught concerning the elements and first principles of things, that is, performed the part of physiologers. His books of physics and metaphysics are full of similar passages. Hence, I consider we ought not to listen to Sextus Empiricus, who, lib. 10. adv. Mathemat. cap. 2. p. 641. affirms that Melissus and Parmenides were called ἀφύσικοι by Aristotle, ὅτι ἀρχὴ κινήσεώς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις, "because nature is the principle of motion," which these philosophers did away with. This conjecture is too far-fetched and repugnant as well to the general tone of Aristotle's writings. II. Nor does Aristotle's confession that the question: "whether there be one immoveable principle or not," does not properly belong to natural philosophy, more effectually assist the cause of Parmenides. For he who refers this controversy to some other science than physics, by no means confesses at the same time, that those who hold something to be immoveable, inculcate correct notions of the nature of this immoveable and abstract it from physical subjects. Aristotle supposed physical science to be conversant solely about those things which fall under our senses; which endure but for a certain time, and then perish; which, in short, have motion or at least, seem to us to have it; and entertaining this opinion, it was natural for him to consider speculations respecting things which are eternal, more general, and altogether removed from the senses, as belonging to some other discipline. It will be worth our while to hear the philosopher himself, Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 1. p. 347. 348. tom. 4. opp. Εἰ δὲ τί ἐστιν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀΐδιον καὶ χωριστὸν, φανερὸν, ὅτι θεωρητικῆς τὸ γνῶναι, οὐ μέντοι φυσικῆς γε· περὶ κινητῶν γάρ τινων ἡ φυσική·———ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ ἀχώριστα μέν, ἀλλ' οὐ ἀκίνητα, "But if any thing is immoveable, and eternal, and separable, it is evident that the knowledge of this belongs to speculative and not to physical science: for the latter is of certain things which are moveable.———For physical science treats of things inseparable, but not immoveable." Hence, all speculations respecting the heavens and the world, which the Stagirite held to be eternal, he separated from physics, and either treated of separately, or referred to metaphysics. III. It will be evident, therefore, in the third place, what construction ought to be put upon the passage in which he grants that Parmenides and Melissus otherwise discoursed well, but denies them to have spoken physically. Aristotle himself, it is notorious, maintained, that there is something eternal and immoveable, namely God. Hence, he could not but generally applaud those philosophers, who in like manner asserted one eternal and immoveable principle. But in doing so, he does not intimate what it was that Parmenides held to be immoveable, or acknowledge him to have entertained correct notions respecting it; on the contrary, in other passages, especially Physic. lib. 1. and Metaphys. lib. 1. he notices, and at the same time, censures his opinion. Not to be unjust, however, I will confess that there is a passage in Aristotle overlooked by Dr. Cudworth, in which the philosopher seems to intimate, that Parmenides' doctrine was such as the learned Doctor supposes it to be, Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 270. tom. 4. opp. Παρμενίδης μὲν ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ἑνὸς ἅπτεσθαι· Μέλισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον, ὁ δὲ ἄπειρόν φησιν εἶναι αὐτό, "For Parmenides seems to have treated of one according to reason, Melissus of one according to matter; wherefore the former asserts it to be finite, the latter infinite." But setting aside that Aristotle proposes this only as a conjecture, the passage is most obscure; nor is it clear what he meant by one κατὰ λόγον, and one κατὰ ὕλην. Of the opinion itself of Parmenides we shall speak by and by.

unmade and immoveable, does not so properly belong to physics, as to a certain other science, which is before it."

Wherefore Parmenides, as well as Xenophanes, his master, by his one and all, meant nothing else but the supreme Deity, he calling it also immoveable. For the supreme Deity was by these ancient philosophers styled, first τὸ ἓν and μονὰς, "a unity and monad," because they conceived that the first and most perfect being, and the beginning of all things must needs be the most simple. Thus Eudorus, in res their sense: Ἀρχὴν ἔφασαν εἶναι τῶν πάν τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῶν ὄντων πάντων ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγε ἓ εἶναι τὸν ὑπεράνω θεὸν, "These ancients affi e, or unity, was the first principle of all; ma l as other things, being derived from it; t his one that highest or supreme God, who d Syrianus, to the same purpose:[10] Οἱ θεῖοι ἐ Θεὸν ἔλεγον, ὡς ἑνώσεως τοῖς ὅλοις αἴτιον, καὶ καὶ πάσης ζωῆς, "Those divine men called God the One, as being the cause of unity to all things, as likewise he was of being and life." And Simplicius concludes, that Parmenides' ἓν ὄν, "one Ens," was a certain divine principle, superior to mind or intellect, and more simple:* Λείπεται οὖν τὸ νοητὸν πάντων αἴτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ ὁ νοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ πάντα κατὰ μίαν ἕνωσιν συνῃρημένως κατείληπται, καὶ ἡνωμένως, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ Παρμενίδειον ἓν ὄν, "It remaineth, therefore, that that intelligible, which is the cause of all things, and therefore of mind and understanding too, in which all things are contained and comprehended compendiously and in a way of unity, I say, that this was Parmenides' one Ens or Being."

In the next place, Parmenides, with the others of those ancients, called also his ἓν ὂν, τὸ πᾶν, "his one Ens or first most simple Being, all, or the universe;" because it virtually contained all things, and as Simplicius writes: Πάντα διακεκριμένως ἐμφαίνεται ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, "All things are from this one distinctly displayed." For which cause, in Plato's Parmenides, this one is said to be, ἐπὶ πάντα πολλὰ ὄντα νενεμημένον, "distributed into all things, that are many." But that Parmenides by his ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one and all," or "the universe," did not understand the corporeal world, is evident from hence, because he called it ἀδιαίρετον, or "indivisible," and as Simplicius observes,† supposed it to have no magnitude; because that which is perfectly one, can have no parts.

[9] Comment. in Physicam. Aristot. p. 39. ed. Græc, Aldinæ.

[10] These words the learned Doctor no doubt extracted from a manuscript of Syrianus' Comm. in Libros. aliquot. Metaphysic. Aristot. For this commentary has not yet been published in the Greek.

* F. 31. Gr. [Comment. in Physic. Aristotel.] † In Phys. fol. 17. 2.

Wherefore, it may be here observed, that this expression of ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one being all," hath been used in very different senses: for as Parmenides and Xenophanes understood it of the supreme Deity, that one most perfect and most simple being was the original of all things; so others of them meant it atheistically, concerning the most imperfect and lowest of all beings, matter or body, they affirming all things to be nothing but one and the same matter diversely modified. Thus much we learn from that place of Aristotle's in his Metaphysics:* Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἕντε τὸ πᾶν καὶ μίαν εἶναί τινα φύσιν ὡς ὕλην τιθέασι, καὶ ταύτην σωματικὴν καὶ μέγεθος ἔχουσαν, δῆλον, ὅτι πολλαχῶς ἁμαρτάνουσι, "They who affirm one to be all in this sense, as if all things were nothing but one and the same matter, and that corporeal and endued with magnitude, it is manifest that they err sundry ways." But here is a great difference betwixt these two to be observed, in that, the atheistical assertors of one and all (whether they meant water or air by it, or something else) did none of them suppose their one and all to be immoveable, but moveable: but they, whose principle was one and all immoveable (as Parmenides, Melissus, and Zeno) could not possibly mean any thing else thereby, but the Deity; that there was one most simple, perfect, and immutable Being incorporeal, which virtually contained all things, and from which all things were derived. But Heraclitus, who is one of those, who are said to have affirmed ἓν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν, "that one was all," or "that the universe was but one thing," might possibly have taken both those senses together, (which will also agree in the Stoical hypothesis) that all things were both from one God, and from one fire; they being both alike corporeal Theists, who supposed an intellectual fire to be the first principle of all things.

And though Aristotle, in his Physics, quarrels very much with Parmenides and Melissus, for making one immoveable principle; yet in his Metaphysics himself doth plainly close with it, and own it as very good divinity, that there is one incorporeal and immoveable principle of all things, and that the supreme Deity is an immoveable nature:† Εἰπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη, λέγω δὲ, χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος, ὅπερ πειράσομαι δεικνύναι, ἐνταῦθα ἂν εἴη που καὶ τὸ θεῖον, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή, "If there be any such substance as this, that is separate (from matter, or incorporeal) and immoveable (as we shall afterwards endeavour to show that there is) then the divinity ought to be placed here, and this must be acknowledged to be the first and most proper principle of all." But lest any should suspect that Aristotle, if not Parmenides also, might, for all that, hold many such immoveable principles, or many eternal,

* Lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 274. tom. 4. opp.] † Lib. 6. cap. 1. and Lib. 13. cap. 7.

uncreated and self-existent beings, as so many partial causes of the world: Simplicius assures us,[1] μὴ γεγονέναι δόξαν πολλὰς καὶ ἀκινήτους τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσαν, i. e., "that though divers of the ancient philosophers asserted a plurality of moveable principles (and some indeed an infinity) yet there never was any opinion entertained amongst philosophers, of many, or more than one immoveable principles." From whence it may be concluded, that no philosopher ever asserted a multitude of unmade, self-existent minds, or inc[illegible]s, as co-ordinate principles of the world.

Indeed Plotinus s[illegible] that Parmenides in his writings, by his τὸ ὄν, [illegible] frequently mean a perfect mind or intellect, the [illegible]e entity (according to him) below that which und[illegible] mind, though incorporeal, was likened by him to [illegible]e it comprehends all within itself, and because i[illegible]t from without, but from within): but that whe[illegible] his "On" or "Ens" one, he gave occasion thereby [illegible]rel with him, as making the same both one and many; intellect being that which contains the ideas of all things in it. Wherefore Parmenides' whole philosophy (saith he) was better digested and more exactly and distinctly set down in Plato's Parmenides, where he acknowledgeth "three unities subordinate, or a trinity of divine hypostases:"* Ὁ παρὰ Πλάτωνι Παρμενίδης, ἀκριβέστερον λέγων, διαιρεῖ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὸ πρῶτον ἓν, ὃ κυριώτερον ἓν· καὶ δεύτερον ἓν πολλὰ λέγων· καὶ τρίτον ἓν καὶ πολλά· καὶ σύμφωνος οὗτος καὶ αὐτός ἐστι ταῖς Τρισίν, "Parmenides in Plato, speaking more exactly, distinguishes three divine unities subordinate; the first of that, which is perfectly and most properly one; the second of that, which was called by him one-many: the third of that, which is thus expressed, one and many. So that Parmenides did also agree in this acknowledgment of a trinity of divine or archical hypostases." Which observation of Plotinus is, by the way, the best key, that we know of, for that obscure book of Plato's Parmenides. Wherefore Parmenides thus asserting a trinity of divine hypostases, it was the first of those hypostases, that was properly called by him, ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one the universe or all:" that is, one most simple being, the fountain and original of all. And the second of them (which is a perfect intellect) was, it seems, by him called, in way of distinction, ἓν πολλὰ or πάντα, "one-many" or "one all things;" by which all things are meant the intelligible ideas of things, that are all contained together in one perfect mind. And of those was Parmenides to be understood also, when he affirmed, that all things did stand, and nothing flow; not of singular and sensible things, which, as the

[1] In Physic. Aristot. fol. 17.
* En. 5. lib. 1. c. 8.

Heraclitics rightly affirmed, do indeed all flow; but of the immediate objects of the mind, which are eternal and immutable: Aristotle himself acknowledging, that no generation nor corruption belongeth to them, since there could be no immutable and certain science, unless there were some immutable, necessary and eternal objects of it. Wherefore, as the same Aristotle* also declares, the true meaning of that controversy betwixt the Heraclitics and Parmenideans, Whether all things did flow, or some things stand? was the same with this, Whether there were any other objects of the mind, besides singular sensibles, that were immutable? and consequently, whether there were any such thing as science or knowledge which had a firmitude and stability in it? For those Heraclitics, who contended, that the only objects of the mind were singular and sensible things, did with good reason consequently thereupon deny, that there was any certain and constant knowledge, since there can neither be any definition of singular sensibles (as Aristotle[2] writes), nor any demonstration concerning them. But the Parmenideans, on the contrary, who maintained the firmitude and stability of science, did as reasonably conclude thereupon, that besides singular sensibles, there were other objects of the mind, universal, eternal and immutable, which they called the intelligible ideas, all originally contained in one archetypal mind or understanding, and from thence participated by inferior minds and souls. But it must be here acknowledged, that Parmenides and the Pythagoreans went yet a step further, and did not only suppose those intelligible ideas to be the eternal and immutable objects of all science, but also, as they are contained in the divine intellect, to be the principles and causes of all other things. For thus Aristotle declares their sense:† Αἴτια τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἄλλοις, and again, τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δὲ εἴδεσι τὸ ἕν, "The ideas are the causes of all other things; and, the essence of all other things below is imparted to them from the ideas, as the ideas themselves derive their essence from the first unity:" those ideas in the divine understanding being looked upon by these philosophers as the paradigms and patterns of all created things. Now these ideas being frequently called by the Pythagoreans "Numbers," we may from hence clearly understand the meaning of that seemingly monstrous paradox or puzzling Griphus of theirs, that[3] Numbers were the causes and

* Met. lib. 4. c. 5. [P. 298. tom. 4. opp.]

[2] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 272. t. 4. opp. Aristotle, however, does not give this as his own but as Plato's opinion, from which he himself dissents.

† Met. lib. 1. c. 6. [P. 273. tom. 4. opp.]

[3] Metaphys. cap. 6. 272. On the Pythagorean numbers I have already said as much as any one need know who is willing to be guided by his reason. The opinion here adopted by the learned Doctor, that the numbers of Pythagoras and the ideas of Plato did not differ from each other, has not a great while ago been set forth and

principles of all things, or that all things were made out of Numbers; it signifying indeed no more than this, that all things were made from the ideas of the divine intellect, called Numbers; which themselves also were derived from a monad or unity: Aristotle somewhere[4] intimating this very account of that assertion, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς αἰτίους εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τῆς οὐσίας, "that Numbers were the causes of the essence of other things," namely, because τὰ εἴδη ἀριθμοί, "the ideas were numbers." Though we are not i[illegible] Pythagoreans made also all the numbers within [illegible] be symbols of things. But besides these two div[illegible] already mentioned, Parmenides seems to have [illegible] third, which, because it had yet more alterity, for [illegible] was called by him, neither ἓν τὸ πᾶν, "one th[illegible] all;" nor ἓν πάντα, "one-all things;" but ἓν καὶ [illegible] and all things:" and this is taken by Plotinus t[illegible] Psyche, that actively produceth all things, in [illegible], according to those divine ideas.

But that Parmenides,* by his one-all immoveable, really understood nothing else but the supreme Deity, is further unquestionably evident from those verses of his cited by Simplicius, but not taken notice of by Stephanus in his Poesis Philosophica, of which we shall only set down some few here.

Ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
Οὐδέποτ' ἦν, οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν
Ἓν συνεχές· Τίνα γὰρ γενεὴν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ;
Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δέσμων,
Ταυτὸν τ' ἐν ταυτῷ τε μένον, καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται &c.

In which, together with those that follow, the supreme Deity is plainly described as one single, solitary, and most simple being, unmade or self-existent, and necessarily existing, incorporeal and devoid of magnitude, altogether immutable or unchangeable, whose duration therefore was very different from that of ours, and not in a way of flux or temporary succession, but a constant eternity, without either past or future. From whence it may be observed, that this opinion of a standing eternity, different

defended by the eminent scholar Jac. Brucker, in a long and erudite comment, which is extant in J. Geo. Schelhorn's Amœnitat. Litterar. t. 7. p. 173. [Beausobre also approves of it, Hist. de Manich. p. 393.] I have no objection to their assenting to this opinion, if they think proper; but to myself there seems to be a vast difference between the notions or ideas of things and numbers, nor can I sufficiently clearly perceive any resemblance between the two. But in subjects so obscure, nothing admits of being decided upon with certainty.

[4] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 272. But in this passage Aristotle is as usual so intricate and obscure, that I consider I should hardly be able to discharge the office of interpreter without great loss of time. Let him, therefore, as having been unwilling to be known to every one, lie concealed in his own darkness.

* In Arist. Phys. fol. 7. et 17. et. 31.

from that flowing succession of time, is not so novel a thing as some would persuade, nor was first excogitated by Christian writers, schoolmen or fathers, it being at least as old as Parmenides; from whom it was also afterwards received and entertained by the best of the other pagan philosophers; however it hath been of late so much decried, not only by atheistical writers, but other precocious and conceited wits also, as nonsense and impossibility.[5]

[5] On the opinion of those who, like most of our theologians at this day, exclude all succession from the notion of eternity, and on the antiquity of that opinion, a more convenient opportunity will I hope be afforded me of discoursing in the sequel. Most assuredly they are mistaken, who deny it to have been entertained prior to the fifth or sixth century. I much doubt, however, whether Parmenides was favourable to it; neither do the verses of his here quoted place this beyond controversy. But of this elsewhere: at present I consider it necessary to offer some observations on the philosophy of Parmenides, to show how far we ought to assent to what is here eruditely and ingeniously argued by the learned Doctor. He strains every nerve in order to prove that Parmenides was free from all impiety towards God and that those, who supposed the one immoveable principle introduced by this philosopher to be this whole universe of things, were guilty of the greatest injustice towards him. [Brucker, Ep. ad Zimmermann. clears him from the charge of atheism.] The same opinion has been advocated by many other distinguished and learned men, amongst whom it will be sufficient to mention the author of the Ars Cogitandi, par. 3. cap. 19. p. 246. Pet. Gassendi, opp. t. 1. p. 206. Mich. Mourgues, in his book intitled Plan Theologique du Pythagorisme, p. 16. Ren. Vallinus, Ad Boëthium de Consolatione Philos. p. 72. who have no doubt of Parmenides having entertained sentiments equally wise and sound as those of Christians. But these are opposed by others not inferior in ability and learning, who maintained that Parmenides philosophized on God and divine things in the same manner as Spinoza, and consequently did away with all religion, Pet. Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, lib. 4. v. Xenophanes, not. b. p. 2887. Jo. Fr. Buddeus, Thes. de Atheismo et Superstit. cap. 1. sect. 19. p. 60. and the illustrious Nic. Hier. Gudlingius, whose long and ingenious commentary, in which he endeavours to establish the atheism of Parmenides, is extant in Gudlingianor. par. 15. p. 372. Among these some also take a middle course, and neither accuse nor exculpate Parmenides; who have not long ago been joined by the most erudite Jac. Fr. Reimann, Historia Atheismi, sect. 1. cap. 30. sect. 3. p. 205. 206. If we could fearlessly put faith in Plotinus and Simplicius, who have been brought forward by Dr. Cudworth as leading authorities in this question, Parmenides would easily come out of the ordeal acquitted of all infamy. To these might be added Proclus, who says much in his praise, and copiously discusses his philosophy, Introduct. in Theologiam Platonic. lib. 1. cap. 7. &c. p. 15—45. But as this class of men is known to have measured the philosophers of antiquity generally according to their own peculiar views, I am wont to be slow in assenting to their statements; nor do I think I am wrong in doing so. Besides, it is impossible to elicit from his poems, or rather fragments of poems occurring here and there in Galen, Clemens, Sextus, Simplicius and others, any thing certain or satisfactory; as they are wonderfully obscure and mere detached and disconnected scraps, of which no one will easily determine the true meaning. I should almost say the same of Plato's dialogue entitled Parmenides. For it is not certain, whether Plato has recorded the real opinions of this philosopher or, as in the case of Socrates, supplied him with his own sentiments; nor is the sense of many things propounded in this dialogue at all apparent. Which being the case, if we wish to ascertain the doctrines of Parmenides, the only recourse left for us is to compare the not very numerous accounts given of them by ancient authors and, having done so, to determine by probable conjecture, what amount of piety or impiety towards God is to be attributed to him. Before all things we ought to bear in mind what is manifest from the testimonies of those whom I shall name by and by, that the philosophy of Parmenides was twofold, one regulated by the senses, the other by reason and judgment; the latter certain and subject to no doubt, the former owing to the infirmity of the senses fallacious and variable: of which the former might not improperly be denominated *physical*, and the

It is well known, that Melissus held forth the very same doctrine with Parmenides, of one immoveable, that was all, which he plainly affirmed to be incorporeal likewise, as Parmenides did:

latter *metaphysical*. See, besides Diogenes, Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 23. and especially Plutarch, Advers. Colotem, p. 1114. &c. t. 2. opp. who shows plainly that some had but imperfectly understood this philosopher's doctrine. To the former philosophy belong the whole visible universe and all its vicissitudes and changes; in short, all things that are subject and exposed to the senses. Whatever, therefore, in his precepts, as handed down by ancient authors, treats of things which can be felt, seen, or touched, pertains altogether to this philosophy; which if learned men had attended to, they would have escaped many difficulties and controversies in the investigation of this question. His assertion, therefore, of two first principles of things, *water* and *fire*, or as Plutarch says, ibid. p. 1114. τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν, or as Plato and others, *earth* and *fire*; his hypothesis that men are procreated by the power of the sun; and all that which, according to Plutarch, he inculcated respecting the heavens, the moon, and the stars, are to be referred this department of his philosophy. Nor, if I am not wholly mistaken, does what he is stated to have taught concerning God, pertain to any other. Parmenides, says Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 2395. commentitium quiddam coronæ similitudine efficit; Stephanem appellat, continentem ardore lucis orbem, qui cingit cœlum, quem appellat Deum, "Parmenides makes a certain imaginary thing resembling a crown; he calls it *stephane*, a continuous orb of fervid light, which surrounds the heavens and which he calls God." What sort of God this is, is manifest, namely, a most subtle fire, surrounding and encompassing the whole world; to which it is very doubtful whether Parmenides ascribed mind and reason. That God with him was that which is most excellent in the nature of things, and which generates and produces all things therein, is, I conceive unquestionable. And this he considered to be fire, which he frequently speaks of as being the maker and framer of all. Diogenes Laërtius, lib 9. segm. 22. p. 561. Δύο τε εἶναι στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ τὸ μὲν δημιουργοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν, "That there are two elements, fire and earth, and that the former has the office of framer or architect." Add Origen, Philosophumena, cap. 11. p. 87. and others. But fire, as every one must allow, pertains to sensible things; therefore there can be no doubt that the God of Parmenides ought to be referred to this part of philosophy. Moreover the reason why he called this all-producing nature *stephane* or crown, although it has afforded various matter for disquisition to learned men, appears to myself to be by no means intricate or recondite. Parmenides comprised his philosophy in a poem, in which he almost invariably designated things by the names of others instead of expressing them by their own. There is extant in Sextus Empiricus, lib. 8. adv. Mathemat. p. 392. &c. a tolerably long fragment from his book on Nature, in which he calls the mental appetites *horses*, reason a *demon*, and the eyes *Helian virgins*. It is not strange, therefore, that he should also have designated the god he professed by a similar name, and should have denominated him a *crown*, as the greatest of ornaments.

I would have no one believe, however, that Parmenides was so absurd and irrational as to consider all things falling under the senses as mere phantasms and fictions of the senses, or to maintain that there is no motion, and that nothing really is produced or destroyed, but merely appears so to us. If he had held such a notion, he would have been unworthy the name of a reasonable being. I am aware, indeed, that Aristotle, Sextus, and others, have so interpreted his opinion. Colotes in Plutarch accuses Parmenides of having denied the existence of fire, water, κρημνοὶ καὶ πόλεις, "a precipice and cities," and of having ranked the whole nature of things among the ravings and illusions of distempered minds. Nor is he differently understood by Aristocles in Eusebius, who, in opposition to him, maintains the existence of motion. In our own times, Pet. Bayle has revived the accusation, Diction. Histor. et Critiq. voc. Xenophanes, t. 4. p. 2887. Il falut donc, says he, among other things, qu' ils (la secte Eleatique) soutinssent, que la nature demeuroit toujours la même, et que les changemens qu' elle soufre ne sont que des illusions de nos sens et que des pures apparences, "They (the Eleatic sect) must therefore have maintained, that nature remains always the same, and that the changes it undergoes are only the illusions of our senses and mere appearances." But he has long ago been defended by Plutarch, who, Adv. Colotem, p. 1113. &c. clearly shows, that Parmenides, in teaching that all visible things consist in and depend

Καὶ ὁ Μέλισσος ἓν ἑόν φησι, δεῖ αὐτὸ σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν, εἰ δὲ ἔχει πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια,* "Melissus also declared, that his one Ens must needs be devoid of body, because if it had any crassities

upon opinion, meant simply to inculcate the doctrine of Heraclitus and so many others, that the whole of nature is perpetually flowing, and has no stability; and, on the contrary, that the things which reason contemplates and comprehends are alone certain and constant. And that such was the fact is, in my opinion, placed beyond all controversy by his very philosophy on physical things. Parmenides not only discoursed of physical things, but also of their first causes and origin, and traced the nature of things to its elements. But this he would not have done, if he had supposed that we dream and are deceived by the senses, and that nothing that we seem to see in reality takes place. For what man in his senses, I ask, investigates the causes and reasons of a thing, which he believes to have no existence? Let us suppose Parmenides to have believed, that nothing whatever is produced, but merely seems so to us, and at the same time to have inquired into the cause of things which are produced, and after exploring the whole to have decided that fire is the maker and contriver of all things, would not this be the height of madness? That which does not exist can have no cause; consequently, if none of those things which we imagine to take place, really do take place, fire could not be laid down as the cause of them. Besides, Parmenides philosophized not only upon present but also upon past things, and endeavoured to ascertain their causes. According to Laërtius and others, one of his dogmas was: "That the first men were generated from the sun." Now what would be the meaning of this axiom, if the man entertained the notions attributed to him by so many ancient and modern writers? Assuredly this, than which nothing can be more absurd: "that there were men before any men existed, to whom it appeared that a sun existed, and that this sun excited motion in the earth, and from it generated men;" to pass over other absurdities connected therewith. And what would Parmenides have thought of himself, if he had classed the generations of all men and animals among empty and unreal visions? [He admitted motion in physics, but denied it in metaphysics.] Let us reject, therefore, the vulgar opinion, that Parmenides took away all motion from the nature of things, and conclude him to have simply meant, that all visible things are subject to perpetual conversions and changes, and therefore do not supply matter for stable and certain knowledge, but only for opinion, more especially as the evidence of the senses also is fallible and uncertain.

The other department of his philosophy was solely occupied in the contemplation of things removed from the senses and the sight. And of this the first precept was: "That there is one that is all, immutable, immoveable," &c. What is meant, therefore, by this one and all, is the first thing to be considered. Dr. Cudworth, and many others besides him, assert it to be God. Neither can it be denied, that what he attributed to this one and all, if rightly understood, is applicable to the Deity. For my part, however, I do not hesitate to dissent from the opinion of those, who make the one and all of Parmenides to have been the whole visible universe, abstracted by reason and thought from all forms and qualities. For the god of Parmenides, as we have already seen, was a most subtle fire, encompassing and confining the whole of nature; which by no means corresponds with what he was wont to inculcate respecting his *one*. Besides, the whole of that part of his philosophy, which he stated to consist in opinions, was employed solely in the consideration of the forms of things. It follows, therefore, that the other part, which was opposed to this, was dedicated to that nature, which is the nurse, seat, and mother of forms. For no one will easily believe, that so eminent a philosopher concerned himself about forms only, and never thought of matter, in which those forms arise; which indeed would have been the part of a man destitute of all mental subtlety and acuteness. I pass over the fact that he calls this one πεπερασμένον, or "finite," which could in no sense be said of God. Dr. Cudworth, indeed, a little afterwards tells us, that God was called by him finite, because he is πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων, "the term and measure of all things." But the venerable Wolf, Not. ad Origenis Philosophumena, p. 86. has already justly remarked upon the improbability of this interpretation. Certainly there would be no

* Simplic. Ar. Phys. fol. 19.

in it, it would have parts." But the only difference that was between them was this, that Parmenides called this one immoveable that was all, πεπερασμένον, "finite or determined," but Melissus ἄπειρον, "infinite;" which difference notwithstanding was in words only, there being none at all as to the reality of their sense: whilst each of them endeavoured in a different way to set forth the greatest perfection of the Deity; there being an equivocation in those words finite and infinite, and both of them signifying in one sense perfection, but in another imperfection. And the disagreeing agreement of these two philosophers with one another, Parmenides and Melissus, as also of Xenophanes with them both concerning the Deity, is well declared by Simplicius after this manner:* Οὐδὲν δὲ ἴσως χεῖρον ὀλίγον παρεκβάντα τοῖς φιλομαθεστέροις ἐπιδεῖξαι, πῶς καίτοι διαφέρειν δοκοῦντες οἱ πάλαιοι περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας, ἐναρμονίως ὅμως συμφέρονται· Καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν περὶ τῆς νοητῆς καὶ πρώτης ἀρχῆς διελέχθησαν, ὡς Ξενοφάνης καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος· ὁ μὲν Παρμενίδης ἓν λέγων καὶ πεπερασμένον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλήθους προϋπάρχειν, καὶ τὸ πᾶσιν ὅρου καὶ πέρατος αἴτιον, κατὰ τὸ πέρας μᾶλλον ἤπερ κατὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀφορίζεσθαι, καὶ τὸ πάντῃ τε τέλειον τὸ τέλος τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀπειληφὸς, πεπερασμένον εἶναι,

opinion so absurd as not to admit of an apt and convenient explication, if such latitude and freedom were allowed in attaching meanings to words. The *one* and *all* of Parmenides, therefore, is the whole nature of things, regarded in and of itself, not by the eyes, but by reason and intellect. The philosopher's meaning was this: "Although various conversions, generations, and corruptions of things take place, still it is the philosopher's part to look deeper, and to separate in his mind's eye nature itself from its numerous forms and modes. If this be done, it will be plain that the whole universe is *one*, that is, connected and fitted together in one continued chain, although many things appear to exist separately and by themselves; also that it is *eternal* and *ungenerated*; also, *immutable*, that is, none of its parts can lose its own nature, although they are variously transferred, and enter sometimes into one sometimes into another nature; lastly, it is *immoveable*, or ἀκίνητον, that is, all motions which take place in the nature of things do not prevent the mass itself, considered as a whole, from remaining fixed and unshaken; as the sea which is agitated by innumerable waves, and yet on the whole is not dislodged from its place, but remains in a certain sense immoveable; or, as the sand of Archimedes, although variously disturbed and stirred by his staff, nevertheless rests unmoved." I am aware how acutely learned men have expounded this dogma of Parmenides, that the universe is immoveable, but to me it appears to be better to follow that which is simple and plain, than to suffer our imagination to take wing and carry us above the clouds and the moon. Lastly, his giving a special form to his universe, likewise admits of easy explanation. Having asserted τὸ πᾶν, or "the universe," to be πεπερασμένον, or "finite," he was called upon to assign some figure to it. For whatever has limits, must necessarily also have figure. But, according to the notion of the ancients, no form was more perfect than the spherical; as we learn from Cicero, among others, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 18. p. 2978. t. 9. opp. Hence it appeared to him most reasonable to assign this figure to the universe of things. Moreover, that these properties, just spoken of, were attributed by Parmenides to the universe, we are informed both by other authors and especially by Origen in his Philosophumena, cap 11. p. 86. and Eusebius. Præparat. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 23. As to his being said to have denied all generations, it must necessarily be understood thus: that when any thing arises or is generated, nothing new is produced which did not exist before.

* Ar Phys. fol. 7.

μᾶλλον δὲ τέλος τῶν πάντων, ὡς ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ ἀτελὲς ἐνδεὲς ὂν, οὔπω πέρας ἀπείληφε· Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀμετάβλητον ὁμοίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεάσατο, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀνέκλειπτον τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τό ἄπειρον τῆς δυνάμεως, ἄπειρον αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο, ὥσπερ καὶ ἀγέννητον· πλὴν ὁ μὲν Χενοφάνης ὡς πάντων αἴτιον, καὶ πάντων ὑπερανέχον, καὶ κινήσεως αὐτὸ καὶ ἠρεμίας καὶ πάσης ἀντιστοιχείας ἐπέκεινα τίθησιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ὑποθέσει· ὁ δὲ Παρμενίδης, τὸ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον αὐτοῦ, καὶ πᾶσης μεταβολῆς, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ δυνάμεως ἐπέκεινα, θεασάμενος, ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ, "Perhaps it will not be improper for us to digress a little here, and to gratify the studious and inquisitive reader, by showing how those ancient philosophers, though seeming to dissent in their opinions concerning the principles, did notwithstanding harmoniously agree together. As first of all, they who discoursed concerning the intelligible and first principle of all, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus; of whom Parmenides called it one finite and determined; because as unity must needs exist before multitude, so that, which is to all things the cause of measure, bound and determination, ought rather to be described by measure and finitude, than infinity; as also that which is every way perfect, and hath attained its own end, or rather is the end of all things (as it was the beginning) must needs be of a determinate nature; for that which is imperfect and therefore indigent, hath not yet attained its term or measure. But Melissus, though considering the immutability of the Deity likewise, yet attending to the inexhaustible perfection of its essence, the unlimitedness and unboundedness of its power, declareth it to be infinite, as well as ingenit or unmade. Moreover, Xenophanes looking upon the Deity, as the cause of all things and above all things, placed it above motion and rest, and all those antitheses of inferior beings, as Plato likewise doth in the first hypothesis of his Parmenides; whereas Parmenides and Melissus, attending to its stability and constant immutability, and its being perhaps above energy and power, praised it as immoveable." From which of Simplicius it is plain, that Parmenides, when he called God πεπερασμένον, "finite and determined," was far from meaning any such thing thereby, as if he were a corporeal being of finite dimensions, as some have ignorantly supposed; or as if he were any way limited as to power and perfection; but he understood it in that sense, in which πέρας is taken by Plato, as opposite to ἀπειρία, and for the greatest perfection, and as God is said to be πέρας καὶ μέτρον πάντων, "the term and measure of all things." But Melissus calling God ἄπειρον, "infinite," in the sense before declared, as thereby to signify his inexhaustible power and perfection, his eternity and incorruptibility, doth therein more agree with our present theology, and the now received manner of speaking.

We have the rather produced all this, to show how curious the ancient philosophers were in their inquiries after God, and how exact in their descriptions of him. Wherefore however Anaximander's Infinite were nothing but eternal senseless matter (though called by him the τὸ θεῖον, "the divinest thing of all") yet Melissus' ἄπειρον, or "Infinite," was the true Deity.[6]

With Parmenides and Melissus fully agreed Zeno Eleates also, Parmenides's scholar, that one immoveable was all, or the original of all things; he mea[illegible]hing else but the supreme Deity. For though [illegible] this Zeno did excogitate certain arguments ag[illegible]ion of bodies, proceeding upon that hypothesis [illegible]ivisibility of body, one of which was famously l[illegible]me of Achilles, because it pretended to prove, [illegible]ble (upon the hypothesis) for the swift-footed [illegible]vertake the creeping snail (which arguments of [illegible]o they are well answered by Aristotle,[7] is not l[illegible]e to inquire); yet all this was nothing else but [illegible]portful exercise of Zeno's wit, he being a subtile logician and disputant, or perhaps an endeavour also to show how puzzling and perplexing to human understanding, the conception even of the most vulgar and confessed phenomena of nature may be. For that Zeno Eleates by his one immovable that was all, meant not the corporeal world, no more than Melissus, Parmenides, and Xenophanes, is evident from Aristotle writing thus concerning him:[8] Τὸ τοιοῦτον ἓν ὂν

[6] Melissus, like his preceptor Parmenides, is held by some in good by others in bad repute, being classed by the former among the believers in a divine Being, and by the latter among Atheists. My own opinion, as to his piety and philosophy, will be fully apparent from the observations just made by me respecting his master. For there is only a slight difference between the doctrines of the two; for which reason the ancients generally associate Melissus and Parmenides together, as having professed one and the same philosophy. That the explications of *finite* and *infinite*, here quoted from Simplicius are far-fetched, and altogether improbable, will be obvious to every one.

[7] Physic. lib. 6. cap. 14. p. 359. tom. 1. opp. But Zeno's arguments against motion are set forth with much greater elegance and ingenuity by Pet. Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, tom. 4. voc. Zeno, p. 2909. who has added an examination of Aristotle's answers. For myself, my limits will not permit me to dwell upon these matters. I shall, however, notice two points: I. I am satisfied, on a careful and attentive perusal of ancient authors, that most of the disputes and controversies of antiquity on the subject of motion, were conflicts, as it were, of the Andabatæ, and arose chiefly from their not all entertaining the same notion and definition of motion. Those who are said by Aristotle, Sextus, Seneca, and others, to have taken away all motion, nevertheless delivered at the same time such precepts to their disciples, as none but a man who acknowledges many things to be moved can inculcate. Which proves, in my opinion, that they attached peculiar signification to the word motion, different from the received usage. II. With respect to Zeno, I consider him to have disputed against motion merely to gratify his own humour. He is stated by Aristotle to be the inventor of the art of logic. In order, therefore, to prove that the power of this art is sufficient to shake even the most certain truths, he shows that by means of it motion itself, than which nothing appears to men to be more certain, may be attacked and controverted.

[8] These precise words are not extant in the part of Aristotle referred to, although we there find what is equivalent to them in sense.

τὸν θεὸν λέγει, οὔτε κινεῖσθαι, οὔτε κινητὸν εἶναι, "Zeno by his one Ens, which neither was moved, nor moveable, meaneth God." Moreover the same Aristotle informs us, that this Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate, that there was but one God, from that idea, which all men have of him, as that which is the best, the supreme and most powerful of all, or as an absolutely perfect being: Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεὸς ἁπάντων κράτιστον, ἕνα φησὶ προσήκειν αὐτὸν, "If God be the best of all things, then he must needs be one." Which argument was thus pursued by him:[9] Τοῦτο θεὸς καὶ θεοῦ δύναμις κρατεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ὥστε καθὸ μὴ κρεῖττον, κατὰ τοσοῦτον οὐκ εἶναι θεόν· πλειόνων οὖν ὄντων, εἰ μὲν εἶεν τὰ μὲν ἀλλήλων κρείττους, τὰ δὲ ἥττους, οὐκ ἂν εἶναι θεούς· πεφυκέναι γὰρ θεὸν μὴ κρατεῖσθαι· ἴσων δὲ ὄντων, οὐκ ἂν ἔχειν θεὸν φύσιν δεῖν εἶναι κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ ἴσον οὔτε βέλτιον οὔτε χεῖρον εἶναι τοῦ ἴσου· ὥστ' εἴπερ εἴη τε καὶ τοιοῦτον εἴη θεὸς, ἕνα μόνον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ πάντα δύνασθαι, ἃ ἂν βούλοιτο, "This is God and the power of God, to prevail, conquer and rule over all. Wherefore by how much any thing falls short of the best, by so much does it fall short of being God. Now if there be supposed more such beings, whereof some are better, some worse, those could not be all gods, because it is essential to God not to be transcended by any; but if they be conceived to be so many equal gods, then would it not be the nature of God to be the best, one equal being neither better nor worse than another: wherefore if there be a God, and this be the nature of him, then can there be but one. And indeed otherwise he could not be able to do whatever he would."

Empedocles is said to have been an emulator of Parmenides also, which must be understood of his metaphysics, because in his physiology (which was atomical) he seems to have transcended him. Now that Empedocles acknowledged one supreme and

[9] De Xenophane, Zenone et Georgia, cap. 3. p. 840. tom. 1. opp. But the whole of what Aristotle there tells us about Zeno's doctrine, does not show what he really inculcated respecting God. I read the name of God; but I nowhere see it clearly stated what meaning Zeno attached to it; excepting only, that he asserted God to be that which is the most excellent of all. In my opinion, nothing that is there mentioned by Aristotle can with consistency be recognized and adopted by a man, who holds God to be the whole universe of things. However, I shall neither directly accuse Zeno and eject him from the number of those who believe in a Deity, as Bayle and others have done, nor altogether acquit him and rank him among the friends of God, which has been attempted not long since by the excellent J. Fr. Reimmann, Hist. Atheismi, sect. 1. cap. 30. sect. 5. p. 207. I should be inclined to say the same not only of his doctrine, but of a great part of the ancient philosophical history, that Terence said of other matters:

Incerta hæc si tu postules
Ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas,
Quam si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias,

"These uncertain things if you seek to make certain by reasoning, you will be doing nothing more than endeavouring to be reasonably mad."

universal Numen, and that incorporeal too, may be concluded from what hath been already cited out of his philosophic poems.* Besides which, the writer De Mundo[10] (who, though not Aristotle, yet was a Pagan of good antiquity) clearly affirmeth, that Empedocles derived all things whatsoever from one supreme Deity: *Τὰ γὰρ δι' ἀέρος ἅπαντα, καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς, καὶ τὰ ἐν ὕδατι, θεοῦ λέγοιτ' ἂν ὄντως ἔργα εἶναι, τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος· ἐξ οὗ κατὰ τὸν φυσικὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα:*

Πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, [illegible] τε ἔσται ὀπίσσω, &c.

"All the things tha[illegible] arth, and in the air and water, may truly be [illegible] of God, who ruleth over the world. Out of w[illegible] the physical Empedocles, proceed all things th[illegible] shall be, viz. plants, men, beasts, and gods." [illegible] ding we conceive to be rather true as to Em[illegible] his words; he affirming, as it seems, in that ci[illegible] these things were made, not immediately out of [illegible] of contention and friendship; because Simplicius, who was furnished with a copy of Empedocles' poems, twice brings in that cited passage of his in this connexion:

Ἐν δὲ κότῳ διάμορφα καὶ ἄνδιχα πάντα πέλονται,
Σὺν δ' ἔβη ἐν φιλότητι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι ποθεῖται.
Ἐκ τῶν γάρ πάνθ' ὅσσ' ἦν, ὅσσα τέ ἐστι, καὶ ἔσται,
Δένδρα τε βεβλάστηκε, καὶ ἄνερες, ἠδὲ γυναῖκες,
Θῆρες τ' οἰωνοί τε, καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς,
Καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέρεστοι.

"Things are divided and segregated by contention, but joined together by friendship; from which two (contention and friendship) all that was, is, and shall be, proceeds; as trees, men and women, beasts, birds, and fishes, and, last of all, the long-lived and honourable gods." Wherefore the sense of Empedocles' words here was this; that the whole created world, together with all things belonging to it, viz. plants, beasts, men, and gods, was made from contention and friendship. Nevertheless, since, according to Empedocles, contention and friendship did themselves depend also upon one supreme Deity, which he with Parmenides and Xenophanes called *τὸ ἓν*, or "the very One;" the writer De Mundo might well conclude, that, according to Empedocles, all things whatsoever, and not only men, but gods, were derived from one supreme Deity. And that this was indeed Empedocles' sense, appears plainly from Aristotle[1] in his Meta-

* P. 26.

[10] Cap. 6. p. 863, tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.

[1] This passage of Aristotle does not prove Empedocles to have held, that all things were generated by the counsel and will of one supreme Being. The Stagirite merely says, that, according to Empedocles, all things, God alone excepted, were produced from discord; and, in proof, he produces the verses in question.

physics:* Τίθησι μὲν γὰρ [Ἐμπεδοκλῆς] ἀρχήν τινα τῆς φθορᾶς τὸ νεῖκος· δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο γεννᾶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἑνός. Ἅπαντα γάρ ἐκ τούτου τ' ἄλλα ἐστὶ, πλὴν ὁ Θεός· λέγει γοῦν,

Ἐξ ὧν πάνθ' ὅσα τ' ἦν, ὅσα τ' ἔσθ', ὅσα τ' ἔσται ὀπίσσω, &c.

"Empedocles makes contention to be a certain principle of corruption and generation: nevertheless, he seems to generate this contention itself also from the very One (that is, from the supreme Deity). For all things, according to him, are from this contention, God only excepted; he writing after this manner, from which (that is, contention and friendship) all the things that have been, are, and shall be (plants, beasts, men, and gods) derived their original." For Empedocles, it seems, supposed, that were it not for νεῖκος, "discord," or "contention," all things would be one: so that, according to him, all things whatsoever proceeded from contention or discord, together with a mixture of friendship; save only the supreme God, who hath therefore no contention at all in him, because he is essentially τὸ ἓν, "unity itself and friendship." From whence Aristotle takes occasion to quarrel with Empedocles, as if it would follow from his principles, that the supreme and most happy God was the least wise of all, as being not able to know any thing besides himself, or in the world without him:† Διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει αὐτῷ, τὸν εὐδαιμονέστατον θεὸν ἧττον φρόνιμον εἶναι τῶν αλλῶν, οὐ γὰρ γνωρίζει τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα· τὸ γὰρ νεῖκος οὐκ ἔχει· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ ὁμοίῳ,

Γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ (φησὶ) γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, &c.

"This therefore happens to Empedocles, that, according to his principles, the most happy God is the least wise of all other things, for he cannot know the elements, because he hath no contention in him; all knowledge being by that which is like: himself writing thus: We know earth by earth, water by water, air by air, and fire by fire; friendship by friendship, and contention by contention."[2] But, to let this pass, Empedocles here making the gods themselves to be derived from contention and friendship, the supreme Deity, or most happy God, only excepted (who hath no contention in him, and from whom contention and friendship themselves were derived) plainly acknowledged both one unmade Deity, the original of all things, under

* Lib. 3. cap. 4. [P. 295. tom. 4. opp.]
† Met. lib. 3. cap. 4. [P. 295. tom. 4. opp.]
[2] Aristotle deals unfairly with Empedocles, as with many of the ancient philosophers. For although he taught that men know like by like, it by no means follows, that he ascribed the same kind of knowledge to the supreme Being, or deprived God of all knowledge. Empedocles may have supposed God to perceive and know things in a very different way from men.

the name of τὸ ἓν, "the very One," and many other inferior gods, generated or produced by him; they being juniors to contention, or discord, as this was also junior to unity, the first and supreme Deity. Which gods of Empedocles, that were begotten from contention (as well as men and other things) were doubtless the stars and demons.

Moreover, we may here observe, that according to Empedocles' doctrine, the true original of all the evil, both of human souls and demons (wl [illegible] like lapsable) was derived from that νεῖκος, "di[illegible]tion,"* that is necessarily contained in the nat[illegible]ether with the ill use of their liberty, both in [illegible] their pre-existent state. So that Empedocles l[illegible] footsteps of Pythagoras, whose praises he thus [illegible] in his poems:

Ἦν δέ τις ἐ[illegible]σια εἰδὼς,
Ὃς δὴ μήκι[illegible]το πλοῦτον,
Παντοίων τ[illegible]ανος ἔργων, &c.†

Horum de numero quidam præstantia norat
Plurima, mentis opes amplas sub pectore servans,
Omnia vestigans sapientum docta reperta, &c.[3]

XXII. Before we come to Socrates and Plato, we shall here take notice of some other Pythagoreans, and eminent philosophers, who clearly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, though doubtless acknowledging withal, other inferior gods. Philo, in his book De mundi Opificio,‡ writing of the Hebdomad or Septenary number, and observing, that, according to the Pythagoreans, it was called both a motherless and a virgin number, because it was the only number within the Decad, which was neither generated, nor did itself generate, tells us, that therefore it was made by them a symbol of the supreme Deity: Οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὸν ἄριθμον τοῦτον ἐξομοιοῦσι τῷ ἡγεμόνι τῶν συμπάντων, "The Pythagoreans likened this number to the prince and governor of all things, or the supreme monarch of the universe;" as thinking it to bear a resemblance of his immutability: which fancy of theirs was before taken notice of by us. However, Philo hereupon occasionally cites this remarkable testimony of Philolaus the Pythagorean: Ἔστι γάρ, φησιν, ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων ὁ Θεὸς, εἷς ἀεὶ ὤν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὅμοιος, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων, "God (saith he) is the prince and ruler over all, always one, stable, immoveable, like to himself, but unlike to every thing else." To which may be added what in Stobæus is further recorded out of the same Phi-

* According to that Νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος, p. 23.
† Porphyr. de Vit. Pyth. p. 194. [Ed. Cantab. p. 35. Ed. Kusteri.]
[3] We have already treated at some length concerning Empedocles and his philosophy, on ch. 1. especially on sect. 24.
‡ P. 23. [P. 22. opp.]

lolaus:* Ἦν ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος, καὶ εἰς αἰῶνα διαμένει, εἷς ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τῶ συγγενέως καὶ κρατίστω κυβερνώμενος, "This world was from eternity, and will remain to eternity, one governed by one, which is cognate and the best." Where notwithstanding he seemeth, with Ocellus, to maintain the world's pre-eternity. And again: Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἔχειν ἔλεγε, κόσμον ἦμεν ἐνέργειαν ἀΐδιον θεῶ τε καὶ γενέσιος, "Wherefore, said Philolaus, the world might well be called the eternal energy or effect of God, and of successive generation."

Jamblichus,[4] in his Protreptics,† cites a passage out of Archytas, another Pythagorean, to the same purpose: Ὅστις ἀναλύσαι οἷός τέ ἐστι, πάντα τὰ γένεα ὑπὸ μίαν τε καὶ αὐτὰν ἀρχὰν, οὗτος δοκεῖ μοι καλὰν σκοπιὰν εὑρηκέναι, ἀφ' οὗ δυνατὸς ἐσσεῖται τὸν θεὸν κατοψεῖσθαι, &c., "Whosoever is able to reduce all kinds of things under one and the same principle, this man seems to me to have found out an excellent specula, or high station, from whence he may be able to take a large view and prospect of God, and of all other things; and he shall clearly perceive, that God is the beginning and end, and middle of all things, that are performed according to justice and right reason." Upon which words of Archytas Jamblichus thus glosseth; "Archytas here declares the end of all theological speculation to be this, not to rest in many principles, but to reduce all things under one and the same head." Adding, Τοιαύτη ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἑνὸς τέλος ἐστὶ πάσης θεωρίας, "That this knowledge of the first unity, the original of all things, is the end of all contemplation." Moreover, Stobæus cites this out of Archytas' book of principles, viz. That besides matter and form,‡ Ἀναγκαιοτέραν τινὰ εἶμεν αἰτίαν, τὰν κινάσοισαν ἐνεστώτων πραγμάτων ἐπὶ τὰν μορφὼ, ταῦτα δὲ τὰν πράταν δυνάμει, καὶ καθυπερτάταν εἶμεν, ὀνομάζεσθαι δε θεὸν, &c., "There is another more necessary cause, which moving, brings the form to the matter; and that this is the first and most powerful cause, which is fitly called God. So that there are three principles, God, matter, and form; God, the artificer and mover, and matter that which is moved, and form the art introduced into the matter." In which same Stobæan excerption, it also follows afterwards: Δεῖ νόῳ τι κρέσσον εἶναι νόῳ δὲ κρέσσον ἐστὶ, ὅπερ ὀνομάζομεν θεὸν, "That there must be something better than mind; and that this thing better than mind is that which we (properly) call God."

Ocellus also in the same Stobæus thus writeth:§ Συνέχει τὰ μὲν σκάνεα ζωὰ, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ψυχά· τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἁρμονία,

* Eccl. Phys. p. 41.

[4] From whom Dr. Th. Gale has extracted these fragments of Archytas, and inserted them among other fragments of the Pythagoreans in his Opuscula Veterum Mythologic. et Physic. p. 735. together with the elegant and accurate version of J. North.

† Cap. 4. p. 20. ‡ Ecl. Ph. p. 82. § P. 32. [Lib. 1. cap. 16.]

ταύτας δ' αἴτιον ὁ Θεός· τοὺς δ' οἴκως καὶ τὰς πόλιας ὁμόνοια, ταύτας δ' αἴτιον νόμος, "Life contains the bodies of animals, the cause of which life is the soul; concord contains houses and cities, the cause of which concord is law; and harmony contains the whole world, the cause of which mundane harmony is God." And to the same purpose Aristæus:* *Ὡς ὁ τεχνίτας ποτὶ τὰν τέχναν, οὕτως Θεὸς ποθ' ἁρμονίαν,* "As the artificer is to art, so is God to the harmony of the world." There is also this passage in the same Stobæus [illegible] nonymous Pythagorean: *Θεὸς μέν ἐστιν ἀρχὰ κ* [illegible] *ὁ κόσμος,* "God is the principle, and the fir [illegible] world (though it be not the supreme God) ye [illegible]

Timæus Locrus, a [illegible] r to Plato, in his book concerning Nature, [illegible] he World (upon which Plato's Timæus was b [illegible] entary) plainly acknowledgeth both one supr [illegible] er and governor of the whole world, and also [illegible] his creatures and subordinate ministers; in the close thereof, writing thus concerning the punishment of wicked men after this life: *Ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἁ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἁγεμὼν Θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμω συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων, ὅσα δεδαμιούργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἀρίσταν εἴδεος ἀγεννάτω καὶ αἰωνίω,* "All these things hath Nemesis decreed to be executed in the second circuit by the ministry of vindictive terrestrial demons, that are overseers of human affairs; to which demons that supreme God, the ruler over all, hath committed the government and administration of the world. Which world is completed and made up of gods, men, and other animals, all created according to the best pattern of the eternal and unmade idea." In which words of Timæus there are these three several points of the pagan theology contained; first, that there is one supreme God, eternal and unmade, the creator and governor of the whole world, and who made it according to the best pattern or exemplar of his own ideas and eternal wisdom. Secondly, that this world created by God is compounded and made up of other inferior gods, men, and brute animals. Thirdly, that the supreme God hath committed the administration of our human affairs to demons and inferior gods, who are constant inspectors over us, some of which he also makes use of for the punishment of wicked men after this life. Moreover, in this book of Timæus Locrus, the supreme God is often called *ὁ Θεός*, and sometime *ὁ δαίμων*, "God in way of eminency;" sometime *Νόος*, "Mind;" some-

* P. 45. † P. 8.

[5] Timæus de Anima Mundi in Gale's Opusc. Veter. Mythologic. et Physic, p. 566.

time τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the very Good;" sometime ἀκρὰ τῶν ἀρίστων, "the principle of the best things;" sometime δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος, "the Maker of the better," evil being supposed not to proceed from him; sometime κράτιστον αἴτιον, "the best and most powerful Cause;" sometime ἀρχαγὸς καὶ γενέτωρ ἁπάντων, "the Prince and Parent of all things." Which God, according to him, is not the soul of the world neither, but the creator thereof, he having made the world an animal, and a secondary generated god: Δηλούμενος ὢν ἄριστον γένναμα ποιεῖν, τοῦτον ἐποίει θεὸν γεννατὸν, οὔποκα φθαρησόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλω αἰτίω, ἔξω τῶ αὐτὸν συντεταγμένω θεῶ, εἴποκα δήλετο αὐτὸν διαλύειν, "God, willing to make the world the best that it was capable of, made it a generated god, such as should never be destroyed by any other cause but only by that God himself, who framed it, if he should ever will to dissolve it. But since it is not the part of that which is good to destroy the best of works, the world will doubtless ever remain incorruptible and happy, the best of all generated things, made by the best cause, looking not at patterns artificially framed without him, but the idea and intelligible essence, as the paradigms, which whatsoever is made conformable to, must needs be the best, and such as shall never need to be mended." Moreover, he plainly declares, that this generated god of his, the world, was produced in time, so as to have a beginning: Πρὶν ὠρανὸν γενέσθαι, λόγῳ ἤστην ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς δαμιουργὸς τοῦ βελτίονος, "Before the heaven was made, existed the idea, matter, and God the opifex of the best." Wherefore, whatever Ocellus and Philolaus might do, yet this Timæus held not the world's eternity; wherein he followed not only Pythagoras himself (as we have already showed) but also the generality of the first Pythagoreans, of whom Aristotle pronounces without exception, γεννῶσι γὰρ τὸν κόσμον, "that they generated the world."* Timæus indeed in this book seems to assert the pre-eternity of the matter, as if it were a self-existent principle together with God; and yet Clemens Alexandrinus cites a passage out of him looking another way:† Ἀλλ' ἄντικρυς καὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν καὶ παρ' Ἑλλήνων ἀκοῦσαι τοῖς; Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ συγγράμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὧδέ μοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἀρχὰ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀγένητος, εἰ γὰρ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχὰ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνα ἀρχὰ, ἐξ ἃς ἐγένετο, "Would you hear of one only principle of all things amongst the Greeks? Timæus Locrus, in his book of nature, will bear me witness thereof; he there in express words writing thus, There is one principle of all things unmade: for if it were made it would not be a principle, but that would be the principle

* Met. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 276. tom. 4. opp.]
† Strom. 5. p. 604. [P. 718. Edit. Potteri.]

from whence it was made." Thus we see, that Timæus Locrus asserted one eternal and unmade God, the maker of the whole world, and besides this, another generated god, the world itself animated, with its several parts; the difference betwixt both which gods is thus declared by him: *Θεὸν δὲ, τὸν μὲν αἰώνιον νόος ὁρῇ μόνος, τῶν ἁπάντων ἀρχαγὸν καὶ γενέτορα τουτέων, τὸν δὲ γεννατὸν ὄψει ὁρέομες, κόσμον δὲ τόνδε, καὶ τὰ μέρα αὐτῶ, ὁκόσα ὠράνιά ἐντι,* "That eternal God, who is the prince, original, and parent of all these t[illegible]y by the mind; but the other generated god [illegible] eyes, viz, this world, and those parts of it whi[illegible] that is, the stars, as so many particular gods [illegible] But here it is to be observed, that the eterna[illegible] so called by Timæus, as being without begin[illegible]aving a distinct kind of duration from that [illegible] properly called Æon, or eternity, he therein [illegible]ides: *Εἰκὼν δέ ἐστι τῶ ἀγεννάτω χρόνω, ὃν* [illegible] *μες· ὡς γάρ ποτ' ἀΐδιον παράδειγμα τὸν ἰδάνικ*[illegible] *ανὸς ἐγεννάθη, οὕτως ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα τὸν αἰῶνα ὅοε χρόνος σὺν κόσμῳ ἐδαμιουργήθη,* "Time is but an image of that unmade duration, which we call eternity: wherefore, as this sensible world was made according to that exemplar or pattern of the intelligible world, so was time made together with the world, as an imitation of eternity."[7]

[6] The learned Doctor, if I am not altogether mistaken, labours in vain to prove, that Timæus Locrus did not associate eternal matter with the supreme Being, or, which is the same thing, supposed the world to have been created by God out of nothing. Any one who even cursorily examines his book De Anima Mundi, cannot help perceiving, that he ranked eternal matter and that, too, animated by a certain confused motion, among the first principles of things. *Ταύταν δὲ τὰν ὕλαν*, see these words p. 544. *ἀΐδιον μὲν ἔφα* (Τιμαῖος), *οὐ μὰν ἀκίνητον, ἄμορφον δὲ κατ' αὐτὰν καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, δεχομέναν δὲ πᾶσαν μορφάν,* "This matter he pronounced to be eternal, but immoveable, and of itself without form or figure, yet receiving every form." He here calls the eternal matter with which he supplies his deity, *ἀκίνητον*, or "immoveable." But this must not be understood, as though Timæus supposed it to have been agitated by no motion whatever. With him that is *ἀκίνητον* which is not moved by reason and in order. And this orderly kind of motion he denies to matter, as is put beyond all doubt by what follows soon afterwards, p. 545. *Ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ θεὸς, ὁρῶν τε τὰν ὕλαν δεχομέναν τὰν ἰδέαν καὶ ἀλλοιουμέναν, παντοίως μὲν, ἀτάκτως δὲ, ἔδει τ' εἰς τάξιν αὐτὰν ἄγειν,* "God being good, and observing matter to receive form and to be changed variously but irregularly, he saw that it was necessary to reduce it to order." Nor are we compelled to think otherwise by what the learned Doctor here quotes in order to prove, that Timæus is not to be classed among those who held matter to be eternal. I. Aristotle in saying that all the Pythagoreans "generated the world," does not add, however, that they "generated the world out of nothing." The words which precede and follow clearly show Aristotle's meaning to be simply this, that the Pythagoreans did not hold the form of the world to be eternal, as the Stagirite himself supposed: he does not deny them to have regarded matter as eternal. II. The passage of Timæus quoted from Clemens is of no weight against the express testimonies which may be collected from the book. For, setting aside that it admits of being explained so as not to oppose the eternity of matter, it is impossible for any one to determine the sense of a few words like these, unless they were restored to their own place in the context.

[7] I should hardly consider this passage of Timæus sufficient to prove, that he held

It hath been already observed,* that Onatus, another Pythagorean, took notice of an opinion of some in his time, that there was one only God, who comprehended the whole world, and no other gods besides, or, at least, none such as was to be religiously worshipped; himself in the mean time asserting, that there was both one God and many gods; or, besides one supreme and universal Numen, many other inferior and particular deities, to whom also men ought to pay religious worship. Now his further account of both these assertions is contained in these following words:† Τοὶ δέ λέγοντες ἕνα θεὸν εἶμεν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πολλὼς, ἁμαρτάνοντι· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον ἀξίωμα τῆς θείας ὑπεροχῆς οὐ συνθεωροῦντι· λέγω δὲ τὸ ἄρχεν καὶ καθηγέεσθαι τῶν ὁμοίων, καὶ κράτιστον καὶ καθυπέρτερον εἶμεν τῶν ἄλλων· τοὶ δ' ἄλλοι θεοὶ ποτὶ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ νοητὸν οὕτως ἔχοντι, ὥσπερ χορευτὰ ποτὶ κορυφαῖον, καὶ στρατιώτα ποτὶ στραταγὸν, καὶ λοχίτα καὶ ἐντεταγμένοι ποτὶ ταξιάρχαν καὶ λοχαρχέταν, ἔχοντε φύσιν, ἕπεσθαι καὶ ἐπακολουθεῖν τῷ καλῶς καθηγεομένῳ· κοινὸν μὲν τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ ἔργον ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ἄρχοντι, καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων· ἀλλ' οὐκέτι ὦνναντο συντετάχθαι τοὶ ἀρχόμενοι ποτὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἀπολειφθέντες ἁγεμόνος· ὥσπερ οὐδὲ χορευταὶ ποτὶ συνῳδίαν, οὐδὲ στρατιῶ ται ποτὶ στρατηγίαν, ἀπολειφθέντες ἁγεμόνος, τοὶ μὲν στραταγῶ, τοὶ δὲ κορυφαιω, "They who maintain, that there is only one God,

eternity to be duration without any succession. Time according to him is that which is produced by the annual conversion of the sun and stars: Ὁ θεὸς, says he, ἐκόσμησεν τὰς περιόδους σὺν κόσμῳ· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πρὸ κόσμῳ ἄστρα, "God ordered time, or the conversions of time, together with the world: for before the world there were no stars." But those also, who have a conception of parts or a certain succession in eternity, acknowledge, that that time which is produced by the motion of the stars, did not exist before the world. Therefore, Timæus' denying that time existed before the origin of the stars, does not show him to have attributed a continuous eternity to God. Besides, the fact of his asserting time to have been made according to the pattern of eternity proves, that he considered time to resemble eternity, and eternity time. But, take away succession from eternity, and you cannot understand what similitude there is between time and eternity, or how time could be formed after the model of eternity. To show the possibility of any one's denying time to have existed before the creation of the world, and yet not acknowledging, that eternity is without all succession, I shall quote a passage of Cicero's on this subject, from De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 2891. tom. 9. opp.: Sæcula nunc dico, non ea, quæ dierum noctiumque numero annuis cursibus conficiuntur: nam fateor, ea sine mundi conversione effici non potuisse: sed fuit quædam ab infinito tempore æternitas, quam nulla temporum circumscriptio metiebatur, *spatio* tamen, qualis ea fuerit, intelligi potest: quod ne in cogitationem quidem cadit, ut fuerit tempus aliquod, nullum quum tempus esset, "I now speak of ages, not those which are formed by the number of days and nights in their annual courses: for those I acknowledge could not be produced without the revolution of the world: but there was a certain eternity from infinity, which was measured by no circumscription of time, the nature of which notwithstanding can be understood from *space*: which is not in thought even conceived to have been time, since no time existed." These are the words of Velleius the Epicurean; who, like Timæus, denies time to have existed before the stars were, and still does not suppose eternity to be without succession and parts, as he affirms that there were ages before time. Nec enim, says he, si mundus nullus erat, *sæcula* non erant, "For, if there was no world, it does not follow that there were not *ages*." He grants therefore that in thought eternity may be distributed into ages.

* Pag. 233. † Stob. Eccl. Phys. p. 5.

and not many gods, are very much mistaken, as not considering aright, what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency chiefly consisteth in, namely, in ruling and governing those which are like to it (that is, gods) and in excelling or surmounting others, and being superior to them. But all those other gods which we contend for, are to that first and intelligible God but as the dancers to the Coryphæus or Choragus, and as the inferior common soldiers to the captain or general; to whom it properly belongeth t[illegible] mply with their leader and commander. The w[illegible] mmon, or the same to them both, to the ruler, ar[illegible] e ruled; but they that are ruled could not ord[illegible] d agree together into one work were they desti[illegible]; as the singers and dancers could not conspire t[illegible] e dance and harmony, were they destitute of a C[illegible] oldiers make up one orderly army, were they witl[illegible] r commander."

And as the suprem[illegible] alled by Onatus the Coryphæus of the gods, so is he in [illegible] manner by the writer De Mundo,[8] styled the Coryphæus of the world, or the Præcentor and Præsultor of it, in these words: *Καθάπερ ἐν χορῷ, κορυφαίου κατάρξαντος, συνεπηχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ γυναικῶν, ἐν διαφόροις φωναῖς ὀξυτέραις καὶ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἁρμονιαν ἐμμελῆ κεραννύντων, οὕτως ἔχει καὶ ἐπί τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ· κατὰ γὰρ τὸ ἄνωθεν ἐνδύσιμον ὑπὸ τοῦ φερωνύμως ἂν κορυφαίου προσαγορευθέντος, κινεῖται μὲν τὰ ἄστρα ἀεὶ καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανός,* "As in a chorus, when the Coryphæus or Præcentor hath begun, the whole choir compounded of men, and sometimes of women too, followeth, singing every one their part, some in higher and some in lower notes, but all mingling together into one complete harmony; so in the world, God, as the Coryphæus, the Præcentor and Præsultor, beginning the dance and music, the stars and heavens move round after him, according to those numbers and measures which he prescribes them, altogether making up one most excellent harmony."

It was also before[9] observed, that Ecphantus the Pythagorean, and Archelaus the successor of Anaxagoras (who were both of them atomists in their physiology) did assert the world to have been made at first, and still to be governed by one divine Mind; which is more than some atomists of ours in this present age, who notwithstanding pretend to be very good Theists, will acknowledge. We shall, in the next place, mention Euclides Megarensis, the head of that sect called Megaric, and who is said to have been Plato's master for some time after Socrates' death; whose doctrine is thus set down by Laërtius:[10] *Οὗτος ἓν*

[8] Cap. 6. p. 861. 862. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.
[9] See ch. 1. sect. 26.
[10] Lib. 2. segm. 106. p. 142.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ φρόνησιν, ὁτὲ δὲ Θεὸν, καὶ ἄλλοτε Νοῦν, καὶ τὰ λοιπά. τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ Ἀγαθῷ, ἀνῄρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων, Which we understand thus, "That Euclides (who followed Xenophanes and Parmenides) made the first principle of all things to be one the very Good, called sometimes Wisdom, sometimes God, sometimes Mind, and sometimes by other names; but that he took away all, that is opposite to good, denying it to have any real entity:" that is, he maintained, that there was no positive nature of evil, or that evil was no principle.[1] And thus do we also understand that of Cicero,[2] when he represents the doctrine of the Megarics after this manner: Id bonum solum esse, quod esset Unum, et Simile, et Idem, et Semper; to wit, that they spake this concerning God, that Good or Goodness itself is a name properly belonging to him, who is also One, and Like, and the Same, and Always; and that the true good of man consisteth in a participation of, and conformity with this first Good. Which doctrine Plato seems to have derived from him, he in like manner calling the supreme Deity by those two names, τὸ ἓν and τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the One" and "the Good," and concluding true human felicity to consist in a participation of the first Good, or of the divine Nature.

In the next place we shall take notice of Antisthenes, who was the founder also of another sect, to wit, the Cynic; for he, in a certain physiological treatise, is said to have affirmed:[3] Esse populares deos multos, sed naturalem unum; "That though there were many popular gods, yet there was but one natural God:" or, as it is expressed in Lactantius:[4] Unum esse naturalem Deum, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares, "That there was but one natural God, though nations and cities had their several popular ones." Wherefore Velleius the Epicurean in Cicero[5] quarrels with this Antisthenes, as one who destroyed the nature of the gods, because he denied a multitude of independent deities, such as Epicurus pretended to assert. For this of Antisthenes is not so to be understood, as if he had therein designed to take away all the inferior gods of the Pagans, which had he at all attempted, he would doubtless have been accounted an Atheist, as well as Anaxagoras was; but his meaning was, only to interpret the theology of the Pagans concerning those other gods of theirs, that were or might be looked upon as abso-

[1] Or to explain the thing more clearly in the language of philosophers: "He maintained evil to be privation."

[2] Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. cap. 42. p. 2325. tom. 8. opp.

[3] Cicero records this saying of Antisthenes, De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2898. tom. 9. opp.

[4] De Ira Dei cap. 11. p. 934. But in Divinar. Institut. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 36. he exhibits Antisthenes' dogma, as it stands in Cicero.

[5] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p, 2898.

lute and independent; that these, though many popular gods, yet indeed were but one and the same natural God, called by several names. As, for example, when the Greeks worshipped Zeus, the Latins Jovis, the Egyptians Hammon, the Babylonians Bel, the Scythians Pappæus; these were indeed many popular gods, yet nevertheless all but one and the same natural God. So again, when in the self-same pagan cities and countries, the respective laws thereof made mention of several gods, as supreme and absolute in their [illegible], as Jupiter in the heavens, Juno in the air, Nep[illegible]r, as being chief in several kinds of functions, as [illegible]ning, Bellona for war, &c. (for this Aristotle t[illegible] his book against Zeno:[6] κατὰ τὸν νόμον, πολ[illegible]ων οἱ θεοὶ, "That according to the laws of ci[illegible], one god was best for one thing, and another f[illegible]thenes here declared concerning these also, th[illegible]ed many popular, or civil gods, but all really o[illegible]atural God.[7]

To Antisthenes might be added Diogenes Sinopensis, of whom it is recorded by Laërtius,[8] that observing a woman too superstitiously worshipping the statue or image of a god, endeavouring to abate her superstition, he thus bespake her: Οὐκ εὐλαβῇ, ὦ γύναι, μή ποτε Θεοῦ ὄπισθεν ἑστῶτος (πάντα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ πλήρη) ἀσχημονήσῃς, "Take you not care, O woman, of not behaving yourself unseemly, in the sight of that God, who stands behind you; for all things are full of him:" thereby giving her occasion, more to mind and regard that supreme and universal Numen, that filleth the whole world and is every where.

XXIII. It hath been frequently affirmed, that Socrates died a martyr for one only God, in opposition to those many gods of the Pagans; and Tertullian,[9] for one, writeth thus of him, Propterea damnatus est Socrates, quia deos destruebat, "Socrates was therefore condemned to die, because he destroyed the gods." And indeed that Socrates asserted one supreme God, the maker and governor of the whole world, is a thing not at all to be

[6] Cap. 4. p. 782. t. 2. opp.

[7] This interpretation however of Antisthenes' saying: "That there were many popular gods, but only one natural God," is too far-fetched and does not appear to correspond to the signification of the words. For who will readily believe Antisthenes to have meant by these words, "that the gods of the several nations were merely so many different names of one supreme Being?" Because the learned Doctor was himself imbued with this opinion, he therefore could easily discover it in the words of Antisthenes; but we who hold this opinion to be doubtful are not able to do so. I consider the meaning of the father of the Cynics to have been evidently this: That, although the various nations made many gods, still these were not naturally gods, there being but one deity who is of himself and by his own nature God. So also was this dogma understood by Lactantius.

[8] Lib. 6. segm. 37. p. 333.

[9] In Apologet. cap. 14. p. 144. ed Havercampii.

doubted. In his discourse with Aristodemus, in Xenophon's first book of Memoirs,[10] he convinced him that the things of this world were not made by chance, but by Mind and Counsel: Οὕτω γε σκοπουμένῳ πάνυ ἔοικε ταῦτα σοφοῦ τινος δημιουργοῦ καὶ φιλοζώου τεχνήματι, "I am now convinced from what you say, that the things of this world were the workmanship of some wise Artificer, who also was a lover of animals." And so he endeavoured to persuade him, that that mind and understanding which is in us, was derived from some mind and understanding in the universe, as well as that earth and water which is in us, from the earth and water of the universe:[1] Σὺ δὲ σεαυτὸν φρόνιμόν τι δοκεῖς ἔχειν, ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ οὐδὲν φρόνιμον εἶναι, εἰδὼς, ὅτι γῆς τε μικρὸν μέρος ἐν τῷ σώματι πολλῆς οὔσης ἔχεις, καὶ ὑγροῦ βραχὺ, πολλοῦ ὄντος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δήπου μεγάλων ὄντων ἑκάστου μικρὸν μέρος λαβόντι τὸ συνήρμοσταί σοι; νοῦν δὲ μόνον ἄρα οὐδαμοῦ ὄντα σε εὐτυχῶς πως δοκεῖς συναρπάσαι, "Do you think that you only have wisdom in yourself, and that there is none any where else in the whole world without you? though you know that you have but a small part in your body of that vast quantity of the earth which is without you; and but little of that water and fire, and so of every other thing, that your body is compounded of, in respect of that great mass and magazine of them which is in the world. Is mind and understanding therefore the only thing, which you fancy you have some way or other, luckily got and snatched unto yourself, whilst there is no such thing any where in the world without you; all those infinite things thereof being thus orderly disposed by chance?" And when Aristodemus afterwards objected, that he could not see any artificer that made the world, as he could those artificers which made all other human things, Socrates thus replies: Οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν σεαυτοῦ σύ γε ψυχὴν ὁρᾷς, ἣ τοῦ σώματος κυρία ἐστίν· ὥστε κατά γε τοῦτο ἔξεστί σοι λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ γνώμῃ ἀλλὰ τύχῃ πάντα πράττεις, "Neither do you see your own soul, which rules over your body; so that you might for the same reason conclude yourself to do nothing by mind and understanding neither, but all by chance, as well as that all things in the world are done by chance." Again, when he further disputed in this manner

[10] These are not Socrates' words, but those of Aristodemus to Socrates, in Xenophon's Memorab. Socrat. p. 573 opp.

[1] I cannot see that Socrates says in these words what Dr. Cudworth makes him say, that the minds of men were derived from the mind of the whole universe. In this discourse with Aristodemus, Socrates decides nothing as to the origin and nature of the mind, his object being to prove that this world was both made by God, and is administered and governed by him. In the English version, however, there are more words than answer to the Greek. Dr. Cudworth, in quoting passages of ancient Greek authors frequently supplies them with free and paraphrastic translations: a custom which I have thought proper to follow in all instances, where no injury is done to the sense.

against the necessity of worshipping the Deity: Οὐχ ὑπερορῶ τὸ δαιμόνιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἡγοῦμαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς ἐμῆς θεραπείας προσδεῖσθαι, "I despise not the Deity, O Socrates, but think him to be a more magnificent being than that he should stand in need of my worship of him:" Socrates again answers: Ὅσῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον ἀξιοῖ σε θεραπεύειν, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον τιμητέον αὐτό, "How much the more magnificent and illustrious that being is which takes care of you, so much the more, in al[illegible] it to be honoured by you." Lastly, Aristodemus [illegible] disbelief of providence, as a thing which seeme[illegible]ible, if not impossible, that one and the same D[illegible] able to mind all things at once, Socrates ende[illegible] this disbelief of his in this manner: Ὦ ἀγαθέ, [illegible]ὶ ὁ σὸς νοῦς ἐνὼν τὸ σὸν σῶμα, ὅπως βούλεται [illegible]οῖεσθαι οὖν χρὴ, καὶ τὴν ἐν παντὶ φρόνησιν τὰ π[illegible] αὐτῇ ἡδὺ ἢ οὕτω τίθεσθαι· καὶ μὴ τὸ σὸν μὲν [illegible] ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια ἐξικνεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ [illegible]ατον εἶναι ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷν, "Consider, friend, I pray you, it that mind, which is in your body, does order and dispose it every way as it pleases; why should not that wisdom which is in the universe be able to order all things therein also, as seemeth best to it? And if your eye can discern things several miles distant from it, why should it be thought impossible for the eye of God to behold all things at once? Lastly, if your soul can mind things both here and in Egypt, and in Sicily; why may not the great mind or wisdom of God be able to take care of all things, in all places?" And then he concludes, that if Aristodemus would diligently apply himself to the worship of God, he should at length be convinced, Ὅτι τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ θεῖον, ὥθ' ἅμα πάντα ὁρᾷν, καὶ πάντα ἀκούειν, καὶ πανταχοῦ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἅμα πάντων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, "That God is such and so great a being, as that he can, at once, see all things, and hear all things, and be present every where, and take care of all affairs." Moreover, Socrates, in his discourse with Euthydemus, in Xenophon's fourth book, speaks thus concerning that invisible Deity which governs the whole world: Οἱ γὰρ ἄλλοι θεοὶ ἡμῖν τὰ ἀγαθὰ διδόντες, οὐδὲν τούτων εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἰόντες διδόασιν, καὶ ὁ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συντάττων τε καὶ συνέχων, ἐν ᾧ πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά ἐστι, &c. οὗτος τὰ μέγιστα μὲν πράττων ὁρᾶται, τόδε οἰκονομῶν ἀόρατος ἡμῖν ἐστιν· ἐννοεῖ δὲ καὶ ὁ πᾶσι φανερὸς δοκῶν εἶναι ἥλιος, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑαυτὸν ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾷν, ἀλλ' ἐάν τις αὐτὸν ἀναιδῶς ἐγχειρῇ θεᾶσθαι, τὴν ὄψιν ἀφαιρεῖται, "The other gods giving us good things, do it without visibly appearing to us; and that God, who framed and containeth the whole world (in which are all good and excellent things) and who continually supplieth us with them, he, though

he be seen to do the greatest things of all, yet notwithstanding is himself invisible and unseen. Which ought the less to be wondered at by us, because the sun, who seemeth manifest to all, yet will not suffer himself to be exactly and distinctly viewed, but if any one boldly and impudently gaze upon him, will deprive him of his sight: as also because the soul of man, which most of all things in him partaketh of the Deity, though it be that which manifestly rules and reigns in us, yet is it never seen, ἃ χρὴ κατανοοῦντα μὴ καταφρονεῖν τῶν ἀορατῶν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν γινομένων, τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν καταμανθάνοντα, τιμᾷν τὸ δαιμόνιον, "Which particulars he that considers, ought not to despise invisible things, but to honour the supreme Deity, taking notice of his power from his effects." Where we have τὸ δαιμόνιον, as also before τὸ Θεῖον, plainly put for the "supreme Deity." And we did the rather set down these passages of Socrates here concerning God and Providence, that we might shame those, who, in these latter days of ours, are so atheistically inclined, if at least they have any *pudor* or shame left in them.

But, notwithstanding Socrates' thus clearly acknowledging one supreme and universal Numen, it doth not therefore follow that he rejected all those other inferior gods of the Pagans, as is commonly conceived. But the contrary thereunto appeareth from these very passages of his now cited, wherein there is mention made of other gods besides the supreme. And how conformable Socrates was to the pagan religion and worship, may appear from those last dying words of his, (when he should be most serious,) after he had drunk the poison, wherein he required his friends to offer a votive cock for him to Æsculapius:* for which Origen thus perstringeth him: Καὶ τηλικαῦτα φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν τῆς καλῶς βεβιωκυίας διεξελθόντες, καταλιπόντες τὸ μέγεθος ὧν αὐτοῖς ὁ Θεὸς ἐφανέρωσεν, εὐτελῆ φρονοῦσι καὶ σμικρὰ, ἀλεκτρυόνα τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ἀποδιδόντες, "And they who had philosophized so excellently concerning the soul, and discoursed concerning the happiness of the future state to those who live well, do afterward sink down from these great, high, and noble things, to a superstitious regard of little, small, and trifling matters, such as the paying of a cock to Æsculapius." Where notwithstanding, Origen doth not charge Socrates with such gross and downright idolatry, as he does elsewhere,[2] for his sacrificing to the Pythian Apollo, who was but an inferior demon. And perhaps some may excuse Socrates here, as thinking that he looked upon Æsculapius no otherwise than as the supreme Deity, called by that name, as exercising his provi-

* Cont. Cels. lib. 9. p. 277.

[2] He means no doubt the passage occurring in lib. 7. adv. Celsum. p. 335. in which Origen suspects that the praises bestowed on Socrates by Apollo arose from the circumstance of the philosopher being a constant worshipper of this deity.

dence over the sickness and health or recovery of men, and that therefore he would have an eucharistic sacrifice offered to him in his behalf, as having now cured him at once of all diseases by death.[3] However Plato[4] informs us, that Socrates immediately before he drunk his poison, did εὔχεσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς, τὴν μετοίκησιν τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε εὐτυχῆ εἶναι, "pray (not to God, but to the gods, that is, to the supreme and inferior gods both together, as in Plato's Phædrus he did to Pan, and the other tutelar gods of that place) that his translation from hence into the other world might be happy to him." And Xenophon, in his Memoirs,[5] informs us, that Socrates did, both in his words and practice, approve of that doctrine of the Pythian Apollo, That the rule of piety and religion ought to be the law of every particular city and country; he affirming it to be a vanity for any man to be singular herein. Lastly, in his own apology, as written by Plato, he professes to acknowledge the sun, moon, and stars for gods; condemning the contrary doctrine of Anaxagoras, as irrational and absurd. Wherefore we may well conclude this opinion of Socrates' being condemned for denying the many gods of the Pagans, or of his being a martyr for one only God, to be nothing but a vulgar error.

But if you therefore demand what that accusation of impiety really was which he was charged with, Socrates himself, in Plato's Euthyphro, will inform you, that it was for his free and open condemning those traditions concerning the gods, wherein wicked, dishonest, and unjust actions were imputed to them. For when Euthyphro, having accused his own father as guilty of murder (merely for committing a homicide into prison, who happened to die there) would justify himself from the examples of the gods, namely Jupiter and Saturn, because Jupiter, the best and justest of the gods, had committed his father Saturn to prison for devouring his sons, as Saturn himself also had castrated his father Cælius for some miscarriages of his, Socrates thus bespeaks him: Ἀράγε, ὦ Εὐθύφρον, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν, οὗ ἕνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπειδάν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λέγῃ, δυσχερῶς πως ἀποδέχομαι, &c. "Is not this the very thing, O

[3] For my part I do not approve of this explication of Socrates' concluding words. Nor do I understand how any one could recommend a cock to be sacrificed to a part or department, as it were, of divine providence. Still, I do not agree with those, who derive from these words matter for grave charge against Socrates and suppose them to prove beyond controversy, that he was as superstitious as the rest of the Athenian people. Socrates uttered them on the point of death and some time after he had drunk the poison, when he was already become nearly torpid. Who then would be so bold as to affirm, that a man speaking in such circumstances was still conscious of what he was teaching his disciples. Probably his mind was already affected, and his reason so impaired, that he did not clearly understand what he was saying.

[4] In Phædone, p. 402. opp. We have already shown the fallacy of what is here stated respecting Socrates' prayers to Pan.

[5] Lib. 4. p. 634. opp.

Euthyphro, for which I am accused? namely, because when I hear any one affirming such matters as these concerning the gods, I am very loth to believe them, and stick not publicly to declare my dislike of them? And can you, O Euthyphro, in good earnest think, that there are indeed wars and contentions among the gods, and that those other things were also done by them, which poets and painters commonly impute to them? such as the *Peplum* or veil of Minerva, which in the Panathenaics is with great pomp and ceremony brought into the Acropolis, is embroidered all over with?" Thus we see that Socrates, though he asserted one supreme Deity, yet he acknowledged, notwithstanding, other inferior created gods, together with the rest of the Pagans, honouring and worshipping them; only he disliked those poetic fables concerning them (believed at that time by the vulgar), in which all manner of unjust and immoral actions were fathered on them; which, together with the envy of many, was the only true reason, why he was then accused of impiety and atheism.[6]

[6] The conclusion here arrived at by the worthy Doctor respecting the religion of Socrates in opposition to received opinions, is a just and wise one; and since his time has been corroborated at some length by the most learned J. Le Clerc, in the Sylvæ Philologicæ subjoined to his Dialogues of Æschines the Socratic, cap. 3. entitled De Socrate, p. 177. &c. Nor ought we to listen to those, among whom are many of the early Christian fathers, who tell us, that Socrates was put to death for no other reason than because he professed one God, and denied the existence of more than one; nor, again, should those be regarded, who maintain that he wholly assented to the common religions of the Greeks, and entertained the same notions regarding the gods, as the rest of the Athenian people. Socrates occupied as it were an intermediate position between the professors of one God and the worshippers of idle deities. The illustrious man, as is manifest from Xenophon and Plato, believed in the existence of one supreme Being, the maker and framer of all things: but to this deity he supposed many natures more noble than man to be subject and to be appointed by him over certain offices; to which it behoves us to pay religious homage. These natures he considered to be the gods worshipped at that period by the Greeks and Athenians. On which account he discarded the poetic fables, as by no means applying to such gods, but wished the ceremonies and rites themselves to be retained and tolerated, till by the blessing of the supreme Being mankind should have become more enlightened. Hence it is not to be wondered at, that, as Xenophon at the very commencement of his Memoirs informs us, he both sacrificed to the gods, and attached some importance to divination. Socrates and the Athenian people were united in the worship only of the gods: their opinions respecting these gods were altogether different. The people in supplicating Mercury, prayed to that Mercury of whom the poets sung, the son of Maia, the patron of thieves and the messenger of the gods. But Socrates, when discharging the same duty, rejected such fables, and worshipped a certain divine and powerful nature, to which he supposed the omnipotent Being who controls all things had committed a portion of his own power. And the same I should wish to be understood of the other deities, to which Socrates is said to have sacrificed like the rest of the Athenians. But the people, and doubtless the priests themselves, regarded with displeasure any attempt to throw discredit upon those fables respecting the gods, upon which the whole of the public religion was based. The priests at least could not be so short-sighted as not to perceive, that, if these fictions of the poets were once thoroughly rooted out of men's minds, the time would soon arrive, when the festivals themselves, which owed their origin to the poetic fables, as also the sacrifices, images, statues, signs, temples, and last of all the priests, would be abandoned and dispensed with. Socrates was said, therefore, to introduce new gods and a new religion, and on this charge was arraigned before his judges. Nor, I must candidly confess, do I consider this to have been done unjustly, or in defiance of truth. Socrates himself, indeed, in Plato, repels the charge, nor is

It hath been also affirmed by many, that Plato really asserted one only God and no more, and that therefore, whensoever he speaks of gods plurally, he must be understood to have done this, not according to his own judgment, but only in a way of politic compliance with the Athenians, and for fear of being made to drink poison in like manner as Socrates was. In confirmation of which opinion, there is also a passage cited out of that thirteenth epistle of Plato's to Dionysius, wherein he gives this as a mark, wher[illegible] epistles, and such as were written according to [illegible] of his own mind, might by his friends be di[illegible]n those which were otherwise: Τῆς μὲν γὰρ [illegible]πτολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχει, θεοὶ δέ τῆς ἥττον, "When I [illegible]es with God, then may you conclude I write se[illegible]ot so when I begin with gods."* And this pla[illegible]herefore the more authentic, because it was long [illegible] by Eusebius to this very purpose, namely to p[illegible]o acknowledged one only God: Δῆλος δέ ἐστιν [illegible], εἰ καὶ συνήθως Ἕλλησι, τῇ τῶν πλειόνων εἴωθε χρῆσθαι προσηγορίᾳ, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, ἐν ᾗ σύμβολα διδοὺς, τῶν τε διὰ σπουδῆς αὐτῷ γραφομένων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλως ἀπερρίμμένων· "It is manifest, that Plato really acknowledged one only God, however, in compliance with the language of the Greeks, he often spake of gods plurally, from that epistle of his to Dionysius, wherein he gives this symbol or mark, whereby he might be known to write seriously, namely, when he began his epistles with God, and not with gods."

Notwithstanding which, we have already manifested out of Plato's Timæus, that he did in good earnest assert a plurality of

Xenophon less strenuous in rebutting it. But I would sooner believe the Athenian people than Socrates and Xenophon. The Athenians believed the Jupiter whom they worshipped to be the son of Saturn, the husband of Juno, the father of the gods, the ruler of thunder, and the brother of Pluto and Neptune; and with them the entire worship of Jupiter was based upon these opinions, as upon sound and sure foundations. But Socrates rejected all these stories and taught, that Jupiter was the supreme creator and lord of the universe. Wherefore, although he propitiated Jupiter with the same ceremonies as the rest of his countrymen, still the Jupiter he imagined to himself was very different from the Jupiter of the Athenians and consequently a new god and a new Jupiter, hitherto unknown to the Greeks. So far, therefore, Socrates was justly accused by Anytus and Melitus of introducing new gods into the city. For, while he allowed the names and rites of the Grecian gods to remain, by discarding the poetic fables he took away the gods themselves and substituted others of his own creation into their place. It is to be regretted, indeed, that a genius like that of Socrates did not ascend higher and investigate more minutely the nature of true religion. But he was prevented most probably from proceeding further in the search of truth by the peculiar constitution of his own mind, which was signally propense to doubt and too regardless of incorporeal subjects. Thus, if we except a few favourite dogmas on God and divine things, he held all speculations as well on physical matters as on those which consist in contemplation alone, to be altogether uncertain. For on subjects of this kind, he considered, that mankind could arrive at nothing satisfactory without some special revelation of the Deity.

* Præp. Ev. lib. 11. cap. 13. [p. 530.]

gods; by which gods of his are to be understood animated or intellectual beings superior to men, to whom there is an honour and worship from men due; he therein declaring,* not only the sun, and moon, and stars, but also the earth itself (as animated) to be a god or goddess. For though it be now read in our copies, πρεσβυτάτην σωμάτων, "that the earth was the oldest of all the bodies within the heavens;" yet it is certain that anciently it was read otherwise, πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν, "the oldest of the gods;" not only from Proclus and Cicero, but also from Laërtius[7] writing thus: Γῆν δὲ πρεσβυτάτην μὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ θεῶν, γενέσθαι δὲ δημιούργημα, ὡς νύκτα καὶ ἡμέραν ποιεῖν, οὖσαν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου, κινεῖσθαι περὶ τὸ μέσον, "Though Plato's gods were for the most part fiery, yet did he suppose the earth to be a god or goddess too, affirming it to be the oldest of all the gods within the heavens, made or created to distinguish day and night, by its diurnal circumgyration upon its own axis, in the middle or centre of the world." For Plato, when he wrote his Timæus, acknowledged only the diurnal motion of the earth, though afterwards he is said to have admitted its annual too. And the same might be further evinced from all his other writings, but especially his book of laws (together with his Epinomis) said to have been written by him in his old age, in which he much insists upon the godships of the sun, moon, and stars; and complains, that the young gentlemen of Athens were then so much infected with that Anaxagorean doctrine, which made them to be nothing but inanimate stones and earth; as also he approves of that then vulgarly received custom of worshipping the rising and setting sun and moon, as gods, to which, in all probability, he conformed himself:† Ἀνατέλλοντός τε ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, καὶ πρὸς δυσμὰς ἰόντων, προσκυλίσεις ἅμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ Βαρβάρων πάντων, ἐν συμφοραῖς παντοίαις ἐχομένων καὶ ἐν εὐπραγίαις, ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ὄντων, καὶ οὐδαμῇ ὑποψίαν ἐνδιδόντων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ θεοί, "The prostrations and adorations that are used both by the Greeks and all Barbarians, towards the rising and setting sun and moon (as well in their prosperities as adversities) declare them to be unquestionably esteemed gods." Wherefore, we cannot otherwise conclude but that this thirteenth epistle of Plato to Dionysius, though extant it seems, before Eusebius' time, yet was supposititious and counterfeit by some zealous but ignorant Christian: as there is accordingly a Νοθεύεται, or brand of bastardy, prefixed to it in all the editions of Plato's works.

* P. 40. Ser.

[7] Lib. 3. segm. 75. p. 211. But we have shown above, that the reading in Plato's Timæus, where he speaks of the earth, ought to be θεῶν, instead of σωμάτων, as given in the MSS.

† De Leg. 10. [p. 664. opp.]

However, though Plato acknowledged and worshipped many gods, yet is it undeniably evident, that he was no polyarchist, but a monarchist, an assertor of one supreme God, the only *αὐτοφυὴς*, or "self-originated being," the maker of the heaven and earth, and of all those other gods. For first, it is plain, that, accor ling to Plato, the soul of the whole world was not itself eter ıal, much less self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, though indeed before its body, the world, from these words of his:* [illegible] *ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανι* [illegible] *ὸς νεωτέραν, ὁ δὲ καὶ γενέσει καὶ ἀρετῇ προτέραν κα* [illegible] *ψυχὴν σώματος, ὡς δεσπότιν καὶ ἄρξουσαν ἀρξομέν* [illegible], "God did not fabricate or make the soul of the [illegible] me order that we now treat concerning it, that is, [illegible] unior to it; but that which was to rule over the w [illegible] ly, being more excellent, he made it first, and s [illegible] ge." Upon which account, Aristotle quarrels wi [illegible] radicting himself, in that he affirmed the soul to be a princi [illegible] and yet supposed it not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven:† Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ Πλάτωνί γε οἷόν τε λέγειν, ἣν οἴεται ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ἐνίοτε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν, ὕστερον γὰρ καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ ἡ ψυχή, "Neither is it possible for Plato here to extricate himself, who sometimes declares the soul to be a principle, as that which moves itself, and yet affirms it again not to be eternal, but made together with the heaven." For which cause some Platonists conclude, that Plato asserted a double Psyche, one the third hypostasis of his trinity, and eternal; the other created in time, together with the world, which seems to be a probable opinion. Wherefore, since, according to Plato, the soul of the world, which is the chief of all his inferior gods, was not self-existent, but made or produced by God in time, all those other gods of his, which were but parts of the world, as the sun, moon, stars, and demons, must needs be so too. But lest any should suspect, that Plato might, for all that, suppose the world and its gods not to have been made by one only unmade God, but by a multitude of co-ordinate, self-existent principles, or deities conspiring; we shall observe, that the contrary hereunto is plainly declared by him, in way of answer to that query, whether or no there were many and infinite worlds (as some philosophers had maintained), or only one? he resolving it thus:‡ Πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον; ἕνα, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸ παράδειγμα δεδημιουργημένος ἔσται· τὸ γὰρ περιέχον πάντα ὁπόσα νοητὰ ζῶα, μεθ' ἑτέρου δεύτερον οὐκ ἄν ποτ' εἴη, &c. ἵνα οὖν τόδε κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ, διὰ

* Plat. Tim. p. 34. [P. 528. opp.]
† Arist. Met. lib. 14. cap. 6. [P. 478. tom. 4. opp.]
‡ Tim. p. 31. [P. 527. edit. Ficini.]

ταῦτα οὔτε δύο οὔτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστι τε καὶ ἔσεται, "Whether have we rightly affirmed, that there is only one heaven (or world), or is it more agreeable to reason, to hold many or infinite? We say there is but one, if it be made agreeable to its intellectual paradigm, containing the ideas of all animals and other things in it; for there can be but one archetypal animal, which is the paradigm of all created beings: wherefore, that the world may agree with its paradigms in this respect of solitude or oneliness, therefore is it not two, nor infinite, but one only begotten." His meaning is, that there is but one archetypal Mind, the Demiurgus, or maker of all things that were produced, and therefore but one world.

And this one God, which, according to Plato, was the maker of the whole world, is frequently called by him, in his Timæus and elsewhere, ὁ Θεὸς, "God," or "the God," by way of excellency; sometimes ὁ Δημιουργὸς, "the Architect or Artificer of the world;" sometimes ὁ Ποιητὴς καὶ Πατὴρ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, "the Maker and Father of this universe," whom it is hard to find out, but impossible to declare to the vulgar. Again, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεὸς, "the God over all;" τῆς φύσεως Κτιστὴς, "the Creator of nature;" τοῦ παντὸς Ἀρχὴ, "the sole Principle of the universe;" πάντων Αἴτιον, "the Cause of all things;" Νοῦς πάντων βασιλεὺς, "Mind, the king of all things;" Νοῦς αὐτοκράτωρ, πάντα κοσμῶν, διὰ πάντων ἰὼν, "that sovereign Mind, which orders all things, and passes through all things; τοῦ παντὸς Κυβερνήτης, "the Governor of the whole;" τὸ ὂν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, "that which always is, and was never made;" ὁ πρῶτος Θεὸς, "the first God;" ὁ μέγιστος Δαίμων, and ὁ μέγιστος θεῶν, "the greatest God," and "the greatest of the gods;" ὁ ἥλιον γεννήσας, "he that generated or produced the sun;"[8] ὁ γῆν, οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν ᾅδου καὶ ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται,* "he that makes earth, and heaven, and the gods; and doth all things, both in heaven and hell, and under the earth." Again,[9] he by whose efficiency the things of

* De Rep. lib. 10. [P. 511.]

[8] Not having found these words in the part of Plato pointed out by the learned Doctor, I suspected, that in hastily glancing over book 10. De Legibus he had inadvertently applied what Plato there says of the soul of the world to God, and had added some words of his own. For, in p. 667. Plato tells us, that the soul of the world governs the universe, and πάντα τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν περιάγειν, "causes all things in heaven, and earth, and the sea to move." But I abandoned this idea on meeting with the very words in another place, namely, De Republica, lib. 10. p. 511.

[9] Plato, in his Sophista, p. 168. distributes the creative power, or δύναμις ποιητική, into *human* and *divine*, but defines this power generally thus: Ποιητικὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαν ἔφαμεν εἶναι, ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνεται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι, "We affirm all that to be creative power, which is the cause of things existing that did not exist before." That Dr. Cudworth should refer this definition to

the world ὕστερον ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα, "were afterwards made when they were not before;" or "from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being." This philosopher somewhere intimating, that it was as easy for God to produce those real things, the sun, moon, stars, and earth, &c., from himself, as it is for us to produce the images of ourselves and whatsoever else we please, only by interposing a looking-glass. Lastly, he is called,[10] ὃς πάντα τ[illegible]ζεται, καὶ ἑαυτὸν, "he that causeth or produce[illegible] things, and even himself;" the meaning whereof [illegible]t is αὐτοφυὴς (as the same Plato also calls him) [illegible]ed Being, and from no other cause besides himself [illegible]of all other things." Neither doth Lactantius Firm[illegible] refuse to speak of God after

the Deity himself, I conside[illegible] cannot be denied, that according to Plato's doctrine this creati[illegible]e-eminently to God. But I by no means approve of his inte[illegible]ls, as though they signified, that God made and created all existin[illegible]ng: to which opinion this philosopher was certainly opposed. The learn[illegible] Docto[illegible] was preceded in this view by Marsilius Ficinus, among others, who, as appears manifest from his index to Plato v. Deus, held this very passage from the Sophist to be sufficient to prove, that Plato entertained the same sentiments regarding the creation of all things, as the professors of the Christian religion: but this is altogether ridiculous. For, to omit other matters, Plato meant this definition of efficient power to be common to the twofold efficiency he is speaking of, namely divine and human. Wherefore, if it be taken in the sense, which these learned men attach to it, the philosopher will be made to assign the power of producing something out of nothing to men also, which is a manifest absurdity. Besides, the words which follow clearly show Plato to be speaking of the production, not of matter itself of which things consist, but of form only.

[10] Namely, De Republica, lib. 10. p. 511. where Plato thus speaks: Ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε τὰ σκεύη ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα ποιεῖ, καὶ ζῶα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν, "For the same artificer is not only able to make all these, but he also produces all things that grow out of the earth, and all animals, as also himself." Which words he afterwards applies to God.

[1] The learned Doctor has confounded together two passages of Lactantius on this argument. One occurs Instit. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 53. where he says: Quia fieri non potest, quin id, quod sit, aliquando esse cœperit; consequens est, ut, quando nihil ante illum fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso procreatus, ideoque ab Apolline αὐτοφυὴς, a Sibylla αὐτογενὴς et ἀγέννητος et ἀποίητος nominatur: quod Seneca, vir acutus, in exhortationibus vidit. Nos, inquit, aliunde pendemus. Itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui, quod est optimum in nobis, animum debeamus. Alius nos edidit, alius instruxit, Deus ipse se fecit, "Forasmuch as it is impossible but that that which exists must have begun to exist, consequently, since nothing was before him, he was procreated from himself, and therefore is called by Apollo αὐτοφυὴς, by the Sibyl αὐτογενὴς, and ἀγέννητος, and ἀποίητος: which Seneca, an acute man, has observed in his exhortations. 'We,' says he, 'depend upon some other. Therefore we look back to some one, to whom we owe our best part, the soul. Another has produced, another has formed us, God made himself.'" The other is in lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 214. Ex se ipso est, ut in libro primo diximus, et ideo talis est, qualem esse voluit, impassibilis, immutabilis, &c., "He is from himself, as we said in the first book, and therefore is such, as he willed himself to be, impassible, immutable." [In like manner concerning God, Aristides, tom. 1. opp. Hymn. in Jovem. p. 5. ed. Canteri. Compare Spanheim, Ad Callimach. p. 8.] In these passages Lactantius philosophizes most corruptly concerning the Deity; and therefore ought not in my opinion to be classed along with those Platonists or even earlier Christian fathers themselves, who discoursed in the same strain, inasmuch as these admitted God to be without end and beginning. For *he is far apart from both.* I am aware, that Lactantius is not without his defenders:

this very manner; that se ipsum fecit, and that he was ex se ipso procreatus, et propterea talis, qualem se esse voluit; "that he made himself; and that being procreated from himself, he therefore was every way such as he willed himself to be." Which unusual and bold strain of theology is very much insisted upon by Plotinus, in his book, Περὶ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ ἑνὸς,* "concerning the will of the first One, or unity;" he there writing thus of the supreme God: Αἴτιον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ δι' αὐτὸν αὐτὸς, "He is the cause of himself, and he is from himself, and himself is for himself." And again: Αὐτός ἐστιν οὗτος ὁ ποιῶν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ κύριος ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ὡς τις ἕτερος ἐθέλησε γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς θέλει αὐτὸς, "This is he, who is the maker of himself, and is lord over himself (in a certain sense); for he was not made that which another willed him to be, but he is that which he willeth himself to be." Moreover:† Αὐτὸς ὢν τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἠγάπησε, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὑποστήσας αὑτὸν, εἴπερ ἐνέργεια μένουσα ὥστε ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, ἀλλὰ ἄλλου μὲν οὐδενὸς, ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ἐνέργημα αὐτὸς, οὐκ ἄρα ὡς συμβέβηκεν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐνεργεῖ αὐτὸς καὶ ὡς αὐτος ἐθέλει, &c. "The supreme Deity loving himself as a pure light, is himself what he loved; thus, as it were, begetting and giving subsistence to himself, he being a standing energy. Wherefore, since God is a work or energy, and yet he is not the work or energy of any other being, he must needs be (in some sense) his own work or energy; so that God is not that which he happened to be, but that which he willeth himself to be." Thus also, a little before:‡ Ἀνακτέον εἰς ἓν τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν· τὸ δὲ θέλειν παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ, ὥστε αὐτὸν πεποιηκέναι αὑτὸν, ὁ λόγος ἀνεῦρεν· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ οἷον ἔργον αὐτοῦ, αὕτη δὲ ταυτὸν τῇ ὑποστάσει αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς ἂν οὕτως ὑποστήσας ἂν εἴη αὐτὸν, ὥστε οὐχ ὅπερ ἔτυχέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ ἐβουλήθη αὐτός, "We must of necessity make will and essence the same in the

but he rejects all vindication, since the fault he is accused of lies not so much in his phraseology as in the whole of the demonstration which he gives. For he openly assumes as a principle, that "that which exists, at some time or other began to exist." From which principle he draws this conclusion: "God exists, therefore he also began to exist." Which being established, he proceeds: "But nothing was before God, from which he could be produced. Therefore God procreated himself." We here see a series of propositions strung together, which render it impossible for us to suppose, that Lactantius, any more than Synesius, Plotinus, and the other Platonists, entertained correct notions or discoursed in a proper strain respecting the Deity. He altogether discarded the eternity of God and connected things, which admit of no connexion and which destroy each other. For what is more foolish than to affirm, that a thing had a beginning and yet was produced from no cause? But there is much more to be met with in Lactantius, showing him to have been a man, who bestowed more time upon the study of eloquence and oratorical embellishment than upon the cultivation of the reasoning powers. Compare the learned J. G. Geret, in his Specimen Examinis Theologiæ Lactantii, Witteb. 1723.4. Quæst. 1. sect. 2. 3. &c. p. 3. &c.

* En. 6. lib. 8. p. 749. [Cap. 14. p. 750.]

† P. 751. ‡ P. 748.

first Being. Wherefore, since his willing is from himself, his being must needs be from himself too; the consequence of which ratiocination is this, that he made himself. For if his volition be from himself, and his own work, and this be the same with his hypostasis or substance, he may be then said to have given subsistence to himself. Wherefore he is not what he happened to be, but what he willed himself to be." But, because this is so unusual a notion, we shall here set down yet one or two passages more of [illegible]'s concerning it:* Οὐκ ἔξω τῆς βουλήσεως αὐτοῦ [illegible]ύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τῇ οἷον οὐσίᾳ ἡ θέλησις· καὶ οὐκ ἔστι [illegible] ἄνευ τοῦ θέλειν ἑαυτῷ ὅπερ ἐστί· καὶ σύνδρομος αὐ[illegible]ν αὐτὸς εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο ὧν ὅπερ θέλει· καὶ ἡ θέλ[illegible] ἕν· καὶ τούτῳ οὐχ ἧττον, ὅτι μὴ ἄλλο αὐτός ὅπερ [illegible] τὸ ὡς ἐβουλήθη ἂν· τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐθέλησε, ἢ το[illegible] γὰρ εἰ ὑποθοίμεθα ἑλέσθαι αὐτῷ ὅτι θέλοι γενέσ[illegible] αὐτῷ ἀλλάξασθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν εἰς ἄλλο, μήτι[illegible] νέσθαι βουληθῆναι, μήτ' ἂν ἑαυτῷ τι μέμψασθαι, ὡς υπο [illegible]ς τοῦτο ὂν ὅ ἐστι, τῷ αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅπερ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ ἐθέλησε καὶ θέλει· ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως ἡ ἀγαθοῦ φύσις θέλησις αὐτοῦ, "The essence of the supreme God is not without his will, but his will and essence are the same; so that God concurreth with himself, himself being willing to be as he is, and being that which he willeth; and his will and himself being one and the same. For himself is not one thing (as happening to be that which he is), and that he would will to be another: for what could God will to be, but that which he is? And if we should suppose, that it were in his own choice to be what he would, and that he had liberty to change his nature into whatsoever else he pleased, it is certain, that he would neither will to be any thing else besides what he is, nor complain of himself as being now that which he is out of necessity, he being indeed no other but that, which himself hath willed, and doth always will to be. For his will is his essential goodness; so that his will doth not follow his nature, but concur with it; in the very essence of this good there being contained his choice, and willing of himself to be such." Lastly:† Πᾶν ἄρα βούλησις, καὶ οὐκέτι τὸ μὴ βουλόμενον, οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸ βουλήσεως ἄρα· πρῶτον ἄρα ἡ βούλησις αὐτὸς, καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐβούλετο ἄρα καὶ οἷον ἐβούλετο, καὶ τὸ τῇ βουλήσει ἑπόμενον, ὃ ἡ τοιαύτη βούλησις ἐγέννα· ἐγέννα δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἐν αὐτῷ, "God is all will, nor is there any thing in him which he doth not will, nor is his being before his will, but his will is himself, or he himself the first will. So that he is as he would himself, and such as he would, and yet his will did not generate or produce any thing that was not before." And now we may in all probability conclude, that Lactantius

* P. 747. † P. 755.

derived this doctrine from Plato and Plotinus;[2] which, how far it is to be either allowed of or excused, we leave others to judge; only we shall observe, that, as the word αὐτογενὴς, frequently attributed to God by Christians as well as Pagans,[3] seems to imply as much; so the scope and drift of Plotinus, in all this, was plainly no other, than partly to set forth the self-existence of the supreme Deity after a more lively manner, and partly to confute that odd conceit, which some might possibly entertain of God, as if he either happened by chance to be what he is, or else were such by a certain necessity of nature, and had his being imposed upon him: whereas, he is as much every way what he would will and choose to be, as if he had made himself by his own will and choice. Neither have we set down all this, only to give an account of that one expression of Plato's, "that God causeth himself and all things," but also to show how punctually precise, curious and accurate, some of these Pagans were in their speculations concerning the Deity.[4]

[2] For my part, however, I think otherwise, as I have professed just above. There is a vast difference between the doctrine of Lactantius, who expressly denies the eternity of God, and that of Plotinus, who every where strenuously maintains it. Besides, if I am not much deceived, the mind of Lactantius was a stranger to subtleties like those in which Plotinus indulged, and probably would not even have understood them, if they had been propounded to him.

[3] Many similar passages, wherein God is called αὐτογενὴς, have been collected from Greek and Latin authors by Dion. Petavius in his Dogmata Theolog. de Trinitate, lib. 5. cap. 5. p. 294. tom. 2. Which, however, as differing in sense, are not all to be held in the same account.

[4] It may be proper to make a few brief remarks upon what is here eruditely discussed by the learned Doctor. I. I know of no passage, in which Plato calls the Deity αὐτοφυὴς; but, as Lactantius informs us, that Orpheus, whoever he was, applied this term to him, it is probably a slip of the learned Doctor's memory. II. The passage of Plato from the De Republica, lib. 10. in which he affirms the supreme Being to have made all other things and also himself, I am almost inclined to think, should be understood of the ideas of natures and not of the natures themselves. I suspect the philosopher to have meant this: That God conceived and formed in his mind from all eternity the exemplar, image, or ἰδέα, not only of all things which he was about at any time to create, but also of himself. And to this surmise I am led by what follows in Plato. For he illustrates his theory, marvellous as it appeared to be, by the example of men, who produce at pleasure their own images in a mirror. Now these images are not the men themselves, but their shadows and resemblances only. Wherefore, when Plato tells us, that God procreated both himself and all other things, he ought there also to be understood, it would seem, as speaking of those eternal images or models of God and all created things. III. Be this as it may, however, Plotinus' refined subtleties upon this subject have a very different signification from the words of Plato, if these latter be even explained as referring to the nature itself of the Deity. For Plato says, that God produced himself in the same way as the world. But, according to his opinion, God framed the world by introducing into chaotic, rude, and undigested matter, a fixed and orderly form. Consequently, if God made himself and the universe in the same manner, we must conclude, agreeably to Plato's own doctrine, that at some finite time God, who had before lain in a state of confusion and disorder, assumed a new habit and a particular form. Which opinion is both foolish and absurd in itself, and as foreign as it can be to the doctrine of Plotinus and his associates. My object here is to show to others, even by this example, that those ancients who make use of the same phraseology are not necessarily to be considered as belonging to the same class on account of the affinity of words. It is inconceivable,

To return therefore to Plato: though some have suspected that trinity, which is commonly called Platonic, to have been nothing but a mere figment and invention of some later Platonists, yet the contrary hereunto seems to be unquestionably evident, that Plato himself really asserted such a trinity of universal and divine hypostases, which have the nature of principles. For first, whereas, in his tenth book of laws, he, professedly opposing Atheists, undertakes to prove the existence of a Deity, he does notwithstan [illegible] end no higher than to the Psyche, or universal [illegible] as a self-moving principle, and the immediate, or [illegible] of all that motion, which is

into what grave errors men [illegible] eminence in the learned world have been led in this respect. [illegible] case in point to prove it. For the worthy Doctor classes Plot [illegible] together, whom he with much more propriety would have kept [illegible] led, that the passages of Plotinus are not always quoted by him [illegible] at author, but some portions here and there omitted, which seemed [illegible] little light upon the matter in hand. IV. The Christian writers [illegible] be procreated from himself, referred the word for the most part to God the Father and held this to be the characteristic, which distinguished him from the Son, whom the scriptures state to be begotten of the Father. From which it is again manifest, that the notion attached by the followers of Christ to this and similar words is very different from that which the Platonists had in their mind, when using them in reference to God. For with Christians, *αὐτοφυὴς*, *ἀγέννητος*, and other names of the kind, when applied to God the Father, meant the same as "generated and produced from no other." Nor are examples altogether wanting to show, that this is not entirely at variance with the principles of the Greek language. I shall adduce one from Dionysius the Areopagite, who has these words in his De Theologia Mystica, cap. 2. p. 25. tom. 2. opp. *Ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς ἄγαλμα ποιοῦντες*. They, he tells us, who inquire into the nature of God, do the same as those "who chisel out a natural statue." Now it would be ridiculous to translate *αὐτοφυὲς* here: "produced from," or "by itself." For what sane man, I ask, would admit, that a statue can be produced from itself? *Ἄγαλμα αὐτοφυὲς* is here a statue not made by an artificer, but produced by nature itself; as there are many stones which represent as it were a natural statue. An *αὐτοφυὴς* God, therefore, may with propriety be interpreted thus: "A God who is without cause, or who is self-existent, and not made or produced by any one." Nevertheless, I would not deny, that some Christian writers may occasionally have applied such like terms to the godhead generally, and that too in a different sense: whom I would grant to have closely followed in the footsteps of the Platonists. Of these we have an example in Synesius, a half Christian and half Platonist, who, Hymn. 3. opp. p. 323. calls God both father and son of himself:

> *Πατὴρ, αὐτοπάτωρ,*
> *Προπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ,*
> *Υἱὲ σεαυτοῦ,*
>
> "Father, father of thyself,
> Forefather, without father,
> Son of thyself."

There was one also, who did not hesitate to apply the epithets we are speaking of to the second person of the Deity, or the son of God, and to call him, *αὐτόφυτος*, *αὐτοφυὴς*, *αὐτόγονος*: namely Nonnus, whose Paraphrase on St. John is well-known. The poet has been severely censured for this, however, by Dan. Heinsius in his Aristarchus appended to this Nonnus, cap. 3. who altogether denies the applicability of such names to God, inasmuch as we thereby lay down a beginning in him who is without beginning. For my part, as I have already intimated, I think, that these words are not to be interpreted so strictly, when employed by those who professed the Christian faith.

in the world. And this is all the god that there he undertakes to prove. But in other places of his writings he frequently asserts, above the self-moving Psyche, an immoveable and standing Nous or intellect, which was properly the Demiurgus, or architectonic framer of the whole world. And lastly, above this multiform Intellect, he plainly asserts yet a higher hypostasis, one most simple and most absolutely perfect Being; which he calls τὸ ἓν, in opposition to that multiplicity, which speaks something of imperfection in it, and τ' ἀγαθὸν, "goodness itself," as being above mind and understanding; the first intelligible, and an infinite fecundity together with overflowing benignity. And accordingly, in his second epistle to Dionysius, does he mention a trinity of divine hypostases, all together. Now the words ὁ θεὸς and τὸ θεῖον, "God," and "the divinity" in Plato, seem sometimes to comprehend this whole trinity of divine hypostases, as they are again sometimes severally applied to each of them, accordingly, as we have already observed, that Zeus or Jupiter in Plato is not always taken for the first and highest hypostasis in his trinity, but sometimes the second hypostasis of mind or intellect is meant thereby, and sometimes again his third hypostasis of the universal and eternal Psyche; nevertheless the first of these three hypostases is that which is properly called by the Platonists, πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, "the fountain of the Godhead," and by Plato himself:[5] Ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς, περὶ ὃν πάντα ἐστὶ, οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ὃ αἴτιον πάντων τῶν καλῶν, "The King of all things, about whom are all things, and for whose sake are all things, and the cause of all good and excellent things."

And this first divine hypostasis, which in Plato's theology is properly αὐτόθεος, "the original Deity," is largely insisted upon by that philosopher in the sixth of his Politics, under the name and title of τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the good;" but principally there illustrated by that resemblance of the sun, called by that philosopher also, "a heavenly God," and said to be the offspring of this highest good, and something analogous to it in the corporeal world, Ὅ,τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα, "This is the same in the intelligible world to intellect (or knowledge) and intelligibles, that the sun is in the sensible world to sight and visibles. For,[6] as the sun is not sight, but only the cause of it;

[5] These words occur in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, p. 707. opp. On the trinity said to have been professed by Plato, Dr. Cudworth discourses at greater length below: for which place we reserve what remarks we have to offer on this argument.

[6] Do not suppose these to be the divine Plato's own words. The learned Doctor has given what he fancied to be Plato's opinion in his own language and it is very doubtful, whether he has accurately expressed the philosopher's meaning. Were I to attempt to explain and illustrate the whole of Plato's reasoning on this point, I should have to enter into a long and tedious discussion, unsuited to the plan of this work. Let those, therefore, who take delight in subtleties refer to the philosopher himself, as they will there find a plentiful harvest.

nor is that light, by which we see, the same with the sun itself, but only ἡλιοειδὲς, a sun-like thing; so neither is the supreme and highest good (properly) knowledge, but the cause of knowledge; nor is intellect (precisely considered as such) the best and most perfect being, but only ἀγαθόειδες, a boniform thing." Again, "As the sun gives to things not only their visibility, but also their generation; so does that highest good not only cause the cognoscibility of things, but also their very essences and beings: Οὐκ οὐσίας ὄ[illegible] ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει [illegible] his highest good being not itself properly essen[illegible] essence, transcending the same, both in respect [illegible] power." Which language and conceit of Plato's [illegible] reek fathers seem to have entertained, yet so as [illegible] e whole Trinity, when they call God ὑπερούσιον, [illegible] tial." But the meaning of that philosopher was, [illegible] no other than this, that this highest good hath no [illegible] racteristic upon it, limiting and determining of it, [illegible] dden and incomprehensible source of all things. In the last place, we shall observe, that this first divine hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is by that philosopher called, τοῦ τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πάντων πατὴρ, "The father of the prince, and cause of all things." Wherein we cannot but take notice of an admirable correspondency betwixt the Platonic philosophy and Christianity, in that the second hypostasis of both their trinities (called also sometimes λόγος by the Platonists, as well as νοῦς) is said to be the immediate cause of all things; and the Demiurgus, the architect, maker or artificer of the whole world.

Now to Plato we might here join Xenophon, because he was his equal, and a Socratic too (though it seems there was not so good correspondence betwixt them); which Xenophon, however in sundry places of his writings he acknowledges a plurality of gods, yet doth he give plain testimony also of one supreme and universal Numen; as this particularly,[7] Ὁ πάντα σείων καὶ ἀτρεμίζων, ὡς μὲν μέγας τις καὶ δυνατὸς, φανερὸς, ὑποῖος δ' ἔστι μορφὴν, ἀφανής, "He that both agitates all things, and establisheth the frame of the whole world, though he be manifest to be great and powerful, yet is he, as to his form, inconspicuous."

XXIV. In the next place we come to Aristotle; who, that

[7] These words are not to be met with in any work of Xenophon's now extant. But they are twice quoted by Clemens Alexandr. in Cohort. ad Gentes, cap. 6. p. 61. and Stromat. lib. 5. p. 417. &c. from whom, I doubt not, they were borrowed by Eusebius and Cyril, who also appeal to them. A similar sentiment, however, occurs among the sayings of Socrates in Memorab. Socrat. lib. 4. p. 634. which led Dr. Potter to suppose, Annot. ad Clement. p. 61. that Clement had quoted this passage of Xenophon from memory, and hence had expressed the sense only and not the words. But as Clement gives the axiom twice in exactly the same words, I attach but little importance to this conjecture.

ıe acknowledged more gods than one (as well as the other Pagans) ppears from his using the word so often plurally. As particularly in this passage of his Nicomachian Ethics:* Ἡ δὲ τελεία ὐδαιμονία, ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη· οὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· τράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; πότερα τὰς δικαίας; ὴ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; ἄλλα τὰς ἀνδρείους; ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας, ὅτι καλόν· ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; τίνι δὲ δώσουσι; ἄτοπον δ', εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον· εἰ δὲ σώφρονες, τί ἂν εἴεν; ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσι φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς· καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθεύδειν, ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα· τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τὸ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας, "That perfect happiness is a speculative or contemplative energy, may be made manifest from hence, because we account the gods most of all happy. Now what moral actions can we attribute them? Whether those of justice amongst one another; as if it were not ridiculous to suppose the gods to make contracts and bargains among themselves, and the like. Or else those of fortitude and magnanimity; as if the gods had their fears, dangers and difficulties to encounter withal. Or those of liberality; as if the gods had some such thing as money too, and there were among them indigent to receive alms. Or, lastly, shall we attribute to them the actions of temperance? But would not this be a reproachful commendation of the gods to say, that they conquer and master their vicious lusts and appetites? Thus running through all the actions of moral virtue, we find them to be small, and mean, and unworthy of the gods. And yet we all believe the gods to live, and consequently to act; unless we should suppose them perpetually to sleep, as Endymion did. Wherefore if all moral actions, and therefore much more mechanical operations, be taken away from that which lives and understands, what is there left to it besides contemplation?" To which he there adds a further argument also of the same thing: "Because other animals, who are deprived of contemplation, partake not of happiness. For to the gods all their life is happy; to men so far forth, as it approacheth to contemplation; but brute animals, that do not at all contemplate, partake not at all of happiness." Where Aristotle plainly acknowledges a plurality of gods, and that there is a certain higher rank of beings above men. And by the way we may here observe, how from those words of his: Ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασι θεοὺς, "All men

* Lib. 10. c. 8. [P. 183. tom. 3. opp.]

suppose the gods to live," and from what follows in him, that opinion[8] of some late writers may be confuted, that the Pagans generally worshipped the inanimate parts of the world as true and proper gods: Aristotle here telling us, that they universally agreed in this, that the gods were animals, living and understanding beings, and such as are therefore capable of contemplation. Moreover, Aristotle in his Politics,* writing on the means to conserve a tyranny, as he calls it, sets down this for one amongst the rest: "Ἔτι δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς φαίνεσθαι ἀεὶ σπουδάζοντα διαφερό[illegible] γὰρ φοβοῦνται, τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν [illegible] δεισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα καὶ φρον[illegible] καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσιν ἧττον, ὡς συμμάχους ἔχοντι[illegible] "For a prince or monarch to seem to be alw[illegible] ordinarily sedulous about the worship of the [illegible] men are less afraid of suffering any injustice [illegible]s or princes, as they think to be religiously disp[illegible]ly affected towards the gods. Neither will they be [illegible] conspiracies against such, they supposing, that the gods will be their abettors and assistants." Where the word δεισιδαίμων seems to be taken in a good sense, and in way of commendation for a religious person; though we must confess, that Aristotle himself does not here write so much like a δεισιδαίμων, as a mere politician. Likewise in his first book De Cœlo, he writeth thus:† Πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ θεῶν ἔχουσιν ὑπόληψιν, καὶ πάντες τὸν ἀνωτάτω τῷ θείῳ τόπον ἀποδιδόασι, καὶ Βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες, ὡς τῷ ἀθανάτῳ τὸ ἀθάνατον συνηρτημένον, εἴπερ οὖν ἐστί τι θεῖον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἔστι, &c. "All men have an opinion or persuasion, that there are gods. And they, who think so, as well Barbarians as Greeks, attribute the highest place to that which is divine, as supposing the immortal heavens to be most accommodate to immortal gods. Wherefore, if there be any divinity, as unquestionably there is, the body of the heavens must be acknowledged to be of a different kind from that of the elements." And in the following book[9] he tells us

[8] This opinion was maintained, we are told, by certain Roman catholics then living in Britain, who carried on a dispute with the most celebrated theologians of the Church of England on the true nature and meaning of idolatry, and who, in order to ward off all suspicion of this crime from themselves, endeavoured to cast the greatest infamy upon the religions of antiquity, and to prove that nations formerly had worshipped inanimate things. This, among other causes, roused the excellent Ed. Herbert of Cherbury, to write his well known work De Religione Gentilium, in which he goes to the opposite extreme in excusing and palliating the opinions and ceremonies of some nations.

* Lib. 5. c. 11.

† Cap. 3. [P. 615. tom. 1. opp.]

[9] The opinion here expressed is maintained by Aristotle in the second book De Cœlo, but he nowhere tells us, that it is agreeable τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ θεῶν. He speaks, however, of this μαντεία at the end of the first chapter of this book, p. 641. tom. 1. opp. where he states, that if the heavens be supposed to be eternal, opinions might be brought forward more in accordance with this vaticination.

again, "That it is most agreeable τῇ μαντείᾳ περὶ τῶν θεῶν, to that vaticination, which all men have in their minds concerning the gods, to suppose the heaven to be a quintessence distinct from the elements, and therefore incorruptible." Where Aristotle affirmeth, that men have generally μαντείαν, "a vaticination" in their minds concerning gods; to wit, that themselves are not the highest beings, but that there is a rank of intellectual beings, superior to men; the chief of which is the supreme Deity; concerning whom there is indeed the greatest μαντεία or "vaticination" of all.

We acknowledge it to be very true, that Aristotle does not so much insist upon demons, as Plato and the generality of Pagans in that age did; and probably he had not so great a belief of their existence; though he doth make mention of them also, as when in his Metaphysics,[10] speaking of bodies compounded of the elements, he instanceth in ζῶά τε καὶ δαιμόνια, "animals and demons," and elsewhere he insinuates them to have airy bodies, in these words:[1] Ἐπιζητήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις, καὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν

[10] Meaning, I have no doubt, the following passage, Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 329. tom. 4. opp. Οὐσία δὲ λέγεται τά τε ἁπλᾶ σώματα, οἷον γῆ, καὶ πῦρ, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ ὅλως σώματα, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων συνεστῶτα, ζωά τε καὶ δαιμόνια, καὶ τὰ μόρια τούτων, "By substance we mean both simple bodies, such as earth, fire, water, and the like, and bodies universally, and whatever are compounded of these, both animals and demons, and the particles of these." This passage is of great weight towards confirming what we have remarked, at some length above on ch. 1. sect. 26. and 40. that what the ancient philosophers called "simple, open," ἀσώματον and "separate from body," is not the same as that, to which moderns apply these terms, and that those, who formerly believed in "spirits, incorporeal natures" and "demons," did not attach the same notions to these words as ourselves. For Aristotle here tells us, that earth, fire, and water are substance, and ἁπλᾶ, or "simple," and asserts, that animals as well as demons are compounded of these elements. Which indeed agrees admirably with Cicero's words concerning the soul, quoted by us above from Academ. Quæst. lib. 4. They clearly show also what is meant by οὐσία in many passages of the ancient philosophers, when it is opposed to γένεσις. Most of the ancients called that ἁπλοῦν which has no admixture of any any other nature or substance, and is not concrete. And οὐσία is attributed to these things, ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκείμενον λέγεται, as Aristotle says, Metaphys. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 329. ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα, "because they are not said of a subject, but the other things of them." But γένεσις is that which is compounded and generated from several elements.

[1] They occur De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 17. tom. 2. opp. But for my part I am quite at a loss to perceive, how it can be proved from this passage, that Aristotle considered demons to have aerial bodies. For there is here no mention of demons, nor one word about aerial bodies; but the philosopher is discoursing of the soul which is in the air. Instead of this passage, therefore, as not bearing upon the question, I shall substitute another, in which demon is distinctly mentioned. It occurs in his Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 785. t. 3. opp. Τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεός, ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον· καίτοι ὅστις οἴεται, θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεοὺς εἶναι, "The demon is nothing else than either God or the work of God: but whoever supposes it to be the work of God, must necessarily suppose gods also." But, candidly to confess the truth, neither this passage nor the one quoted by Dr. Cudworth, will much assist those who seek to prove, that Aristotle did not discard demons. With regard to this passage, it is an example adduced by the philosopher to show, how a rhetorician in the forum may reason from a definition; and therefore it affords us no clue to his own sentiments. For, as every one must be aware, it would be improper to

τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ, τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις βελτίων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα, "Some perhaps would demand a reason, why the soul that is in the air, is better and more immortal than that in animals." However, whether Aristotle believed these lower demon gods or no, it is certain, that he acknowledged a higher kind of gods, namely, the intelligences of all the several spheres, if not also the souls of them and the stars; which spheres being, according to the astronomy then received, forty-seven in number, he must needs acknowledge at least so many gods. Besides which, Aristotle seems also to suppose [illegible] of incorporeal gods, without the heavens, where, [illegible] n, there is neither body, nor place, nor vacuum, [illegible] ese words:* Οὔτ' ἐν τόπῳ τὰκεῖ πέφυκεν, οὔτε χρ[illegible] γηράσκειν, οὐδ' ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς οὐδεμία μεταβολὴ, τῶ[illegible] ἄτω τεταγμένων φορὰν, ἀλλ' ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθ[illegible] ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ αὐταρκεστάτην διατελεῖ τὸν ἅ[illegible] They who exist there are such as are neither [illegible] place, nor to wax old with time, nor is there a[illegible]ll in those things above the highest sphere; but they being impassible and unalterable, lead the best and most self-sufficient life, throughout all eternity." But this passage is not without suspicion of being supposititious.[2]

take all that a writer brings forward in illustration of the rules of speaking as his own real opinions. If I am not very much mistaken, this example is borrowed by the philosopher from Socrates' defence, and perhaps from the very Apologies of Plato and Xenophon. Socrates was accused of denying the existence of gods, but yet he constantly affirmed, that a demon was always present to him. Aristotle, therefore, shows that this demon of Socrates is of itself sufficient to clear his character and refute the charges of his enemies. For, a demon being either God or the work of God, it follows that he who maintains the presence of a demon in himself can in no wise be suspected of atheism.

* De Cœl. lib. 1. c. 9. [P. 631. tom. 1. opp.]

[2] For myself, however, I entertain an altogether different view of this passage. In the first place I see no reason whatever for suspecting it not to be Aristotle's. For besides its being in perfect accordance with the opinions propounded by the Stagirite in the same chapter and elsewhere, these words are evidently required by the whole context of the discourse; which, without them, would be altogether lame and destitute of meaning. Again, I can in no way find out how it can be inferred from this passage, that Aristotle supposed certain gods to exist without the heavens. For he is not speaking of natures placed out of heaven, but explaining the affections of those inclosed in heaven, which he concludes to be independent of place, time, and all vicissitude, inasmuch as heaven itself is without place, vacuum, or time. I shall add a few words on the whole of the argument here pursued by the learned Doctor. If I possess the faculty of judging, all that he advances is insufficient to convince us, that Aristotle is to be ranked among those who hold the existence of many gods. I should wish the same to be understood also of some other philosophers, whose dogmas he has explained in the preceding. In the first place, the general tenor of the doctrine professed by Aristotle shows, that he could not have worshipped such gods as were at that period reverenced in Greece, or in the proper sense of the term paid homage to Juno, Jupiter, Diana, Mercury, and the other popular deities. It remains for us to inquire, whether he professed a plurality of gods in some such way as we have above shown Socrates to have done. In order to arrive at a clear view of the matter it ought to be determined in the first instance, what is meant by "believing in the existence of many gods." In my opinion, he alone believes in a plurality of gods, who not only admits the existence of many beings more powerful, more noble, and more excellent than mankind, but inculcates

Notwithstanding all which, that Aristotle did assert one supreme and universal Numen, is a thing also unquestionable. For though it be granted that he useth the singular θεὸς, as likewise τὸ θεῖον and τὸ δαιμόνιον, many times indefinitely, for a god in general, or any divine being; and that such places as these have been oftentimes mistaken by Christian writers, as if Aristotle had meant the supreme God in them; yet it is nevertheless certain, that he often useth those words also emphatically, for one only supreme God, as in that of his Metaphysics:* Ὅτε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τὸ αἴτιον πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, "God seemeth to be a cause and certain principle to all things." And also in his De Anima,† where he speaks of the soul of the heavens, and its circular motion: Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ὅτι βέλτιον λέγεται· καίτοι γ' ἐχρῆν τὸν θεὸν διὰ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὅτι βέλτιον αὐτῇ τὸ κίνεσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δὲ οὕτως ἢ ἄλλως, "Neither is that a good cause of the circular motion of the heavens, which they (that is the Platonists) call the

that men ought to pay a certain homage and offer sacrifice to these beings. For we are not to rank any one among the worshippers of many gods, who simply supposes many beings to exist far superior to men in power, strength, wisdom, and other attributes. For in that case all Christians, who, agreeably to sacred writ, believe in the existence of God's messengers or angels, would have to be included in this class. There must be superadded an opinion, that it is the duty of all men to propitiate these natures with divine worship and ceremonies. We ought to ascertain first of all, therefore, whether Aristotle believed in many gods in this way. It is beyond question, that he supposed certain minds or intelligences to preside over the celestial orbs and believed them to be natures far surpassing the whole human race and to hold a middle station between the supreme God and mortals. On these intelligences he bestowed the name of gods; and, moreover, acknowledged no other gods besides these. We advance nothing here upon conjecture, but shall prove such to be the fact from Aristotle's own words, occurring Metaphysic. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 483. tom. 4. opp. Thus, after having by sundry arguments shown the existence of such like minds, he subjoins as follows. Παραδέδοται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ἐν μύθου σχήματι καταλελειμμένα τοῖς ὕστερον, ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, "It has been handed down from our ancestors of old, and left to posterity in the form of fable, that these (intelligences) are gods, and that the divinity contains the whole of nature." To which he adds, that this opinion is worthy of being entertained, nay, a noble one; but that the rest that is handed down respecting the gods, is mere fiction and idle nonsense, invented for the sake of the laws and the public weal: Τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσέχεται πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ προς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ σύμφερον χρῆσιν, "But the rest is fabulously added for the persuasion of the multitude, and for the benefit of the laws and the furtherance of what is useful." Nothing can be plainer. Aristotle believed in the existence of no gods except those natures, which he supposed to preside over the celestial orbs. But did he at the same time suppose worship, prayers, and sacrifices to be due to them? I am either grossly mistaken or he ranked all these among the absurdities, which he considers to have been invented from motives of utility. So far from supposing him to have decreed divine honours to these intelligences, I suspect him to have been persuaded, that public worship and homage ought not to be paid even to the supreme Being. I see no reason, indeed, why he should have felt inclined to pray to these deities, which in his opinion not only performed their duties by fate and necessity from all eternity, but also attended to nothing else besides the orbs over which they respectively presided and exercised no sort of control over human affairs.

* Lib. 1. [Cap. 2. p. 263. tom. 4. opp.]

† Lib. 1. c. 3. [P. 10. tom. 2. opp.]

τὸ βέλτιον, because it is better that it should be so than otherwise; as if God therefore ought to have made the soul of the world such, as to move the heaven circularly, because it was better for it to move so than otherwise: but this being a speculation that properly belongs to some other science, we shall no further pursue it in this place." Thus afterwards again in the same book:[3] Συμβαίνει δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ γε καὶ ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεὸν, μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων ἓν οὐ γνωριεῖ, τὸ Νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα, ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον, "It follows from Empedocles' principles, that God must needs be the most unwise of all, he alone being ignorant of that (out of which all other things are compounded) νεῖκος, or contention (because himself is nothing but φιλία, unity and friendship) whereas mortal animals may know or conceive all things, they being compounded of all." Which same passage we have again also, in his Metaphysics,[4] from whence it was before cited to another purpose. To these might be added another place out of his book of Generation and Corruption:[5] Τὸ ὅλον συνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεὸς, ἐντελεχῇ ποιήσας γένεσιν, "God hath filled up the whole, or universe, and constantly supplies the same, having made a continual successive generation." Lastly, τὸ δαιμόνιον is sometimes plainly used by Aristotle also, not for the divinity in general, or any thing that is divine, but for that one supreme Deity, the governor of the whole world. Thus in that passage of his Rhetoric to Alexander:* Τοῦτό ἐστιν, ᾧ διαφέρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν ζώων, ἡμεῖς οἱ μεγίστης τιμῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου τετυχηκότες, "This is that wherein we men differ from other animals, having received the greatest honour from God, that though they be endued with appetite and anger, and other passions, as well as we, yet we alone are furnished with speech and reason."

Over and besides which, Aristotle, in his Metaphysics,† (as hath been already observed) professedly opposeth that imaginary opinion of many independent principles of the universe; that is, of many unmade self-existent deities; he confuting the same from the phenomena, because ἅπαντα πρὸς ἓν συντέτακται, "all things are plainly co-ordered to one," the whole world conspiring into one agreeing harmony; whereas, if there were many principles or independent Deities, the system of the world must needs have been ἐπεισοδιώδης, "incoherent and inconspiring," like an all-agreeing drama, botched up of many impertinent in-

[3] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 16. tom. 2. opp.
[4] Lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 295. tom. 4. opp. Where, however, we find the same sentiment only, not exactly the same words. On the matter itself I have treated above on sect. 21. and have shown, that Aristotle has done Empedocles injustice.
[5] Lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 741. tom. 1. opp.
* Cap. 1. p. 609. P. [P. 833. tom. 3. opp.]
† Lib. 14. cap. 10. Par. [P. 484. tom. 4. opp.]

tersertions. Whereupon, Aristotle concludes after this manner: Τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται κακῶς πολιτεύεσθαι,

Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν Πολυκοιρανίη, Εἷς Κοίρανος,

"But things will not be ill administered (which was then it seems a kind of proverbial speech) and according to Homer, the government of many is not good, (nor could the affairs of the world be evenly carried on under it) wherefore there is one Prince or Monarch over all." From which passage of Aristotle's it is evident, that though he asserted Πολυθείαν, "a multiplicity of gods" in the vulgar sense, as hath been already declared, yet he absolutely denied Πολυκοιρανίην and Πολυαρχίαν, "a polyarchy or mundane aristocracy," that is, a multiplicity of first principles and independent deities. Wherefore, though Aristotle doated much upon that whimsey of his, of as many intelligibles, or eternal and immoveable minds (now commonly called intelligencies) as there are moveable spheres of all kinds in the heavens, (which he sticks not also sometimes to call principles;) yet must he of necessity be interpreted to have derived all these from one supreme universal Deity, which as Simplicius expresseth it, is Ἀρχὴ ἀρχῶν, "the principle of principles;" and which comprehends and contains those inferior deities under it, after the same manner as the primum mobile, or "highest sphere," contains all the lesser spheres within it; because otherwise there would not be εἷς Κοίρανος, "one prince or monarch" over the whole; but the government of the world would be a polykœrany or aristocracy of gods, concluded to be an ill government. Moreover, as Plotinus[6] represents Aristotle's sense,* it is not conceivable that so many independent principles should thus constantly conspire, πρὸς ἓν ἔργον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ συμφωνίαν, "into one work, that agreeable symphony, and harmony of the whole heaven." As there could not be any reason neither, why there should be just so many of these intelligences, as there are spheres and no more; and it is absurd to suppose, κατὰ συντυχίαν τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, "that the first principles of the universe happened by chance."

Now, this highest principle as it is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "an immoveable essence," is by Aristotle in the first place supposed to be ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, "the principle of motion in the universe," or at least of that chiefest motion of the primum mobile, or, "highest sphere," (which according to the astronomy of those

[6] The learned Doctor is mistaken. In that passage Plotinus is not explaining Aristotle's opinion, but enumerating the difficulties connected with it, in order to show that Plato held much sounder views on divine matters than Aristotle. And the very words quoted by him contain a certain doubt, which Plotinus considers Aristotle's doctrine to labour under. He denies it to have been made clear by Aristotle, why all the intelligences conspire so harmoniously to the performance of one work.

* Enn. 5. lib. 1. cap. 7. [Cap. 9. p. 490. 491.]

times seems to have been the sphere of fixed stars) by whose rapid circumgyration, all the other spheres and heavens were imagined to be carried round from east to west. And accordingly, the supreme Deity is by Aristotle* called *τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον*, "the first immoveable mover," or the mover of the primum mobile, and whole heaven. Which first mover being concluded by him to but one, he doth from thence infer the singularity of the heaven or world:† *Ἓν μὲν ἄρα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ, τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίν* [illegible] *κινούμενον ἄρα ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς ἓν μόνον. εἷς ἄρα* [illegible] "There is one numerically first immoveable move [illegible]; and therefore there is but one moveable neither [illegible] one heaven or world. In which doctrine of Ar [illegible] seems to be a great difference betwixt his phil [illegible] of Plato's; in that Plato makes the principle [illegible] e heavens and whole world to be a self-moving [illegible] stotle supposeth it be an immoveable mind o [illegible] Nevertheless, according to Aristotle's explication of himself, the difference betwixt them is not great, if any at all; Aristotle's immoveable mover being understood by him, not to move the heavens efficiently, but only objectively and finally, *ὡς ἐρώμενον*, "as being loved." Which conceit of his Proclus upon Plato's Timæus‡ perstringeth after this manner: *Τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν τὸν κόσμον ἐπιστρέψαντες ἐπὶ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἔρωτος, τοῦ περὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὄρεκτον, δόντες αὐτῷ τὴν κίνησιν, οὐδὲν ἔφασαν ἀπὸ τοῦ νοῦ καθήκειν εἰς αὐτὸν, ἐν ἴσῳ προστάξαντες αὐτὸν τοῖς ἐρασμίοις μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, μηδὲν δὲ γεννήτικον ἔχουσιν ἐν τῇ ἑαυτῶν φύσει*, "Some of the ancients converting the world to mind (or intellect) and making it move only by love of that first desirable, acknowledged nothing at all to descend down from Mind (or God) upon the world; but equalized the same with other amiable things, amongst sensibles, that have nothing generative in their nature." Where Proclus seems to suppose Aristotle to have attributed to God no efficiency at all upon the world; the contrary whereunto shall be evidently proved afterwards. In the mean time, it is certain that Aristotle, besides his immoveable mover of the heavens, which moveth only finally or as being loved, must needs suppose another immediate mover of them, or efficient cause of that motion; which could be nothing but a soul, that enamoured with this supreme mind, did, as it were in imitation of it, continually turn round the heavens. Which seems to be nothing but Plato's doctrine disguised; that philosopher affirming likewise, the circular motions of the

* Met. lib. 14. cap. 8. p. 1003. P. [P. 481. tom. 4. opp.]
† Met. lib. 14. cap. 8. [P. 483. tom. 4. opp.
‡ P. 167.

heavens, caused efficiently by a soul of the world in his Timæus,[7] to be, *τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν*, "a motion, that is most agreeable to that of mind or wisdom." And again, in his laws:[8] *Τὴν τοῦ νοῦ περιόδῳ πάντως ὡς δυνατὸν, οἰκειοτάτην καὶ ὁμοίαν*, "That which of all corporeal motions only resembles the circuit of intellect. Which Platonic conceit found entertainment with Boëtius,* who writing of the soul of the world, represents it thus:

> Quæ cum secta duos motum glomeravit in orbes,
> In semet reditura meat, mentemque profundam
> Circuit, et simili convertit imagine cœlum.

Wherefore, as well according to Plato's hypothesis, as Aristotle's, it may be affirmed of the supreme Deity, in the same Boëtius' language, that,

> ———Stabilisque manens dat cuncta moveri.

"Being itself immoveable, it causeth all other things to move." The immediate efficient cause of which motion also, no less according to Aristotle than Plato, seems to have been a mundane soul; however, Aristotle thought not so fit to make this soul a principle; in all probability, because he was not so well assured of the incorporeity of souls, as of minds or intellects.[9]

Nevertheless, this is not the only thing which Aristotle imputed to his first and highest immoveable principle, or the supreme Deity, its turning round of the primum mobile, and that no otherwise than as being loved, or as the final cause thereof, as Proclus supposed; but he, as well as Anaxagoras,† asserted it to be also, *τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς αἰτίαν*, "the cause of well and fit," or *τὸ οὗ οὐκ ἄνευ τό εὖ*, "that without which there could be no such thing as well;" that is no order, no aptitude, proportion, and harmony in the universe: he declaring excellently, that *εἰ μὴ ἔσται παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἄλλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἀρχὴ καὶ τάξις, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ-τῆν ἀρχὴς ἀρχὴ*, "unless there were something else in the world besides sensibles, there could be neither beginning nor order in it, but one thing would be the principle of another infinitely, or without end." And again in another place already

[7] Cap. 17. p. 241. ed. Fabricii. Cicero translates the words differently: Unus, says he, ex septem motibus, qui mentem atque intelligentiam cohiberet maxime, "One of the seven motions, which most controls mind and intelligence." In my opinion, Plato's meaning is better expressed by Chalcidius, who translates thus: Motum rationabilem, cui animarum proprius est circuitus, "A reasonable motion, to which the circuit of souls is proper," agreeably to the other passage from De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 669.

[8] Lib. 10. p. 669.

* De Consol. lib. 3. Met. 9.

[9] The whole of this question, whether Aristotle ascribed a soul to the world or not, and in what this soul of Aristotle's differed from that of Plato, has been copiously discussed by us above, on the Digression concerning a Plastic Nature, sect. 23. 24.

† Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. P.

cited:[10] Τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, ἴσως οὔτε πῦρ οὔτε γῆν, &c. οὐδ' αὐτῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα καλῶς ἔχει, "It is not at all likely that either fire or earth, or any such body, should be the cause of that well and fit that is in the world; nor can so noble an effect as this be reasonably imputed to chance or fortune." Wherefore himself, agreeably with Anaxagoras, concludes that it is Νοῦς or "Mind," which is properly αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς, "the cause of well and right," and accordingly does he frequently call the supreme Deity by that name. He affirming likewise,[1] that the order, pulchritude and harmony of the whole world dependeth upon that one highest and supreme Being in it, after the same manner as the order of any army dependeth upon the general or emperor, who is not for the order, but the order for him. Which highest Being of the universe is therefore called by him also, conformably to Plato, τὸ ἀγαθὸν κεχωρισμένον, "the separate good of the world," in way of distinction from that intrinsic or inherent good of it, which is the order and harmony itself:* Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πότερον ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον; πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι, καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἢ τὴν τάξιν, ἢ ἀμφοτέρως, ὥσπερ στράτευμα; καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ τάξει τὸ εὖ καὶ ὁ στράτηγος, καὶ μᾶλλον οὗτος, οὐ γὰρ οὗτος διὰ τὴν τάξιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη διὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν· πάντα γὰρ συντέτακταί πως, "It is to be considered also what is the good and best of the universe; whether its own order only; or something separate and existing by itself? or rather both of them together? As the good of an army consisteth both in its order, and likewise in its general or emperor but principally in this latter, because the emperor is not for the order of the army, but the order of the army is for him; for all things are co-ordered together with God, and respectively to him." Wherefore, since Aristotle's supreme Deity, by what name soever called, whether mind or good, is the proper efficient cause of all that well and fit that is in the universe, of all the order, pulchritude, and harmony thereof; it must needs be granted, that besides its being the final cause of motion, or its turning round the heavens by being loved, it was also the efficient cause of the whole frame of nature and system of the world. And thus does he plainly declare his sense, where he applauds Anaxagoras for maintaining Νοῦν εἶναι καὶ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῆς τάξεως πάσης αἴτιον,† "that mind is the cause not only of all order, but also of the whole world:" and when himself positively affirms, ἐκ τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις,‡ "that

[10] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 266. tom. 4. opp. See what we have said on chap. 3. sect. 11.

[1] Ibid. lib. 14. cap. 10. p. 484. 485. tom. 4. opp.

* Met. lib. 14. cap. 10. [P. 484. tom. 4. opp.]

† Met. lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 266. tom. 4. opp.]

‡ Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. [P. 479. tom. 4. opp.] De Part. An. lib. 1.

from such a principle as this, depends the heaven, and nature." Where by heaven is meant the whole world, and by nature that artificial nature of his before insisted on, which doth nothing in vain, but always acteth for ends regularly, and is the instrument of the divine mind. He also somewhere affirmeth, that if the heavens or world were generated, that is, made in time, so as to have had a beginning, then it was certainly made, not by chance and fortune, but by such an artificial nature as is the instrument of a perfect mind. And in his Physics, where he contends for the world's ante-eternity, he concludes nevertheless,* ἀνάγκη νοῦν αἴτιον καὶ φύσιν εἶναι τοῦδε παντὸς, "that mind together with nature must of necessity be the cause of this whole universe." For though the world were never so much co-eternal with mind, yet was it in order of nature after it, and junior to it as the effect thereof, himself thus generously resolving,† εὐλογώτατόν εἶναι νοῦν προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν· τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, "that though some (that is, the Atheists) affirm the elements to have been the first Beings, yet it was the most reasonable thing of all to conclude, that Mind was the oldest of all things, and senior to the world and elements; and that according to nature, it had a princely and sovereign dominion over all." Wherefore, we think it now sufficiently evident, that Aristotle's supreme Deity does not only move the heavens as being loved, or is the final cause of motion; but also was the efficient cause of this whole mundane system, framed according to the best wisdom, and after the best manner possible.[2]

For perhaps it may not be amiss here to observe, that God was not called Mind by Aristotle, and those other ancient philosophers, according to that vulgar sense of many in these days of ours; as if he were indeed an understanding or perceptive being, and that perfectly omniscient, but yet nevertheless such as acted all things arbitrarily, being not determined by any rule or nature of goodness, but only by his own fortuitous will. For, according to those ancient philosophers, that which acts without

* Lib. 2. cap. 6. [P. 474. tom. 1. opp.]

† Ar. de An. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 16. tom. 2. opp.

[2] Our worthy author explains Aristotle's precepts concerning the Deity entirely in accordance with the opinion of the junior Platonists: and in doing so, I consider him not to have exercised sufficient caution. If I possess any faculty of judging in such matters, we ought not, I conceive, to estimate the opinions of Aristotle and other philosophers on God and divine things from a few short passages picked out here and there, but from the general tenor and context of their entire doctrine. No one is or can be so guarded in writing, as not to let fall something, which another may be able to torture into a different sense and convert into a favourable or unfavourable argument. Wherefore, if a few words be alone sufficient for establishing innocence or guilt, no man is so black or so white, but may to the minds of the careless or less intelligent be convicted of the grossest sins, or acquitted of every crime. I might, if so disposed, enter into a long disputation on these passages of Aristotle and their true meaning, which I shall refrain from doing, as I intend briefly stating my opinion respecting this philosopher's piety and religion in the sequel.

respect to good, would not be so much accounted mens as dementia, "mind," as "madness or folly;" and to impute the frame of nature or system of the world, together with the government of the same, to such a principle as this, would have been judged by them all one, as to impute them to chance or fortune. But Aristotle and those other philosophers, who called the supreme God Νοῦς or "Mind," understood thereby that which of all things in the whole world is most opposite to chance, fortune and temerity; that wl[illegible] l by the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the well and fit" of [illegible] it be not rather the very rule, measure and esse[illegible] tself; that which acteth all for ends and good, and [illegible] ing after the best manner, in order to the whole. [illegible] s in that place before cited out of Plato's Phædo, [illegible] meaning of that opinion, "that Mind made the [illegible] s the cause of all things:" Ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτ[illegible] ν πάντα κοσμεῖν, καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν β[illegible] That therefore everything might be concluded to have bee[illegible] posed of after the best manner possible." And accordingly, Theophrastus, Aristotle's scholar and successor, describeth God after this manner: Τὸ πρῶτον καὶ θειότατον, πάντα τὰ ἄριστα βουλόμενον, "That first and divinest Being of all, which willeth all the best things." Whether of these two hypotheses concerning God, one of the ancient pagan philosophers, that God is as essentially goodness as wisdom, or, as Plotinus after Plato calls him, decency and fitness itself; the other, of some late professors of Christianity, that he is nothing but arbitrary will, omnipotent and omniscient; I say, whether of these two is more agreeable to piety and true Christianity, we shall leave it to be considered.

Lastly, it is not without probability, that Aristotle did, besides the frame of nature and fabric of the world, impute even the very substance of things themselves also to the divine efficiency (nor indeed can there well be any doubt of any thing save only the matter); partly from his affirming God to be a cause and principle to all things, and partly from his commending this doctrine of Anaxagoras:* Ἅμα τῷ καλῶς, αἰτίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων νοῦν, "That mind was, together with well and fit, the cause and principle of things themselves."[3] However, that Aristotle's inferior gods at least, and therefore his intelligences of the lesser spheres, which were incorporeal

* Met. lib. i. cap. 3. [P. 266. tom. 4. opp.]

[3] This sentiment is not to be met with in Aristotle. He does not speak of mind: nor assert that mind, together with that which is well and fit, is the cause and principle of things. Behold the philosopher's own words: Οἱ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἅμα τῷ καλῶς τὴν αἰτίαν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων ἔθεσαν, the meaning of which I consider to be: "Those, therefore, who supposed so (which he makes Anaxagoras and Hermotimus to have done), asserted the cause of the well and beautiful to be also the cause of all things that really exist.

substances, were all of them produced or created by one Supreme, may be further confirmed from this definition of his in his rhetoric:[4]* Τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς, ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον, "The divinity is nothing but either God or the work of God." Where θεὸς is unquestionably used in way of eminency for the Supreme Deity, as in those other places of Aristotle's before cited, to which sundry more might be added, as:† Πάντα ἔχει τ' ἀγαθὰ ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης, "God possesseth all good things, and is self-sufficient. And again, where he speaks of things that are more than praiseworthy:[5]‡ Τοιοῦτον δὲ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ τ' ἀγαθὸν, πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τ' ἄλλα ἀναφέρεσθαι, "Such are God and Good, for to these are all other things referred." But here Aristotle affirming, "that there is nothing divine, but either God himself, or the work and effect of God," plainly implies, that there was no multitude of self-existent deities, and that those intelligences of the lesser stars or spheres, however eternal, were themselves also produced or caused by one supreme Deity.

Furthermore, Aristotle declares,§ that this speculation concerning the Deity does constitute a particular science by itself, distinct from those other speculative sciences of physiology, and the pure mathematics; so that there are in all three speculative sciences, distinguished by their several objects, physiology, the pure mathematics, and theology or metaphysics: the former of these, that is, physiology, being conversant περὶ ἀχώριστα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, "about things both inseparable from matter, and moveable;" the second (viz. geometry, or the pure mathematics), περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν, ἀλλ' οὐ χωριστὰ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ, "About things immoveable indeed, but not really separable from matter, so as to exist alone by themselves;" but the third and last, περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα, "Concerning things both immoveable and separable from matter," that is, "incorporeal substances immoveable:" this philosopher there adding: Εἰ μή ἐστί τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δέ ἐστί τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα, καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, "That if there were no other substance besides these natural things, which are material and moveable, then would physiology be the first science; but if there be any immoveable substance,

[4] This passage, as must be clear from what we have already remarked respecting its sense, is not of the slightest force towards establishing the learned Doctor's position, that Aristotle considered these intelligences which rule the celestial bodies to have been produced from God himself. Neither is it very intelligible, indeed, how this could be the case, inasmuch as he supposed them to have been connected with their orbs from all eternity.

* Lib. 2. cap. 23. [P. 785. tom. 3. opp.]

† Mag. Mor. lib. 2. cap. 15. [P. 255. tom. 3. opp.]

[5] In these words, however, Aristotle is stating not his own, but Eudoxus' opinion.

‡ Eth. Nic. lib. 1. cap. 12. [P. 18. tom. 3. opp.]

§ Met. lib. 6. cap. 1. [P. 346. tom. 4. opp.]

the philosophy thereof must needs in order of nature be before the other." Lastly, he concludes, that as the speculative sciences in general are more noble and excellent than the other, so is theology or metaphysics the most honourable of all the speculatives. Now the chief points of the Aristotelic theology, or metaphysical doctrine concerning God, seem to be these four following. First, that though all things be not ingenit or unmade, according to that in his book against Xenophanes:[6] Ἆρ' ἀνάγκη ἀγέννητα πάντα εἶνα[illegible] γεγονέναι ἕτερα ἐξ ἑτέρων;* "There is no neces[illegible] ings should be unmade, for what hinders but tha[illegible] ay be generated from other things?" Yet there [illegible] something eternal and unmade, as likewise inc[illegible] use εἰ πᾶσαι οὐσίαι φθαρταί, πάντα φθαρτά, "if all [illegible] e corruptible, then all might come to nothing." [illegible] unmade (or self-existent) and incorruptible sub[illegible] g to Aristotle, is not senseless matter, but a per[illegible] condly, that God is also an incorporeal substance, κεχωρισμένη τῶν αἰσθητῶν,† "separate from sensibles;" and not only so, but, according to Aristotle's judgment likewise, ἀδιαίρετος, and ἀμερής, and ἀμεγέθης, "indivisible," and "devoid of parts," and "magnitude." Nor can it be denied, but that besides Aristotle, the generality of those other ancients who asserted incorporeal substance, did suppose it likewise to be unextended, they dividing substances (as we learn from Philo) into διαστηματικαὶ καὶ ἀδιάστατοι οὐσίαι, "distant and indistant," or "extended and unextended substances." Which doctrine, whether true or no, is not here to be discussed. Thirdly: Τὸ αὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν,‡ "That in God intellect is really the same thing with the intelligibles." Because the divine Mind being (at least in order of nature) senior to all things, and architectonical of the world, could not look abroad for its objects, or find them any where without itself, and therefore must needs contain them all within itself. Which determination of Aristotle's is no less agreeable to Theism than to Platonism; whereas, on the contrary, the Atheists, who assert mind and understanding as such, to be in order of nature junior to matter and the world, do therefore, agreeably to their own hypothesis, suppose all intellection to be by way of passion from corporeal things without, and no mind or intellect to contain its intelligibles, or immediate objects, within itself. Lastly, that God being an immoveable substance, his οὐσία is ἐνέργεια,§ "his essence" and "act or operation" the same: Δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι οὐσίαν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια, "There must therefore needs be

[6] De Xenophane, Zenone et Gorgia, cap. 2. p. 836. tom. 2. opp.
* Met. lib. 14. cap. 6. [P. 477. tom. 4. opp.]
† Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. [P. 180. tom. 4. opp.]
‡ Met. lib. 14. cap. 7. and cap. 9.
§ Met. lib. 14. cap. 6.

ome such principle as this, whose essence is act or energy." From which theorem Aristotle indeed endeavours to establish he eternity of the world, that it was not made ἐκ νυκτὸς, καὶ ὁμοῦ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, "from night, and a confused chaos of things, and from nothing;" that is, from an antecedent non-existence, brought forth into being; because God, who is an immoveable nature, and whose essence is act or energy, cannot be supposed to have rested or slept from eternity, doing nothing at all, and then, after infinite ages, to have begun to move the matter, or make the world. Which argumentation of Aristotle's perhaps would not be inconsiderable, were the world, motion, and time, capable of existing from eternity, or without beginning. Of which more elsewhere. However, from hence it is undeniably evident, that Aristotle, though asserting the world's eternity, nevertheless derived the same from God, because he would prove this eternity of the world from the essential energy and immutability of the Deity.

We shall now conclude all concerning Aristotle with this short summary, which himself gives us of his own creed and religion, agreeably to the tradition of his pagan ancestors:* Παραδέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παλαιῶν, ὅτι θεοί τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι, καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖον τὴν ὅλην φύσιν· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσῆχθαι πρὸς τὴν πειθὼ τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν· ἀνθρωποειδεῖς τε γὰρ τούτους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὁμοίους τισὶ λέγουσι, καὶ τούτοις ἕτερα ἀκόλουθα καὶ παραπλήσια, "It hath been delivered down to us from very ancient times, that the stars are gods also; besides that supreme Deity, which contains the whole nature. But all the other things were fabulously added hereunto, for the better persuasion of the multitude, and for utility of human life and political ends, to keep men in obedience to civil laws. As for example, that these gods are of human form, or like to other animals; with such other things as are consequent hereupon." In which words of Aristotle these three things may be taken notice of. First, that this was the general persuasion of the civilized Pagans from all known antiquity downwards, that there is one τὸ θεῖον, which comprehends the whole nature. Where τὸ θεῖον is by Aristotle plainly taken for the supreme Deity. And his own sense concerning this particular is elsewhere thus declared after the same manner, where he speaks of order, harmony, and proportion:† Θείας γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἥτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, "this is the work of divine power, which also contains this universe." Which Divinity, containing and comprehending the whole nature and universe, must needs be a single and solitary Being; according to that expression of Horace before cited:

* Met. lib. 14. cap. 8. [P. 483.]

† In Polit.

Nec viget quicquam simile aut secundum,

"That, which hath hath nothing like it, nor second to it." The next thing is, that according to the pagan tradition, besides this universal Numen, there were certain other particular and inferior deities also, that is, understanding beings superior to men; namely, the animated stars or spheres, according to the vulgar apprehension, though Aristotle's philosophy would interpret this chiefly of their immoveable minds or intelligences. Lastly, that all the rest of the pag[illegible] and theology, those two things only excepted, were [illegible] fictitious, invented for the better persuasion of th[illegible] to piety, and the conserving of them in obedience to civil [illegible] mongst which this may be reckoned for one, that those g[illegible]e all like men or other animals; and therefore to be wors[illegible]d in images and statues of those several forms; with all th[illegible]her fabulous farrago, which dependeth hereupon. Which b[illegible] separated from the rest, the πάτριος δόξα, or "ancient tradi[illegible] of their pagan progenitors," would remain comprised within those two particulars above mentioned; namely, that there is one supreme Deity, that contains the whole universe, and that besides it, the animated stars or their minds are certain inferior gods also.[7]

[7] From the passage of Aristotle, here copiously discussed by Dr. Cudworth, we learn that philosopher's own sentiments respecting the public religions prevailing in his time in Greece, but not the theological opinion of the Greeks generally, much less of all the ancient nations. Neither do I agree with the learned Doctor in thinking, that Θεῖον in these words of the Stagirite is to be understood of the supreme Deity. This term, as is manifest from the whole tenor of the discourse, implies that "divine power," supposed by the ancients to be diffused from the stars, which they regarded as gods, through the whole of the universe. Nor is Aristotle discoursing in this place of the supreme Lord of all things, but of the minds or intelligencies, which he supposed to preside over the heavenly bodies. The meaning of the entire passage is as follows: "It has been handed down to us from our ancestors, that the stars, or the intelligences which rule the stars, are gods, and that the power and authority of these gods pervade the whole universe." It may be added, that the word Θεῖον is used by Aristotle generally of any thing more excellent than man, and also of gods: see De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 615. tom. 1. opp.

Long and grave were the controversies of the learned of former times respecting the religion and piety of Aristotle; many of whom, as we are informed by Meric Casaubon in his notes on Diogenes Laërtius, p. 635. did not scruple to assert, that what Aristotle has written concerning God is altogether divine; while others maintained, that nothing can be more subversive of all true piety and religion than this philosopher's doctrines and that we ought to assign to him the very foremost place among atheists. The passages, which have any weight towards exculpating Aristotle, have been culled from his writings by no one more ably than by Joh. Jonsius De Scriptor. Histor. Philos. lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 5. p. 9. while such as are in favour of those, who rank him among the enemies of God, have been set forth with great zeal and labour by the venerable J. Georg. Walch in the Exercit. De Atheismo Aristotelis, extant among his Parerga Academica, published at Leipzig, 1721.8. where we have also an account of the authors who have disputed on each side of this question: whom J. Alb. Fabricius also enumerates in his Delectus Argum. pro Veritate Religionis Christianæ, cap. 8. sect. 3. p. 307. Of all the writers who have taken up the cause of Aristotle, the latest is the most erudite, J. Fr. Reimmann, in his Historia Atheismi, sect. 2. cap. 27. sect. 1. 2. &c. p. 182. &c. The reason why this controversy is still undecided has been, that the

To Aristotle may be here subjoined Speusippus and Xenocrates, his equals and corrivals, they being Plato's successors; together with Theophrastus, his own scholar and successor.

disputants have neither attached the same meaning to the word God nor to the term Atheist. Wherefore in the first instance we shall have to inquire, what is understood by God and by a man who denies the existence of God. What has given rise to another difficulty is this, that many wish the question to be decided from some particular passages of the philosopher; while others, unquestionably with more justice, maintain, that the whole tenor and complexion of his doctrine is to be taken into consideration. Moreover, the partisans of Aristotle appeal also to the book De Mundo, which their opponents, in my opinion, are right in rejecting and excluding from his genuine works. To confess frankly my own sentiments, I am naturally more disposed to excuse than to accuse others and I am slow in subscribing my assent, when the dispute turns upon so grave a charge as the denial of God. Nevertheless, I cannot but avow my conviction, that the God of Aristotle is such as neither to impress me with feelings of love nor of fear, that is, a God in name rather than in reality. Nay more, I consider the difference to be but slight between his God and the gods of Epicurus Both are represented as neither having any functions of their own nor concerning themselves in those of others, but as occupied wholly in contemplation and on that account happy.

God is the eternal cause of all things, possessing infinite liberty, wisdom, and power, and at the same time most righteous and most just. He who takes away from God any one of these attributes worships not God, but the shadow and semblance of God, and although he may use magnificent phrases and swear ten thousand times, that he reverences a Deity, he is not to be listened to. To the God of Aristotle, as I shall briefly make appear, hardly any of these attributes will apply. From which it follows, that he can neither benefit nor injure the human race, and consequently is undeserving of their homage. In the first place, as is well known to all, Aristotle conceived the world to have existed of itself, and necessarily, from all eternity, like God himself. In what manner he associated the world with God, I shall not now inquire. Whether he supposed the nature of things to have flowed from God from everlasting, as did the junior Platonists, whom many of the moderns collaud for this, or fancied some other bond of connexion between God and the world, this one thing is unquestionable, that he ascribed the same eternal and necessary existence to both. Hence he considered the heavens to be, like God, subject to no manner of change. See his De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 613. tom. 1. opp. Consequently, his God has no liberty of action and therefore it is useless for any one to address him with prayers. For if the universe is governed by an eternal law and does not admit of the least change, I see no reason, why any assistance should be expected from the deity. Some one will object, perhaps, that according to Aristotle the heavens indeed are unchangeable, but not also the things that are beneath the heavens and the moon. To whom, although having much that I could say in reply, I shall at present content myself with this one answer, that in Aristotle's opinion, as every one knows, God has nothing whatever to do with the things, which exist and take place beneath the moon. In the first place, then, we have a God destitute of liberty, and consequently unworthy of all religious homage and worship.

Again, Aristotle, it is notorious, connected God with the extreme sphere. It is evident, therefore, that he believed him neither to be infinite, nor omnipresent. And what necessity, I ask, is there to worship, love, or fear such a Deity? For my own part, I am at a loss to know by what means, if even he had left any virtue to this Deity, the prayers of mankind could be conveyed to him. Plato employs demons as ministers in this matter, and assigns these as intercessors between mortals and the supreme Being, whom he likewise considers to be far removed from all human affairs and not every where present. But Aristotle denies the existence of such demons, and, as we have already seen, adopts no other gods except the intelligences or minds that preside over the celestial bodies. But these intelligences are ignorant of all human affairs, and confine their cares exclusively to the orbs entrusted to their respective charge. The supreme Deity therefore cannot learn the prayers of mankind through these interpreters. By what other means, then, is the God of Aristotle to become acquainted with our wants and desires? I indeed can see none: nor do I understand, why I should hold in reverence a Deity, whom no affairs or prayers of mine

Concerning the former of which it is recorded in Cicero,[8] that agreeably with Plato, he asserted vim quandam, quâ omnia regantur, eamque animalem, "one animal and intellectual force,

can by possibility reach. Now to acknowledge a God, utterly destitute of liberty and power, and in whom no hope or reliance can be reposed, is in my opinion to do the same as is recorded of Epicurus, namely, to leave a God in words, but to discard him in reality.

But granting, that some of the things transacted among mortals are made known to this Deity: nay, granting him to be fully cognizant of all things, and to possess also the will to assist us; still even then he will not be one whom we ought to regard as God. And why? The God of Aristotle, like the gods of Epicurus, is perfectly inactive and otiose, existing in a state of perpetual quietude and repose, and in this quietude his chief happiness is made to consist. Aristotle, I am aware, tells us that the *οὐσία* or "essence" of God is *ἐνέργεια*, "operation," Metaphysic. lib. 14. cap. 6. tom. 4. opp. But all that is meant by this high-sounding word is, that God lives and contemplates. This I shall show by his own words, De Cœlo, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 644. tom. 1. opp. *Θεοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι ζωὴ ἀίδιος*, "The operation of God is immortality: but this is perpetual life." What can be clearer? In stating the essence of God to be operation, he simply means that God lives from everlasting. Besides, he expressly denies all action in his God, and leaves to him nothing but contemplation. For after saying that God lives, and concluding from this that he also acts, he tells us that no other action can apply to God but contemplation: *Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφῃρημένῳ, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται, πλὴν θεωρίας; ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητική*, "But to him who lives, if we take away action and, much more, production, what is left but contemplation? So that the operation of God, surpassing as it is in happiness, consists in contemplation:" Ethic. ad Nicomachum, lib. 10. cap. 8. p. 184. tom. 3. opp. But if asked, what it is that the Deity contemplates, he decides nothing, but confesses pretty plainly, that this is beyond human comprehension: Magnor. Moral. lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 256. tom. 3. opp. *Τί μὲν οὖν ὁ Θεὸς θεάσεται, ἀφίσθω*, "Let what the Deity contemplates, therefore, be passed over." Away then with the God, who lives for himself alone and is occupied wholly in contemplation. For what comfort or assistance are mortals to expect from him?

Lastly, it is abundantly evident from what we have said, that justice has no place in the God of Aristotle. For he who is bound down by necessity, who is confined to a certain spot, and neither sees the affairs of mortals, nor, if he did so, could take the slightest interest in them, can be influenced by no desire to reward the good or punish the bad. Hence all that Aristotle has inculcated on morals and probity of life is founded upon no considerations having reference to God and his virtues, but solely upon human and natural reasons, altogether apart from virtue.

Let wise men judge from these things, how much difference there can be between a man, who disbelieves altogether the being of a God, and Aristotle, who acknowledges indeed a first cause of motion, but denies that this cause is free, infinite, omnipresent, omnipotent, cognizant of human affairs, in short, the governor of all things. If those are atheists, who own indeed the existence of a God, but inculcate that the same is to be worshipped for no other reason than because of the excellence of his nature, I cannot see how Aristotle is to be excepted from the number. Although it is even doubtful, whether he considered that God was to be worshipped at all. To conclude, Aristotle, as is manifest from all that he has written on God and divine matters, conceived this world, together with God himself, to be no other than a machine endowed with eternal motion. And as in every machine that moves, some principle of

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[8] De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 2898. 2899. tom. 9. opp. The Doctor, however, is wrong in his interpretation of Cicero's words. Velleius does not complain of Speusippus as endeavouring to destroy the Epicurean gods only, but all gods whatever. His meaning is, that the doctrine laid down by Speusippus respecting divine things would warrant the conclusion, that he meant to root out from men's minds all notion of gods: for he committed the administration of all things to one animal force, and therefore took away all power and authority from the gods.

by which all things are governed;" by reason whereof, Velleius the Epicurean complains of him, as thereby endeavouring, evellere ex animis cognitionem deorum, "to pluck out of the minds of men the notion of gods:" as indeed both he and Plato did destroy those Epicurean gods, which were all supposed to be independent and to have no sway or influence at all upon the government of the world; whereas neither of them denied a plurality of subordinate and dependent deities, generated or created by one supreme, and by him employed as his ministers in the economy of the universe: for had they done any such thing as this, they would certainly have been then condemned for Atheists. And Xenocrates' theology is thus represented in Stobæus: Τὴν Μονάδα καὶ τὴν Δυάδα θεοὺς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄῤῥενα πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα, καὶ Πέριττον, καὶ Νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ θήλειαν μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός, &c., "That both a Monad and Dyad were gods, the one masculine, having the order of a father, which he calleth Zen and Mind, and which is also to him the first God; the other feminine, as it were the mother of the gods, which is to him the soul of the universe:" besides which he acknowledgeth the heaven to be divine, that is, animated with a particular soul of its own, and the fiery stars to be celestial gods, as he asserted also certain sublunary gods, viz. the invisible demons. Where instead of the Platonic trinity, Xenocrates seems to have acknowledged only a duality of divine hypostases; the first called a Monad and Mind, the second a Dyad and Soul of the universe. And lastly, we have this testimony of Theophrastus,[9] besides others, cited out of his Metaphysics: Θεία γὰρ πάντων ἀρχὴ, δι' ἧς ἅπαντα καὶ ἔστι καὶ διαμένει, "There is one divine principle of all things, by or from which all things subsist and remain."

XXV. The Stoics and their chief doctors, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, were no better naturalists and metaphysicians than Heraclitus, in whose footsteps they trode; they in like

motion ought to be present; so he supposed also, that some cause was to be assigned for the motion of this vast mundane mass. Accordingly he tells us, that this cause is God, whom he describes in words sufficiently copious and elegant, but destitute for the most part of any intelligible meaning. If I meditate upon the existence of a certain eternal principle of motion, which lives and contemplates, what joy, or hope, or fear, have I from this, what inducement towards living well or help towards dying in peace? Just the same, if I am not mistaken, as I should derive from the pleasing dream, that the gods live a life of bliss in the intermundane gardens of Epicurus, and have neither occupation of their own nor cause any to others.

[8] Ecl. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 17.]

[9] Not having at hand Theophrastus' book, entitled Ἀποσπασματιῶν τῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, I am unable to find out whether this passage is to be found in it or not. Many very learned men, however, consider it not be a genuine work of Theophrastus. See J. Alb. Fabricius' Biblioth. Græc. lib. 3. cap. 9. sect. 14. p. 242.

manner admitting no other substance besides body, according to the true and proper notion thereof, as that which is not only διαστατὸν, "distant and extended," but also ἀντίτυπον, "resisting and impenetrable." So that, according to these Stoics, the souls not only of other animals, but of men also, were properly corporeal, that is substances impenetrably extended; and which differed from that other part of theirs, commonly called their body, no otherwise than that they were[10] σῶμα ἀραιότερον καὶ λεπτομερέστερον, "a more thin and subtle body," and πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον, "a hot and fiery spirit:" it being supposed by these philosophers that cogitation, reason, and understanding, are lodged only in the fiery matter of the universe. And though the generality of these Stoics acknowledged human souls to have a certain permanency after death, and some of them till the next conflagration, (unless perhaps they should be crushed and broken all to pieces, in their passage out of the body, by the downfall of some tower, steeple, or the like upon them) yet did they all conclude against their immortality, there being nothing at all immortal with them (as shall be afterwards declared) save only Jupiter, or the one supreme Deity. And as for the punishment of wicked souls after death, though some of them seem to have utterly exploded the same, as a mere figment of poets, (insomuch, that Epictetus[1] himself denies there was any Acheron, Cocytus, or Phlegethon) yet others granted that as the better souls after death did mount up to the stars, their first original, so the wicked wandered up and down here in certain dark and miry subterraneous places, till at length they were quite extinct. Nevertheless, they seem to have been all of this persuasion, that the frightening of men with punishments after death was no proper nor accommodate means to promote virtue, because that ought to be pursued after for its own sake, or the good of honesty, as vice to be avoided for that evil of turpitude which is in it, and not for any other external evil consequent thereupon. Wherefore Chrysippus reprehended Plato for subjoining to his republic such affrightful stories of punishments after death:* Φησὶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀποτρέπειν τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν φόβῳ τῆς ἀδικίας τὸν Κέφαλον· εὐδιάβλητόν τ' εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἐξάγοντα πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπιπτούσας, τὸν περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κολάσεων λόγον, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκοῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τοῦ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνείργουσι, "Chrysippus affirmeth,

[10] These are the words of Chrysippus, preserved by Plutarch, in his book, De Repugnantiis Stoicorum, p. 1052. tom. 2. opp. The subject here briefly touched upon is explained at greater length by Lipsius, Thomasius, Scioppius and others, who have treated professedly of the Stoics and their doctrines.

[1] See Arrian's Comm. De Epicteti Disput. lib. 3. cap. 13. p. 293.

* Plut. de Stoic. Rep. p. 1040.

that Plato (in the person of Cephalus) does not rightly deter men from injustice by the fear of divine punishments and vengeance after death; since this opinion (of torments after death) is liable to much exception, and the contrary is not without probabilities; so that it seems to be but like to women's frightening children from doing unhappy tricks, with those bugbears of Acco and Alphito." But how fondly these Stoics doated upon that hypothesis, that all was body, may appear from hence, that they maintained even accidents and qualities themselves to be bodies; for voice and sound, night and day, evening and morning, summer and winter, nay, calends and nones, months and years, were bodies with them. And not only so, but also the qualities of the mind itself, as virtue and vice, together with the motions and affections of it, as anger and envy, grief and joy; according to that passage in Seneca,[2] Corporis bona sunt corpora; corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi, nam et hic corpus est, "The goods of a body are bodies; now, the mind is a body, and therefore the goods of the mind are bodies too." And with as good logic as this did they further infer, that all the actions, passions, and qualities of the mind, were not only bodies, but also animals likewise:[3] "Animam constat animal esse, cum ipsa efficiat, ut simus animalia; virtus autem nihil aliud est quàm animus taliter se habens, ergo animal est, "It is manifest that the soul is an animal, because it is that by which we are made animals; now virtue and vice are nothing else but the soul so and so affected or modified, and therefore these are animals too." Thus we see what fine conclusions these doaters upon body (though accounted great masters of logic) made; and how they were befooled in their ratiocinations and philosophy.

Nevertheless, though these Stoics were such sottish Corporealists, yet were they not for all that Atheists; they resolving that mind or understanding, though always lodged in corporeal substance, yet was not first of all begotten out of senseless matter, so or so modified, but was an eternal unmade thing, and

[2] Epist. 106. p. 399. tom. 2. opp. But the passage in Seneca is somewhat different from the one here given: Quæ ergo propria sunt corporis, ea corporis bona sunt: corpora ergo sunt et quæ animi sunt: nam et hic corpus est, "But those things which are proper to body are the goods of the body; therefore those of the mind too are bodies: for this also is a body."

[3] Senec. Epist. 103. p. 422. tom. 2. opp. where, however, you will not find the reading, taliter se habens, but, quodammodo se habens. The learned Doctor quoted both passages out of Just. Lipsius' Introd. in Physiol. Stoic. lib. 2. diss. 4. p. 64. a. b. where they are given incorrectly as here. As to the rest, Seneca himself spurns this Stoical doctrine, and declares openly: Me in alia sententia profiteor esse, "I profess myself to be of a different opinion." At the present day we ridicule this dogma, and not altogether unjustly. Nevertheless, it will appear much less ridiculous and absurd, if we examine into their opinions on body and bodies generally, and take into consideration the definitions they were wont to give of bodies: on which subject I shall not dwell at present.

the maker of the whole mundane system. And therefore as to that controversy so much agitated amongst the ancients, whether the world were made by chance, or by the necessity of material motions, or by mind, reason and understanding; they avowedly maintained that it was neither by chance nor by material necessity, but divinâ mente, "by a divine and eternal mind" every way perfect. From which one eternal mind they also affirmed human souls to have been derived, and not from senseless matter: Prudentiam et mentem à diis ad homines pervenisse,[4] "that mind and wisdom descended down to men from the Deity." And that Ratio nihil aliud est quâm in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa,[5] "Reason is nothing else but part of the divine spirit merged into a human body:" so that these human souls were to them no other than μόρια θεοῦ καὶ ἀποσπάσματα,[6] "certain parts of God, or decerptions and avulsions from him." Neither were the reasons, by which these Stoics would prove the world to have had a divine original, at all contemptible, or much inferior to those which have been used in these latter days; they being such as these: first, that it is no more likely this orderly system of the world should have been made by chance, than that Ennius' Annals, or Homer's Iliad might have resulted from the fortuitous projection or tumbling out of so many forms of letters, confounded altogether; there being as much continued and coherent sense, and as many several combinations in this real poem of the world, as there is in any fantastic poem made by men. And since we see no houses or cities, no books or libraries any where made by the fortuitous motions of matter, it is a madness to think that this admirable compages of the whole world should first have resulted from thence. Again, there could not possibly be such an agreeing and conspiring cognation of things, and such a universal harmony throughout the whole world, as now there is, nisi ea uno divino et continuato spiritu continerentur, "were they not all contained by one and the same divine spirit:" which is the most obvious argument for the unity or oneliness of the Deity. They reasoned also from the scale of nature, or the gradual perfection of things in the universe, one above another; that therefore there must be something absolutely perfect, and that either in the world itself, or something presiding over it, was à principio sapiens,[7] "wise from the beginning," or rather without beginning, and from eternity. For as in the growth of plants and animals, Natura

[4] Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 31. p. 3000. tom. 9. opp.

[5] Seneca, Epist. 66. p. 168. tom. 2. opp.

[6] Arrian. in Epictet. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 123. Αἱ ψυχαὶ μὲν οὕτως εἰσὶν ἐνδεδεμέναι καὶ συναφεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτε αὐτοῦ μόρια οὖσαι καὶ ἀποσπασμάτια, "Souls are thus bound to and connected with God, as being parts of and decerptions from himself."

[7] Cicero uses these words, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 2973. tom. 9. opp. from which book all the Stoical arguments here adduced by Dr. Cudworth are taken.

suo quodam itinere ad ultimum pervenit, "nature by a continual progress, and journeying forwards, arrives at length to the greatest perfection, which those things are respectively capable of;" and as those arts of picture and architecture aim at perfection; ita in omni naturâ necesse est absolvi aliquid et perfici, "so in the nature of the whole universe there must needs be something absolutely perfect, reached unto." Necesse est præstantem aliquam esse naturam, qua nihil est melius; since there is such a gradual ascent and scale of perfections in nature, one above another, "there must needs be some most excellent and perfect Being, than which nothing can be better," at the top of all, as the head thereof. Moreover, they disputed Socratically, after this manner:[8] Unde arripuit homo vitam, mentem et rationem? "Whence did man snatch life, reason, or understanding? Or from what was it kindled in him? For is it not plain that we derive the moisture and fluidity of our bodies from the water that is in the universe, their consistency and solidity from the earth, their heat and activity from the fire, and their spirituosity from the air?" Illud autem, quod vincit hæc omnia, rationem, mentem et consilium, &c. ubi invenimus? unde sustulimus? An cætera mundus habebit omnia? Hoc unum, quod plurimi est, non habebit? "But that which far transcendeth all these things, our reason, mind and understanding, where did we find it? or from whence did we derive it? Hath the universe all those others things of ours in it, and in a far greater proportion? and hath it nothing at all of that, which is the most excellent thing in us?" Nihil quod animi, quodque rationis est expers, id generare ex se potest animantes compotesque rationis, mundus autem generat animantes compotes rationis: "Nothing that is devoid of mind and reason, can generate things animant and rational; but the world generateth such, and therefore itself (or that which contains it, and presides over it) must needs be animant and rational, or intellectual." Which argumentation is further set home by such similitudes as these: Si ex oliva modulatè canentes tibiæ nascerentur, non dubitares, quin esset in oliva tibicinis quædam scientia. Quid si platani fidiculas ferrent numerosè sonantes, idem scilicet censeres in platanis inesse musicam. Cur igitur mundus non animans sapiensque judicetur, cum ex se procreet animantes atque sapientes? "If from the olive-tree should be produced pipes sounding harmoniously, or from the plain-tree fiddles, playing of their own accord musically, it would not at all be doubted, but that there was some musical either skill or nature in those trees themselves: why therefore should not the world be concluded to be both animant and wise (or to have something in it which is so) since it produceth such beings

[8] See Cicero's De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 6. 7. 8. 9.

from itself?" And though perhaps some may think that of Cotta's here to have been a smart and witty repartee,[9] Quærit Socrates, unde animam arripuerimus, si nulla fuerit in mundo? Et ego quæro, unde orationem? unde numeros? unde cantus? nisi verò loqui solem cum luna putemus, cum proprius accesserit: aut ad harmoniam canere mundum, ut Pythagoras existimat, "Socrates demandeth whence we snatched soul, life and reason, if there were none in the world? and I demand (saith he) whence did we snatch speech, music and numbers? Unless perhaps you will suppose the sun to confabulate with the moon, when he approaches near her in the Syzygiæ; or the world to sound harmonically, as Pythagoras conceited." Yet this, how smart soever it may seem, was really but an empty flash of Academic wit, without any sol[illegible] as shall be manifest afterwards. Lastly, the [illegible] ed to prove the existence of a God after this ma[illegible] ars corporis nostri est, quæ non sit minor, quam [illegible] us, sic mundum universum pluris esse necesse e[illegible] aliquam universi: As there is no part of our bo[illegible] nferior in perfection to ourselves, so must the [illegible] needs be supposed to be better and more perf[illegible] the parts thereof." Wherefore, since it is bette[illegible] with life and understanding, than to be devoid th[illegible] are pure perfections; they being in some measu[illegible] must needs be much more in the whole. Nullius [illegible] pars potest esse sentiens; "No part of that which is utterly dead and stupid, can have life and understanding in it." And it is a madness for any man to suppose, Nihil in omni mundo melius esse, quam se, "that there is nothing in the whole world better than himself or than mankind," which is but a part thereof. Now Cotta here again exercises his jeering Academic wit after the same manner as before: Hoc si placet, jam efficies, ut mundus optime librum legere videatur, &c. Isto modo etiam disertus, mathematicus, musicus, omni denique doctrina refertus, postremo philosophus erit mundus. "By this same argument you might as well prove, that the world is also book-learned, an orator, a mathematician, a musician, and last of all, a philosopher." But neither this objection of his, nor that former, have any firmitude at all in them: because though an effect cannot be better or more perfect than its cause, nor a part than the whole, and therefore, whatsoever there is of pure perfection in any effect, it must needs be more in the cause; yet as to those things there mentioned by Cotta, (which have all a plain mixture of imperfection in them) as they could not therefore formally exist in that which is absolutely perfect, so is it sufficient, that they are all eminently and virtually contained therein.

[9] Ibid. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 3064. tom. 9. opp.

By such argumentations as these (besides that taken from the topic of prescience and divination) did the ancient Stoics endeavour to demonstrate the existence of a God, or a universal Numen, the maker and governor of the whole world; and that such a one, as was not a mere plastic or methodical and senseless, but a conscious and perfectly intellectual nature. So that the world to them was neither a mere heap and congeries of dead and stupid matter, fortuitously compacted together; nor yet a huge plant or vegetable, that is, endued with a spermatic principle only; but an animal informed and enlivened by an intellectual soul. And though, being incorporealists, they sometimes called the whole world itself or mundane animal, God; and sometimes the fiery principle in it, as intellectual, and the Hegemonic of the mundane soul; yet was the god of the Stoics properly, not the very matter itself, but that great soul, mind, and understanding, or in Seneca's language, that "ratio incorporalis," that rules the matter of the whole world. Which Stoical god was also called as well Τ' ἀγαθὸν as Νοῦς, "good" as "mind;" as that which is a most moral, benign, and beneficent being; according to that excellent Cleanthean description of him, in Clemens Alexandrinus:[10]

> Τ' ἀγαθὸν ἱρωτᾷς μ' οἷόν ἐστι; ἄκουε δὴ,
> Τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, εὐσεβὲς,
> Κρατοῦν ἑαυτοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλὸν, δίον, &c.

But this maker and governor of the whole world was most commonly named by the Stoics Zeus and Zen, or Jupiter; some of them concluding, that therefore there was but one Zeus or independent Deity, because the whole world was but one animal governed by one soul; and others of them endeavouring, on the contrary, to prove the unity and singularity of the world from the oneliness of this Zeus, or the supreme Deity, supposed and taken for granted, and because there is but one fate and providence. Which latter consequence, Plutarch would by no means allow of, he writing thus concerning it, where he pleads for a plurality of worlds:* Καὶ μὴν τά γε ἄλλα τῶν Στωικῶν τίς ἂν φοβηθείη, πυνθανομένων, πῶς Εἱμαρμένη μία μένει καὶ Πρόνοια, καὶ οὐ πολλοὶ Δίες καὶ Ζῆνες ἔσονται, πλειόνων ὄντων κόσμων; τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη πολλοὺς εἶναι Δίας, ἂν πλείονες ὦσι κόσμοι, καὶ μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρχοντα πρῶτον καὶ ἡγεμόνα τοῦ ὅλου θεὸν, οἷος ὁ παρ' ἡμῖν κύριος ἁπάντων καὶ πατὴρ ἐπονομαζόμενος, &c. "Neither is it at all considerable, what the Stoics here object against a plurality of worlds, they demanding, how there could be but one fate, and one providence, and one Jove (or independent Deity) where there many worlds? For what necessity is there, that

[10] In two places, namely, Protreptic. cap. 6. p. 61. and Stromat. lib. 5. p. 715.
* De Def. Or. p. 425.

there must be more Zens or Joves than one, if there were more worlds? and why might not that one and the same God of this universe, called by us the Lord and Father of all, be the first prince, and highest governor in all those worlds? Or what hinders, but that a multitude of worlds might be all subject to the fate and providence of one Jupiter, or supreme God, himself inspecting and ordering them every one; and imparting principles and spermatic reasons to them, according to which all things in them might be governed and disposed? For can many distinct persons in an army or chorus be reduced into one body or polity? and could not ten or fifty, or a hundred worlds in the universe, be all governed by [illegible] be ordered together in reference to one princi[illegible] h place these two things are plainly contained; fi[illegible] oics unquestionably asserted one supreme Deity, [illegible] narch over the whole world; and secondly, that P[illegible] far from giving any entertainment to the co[illegible] that he concluded, though there were ten or fif[illegible] d worlds, yet they were all subject to one supre[illegible] l independent Deity.

But however, thou[illegible] thus unquestionably asserted one sole independen[illegible] l Numen, the monarch over the whole world, ye[illegible] withstanding, together with the other Pagans, acknowledge a plurality of gods; they concluding, πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων, "that all things were full of gods and demons." And so far were they from falling short of the other Pagans, as to this polytheism or multiplicity of gods, that they seem rather to have surpassed and outstripped them therein. Plutarch[1] making mention of their τοσοῦτον πλῆθος θεῶν, "their so great multitude of gods;" and affirming them, ἐμπεπληκέναι τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τόν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, "to have filled the whole heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods." Nevertheless, they plainly declare, that all this their multiplicity of gods (one only excepted) was generated or created in time by that one, called Zeus or Jupiter, who was not only the spermatic reason, but also the soul and mind of the whole universe; and who from himself produced the world, and those gods, out of non-existence into being. And not only so, but that also in the successive conflagrations they are all again resolved and swallowed up into that one. Thus Plutarch in his defect of oracles,* writing of the mortality of demons: Τοὺς Στωικοὺς γινώσκομεν οὐ μόνον κατὰ δαιμόνων, ἣν λέγω δόξαν, ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν, ὄντων τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος, ἑνὶ χρωμένους ἀϊδίῳ καὶ ἀφθάρτῳ, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους καὶ γεγονέναι καὶ φθαρήσεσθαι νομίζοντας, "We know the

[1] De Repugnantiis Stoicorum, p. 1075. tom. 2. opp.
* P. 420.

Stoics to maintain this opinion, not only concerning demons, but also the gods themselves, that they are mortal. For though they own such a multitude of gods, yet do they acknowledge only one of them eternal and incorruptible; affirming concerning all the rest, that as they were made in time, so they shall be again corrupted and destroyed." Plutarch himself there defends the mortality of demons, but this only as to their corporeal part, that they die to their present bodies, and transmigrate into others, their souls in the mean time remaining immortal and incorruptible; but the Stoics maintained the same as well concerning gods as demons; and that in such a manner, as that their very souls, lives and personalities, should be utterly extinguished and destroyed. To the same purpose Plutarch again writeth, in his book of Common Notions against the Stoics:* Χρύσιππος καὶ Κλεάνθης ἐμπεπληκότες (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν) τῷ λόγῳ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανὸν, τὴν γῆν, τὸν ἀέρα, τὴν θάλατταν, οὐδένα τῶν τοσούτων ἄφθαρτον, οὐδὲ ἀΐδιον ἀπολελοίπασι, πλὴν μόνου τοῦ Διός· εἰς ὃν πάντας καταναλίσκουσι τοὺς ἄλλους, &c. ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλα πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπων συλλογιζόμενα ἔχει τὰς ὑποθέσεις αὐτῶν, καὶ τοῖς δόγμασιν ἕπεται, ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ μέγα βοῶντες ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεῶν καὶ προνοίας, εἱμαρμένης τε καὶ φύσεως γράμμασι διαῤῥήδην λέγουσι, τοὺς θεοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι γεγονότας καὶ φθαρησομένους ὑπὸ πυρὸς, τηκτοὺς κατὰ αὐτοὺς, ὥσπερ κηρίνους ἢ καττιτερίνους ὄντας, "Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled the whole heaven, earth, air and sea with gods, leave not one of these their so many gods incorruptible nor eternal, save Jupiter only, into whom they consume all the rest; thereby making him to be a helluo and devourer of gods; which is as bad as if they should affirm him to be corruptible, it arguing as much imperfection for one to be nourished and preserved by the consumption of other things into him, as for himself to die. Now this is not only gathered by way of consequence from the other principles of the Stoics, but it is a thing which they expressly assert, and with a loud voice proclaim in all their writings concerning the gods, providence, fate and nature; that all the gods were generated (or made in time) and that they shall be all destroyed by fire; they supposing them to be meltable, as if they were waxen or leaden things." This indeed is essential to the Stoical doctrine, and from their principles inseparable and unavoidable; forasmuch as they held all to be body, and that in the successive conflagrations all corporeal systems and compages shall be dissolved by fire; so that no other Deity can then possibly remain safe and untouched, save Jupiter alone, the fiery principle of the universe, animated or intellectual. Here therefore there is a considerable difference to be observed betwixt these Stoics and

* P. 1075.

the other pagan Theists; that whereas the others for the most part acknowledged their gods to have been made in time by one supreme universal Numen, but yet nevertheless to be immortal, and to continue to eternity; the Stoical Pagans maintained, that all their other gods, save Jupiter alone, were not only γεγονότες, but also φθαρησόμενοι, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as that their very personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated; all the Stoical gods in the conflagration being as it were melted and confounded into one.

Wherefore during the intervals of the successive conflagrations, the Stoics all agreed, that there is no more than one God (Zeus or Jupiter) left alone (there being then indeed nothing else besides himself, who afterwards produceth the whole mundane system, together with all the gods, out of himself again. Chrysippus in Plutarch affirmeth:* Ἐοικέναι τῷ μὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τὸν Δία καὶ τὸν κόσμον, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ τὴν Πρόνοιαν· ὅταν οὖν ἐκπύρωσις γένηται, μόνον ἄφθαρτον ὄντα τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν, ἀναχωρεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν πρόνοιαν, εἶτα ὁμοῦ γενομένους, ἐπὶ μιᾶς τῆς τοῦ αἰθέρος οὐσίας διατελεῖν ἀμφοτέρους, "That as Jupiter and the world may be resembled to a man, so may providence be to the soul: when therefore there shall be a conflagration, Jupiter of all the gods being alone incorruptible and then remaining, will retire and withdraw himself into providence; and so both together remain in that same ethereal substance." Where notwithstanding Jupiter and providence are really but one and the same thing. And Seneca[q] writeth thus concerning the life of a wise man in solitude: Qualis futura est vita sapientis, si sine amicis relinquatur, in custodiam conjectus, aut in desertum littus ejectus? Qualis est Jovis, cum, resoluto mundo, et DIIS IN UNUM CONFUSIS, paulisper cessante natura, acquiescit sibi, cogitationibus suis traditus, "If you ask what would be the life of a wise man, either in a prison, or desert? I answer, the same with that of Jupiter, when the world being resolved, and the GODS all CONFOUNDED into ONE, and the course of nature ceasing, he resteth in himself, conversing with his own cogitations." Arrianus' Epictetus likewise, speaking of the same thing, ironically introduces Jupiter, bemoaning himself in the conflagration as now left quite alone, after this manner:† Τάλας ἐγώ, οὔτε τὴν Ἥραν ἔχω, οὔτε τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν, οὔτε τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα, οὔτε ὅλως ἢ ἄδελφον, ἢ υἱὸν, ἢ συγγενῆ, "Alas, I am now left all alone; I have neither Juno, nor Minerva, nor Apollo with me; neither brother nor son, nor nephew, nor kinsman (neither god nor goddess) to keep me company." He adding also, according to the sense of

* P. 1077. [De Repugn. Stoicor.]
[q] Epist. 9. p. 22. tom. 2. opp.
† Arr. lib. 3. cap. 13. [P. 291.]

the Stoics, that in all these successive conflagrations, ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ σύνεστι, καὶ ἡσυχάζει ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἐννοεῖ τὴν διοίκησιν ἑαυτοῦ, οἵα ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαις γίνεται πρεπούσαις ἑαυτῷ, "Jupiter being left alone, converseth only with himself, and resteth in himself, considering his own government, and being entertained with thoughts becoming himself." And thus have we made it unquestionably evident, that the Stoics acknowledged only one independent and self-existent Deity, one universal Numen, which was not only the creator of all the other gods, but also, in certain alternate vicissitudes of time, the decreator of them; he then swallowing them up, and devouring them all into himself, as he had before produced them together with the world out of himself.[3]

[3] So many grave and learned writers have expounded the doctrine of the Stoics, that were I to enter in this place into a long dissertation upon it, I should undertake a superfluous labour. I shall say a few words, however, upon the gods of this sect, in order to throw some light upon the remarks of Dr. Cudworth. I. The gods of the Stoics are, unless I am mistaken, of a twofold kind, *natural*, if we may so term them, and *made*. The natural gods are the heavenly bodies, sun, moon, fixed stars, and planets; the divinity of which is asserted at great length by Lucilius in Cicero De Natura Deor, lib. 2. Lactantius, Divinar. Institut. lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 185. says: Philosophi Stoicæ disciplinæ in ea sunt opinione, ut omnia cœlestia, quæ moventur, in Deorum numero habenda esse, censeant, "The philosophers of the Stoical creed are of opinion, that all the heavenly bodies which move are to be ranked in the number of the gods." We have already, therefore, a countless host of gods. But, whether in addition to the heavenly bodies they acknowledged any other natural deities except demons, which Plutarch informs us, De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 882. tom. 2. opp. were introduced by them, I very much doubt. For when he says, De Repugnantiis Stoicor. p. 1075. tom. 2. opp. that this sect filled the earth, air, sea, and fire with gods, he speaks more in the spirit of malice than of truth. Nor do I think we ought to put any greater faith in those who have recorded that the earth, water, fire, and I know not what other portions of nature, were reckoned by the Stoics in the rank of gods. The style of speaking commonly adopted by the Stoics was the sole cause, in my opinion, why many entertained so unfavourable an opinion of this class. They supposed a divine power to pervade the whole universe; hence every thing, they considered, might in a certain way be called God, and was very often so called by them. Res ipsa, says the Stoic, discoursing in Cicero De Natur. Deor. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 2988. in qua vis major est aliqua, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa vis nominetur Deus, "The thing in which there exists any considerable power, is so named, that the power itself is called God." And a little before: Illud, quod erat a Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei nuncupabant, "That which was produced from God they designated by the name of God himself." Hence many who did not attend to the meaning of these phrases fancied, that the several parts of the universe were regarded by the Stoics as so many separate and self-existent deities, to which opinion, however, they were altogether opposed. They suffered various names of one God to be applied according to the variety of his functions and virtues, but at the same time supposed all these names to belong to one being, who manifests his power in divers ways. Seneca, De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. Quæcumque voles, Deo nomina proprie aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cœlestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera, "You may give to God with propriety any names whatever, that imply any power and effect of celestial things. His appellations may be as numerous as his functions." Add Athenagoras, who beautifully illustrates the same, Legat. pro Christianis cap. 6. p. 28. ed. Oxon. I should not be disposed, therefore, to look for the gods of the Stoics, strictly so called by them, out of the region of the stars; which, on account of their wonderfully constant and unvarying courses they considered to be inhabited by intelligences of surpassing excellence, culled or decerpted from the supreme Deity. The *made* gods, as I have termed them, of the Stoics, were men or *heroes*, exalted to

It it granted, that these Stoics as well as the other Pagans did religiously worship more gods than one, that is more understanding beings superior to men. For it was Epictetus'[4] own

heaven by the esteem and admiration of mortals. But, whether they ranked these among the gods from their own conviction, or merely to avoid the ill will of others, I would not rashly assert. It is sufficient for us to expound their doctrine, leaving it to others to decide, whether it were sincere or pretended. The Stoics, although they denied the immortality of souls, nevertheless considered the minds of some men to possess so much virtue and constancy, that they remained, when freed from the bodies, and did not return to the c rce of souls till the final conflagration of the world. Thes s they held to be gods and meet to be worshipped as gods. nded the worship of Hercules, Æsculapius, Castor, and the ere known to have lived among men. This is manifest as w om ancient authors as from the discourse of the Stoic Balb Deor. lib. 2. cap. 24. p. 2990. tom. 9. opp. who, after desc of heroes, concludes the subject with these words: Quorum atque æternitate fruerentur, Dii rite habiti sunt, quum et opt hose souls, as being permanent and enjoying eternity, were , since they were both best and eternal." The rest of the g were altogether repudiated by the Stoics, who contended, t ore than parts of the nature of things, clothed by poetic fic Hence arose those numerous physical explications of the ancient fables concerning the gods, which have for the most part come down to our own times, and in which this sect in particular took a wonderful delight.

II. We see, therefore, what sort of gods the Stoics professed, which I have thought proper to be at some pains in showing, because most of those, I observe, who have canvassed the religion of this sect, do not do them justice, while others are altogether in doubt as to the opinion they ought to form respecting their gods. To myself they appear to have worshipped no deities properly so called, except the natures residing in the stars, and the souls of great men. And even so, the multitude of their deities is sufficiently large, nay, incredible. Nevertheless, their having worshipped so many gods occasions less surprise than their not having worshipped more. For if they had wished their religions opinions to harmonize with the rest of their precepts, they ought to have adopted a much larger number. "An inferior Deity," according to the Stoics, "is a nature partaking of mind, counsel, reason, and lastly of the faculty of exciting matter, and plucked from the supreme Being, like a branch or rod." For their sole reason for ranking the stars among the gods was, because their perpetual and constant courses proved, that mind and intelligence resided in them. That is, as we learn from Cicero, they reasoned as follows, "Whatever possesses mind and counsel is a part of God, and a certain God. But, where there is constancy and perpetual order, there of necessity must be mind and counsel. Now the stars preserve their orderly, constant and equable courses; therefore they are endowed with mind and reason; therefore they are gods." However, if we follow the principles of the Stoics, this description of a God applies equally well to the souls of men. For these also not only partake of reason, mind, and order, but are also decerpted from God, and portions or branches of the supreme Being, in which there exists the power of impelling and exciting matter. Accordingly, the Stoics do not hesitate frequently to call the human mind God. Wherefore, in order to be consistent, they ought also to have placed all souls among the gods and to have mutually paid divine honours to each other. I pass over the souls of brutes, upon which they did not all hold the same opinion.

III. Now it is clear from what has been said, that the Stoics were not worshippers of many gods in the same sense as the rest of the people, and therefore cannot properly be ranked in the same class. Their gods were parts of the one supreme Being, and were ultimately to return to the source from which they emanated. They possessed, therefore, no stability or virtue of their own; at the coming of the great year death and destruction awaited them all. But the gods of the other classes were self-existent natures, really distinct and separate from the supreme Being, and about to

[4] Apud Arrian. Diss. Epictet. lib. 1. diss. 1. p. 84.

exhortation: Εὔχου θεοῖς, "Pray to the gods." And the same philosopher[5] thus describeth the disposition of a person rightly affected: Θέλω εἰδέναι, τί μοι καθῆκον πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, "I would willingly know what is my duty, first to the gods, and then to my parents and other relations." And they are M. Antoninus' precepts:[6] Αἰδοῦ θεούς, "Revere the gods," and: Ἐν ἅπασι θεοὺς ἐπικαλοῦ, "In every thing implore the aid and assistance of the gods." And accordingly in that close of his first book,[8] himself does thankfully ascribe many particular benefits to the gods in common: Παρὰ τῶν θεῶν τὸ ἀγαθοὺς παππους, &c. "I owe to the gods, that I had good progenitors and parents," &c. Where, amongst the rest, he reckons up this for one, that he never was any great proficient, either in poetry or rhetoric; because these would probably (had he succeeded in his pursuit of them) have hindered him from the attainment of far better things. And after all his enumeration, he concludeth thus: Πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα θεῶν βοηθῶν καὶ τύχης δεῖται, "For all these things need the assistance of the gods and fortune," viz. because they are not in our own power.[9]

remain to all eternity; which also had the power of distributing rewards and inflicting punishments. The Stoics, to speak properly, acknowledged but one God. Athenagoras, Apol. pro Christian, cap. 6. p. 20. Οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, κἂν ταῖς προσηγορίαις κατὰ τὰς παραλλάξεις τῆς ὕλης, δι' ἧς φασι τὸ πνεῦμα χωρεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ, πληθύνουσι τὸ θεῖον τοῖς ὀνόμασι, τῷ γοῦν ἔργῳ ἕνα νομίζουσι τὸν θεόν, "The Stoics, although by using various appellations according to the variety of matter, through which they assert the Spirit of God to be diffused, they multiply the divinity in name, nevertheless in reality consider, that there is only one God." But inasmuch as they supposed this one God to have sent forth portions of his own virtue, and inclosed them in certain bodies, they therefore appeared to worship several gods, and were themselves anxious to appear so. Nor did they at all conceal this, but in my opinion used the words God and gods promiscuously for the very purpose of showing, that they might in a certain sense be said to be worshippers of one and also of many gods. Of this we have innumerable instances in Antoninus, Seneca, Arrian, by whom one and the same thing is attributed indiscriminately sometimes to gods and sometimes to God. As an example I shall adduce one passage of the emperor Antoninus, from lib. 12. sect. 5. p. 351. Ὁρᾷς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς, ὅτι τοῦτο παραζητῶν δικαιολογῇ πρὸς ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ· οὐκ ἂν ἐ' οὕτω διελεγόμεθα ΤΟΙΣ ΘΕΟΙΣ, εἰ μὴ ἄριστοι καὶ δικαιότατοι εἶσι, "You see, that in investigating this matter you vindicate yourself before God; but we would not so vindicate ourselves before the gods, unless they were most upright and most just." Add Arrian's Epictetus, lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 118. &c. The learned Doctor himself rightly notices this a little afterwards; but he assigns a different reason, which I do not agree to; namely, that the gods of the Stoics considered conjointly are God, and reversely the God of the Stoics considered in the several parts of nature is distributed into many gods.

[5] Epict. lib. 3. cap. 17. p. 222.
[6] Lib. 6. sect. 30. p. 190.
[7] Lib. 6. sect. 23. p. 183.
[8] Lib. 1. sect. 17.. p 30.

[9] In reference to these passages, wherein the Stoics exhort us to pray to the gods, the remark made a little above ought especially to be borne in mind, namely, that they use the words θεὸς and θεοὶ promiscuously and indifferently. Nevertheless, I would not deny that the Stoics prayed to those whom they called gods, as well as to the supreme Being; although in both cases I consider them to have acted absurdly. According to Zeno's doctrine, the minds of men are parts of God. Therefore a Stoic, when he would have men to pray to God, is telling a part to address prayers to its whole. And again, when he says that men ought to supplicate the other gods, he is advising one part of God to become a suppliant to another part. But such is the weakness of the human mind, that even wise men are very frequently unable to perceive the consequences immediately deducible from their own dogmas.

Neither can it be denied, but that they did often derogate from the honour of the supreme God, by attributing such things to the gods in common (as the donors of them) which plainly belong to the supreme God only. As when Epictetus makes reason in men to be a gift of the gods:* Ἡμῖν οὖν λόγος ἐπὶ ἀτυχίᾳ καὶ κακοδαιμονίᾳ δέδοται ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν; "Is reason therefore given us by the gods merely to make us miserable and unhappy? And when he again imputes virtue to them: "Hast thou overcome thy lu[illegible]rance, thine anger?"† Πόσῳ μείζων αἰτία θυσίας, [illegible]αρχία; ταῦτα ἐκ σοῦ αὐτοῦ γίνεται καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν [illegible]uch greater cause then hast thou of offering sacri[illegible] hadst got a consulship or prætorship? For th[illegible] only from thyself, and from the gods." Though [illegible]ese speeches of theirs seems to have been no othe[illegible]use they took it for granted, that those understan[illegible]rior to men, called by them gods, were all of the[illegible]ts and ministers of the supreme God in the go[illegible]e world; and had therefore some kind of stroke or influence, more or less, upon all the concernments of mankind. Whence it came to pass also, that they often used those words God and gods promiscuously and indifferently; as one and the same celebrated speech of Socrates is sometimes expressed singularly: Εἰ ταύτῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, "If God will have it so, let it be so" (Arr. Epict. lib. 1. cap. 29. and lib. 4. cap. 4.); and sometimes again plurally: Εἰ ταύτῃ φίλον τοῖς θεοῖς, "If the gods will have it so."

Wherefore, notwithstanding the many gods of those Stoics, they worshipped for all that one supreme, that is, one universal Numen, that contains and comprehends the whole world, who was variously described by them, sometimes as the nature and reason of the whole world: Ἡ τῶν ὅλων φύσις πρεσβυτάτη θεῶν,‡ "The nature of the whole, the oldest of all the gods;" and Ἡ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦσα φύσις, "That nature which governs all things;" Ὁ τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν διοικῶν λόγος,§ "That reason which governs the substance of all;" Ὁ διά τῆς οὐσίας διήκων λόγος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ αἰῶνος, κατὰ περιόδους τεταγμένας οἰκονομῶν τὸ πᾶν,‖ "That reason which passes through the substance of the universe, and through all eternity, orders and dispenses all according to appointed periods." Sometimes is he called, Ἡ τῶν ὅλων αἰτία,¶ "The cause of all things;" sometimes, Τὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἡγεμονικόν,** "The hegemonic and ruling principle of the whole world;" and Ὁ ἡγεμὼν τοῦ κόσμου, "The prince of the world." Again, Ὁ διοικῶν τὰ ὅλα,†† "The

* Lib. 3. cap. 24. [Apud Arrian, p. 329.]
† Lib. 4. cap. 3. [P. 388.]
‡ Anton. lib. 9. [Sect. 1. p. 262.
§ Ant. lib. 7. sect. 18. [P. 213.]
‖ Ant. lib. 6. sect. 1. [Page 170.]
¶ Ant. lib. 5. sect. 24.
** *Ant. lib. 9.*
†† Ant. lib. 7. sect. 47. [Sect. 75. p. 236.]

governor of the whole," as in this of Epictetus: Ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ γνώμην ὑποτέταχε τῷ διοικοῦντι τὰ ὅλα, καθάπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πολῖται νόμῳ τῆς πόλεως,* "A good man submits his mind to the governor of the whole universe, as good citizens do theirs to the law of the city." Also, Ὁ διατάσσων, "The orderer of all;" in this other religious passage of the same philosophers: Τὸ παιδεύεσθαι, τουτέστι μανθάνειν ἕκαστα οὕτω θέλειν, ὡς γίνεται· πῶς δὲ γίνεται; ὡς διέταξεν αὐτὰ ὁ διατάσσων,† "To be instructed is to will things to be as they are made: and how are they made? as that great disposer of all hath appointed." Again, the supreme God is sometimes called by them: Τὸ περίεχον τὰ ὅλα νοερὸν, "that intellectual principle which contains the whole," as in this instruction of M. Antoninus: Μὴ μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ,‡ "That, as our bodies breathe the common air, so should our souls suck and draw in vital breath from that great mind that comprehends the universe, becoming as it were one spirit with the same." He is also called by them Ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς καὶ διάνοια,§ "the mind and understanding of the whole world;" Μία πάντων πήγη νοερὰ, "One intellectual fountain of all things;" and lastly, to name no more, Θεὸς εἷς διὰ πάντων, καὶ οὐσία μία, καὶ νόμος εἷς,‖ "One God through all, one substance, and one law." Which supreme God was commonly called also by the Stoics, together with the generality of the other Pagans, ὁ Θεὸς, or "God," emphatically and in way of eminency, as in this of Epictetus:[10] Μηδὲν ἄλλο θέλε, ἢ ἃ ὁ Θεὸς θέλει, καὶ τίς σε κωλύσει; "Will nothing but what God willeth, and then who can be able to hinder thee?" And again: Θέλησον καλὸς φανῆναι τῷ θεῷ, ἐπιθύμησον καθαρὸς μετὰ καθαροῦ σεαυτοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ,¶ "Affect to seem fair to God, desire to be pure with thy pure self, and with God." Also where[1] he speaks of the regular course of things in nature: Τεταγμένως, καθάπερ ἐκ προστάγματος Θεοῦ, ὅταν ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀνθεῖν, ἀνθεῖ, ὅταν εἴπῃ βλαστάνειν, βλαστάνει, "That it proceedeth orderly, every thing as it were obeying the command of God; when he bids the plants to blossom, they blossom; and when to bring forth fruit, they bring forth fruit." To which innumerable other instances might be added. And Zeus or Jupiter was the proper name of this supreme God amongst the Stoics also; whence the government of the whole

* Lib. 1. cap. 12. [Apud Arrian. p. 118.]
† Ep. p. 119. Cant. ‡ Lib. 8. sect. 45. [Sect. 54. p. 258.]
§ Anton. p. 125. [Lib. 5. sect. 30. p. 164.] ‖ Ant. p. 257.]
¶ Anton. lib. 7. sect. 7. [Sect. 9. p. 210.]
[10] Apud Arrian, lib. 2. cap. 27. p. 221.
** Lib. 2. cap. 18. [P. 225.]
[1] Apud Arrian. lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 122. 123.

world is called by them, Διὸς διοίκησις,[2] "The government or economy of Jupiter." Lastly, this supreme God is sometimes distinguished by them from the other gods, expressly and by name; as in this of Epictetus: Ἐγὼ δ' ἔχω τίνι ὑποτετάχθαι, τίνι πείθεσθαι, τῷ θεῷ καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκεῖνον,* "I have, whom I ought to be subject to, whom to obey, God and those who are next after him;" that is, the supreme and inferior gods. So likewise, where he exhorteth not to desire things out of our own power: Ἀλλὰ τῷ Δι[illegible] καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, ἐκείνοις παράδος, ἐκεῖνοι[illegible] "Let Jupiter alone with these things, and the[illegible]ver them up to be ordered and governed by the[illegible]in, where he personates one that places his happin[illegible]gs without him: Κάθημαι καὶ στένω, καὶ δν δύ[illegible] τὸν Δία καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄλλους, "I then shall [illegible] and speaking evil of every one, even Jupiter hi[illegible]er gods."

And it must in rea[illegible]l, that this Jupiter, or universal Numen of the w[illegible]noured by these Stoics far above all their other particular gods; he being acknowledged by them to have been the maker or creator of them as well as the whole world, and the only eternal and immortal God: all those other gods, as hath been already declared, being as well corruptible, mortal, and annihilable, as they were generated or created. For though Cicero's Lucilius Balbus,‡ where he pretends to represent the doctrine of the Stoics, attributes the very first original of the world to a plurality of gods, in these words: Dico igitur *providentiâ Deorum* mundum et omnes mundi partes, et initio constitutas esse, et omni tempore administrari; yet unquestionably Cicero forgat himself herein, and rather spake the language of some other Pagans, who, together with the generation of the world, held indeed a plurality of eternal (though not independent) deities, than of the Stoics, who asserted one only eternal God; and supposed, in the reiterated conflagrations, all the gods to be melted and confounded into one, so that Jupiter being then left alone, must needs make up the world again, as also all those other gods out of himself. And thus does Zeno in Laërtius[3] describe the Cosmopœia: Τὸν θεὸν κατ' ἀρχὰς, καθ' αὑτὸν ὄντα, "That God at first being alone by himself, converted the fiery substance of the world by degrees into water," that is, into a

[2] The words of Epictetus preserved by Arrian, lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 251. Ἄνθρωπε, τὸ προκείμενόν σοι, κατασκευάσαι σεαυτὸν,——συναρμόζοντα τῇ τοῦ Διὸς διοικήσει, "O man, it is thy object, so to prepare thyself,——as to harmonize with the government of Jupiter."

* Lib. 4. cap. 12. [P. 426.] † Lib. 2. cap. 17. [P. 221.]

‡ De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 225. Lamb. [Cap. 30. p. 2999. tom. 9. opp.

[3] Lib. 7. De Vitis Philos. segm. 136. p. 450. The learned Doctor, however, does not repeat the identical words of Zeno or Laërtius, but merely gives what he considers to be their sum and substance.

crasser chaos; "out of which water, himself afterwards, as the spermatic reason of the world, formed the elements and whole mundane system." And Cicero himself elsewhere, in his De Legibus,[4] attributes the first original of mankind cautiously, not to the gods in common, but to the supreme God only: Hoc animal providum, &c. quem vocamus hominem, præclara quadam conditione generatum esse, à SUMMO DEO: and this, rather according to the sense of the Stoics than of the Platonists, whose inferior generated gods also (being first made) were supposed to have had a stroke in the fabrifaction of mankind, and other animals. Thus Epictetus plainly ascribes the making of the whole world to God, or the one supreme Deity, where he mentions the Galileans, that is, the Christians, their contempt of death, though imputing it only to custom in them, and not to right knowledge (as M. Antoninus[5] likewise ascribes the same to *ψιλὴ παράταξις*, "mere obstinacy of mind"): *Ὑπὸ μανίας μὲν δύναταί τις οὕτω διατεθῆναι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἔθους οἱ Γαλιλαῖοι, ὑπὸ λόγου δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεως οὐδεὶς δύναται μαθεῖν, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς πάντα πεποίηκε τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν κόσμον,*[*] "Can some be so affected out of madness, and the Galileans out of custom? and can none attain thereunto by reason and true knowledge, namely, because God made all things in the world, and the whole world itself perfect and unhinderable; but the parts thereof for the use of the whole, so that the parts ought therefore to yield and give place to the whole." Thus does he again elsewhere demand: *Τὸν ἥλιον τίς πεποίηκε, καρπούς δὲ τίς*, &c. "Who made the sun? Who the fruits of the earth? Who the seasons of the year? Who the agreeable fitness of things? Wherefore thou having received all from another, even thy very self, dost thou murmur and complain against the donor of them, if he take away any one thing from thee? Did he not bring thee into the world? show thee the light? bestow sense and reason upon thee?" Now the sun[6] was the chief of the inferior Stoical gods, and therefore he being made by another, all the rest of their gods must needs be so too. And thus is it plainly expressed in this following citation: *Εἴ τις τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ*

[4] De Legib. lib. 1. cap. 8. p. 3804. tom. 9. opp. Our author properly reminds us, that this is said according to the sense of the Stoics. For a great portion of Cicero's discourse in this place is borrowed from that school.

[5] Lib. 2. sect. 3. p. 319. On which passage I treated specifically some time ago, Observation. Sacrar. et Historico. Criticar. lib. 1. cap. 3. p. 137.

[*] Lib. 4. cap. 7. [P. 500.]

[6] A more striking passage than the one here given, respecting the creation of the sun by the supreme Being, occurs in Arrian, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 124. where he proves by no mean arguments, that God perceives all things: *Ὁ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν πεποιηκὼς καὶ περιάγων, μέρος ὄντ' αὐτοῦ μικρὸν, ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, οὗτος δὲ οὐ δύναται πάντων αἰσθάνεσθαι*; "But he who made the sun itself and causes it to revolve, being a small portion of his works, if compared with the whole, is he unable to perceive all things?"

*συμπαθῆσαι κατ' ἀξίαν δύναιτο, ὅτι γεγόναμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντες προηγουμένως, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πατήρ ἐστι τῶν τ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐδὲν ἀγενὲς, οὐδε ταπεινὸν ἐνθυμηθήσεται περὶ ἑαυτοῦ,** "If any one could be thoroughly sensible of this, that we are all made by God, and that as principal parts of the world, and that God is the father both of men and gods, he would never think meanly of himself, knowing that he is the son of Jupiter also." Where Θεὸς is plainly put for the supreme God, and θεοὶ for the inferior [illegible] gain, he thus attributes the making of man and [illegible] the whole world to God, or Jupiter only: Ὁ [illegible] ρώπους ἐπὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐποίησε, &c. τὴν δὲ οἰ[illegible] ῦ καὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, ὥσπερ ἄξιον τὸν κηδόμενον ἡμῶν, [illegible] ροϊστάμενον ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις,† "God made all men [illegible] they might be happy, and as became him, who [illegible] care of us, he placed our good and evil in those [illegible] are in our own power. And: Τῷ ὄντι κακῶς διοικε[illegible] μὴ ἐπιμελεῖται ὁ Ζεὺς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν, ἵν' ὦσιν [illegible] εὐδαίμονες,‡ "Things would not be well governed, if Jupiter took no care of his own citizens, that they also might be happy like himself."[7]

* Lib. 1. cap. 3. [P. 90. Vide etiam, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 124.]
† Lib. 3. cap. 24. [P. 328.] ‡ Lib. 3. cap. 24. [P. 331.]

[7] That the Stoics, as the learned Doctor proves in this place by numerous authorities, held their supreme Being to be the parent and founder of all things, is altogether unquestionable. And yet I should not on that account find fault with Cicero for making the Stoic Balbus assert, that this world was made and is administered, Deorum immortalium providentia, "by the providence of the immortal gods," or consider him to have been guilty of any error. For, I. it has been already observed, that the Stoics employed the words God and gods promiscuously, and ascribed one and the same work sometimes to God and sometimes to gods, as its authors. And Cicero, in the very oration of the Stoic Balbus from which these words are taken, so observes this custom as to make no distinction between him and the other Stoics: Non est igitur, says he, a little after the words in question, natura *Deorum* præpotens, neque excellens, si quidem ea subjecta est vel necessitati vel naturæ.——Nihil autem est præstantius *Deo*.——Nulli igitur est naturæ obediens aut subjectus *Deus*.——Etenim, si concedimus, intelligentes esse *Deos*, concedimus etiam, providentes, "The nature of the *gods*, therefore, is not all-powerful or excellent, if it is subject either to necessity or nature.——But nothing is more excellent than *God*.——Therefore *God* is not obedient or subject to any nature.——For if we grant that the *gods* are intelligent, we grant also that they are provident." Even this one passage is a proof, that Cicero, in discoursing according to the sense of the Stoics, considered it to be all the same, whether the word God or gods be made use of. II. Nor, if we look more minutely into the Stoical doctrine, can it appear absurd to us, that the construction of the world should be ascribed by this sect to a plurality of gods, although, strictly speaking, they believed the supreme and most high God to have alone performed this work. For the gods of the Stoics are all of them parts of the supreme God, and were all in God, when he alone was meditating the creation of the world. Wherefore, when he himself commenced this work, in a certain sense the gods also, which were in him, at the same time took a part in it. Consequently the Stoic is not to be censured, if he assigns the formation of the world sometimes to God, in whom all the gods were comprised, and sometimes to gods, as being subsequently separated from the supreme Being. The tenor of his doctrine admits of both. III. But what, if I should make it appear, that the Stoics, like the Platonists, attributed some part of its fabrication even to minor deities, and did not, as the learned Doctor supposes, refer the whole of this work to the

And that these Stoics did indeed religiously worship and honour the supreme God above all their other gods, may appear from sundry instances. As first, from their acknowledging him

power and energy of their supreme Being alone? I shall prove this, not only from the express words of an illustrious philosopher of this school, but also from their esoteric physiology. The philosopher to whose evidence I shall appeal is Seneca, who, De Beneficiis, lib. 6. cap. 23. p. 494. tom. 1. opp. thus speaks of the sun, moon, and stars, which the Stoics regarded as principal gods: In prima autem illa (mundi) constitutione, quum *universa disponerent*, etiam nostra viderunt, rationemque hominis habuerunt. Itaque non possunt videri sua tantum caussa decurrere, et explicare opus suum, quia *pars operis sumus et nos*. Debemus ergo soli et lunæ et cæteris cœlestibus beneficium.——In nostras quoque utilitates a *principio rerum* præmissa mens est, et is ordo mundo datus, ut appareat, curam nostri non inter ultima habitam.——Di non possunt videri nescisse, quid effecturi essent, quum omnibus alimenta protinus et auxilia providerint: nec eos per negligentiam genuere, quibus tam multa generabant, "But in that first formation (of the world), when *they disposed all things*, they saw also to our interests and took account of man. Therefore they cannot be looked upon as running their courses for themselves only and developing their own work, since *we also are a part of that work*. Therefore we owe an obligation to the sun, and moon, and heavenly bodies.——Moreover, *from the beginning of things*, mind was sent before for our benefit, and such order given to the world, as to make it appear, that the care of us was not reckoned among things of the lowest consideration.——The gods cannot be regarded as having been ignorant, what they were about to effect, inasmuch as they forthwith produced sustenance and succour for all: nor did they generate those carelessly, for whom they produced so many things." If we take him, therefore, as an authority, the disposition of the whole universe, the care over all things, and lastly, the generation of the human race belong to the sun, moon, and stars; and not to the supreme God alone. And this doctrine is in perfect accordance with the physical precepts of the Stoics. For, although this sect supposed all things to have flowed and proceeded from Jupiter or the supreme Deity, they notwithstanding did not believe, that the fabric of the universe was produced and arranged by one effort and impulse, but according to a certain law, process, and order. Thus they considered fire or ether to have sprung forth the first of all things, and to have occupied the highest place, the rest following in succession. From among many witnesses it will be sufficient to cite only Manilius, a well-known Stoic, who, Astronomicon, lib. 1. v. 147. &c. p. 5. thus sings:

Sed facies quæcumque tamen sub origine rerum
Convenit, et certo digestum est ordine corpus.
Ignis in æthereas volucer se sustulit auras,
Summaque complexus stellantis culmina cœli,
Flammarum vallo naturæ mœnia fecit.

Add Diogenes Laertius, lib. segm. 136. 137. p. 450. As soon as fire was secreted if we may so speak, from the supreme Being, the minor deities or stars were, according to their opinion, immediately generated in it; and, on these being produced, the rest of the elements then came forth, and were assigned their respective places. This, we are told in express words by Laërtius from Zeno, Chrysippus, and other champions of the Stoics, lib. 7. segm. 137. p. 451: Ἀνωτάτω μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ πῦρ, ὃν δὴ αἰθέρα καλεῖσθαι· ἐν ᾧ πρώτην τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν γεννᾶσθαι, εἶτα τὴν τῶν πλανωμένων, μεθ' ἣν τὸν ἀέρα, εἶτα τὸ ὕδωρ, ὑποστάθμην τε πάντων τὴν γῆν, "For (they say) that at the top is fire, which they call ether: in which was produced first the sphere of the fixed stars, then of the planets, after which the air, then water, and as the substratum of all the earth." Consequently, the celestial deities of the Stoics, which they preferred far before all the rest, existed prior to the other elements, water, air, and earth, and before either men or animals or any other parts of the universe, rational or irrational, were produced. But that a God should exist and do nothing the Stoics, held to be absurd and ridiculous. Primum igitur, says the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 30. p. 2999. tom. 9. opp. aut negandum est, Deos esse.——aut, qui deos esse concedunt, iis fatendum est, eos *aliquid agere*, idque præclarum, "In the first place, therefore, either the existence of gods

to be the sovereign legislator, and professing subjection and obedience to his laws, accounting this to be their greatest liberty. Thus Epictetus: Εἰς ἐμὲ οὐδεὶς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει, ἠλευθέρωμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἔγνωκα αὐτοῦ τὰς ἐντολάς, οὐκέτι οὐδεὶς δουλαγωγῆσαί με δύναται,* "No man hath power over me, I am made free by God (by becoming his subject), I know his commandments, and no man can bring me under bondage to himself." And again: Ταῦτα ἐπιτηδεύων θέλω εὑρεθῆναι, ἵν' εἰπεῖν δύνωμαι τῷ Θεῷ, μήτι παρέβην σου, τὰς ἐντολάς† &c., "These things would I be found employing myself about, that I may be able to say to God, Have I transgressed any of thy commandments? have I used my faculties and anticipations (or common notions) otherwise than thou requiredst?"

Again, from their acknowledging him to be the supreme governor of the whole world, and the orderer of all things in it by his fate and providence, and their professing to submit their wills to his will in every thing; Epictetus somewhere[6] thus bespeaks the supreme God: Μήτι ἐμεμψάμην σου τὴν διοίκησιν; ἐνόσησα, ὅτι ἐθέλησας, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἑκών· πένης ἐγενόμην σου θέλοντος ἀλλὰ χαίρων· οὐκ ἦρξα, ὅτι σὺ οὐκ ἐθέλησας· οὐδέποτ' ἐπιθύμησα ἀρχῆς· μήτι με τούτου ἕνεκα στυγνότερον εἶδες; μὴ οὐ προσῆλθόν σοι φαιδρῷ τῷ προσώπῳ, ἕτοιμος εἴτι ἐπιτάσσεις, εἴ τε σημαίνεις; νῦν με θέλεις ἀπελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς πανηγύρεως; ἄπειμι· χάριν σοι ἔχω πᾶσαν, ὅτι ἠξίωσάς με συμπανηγυρίσαι σοι, καὶ ἰδεῖν ἔργα τὰ σὰ καὶ τῇ διοικήσει σου συμπαρακολουθῆσαι· ταῦτά με ἐνθυμούμενον, ταῦτα γράφοντα, τοῦτα ἀναγινώσκοντα καταλάβοι ἂν θάνατος, "Did I ever complain of thy government? I was sick when thou wouldst have me to be, and so are others, but I was so willingly. I was poor also at thy appointment, but rejoicing; I never bore any magistracy, or had any dignity, be-

must be altogether denied,——or those who admit gods to exist, must confess that *they do something*, and something noble too." Wherefore, if the Stoical gods were first generated, and the gods cannot but do something great and noble, we must necessarily conclude, that immediately on their being produced, as Seneca expressly writes, they contributed their aid towards the disposition and arrangement of the world and the generation of men and animals. Hence there is no reason, why Cicero and others should be accused of error, when they tell us, that, according to the doctrine of the Stoics, this world was both framed originally and has ever since been administered and superintended by the care and providence of the immortal gods. For the opinion of the Stoics was the same as Plato's; who, as appears from the Timæus, attributed the production of the inferior gods to the supreme Being, and to them the procreation of men and other animals. Nor is this doctrine at variance with those numerous sayings of theirs in which they assert Jupiter, or the most high God alone to be the maker and architect of this world. For, since they supposed these deities to have sprung from the supreme Being and to have perfected all things at his bidding and by his command and power, whatever therefore was performed by them might fairly be regarded and appealed to as the work of their supreme Parent himself. Plato and his followers in numberless passages, acknowledged one God as the creator of the world, and yet, as I have before intimated, they inculcated, that a great portion of the work was intrusted to the inferior deities.

* Lib. 4. cap. 7. † Lib. 3. cap. 5.

[6] Apud Arrian. Diss. Epictet. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 274.

cause thou wouldst not have me, and I never desired it. Didst thou ever see me the more dejected or melancholy for this? Have I appeared before thee at any time with a discontented countenance? Was I not always prepared and ready for whatsoever thou requiredst? Wilt thou now have me to depart out of this festival solemnity? I am ready to go; and I render thee all thanks for that thou hast honoured me so far as to let me keep the feast with thee, and behold thy works, and observe thy economy of the world. Let death sieze upon me no otherwise employed, than thus thinking and writing of such things." He likewise exhorts others after this manner:* Τόλμησον ἀναβλέψας πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι χρῶ μοι λοιπὸν, εἰς ὃ ἂν θέλῃς· ὁμογνωμονῶ σοι, ἴσος εἰμί· οὐδὲν παραιτοῦμαι τῶν σοι δοκοῦντων· ὅπου θέλεις ἄγε· ἣν θέλεις εἰθῆτα περίθες· ἄρχειν με θέλεις, ἰδιωτεύειν, μένειν, φεύγειν, πένεσθαι, πλουτεῖν; ἐγώ σοι ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τούτων πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπολογήσομοι· δείξω τὴν ἑκάστου φύσιν, οἵα ἐστίν, "Dare to lift up thine eyes to God and say, Use me hereafter to whatsoever thou pleasest. I agree, and am of the same mind with thee, indifferent to all things. I refuse nothing that shall seem good to thee. Lead me whither thou pleasest. Let me act what part thou wilt, either of a public or private person, of a rich man or a beggar. I will apologize for thee as to all these things before men. And I will also show the nature of every one of them."

The same is likewise manifest from their pretensions to look to God, and refer all to him; expecting aid and assistance from him, and placing their confidence in him. Thus also Epictetus:† Κἀγω μὲν ἔχω ταύτην ἐπιβολὴν ἀποτελέσαι ὑμᾶς ἐλευθέρους, εὐδαιμονοῦντας, εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἀφορῶντας, ἐν παντὶ μικρῷ καὶ μεγάλῳ, "My design is this, to render you free and undisturbed, always looking at God, as well in every small, as greater matter." Again, the same Stoic concludes:‡ Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλως ἐκβαλεῖν λύπην, φόβον, ἐπιθυμίαν, &c. εἰ μὴ πρὸς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἀποβλέποντα, ἐκείνῳ μόνῳ προσπεπονθότα, τοῖς ἐκείνου προστάγμασι καθωσιωμένον, "A man will never be able otherwise to expel grief, fear, desire, envy, &c. than by looking to God alone, and being devoted to him, and the observance of his commandments." And he affirmeth of Hercules, that this great piece of piety was so long since observed by him:§ Τὸν Δία αὐτοῦ πατέρα ἐκάλει, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ἀφορῶν ἔπραττεν, ἃ ἔπραττε, "That as he called Jupiter, or the supreme God, his father, so did he whatsoever he did, looking at him." Thus M. Antoninus speaketh of a double relation that we all have; one πρὸς τοὺς συμβιοῦντας, "to those that live with us;"‖ and another,

* Lib. 2. cap. 16. [P. 217.]
† Lib. 2. cap. 19. [P. 231.]
‡ Lib. 2. cap. 16. [P. 218.]
§ Lib. 3. cap. 24. [P. 330.
‖ Lib. 8. sect. 23. [Sect. 27. p. 247.]

πρὸς τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν, ἀφ' ἧς συμβαίνει πᾶσιν πάντα, "to that divine cause, from which all things happen to all." As likewise he affirmeth, Οὐκ ἀνθρώπινόν τι ἄνευ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα συναναφορᾶς εὐπράξεις,* "That no human thing is well done without a reference to God." And he excellently exhorteth men, Ἐνὶ τέρπου καὶ προσαναπαύου, τῷ ἀπὸ πράξεως κοινωνικῆς μεταβαίνειν ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν κοινωνικὴν σὺν μνήμῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ,† "To be delighted and satisfied with this one thing; in doing one action after another, tending to a common good, or [illegible] man society; together with the remembrance of [illegible] he declareth his own confidence in the supreme [illegible] words:‡ Θαῤῥῶ τῷ διοικοῦντι, "I trust and rely up[illegible] of the whole world."

This may be con[illegible]m their thanking the one supreme God for all, [illegible]f all good, and delightfully celebrating his praise [illegible]clares it to be the duty of a good man, χάριν ἔχει [illegible] τῷ θεῷ,§ "to thank God for all things." And els[illegible]eth thus:‖ Εἰ νοῦν εἴχομεν, ἄλλο τι ἔδει ἡμᾶς πο[illegible] ἰδίᾳ, ἢ ὑμνεῖν τὸ θεῖον, καὶ εὐφημεῖν, καὶ ἐπεξέρχεσθαι τὰς χαριτας; οὐκ ἔδει καὶ σκάπτοντας, καὶ ἀροῦντας, καὶ ἐσθίοντας, ᾄδειν τὸν ὕμνον τὸν εἰς τὸν θεὸν; μέγας ὁ θεὸς, ὅτι ἡμῖν παρέσχεν ὄργανα ταῦτα, δι' ὧν τὴν γὴν ἐργασόμεθα· μέγας ὁ θεὸς, ὅτι χεῖρας ἔδωκεν, &c. ὅτι αὔξεσθαι λεληθότως, ὅτι καθεύδοντας ἀναπνεῖν· ταῦτα ἐφ' ἑκάστου εὐφημεῖν ἔδει, καὶ τὸν μέγιστον καὶ θειότατον ὕμνον ἐφυμνεῖν, ὅτι τὴν δύναμιν ἔδωκε τὴν παρακολουθητικὴν τούτων· τί οὖν; &c. εἰ γοῦν ἀηδὼν ἤμην, ἐποίουν τὰ τῆς ἀηδόνος, εἰ κύκνος, τὰ τοῦ κύκνου, νῦν δὲ λογικός εἰμι, ὑμνεῖν με δεῖ τὸν θεὸν, "Had we understanding, what should we do else but both publicly and privately praise God, bless him, and return thanks to him? Ought not they, who dig, plough, and eat, continually to sing such a hymn to God as this: Great is that God, who gave us these organs to cultivate the earth withal; great is that God who gave us hands, &c. who enabled us to grow undiscernibly, to breathe in our sleep. But the greatest and divinest hymn of all is this, to praise God for the faculty of understanding all these things. What then if for the most part men be blinded, ought there not to be some one, who should perform this office, and sing a hymn to God for all? If I were a nightingale, I would perform the office of a nightingale; or a swan, that of a swan: but now, being a reasonable creature, I ought to celebrate and sing aloud the praises of God," that is, of the supreme Deity.

Lastly, the same is evident from their invoking the supreme God as such, addressing their devotions to him alone without the

* Lib. 3. sect. 11. [Sect. 13. p. 87.]
‡ Lib. 6. sect. 8. [Sect. 10. p. 174.]
§ Lib. 4. c. 7. [P. 401.]
† Lib. 6. sect. 5. [Sect. 7. p. 172.]
‖ Lib. 1. cap. 16. [P. 127.

conjunction of any other gods; and particularly imploring his assistance against the assaults of temptations, called by them fancies.* To this purpose is that of Epictetus: Μέγας ὁ ἀγών ἐστι, θεῖον τὸ ἔργον, ὑπὲρ βασιλείας, ὑπὲρ ἐλευθερίας· τοῦ θεοῦ μέμνησο, ἐκεῖνον ἐπικαλοῦ βοηθὸν καὶ παραστάτην, ὡς τοὺς Διοσκόρους ἐν χειμῶνι οἱ πλέοντες, "This is a great conflict or contention, a divine enterprise; it is for liberty and for a kingdom. Now remember the supreme God; call upon him as thy helper and assistant, as the mariners do upon Castor and Pollux in a tempest." He commends also this form of devotional address, or divine ejaculation, which was part of Cleanthes' litany, to be used frequently upon occasion:[9] Ἄγου δή με, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι ποθ' (ὑμῖν) εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, ὡς ἑψομαί γε ἄοκνος· ἤν δέ γε μὴ θέλω, οὐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι, "Lead me, O Jupiter, and thou Fate, whithersoever I am by you destined; and I will readily and cheerfully follow; who, though I were never so reluctant, yet must needs follow." Where Jupiter and Fate are really but one and the same supreme Deity, under two several names. And therefore the sense of this devotional ejaculation was no less truly and faithfully, than elegantly thus rendered by Seneca.†

> Duc me parens, celsique dominator poli,
> Quocunque placuit, nulla parendi est mora,
> Assum impiger; fac nolle, comitabor gemens,
> Malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono.

But because many are so extremely unwilling to believe that the Pagans ever made any religious address to the supreme God as such, we shall here set down an excellent and devout hymn of the same Cleanthes to him; the rather because it hath been but little taken notice of. And the more to gratify the reader, we shall subjoin an elegant translation thereof into Latin verse; which he must owe to the muse of my learned friend Dr. Duport.‡

> Κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε, παγκρατὲς αἰεὶ,
> Ζεὺς, φύσεως ἀρχηγὲ, νόμου μετὰ πάντα κυβερνῶν,
> Χαῖρε. Σὲ γὰρ πᾶσι θέμις θνητοῖσι προσαυδᾶν·
> Ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν, ἤχου μίμημα λαχόντες
> Μοῦνον, ὅσα ζώει τε καὶ ἕρπει θνητ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν.
> Τῷ σε καθυμνήσω καὶ σὸν κράτος αἰὲν ἀείσω.
> Σοὶ δὲ πᾶς ὅδε κόσμος ἑλισσόμενος περὶ γαῖαν
> Πείθεται, ἦκεν ἄγῃς, καὶ ἑκὼν ὑπὸ σεῖο κρατεῖται.
> Τοῖον ἔχεις ὑποεργὸν ἀνικήτοις ὑπὸ χερσὶν
> Ἀμφήκη, πυρόεντα, ἀειζώοντα κεραυνόν·
> Τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πλήγης φύσεως πάντ' ἰῤῥίγασι,

* Lib. 2. cap. 18. [Apud Arrian. p. 226.]
* Arrian commends this prayer in various places, especially lib. 3. cap. 26. p. 366.
† Ep. 106. [107. tom. 2. opp. p. 402.]
‡ Steph. Poes. Philos. p. 49. [Ex Stobæi. Eclog. Physic.]

Ὦι σὺ κατευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων
Φοιτᾷ μιγνύμενος·
Ὃς τόσσος γεγαὼς ὕπατος βασιλεὺς διὰ παντὸς·
Οὐδέ τι γίγνεται ἔργον ἐπὶ χθονὶ σοῦ δίχα, δαίμων,
Οὔτε κατ' αἰθέριον θεῖον πόλον, οὔτ' ἐπὶ πόντῳ,
Πλὴν ὁπόσα ῥέζουσι κακοὶ σφετέρῃσιν ἀνοίαις.
Καὶ κοσμεῖς τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν.
Ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν πάντα συνήρμοκας, ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν,
Ὥσθ' ἕνα γίνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντων.
Ὃν φεύγοντες ἐῶσιν, ὅσοι θνητῶν κακοί εἰσιν,
Δύσμοροι, οἵ τ' ἀναθῶν μὲν ἀεὶ κτῆσιν ποθέοντες,
[illegible] νόμον, οὔτε κλύουσιν,
[illegible] βίον ἐσθλὸν ἔχοιεν·
[illegible] καλοῦ ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλα
[illegible] ἣν δυσέριστον ἔχοντες,
[illegible] αμμένοι οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ,
[illegible] σώματος ἡδέα ἔργα,
[illegible] αινεφὲς, ἀρχικέραυνε,
[illegible] ύνης ἀπὸ λυγρῆς,
[illegible] υχῆς ἄπο, δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι
[illegible] κης μετὰ πάντα κυβερνᾷς·
[illegible] δώμεσθά σε τιμῇ,
[illegible] ηνεκὲς, ὡς ἐπέοικε
Θνητὸν [illegible] βροτοῖς γέρας ἄλλοτε μεῖζον,
Οὔτε θεοῖς, ἢ κοινὸν ἀεὶ νόμον ἐν δίκῃ ὑμνεῖν.

Magne pater divûm, cui nomina multa, sed una
Omnipotens semper virtus, tu Jupiter autor
Naturæ, certâ qui singula lege gubernas!
Rex salve. Te nempe licet mortalibus ægris
Cunctis compellare; omnes tua namque propago
Nos sumus, æternæ quasi imago vocis et echo
Tantum, quotquot humi spirantes repimus; ergo
Te cantabo, tuum et robur sine fine celebrans.
Quippe tuo hic totus, terram qui circuit, orbis
Paret (quoquo agis) imperio, ac obtemperat ultrò.
Invictis telum manibus tibi tale ministrum,
Anceps, ignitum, haud moriturum denique fulmen.
Ictu etenim illius tota et natura tremiscit;
Illo et communem rationem dirigis, et quæ
Mundi agitat molem, magno se corpore miscens:
Tantus tu rerum dominus, rectorque supremus.
Nec sine te factum in terris, Deus, aut opus ullum,
Æthere nec dio fit, nec per cærula ponti,
Errore acta suo nisi quæ gens impia patrat.
Confusa in sese tu dirigis ordine certo;
Auspice te ingratis et inest sua gratia rebus;
Felice harmonia; tu scilicet omnia in unum
Sic bona mixta malis compingis, ut una resurgat
Cunctorum ratio communis et usque perennans:
Quam refugit spernitque hominum mens læva malorum.
Heu miseri! bona qui quærunt sibi semper et optant,
Divinam tamen hanc communem et denique legem
Nec spectare oculis, nec fando attendere curant:
Cui si parerent, poterant traducere vitam
Cum ratione et mente bonam: nunc sponte feruntur
In mala præcipites, trahit et sua quemque voluptas.
Hunc agit ambitio, laudisque immensa cupido;
Illum et avarities, et amor vesanus habendi;
Blanda libido alium, venerisque licentia dulcis:
Sic aliò tendunt alii in diversa ruentes.
At tu, Jupiter alme, tonans in nubibus atris,

Da sapere, et mentem miseris mortalibus aufer
Insanam, hanc tu pelle pater ; da apprendere posse
Consilium, fretus quo tu omnia rite gubernas :
Nos ut honorati pariter tibi demus honorem,
Perpetuis tua facta hymnis præclara canentes,
Ut fas est homini ; nec enim mortalibus ullum,
Nec superis, majus poterit contingere donum,
Quam canere æterno communem carmine legem.[10]

[10] That the Stoics professed a certain God or fiery nature, eternal, wise and provident, admits of no controversy; and therefore, I do not agree with those, who deny all distinction between this sect and those that altogether discard a supreme Being. But neither can I assent to the opinion of others, who hold the Stoical precepts on God and religion to possess nearly as much dignity and excellence, as either the axioms of sound reason or the doctrines of Christianity. For, without disowning, that the Stoics have spoken sublimely in many instances of God and our duty towards God, and that most of their religious tenets, if considered in themselves, fall very short of the truth ; still there is much that detracts from their excellence, if we compare them with one another or with the rest of the principles of their school. The discipline of this sect is not to be learned from the magnificent phrases of this or that Stoic, but the whole of it ought to be placed before our view as a system, and afterwards a judgment formed as to the utility and excellence of the several dogmas. Indeed, no sect, in my opinion, admits of being more easily defended by an ingenious and erudite man than this ; and chiefly for two reasons. In the first place, although the Stoics sufficiently agree among themselves upon the chief points of philosophy, yet, when we come to individual precepts, they are wonderfully at issue, and what is adopted by one is not also assented to by another. Secondly, there are innumerable sayings of theirs extant, in which they appear to depart from the fundamental axioms of their own doctrine and to overthrow what they themselves had advanced. This we may be very easily convinced of from Seneca alone ; in whom we meet with so many contradictions and so many things repugnant to the first principles of the doctrine which he professed, that no one, however talented he may be, can reconcile and harmonize all the opinions of this writer with each other. Wherefore, if the dogmas or sayings of this or that Stoic be considered in themselves, we shall never be at a loss for arguments to justify and uphold the cause of this sect. For my part, however, I consider that the goodness or badness of any doctrine should be judged of from its fundamental principles, and from its general tenor and context, and that we should take into especial consideration, not what some have said or written, but what they ought to have said or written consistently with the rest of their opinions. For if this rule be neglected, who, I would ask, is so depraved or so stupid, as not to admit of being defended by an eloquent and talented man ? No one has ever existed, so hostile to God or so opposed to truth and right reason, as not to have said many excellent things from time to time, which were totally at variance with his other opinions. But I return to the god of the Stoics; who, if estimated, not from the high-sounding words of certain individuals of this sect, but from the decrees and principles of the whole body, appears to me to possess little of the greatness and majesty of Deity.

In the first place, all must confess, that the Stoical god is wholly immersed in matter, and cannot possibly be separated from it ; also that he is diffused and extended through the whole universe. The absurdities consequent upon which opinion have been already pointed out by Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. 2. cap. 5. p. 189. and in our times by P. Bayle, Continuation des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 1. sec. 67. p. 338. &c. Secondly, this god is wholly corporeal : which even J. Lipsius has not been able to deny, and in proof of which many testimonies have been collected from ancient authors by Ez. Spanheim, Ad Juliani Cæsares, p. 110. 111. Again, he is finite. For this sect asserted the world to be finite, and denied the existence of more worlds than one ; as is evident even from Plutarch, De Stoicorum Repugnantiis, tom. 2. opp. p. 1053. Wherefore, if God is nothing but a fiery nature pervading the whole world, it follows also that God is finite, and not larger than the world, which the Stoics considered to be surrounded with an immense void. Hence, also, not a few of this sect ascribed a spherical figure to God. For, according to their doctrine, the world is spherical : but God is the soul of the world : therefore, it follows that he possesses the same form as the world itself. Manilius, Astronomic. lib. 1. cap. 7. on the figure which we call a sphere :

XXVI. It would be endless now to cite all the testimonies of other philosophers and pagan writers of latter times, concerning one supreme and universal Numen. Wherefore we shall content

Hæc æterna manet *divisque simillima forma.*

But, if the god of the Stoics be finite, it is unquestionable, that his virtues and perfections must also be finite. Neither do they attempt to deny this. From such a deity, therefore, we ought not to expect infinite knowledge, wisdom, power, and goodness. All these, and whatever other v[illegible] besides these, are circumscribed and defined by this world. As reg[illegible] d liberty in particular, they openly acknowledged, that their God [illegible] nplish all that he wished, and that he did not possess the power of fr[illegible] und down by the fate inherent in the very nature of matter. Like th[illegible] y lamented, that the perversity and malignity of matter prevented th[illegible] t of many much better things in this world, than those which have be[illegible] rdained by God, that is, they granted matter to be more powerful than God. [illegible], De Provid. cap. 5. p. 195. tom. 1. opp. says: Quare tamen Deus tam iniqu[illegible] distributione fati fuit, ut bonis viris paupertatem, vulnera, et acerba funera adsc[illegible] peret? Non potest artifex mutare materiem: hæc passa est. Quædam sepa[illegible] quibusdam non possunt, cohærent, individua sunt, "But why was God so unju[illegible] he distribution of fate, as to dispense poverty, wounds, and cruel deaths to good [illegible]? The artificer cannot change the material: this suffered it. Some things cannot be disconnected from others, but cohere and are inseparable." Compare the same writer in Quæst. Natural. Præf. lib. 1. p. 485. tom. 2. opp. and especially Antoninus, lib. 6. Ad Se Ipsum, sect. 36. p. 195. Nor, as Thom. Gataker imagines, is this opinion at variance with what Antoninus says both elsewhere and lib. 6. sect. 1. p. 170. *τὴν τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν*, "that the matter of the universe," *εὐπειθὴ καὶ εὐτρεπῆ*, "is obedient and compliant." For that matter obeys and complies which suffers so much to be formed and fashioned out of it, as its nature permits: as a piece of wood, out of which an artificer cannot form a Mercury, although it baffles his industry in one respect, nevertheless obeys his hand and skill in another. The Stoics leave *internal justice* to God; but the *external*, or that which rewards the good and punishes the bad, they exclude from his nature altogether: by doing which they extinguish in mankind all motive for the practice of virtue and destroy the very foundations of divine worship. I am aware, indeed, that Seneca sometimes speaks of God's rewards and punishments: see Epist. 95. p. 354. t. 2. opp. But that all such sayings are to be classed among the innumerable things spoken popularly by this writer, will be obvious to any one, who compares them with the other dogmas of the Stoics. For it is a common custom with them to leave the usage of language to the people, but to reserve the science to themselves. Agreeably to which observation we ought to estimate the force of many expressions occurring in Seneca's writings, more especially in his Consolationes ad Marciam et Helvidiam; in which he adapts his words to the comprehension of those, whom he is addressing, and discourses not so much according to the strict rules of the doctrine, which he professes, as in conformity with the commonly received usage, in order more powerfully to excite the minds of the weak and uninformed.

Let us consider somewhat more minutely, therefore, what opinion the Stoics ought to have held on divine rewards and punishments consistently with their own philosophy and apart from those admissions of theirs, which they granted, as they conceived, to the popular ear rather than to truth. Indeed, that they discarded eternal rewards and punishments and denied the immortality of souls, is notorious. [Berkeley attempts to prove the contrary, Alciphron, tom. 1. p. 206. but without success.] See for example what has been collected from M. Antoninus by J. Fran. Buddeus in his Introduc. ad Philos. Stoicam ex Mente Antonini sect. 14. sect. 8. p. 55, &c. prefixed to the edition of Antoninus lately published at Leipzig. And this doctrine, if I am not much mistaken, is in accordance with the principles of their interior philosophy. The greatest happiness, according to them, consists in virtue; the greatest misery in vice. That solum bonum honestum, solum malum turpe, "the honourable is the only good, and the base the only evil," is a well-known maxim of this sect. Life, therefore, and all things that tend to make life more agreeable or more wretched, can have no place among goods or evils: and a wise man neither requires nor wishes for life or the

ourselves only to instance in some of the most remarkable, beginning with M. Tull. Cicero; whom though some would suspect to have been a sceptic as to theism, because in his De

goods of life. Consequently, if life were eternal, a wise man would by no means be more happy, nor a wicked man more miserable. We, who taking reason for our guide suppose souls to be immortal, derive one of our strongest arguments from the state of the good and the wicked in this life. Here, we grant, the good are oftentimes in adversity and the wicked prosper. From which we draw the conclusion, that in the life hereafter the good will be rewarded and the wicked punished. And that we are right in doing so, is shown by the example of our Saviour himself, who expressly uses this very argument in the parable of the rich man, Luke xvi. 25. Μνήσθητι, ὅτι ἀπέλαβες σὺ τὰ ΑΓΑΘΑ σου ἐν τῇ ζωῇ σου, καὶ Λάζαρος ὁμοίως τὰ ΚΑΚΑ· νῦν δὲ ὧδε ΠΑΡΑΚΑΛΕΙΤΑΙ, σὺ δὲ ΟΔΥΝΑΣΑΙ, "Remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy *good things*, and likewise Lazarus *evil things*: but now he is *comforted* and thou art *tormented*." But the Stoics denied, that any evil can befall a good man here, as all happiness consists in virtue alone, or that any good can happen to the wicked, as all misery is centred in vice. Hence they would have repudiated this passage altogether, nor admitted that a time is to come when the good shall receive the good things, which they lacked in this life, and the wicked suffer evils in return for the goods, which they hitherto enjoyed. Besides, I am at a loss to know, what sort of reward a wise Stoic could expect from God after death. It is not pleasures; for he, who holds virtue to be its own reward, despises these. See Antoninus, lib. 6. sect. 34. p. 193. Neither is it virtue. For a wise man can acquire this of himself, and in departing from this life is already in possession of it. In like manner, what punishment can impend over the wicked, according to the principles of the Stoics? Not torments, not pains; for they deny these to be evils or punishments. Nor vicious propensities and violent perturbations of the mind, as alone constituting evil; for these cannot proceed from God, in whom no evil exists; putting aside, that according to their doctrine all souls, even of the wicked, possess an innate faculty of quelling and subduing the passions. Consequently, there would be a power in the soul of an impious man of resisting the divine punishments and freeing itself from them. I pass over other considerations, which must necessarily have led a Stoic to suppose, that the souls of men are not immortal.

As little did their doctrine admit of rewards and punishments in this life. In the first place they held, that it is a wise man's part to be free from all perturbations of mind and entirely to expel the passions. At the same time they inculcated, that a wise man ought to follow and imitate God. Hence they must necessarily have excluded the passions, anger, mercy, hatred, &c. from God also, the same as from a wise man, and have supposed, that he cannot be offended by the wicked, nor on the other hand be appeased by the good. See Lactantius, De Ira Dei, cap. 5. p. 901. and cap. 17. p. 951. But if the Deity cannot be offended by the vices of men, if he neither hates, nor pities, nor is incensed, what will become of his rewards and punishments? By attending even to this alone we may easily understand, that the words *sin*, *reward*, *punishment*, have not the same signification in the schools of the Stoics, as among the rest of mankind, and are more ornamental than either proper or true. Again, what means has the Stoical God of rewarding the virtuous deeds of the good in this life, or checking the crimes of the wicked? Will he bestow upon the wise man riches, power, honours? But in these there is nothing of good, nor does the wise man make any use of such external and fortuitous things, who is as happy in Phalaris' bull as at the banquets of the Sybarites. Or will he remunerate him with virtue? But to obtain this a wise man needs not the assistance of God: for, if we are to believe the Stoics, virtue belongs to the things, which they term τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or within our own power. See Epicteti Enchiridion, cap. 1. and Arrian's Diss. in Epictetum, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 84. On the other hand, what sort of punishment will the wicked be in fear of? Is it disease, poverty, ignominy, exile? But in the first place these are fortuitous and necessarily associated with the nature of things, to which the wise and good man is as liable as the impious and wicked: Antoninus, lib. 6. sect. 36. p. 193. Again, these are not evils, and therefore cannot be considered as punishments. Or is it an overflow of vices and vicious propensities? But these God, being by nature benign and just and destitute of all vice, can in nowise impart. Lastly, the world cannot dispense with the evil and vicious, as a necessary

Natura Deorum he brings in Cotta the Academic, as well opposing Q. Lucil. Balbus the Stoic, as C. Velleius the Epicurean; yet from sundry other places of his writings it sufficiently appears, that he was a dogmatic and hearty Theist; as for example, this in his second book De Divin.: Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri, "That there is some most excellent and eternal nature, which is to be admired and honoured by mankind, the pulchritude of the world and the order of the heavenly bodies compel us to confess." And this in his oration De Haruspicum Responsis:

part: see Antoninus, Ad Se Ipsum, lib. 6. sect. 42. p. 196. Chrysippus in Plutarch, De Repugnant. Stoicor. tom. 2. opp. p. 1049. and it is impossible, but that there must be shameless, designing, and fraudulent men: Antoninus, lib. 9. sect. 42. p. 285. What punishment, therefore, will be awarded to men, who are indispensable to the universal system and whom, if all things are to be kept in their proper state, the world can no more bear the loss of than of the sun or the stars. From this it is, I imagine, already evident, how we are to understand what the Stoics inculcate with so much pomp respecting the worship of God and our duty towards the supreme Being. To me all these things appear to possess much more of vanity and show than of truth. Why, I ask, does the Stoic address the Deity in prayer? For the sake of receiving virtue? This, however, if so disposed, he can acquire of himself. Is it then in order to obtain riches, pleasures, honours, benefits? But these are not of such importance, that we should petition the gods for them. Besides, they were long ago defined by God, at the time when he made the world and determined every man's destiny, and cannot therefore now be changed. Seneca, De Providentia, cap. 5. p. 194. tom. 1. opp. Olim constitutum est, quid gaudeas, quid fleas. Fata nos ducunt, et quantum cuique restet, prima nascentium hora disposuit, "It was long since settled and ordained, what is to cause you joy and what sorrow. Our destinies guide us, and whatever there is in store for each of us was appointed at the first hour of our birth." Similar sayings are continually to be met with among the Stoics. Why, therefore, if such be the case, do we weary both ourselves and God with prayers, since all things run on by a fixed and inviolable law? Majestatis diminutio est, says the same Seneca, Quæst. Natural. lib. 1. præf. p. 482. tom. 2. opp. et confessio erroris, mutanda fecisse. Necesse est enim, ei eadem placere, cui nisi optima placere non possunt: nec ob hoc minus liber et potens est. Ipse enim est necessitas sua, "It is a lessening of his majesty, and a confession of error, to have made things which require to be changed. For it is necessary, that the same things must always please him, whom nothing but the best can please: neither on that account is he less free and powerful. For he is his own necessity." The Stoics, in short, if they wish to follow their own precepts and not to contradict themselves, cannot be otherwise affected towards God, than nations are towards departed men, from whom they formerly received great benefits: whom, properly speaking, they neither love nor fear, but merely hold in reverence. They are indebted to their God for life, soul, and the opportunities of this world; but more they cannot expect from him, whether of good or of evil. If they practise virtue, they have in it their reward; and in vice, if addicted to it, their punishment. Wherefore they have no reason either to love or fear God: it is sufficient, if they are mindful of his benefits, or as Cicero, De Divinatione, lib. 2. cap. 72. p. 3255. tom. 9. opp. beautifully expounds the Stoical duties towards God: Esse credant aliquam præstantem æternamque naturam, eamque suspiciant et admirentur, "if they believe a certain transcendent and eternal nature to exist, and honour and admire it." Although, if they neglect even this duty, they will incur little or no evil. Such being the case, therefore, I consider all that the Stoics inculcate on the duty of praying to God and the prayers themselves, which they are said to have addressed to him, as the precepts and words of men, who do not sufficiently attend to logical consequences, or as belonging to those maxims, which they were wont frequently to give utterance to, in order that they might not appear wholly to dissent from the religion and common belief of the people.

Quis est tam vecors, qui cum suspexerit in cœlum, Deos esse non sentiat, et ea, quæ tanta mente fiunt, ut vix quisquam arte ulla ordinem rerum ac vicissitudinem persequi possit, casu fieri putet? "Who is so mad or stupid, as when he looks up to heaven, is not presently convinced, that there are gods? or can persuade himself, that those things, which are made with so much mind and wisdom, as that no human skill is able to reach and comprehend the artifice and contrivance of them, did all happen by chance?" To which purpose more places will be afterwards cited. However, in his philosophic writings it is certain, that he affected to follow the way of the new academy, set on foot by Carneades; that is, to write sceptically, partly upon prudential accounts, and partly for other reasons intimated by himself in these words:* Qui requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosiùs id faciunt, quam necesse est. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. Quinetiam obest plerumque iis, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum, qui se docere profitentur. Desinunt enim suum judicium adhibere, idque habent ratum, quod ab eo, quem probant, judicatum vident, "They, who would needs know, what we ourselves think concerning every thing, are more curious than they ought, because philosophy is not so much a matter of authority as of reason; and the authority of those who profess to teach, is oftentimes an hindrance to the learner, they neglecting by that means to use their own judgment, securely taking that for granted which is judged by another whom they value." Nevertheless, Cicero, in the close of this discourse De Natura Deorum† (as St. Austin[1] also observeth) plainly declares himself to be more propense and inclinable to the doctrine of Balbus, than either that of Velleius or Cotta; that is, though he did not assent to the Stoical doctrine or theology in every point (himself being rather a Platonist than a Stoic), yet he did much prefer it before, not only the Epicureism of Velleius, but also the scepticism of Cotta.[2]

* De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. [Cap. 5. p. 2886.]

[† Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 2881. expressly acknowledges in his own person, that those who believe in a God have the greater probability on their side; nay, that we are led to the opinion by nature herself. See Zimmermann's Diss. De Theologia Ciceronis in the Museum Helvetic. tom. 1. par. 3. p. 374. who modestly refutes some of our own remarks, and defends Cicero from the charge of atheism.]

[1] See his De Civitate Dei, lib. 4. cap. 30. p. 86. tom. 7. opp. where, however, he does not think very favourably of Cicero's religion.

[2] The learned Doctor is mistaken in supposing, that in the concluding words of his De Natura Deorum Cicero rejects the opinions both of the Epicureans and Academics, on the subject of the gods. For in these words he speaks as became one of the sect of the Academics, who are well known to have approved of those opinions, in which they considered there was the greatest probability, but to have regarded none as altogether certain and true. [Zimmerm. ibid. p. 519. Warburton, in his Divine Legation of Moses, tom. 1. p. 393. shows at some length, how difficult it is to ascertain Cicero's real opinion.] Properly speaking, the Academics had no dogmas of their own. They were accustomed to dispute against the opinions of all, and in the meantime to follow

Wherefore Augustinus Steuchus, and other learned men, quarrel with sundry passages of Cicero's upon another account, not as atheistical, but as seeming to favour a multitude of independent gods; he sometimes attributing not only the government of the world, and the making of mankind, but also the first constitution and fabric of the whole world, to gods plurally. As when he writeth thus:[3] Ut perpetuus mundi esset ornatus, magna adhibita cura est à providentia deorum, "For the perpetual adorning of the world, great care hath been taken by the providence of the gods." And, A diis immortalibus hominibus provisum esse, &c. "That the immortal gods have provided for the convenience of mankind, appears from the very fabric and figure of them." And that place before cited:* Dico igitur providentia deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes initio constitutas esse, "I say, that the world and all its parts were at first constituted by the providence of the gods." And lastly, where he states the controversy of that book† De Natura Deorum thus: Utrum dii nihil agant, nihil moliantur? An contrà ab his et à principio omnia facta, et constituta sint, et ad infinitum tempus regantur atque moveantur? "Whether the gods do nothing at all, but are void of care and trouble? Or whether all things were at first made and constituted, and ever since are moved and governed by them?" Notwithstanding which it is evident, that this learned orator and philosopher plainly acknowledged the monarchy of the whole, or one supreme and universal Numen over all. And that first from his so often using the word God in the singular, emphatically and by way of eminency: as,[4] Ipsi

those, which they considered to be the most probable. Hence it will be evident, in what light we are to view the religion of Cicero. He was favourable to the Academics alone; and in my opinion for this reason, because he perceived that the principles of this sect were above all others adapted to his own favourite pursuit, forensic oratory. These philosophers argued on both sides of all subjects, and what could be more desirable or more available than such a faculty to a man, who delighted in swaying the people by his eloquence and in defending the cause of the accused? Hence to suit his own purpose, he adopted and maintained sometimes this sometimes that opinion. Although regarding the precepts of the Stoics on the subject of the gods as possessing greater authority and probability than those of the other philosophers, he nevertheless believed it to be out of the power of any one to show, whether these were true or not. The religion of this great orator, therefore, is uncertain and doubtful; in fact, no religion at all. In his Orations, I admit, we meet with a considerable number of passages exhibiting great piety towards god and gods; but who is not aware, that in them the orator is addressing himself to the opinion of the vulgar, and, as he himself intimates, looked less to what seemed to be required by the truth than by the cause, which he was advocating.

[3] In these passages, however, which, with many others of the same kind, occur in lib. 3. De Natura Deorum, Cicero is not speaking in his own person, but in that of Balbus the Stoic; and the Stoics, as we have already copiously remarked, were continually discoursing about the gods.

* De Nat. Deor. p. 225. † P. 195. Lamb.

[4] Lib. 2. De Legibus, cap. 10. p. 3352. tom. 9. opp. But in this book also Cicero is in the habit of using the words god and gods indiscriminately. Wherefore I would not affirm, that the supreme Deity is here meant by him.

Deo nihil minus gratum, quàm non omnibus patere ad se placandum et colendum viam, "Nothing can be less grateful to God himself, than that there should not be a liberty open to all (by reason of the costliness of sacrifices) to worship and appease him." And,[5] Nisi juvante Deo, tales non fuerunt Curius, Fabricius, &c. "Curius and Fabricius had never been such men as they were, had it not been for the divine assistance." Again,[6] Commoda, quibus utimur, lucemque, quâ fruimur, spiritumque, quem ducimus, à Deo nobis dari atque impertiri videmus, "We must needs acknowledge, that the benefits of this life, the light which we enjoy, and the spirit which we breathe, are imparted to us from God." And to mention no more, in his version of Plato's Timæus,[7] Deos alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas mundi partes spargens Deus quasi serebat, "God distributing gods to all the parts of the world, did as it were sow some gods in the earth, some in the moon," &c. Moreover, by his making such descriptions of God as plainly imply his oneness and singularity, as in his Orat. pro Milone:[8] Est, est profectò

[5] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 66. p. 3048. But these are not so much Cicero's words as those of Balbus, whose discourse Cicero is there repeating.

[6] Orat. pro Sexto Roscio, cap. 45. p. 449. tom. 3. opp. But it must be observed, that the reading in this passage in Cicero is not, a *Deo* nobis dari, but ab *eo*; the word *eo* referring to the name Jupiter optimus maximus, which occurs a little before. Wherefore this passage does not belong to those, in which Cicero calls the supreme Deity *God* by way of eminence.

[7] If these words occurred in the manner here represented in Cicero's Latin version of the Timæus, still they would not express the sentiment of Cicero himself, but of Plato, whom he translates. But Cicero has not written what the learned Doctor makes him write. His words, from cap. 13. Timæi, p. 4034, tom. 9. opp. are these: Quæ cum ita designasset, ... alios in terra, alios in luna, alios in reliquas partes spargens quasi serebat; where we neither have the word god nor gods. I do not deny, however, that these names are to be repeated from what goes before. And, as is well known, there are several passages in the Timæus in which Plato speaks both of one and of many gods.

[8] Cap. 31. p. 2846. tom. 3. opp. But I cannot admit even this passage to be evidence of Cicero's having professed one God. Omitting for the present, that it is taken from an oration, in which Cicero conforms to the popular judgment rather than the truth of things; it will be sufficient for me to show, that in this passage he attaches one and the same sense to the *divine power* and the *immortal gods*. The wily orator's whole object is to persuade the multitude, that Milo, in his assault on Claudius, was incited and impelled by a certain divine power, or by the immortal gods, in order to rid the Roman people of so great a monster. He thus commences this part of his oration: Hujus beneficii gratiam, Judices, fortuna populi Romani, et vestra felicitas, et *Dii* immortales sibi deberi putant, "For this kindness, O judges, the fortune of the Roman people, and your own happiness, and the *immortal gods*, consider gratitude to be due to them." After saying which he proceeds briefly to show the existence of such a *divine power*, or *immortal gods*, as he had called them. This he does chiefly in the words here quoted, and then goes on as follows: Non est humano consilio, ne mediocri quidem, judices, *deorum immortalium* cura res illa perfecta, "This deed was accomplished not by human counsel, O judges, nor by the ordinary care, indeed, of the immortal gods." And, lest any one should doubt, what sort of gods are meant, he immediately addresses the Alban gods, the Latian Jove, and the Bona Dea, who, he says, have at length opened their eyes to the punishment of Clodius. This subject he pursues also through several of the following passages, which, to avoid prolixity, I shall refrain from quoting. [See Zimmermann, ibid. p. 417. 418.] Therefore, it is plain that the divine power,

illa vis; neque in his corporibus, atque in hac imbecillitate nostrâ, inest quiddam, quod vigeat et sentiat, et non inest in hoc tanto naturæ tamque præclaro motu. Nisi fortè idcirco esse non putant, quia non apparet nec cernitur: proinde quasi nostram ipsam mentem, qua sapimus, qua providemus, qua hæc ipsa agimus et dicimus, videre, aut planè qualis et ubi sit, sentire possumus, "There is, there is certainly such a divine force in the world; neither is it reasonable to think, that in these gross and frail bodies of ours there should be something which hath life, sense, and understanding, and yet no such thing in the whole universe; unless men will therefore conclude, that there is none, because they see it not: as if we could see our own mind (whereby we order and dispose all things, and whereby we reason and speak thus), and perceive what kind of thing it is, and where it is lodged." Where, as there is a strong asseveration of the existence of a God, so is his singularity plainly implied, in that he supposes him to be one mind or soul acting and governing the whole world, as our mind doth our body. Again, in his Tusculan Questions:* Nec verò Deus ipse alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam, et libera, segregata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, "Neither can God himself be understood by us otherwise than as a certain loose and free mind, segregated from all mortal concretion, which both perceives and moves all things." So again in the same book:† Hæc igitur et alia innumerabilia cum cernimus, possumusne dubitare, quin his præsit aliquis vel effector, si hæc nata sunt, ut Platoni videtur; vel si semper fuerint, ut Aristoteli placet, moderator tanti operis et muneris? "When we behold these and other wonderful works of nature, can we at all doubt, but that there presideth over them, either one maker of all, if they had a beginning, as Plato conceiveth; or else, if they always were, as Aristotle supposeth, one moderator and governor?" And in the third De Legibus:‡ Sine imperio nec domus ulla, nec civitas, nec gens, nec hominum universum genus stare, nec rerum natura omnis, nec ipse mundus potest. Nam et hic Deo paret, et huic obediunt maria terræque, et hominum vita jussis supremæ legis obtemperat, "Without government, neither any house, nor city, nor nation, nor mankind in general, nor the whole nature

whose existence Cicero is here showing, and the immortal gods or popular Roman deities are in this place one and the same. Dr. Cudworth, indeed, considers it to be evident, that Cicero here meant only one God, from his comparing this divine power with the human mind, which is one. But he clearly did not intend this comparison to be taken in so wide a sense, being properly confined within these limits: "As our own mind exists and yet is not seen, so also this divine power, invisible though it be to us, does notwithstanding really exist."

* Lib. 1. p. 126. [Cap. 27. p. 2604. tom. 8. opp.]

† Tusc. Q. lib. 1. p. 126. [Cap. 29. p. 2606.]

‡ P. 343. [Cap. 1. p. 3389. tom. 9. opp.]

of things, nor the world itself could subsist. For this also obeyeth God, and the seas and earth are subject to him, and the life of man is disposed of by the commands of the supreme law." Elsewhere he speaks of Dominans ille nobis Deus, qui nos vetat hinc injussu suo demigrare,[9] "That God, who rules over all mankind, and forbids them to depart hence without his leave;" of Deus, cujus numini parent omnia,[10] "That God, whose divine power all things obey." We read also in Cicero of summus or supremus Deus,[1] "the supreme God," to whom the first making of man is properly imputed by him; of Summi rectoris et domini Numen,[2] "The divine power of the supreme Lord and Governor;" of Deus præpotens,[3] and rerum omnium præpotens Jupiter,[4] "The most powerful God," and "Jupiter, who hath power over all things;" of Princeps ille Deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, sicut animus humanus id corpus, cui præpositus est,[5] "That chief or principal God, who governs the whole world in the same manner as a human soul governeth that body which it is set over." Wherefore, as for those passages before objected, where the government of the world, as to the concernments of mankind at least, is ascribed by Cicero to gods plurally, this was done by him and other Pagans, upon no other account but only this, because the supreme God was not supposed by them to do all things himself immediately in the government of the world, but to assign certain provinces to other inferior gods, as ministers under him; which therefore sharing in the economy of the world, were looked upon as co-governors thereof with him. Thus when Balbus in Cicero, to excuse some seeming defect of providence, in the prosperities of wicked and the adversities of good men, pretended, Non animadvertere omnia deos, nè reges quidem, "That the gods did not attend to all things, as

[9] Tusculan. Quæs. lib. 1. cap. 30. p. 2609. But there is a trifling inaccuracy again in this quotation. We do not read in Cicero as here: Dominans nobis Deus, but, Dominans *in nobis* Deus. Now, according to the Stoics, the god that rules in men is the rational soul or right reason. Hence it is plain, that these words are not to be understood of the supreme Deity.

[10] De Divinatione, lib. 1. cap. 53. p. 3177. tom. 9. opp.

[1] Dr. Cudworth meant, most probably, the following passage, occurring in the Somnium Scipionis, cap. 4. p. 3977. tom. 10. opp. Novem tibi orbibus connexa sunt omnia: quorum unus est cœlestis, extimus, qui reliquos omnes complectitur, *summus ipse Deus*, arcens et continens ceteros, "All things are connected together in nine spheres, of which one is the celestial and outermost, which comprehends and encompasses all the rest, the supreme God himself, confining and containing the others." But here Cicero's *summus* Deus is the last of those nine spheres, of which the ancients supposed heaven to consist. The reason why he calls this sphere the supreme God is investigated by Ramus and Vinetus in their notes on this place. Add another passage, in which he speaks of the *supremus* Deus, De Legibus, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 3304. tom. 9. opp.

[2] See lib. 4. De Finib. Bonor. et Malor. cap. 5. p. 2471. tom. 8. opp.

[3] De Legibus, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 3304. tom. 10. opp.

[4] De Divinat. lib. 2. cap. 18. p. 3204. tom. 9. opp.

[5] See Somnium Scipion. cap. 3. p. 3973. tom. 10. opp.

neither do kings:" Cotta amongst other things replied thus:[6] Fac divinam mentem esse distentam, cœlum versantem, terram tuentem, maria moderantem, cur tam multos deos nihil agere et cessare patitur? Cur non rebus humanis aliquos otiosos deos præfecit, qui à te, Balbe, innumerabiles explicati sunt? "Should it be granted, that the divine Mind (or supreme Deity) were distracted with turning round the heavens, observing the earth, and governing the seas, yet why does he let so many other gods do nothing at all? Or why does he not appoint some of those idle gods over human affairs, which, according to Balbus and the Stoics, are innumerable?" Again, when the immortal gods are said by Cicero to have "provided for the convenience of mankind in their first constitution," this doubtless is to be understood according to the Platonic hypothesis, that the gods and demons being first made by the supreme God, were set to work and employed by him afterward in the making of man and other mortal animals. And lastly, as to that, which hath the greatest difficulty of all in it, when the whole world is said by Cicero to have been made by the providence of the gods, this must needs be understood also of those eternal gods of Plato's, according to whose likeness or image the world and man are said to have been made; that is, of the trinity of divine hypostases, called by Amelius Plato's three minds and three kings, and by others of the Platonists the first and second and third God, and the τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, and τὸ δεύτερον αἴτιον, &c. "the first and second cause," &c. And it may be here observed, what we learn from St. Cyril, that some Pagans endeavoured to justify this language and doctrine of theirs, even from the Mosaic writings themselves:* Θεοῖς ἑτέροις ὑποτοπήσαντες τὸν τῶν ὅλων φᾶναι θεὸν, ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν, "They suspecting, that the God of the universe being about to make man, did there bespeak the other gods (τοῖς μεθ' ἑαυτὸν δευτέροις καὶ ἐν μείοσιν οὖσι, 'which were secondary and inferior to him') after this manner, Let us make man according to our own image and likeness." Which St. Cyril, and other Christian writers understand of the trinity. Now those eternal gods of Plato, according to whose image the world and man is said by him to have been made, and which (though one of them were properly called the Demiurgus), yet had all an influence and causality upon the making of it, were (as hath been already observed) not so many

* De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 39. p. 3107. tom. 9. opp. But we cannot I imagine, learn what Cicero's opinion was from this passage. For in the first place, Cotta, after the manner of the Academics, is here endeavouring merely to refute Balbus, without establishing any thing certain himself. Again, as has been already observed by the learned Doctor, Cicero at the close of this work abandons Cotta and owns, that he prefers the opinion of Balbus as the more probable.

* Contra Jul. lib. 1.

independent and self-originated deities, but all derived from one first principle. And therefore Cicero following Plato in this is not to be suspected upon that account, to have been an assertor of many independent gods, or partial creators of the world; especially since in so many other places of his writings, he plainly owns a divine monarchy.[7]

We pass from M. Tullius Cicero to M. Terentius Varro, his equal, a man famous for polymathy or multifarious knowledge, and reputed unquestionably (though not the most eloquent, yet) the most learned of all the Romans, at least as to antiquity. He wrote one and forty books concerning the antiquities of human and divine things; wheren he transcended the Roman Pontifices themselves, and discovered their ignorance as to many points of their religion. In which books he distinguished three kinds of theology, the first mythical or fabulous, the second physical or natural, and the last civil or popular: the first being most accommodate to the theatre or stage; the second to the world, or the wiser men in it; the third to cities, or the generality of the civilized vulgar. Which was agreeable also to the doctrine of Scævola, that learned Pontifex, concerning three sorts of gods, poetical, philosophical, and political. As for the mythical and poetical theology, it was censured after this manner by Varro:* In eo sunt multa contra dignitatem et naturam immortalium ficta. In hoc enim est, ut Deus alius ex capite, alius ex femore sit, alius ex guttis sanguinis natus. In hoc, ut Dii furati sint, ut adulteraverint, ut servierint homini. Denique, in hoc omnia Diis attribuuntur, quæ non modo in hominem, sed etiam in contemptissimum hominem cadere possunt, "That, according to the literal sense, it contained many things contrary to the dignity and nature of immortal beings; the genealogy of one God being derived from the head, of another from the thigh, of another from drops of blood: some being represented as thieves, others as adulterers, &c. and all things attributed to the gods therein, that are not only incident to men, but even to the most contemptible and flagitious of them." And as for the second, the natural theology, which is the true, this Varro conceived to be above the capacity of vulgar citizens; and that therefore it was expedient, there should be another theology calculated, more accommodate for them, and of a middle kind betwixt the natural and the fabulous, which is that which

[7] Dr. Cudworth here goes out of his way without the least necessity. When Cicero wrote this passage, he was not even thinking of Plato's eternal gods. In it the Stoic is speaking, and expounding the opinion of his own sect. But that the Stoics imputed some share in the creation and administration of this world to the stars, which they regarded as gods, we have given sufficient evidence of above, when showing that this stat ement of Cicero cannot fairly be charged with error.

* Aug. de Civ. D. lib. 6. cap. 5. [P. 116. tom. 7. opp.]

is called civil. For he affirmed, Multa esse vera, quæ vulgo scire non sit utile, et quædam, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat,* "That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; and again, some things, which, though false, yet it was expedient they should be believed by them." As Scævola, the Roman Pontifex, in like manner, would not have the vulgar to know that the true God had neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members. Ex [illegible] istimat (saith St. Austin of him) falli in religione [illegible] licere etiam in libris rerum divinarum ipse Varro [illegible] Scævola therefore judgeth it expedient that ci[illegible] leceived in their religion; which also Varro him[illegible] ot to affirm in his books of divine things." Whe[illegible] o, though disapproving the fabulous theology, ye[illegible] design, as he conceived, did he endeavour to asser[illegible] e could the civil theology, then received among[illegible] and to vindicate the same from contempt: yet [illegible] as that, Si eam civitatem novam constitueret, ex naturæ potiùs formulâ, deos et deorum nomina se fuisse dedicaturum, non dubitet confiteri,‡ "If he were to constitute a new Rome himself, he doubts not to confess, but that he would dedicate gods and the names of gods after another manner, more agreeably to the form of nature or natural theology." Now, what Varro's own sense was concerning God, he freely declared in those books of Divine Things; namely, that he was the great soul and mind of the world. Thus St. Austin: Hi soli Varroni videntur animadvertisse, quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem,§ "These alone seem to Varro to have understood, what God is, who believed him to be a soul, governing the whole world by motion and reason." So that Varro plainly asserted one supreme and universal Numen, he erring only in this (as St. Austin conceives) that he called him a soul, and the creator of soul, or a pure and abstract mind. But as Varro acknowledged one universal Numen, the whole animated world, or rather the soul thereof, which also he affirmed to be called by several names, as in the earth, Tellus; in the sea, Neptune; and the like: so did he also admit (together with the rest of the Pagans) other particular gods, which were to him nothing but parts of the world animated with souls superior to men: A summo circuitu cœli usque ad circulum lunæ æthereas animas esse astra ac stellas, eosque cœlestes deos, non modo intelligi esse, sed etiam videri: inter lunæ verò gyrum et nimborum cacumina aëreas esse animas, sed eas animo, non oculis,

* Aug. Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 31. [P. 87.] † Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 27. [P. 84.]
‡ Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 31. [P. 87.] § Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 9. [Cap. 32. p. 87.]

videri; et vocari heroas, et lares, et genios,* "That from the highest circuit of the heavens to the sphere of the moon there are ethereal souls or animals, the stars, which are not only understood, but also seen to be celestial gods; and between the sphere of the moon and the middle region of the air, there are aëreal souls or animals, which though not seen by our eyes, yet are discovered by our mind, and called heroes, lares, and genii." So that, according to Varro, the only true natural gods were, as himself also determined, anima mundi, ac partes ejus; first, the great soul and mind of the whole world, which comprehendeth all; and secondly, the parts of the world animated superior to men. Which gods also he affirmed to be worshipped castiùs, more "purely" and "chastely," without images, as they were by the first Romans for one hundred and seventy years: he concluding: Qui primi simulachra deorum populi posuerunt, eos civitatibus suis et metum dempsisse et errorem addidisse; prudentur existimans (saith St. Austin) deos facilè posse in simulachrorum stoliditate contemni,† "That those nations, who first set up images of the gods, did both take away fear from their cities, and add error to them; he wisely judging, that the foppery of images would easily render their gods contemptible."

L. Annæus Seneca, the philosopher, was contemporary with our Saviour Christ and his Apostles, who, though frequently acknowledging a plurality of gods, did nevertheless plainly assert one supreme, he not only speaking of him singularly, and by way of eminency, but also plainly describing him as such;‡ as when he calls him Formatorem universi; rectorem et arbitrum et custodem mundi; ex quo suspensa sunt omnia; animum ac spiritum universi; mundani hujus operis dominum et artificem; cui nomen omne convenit; ex quo nata sunt omnia; cujus spiritu vivimus; totum suis partibus inditum, et se sustinentem sua vi; cujus consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus eat, et actus suos explicet; cujus decreto omnia fiunt; divinum spiritum per omnia maxima et minima æquali intentione diffusum; Deum potentem omnium; Deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia; qui ubique et omnibus præsto est; cœli et deorum omnium Deum; a quo ista numina, quæ singula adoramus et colimus, suspensa sunt:§ and the like, "The framer and former of the universe, the governor, disposer, and keeper thereof; him upon whom all things depend; the mind and spirit of the world: the artificer and lord of this whole mundane fabric; to whom every name belongeth; from whom all things spring; by whose spirit we live; who is in all his parts, and sustaineth himself by his own force; by whose counsel the

* Civ. D. lib. 7. cap. 6. [P. 129.] † De Civ. D. lib. 4. cap. 31. [P. 87.]
‡ Nat. Q. lib. 2. sect. 45. [P. 537. tom. 2. opp.] § P. 442. Lips.

world is provided for, and carried on in its course constantly and uninterruptedly; by whose decree all things are done; the divine Spirit that is diffused through all things both great and small with equal intention; the God, whose power extends to all things; the greatest and most powerful God, who doth himself support and uphold all things; who is present every where to all things; the God of heaven, and of all the gods, upon whom are suspended all those other divine powers which we singly worship and ad[illegible] we may here observe from St. Austin,* that thi[illegible] book of his against superstitions (that is now [illegible] ly highly extol the natural theology, but also plai[illegible] condemn the civil theology then received amongst [illegible] d that with more freedom and vehemency than [illegible] the fabulous, or theatrical and poetical theology. [illegible] great part whereof he pronounced, that a wise [illegible] erve such things, tanquam legibus jussa, non tan[illegible], "only as commanded by the laws (he therein exercising [illegible] obedience) but not at all as grateful to the gods."[8]

M. Fabius Quintilianus, though no admirer of Seneca, yet fully agreed with him in the same natural theology, and sets down this, as the generally received notion or definition of God, Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immistum,† "That God is a spirit mingled with and diffused through all the parts of the world;" he from thence inferring Epicurus to be an Atheist, notwithstanding that he verbally asserted gods, because he denied a God according to this generally received notion, he bestowing upon his gods a circumscribed human form, and placing them between the worlds.[9] And the junior Pliny, though he were a

* Civ. D. lib. 6. cap. 10. [P. 122.]

[8] As Seneca preferred and openly professed the Stoical philosophy, his religious sentiments may easily be gathered from what we have discussed a little above respecting the theology of the Stoics.

† Lib. 7. cap. 3.

[9] I am not certain, that the learned Doctor has here correctly expounded Quintilian's meaning, and has not sacrificed a little to his own cause. Of this the reader will be best able to judge, if we quote the whole passage from Instit. Orator. lib. 7. p. 412. Quando, says he, de nomine constat, de re dubium est: interim conjectura est: ut si quæratur, quid sit Deus. Nam qui id neget, Deum esse spiritum omnibus partibus immistum, tum, non hoc dicat, falsum esse illius divinæ naturæ appellationem; sicut Epicurus, qui humanam ei formam locumque inter mundos dedit. Nomine uterque uno utitur; utrum sit in re, conjectat, "When the name is agreed on, there is a doubt about the thing: meanwhile there is conjecture: as if the question be, what God is. For he who denies, that God is a spirit, mingled with and diffused through all parts of the world, may not assert, moreover, that this appellation of the divine nature is improper; as Epicurus, who bestowed upon it a human form and a place between the worlds. Both adopt one and the same name; as to which of the two it is in reality, they conjecture." Unless I am mistaken, Quintilian neither sets down this as the generally received definition of God, nor accuses Epicurus of being an Atheist for despising it. He affirms merely that both he who adopts, and Epicurus, who rejects this definition, agree that there is a certain nature to which the name God is applicable, but differ as to what kind of nature this is. For the rest, I have no

persecutor of the Christians, he concluding, qualecunque esset, quod faterentur, pervicaciam certè et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri, [10] "that whatsoever their religion were, yet notwithstanding their stubbornness and inflexible obstinacy ought to be punished;" and who compelled many of them to worship the images of the emperor, and to sacrifice and pray to the statues of the pagan gods, and lastly, to blaspheme Christ; yet himself plainly acknowledged also one supreme universal Numen, as may sufficiently appear from his panegyric oration to Trajan, where he is called, Deus ille, qui manifestus ac præsens cœlum ac sidera insidet, "that God who is present with, and inhabits the whole heaven and stars:"* himself making a solemn prayer and supplication to him, both in the beginning and close thereof,[1] and sometimes speaking of him therein singularly and in way of eminency; as in these words: Occultat utrorumque semina Deus, et plerumque bonorum malorumque causæ sub diversâ specie latent, "God hideth the seeds of good and evil, so that the causes of each often appear disguised to men." L. Apuleius also, whose pretended miracles the Pagans endeavoured to confirm their religion by,[2] as well as they did by those of Apollonius, doth in sundry places of his writings plainly assert one supreme and universal Numen: we shall only here set down one: Cum summus deorum cuncta hæc non solùm cogitationum ratione consideret; sed prima, media, et ultima obeat; compertaque intimæ providentiæ ordinationis universitate et constantia regat,† "Since the highest of the gods does not only consider all these things in his mind and cogitation, but also pass through and comprehend within himself the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and constantly govern all by his occult providence." Lastly, Symmachus, who was a zealous stickler for the restitution of paganism, declared the Pagans to worship one and the same God with the Christians, but in several ways; he conceiving that there was no necessity God should be worshipped by all after the same manner: Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, UNUM putari:

remark to offer on the religion of this most celebrated rhetorician. For he has nowhere clearly and openly expressed his sentiments.

[10] These words are taken from his well-known epistle to Trajan, lib. 10. Epistolar. ep. 97. p. 456.

* And Mundi parens, and Parens hominum deorumque.

[1] In the beginning and close of the Panegyric, Pliny addresses a solemn prayer to Jupiter Optimus Maximus and Jupiter Capitolinus. It remains to be shown, and I much question whether this be possible, whether he meant by these words Jupiter, the son of Saturn, whom the Romans worshipped, or the supreme Deity, who rules a· governs all things. For my part, I consider we cannot easily ascertain from the · gyric of an orator, any more than from the verses of a poet, what sentiments th· entertained on the subject of religion. A great license is allowed to both o· their phraseology to the received notions of the people.

[2] According to St. Augustine, Ep. 138. p. 317. tom. 2. opp.

† De Philos. p. 278. Colo.

eadem spectamus astra; commune cœlum est; idem nos mundus involvit; quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum.* "We ought in reason to think, that it is one and the same thing which all men worship; as we all behold the same stars, have the same common heaven, and are involved within the same world. Why may not men pursue one and the same thing in different ways? One path is n[illegible] d men to so grand a secret." The sense whereof is [illegible] xpressed by Prudentius:†

Uno omnes [illegible] ir eodem
Aëre, comm[illegible] is aura.
Sed quid si[illegible] sa secuti
Quærimus; [illegible] ntibus *unum*
Imus ad *oc*[illegible] cuique genti,
Per quod it[illegible] m grande profundum.

And again afterward,‡

Secretum sed grande nequit rationis operte
Quæri aliter, quàm si sparsis via multiplicetur
Tramitibus, et centenos terat orbita calles,
Quæsitura Deum variata indage latentem.

And the beginning of Prudentius' confutation is this:

§ Longè aliud verum est. Nam multa ambago viarum
Anfractus dubios habet, et perplexius errat.
Sola errore caret simplex via, nescia flecti
In diverticulum, biviis nec pluribus anceps, &c.

We shall now instance also in some of the latter Greek writers. Though the author of the book De Mundo were not Aristotle, yet that he was a Pagan, plainly appears from some passages thereof;[3] as where he approves of sacrificing to the

* P. 306. [Epist. lib. 10. Epist. 61. p. 442.]
† P. 285. [Contra Symmachum, lib. 2. v. 85.] ‡ P. 308. [V. 842.] § V. 846.
[3] I have been unable, however, to find these passages in the De Mundo. On the contrary, from the last chapter of this book, where he states that one God is addressed by various names, it is, I think, evident, that the author repudiated the multitude of gods formerly worshipped in Greece. Dr. Cudworth, whilst writing this, had in his mind no doubt the following words, which occur cap. 6. p. 865. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis: *Γίνονται δὲ καὶ δημοθοινίαι νόμιμοι, καὶ πανηγύρεις ἐνιαύσιοι,* ΘΕΩΝ *τε θυσίαι, καὶ ἡρώων θεραπεῖαι, καὶ χοαὶ κεκμηκότων,* "There take place also the appointed public banquets, the yearly festival assemblies, the sacrifices to the gods, the worship of heroes, and the libations to the dead." But, if I am not completely mistaken, it never can be proved from this passage, that the writer of the book De Mundo was a worshipper of many gods. For he does not commend and approve of those, who do all these things, but simply relates what takes place among mankind, and recounts the various duties and occupations of the citizens of a commonwealth. In the present passage he compares the world to a state and argues, that, as in the latter all things, however various and diversified, are done agreeably to the will and law of one man, so also the whole of the things that happen in the world, infinite though they be, are nevertheless administered by the authority and power of God. In the argument drawn by the learned Doctor from Apuleius, to show that the author of the De Mundo was a Pagan, there is evidently not the slightest weight whatever.

gods, and of worshipping heroes and dead men: as also because Apuleius would not otherwise have translated so much of that book, and incorporated it into his De Mundo. He therefore does not only commend this of Heraclitus:[4] Ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, "That there is one harmonious system made out of all things, and that all things are derived from one;" but doth himself also write excellently concerning the supreme God, whom he calleth, τὴν τῶν ὅλων συνεκτικὴν αἰτίαν,* "the cause, which containeth all things," and τὸ τοῦ κόσμου κυριώτατον, "the best and most excellent part of the world;" he beginning after this manner: Ἀρχαῖος μὲν οὖν τις λόγος καὶ πάτριός ἐστι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ τὰ πάντα καὶ διὰ θεοῦ ἡμῖν συνέστηκε· οὐδεμία δὲ φύσις, αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν αὐτάρκης, ἐρημωθεῖσα τῆς ἐκ τούτου σωτηρίας, "It is an ancient opinion or tradition, that hath been conveyed down to all men from their progenitors, that all things are from God, and consist by him; and that no nature is sufficient to preserve itself, if left alone, and devoid of the divine assistance and influence." Where we may observe, that the Apuleian Latin version, altering the sense, renders the words thus: Vetus opinio est, atque in cogitationes omnium hominum penitus incidit, Deum esse: originis non habere auctorem; Deumque esse salutem et per-

[4] In my opinion, the saying of Heraclitus does not mean what the learned Doctor supposes, "that all things were made by one God." The author of the book De Mundo, cap. 5. p. 856. tom. 1. opp. Aristot. tells us, that the world is compounded of contraries, agreeing and harmonizing with each other, and adds, that Heraclitus signified the same in these words: Συνάψειας οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὖλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνᾷδον καὶ διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἓν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα," Connect together the crisped and the not crisped, the concordant and the discordant, the consonant and the dissonant: also, one from all, and all from one." The force of this passage, drawn from the inmost recesses of Heraclitus' philosophy, is thus learnedly explained by G. Olearius, Diss. 2. de Heracliti Principio Rerum Omnium, sec. 8. p. 865. in Stanley's History of Philosophy: Ex omnibus unum, inquam ὁδῷ ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω, dum omnes atomi diversæ figuræ, quas οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὖλα vocat Heraclitus, in unam massam concrevere: ex uno omnes, ὁδῷ ἄνω, dum, as he explains the thing below, sect. 12. p. 869. ex rudi mole et indigesta, divina cura, corpora ad ornatum hujus mundi spectantia educuntur, "One from all, that is by the process downwards, when all the atoms of different figures, termed οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὖλα by Heraclitus, are concreted and compounded into one mass; all from one, by the upward process, when the bodies belonging to the adornment of this world are produced by divine agency out of rude and undigested matter." After which observation he thus corrects our author: Sane istum verum verborum Heracliti apud Aristotelem sensum esse, nemo, qui totum locum consideraverit, diffitebitur: ut mirum proinde sit, doctissimum virum, R. Cudworthum sublimius quippiam in istis quæsivisse, dum auctorem Libri de Mundo commendat, quod non tantum illud Heracliteum, ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα, allegaverit, sed et ipse egregie de summo Deo docuerit, "Indeed, that this is the true meaning of Heraclitus' words in Aristotle, will be confessed by every one who examines the whole passage: wherefore it is surprising, that the most learned Dr. R. Cudworth should have sought for any thing higher in them, where he commends the author of the book De Mundo, as not only recognizing this Heraclitean "all things from one," but as himself writing also excellently concerning the supreme God." I hope I shall have some furture opportunity of examining into the correctness of this interpretation of Olearius': in the meantime, however, I cannot but acknowledge the justice of his censure of our author.

* Cap. 6. [P. 858. tom. 1. opp. Aristot.]

severantiam earum, quas effecerit, rerum. So that whereas, in the original Greek, this is said to be the general opinion of all mankind, "That all things are from God, and subsist by him, and that nothing at all can conserve itself in being without him;" Apuleius, correcting the words, makes the general sense of mankind to run no higher than this: "That there is a God, who hath no author of his original, and who is the safety and preservation of all those things that were made by himself." From whence it may be probably co[illegible] uleius, who is said to have been of Plutarch's pr[illegible] ted also with those paradoxical opinions of Pl[illegible] sequently did suppose all things not to have bee[illegible], nor to have depended on him (as the writer De [illegible]) but that there was something besides God, as [illegible] tter and an evil principle, uncreated and self-ex[illegible] ards the same writer De Mundo elegantly illu[illegible] litudes, how God by one simple motion and en[illegible] n, without any labour or toil, doth produce and govern all the variety of motions in the universe; and how he doth *συέχειν τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἁρμονίαν τε καὶ σωτηρίαν*, "contain the harmony and safety of the whole." And lastly, he concludes: "*Ὅπερ ἐν νηῒ κυβερνήτης, ἐν ἅρματι δὲ ἡνίοχος, ἐν χορῷ κορυφαῖος, ἐν πόλει νόμος, ἐν στρατοπέδῳ ἡγεμὼν, τοῦτο θεὸς ἐν κόσμῳ,*[4] "That what a pilot is to a ship, a charioteer to a chariot, the coryphæus to a choir, law to a city, and a general to an army; the same is God to the world." There being only this difference, that whereas the government of some of them is toilsome and solicitous, the divine government and steerage of the world is most easy and facile; for as this writer adds: "God being himself immoveable, moveth all things; in the same manner as law, in itself immoveable, by moving the minds of the citizens, orders and disposes all things."

Plutarchus Chæronensis (as hath been already declared) was unluckily engaged in two false opinions, the first of matter's being ingenit or uncreated, upon this pretence, because nothing could be made out of nothing; the second of a positive substantial evil principle, or an irrational soul and demon self-existent, upon this ground, because[5] *τὴν κακίαν γεγονέναι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὸ φαῦλον ἐπίγραμμα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιητοῦ βούλησιν, πᾶσαν ἐπίνοιαν ἀτοπίας ὑπερβάλλει*, "There is no greater absurdity imaginable, than that evil should proceed from the providence of God, as a bad epigram from the will of the poet." In which respect he was before called by us a Ditheist. Plutarch was also a worshipper of the many pagan gods, himself being a priest of the Pythian Apollo. Notwithstanding which, he unquestionably asserted one sole principle of all good, the

[4] P. 864. [5] De Fato, p. 572. tom. 2. opp.

cause of all things (evil and matter only excepted) the framer of the whole world, and maker of all the gods in it; who is therefore often called by him God, in way of eminency, as when he affirmeth,[6] ἀεὶ γεωμετρεῖν τὸν Θεὸν, "that God doth always act the geometrician;" that is, do all things in measure and proportion. And again:[7] Πάντα καθ' ἁρμονίαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κατασκευάζεσθαι, "That all things are made by God according to harmony;" and that,[8] ὁ θεὸς ἁρμονικὸς καλεῖται καὶ μουσικὸς, "God is called a harmonist and musician." And he hath these epithets given him: Ὁ μέγας θεὸς, "the great God;" and ὁ ἀνωτάτω θεὸς, "the highest or uppermost God," and ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, "the first God;" and ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς, "the unmade self-existent God;" all the other pagan gods, according to him, having been made in time, together with the world. He is likewise styled by Plutarch, πέλαγος τοῦ καλοῦ, "the sea of pulchritude;" and his standing and permanent duration, without any flux of time, is excellently described by the same writer, in his book concerning the Delphic inscription. Lastly, Plutarch affirmeth, that men generally pray to this supreme God for whatsoever is not in their own power, ὅσα μὴ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν, εὐχόμεθα τὸν θεὸν διδόναι.

Dio Chrysostomus, a sophist, Plutarch's equal, though an acknowledger of many gods, yet nevertheless asserteth,* βασιλεύεσθαι τὸ ὅλον, "That the whole world is under a kingly power or monarchy," he calling the supreme God, sometime,† Τὸν κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν βασιλέα τε καὶ ἄρχοντα, καὶ πρύτανιν, καὶ πατέρα, "The common king of gods and men, their governor and father; τὸν πάντων κρατοῦντα θεὸν, "the God that rules over all;"‡ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον θεὸν, "the first and greatest God;" τὸν κορυφαῖον προεστῶτα τῶν ὅλων, καὶ κατευθύνοντα τὸν ἅπαντα οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον, &c. "the chief president over all things, who orders and guides the whole heaven and world, as a wise pilot doth a ship;"§ τὸν τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἡγεμόνα οὐρανοῦ, καὶ τῆς ὅλης δεσπότην οὐσίας, "the ruler of the whole heaven, and lord of the whole essence;" and the like. And he affirming that there is a natural prolepsis in the minds of men concerning him:‖ Περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἐν πρώτοις δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους· ὁμοίως μὲν Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, ἀναγκαία καὶ ἔμφυτος ἐν παντὶ τῷ λογικῷ γιγνομένη

[6] The learned Doctor's memory has deceived him. This precept is not Plutarch's, but ascribed by report to Plato. Although Plutarch, Sympos. lib. 8. Quæst. 2. p. 718. tom. 2. opp. ably canvasses its force and meaning.

[7] De Musica, p. 1147. tom. 2. opp. Neither does Plutarch state this as his own opinion, but according to the sense of the Pythagoreans and other ancient philosophers, who he tells us taught as much.

[8] This dogma I have been unable to find in Plutarch.

* P. 199. [Ed. Morell.] † P. 210.

‡ P. 203. § P. 446. ‖ P. 201.

κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνευ θνητοῦ διδασκάλου καὶ μυσταγωγοῦ, "Concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially of that supreme Ruler over all, there is an opinion in all human kind, as well Barbarians as Greeks, that is naturally implanted in them as rational beings, and not derived from any mortal teacher." The meaning whereof is this, that men are naturally possessed with a persuasion, that there is one God, the supreme governor of the whole world, and that there are also below him, but above men, many other int[illegible] which these Pagans called gods.

That Galen was no[illegible] what his religion was, may plainly appear from t[illegible] out of his third book De Usu Partium, to omit [illegible] *Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως εἰ ἐπὶ πλέον τοιούτων μνημονεύοιμι [illegible] οἱ σωφρονοῦντες ὀρθῶς ἄν μοι μέμψοιντο, καὶ μια[illegible] λόγον, ὃν ἐγὼ τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος ἡμᾶς ὕμνον [illegible] θημι, καὶ νομίζω τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν ὄντως εὐσέβειαν· ο[illegible] κατόμβας αὐτῷ παμπόλλους καταθύσαιμι, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μυρία μύρα θυμιάσαιμι καὶ κασίας, ἀλλ' εἰ γνοίην μὲν αὐτὸς πρῶτος, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐξηγησαίμην, οἷος μέν ἐστι τὴν σοφίαν, οἷος δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, ὁποῖος δὲ τὴν χρηστότητα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐθέλειν κοσμεῖν ἅπαντα τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον κόσμον καὶ μηδενὶ φθονεῖν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τῆς τελεωτάτης χρηστότητος ἐγὼ δεῖγμα τίθεμαι· ταύτῃ μὲν ὡς ἀγαθὸς ἡμῖν ὑμνείσθω· τὸ δ' ὡς ἂν μάλιστα κοσμηθείη, πᾶν ἐξευρεῖν, ἄκρας σοφίας· τὸ δὲ καὶ δρᾶσαι πανθ', ὅσα προείλετο, δυνάμεως ἀηττήτου,* "Should I any longer insist upon such brutish persons as those, the wise and sober might justly condemn me, as defiling this holy oration, which I compose as a true hymn to the praise of him that made us; I conceiving true piety and religion towards God to consist in this, not that I should sacrifice many hecatombs, or burn much incense to him, but that I should myself first acknowledge, and then declare to others, how great his wisdom is, how great his power, and how great his goodness. For that he would adorn the whole world after this manner, envying to nothing that good, which it was capable of, I conclude to be a demonstration of most absolute goodness, and thus let him be praised by us as good. And that he was able to find out how all things might be adorned after the best manner, is a sign of the greatest wisdom in him. And lastly, to be able to effect and bring to pass all those things, which he had thus decreed, argues an insuperable power."

Maximus Tyrius, in the close of his first dissertation, gives us this short representation of his own theology: *Βούλομαι δέ σοι δεῖξαι τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρᾳ εἰκόνι. Ἐννόει μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἐρρωμένην, πρὸς μίαν ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἑκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς*

* P. 402. [Cap. 10. tom. 2. opp. edit. Basil.].

ἀρχῆς οὐκ Ἄλυν ποταμὸν, οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιῶτιν, οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ ὠκεανῷ ἠϊόνας, ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν τὸν μὲν ὑψοῦ, τὴν δ' ἔνερθεν· βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα, ὥσπερ νόμον παρεχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις, σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν, καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς, πολλοὺς μὲν ὁρατοὺς θεοὺς, πολλοὺς δε ἀφανεῖς· τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἱλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς καὶ βασιλεῖς συγγενεστάτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοὺς καὶ συνεστίους· τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι τοῦτων καταδεεστέρους· διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς, "I will now more plainly declare my sense by this similitude: Imagine in your mind a great and powerful kingdom or principality, in which all the rest freely and with one consent conspire to direct their actions, agreeably to the will and command of one supreme king, the oldest and the best: and then suppose the bounds and limits of this empire not to be the river Halys, nor the Hellespont, nor the Meotian lake, nor the shores of the ocean; but heaven above, and the earth beneath. Here then let that great king sit immoveable, prescribing laws to all his subjects, in which consists their safety and security: the consorts of his empire being many, both visible and invisible gods; some of which, that are nearest to him, and immediately attending on him, are in the highest royal dignity, feasting as it were at the same table with him: others again are their ministers and attendants; and a third sort, inferior to them both. And thus you see, how the order and chain of this government descends down by steps and degrees, from the supreme God to the earth and men." In which resemblance, we have a plain acknowledgment of one supreme God, the monarch of the whole world, and three subordinate ranks of inferior gods, as his ministers, in the government of the world; whom that writer there also calls, θεοὺς θεοῦ παῖδας καὶ φίλους, "gods, the sons and friends of God."

Aristides the famous Adrianean sophist and orator, in his first oration or hymn vowed to Jupiter, after he had escaped a great tempest, is so full to the purpose, that nothing can be more; he, after his proem, beginning thus: Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησε, καὶ Διός ἐστιν ἔργα ὅσα ἐστὶ πάντα, καὶ ποταμοὶ, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλαττα, καὶ οὐρανὸς· καὶ ὅσα τούτων μεταξὺ ἄνω, καὶ ὅσα ὑπὸ ταῦτα· καὶ θεοὶ καὶ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει, καὶ ὅσα εἰς ὄψιν ἀφικνεῖται, καὶ ὅσα δεῖ νοήσει λαβεῖν. Ἐποίησε δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· οὐ Κρήτης ἐν εὐώδεσιν ἄντροις τραφεὶς· οὐδ' ἐμέλλησεν αὐτὸν Κρόνος καταπιεῖν· οὐτ' ἀντ' ἐκείνου λίθον κατέπιεν, οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσε Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ μήποτε κινδυνεύσῃ· οὐδ' ἔστι πρεσβύτερον οὐδὲν Διός· οὐ μᾶλλόν γε ἢ υἱεῖς τε πατέρων πρεσβύτεροι γένοιτ' ἂν, καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα τῶν ποιοῦντων· ἀλλ' ὅδε ἐστὶ πρῶτος τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων· αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος· ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεὶ, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. Καὶ ὥσπερ τὴν

Ἀθηνᾶν ἄρα ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἔφυσε, καὶ γάμου οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη εἰς αὐτὴν, οὕτως ἔτι πρότερον αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐποίησε, καὶ οὐδὲν προσεδεήθη ἑτέρου εἰς τὸ εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον πάντα εἶναι ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι χρόνον εἰπεῖν. Οὔτε γὰρ χρόνος ἦν πω τότε, ὅτε μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδέν· δημιουργοῦ γὰρ ἔργον οὐδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον· οὕτω δὴ ἀρχὴ μὲν ἁπάντων Ζεὺς καὶ ἐκ Διὸς πάντα, ἅτε δὲ ὢν χρόνου τε κρείττων, καὶ οὐδένα ἔχων τὸν ἀντικόψοντα, αὐτός τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ὁ κόσμος ἦν, οὕτω ταχὺ πάντα ἐποίησε, ἐποίησε δὲ ὦ[illegible] r made all things, and all things whatsoever exis[illegible] f Jupiter; rivers, and earth, and sea, and heaven, a[illegible] ween these, and gods, and men and all animals, v[illegible] ceivable either by sense or by the mind. But Ju[illegible] made himself;* for he was not educated in the flo[illegible] rous caves of Crete, neither was Saturn ever about[illegible] nor instead of him did he swallow down a stone. [illegible] was never in danger, nor will he be ever in da[illegible] ing. Neither is there any thing older than Jupite[illegible] n there are sons older than their parents, or works than their opificers. But he is the first and the oldest, and the prince of all things, he being made from himself; nor can it be declared when he was made, for he was from the beginning, and ever will be his own father, and greater than to have been begotten from one another. As he produced Minerva from his brain, and needed no wedlock in order thereunto, so before this did he produce himself from himself, needing not the help of any other thing for his being. But, on the contrary, all things began to be from him, and no man can tell the time; since there was not then any time when there was nothing else besides, and no work can be older than the maker of it. Thus was Jupiter the beginning of all things, and all things were from Jupiter, who is better than time, which had its beginning together with the world." And again: Ὡς δὲ καὶ θεῶν ὅσα φῦλα ἀπορρόην τῆς Διὸς τοῦ πάντων πατρὸς δυνάμεως ἕκαστα ἔχει, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὴν Ὁμήρου σειρὰν, ἅπαντα εἰς αὐτὸν διήρτηται, καὶ πάντα ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξῆπται· ἔρωτά τε καὶ ἀνάγκην δύο τούτω συναγωγοτάτω καὶ ἰσχυροτάτω ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ἐγέννησεν, ὅπως αὐτὼ τὰ πάντα συνέχοιεν, &c. ἐποίει θεοὺς μὲν, ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητὰς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτὰς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας, &c. πάντα δὲ πανταχοῦ Διὸς μεστὰ, καὶ ἁπάντων θεῶν εὐεργεσίαι Διός εἰσιν ἔργον, &c. "All the several kinds of gods are but a defluxion and derivation from Jupiter; and, according to Homer's chain, all things are connected with him and depend upon him. He, amongst the first, produced love and necessity, two the most powerful holders of things together, that they might make all things firmly to cohere. He made gods to be the curators of

* How God was said to be self-made: See p. 405 and 406.

men, and he made men to be the worshippers and servers of those gods. All things are every where full of Jupiter, and the benefits of all the other gods are his work, and to be attributed to him, they being done in compliance with that order, which he had prescribed them."

It is certain, that all the latter philosophers after Christianity, whether Platonists or Peripatetics, though for the most part they asserted the eternity of the world, yet universally agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, the cause of the whole world, and of all the other gods. And as Numenius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Proclus, Damascius, and others, held also a trinity of divine hypostases, so had some of those philosophers excellent speculations concerning the Deity, as particularly Plotinus;* who notwithstanding that he derived matter and all things from one divine principle, yet was a contender for many gods. Thus in his book inscribed against the Gnostics: Χρὴ ὡς ἄριστον μὲν αὐτὸν πειρᾶσθαι γίνεσθαι, μὴ μόνον δὲ αὐτὸν νομίζειν ἄριστον δύνασθαι γενέσθαι, οὕτω γὰρ οὔπω ἄριστος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἄλλους ἀριστους, ἔτι καὶ δαίμονας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον θεοὺς, τούς τε ἐν τῷ δὲ ὄντας κἀκεῖ βλέποντας· πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν μακαριωτάτην· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἤδη καὶ τοὺς νοητοὺς ὑμνεῖν θεοὺς, ὑφ' ἅπασι δὲ ἤδη τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἐκεῖ βασιλέα· καὶ ἐν τῷ πλήθει μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν τὸ μέγα αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνύμενον. Οὐ γὰρ τὸ συστεῖλαι εἰς ἕν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δεῖξαι πολὺ τὸ θεῖον, ὅσον ἔδειξεν αὐτὸς, τουτέστι δύναμιν θεοῦ εἰδότων, ὅταν μένων, ὅς ἐστι, πολλοὺς ποιῇ, πάντας εἰς αὐτὸν ἀνηρτημένους, καὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου ὄντας· καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅδε δι' ἐκεῖνόν ἐστι, κἀκεῖ βλέπει καὶ πᾶς καὶ θεῶν ἕκαστος, "Every man ought to endeavour with all his might, to become as good as may be, but yet not to think himself to be the only thing that is good, but that there are also other good men in the world, and good demons, but much more gods; who, though inhabiting this inferior world, yet look up to that superior; and most of all, the prince of this universe, that most happy soul. From whence he ought to ascend yet higher, and to praise those intelligible gods, but above all that great King and Monarch; declaring his greatness and majesty by the multitude of gods which are under him. For this is not the part of them, who know the power of God, to contract all into one, but to show forth all that divinity, which himself hath displayed, who remaining one, makes many depending on him; which are by him and from him. For this whole world is by him, and looks up perpetually to him, as also doth every one of the gods in it." And Themistius, the Peripatetic (who was so far from being a Christian, that, as Petavius probably conjectures, he perstringes

* En. 2. lib. 9. c. 9. [P. 207.]

our Saviour Christ under the name of Empedocles, for making himself a God) doth not only affirm, that one and the same supreme God was worshipped by Pagans, and the Christians, and all nations, though in different manners; but also, that God was delighted with this variety of religions:* *Ταύτῃ νόμιζέ γάννυσθαι τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σύρους ἐθέλει πολιτεύεσθαι, ἄλλως Ἕλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους, καὶ οὐδ' αὐτοὺς Σύρους ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἤδη κατακεκερμάτισται εἰς μικρά,* "The author and prince of [illegible] ns to be delighted with this variety of worship; h[illegible] e Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks anot[illegible] yptians another; neither do the Syrians (or Chris[illegible] s all agree, they being subdivided into many se[illegible]

We shall conclud[illegible] this full testimony of St. Cyril,† in his first bo[illegible] n: *Ἅπασιν ἐναργὲς, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς τὰ Ἑλλήνων φι[illegible] ιν, ἕνα μὲν ἐδόκει Θεὸν εἶναι συνομολογεῖν, τὸν τῶ[illegible] ργὸν, καὶ πάντων ἐπέκεινα κατὰ φύσιν, πεποιῆσθαι [illegible] καὶ παρῆχθαι πρὸς γένεσιν ἑτέρους τινὰς θεοὺς, κατάφασιν αὐτοὶ, νοητούς τε καὶ αἰσθητούς,* "It is manifest to all, that amongst those, who philosophize in the Greek way, it is universally acknowledged, that there is one God, the maker of the universe, and who is by nature above all things; but that there have been made by him, and produced into generation, certain other gods (as they call them) both intelligible and sensible."[10]

* Orat. 12. [P. 156. edit. Harduini.]

[9] These are not the Greek words of Themistius, but of Dan. Petavius. Andr. Dudithius published a Latin version of this twelfth oration of Themistius. But since that time, by some chance or other, the Greek copy was entirely lost, and neither Petavius nor Harduinus, with all their diligence, could meet with it. Hence Petavius, in his edition of Themistius, endeavoured to supply the loss by translating Dudithius' version into Greek.

† P. 23.

[10] Dr. Cudworth is neither the first nor the only one, who has endeavoured to prove, that one supreme God was worshipped by most of the Grecian philosophers distinguished for zeal in the cause of truth; although probably he has surpassed all, who have touched upon this argument, in the number and variety of testimonies. In the first place, all those who in the early ages of Christianity wrote apologies in defence of the truth of our holy religion against the Pagans, fancied themselves able to show, that the most eminent philosophers, like the Christians, had professed one Parent and Lord of all things. I am aware, indeed, that they were not always successful in their attempts, and that not a few were reluctantly dragged by them into this society of worshippers of one God, whom it would have been much better to rank among Atheists; nevertheless, that their object was the same as that of Dr. Cudworth is unquestionable. Of the Greeks, see Clemens Alexandr. both throughout his Stromata, and in his Cohortat. ad Gentes, cap. 6. p. 59. &c. Athenagoras, Apologia pro Christian. cap. 6. p. 22. &c. p. 27. &c. Theophilus Antioch. lib. 2. ad Autolycum, cap. 57. p. 263. and lib. 3. cap. 2. p. 268. Cyrillus Alexandr. lib. 1. contra Julian. p. 26. Justin Martyr, Cohortat. ad Gentes, p. 15. Of the Latins, Tertullian, Apologetic. cap. 24. p. 235. Minucius Felix, Octavius, cap. 19. p. 174. Arnobius, lib. 1. adv. Gentes, p. 21. &c. and others whom it is unnecessary to enumerate. In more modern times, and prior to Dr. Cudworth, besides Steuchus, Mornæus, Grotius, and others, who have undertaken the championship of the Christian religion, an acute theologian of our own church, Jac. Martini, in Exercitat. Metaphysic. published at Witteb. 1608. 8. has

XXVII. Neither was this the opinion of philosophers and learned men only amongst the Pagans, but even of the vulgar also. Not that we pretend to give an account of all the most

with great erudition and copiousness expounded the opinions of philosophers concerning one God. To whom may be added, Elias Schedius, who De Diis Germanis, p. 291. has written a very long, but verbose rather than accurate commentary on the agreement of nations in the worship of one God; also Mic. Mourgues, Plan Theologique du Pythagorisme, tom. 1. lettr. 1. p. 2. &c. Since Dr. Cudworth's time much care and labour have been bestowed upon this argument by Tobias Pfanner in his Systema Theologiæ Gentil. Purioris, cap. 2. sect. 1. &c. p. 34. &c. with whom may be joined Pet. Dan. Huet, who gives us a neat and comprehensive analysis of all that has been advanced upon the subject by others, Quæstiones Alnetanæ de Concordia Rationis et Fidei, lib. 2. cap. 2. sect. 11. p. 84. &c. I pass over Dr. Cudworth's countryman, Ed. Herbert of Cherbury, who is altogether bent upon showing, that the whole of the ancients who worshipped many gods acknowledged at the same time the one supreme God professed by us Christians, De Religione Gentilium, cap. 13. p. 214. and cap. 15. p. 248. And such was the view generally entertained in former times. But when in the last generation, or so, the doctrines of the ancient philosophers began to be more minutely inquired into, numbers started up, eminent for ability and erudition, who held all such labour to be vain and futile, and maintained that the sayings brought forward from these philosophers concerning one God, were to be understood either of the sun, or of the soul of the world, or of the whole nature of things, and consequently that most of those who were held forth as professing one God, were to be classed with Atheists rather than with Christians and the rational worshippers of a supreme Being. Prior to the publication of Dr. Cudworth's work, Dr. Sam. Parker, Bishop of Oxford. is the first that I know of, who professedly entered upon this argument, in his Tentamina Physico. Theologica de Deo, Lond. 1665. 4. in lib. 2. cap. 1. and 2. p. 181. of which he undertakes to prove: Gentilium de Deo placita perperam ad supremum, quem colimus, Deum traduci; sed aut de sole, aut de anima mundi, quæ suprema omnium Numina esse censuerunt, intelligi oportere, "That the dogmas of the Pagans concerning God are erroneously referred to the God, whom we worship; and ought to be understood either of the sun or the soul of the world, which they regarded as the supreme deities of all." Nor can it be denied, that his disputation is characterized by much ingenuity and acumen. But the same argument has in our own times been handled with still greater subtlety and eloquence by Mons. Bayle, who, in his Histor. and Crit. Dictionary, as well as in other writings, contends, that the most eminent philosophers of antiquity, whom others have confidently ranked among the worshippers of one God, are to be classed rather with the partisans of Spinoza, and that properly speaking none, or at the most but a very small portion of them acknowledged one supreme Deity. See his Response aux Questions d' un Provincial, tom. 2. cap. 107. p. 415. and Continuation des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 1. p. 116. 118. 331. and tom. 2. p. 495. And the opinion of this most able critic, widely diffused as it is at the present day, has led a great many writers of the highest standing in the learned world to brand almost all the ancient philosophers, even those hitherto singled out for their supposed piety, with the stigma of atheism, and to consider nearly the whole of those, who have spoken of one principle of things, as having been imbued with the insane principles of Spinoza. I have already frequently touched upon this subject, and have freely declared my sentiments on some of those philosophers, whose religion has of late been called in question. I shall now merely canvass the arguments brought forward against our author by Mons. Bayle; who, however, did not make use of the English work itself, but founded his criticisms upon the portions extracted from it by J. Le Clerc, in tom. 2. of the Biblioth. Choisie, p. 63. &c. In general, he charges Dr. Cudworth with want of selection in his testimonies, Continuat. des Pensées sur les Cometes, tom. 1. p. 333. and 335. and with having drawn to his own side many dicta of the ancients, which, if their real meaning be strictly attended to, are altogether repugnant to the doctrine of one supreme God, ibid. p. 336. Which accusation, it must be owned, is not wholly destitute of truth; as we have sufficiently shown in our own observations upon this book, and upon the various passages of ancient authors, which are quoted in it. On the other hand, however, it abounds with much excellent argument; nor is it surprising, that in such a multitude of testimonies the able and erudite author should

sottish vulgar amongst them, who, as they little considered their religion, so probably did they not understand that mystery of the pagan theology (hereafter to be declared) that many of their

sometimes have attended to the words rather than to their meaning; more especially as he seems to have cited not a few of the passages from memory. And who, I ask, possesses such strength of intellect and memory, as to be able at once to refer all that he has met with in ancient authors to their respective sources, and thence to decide upon their true sense. We ought not to look at occasional errors, but rather to feel a deep sense of gratitude towards the illustrious scholar, who has supplied us with so rich a collection of passages; from which the opinions of the early philosophers concerning God can for the most part be sufficiently ascertained.

In particular, Bayle, I. denies Dr. Cudworth to be right in ranking the Egyptians among the worshippers of a supreme Deity; which he tells us is at variance with the authority of Diodorus Siculus, who testifies, that this nation was addicted to the foulest superstitions, ibid. p. 332. This controversy may, I think, be easily decided by reference to our own copious disputation above, on the religion of the Egyptians. II. He considers, that Pythagoras is to be excepted from this class, because that philosopher held God to be the soul of the world, and the soul of the world is not any thing one and simple, but a nature compounded of various parts, ibid. p. 333. Here, however, the ingenious critic is lacking either in candour or perspicacity; as will be made appear by and by. He blends and confounds two ideas, which ought by no means to be confounded. III. He asserts the same of Xenophanes Parmenides, who he maintains were no better than Spinoza. ibid. p. 334. &c. Upon these we have already declared our opinion. IV. He is astonished most of all, p. 334. that the Romans, especially Varro and Pliny, should be numbered among those, who professed the existence of one God; for both these acknowledged no other God but the soul of the world and this whole universe of things, in which no unity, properly so called, exists. This, in the case of Varro, he intimates, is openly avowed by St. Augustine. On Pliny he adds nothing further; but it is obvious that the acute writer meant the elder Pliny, whereas Dr. Cudworth speaks of the younger Pliny, the author of the Panegyric on Trajan. V. The Stoics, he admits, may with great semblance of truth be ranked among the worshippers of one God, sect. 67. p. 378. &c. although it will be evident, he adds, if all things be duly considered, that this god of the Stoics consisted of innumerable parts, and therefore cannot truly and properly be called one. The same he affirms respecting the god of Hippocrates. Not even the Platonists, VI. will he allow to be ranked among the professors of one God, sect. 68. p. 342. For, 1. The junior Platonists, who existed subsequently to the birth of our Saviour, profited by the reading of Christian books, and copied the words as well as the doctrines of Christianity. 2. If we attentively examine, in all its parts, the doctrines of Plotinus, Proclus, and others of their class, on God and religion, nothing can possibly be more monstrous and absurd. 3. Not even Plato himself had any clear and comprehensive idea of a supreme God; which is proved by him upon the authority of Gassendi. The two last of these observations we shall canvass by and by, when we come to a general explication of this question. As respects the first, I should not deny its truth, nor suppose, that the opinions either of Plato or of the other ancient philosophers, can be learnt from the dogmas of the junior Platonists. To declare my own sentiments, indeed, Dr. Cudworth has unquestionably attached too much importance to this sect. The disputes carried on by the Christians against their pagan opponents caused philosophers to adopt much more rational views, than they had entertained before, and to combine and reconcile in some measure the doctrines of one and many gods. The manner in which this was done has been set forth by no one more elegantly, than by the erudite author of the Recognitions of Clement; who, lib. 5. sect. 19. p. 551. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. explains the opinion of most of the philosophers of his time in the following words: Unum esse et nos dicimus Deum, qui est omnium dominus: sed et isti Dii sunt. Sicut enim unus est Cæsar, et habet sub se multos judices: . . . simili arbitramur modo, quum unus sit major omnium Deus, etiam istos ad similitudinem earum, quas diximus, potestatum ordinatos esse in hoc mundo Deos, illi quidem majori subjectos, nos tamen, et quæ in hoc mundo sunt, dispensantes, " We also say, that there is one God, who is lord of all: but these also are gods. For as there is one Cæsar, who has many judges under him . . . . so we suppose, there being one God

gods were nothing but several names and notions of one supreme Deity, according to its various manifestations and effects; but because, as we conceive, this tradition of one supreme God did run current amongst the generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans at least, whether learned or unlearned. For we cannot make a better judgment concerning the vulgar and generality of the ancient Pagans, than from the poets and mythologists, who were the chief instructors of them. Thus Aristotle, in his Politics, writing of music, judgeth of men's opinions concerning the gods from the poets: Σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἣν ἔχωμεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν, οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ᾄδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιη-

supreme over all, that these gods also are appointed in this world after the manner of those authorities we have mentioned, subject indeed to that supreme God, but governing and administering us and every thing in this world." Thus were they compelled to speak by the force of that truth, to which the Christians were devoted. But these principles are altogether foreign to those, who lived before the Christian era. Lastly, VII. He denies also, that Heraclitus belongs to this class; and after explaining his doctrine according to the view of G. Olearius, concludes, that the god of this philosopher was not one simple nature, but a combination of various and distinct natures, tom. 2. ibid. sect. 105. p. 495.—Such are the arguments advanced by Bayle in opposition to our author; and although some of them, as we have already acknowledged, are not entirely destitute of force, still the greater part have not the slightest bearing upon the question. For Bayle plays upon the ambiguity of the words *one* and *unity*, and attaches to them a more extensive meaning, than is intended by Dr. Cudworth. The latter opposes what he calls *unity* to *multitude*, and undertakes to prove merely, that most of the philosophers, although otherwise worshipping many gods, nevertheless referred all things to one fountain and cause. But he does not contend, that all these philosophers entertained such exalted notions of this one principle and one cause of all things, as to leave no room for censure. He is satisfied with maintaining, that the generality of them acknowledged one supreme God; but, whether they taught correctly or otherwise concerning this God, he leaves undetermined; nor does he take upon himself to prove, that nothing can be deduced from their precepts, except what is sound and consistent. On the contrary, Bayle opposes to the word *unity* not only *multitude*, but *composition* also, and confounds two notions, which in my opinion he ought to have kept distinct, namely, *simplicity* and *unity*. This I shall prove from his own words, ibid. tom. 1. sect. 66. p. 335. Quel est l' etat de la question lorsqu' on veut philosopher touchant *l' Unite* de Dieu? C' est de savoir s'il y a une Intelligence parfaitement *simple*, totalement distinguée de la matiere et de la forme du monde et productrice de toutes choses, "What is the state of the question, if we wish to philosophize concerning the *unity* of God? It is to know, whether there is an Intelligence perfectly *simple*, totally distinct from the matter and form of the world, and the Creator of all things." Unity, therefore, according to him, comprises also simplicity and freedom from all corporeal concretion whatever. Wherefore, if this definition is to be admitted, which I think will be done by few, no one can be said to profess one God, unless he concedes the same to be most simple and altogether removed from all contagion of matter. To which rule if the precepts of ancient philosophy respecting God are to be reduced, I should neither feel disposed to defend Pythagoras, nor Parmenides, nor the Stoics, nor even Plato and Socrates. But Dr. Cudworth meant no such definition of unity, and therefore cannot justly be reprehended for having reckoned not a few among the worshippers of one God, who nevertheless supposed his nature to be in a certain measure corporeal or compounded of parts. I speak not of its being inconsistent with the part of a wise man, to charge the dead with inferences, which, most likely, if living, they would have altogether repudiated. But such is the wont of this most acute writer; he confounds all things, separates and combines, as his fancy leads him, changes the significations of words, puts his own interpretations upon the precepts of the ancients; in short, grasps at every thing that offers, and adorns it with no ordinary eloquence, in order to gain his own point, and to render that probable, which he wishes to appear so.

ταις,* "We may learn what opinion men have concerning the gods from hence, because the poets never bring in Jupiter singing or playing upon an instrument." Now we have already proved from sundry testimonies of the poets, that (however they were depravers of the pagan religion, yet) they kept up this tradition of one supreme Deity, one king and father of gods: to which testimonies many more might have been added, as of Seneca the tragedian, Statius, Lucan, Silius Italicus, Persius, and Martial, but that [illegible] ed them, to avoid tediousness. Wherefore we [illegible] ntent ourselves only to set down this affirmation [illegible] omus, concerning the theology of the poets: Οὗ [illegible] ς οἱ ποιηταὶ κατὰ ταῦτα, τὸν πρῶτον καὶ μέγιστον [illegible] λοῦσι συλλήβδην ἅπαντος τοῦ λογικοῦ γένους, κ [illegible] ία· οἷς πειθόμενοι οἱ ἄνθρωποι Διὸς βασιλέως [illegible] ς· καὶ δὴ καὶ πατέρα αὐτὸν οὐκ ὀκνοῦσι προσαγ [illegible] χαῖς,† "All the poets call the first and greatest [illegible] universally, of all the rational kind; as also th [illegible] Agreeably with which of the poets, do men erect altars to Jupiter king, and stick not to call him father in their devotions."

Moreover, Aristotle himself hath recorded this in his Politics:[1] Πάντες λέγουσι θεοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι, "That all men affirmed the gods to be under a kingly power;" or, "That there is one supreme King and Monarch over the gods." And Maximus Tyrius declareth, that as well the unlearned as the learned, throughout the whole pagan world, universally agreed in this, that there was one supreme God, the father of all the other gods:‡ Εἰ συναγαγὼν ἐκκλησίαν τῶν τεχνῶν τούτων, κελεύεις ἅπαντας ἀθρόους διὰ ψηφίσματος ἑνὸς ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, οὐδεὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν τὸν γραφέα εἰπεῖν, ἄλλο δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν, καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄλλο; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὰ Δία τὸν Σκύθην, οὐδὲ τὸν Ἕλληνα, οὐδὲ τὸν Πέρσην, ἢ τὸν Ὑπερβόρειον· ἀλλὰ ἴδοις ἂν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλα, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα ψηφιζομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, πάντας δὲ πᾶσι διαφερομένους· οὐ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, οὐ τὸ κακὸν ὅμοιον, οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐ τὸ καλὸν· νόμος μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ δίκη ἄνω καὶ κάτω φέρεται διασπώμενα καὶ σπαρασσόμενα· μὴ γὰρ ὅτι γένος γένει ὁμολογεῖ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πόλις πόλει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἶκος οἴκῳ, οὐδὲ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ, οὐδὲ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· ἐν τοσούτῳ δὲ πολέμῳ καὶ στάσει καὶ διαφωνίᾳ, ἕνα ἴδοις ἂν ἐν πάσῃ γῇ ὁμόφωνον νόμον καὶ λόγον, ὅτι ΘΕΟΣ ΕΙΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΗΡ, καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες, συνάρχοντες θεῷ· ταῦτα δὲ ὁ Ἕλλην λέγει καὶ ὁ Βάρβαρος λέγει, καὶ ὁ ἠπειρώτης, καὶ ὁ θαλάττιος, καὶ ὁ σοφὸς, καὶ ὁ ἄσοφος, "If there were a meeting called of all these several

* Lib. 8. c. 5. [P. 607. tom. 3. opp.]
[1] Lib. 4. cap. 15. p. 510. tom. 3. opp.
† Orat. 36. p. 447.
‡ Diss. 1. p. 4. 5.

trades and professions, a painter, a statuary, a poet, and a philosopher, and all of them were required to declare their sense concerning God, do you think, that the painter would say one thing, the statuary another, the poet another, and the philosopher another? No nor the Scythian neither, nor the Greek, nor the Hyperborean. In other things we find men speaking very discordantly to one another, all men as it were differing from all. The same thing is not good to all nor evil, honest nor dishonest. For law and justice itself are different every where; and not only one nation doth not agree with another therein, but also not one city with another city, nor one house with another house, nor one man with another man, nor lastly any one man with himself. Nevertheless, in this so great war, contention, and discord, you may find every where throughout the whole world, one agreeing law and opinion, That THERE IS ONE GOD THE KING AND FATHER OF ALL, and many gods, the sons of God, co-reigners together with God. These things both the Greek and the barbarian alike affirm, both the inhabitants of the continent and of the sea-coast, both the wise and the unwise." Nothing can be more full than this testimony of Maximus Tyrius, that the generality of the pagan world, as well vulgar and illiterate as wise and learned, did agree in this, that there was one supreme God, the creator and governor of all. And to the same purpose was that other testimony before cited out of Dio Chrysostomus:* Περὶ δὲ θεῶν τῆς τε καθόλου φύσεως, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ πάντων ἡγεμόνος, δόξα καὶ ἐπίνοια κοινὴ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, ὁμοίως δὲ Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ Βαρβάρων, &c. "That concerning the nature of the gods in general, but especially concerning that prince of all things, there was one agreeing persuasion in the minds of all mankind, as well barbarians as Greeks." Where Dio plainly intimates also, that there was a more universal consent of nations in the belief of one God, than of many gods.[2]

* Orat. 12. p. 201.

[2] That the vulgar and generality of the Greek and Latin Pagans worshipped one supreme God, the parent of the whole universe, can be proved, the learned Doctor thinks, by the twofold authority of the poets and of certain philosophers and rhetoricians. But I fear, that in reality there is less weight in either towards determining this question, than may at first sight appear. I. The popular sentiments concerning God and religion may, I admit, be ascertained from the poets: not that I suppose the people to have received their religion from the poets, a view adopted by many learned men, whom I have already answered in another place; but, on the contrary, that the latter embodied in verse the current traditions handed down by the priests, and by the charms of poetry contributed towards strengthening and perpetuating the popular superstition. The supreme God, Jupiter, of whom they sing, as I have already shown from Homer and Hesiod, is the son of Saturn, and boasts no higher origin than the rest of the gods, who according to the poets were all descendants of Chaos or Oceanus, the same as men. He holds the supreme and sovereign power, not, as has already been made appear, by the law of nature, but partly by force and partly by the favour of the other deities. Of one supreme God, therefore, the parent and creator of all

It hath been already observed, that the several pagan nations had vulgarly their peculiar proper names for the one supreme God. For as the Greeks called him Zeus or Zen, the Latins Jupiter or Jovis, so did the Egyptians, Africans, and Arabians, Hammon. Which Hammon therefore was called by the Greeks the Zeus of the Africans, and by the Latins their Jupiter. Whence is that in Cicero's De Natura Deorum:[3] Jovis Capitolini nobis alia species, alia Afris Ammonis Jovis, "The form of the Capitoline Jupite ns is different from that of Jupiter Ammon with The name of the Scythian Jupiter also, as Her , was Pappæus, or father. The Persians likewis ὺς πατρῷος, as Xenophon styles him, their cou upiter (namely Mithras or Oromasdes) who in phon is distinguished from the sun, and called amation in the Scripture: "The Lord God of d given him all the kingdoms of the earth." ylonian Bel is declared by Berosus (a priest of [illegible] to have been that God who was the maker of heaven and earth. And learned men conceive, that

things, and secrete from matter, the poets subsequent to Homer and Hesiod seem not to have had the remotest conception; and if any thing be met with in their writings, which apparently evinces the contrary, still it is presently followed by something else, from which we may easily learn, that those are very much deceived, who interpret their magnificent phrases according to our own notions, and estimate poetical figures by the rules of prose. Take, for example, Petronius, Satyricon, cap. 122. p. 580. ed Burmanni. In this poet, Cæsar addresses Jupiter as follows:

> Jupiter omnipotens, et tu Saturnia tellus,
> Armis læta meis.

Now if these words be considered in themselves and the term *omnipotens* be understood in the stricter and Christian sense, the poet will appear to have entertained a sublime conception of God, and to have placed a being of infinite power over the nature of things. But on proceeding with our perusal, we soon find that a very qualified meaning is to be attached to this epithet, and that the poet's language is more exalted than his opinions. For this omnipotent Jupiter is alarmed and terrified at Pompey's triumphs, cap. 123. p. 589.

> Et piratarum scopulos: modo quem ter ovantem
> *Jupiter horruerat.*

II. Rhetoricians and philosophers I consider to be very unsafe authorities, in a dispute respecting the religion of the common people. For they are accustomed to supply their own interpretations and to measure the popular capacity by their own. Besides, what should compel us immediately to accept every thing recorded by Dio and Maximus as true? The latter indeed tells us, that the whole world agreed in the profession of one supreme God: but it still remains a question, whether in making this statement he strictly conformed to the truth, or indulged more than he ought in rhetorical exaggeration. I pass over other things tending greatly to weaken the force of such like testimonies.

[3] Lib. 1. cap. 29. p. 2923. tom. 9. opp. The utmost that can be inferred, however, from this passage is, that the Romans regarded the Hammon of the Egyptians and the Jupiter of the Greeks as one and the same God, but it does not prove, that these were not in reality two distinct deities. The Romans were accustomed to designate the principal god of other nations by the name of Jupiter. But this very difference in form between Hammon and Jupiter might of itself have convinced them, that it was wrong to confound the two together as one Deity.

Baal (which is the same with Bel, and signifies Lord) was first amongst the Phœnicians also a name for the supreme God, the Creator of heaven and earth, sometimes called Beel samen, "The Lord of heaven." As likewise that Molech, which signifies "king," was, amongst the Ammonites, "the king of their gods;" and that Marnas, the chief god of the Gazites, who were Philistines, and signifying "the Lord of men," was that from whence the Cretians derived their Jupiter, called "the Father of gods and men."[4]

Origen[5] indeed contended, that it was not lawful for Christians to call the supreme God by any of those pagan names, and probably for these reasons, because those names were then frequently bestowed upon idols, and because they were contaminated and defiled by absurd and impure fables. Nevertheless, that learned father does acknowledge the Pagans to have meant τὸν θεὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν, "the God over all," by those several names: which yet Lactantius Firmianus would by no means allow of as to the Roman Jupiter, worshipped in the capitol, he endeavouring to confute it after this manner: Vana est persuasio eorum qui nomen Jovis summo Deo tribuunt. Solent enim quidam errores suos hac excusatione defendere; qui convicti de uno Deo, cum id negare non possunt, ipsum colere affirmant, verum hoc sibi placere, ut Jupiter nominetur, quo quid absurdius? Jupiter enim sine contubernio conjugis filiæque coli non solet. Unde, quid sit, apparet, nec fas est id nomen eo transferri, ubi nec Minerva est ulla nec Juno,* "It is a vain persuasion of those, who would give the name of Jupiter to the supreme God. For some are wont thus to excuse their errors, when they have been convinced of one God, so as that they could not contradict it, by saying, that themselves worshipped him, he being called by them Jupiter: than which, what can be more absurd? since Jupiter is not worshipped without the partnership of his wife and daughter. From whence it plainly appears what this Jupiter is, and that the name ought not to be transferred thither, where there is neither any Minerva, nor Juno." The ground of which

[4] Having already treated sufficiently of all these names of God, and having at the same time pointed out the passages of the several authors here quoted, I have now nothing farther to offer. Indeed, I should readily admit, that the several nations had some peculiar name for the deity which they respectively held to be supreme. But this by no means induces me to suppose, that they all agreed in the belief of one God, from whom all the other deities had derived their power and who was the object of universal worship. For the history of the gods, to whom these names were applied, clearly shows, that they were popular and ancestral gods, and, moreover, that they were men exalted to heaven by the suffrages of the people; not to mention, that the Greeks as well as Romans gave the names of their own deities to those of other nations, and thereby occasioned a mighty confusion of gods. But I am unwilling to dwell here upon an argument, which I have already more than once touched upon at considerable length.

[5] Contra Celsum, lib. 1. p. 18.

* Lib. 1. cap. 11. p. 76.

argumentation of Lactantius was this,[6] because the great Capitoline temple of Jupiter had three Sacella or lesser chapels in it, all contained under one roof, Jupiter's in the middle, Minerva's on the right hand, and Juno's on the left; according to that of the poet:

Trina in Tarpeio fulgent consortia templo.

Which Juno, according to the poetic theology, is said to be the wife of Jupiter, his daughter, begotten not upon Juno, but from ı. Where it is plain, that there is a certain mix hical or poetical theology, together with the nat every where else there was, to make up that civil ıe Pagans. But here (according to the more r ane doctrine of the Pagans) these three Capitolin Minerva, and Juno, as well as some others, may b have been nothing else but several names and no preme Deity, according to its several attributes and manifestations; Jupiter signifying the divine power and sovereignty, as it were seated and enthroned in the heavens; Minerva, the divine wisdom and understanding; and Juno, the same deity, acting in these lower parts of the world. Unless we would rather, with Macrobius,[7] physiologize them all three, and make Minerva to be the higher heaven, Jupiter the middle ether, and Juno the lower air and earth, all animated; that is, one god, as acting differently in these three regions of the world. Which yet seems not so congruous, because it would place Minerva above Jupiter.[8]

[6] See a copious discussion of this subject by Just. Ryquius, De Capitolio, cap. 13. p. 158, &c.

[7] Saturnal. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 391, 392.

[8] I. This very difference of opinion respecting these three deities, ought to have convinced the learned Doctor, that all such explications of the ancient religions were spurious, and invented at a later period by the more sagacious, for the mere purpose of concealing in some measure the turpitude and deformity of the public worship. We have eight or nine, if not more, opinions upon the hidden signification of these three capitoline gods; and which of them is to be preferred to the others is what no one can positively assert, who is guided by reason and not by a delusive imagination. It is clear therefore, that they are all destitute of foundation, and were concocted by men, who wished to accommodate the popular religions to the maxims of their own philosophy. But why many words? The temples, priests, ceremonies, and histories of the gods we are speaking of, at once refute every thing of the sort that has yet been put forward. In my opinion the history of ancient religions will be altogether done away with, unless we carefully distinguish them from the new interpretations of the philosophers and priests, especially those which were propounded subsequently to the Christian era. II. The learned Doctor, in his partiality for his own opinion, gives a greater latitude of meaning to Macrobius' words, than they will bear. For this author does not say, that the three names of Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno designate one God as exercising his power in different ways. III. As to his rejecting Macrobius' opinion on account of its placing Minerva above Jupiter, this I should consider of no importance, provided it were unobjectionable in other respects. For that Minerva occupied a more honourable position in the Capitol, or was on the right hand of Jupiter, while Juno held a lower place, is unquestionable. See Ryquius, De Capitolio, cap. 13. p. 158.

Nevertheless, it may justly be suspected, as G. I. Vossius[9] hath already observed, that there was yet some higher and more sacred mystery in this Capitoline trinity, aimed at; namely, a trinity of divine hypostases. For these three Roman or Capitoline gods were said to have been first brought into Italy out of Phrygia by the Trojans, but before that into Phrygia by Dardanus, out of the Samothracian island; and that within eight hundred years after the Noachian flood, if we may believe Eusebius. And as these were called by the Latins Dii Penates, which Macrobius thus interprets,[10] Dii per quos penitus spiramus, per quos habemus corpus, per quos rationem animi possidemus, that is, "the gods, by whom we live, and move, and have our being;" but Varro, in Arnobius,[1] Dii, qui sunt intrinsecus, atque in intimis penetralibus cœli, "the gods, who are in the most inward recesses of heaven:" so were they called by the Samothracians, Κάβειροι, Cabiri, that is, as Varro[2] rightly interprets the word, θεοὶ δυνατοὶ, or divi potes, "the powerful and mighty gods." Which Cabiri being plainly the Hebrew כבירים, gives just occasion to suspect that this ancient tradition of three divine hypostases (unquestionably entertained by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato amongst the Greeks, and probably by the Egyptians and Persians) sprung originally from the Hebrews; the first of these divine hypostases, called Jove, being the fountain of the godhead; and the second of them, called by the Latins Minerva, (which, as Varro[3] interprets it, was that wherein ideæ et exempla rerum, "the ideas and first exemplars or patterns of things" were contained) fitly expressing the divine Logos; and

Gerh. J. Vossius, De Theolog. Gentili, lib. 8. cap. 12. p. 751. Men versed in these matters are very diligent in inquiring, why the Romans preferred the daughter of Jupiter before his wife and gave her a higher place, and divine I know not what recondite and mystical reasons for this custom. But to myself the question appears to admit of very easy explication. For, in the first place, this goddess was a portion, as it were, of Jupiter himself, as having been produced from his brain, and therefore more noble than Juno: secondly, she was also more powerful, because like her father she was armed with the thunder, which she could at pleasure hurl against her enemies: which power Juno lacked. Virgil says of Minerva, Æneid, lib. 1. v. 46,

Ipsa Jovis rapidum jaculata a nubibus ignem.

[9] De Theolog. Gentili, lib. 8. cap. 12. p. 750. 751.

[10] Saturnal. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 391. But it ought to have been added, that with Macrobius these gods by whom we breathe and reason, are no other than the three regions of the air which encompasses this globe, the highest, middle, and lowest. Which opinion makes strongly against those, who employ this testimony of his in order to discover a trinity in the Dii Penates.

[1] Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 155. But Varro subjoins what ought not to be overlooked: horum Deorum Penatum nec numerum nec nomina sciri, "that neither the number nor names of these household gods are known."

[2] De Ling. Latin. lib. 4. p. 66.

[3] He means no doubt the passage of Varro, preserved by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 7. cap. 28. p. 141. tom. 7. opp. in which he tells us he has discovered that Jupiter signifies heaven, Juno the earth, and Minerva ideas.

the third Juno, called amor ac delicium Jovis,* well enough answering (as Vossius thinks) to the divine Spirit.[4]

But Lactantius hath yet another objection against the Roman

[4] I have no hesitation, however, in pronouncing this opinion of Vossius and Dr. Cudworth concerning the three Capitoline gods, Jupiter, Minerva, and Juno, to be palpably untrue; nor should I ever persuade myself to seek for traces of the divine Trinity in such matters. I shall say nothing of the history of these deities, which puts it beyond all controversy, that Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva were human beings, whom superstition had placed among the gods: but shall merely make a remark or two on the matter itself, to show the fallacy of such surmises. I. The reason, why the Romans associated these three deities together, is not very difficult to understand. That Jupiter and Juno should be associated, will surprise no one, the wife being meet society for the husband. It remains, therefore, to show, why Minerva alone of the rest of the deities was joined with these two. But to any one, who considers that Minerva was the darling offspring and the noblest portion of Jupiter, as being sprung from his brain, it will not appear strange, that she should be placed along with Juno by the side of her parent, in preference to all the other gods. For what, I ask, is there of mystery or singularity in a beloved and, properly speaking, only daughter, being assigned as a companion to her father. II. That these three may have been the images of three gods, I should admit; but how Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva can be the images of three persons in one godhead, let those make appear, who take delight in such conjectures. It was the universal belief of the ancient Greeks and Romans, that they were three separate and wholly distinct, but at the same time unequal, natures; nor is there the slightest vestige of any one's having held the same opinion respecting these deities, as Christians entertain in regard to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Wherefore, if Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva be the remnants of a Trinity, imported in some way or other from the Hebrews into Phrygia, Samothrace, Greece, and Rome, it will be reasonable to suppose, that the Jewish Trinity did not consist of three persons of equal dignity in one God, but of three unequal gods. III. What is more difficult of digestion than this, that the Son and Holy Spirit were represented by the statues of females, the wife and daughter of Jupiter? What could have induced any man in his senses to change the Son of God into the daughter, and the Holy Spirit into the wife of God? Did the stupidest Sabine ever dream of any thing half so absurd? I know what learned men will say: Minerva is the goddess of wisdom; but the Son of God is called the Word of God; Juno was the love and delight of Jupiter, and the Cabalists call the Holy Spirit, Love; therefore, the former might well be represented as the goddess of wisdom, and the latter as the wife of the same. But unless Vossius and some others, whose worth I hold in high respect, had said these things, I should exclaim:

O rem ridiculam, Cato, et jocosam!

This I will frankly say: If it be fair to go on reasoning in this manner, I shall soon be able to find an image of the divine Trinity in the lower regions in Pluto and Proserpine. For what should hinder us from associating Proserpine's mother, Ceres, with the wife and husband? And why, if there be any weight in such arguments, may I not assert, that the three celebrated Indian deities, Brama, Isuren, and Wistnu, exhibit most evident traces of an ancient opinion respecting three persons in one God? IV. But learned men urge: "Juno, Jupiter, and Minerva are Dii Penates: but the Dii Penates are the gods, by whom we breathe and live: also these deities are the Cabiri, which word Cabiri is derived from the Hebrew כביר, 'mighty:' therefore, these gods were imported into the other nations from the Hebrews; and who will affirm, that false deities could come from the Hebrews?" The different clauses here are so many arguments, that those who possess the faculty of reason do not always exercise it as they ought. In the first place, as regards the Dii Penates, the whole history of these gods is full of so many doubts and difficulties, that at this day nothing certain can be decided upon respecting them. It will be sufficient to read, what Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 155. has observed concerning this class of gods. But granting, that these were the Dii Penates, and admitting also the description given of these Dii Penates by Macrobius, and by Varro in Arnobius, still it will be clear from

* De Theol. Gen. lib. 8. cap. 12.

Jupiters* being the supreme God: Quid? quod hujus nominis proprietas non divinam vim sed humanam exprimit? Jovem enim Junonemque à Juvando esse dictos, Cicero interpretatur. Et Jupiter quasi Juvans pater dicitur. Quod nomen in Deum minimè convenit, quia juvare hominis est, &c. Nemo sic Deum precatur, ut se adjuvet, sed ut servet, &c. Ergo non imperitus modo, sed etiam impius est, qui nomine Jovis virtutem summæ potestatis imminuit. "What if we add, that the propriety of this word Jupiter does not express a divine, but only a human force? Cicero deriving both Jove and Juno alike à juvando, that is, from helping: for Juvans Pater, or a helping father, is not a good description of God; forasmuch as it properly belongeth to men to help. Neither doth any one pray to God to help him only, but to save him. Nor is a father said to help his son, whom he was the begetter of, &c. Wherefore he is not only

what we have remarked a little above, on the passages of Macrobius and Arnobius, that the idea of three persons in one god is quite out of the question, when mention is made of the Dii Penates. In short, what sort of argumentation is this? "The Dii Penates are Jupiter, Juno, Minerva; but the Dii Penates are the gods, by whom we breathe and live: therefore, Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva present the image of the most holy Trinity." Nor is more aid afforded us by the Dii Cabiri, towards determining this question. In the first place, the disputes of those who treat of the Cabiri are interminable. For it is uncertain, whether there were three, or two, or four, or more gods, so designated by antiquity; and it is still more uncertain, what sort of gods these were. See Ger. J. Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 2. cap. 57. p. 228. and Tob. Guthberlethus, De Mysteriis Deor. Cabirorum, cap. 3. and 4. p. 19. Some suppose Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva to be alone the Cabiri. But those are supported by the testimonies of a much greater number of authors, who make them either to be two only, Castor and Pollux, or four, Ceres, Proserpine, Pluto, and Mercury. See Adr. Reland's Diss. de Diis Cabiris, sect. 2. in Diss. Select. tom. 1. p. 194. Nor is the contention less about the meaning of the word Cabiri. Marsham, Vossius, Bochart, and many others, approve of the derivation adopted by Dr. Cudworth; but others not inferior in ability or erudition, reject it. See Guthberlethus, De Mysteriis Deor. Cabir. cap. 1. and Raph. Fabrettus, Comm. ad Columnam Trajani. cap. 4. p. 80. &c. And not long ago Reland started forth and attempted to prove by no contemptible arguments, that this name comes from the Hebrew word חבר, "he joined together, associated," and that the Cabiri signify the *associated gods*. But if we assent to those, who suppose them to be the כבירים, or, the *powerful gods*, and derive the word from the noun כביר, will it be evident even then, that the Cabiri were the one triune God worshipped by the Hebrews? I think not. Far different is the view taken by Sam. Bochart, who, Canaan. lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 394. relying upon this very etymology, argues most ingeniously, that the gods called Cabiri, were worshipped by the ancient Phœnicians. And certainly, inasmuch as the languages of the Phœnicians, Hebrews, and other Eastern nations, were kindred languages, although we prove a certain name to be derived from a Hebrew noun, it does not necessarily follow, that the thing designated by that name is also to be sought for among the Hebrews alone. For if we were to suppose, that whatever is allied in name to a Hebrew word is also of Hebrew origin, we should have to refer many things to the Hebrews, which are known to have originated in other nations, and never to have been adopted by the Hebrews. I might add, that there is nothing more worthless and uncertain, than what are called etymological arguments, and also, that it is impossible to understand, why, if the Hebrews called the triune God כבירים, there should be no trace of this name in their sacred writings. But what need of many words? Any one who pays even the slightest attention to the mysteries and worship of the gods, called Cabiri, will at once be convinced, that light and darkness, day and night, are not more widely different from each other, than the trinity of divine hypostases and those counterfeit deities worshipped by ancient nations.

* P. 63.

unskilful, but impious also, who, by the name of Jove or Jupiter, diminishes the power of the supreme God." But as this of Lactantius seems otherwise weak enough; so is the foundation of it absolutely ruinous, the true etymon of Jupiter (though Cicero knew not so much) being without peradventure, not Juvans Pater, but Jovis Pater, "Jove, the father of gods and men;" which Jove is the very Hebrew Tetragrammaton (however these Romans came by it) only altered by a Latin termination. Wherefore, as there [illegible] iety at all in calling the supreme God Jove o[illegible] hat very name which God himself chose to be c[illegible] r is there any reason why the Latins should no[illegible] e supreme God thereby, as the Greeks did un[illegible] eus, which will be proved afterwards from irref[illegible]

[4] To avoid unnecessary p[illegible] r what is here put forward by the learned Doctor on the nam[illegible] wever, I doubt not, will consider Cicero's derivation of this w[illegible] le as the one preferred by himself, although he is following in the [illegible] e highest eminence. I am free to confess also, that Lactantius' second reason for denying, that God can be designated by the name of Jupiter, is weak and futile. As regards the subject itself, however, I cannot but agree with Origen and Lactantius, in considering it to be altogether improper to address the supreme God by the names of the false deities worshipped by ancient nations; and certainly, there seems to me to be great force in the argument adduced by them in support of this opinion. The names of Jupiter, Hammon, Belus, Sabazius, were proper to certain gods, respecting whose origin and actions the most absurd stories were in circulation; and therefore, their names could not be repeated without bringing to the recollection of most of the auditors the various things, which the multitude and priests associated with these names. He who heard Jupiter spoken of would at the same time be reminded of his parents, Rhea and Saturn, of his brothers, his wife, his debauches and adulteries. Wherefore, if Christians had addressed their supreme God by the same name, they would have led all men, with the exception of some few of the more intelligent, to suppose, that the Deity of the Christians was of the same nature and consequently polluted with the same crimes as the Jupiter of the Greeks and Romans. And how great an injury such an opinion would have brought upon the human race must be obvious to every one. They certainly would have given a far different meaning to the name Jupiter from the Greeks and Romans; but who is not aware, that the people are slow in attaching new ideas to old words, and are wont to decide upon the signification of names not agreeably to the sense and wish of philosophers, but according to custom and the received usage of language? Hence, whatever the disciples of our Saviour might have said or thought, the vulgar notion of the word Jupiter would have always been present to the minds of the multitude. But supposing even, that this error could have been obviated, still it would have been derogatory to the majesty of the supreme Being to apply to him names, which had for ages been associated with the foulest and most atrocious crimes. Besides, those who required the Christians to concede, that it was a matter of indifference by what name the supreme Deity was addressed, whether by that of Jupiter, Belus, Hammon, or any other, were a few philosophers, Celsus, Hierocles, and one or two more, who neither agreed with the people in their sentiments on religion, nor had any other object than the overthrow and destruction of Christianity. Hence, they endeavoured above all things to prove, that whatever was excellent and rational in the precepts of the Christians had already been recognized by the generality of nations, long before the appearance of this sect in Palestine. But of these precepts, whose excellence and truth they were utterly unable to deny, the doctrine of one God was the most prominent. Wherefore, they contended, that there was no nation prior to the time of Christ, to which this doctrine was unknown, and that the names of the principal deities of the respective nations were all appellations of one supreme God; consequently, that the people had no occasion to resort to Christians for a knowledge

Especially if we consider that the Roman vulgar commonly bestowed these two epithets upon that Capitoline Jupiter (that is, not the senseless statue, but that God, who was there worshipped in a material statue) of Optimus and Maximus, the best and the greatest; they thereby signifying him to be a being infinitely good and powerful. Thus Cicero, in his De Nat. Deorum,[6] Jupiter à poetis dicitur divum atque hominum pater, à majoribus autem nostris optimus maximus, "That same Jupiter, who is by the poets styled the father of gods and men, is by our ancestors called the best, the greatest." And in his Orat. pro Roscio, Jupiter optimus maximus, cujus nutu et arbitrio cœlum, terra, mariaque reguntur, "Jupiter the best, the greatest, by whose beck and command, the heaven, the earth, and the seas are governed." As also the junior Pliny, in his panegyric oration, Parens hominum deorumque optimi prius, deinde maximi nomine colitur, "The father of men and gods is worshipped under the name, first of the best, and then of the greatest." Moreover, Servius Honoratus informs us, that the Pontifices in their public sacrifices were wont to address themselves to Jupiter in this form of words: Omnipotens Jupiter, seu quo alio nomine appellari volueris, "Omnipotent Jupiter, or by what other name soever thou pleasest to be called." From whence it is plain that the Romans, under the name of Jupiter, worshipped the omnipotent God. And, according to Seneca, the ancient Hetrurians, who are by him distinguished from philosophers, as a kind of illiterate superstitious persons (in these words: Hæc adhuc Etruscis et philosophis communia sunt, in illo dissentiunt*) had this very same notion answering to the word Jupiter, namely, of the supreme monarch of the universe. For first, he sets down their tradition concerning thunderbolts in this manner: Fulmina dicunt à Jove mitti, et tres illi manubias dant. Prima (ut aiunt) monet et placata est, et ipsius consilio Jovis mittitur. Secundam quidem mittit Jupiter, sed ex consilii sententiâ; duodecim enim deos advocat, &c. Tertiam idem Jupiter mittit, sed adhibitis in consilium diis, quos superiores et involutos vocant, quæ vastat, &c. "The Hetrurians say, that the thunderbolts are sent from Jupiter, and that there are three kinds of them; the first gentle and monitory, and sent by Jupiter alone; the second sent by Jupiter, but not without the counsel

of this God, or to forsake the religion of their forefathers. Such being the case, I consider the Christians to have acted most wisely in hesitating here about words. For if they had admitted that Pappæus, Jupiter, Belus, Hammon, and an infinity of other names, were designations of one and the same supreme God, and that it was of no importance by which of these names he was addressed, they must also have granted, that the popular religions were much less absurd, than they the Christians had represented them, and that after all the world stood in no great need of a new teacher and corrector of ancient superstitions.

[6] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 25. p. 2992. tom. 9. opp. The passage which follows occurs Orat. pro Roscio. cap. 45. p. 948. tom 3. opp.

* Nat. Quæs. 1. cap. 41. [P. 536. tom. 1. opp.]

and consent of the twelve gods, which thunderbolt doth some good, but not without harm also; the third sent by Jupiter likewise, but not before he hath called a council of all the superior gods: and this utterly wastes and destroys both private and public states." And then does he make a commentary upon this old Hetrurian doctrine, that it was not to be taken literally, but only so as to impress an awe upon men, and to signify that Jupiter himself intended nothing but good, he inflicting evil not alone, but in partne[illegible]s, and when the necessity of the case required. [illegible]st place, Ne hoc quidem crediderunt (Etrusci), [illegible] in Capitolio et in cæteris ædibus colimus, mitt[illegible]ulmina; sed eundem, quem nos, Jovem intelligu[illegible]toremque universi, animum ac spiritum, mundar[illegible]dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne conven[illegible]d these Hetrurians believe, that such a Jupiter [illegible] in the Capitol and in the other temples, did fl[illegible]s with his own hands, but they understood the very same Jupiter, that we now do, the keeper and governor of the universe, the mind and spirit of the whole, the lord and artificer of this mundane fabric, to whom every name belongeth." And lastly, that the vulgar Romans afterwards, about the beginning of Christianity, had the same notion of Jupiter as the supreme God, evidently appears from what Tertullian hath recorded in his book Ad Scapulam, that when Marcus Aurelius, in his German expedition, by the prayers of the Christian soldiers made to God, had obtained refreshing showers from heaven in a great drought; Tunc populus adclamans JOVI DEO DEORUM, QUI SOLUS POTENS EST, in Jovis nomine Deo nostro testimonium reddidit, "That then the people with one consent crying out, thanks be to JUPITER THE GOD OF GODS, WHO ALONE IS POWERFUL, did thereby in the name of Jove or Jupiter, give testimony to our God." Where, by the way, we see also, that Tertullian was not so nice as Lactantius, but did freely acknowledge the Pagans by their Jupiter to have meant the true God.[7]

That some of the Romans possessed sufficient intelligence to reject the fables and absurd legends of the priests and to worship under the name of Jupiter the supreme God, who governs all things, I am by no means disposed to call into question; but I cannot prevail upon myself to believe, that the Romans generally, people and philosophers, unlearned and learned, were imbued with a like notion of Jupiter. The Roman people at least, as is shown by innumerable passages of ancient authors and evident, moreover, from the very worship itself, believed Jupiter Capitolinus to be the son of Saturn, the husband of Juno, and father of Minerva, who ruled in heaven and from thence hurled his thunderbolts amongst men. Nor has the learned Doctor here brought forward any thing, which will induce me to abandon this opinion. I. The title Optimus Maximus, "best and greatest," proves nothing. For, as every one is aware, the range of meaning in such words is to be contracted or amplified according to the nature of the circumstances under which they are applied. Hence, as the Romans every where relate things of their Jupiter Optimus Maximus, which are neither indicative of great goodness nor of unlimited power, and on the contrary record many proofs *of exceeding weakness*, it is evident, that but a very slight and circumscribed sense is to

As nothing is more frequent with pagan writers, than to speak of God singularly, they signifying thereby the one supreme Deity, so that the same was very familiar with the vulgar Pagans also, in their ordinary discourse and common speech, hath been recorded by divers of the fathers. Tertullian[8] in his book De Testimonio Animæ, and his Apologet. instanceth in several of these forms of speech then vulgarly used by the Pagans; as "Deus videt," "Deo commendo," "Deus reddet," "Deus inter nos judicabit," "Quod Deus vult," "Si Deus voluerit," "Quod Deus dederit," "Si Deus dederit," and the like. Thus also Minutius Felix:[9] Cum ad cœlum manus tendunt, nihil aliud quâm Deum dicunt, et magnus est, et Deus verus est, &c. vulgi iste naturalis sermo, an Christiani confitentis oratio? "When they stretch out their hands to heaven, they

be attached to these names. II. That Jupiter was styled "Omnipotent" by the Romans, is unquestionable. But I have already shown from Petronius, that this epithet, when applied to Jupiter, was used in a much more qualified sense than with us at the present day. III. Seneca refers the conceits of the Hetrurians to the keeper and governor of the universe. But who will say that he is guilty of no error in this exposition? The Hetrurians themselves did not profess this to be their opinion, but Seneca merely suspects or imagines, that they entertained it. And who can put faith in a philosopher, who explains the religion of a people according to the laws of his own discipline? IV. As little weight is there in the testimony of Tertullian. In the first place he nowher estates these to be the prayers of the Christian soldiers, but of the Roman people, praising God on being relieved from a great drought. This is proved by the words themselves, which I shall quote: Quomodo non geniculationibus et jejunationibus nostris etiam siccitates depulsæ sunt? Tunc populus acclamans, &c. "How are not even droughts put an end to by our kneelings and fastings? Then the people crying aloud, &c." But, as Tertullian had made mention a little before of a shower having been obtained by the prayers of the Christians in the German expedition, the learned Doctor therefore supposed these words to refer to that rain. Secondly, Tertullian does not affirm, that the Roman Jupiter is the same as the god worshipped by the Christians. The meaning of what he says is evidently this: "The Roman people, on being relieved from drought, praise Jupiter: but as this blessing was obtained by the prayers of Christians, therefore, these praises properly belong to the God of the Christians. The people sing the praises of Jupiter, but while they sing the praises of that God, from whom this boon was received, they in reality sing the praises of the God of the Christians, to whom the whole is owing." Whence it is at the same time apparent, that Tertullian did not approve of those, who called the supreme God Jupiter, and that his sentiments in that respect were not different from those of Origen and Lactantius. On the contrary, in his Apologeticus and other books, he sneers at the Roman Jupiter in such a manner, that it is not at all likely he would have patiently suffered any one to designate the supreme Being by the name of so obscene and flagitious a deity. In his Apologet. cap. 10. p. 114. we have the following of Jupiter: Etiam Jovem ostendemus tam hominem, quam ex homine, et deinceps totum generis ipsius examen tam mortale, quam seminis sui par, "We shall show Jupiter to be a man, and sprung from a man, and also that the whole tribe of his descendants are mortal, and like their race." How then can he suppose the supreme God to be meant by Jupiter, who broadly asserts Jupiter to be a wretched mortal, and afterwards enters into a review of all his crimes? I add another passage, in which he distinctly denies, that the Christians worshipped the god of the Romans, Apolog. cap. 24. p. 241. 242. Lædimus Romanos, quia non Romanorum Deum colimus, "We offend the Romans, because we do not worship the god of the Romans."

[8] See his Apologet. cap. 17. p. 175. and De Testimonio Animæ, cap. 2. p. 35. opp. ed. Venetæ. Add also his De Resurrectione Carnis, cap. 3. p. 205.

[9] In Octavio, cap. 18. p. 171. ed. Gronovii.

mention only God; and these forms of speech, He is great, and God is true, and, If God grant (which are the natural language of the vulgar), are they not a plain confession of Christianity?" And lastly Lactantius:[10] Cum jurant, et cum optant, et cum gratias agunt, non deos multos, sed Deum nominant; adeò ipsa veritas, cogente natura, etiam ab invitis pectoribus erumpit, "When they swear, and when they wish, and when they give thanks, they name not many gods, but God only; the truth, by [illegible] nature, thus breaking forth from them, whether [illegible]." And again: Ad Deum confugiunt, à Deo p[illegible] Deus ut subveniat oratur. Et si quis ad extrem[illegible] necessitatem redactus, victum precibus exposcit [illegible] obtestatur, et per ejus divinum atque unicum [illegible] sibi misericordiam quærit, "They fly to God, [illegible] of God, they pray that God would help them; a[illegible] ne is reduced to extremest necessity, he begs for [illegible] d by his divine power alone implores the mercy [illegible] ich same thing is fully confirmed also by Proclus upon Plato's Timæus; where he observes that the one supreme God was more universally believed throughout the world in all ages, than the many inferior gods:* Τάχα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι δὴ αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν ἑαυταῖς προσεχεστέρων ϑᾶττον ἐπιλανθάνονται, τῶν δὲ ὑπερτέρων ἀρχῶν μᾶλλον μνημονεύουσι. Δρῶσι γὰρ μᾶλλον εἰς αὐτοὺς δι' ὑπεροχὴν δυνάμεως, καὶ δοκοῦσιν αὐταῖς παρεῖναι δι' ἐνέργειαν· ὁ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὄψιν γίγνεται τὴν ἡμετέραν· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐν γῇ κειμένων οὐχ ὁρῶντες, ὁμῶς αὐτὴν ὁρᾷν δοκῶμεν τὴν ἀπλανῆ, καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀστέρας, διότι καταλάμπουσιν ἡμῶν τὴν ὄψιν τῷ ἑαυτῶν φωτί. Μᾶλλον οὖν καὶ τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς λῆθην ἴσχει καὶ ἀορασίαν τῶν προσεχεστέρων, ἢ τῶν ἀνωτέρων καὶ ϑειοτέρων ἀρχῶν· οὕτω τὴν πρωτίστην ἀρχὴν πᾶσαι ϑρησκεῖαι καὶ αἱρέσεις συγχωροῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ ϑεὸν πάντες ἄνϑρωποι ἐπικαλοῦσι βοηϑόν· ϑεοὺς δὲ

[10] Institut. Divin. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 159. To these passages may be added a clear evidence of the same from Armobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 2. p. 54. Da, says he, verum judicium: et hæc omnia circumspiciens, quæ videmus, magis, an sint Dii ceteri, quam in Deo cunctabitur, quem esse, omnes naturaliter scimus: sive quum exclamamus: O Deus! sive quum illum testem Deum constituimus improborum, et quasi nos cernat, faciem sublevamus ad cœlum, "Give a true judgment: and he, who looks round upon all that we see, will doubt rather, whether the other gods, exist than hesitate with respect to God, whose existence we all naturally recognize, when for example we exclaim, O God! or appeal to this God as a witness against the wicked, and, as conscious that he beholds us, lift up our eyes to heaven." The argument itself, however, which is drawn from these phrases of the vulgar, seems to me to have very little weight in it. For it is notorious, that in ordinary discourse those, who hold the existence of many natures of the same class and order, sometimes mention only one, although meaning several. Christians, though they believe that pious men are committed by God to the protection of innumerable angels, nevertheless, when speaking thereof, frequently introduce but one angel; and yet it would be wrong to infer, that those, who express themselves in this manner, acknowledge the existence of no more than one.

* P. 286.

εἶναι μετ' αὐτὴν, καὶ πρόνοιαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ, οὐ πᾶσαι πιστεύουσι', ἐναργέστερον γὰρ αὐταῖς καταφαίνεται τὸ ἓν τοῦ πλῆθους, "And perhaps you may affirm, that souls do sooner lose their knowledge of those things which are lower and nearer to them, but retain a stronger remembrance of those higher principles; because these do act more vigorously upon them, by reason of the transcendency of their power, and by their energy seem to be present with them. And the same thing happens as to our bodily sight; for though there be many things here upon earth which none of us see, yet every one observes that highest sphere, and takes notice of the fixed stars in it, because these strongly radiate with their light upon our eyes. In like manner does the eye of our soul sooner lose the sight and remembrance of the lower than of the higher and diviner principles. And thus all religions and sects acknowledge that one highest principle of all, and men every where call upon God for their helper; but that there are gods, after and below that highest principle, and that there is a certain providence descending down from these upon the universe, all sects do not believe; the reason whereof is, because the one or unity appears more clearly and plainly to them, than the many or a multitude."

Moreover, we learn from Arrianus' Epictetus, that that very form of prayer, which hath been now so long in use in the Christian church, Kyrie Eleeson, "Lord have mercy upon us," was anciently part of the Pagans' litany to the supreme God, either amongst the Greeks, or the Latins, or both: *Τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι,* (saith Epictetus*) *δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ, Κύριε ἐλέησον,* "Invoking God, we pray to him after this manner, Lord have mercy upon us." Now this Epictetus lived in the times of Adrian the emperor; and that this passage of his is to be understood of Pagans, and not of Christians, is undeniably manifest from the context, he there speaking of those, who used auguria, or divination by birds. Moreover, in the writings of the Greekish Pagans, the supreme God is often called *Κύριος,* or "Lord." For, not to urge that passage of the *Τέλειος Λόγος,* or "Asclepian Dialogue," cited by Lactantius,[1] where we read of *Ὁ Κύριος καὶ πάντων ποιητὴς,* "The Lord and Maker of all," Menander in Justin Martyr,[2] styleth the supreme God: *Τὸν ὄντα πάντων Κύριον γενικώτατον,* "The most universal Lord of all." And Osiris in Plutarch is called *Ἁπάντων Κύριος,* "The Lord of all things." And this is also done absolutely, and without any adjection, and that not only by the LXX. and Christians, but also by pagan writers. Thus in Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride, we read of *Τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ* ΚΥΡΙΟΥ, *καὶ νοητοῦ γνῶ-*

* Lib. 2. cap. 7. [P. 186.]

[1] Institut. Divinar. lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 419.

[2] De Monarchia Dei, p. 108. Compare Le Clerc's Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiæ, p. 49.

σις, "The knowledge of the first Intelligible, and the Lord," that is, of the supreme God. And Oromasdes is called ὁ Κύριος, "the Lord," in Plutarch's Life of Alexander; as Νοῦς, also Κύριος, by Aristotle,* that is, "The supreme ruler over all." Thus likewise Plato in his sixth epistle Ad Hermiam, &c. styles his first divine hypostasis, or the absolutely supreme Deity: Τοῦ ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα Κύριον, "The father of the prince and cause of the world (that is, of the eternal Intellect), the LORD." Again, Jamblichus† writeth thus of the supreme God: Δεῖν ὁμολογεῖται παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἀγαθὸν ζητεῖν, "It is confessed, that every good thing ought to be asked of the Lord," that is, the supreme God; which words are afterwards repeated in him also, p. 129, but depraved in the printed copy thus:[3] Δεῖν δὲ ὁμολογεῖν περὶ τοῦ κυρίου τ' ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ. Lastly, Clemens Alexandrinus[4] tells us, that the supreme God was called not by one only name, but by divers diversely, namely: Ἤτοι Ἕν, ἢ τ' Ἀγαθὸν, ἢ Νοῦν, ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ Ὄν, ἢ Πατέρα, ἢ Θεὸν, ἢ Δημιουργὸν, ἢ Κύριον, "Either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or the very Ens, or the Father, or the Demiurgos, or the Lord." Wherefore, we conclude, that this Kyrie Eleeson, or Domine Miserere, in Arrianus, was a pagan litany or supplication to the supreme God. Though from Mauritius the emperor's Stratagemata it appears, that in his time a Kyrie Eleeson was wont to be sung also by the Christian armies before battle.‡[5]

* De An. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 16. tom. 2. opp.]

† Vit. Pyth. p. 89. [Cap 18. p. 72. ed. Kusteri.]

[3] This has been noticed by Lud. Kuster, who, in his edition of Jamblichus, cap. 28. p. 115. exhibits the passage emended according to the view of Dr. Cudworth.

[4] Stromat. lib. 5. p. 695.

‡ Rigalt. Gloss.

[5] Dr. Cudworth's opinion respecting this well-known form of prayer of the Christians: Κύριε ἐλέησον! is the same as the one adopted by Cardinal J. Bona, Rerum Liturgic. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 316. and Divinæ Psalmod. cap. 14. sect. 4. p. 485. and a few others of inferior authority; some of whom have gone so far as to affirm, that this prayer among many other things was borrowed by the Christians from the Pagans. To confess the truth, however, I should hardly be induced to class this among the ordinary prayers, which either the Greeks or Romans addressed to their deities in the temples and public worship. For it is very uncertain, whether Arrian or Epictetus composed this prayer himself and put it into the mouths of the men he is rebuking, or took it from the daily usage and habits of the people. In this passage Epictetus censures those persons, who were accustomed to approach God with fear and trembling, not in order to put themselves under the protection of divine providence, but to sue for deliverance from some pressing evil: Νῦν δὲ τρέμοντες τὸ ὀρνιθάριον κρατοῦμεν, καὶ τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενοι δεόμεθα αὐτοῦ· Κύριε ἐλέησον! ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν, "But now trembling we betake ourselves to augury, and invoking God we pray to him, Lord have mercy upon us! Grant that I may escape!" As Epictetus evidently supplied the words: ἐπίτρεψόν μοι ἐξελθεῖν, out of his own head, and did not borrow them from the commonly received forms of prayer, why may he not have himself been the author of the rest of the words in question? But granting that he had at any time heard persons pray in this manner, which I do not deny to be possible, I cannot see, that a prayer made use of by one or two individuals is necessarily to be received as a part of the ordinary litany of the Pagans. But the idea entertained by ome, that the Christians in using this form merely followed the example of the Pagans, is altogether absurd. For setting aside, that so short and simple a prayer might natu-

And that the most sottishly superstitious and idolatrous of all the Pagans, and the worshippers of never so many gods amongst them, did notwithstanding generally acknowledge one supreme Deity over them all, one universal Numen, is positively affirmed, and fully attested by Aurelius Prudentius, in his Apotheosis,* in these words:

> Ecquis in Idolio recubans inter sacra mille,
> Ridiculosque deos venerans, sale, cespite, thure,
> Non putat esse Deum summum, et super omnia solum?
> Quamvis Saturnis, Junonibus, et Cytheræis,
> Portentisque aliis, fumantes consecret aras;
> Attamen in cœlum quoties suspexit, in uno
> Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
> Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

We are not ignorant, that Plato in his Cratylus,[6] where he undertakes to give the etymologies of words, and amongst the rest of the word θεοί, writeth in this manner, concerning the first and most ancient inhabitants of Greece: "That they seemed

rally suggest itself to men oppressed by any calamity, it is still a question, supposing any traces of imitation to exist, which of the two copied the other, the Christians or Pagans. The latter, I am certain, borrowed at least as many customs, sayings, and doctrines from the Christians, as the Christians did from them, nay even more; as I have shown by numerous examples in a specific dissertation published not long ago. But I know not what infatuation has come upon learned men, who no sooner observe any points of resemblance between the Christian and pagan observances, than they immediately cry out, that the Christians derived every thing from the impure sources of other nations: as if they on the other hand had had nothing, which could excite emulation in the pagan priests. II. But let us reserve these matters, important as they are, for a more convenient opportunity, and add a few remarks on the word κύριος. Dr. Cudworth considers these prayers to pertain to the supreme God and in proof cites some passages of the ancients, in which the almighty Architect of all things is called simply and absolutely Κύριος. But those who possess any knowledge of ancient matters cannot but be aware, that the names κύριος and δεσπότης with the Greeks, and *dominus* with the Romans, were not proper to the one supreme God, but common to all the gods. The word δεσπότης I pass over for the present; on which consult Ez. Spanheim, Preuves des Remarques sur les Cesars de Julien, p. 39. But that κύριος and *dominus* could be used simply to designate any god whatever, is proved in the case of the Roman emperors, who in order to establish their own claims to divinity, not only called themselves κύριοι and *domini* on their coins, but encouraged the people to address them by the same appellations. See Ez. Spanheim, De Usu et Præstantia Numismat. diss. 8. tom. 1. p. 758. and Anton. Borremansius, Vesper. Gorinchemenses, cap. 1. p. 3. &c. And this meaning of the words κύριος and *dominus* was not unknown to the Christians; whom on that account neither threats nor promises could induce to apply them to the emperors. Herodes the governor of Irene and Nicetes thus address Polycarp the bishop of Smyrna, in Eusebius, Histor. Eccles. lib. 4. cap. 15. p. 131: Τί κακόν ἐστιν, εἰπεῖν ΚΥΡΙΕ Καῖσαρ; "What harm is there in saying *Lord* Cæsar?" He however stedfastly refuses: Οὐ μέλλω πράττειν, ὃ συμβουλεύεταί μοι, "I will never do what you advise me." Tertullian, Apologet. cap. 34. p. 289. Dicam plane imperatorem Dominum, sed more communi; sed quando non cogor, ut *Dominum Dei vice* dicam, "I will say plainly the Lord the emperor, but after the common fashion, and when I am not compelled to say *the Lord, the vicegerent of God.* Thus much I have thought proper to remark, lest those who find the word κύριος employed in reference to God in the monuments of the ancients, should immediately think of the supreme God, and give them credit for wiser notions on the subject of the Deity than they really entertained.

* Verse 254.

to him, like as other Barbarians at that time, to have acknowledged no other gods than such as were visible and sensible, as the sun and the moon, and the earth, and the stars, and the heaven. Which they perceiving to run round perpetually, therefore called them θεοὺς, from θέω, that signifies to run. But that when afterward they took notice of other invisible gods also, they bestowed the same name of θεοὶ upon them likewise." Which passage of Plato's Eusebius somewhere[7] would make use of, to prove, that the Pagans universally acknowledged no other gods but corporeal and inanimate; plainly contrary to that philosopher's meaning, who as he nowhere affirms, that any nation ever was so barbarous as to worship senseless and inanimate bodies, as such, for gods, but the contrary; so doth he there distinguish from those first inhabitants of Greece, and other Barbarians, the afterward civilized Greeks, who took notice of invisible gods also. However, if this of Plato should be true, that some of the ancient Pagans worshipped none but visible and sensible gods (they taking no notice of any incorporeal beings); yet does it not therefore follow, that those Pagans had no notion at all amongst them of one supreme and universal Numen. The contrary thereunto being manifest, that some of those Corporealists looked upon the whole heaven and ether animated as the highest God, according to that of Euripides cited by Cicero:*

> Vides sublime fusum, immoderatum æthera,
> Qui tenero terram circumvectu amplectitur;
> Hunc summum habeto divum, hunc perhibeto Jovem.

As also that others of them conceived, that subtile fiery substance, which permeates and pervades the whole world (supposed to be intellectual) to be the supreme Deity, which governs all; this opinion having been entertained by philosophers also, as namely the Heraclitics and Stoics. And lastly, since Macrobius,[8] in the person of Vettius Prætextatus, refers so many of the pagan gods to the sun, this renders it not improbable, but that some of these Pagans might adore the animated sun, as the sovereign Numen, and thus perhaps invoke him in that form of prayer there mentioned:[9] Ἥλιε παντοκράτωρ, κόσμου πνεῦμα, "O omnipotent sun, the mind and spirit of the whole world," &c. And even Cleanthes himself, that learned Stoic and devout religionist, is suspected by some to have been of this persuasion.

Nevertheless, we think it opportune here to observe, that it was not Macrobius' design, in those his Saturnalia, to defend

[7] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 29.
* De Nat. Deor. p. 223. [Lib. 2. cap. 25. p. 2993.]
[8] Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 17. &c. p. 270. &c.
[9] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 23. p. 313.

this, either as his own opinion, or as the opinion of the generality of Pagans, that the animated sun was absolutely the highest Deity (as some have conceived;) nor yet to reduce that multiplicity of pagan gods, by this device of his, into a seeming monarchy, and nearer compliance with Christianity; he there plainly confining his discourse to the dii duntaxat, qui sub cœlo sunt, that is, "the lower sort of mundane gods;" and undertaking to show, not that all of these neither, but only that many of them were reducible to the sun, as polyonymous, and called by several names, according to his several virtues and effects. For what Macrobius' own opinion was, concerning the supreme Deity, appeareth plainly from his other writings, particularly this passage of his commentary upon Scipio's dream, where the highest sphere and starry heaven was called Summus Deus, "the supreme God:"* Quod hunc extimum globum, summum Deum vocavit, non ita accipiendum est, ut iste prima causa et Deus ille omnipotentissimus existimetur; cum globus ipse, quod cœlum est, animæ sit fabrica, anima ex mente processerit, mens ex Deo, qui verè summus est, procreata sit. Sed summum quidem dixit ad cæterorum ordinem, qui subjecti sunt; Deum verò, quòd non modò immortale animal ac divinum sit, plenum inclytæ ex illa purissima mente rationis, sed quòd et virtutes omnes, quæ illam primæ omnipotentiam summitatis sequantur, aut ipse faciat, aut contineat; ipsum denique Jovem veteres vocaverunt, et apud theologos Jupiter est mundi anima, "That the outmost sphere is here called the supreme God, is not so to be understood, as if this were thought to be the first cause, and the most omnipotent God of all: for this starry sphere being but a part of the heaven, was made or produced by soul. Which soul also proceeded from a perfect mind or intellect; and again, Mind was begotten from that God who is truly supreme. But the highest sphere is here called the supreme God, only in respect to those lesser spheres or gods that are contained under it; and it is styled a god, because it is not only an immortal and divine animal, full of reason derived from that purest mind, but also because it maketh or containeth within itself all those virtues which follow that omnipotence of the first summity. Lastly, this was called by the ancients Jupiter, and Jupiter to theologers is the soul of the world." Wherefore though Macrobius, as generally the other Pagans, did undoubtedly worship the sun as a great god, and probably would not stick to call him Jupiter, nor παντοκράτωρ neither (in a certain sense) "omnipotent, or the governor of all," nor perhaps Deum Summum, as well as the starry heaven was so styled in Scipio's dream, he being the chief moderator in this lower world; yet nevertheless, it is plain, that he

* Lib. 1. cap. 17. [P. 87.]

was far from thinking the sun to be primam causam, or omnipotentissimum Deum, "the first cause," or "the most omnipotent God of all." He acknowledging above the sun and heaven, first, an eternal Psyche, which was the maker or creator of them both; and then above this Psyche, a perfect mind or intellect; and lastly, above that mind a God, who was verè summus, "truly and properly supreme, the first cause, and the most omnipotent of all gods." Wherein Macrobius plainly Platonized, asserting a trinity of archical o[illegible]ses. Which same doctrine is elsewhere also furth[illegible]im after this manner: Deus, qui prima causa est, e[illegible]omnium, quæque sunt, quæque videntur esse, pri[illegible] est. Hic superabundanti majestatis fœcunditat[illegible] creavit. Hæc mens, quæ Νοῦς vocatur, qua pa[illegible]lenam similitudinem servat auctoris, animam verè [illegible]teriora respiciens. Rursus anima partem, quam [illegible]ur, ac paulatim regrediente respectu in fabricam [illegible] corporea ipsa degenerat:* "God, who is, and is c[illegible] cause, is alone the fountain and original of all things, that are or seem to be; he by his superabundant fecundity produced from himself mind, which mind, as it looks upward towards its father, bears the perfect resemblance of its author, but as it looked downward, produced soul. And this soul again, as to its superior part, resembles that mind from whence it was begotten; but working downwards, produced the corporeal fabric, and acteth upon body." Besides which, the same Macrobius tells us,[10] that, Summi et principis omnium Dei nullum simulachrum finxit antiquitas, quia supra animam et naturam est, quo nihil fas est de fabulis pervenire; de diis autem cæteris, et de anima, non frustra se ad fabulosa convertunt, "The pagan antiquity made no image at all of the highest God, or prince of all things, because he is above soul and nature, where it is not lawful for any fabulosity to be intromitted. But as to the other gods, the soul of the world, and those below it, they thought it not inconvenient here to make use of images, and fiction or fabulosity." From all which it plainly appears, that neither Macrobius himself, nor the generality of the ancient Pagans, according to his apprehension, did look upon the animated sun as the absolutely supreme and highest Being.[1]

* Somn. Scip. lib. 1. cap. 14. [P. 73.]

[10] See Somn. Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 9. The learned Doctor, however, here gives the sense and meaning rather than the words of Macrobius.

[1] Macrobius, as is manifest from his commentary upon Cicero's Somnium Scipionis, was thoroughly imbued with the precepts of the school usually called by us the later Platonic. [He was not a Christian, as supposed by Barth, Grotius, Collinus, in opposition to whom see Masson, Bibl. Raisonnée, tom. 13. part. 2. p. 447. &c.] Hence we can easily understand, not only what his sentiments were upon religion and the supreme Deity, but also why he was so lavish and ingenious in his praises of the sun. For this sect of philosophers, although acknowledging a supreme God, maintained at the

And perhaps it may not be amiss to suggest here, what hath been already observed, that the Persians themselves also, who of all pagan nations have been most charged with this, the worshipping of the sun as the supreme Deity, under the name of Mithras, did notwithstanding, if we may believe Eubulus[2] (who wrote the history of Mithras at large), acknowledge another invisible Deity superior to it (and which was the maker thereof, and of the whole world), as the true and proper Mithras. Which opinion is also plainly confirmed not only by Herodotus,* distinguishing their Jupiter from the sun, but also by Xenophon in sundry places, as particularly where he speaks of Cyrus' being admonished in a dream of his approaching death, and thereupon addressing his devotion by sacrifices and prayers, first to the Ζεὺς πατρῷος, "the Persian Jupiter," and then to the sun, and the other gods :† Ἔθυε Διί τε πατρῴῳ καὶ ἡλίῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄκρων, ὡς Πέρσαι θύουσιν, ὧδε ἐπευχόμενος, Ζεῦ πατρῷε καὶ ἥλιε καὶ πάντες θεοὶ, δέχεσθε τάδε χαριστήρια, &c., "He sacrificed to their country (or the Persian) Jupiter, and to the sun, and to the other gods, upon the tops of the mountains, as the custom of the Persians is; praying after this manner: Thou, our country Jupiter (that is, thou Mithras or Oromasdes),

same time, that next to him the sun was the greatest and most excellent deity: and with what subtlety they expounded this dogma, may be best learnt from Julian's Oration in Solem. Add Zac. Mitylenæus' Dialogue De Opificio Mundi, p. 173. 176. 184. Therefore Macrobius also, wholly devoted as he was to this sect, was anxious to deserve well of the sun, and affirmed that this was the only deity worshipped in former times. But throughout the whole of this disputation he is influenced more by party zeal and preconceived opinions than by reason and truth; and, as might easily be demonstrated, if time and opportunity would permit, confounds rather than explains the popular religions of antiquity. Neither was Macrobius the first who ventured to identify all gods with the sun, but merely followed in the footsteps of the principal philosophers of the sect to which he belonged. We have in Eusebius' Præparat. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 112. a long passage of Porphyry, in which he maintains, that no small number of the gods were the images of one sun. But the futility of all such attempts has already been powerfully exposed by Eusebius, ibid. cap. 12. p. 120. To whose arguments if learned men had paid a due degree of attention, I am quite certain they would not have so readily fallen into Macrobius' opinion. Even Julian seems to be aware, that it is impossible to refer all the deities to one sun. He therefore sets about the matter more ingeniously, and confesses that there are other deities without the sun, such as Bacchus, Mercury, Æsculapius, &c., but at the same time, in order to detract as little as possible from the honours of this luminary, he inculcates, that all these gods were generated from it: Orat. 4. in Solem. p. 144. &c. He intimates also, ibid. p. 157. that this subject, briefly touched upon by himself, was pursued to greater length by Jamblichus, in his Περὶ θεῶν, a work not now extant. I have often wondered, how great and learned men could prevail upon themselves to give their unhesitating assent to all that the later philosophers and rhetoricians, subsequent to the birth of our Saviour, have written respecting the religions and gods of the Pagans; who, as they must have known, had recourse to all sorts of expedients, in order to elude the attacks of Christians, and represent their own doctrines in the most favourable light. But with those who consume a great portion of their life in the exploration of antiquity, the name of an ancient author is every thing: a failing to be tolerated in men so excellent in other respects, and possessing so many claims to our esteem and gratitude.

[2] In Porphyry, De Antro Nympha. p. 253. &c.

* Lib. 1. n. 131.

† Cyri. Inst. lib 8. p. 134.

and thou sun, and all ye other gods, accept, I pray you, these my eucharistic sacrifices," &c. And we find also the like prayer used by Darius in Plutarch: Ζεῦ πατρῷε Περσῶν, "Thou our country Jupiter," or, "supreme God of the Persians." Moreover, Herodotus and Curtius* record, that in the Persian pomp and procession there was wont to be drawn a chariot sacred to Jupiter, distinct from that of the sun. But Cyrus' proclamation in the book of Esdras putteth all out of doubt: since "that Lord God of heaven said "to have given Cyrus all the kingdoms of t mmanded him to build him a house at Jerusalem, lerstood of the sun.[3]

The Ethiopians in ay well be looked upon as Barbarians; and yet y acknowledge one supreme Deity, but also such from the world, and therefore invisible; he w cerning them:[4] Θεὸν νομίζουσι τὸν μὲν ἀθάνατ ναι τὸν αἴτιον τῶν πάντων, τὸν δὲ θνητὸν, ἀνώνυμ πιτοπολὺ τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ βασιλικοὺς θεοὺς νομίζουσι, "They believe, that there is one immortal God, and this the cause of all things; and another mortal one, anonymous; but for the most part they account their benefactors and kings gods also." And though Cæsar[5] affirm of the ancient Germans: Deorum numero eos solos ducunt, quos cernunt, et quorum opibus apertè juvantur, Solem, et Vulcanum,

* De Fort. Alex. lib. 2.

[3] On the religion of the Persians I have already commented at sufficient length, and shall merely observe in this place, that Cyrus' edict in Esdras i. 2. although showing this king's own estimation of the God of the Jews, cannot be considered as evidence of the religion and theological opinions of the whole Persian people.

† Lib. 17. p. 822.

[4] I am unable to find all that the learned Doctor imagines is to be found in this passage of Strabo. For the author does not state, that the Ethiopians acknowledged one supreme God distinct from the world and invisible to mortals. As to the subject itself, I am convinced, that this Ethiopian god is that twofold principle of good and evil, the worship of which was so general among the nations of antiquity. For that many of these nations, the Persians, Egyptians, and others, believed the god, from whom all evil proceeds, to be mortal and destined to be gradually extinguished and annihilated, is evident even from Plutarch De Iside et Osiride, p. 370. And I am led more easily to believe this from the following two reasons in particular. I. These Ethiopians are the people now called Abyssinians, and conterminous to the Egyptians. But that the Egyptians worshipped two deities, one good and the other evil, and held the latter, whom they denominated Typhon, to be mortal, or supposed that his power would be gradually crushed, is abundantly testified by Plutarch. In all probability, therefore, the Ethiopians adopted this, as well as many other dogmas, from the Egyptians. II. The Ethiopians were accustomed to call this god, to whom they imputed mortality, ἀνώνυμος καὶ οὐ σαφής: by which words, supposing them to be correctly expressed by Strabo in Greek, they in my opinion meant nothing more than what the Persians and other nations commonly inculcated respecting the evil deity, namely, that it resembled ἀγνοία or "ignorance:" Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 369. For he, who is without a name and unknown, is certainly a true emblem of ignorance. Unless I am not mistaken therefore, learned men have in the Ethiopians an additional instance of a nation infected with the principles of Manicheism before the time of Manichæus.

[5] *De Bello* Gallico, lib. 6. cap. 21. p. 125. ed. Cellarii.

et Lunam; yet is he contradicted by Tacitus,[6] who, coming after him, had better information: and others have recorded,[7]* that they acknowledged one supreme God, under the name of

* See Sched. de Diis Germ. [Syngr. 1. cap. 12. p. 291.]

[6] The learned Doctor here expresses himself ambiguously in reference to the discordance between Tacitus and Cæsar in their accounts of the ancient religion of the Germans. For considering it to be his principal object to show, that all the ancients were worshippers of one God, we might suppose his meaning to be, that Cæsar in stating the Germans to have had many gods, is contradicted by Tacitus as affirming them to have acknowledged only one. But the fact is far otherwise. The sole difference between Tacitus and Cæsar is this, that while the latter asserts them to have held the sun, moon, and fire to be the only gods, the former records, Germaniæ, cap. 29. 34. 40. that they professed others besides these, namely Mercury, Mars, Hercules, Isis. There are many considerations which would induce us to reject Cæsar's authority in this matter, who no doubt hastily attributed the religion of one tribe to the whole of the German people. See G. Hecht's Germania Sacra ac Litterata, par. 1. cap. 3. 4. p. 3. &c. and P. Hachenberg's Germania Media, diss. 8. p. 178. But even should we adopt Tacitus' account in preference, still it supplies us with no proof, that the Germans acknowledged one supreme God, the ruler and governor of all things.

[7] This is Schedius' conjecture, but supported by no authorities or arguments, although not a few have considered it to be in the highest degree probable. For thus, as one laying down laws, he says, De Diis Germanis, syngr. 1. cap. 12. p. 291. Deus priscis Celtis Thau dictus fuit; postmodum errore et stupiditate populi τὸ Thau transiit in Thauta, hinc in Thautes, ultimo in Theutates. Unicus autem Deus a Celtis colebatur, qui posteris Theutates, quum primum Thau diceretur, dictus fuit, "The god of the ancient Celts was called Thau; which subsequently, through the error and stupidity of the people, was corrupted into Thauta, then into Thautes, and lastly into Theutates. But they worshipped only one God, which being called Thau primitively, was by posterity called Theutates." He afterwards diverges into a long digression, in which he endeavours to prove from ancient testimonies, that the several nations worshipped but one God. Now, in the first place, Schedius speaks, as though he had learnt all this from the Celts themselves and had personally witnessed their stupidity and faults of pronunciation. Secondly, he asserts, in total violation of truth, that they worshipped only one God; whereas it is clear, from the most unquestionable testimonies, that besides Thaautes this nation acknowledged several gods, Hesus, Taranis, and others. But perhaps his opinions were more correct than his statements, and he simply meant that the Celts, although worshipping a plurality of gods, nevertheless ascribed greater power to one, namely, Thaautes, than to the others. The learned Doctor goes still farther even, and transfers what Schedius says of the Celts to the Germans, being influenced, I suppose, by the conviction, that the Theutates of the Celts and Tuisto, the earth-sprung god of the Germans, spoken of by Tacitus, Germaniæ cap. 1. were one and the same deity. For my own part, I shall deal liberally with these most learned men, and shall neither question in this place the etymologies of Schedius nor contend, that Thaautes or Theutates and Tuisto ought by no means to be confounded. [That they are the same deities is the opinion also of Leibnitz, Epist. p. 318. 422. where he treats of the difference of the Gallic and German religions. His conjecture, p. 451. that Dis, from whom Cæsar states the Germans to be sprung, does not differ from Theut, is ingenious.] Let all these matters remain in the position in which learned men have placed them, till they fall by the arguments of others. I shall not even deny, that the Celts and Germans paid religious homage to one god pre-eminently above all the others; for ancient records supply nothing, that will enable us satisfactorily to decide this question. But I shall confine my inquiry to this alone, Whether learned men are right in identifying this Thaautes, be it that he was worshipped by the Gauls and Celts only or also by the Germans, with the supreme Parent and Lord of all things; which, I must candidly confess, seems to me to be done in opposition to all truth. For, I. It is manifest, from unquestionable ancient testimonies, collected by the most erudite J. Martini, De Veterum Gallorum Religione, that the Gauls believed Hesus to be much more powerful and excellent than Thaautes; which, indeed, led this learned writer to conclude, that Æsus or Hesus was the image of the supreme Deity; the correctness of which conclusion we shall examine into by and by. II. The Celts

Thau first, and then of Thautes, and Theutates. Lastly, the generality of the Pagans at this very day, as the Indians, Chinese, Siamenses and Guineans, the inhabitants of Peru,

or Gauls ascribed such attributes to this Theutates, as led the Romans to identify him with their own god Mercury. See Schedius, De Diis German. syngr. 1. cap. 5. p. 155. and G. J. Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 1. cap. 35. p. 98. And I have no doubt, say the facts themselves show, that all the accounts of Cæsar, Tertullian, and other ancient authors concerning Mercury, to whose worship, they tell us, the Gauls were devoted, pertain to this Theutates alone. Wherefore, it is by no means probable, that this deity was represented by the Gauls as the parent, architect, and governor of the universe; because if such had been the case, the Romans unquestionably would have discovered in him the image of their own Jupiter rather than of Mercury. On the contrary, it is clear I think from hence, that they held him to preside over the same things as the Mercury of the Greeks and Romans, namely, commerce, theft, and eloquence. III. The Gauls were accustomed to appease this Theutates with human victims; the same honour they paid to Hesus and Taranis. Lucan, Pharsal. lib. 1. v. 466.

E quibus immitis placatur sanguine diro
Theutates, horrensque feris altaribus Hesus,
Et Taranis Scythicæ non mitior ara Dianæ.

Can such bloody and cruel rites, I ask, be applied to the supreme Being? Or if Theutates was the supreme Being, why were the same honours paid to Hesus and Taranis? These very victims, which we are told the Gauls sacrificed to Theutates, led J. Martini to suppose, that Pluto rather than Mercury was to be identified with this deity, Religion des Gaulois, lib. 3. cap. 3. p. 15. &c. whose opinion I should be inclined to adopt in preference to that of the ancient Romans, were I not convinced of the impropriety of confounding the gods of barbarous nations with the Grecian and Roman deities. But enough of Theutates, of whom I have been induced to speak at some length, because learned men, I perceive, even in the present day, are too ready to defend the cause of the ancient Gauls, Germans, Celts, and Britons, against those who do not scruple to hold them forth as having been imbued with the grossest superstitions.

The erudite Frenchman who asserts Theutates to be the image of Pluto, at the same time assigns the place of the supreme Being to another god of the Gauls or Celts, namely, Esus or Æsar, Religion des Gaulois, tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 2. p. 257. &c. This he holds to be the *unknown* God, spoken of by St. Paul, Acts xviii. this the *hidden* God of the Hebrews, and the *anonymous* God of the Samaritans, p. 260. Hence he supposes the Gauls to have acknowledged a supreme Ruler of all things prior to the birth of our Saviour, but subsequently by some untoward fate to have converted Hesus into Jupiter. The arguments by which he considers this point to be established, are drawn partly from the words and names, and partly from the things themselves. I. He remarks, that Esus and Æsar, in the language of Hetruria and ancient Gaul, signify God, p. 257. I will grant that nothing can be more true; still I confess myself to be ignorant, what this has to do with confuting those who maintain that Hesus and the supreme God are not one and the same, "The name Hesus is the same as the Latin Deus. Therefore Hesus is the supreme God who was worshipped by the Hebrews." He who is convinced by reasoning like this, is certainly very easy of conviction. II. Hesus, he tells us, in the language of the ancient Gauls, means the same as *terrible*. But whence did the estimable writer ascertain this? Hear the reason: "Heuz, or Heus, in Lower Bretagny, signifies horror, terror." If so disposed, I might altogether disregard this argument, and pronounce it to be utterly worthless. But in courtesy to the learned monk, let us grant what he assumes, that Hesus is the same as *terrible*. What then? "But," he proceeds, "in the Scriptures God is called terrible: therefore, Hesus is the supreme God." See p. 264. What force there is in such argumentation as this will be best shown by imitating it. Jupiter is called by the ancients greater and best. The supreme God is distinguished by the same names in holy writ. Therefore Jupiter is the supreme God of the Hebrews. Mars is a thousand times denominated terrible by the poets and other writers. God is also called so in the Scriptures. Therefore Mars is the supreme Deity. Æsculapius, in an infinity of places is called Σωτήρ,

Mexico, Virginia and New England (some of which are sufficiently barbarous) acknowledge one supreme or greatest God; they having their several proper names for him, as Parmiscer,

and in the sacred volume the Deity is so designated. Therefore Esculapius is the supreme God of the Hebrews.—Now he who fancies that there is no weight in these arguments, must also reject the learned writer's reasoning. III. But the oak was sacred to Æsus; and the true and only God appeared to Abraham under an oak, according to Moses, Gen. xviii. Therefore Æsus is no other than the God who conversed with Abraham. See p. 259. I shall dismiss this reason in silence, being well aware that to any one possessing common intellect it cannot but appear contemptible. It belongs indeed to that class of arguments, to repeat which is the same as to refute them. IV. Lucan informs us, that it was granted to the Druids alone to know the gods they worshipped, Pharsal. lib. 1.

> Solis nosse deos et cœli numina vobis,
> Aut solis nescire datum.

Therefore the god Æsus is the *unknown God* of the Hebrews and St. Paul, that is, the supreme and omnipotent God. Thus the erudite author elegantly argues, p. 262. In my opinion, these verses of Lucan are best explained by Cæsar, who, De Bello Gallico, lib. 6. cap. 14. p. 191. says that the Druids, disciplinam suam in vulgus efferri noluisse, "were unwilling to have their doctrine made public." For which reason the knowledge of the gods and religion were confined to the Druids alone. But how it can be inferred from thence, that Æsus was the unknown, that is, the true God, announced by St. Paul, I am altogether at a loss to imagine. The Druids alone understood the religion of the Gauls. Therefore Æsus is the true and only God. Away with those who find nothing to object to in such an argument. I might add also, that Lucan is speaking of many gods, and not of one only. But why many words? For my own part I shall not undertake to determine, in the total absence of ancient testimonies, whether the Gauls did or did not suppose one supreme God to preside over all things; but this I am convinced of, that those are mistaken who identify this god with Æsus. Indeed, were there nothing else to deter me from assenting to their opinion, those human sacrifices even, which the Gauls are known to have offered to Hesus, would of themselves oppose an insurmountable obstacle. But I have another reason, and one too altogether decisive of the question. Those who possess even a slight acquaintance with subjects of this kind are well aware, that the Romans supposed the Hesus of the Gauls to be their own Mars. See Religion des Gaulois, tom. 1. lib. 2. cap. 1. and 2. p. 246. &c. Therefore whatever is recorded in Cæsar and other authors, respecting the worship of Mars among the Gauls, is evidently to be understood of the worship of Hesus, who was called Mars by the Romans. Now read the following words of Cæsar's from lib. 6. De Bello Gallico, cap. 17. p. 193. and consider them as said of Hesus: Martem (putant Galli) bella regere: huic, quum prælio dimicare constituerunt, ea, quæ bello ceperunt, plerumque devovent: quæ superaverint, animalia capta immolant; reliquas res in unum locum conferunt, "The Gauls suppose Mars to rule over wars: to him, when they have decided upon going forth to battle, they mostly devote the spoils: the captured animals that survive they sacrifice; and bring the other things together into one place." Do these, I ask, contain even the slightest indication of the supreme Being; nay, do they not on the contrary show, that Hesus was no other than the deity supposed by that nation to preside over the waging of wars? My readers will pardon me for the length to which I have carried these remarks. It is of the utmost importance to disclose the true nature of the religions which flourished before the birth of our Saviour, and to divest them of the false expositions of learned men, in order that the benefits conferred by Christ upon mankind may be made more clear and manifest. But there are in these days, as there were formerly, men eminent for ability and erudition, who fancy themselves able to refute almost every charge of superstition and gross error in the nations of antiquity, or at least to persuade us that there were not so many blemishes to be found in them as the Christian fathers supposed; whose opinions are the more readily instilled into the mind, the more elegant is the style and form at the present day of the books, in which they are put forth. These, in my opinion, as far as truth will permit, we ought strenuously to oppose, lest some one

Fetisso, Wiracocha, Pachacamac, Vitziliputzti, &c. though worshipping withal other gods and idols. And we shall conclude this with the testimony of Josephus Acosta:* Hoc commune apud omnes pænè Barbaros est, ut Deum quidem omnium rerum supremum et summè bonum fateantur; spirituum vero quorundam perversorum non obscura opinio sit, qui à nostris Barbaris Zupay vocari solent. Igitur et quis ille summus, idemque sempiternus rerum omnium opifex, quem illi ignorantes colunt, per omnia doceri debent ab illo, illiusque fidelibus ministris angelis, absi a cacodæmonum, "This is common almost to all to confess one supreme God over all, who is perf also they have a persuasion amongst them of ce s, which are called by our Barbarians Zupay. ey ought to be first well instructed, what that ernal Maker of all things is, whom they ignorantl then how great a difference there is betwixt those , and his faithful ministers, the angels."[8]

XXVIII. It hath been already declared, that according to Themistius and Symmachus, two zealous Pagans, one and the same supreme God was worshipped in all the several pagan religions throughout the world, though after different manners. Which diversity of religions, as in their opinion it was no way inconvenient in itself, so neither was it ungrateful nor unacceptable to Almighty God, it being more for his honour, state, and grandeur, to be worshipped with this variety, than after one only manner. Now, that this was also the opinion of other ancienter Pagans before them, may appear from this remarkable testimony of Plutarch in his book De Iside, where defending

should start forth from the ranks of those who meditate evil to all religions, and chant to us in the old strain of Celsus, Hierocles, and others foes of Christianity: "What important boon, then, has Christ conferred upon the world, if the truth, for the most part at least, was already known before his time? What wonder is it, that the Christian doctrine should have been so speedily propagated, when its seeds had already been scattered among all nations, and needed a certain culture alone to insure their full growth and development?"

* De proc. Indor. Sal. lib. 5. 479.

[8] The subject here in question is not respecting the wise men, but the multitude and common people of the various eastern nations. I have no doubt, but that most of these nations worship one god, greater and more excellent than the rest of their deities; but I do doubt whether they have the same notion of this supreme God as ourselves, who have been enlightened by revelation. There are many things, which would lead me almost to the conclusion, that most of them confine the sway of their supreme deities within the limits of the countries which they themselves inhabit, and do not suppose it to extend farther than their own kingdoms. I should like any one, therefore, acquainted with these matters, to answer me the following queries: Do the Siamese believe their Sommonacodom to give laws not only to the kingdom of Siam but also to the Gauls, Germans, and all the rest of the world? Do the Indians conceive, that their supreme god Brama is lord also of Europe, or do they think that Europe is governed by one god and India by another? Do the Japanese suppose the god, whom they hold to be the head of the whole family of gods, to have power also out of their own island, and to control the entire globe?

the Egyptian worship, (which was indeed the main design of that whole book,) but withal declaring, that no inanimate thing ought to be looked upon or worshipped as a god, he writeth thus:* Οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεὸς· τοὺς δὲ δωρουμένους ἡμῖν καὶ παρέχοντας ἀένναα καὶ διαρκῆ θεοὺς ἐνομίσαμεν, οὐχ ἑτέρους παρ' ἑτέρους, οὐδὲ βαρβάρους καὶ Ἕλληνας, οὐδὲ νοτείους καὶ βορείους· ἀλλὰ ὥσπερ ἥλιος, καὶ σελήνη, καὶ οὐρανὸς, καὶ γῆ, καὶ θάλασσα, κοινὰ πᾶσιν, ὀνομάζεται δὲ ἄλλως ὑπ' ἄλλων, οὕτως ΈΝΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΥ τοῦ ταῦτα κοσμοῦντος, καὶ ΜΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΆΣ ἐπιτροπευούσης, καὶ δυνάμεων ὑπουργῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμένων, ἕτεραι παρ' ἑτέροις κατὰ νόμον γεγόνασι τιμαὶ καὶ προσηγορίαι· καὶ συμβόλοις χρῶνται καθιερώμενοι, οἱ μὲν ἀμυδροῖς, οἱ δὲ τρανωτέροις, ἐπὶ τὰ θεῖα νόησιν ὁδηγοῦντες οὐκ ἀκινδύνως, "No inanimate thing ought to be esteemed for a God, but they who bestow these things upon us, and afford us a continual supply thereof for our use, have been therefore accounted by us gods. Which gods are not different to different nations: as if the Barbarians and the Greeks, the southern and the northern inhabitants of the globe, had not any the same, but all other different gods. But as the sun, and the moon, and the heaven, and the earth, and the sea, are common to all, though called by several names in several countries; so ONE REASON ordering these things, and ONE PROVIDENCE dispensing all, and the inferior subservient ministers thereof, having had several names and honours bestowed upon them by the laws of several countries, have been every where worshipped throughout the whole world. And there have been also different symbols consecrated to them, the better to conduct and lead on men's understandings to divine things; though this hath not been without some hazard or danger of casting men upon one or other of these two inconveniences, either superstition or atheism." Where Plutarch plainly affirms, that the several religions of the pagan nations, whether Greeks or Barbarians, and among these the Egyptians also, as well as others, consisted in nothing else but the worshipping of one and the same supreme mind, reason, and providence, that orders all things in the world, and of its ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις ἐπὶ πάντα τεταγμέναι, "its subservient powers or ministers," appointed by it over all the several parts of the world; though under different names, rites, and ceremonies, and with different symbols.

Moreover, that Titus Livius was of the very same opinion, that the pagan gods of several countries, though called by several names, and worshipped with so great diversity of rites and ceremonies, yet were not for all that different, but the same common to all, may be concluded from this passage of his, where

* P. 377.

he writeth of Hannibal:* Nescio an mirabilior fuerit in adversis, quàm secundis rebus. Quippe qui mistos ex colluvione omnium gentium, quibus alius ritus, alia sacra, alii PROPE dii essent, ita uno vinculo copulaverit, ut nulla seditio exstiterit, "I know not whether Hannibal were more admirable in his adversity or prosperity; who having a mixed colluvies of all nations under him, which had different rites, different ceremonies, and almost different gods from one another, did notwithstanding so unite them altoge[illegible]mon bond, that there happened no sedition at [illegible]em." Where Livy plainly intimates, that thoug[illegible] great diversity of religious rites and ceremonies [illegible]gans, as if they had worshipped several gods, [illegible]f them all were really the same, namely, one su[illegible]d his ministers under him.[9] And the same Livy [illegible]ares this to have been the general opinion of the [illegible]alians likewise at that time; where he tells us, how [illegible]d with Q. Fulvius Flaccus, for that when being censor, and [illegible]ing a new temple in Spain, he uncovered another temple dedicated to Juno Lacinia amongst the Brutii, and taking off the marble tiles thereof, sent them into Spain to adorn his new erected temple withal; and how they accused him thereupon publicly in the senate house in this manner:† Quod ruinis templorum templa ædificaret, tanquam non iidem ubique dii immortales essent, sed spoliis aliorum alii colendi exornandique, "That with the ruins of temples he built up temples; as if there were not every where the same immortal gods; but that some of them might be worshipped and adorned with the spoils of others."[10]

* Lib. 28. cap. 12. [P. 679.]

[9] The learned Doctor has not quoted this passage of Livy as it stands in the author, but has extracted his meaning from a greater number of words. I doubt, however, whether many will approve of the interpretation. Livy writes that Hannibal's army was composed of various nations, differing not only in manners, language, and religion, but almost in gods. To me it seems difficult to understand how it can be inferred from hence, that their gods were really the same, although bearing different names, and moreover, that they worshipped one supreme God more excellent than the others, whom they regarded as his ministers. Learned men who are prepossessed in favour of a particular opinion are sometimes too ingenious in explaining the words of ancient authors.

† Doc. 5.

[10] This passage occurs lib. 42. cap. 3. p. 1113. It certainly shows that Livy, who here introduces the Roman people speaking his own sentiments, supposed the gods of the Romans to be worshipped also in Spain and other parts of the world. This was the general opinion of almost all the Romans: which seems to have originated in the first instance from a similarity of rites, and afterwards to have been strengthened by considerations of public utility. For the Romans calculated upon being able more easily to conciliate barbarous nations, if they could induce them to amalgamate their ceremonies, deities, and religion with their own, and could instil into their minds a belief, that the gods of Rome were the same as those of Gaul, Spain, and Germany. Hence, they gave the names of their own gods to those of barbarous nations. But that which here forms the main point in question, is not equally clear from this passage, namely, that Livy supposed all nations to have worshipped one supreme God of infinite power, and the lord of the universe.

The Egyptians were doubtless the most singular of all the Pagans, and the most oddly discrepant from the rest in their manner of worship; yet nevertheless, that these also agreed with the rest in those fundamentals of worshipping one supreme and universal Numen, together with his inferior ministers, as Plutarch sets himself industriously to maintain it, in that forementioned book De Iside; so was it further cleared and made out (as Damascius informs us) by two famous Egyptian philosophers, Asclepiades and Heraiscus, in certain writings of theirs, that have been since lost:* *Αἰγυπτίους δὲ ὁ μὲν Εὔδημος οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ἱστορεῖ· Οἱ δὲ Αἰγύπτιοι καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλόσοφοι γεγονότες, ἐξήνεγκαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κεκρυμμένην, εὑρόντες ἐν Αἰγυπτίοις δή τισι λόγοις, ὡς εἴη κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ μὲν μία τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴ, σκότος ἄγνωστον, &c. ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ἐκεῖνο περὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, ὅτι διαιρετικοί εἰσι πολλαχοῦ τῶν κατὰ ἕνωσιν ὑφεστώτων· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν διῃρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, ὡς ἔξεστι μαθεῖν τοῖς ἐκείνων συγγράμμασιν ἐντυχοῦσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις· λέγω δὲ τῇ Ἡραΐσκου ἀναγραφῇ τοῦ Αἰγυπτίου καθόλου λόγου, πρὸς τὸν Πρόκλον γραφείσῃ τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ τῇ ἀρξαμένῃ γράφεσθαι συμφωνίᾳ ὑπὸ Ἀσκληπιάδου τῶν Αἰγυπτίων πρός τοὺς ἄλλους Θεολόγους,* "Though Eudemus hath given us no certain account of the Egyptians, yet the Egyptian philosophers of latter times have declared the hidden truth of their theology, having found in some Egyptian monuments, that, according to them, there is one principle of all things, celebrated under the name of the unknown darkness, and this thrice repeated, &c. Moreover, this is to be observed concerning these Egyptians, that they are wont to divide and multiply things that are one and the same. And accordingly, have they divided and multiplied the first Intelligible, or the one supreme Deity, into the properties of many gods; as any one may find, that pleases to consult their writings: I mean that of Heraiscus, entitled, the Universal doctrine of the Egyptians, and inscribed to Proclus, the philosopher; and that symphony or harmony of the Egyptians with other theologers, begun to be written by Asclepiades, and left imperfect." Of which work of Asclepiades, the Egyptian Suidas, also maketh mention upon the word Heraiscus: *Ὁ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδης ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις βιβλίοις ἀνατραφεὶς, ἀκριβέστερος ἦν ἀμφὶ θεολογίαν τὴν πάτριον, ἀρχὰς τε αὐτῆς καὶ μέσα διεσκεμμένος ὡς ἔξεστιν εἰδέναι σαφῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ὕμνων, ὧν συγγέγραφεν εἰς τοὺς Αἰγυπτίων θεοὺς, καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς πραγματείας, ἣν ὥρμησε γράφε περιέχουσαν τῶν θεολογιῶν ἁπασῶν συμφωνίαν,* "But Ascl piades having been more conversant with ancient Egypti writings, was more thoroughly instructed, and exactly skilled his country theology; he having searched into the princi

* Damasc. de Princ. M. S. [Vide Wolfii Anecdota Græca, tom. 3. p. 260.]

thereof, and all the consequences resulting from them; as manifestly appeareth from those hymns which he composed in praise of the Egyptian gods, and from that tractate begun to be written by him (but left unfinished) which containeth the symphony of all theologies." Now, we say that Asclepiades' symphony of all the pagan theologers, and therefore of the Egyptian with the rest, was their agreement in those two fundamentals expressed by Plutarch; namely, the worshipping of one supreme and universal Numen, Reason, and Providence, governing all things; and then of his subservient ministers (the instrments of providence) appointed by him over all the parts of the world: which being honoured under several names, and with different rites and ceremonies, according to the laws of the respective countries, caused all that diversity of religions that was amongst them. Both which fundamental points of the pagan theology were in like manner acknowledged by Symmachus,[1] the first of them being thus expressed: Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt, unum putari, "That all religions agreed in this, the worshipping of one and the same supreme Numen:" and the second thus, Varios custodes urbibus mens divina distribuit, "That the divine Mind appointed divers guardian and tutelar spirits under him, unto cities and countries." He there adding also, that suus cuique mos est, suum cuique jus, "that every nation had their peculiar modes and manners in worshipping of these;" and that these external differences in religion ought not to be stood upon, but every one to observe the religion of his own country. Or else these two fundamental points of the pagan theology may be thus expressed: first, that there is one self-originated Deity, who was δημιουργὸς, or "Maker of the whole world;" secondly, that there are besides him other gods also, to be religiously worshipped (that is, intellectual beings superior to men) which were notwithstanding all made or created by that one. Stobæus thus declareth their sense:* Τὸ πλῆθος τῶν θεῶν ἔργον ἐστὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ, ἅμα τῷ κόσμῳ γενόμενον, "That the multitude of gods is the work of the Demiurgus, made by him, together with the world."[2]

[1] Epistolar. lib. 10. ep. 61. p. 442.

* Ecl. Phys. cap. 1. [Lib. 1. p. 4.]

[2] What the learned Doctor here states respecting the subject of this unfinished work of Asclepiades, On the Harmony of all Religions, is mere conjecture, altogether unsupported by arguments. For no ancient author has given us any account of the contents of this book. But, even supposing the conjecture to be well-founded, still I should consider, that little reliance is to be placed upon the authority of this writer. For the fact of his having dedicated his work to Proclus shows him to have belonged to the sect of the later Platonists, of which Proclus was a distinguished member. Doubtless, therefore, his object was to prove in this book, that the principles of his own sect were espoused not only by the Egyptians, but by all other nations: the vanity and futility of which is self-evident. Most of the gods of ancient nations, as has already been justly observed by the erudite J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Choisie, tom. 3. p. 81. were men who had lived in those countries, where they were worshipped. Con-

XXIX. And that the pagan theologers did thus generally acknowledge one supreme and universal Numen, appears plainly from hence, because they supposed the whole world to be an animal. Thus the writer De Placitis Philos.* and out of him Stobæus, Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες ἔμψυχον τὸν κόσμον καὶ προνοίᾳ διοικούμενον· Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος, καὶ ὅσοι τὰ ἄτομα εἰσηγοῦνται καὶ τὸ κενὸν, οὔτε ἔμψυχον οὔτε προνοίᾳ διοικεῖσθαι, φύσει δέ τινι ἀλόγῳ, "All others assert the world to be an animal, and governed by Providence; only Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, and those who make atoms and vacuum the principles of all things, dissenting, who neither acknowledge the world to be animated, nor yet to be governed by Providence, but by an irrational nature." Where, by the way, we may observe the fraud and juggling of Gassendus,[3] who takes occasion from hence highly to extol and applaud Epicurus, as one who approached nearer to Christianity than all the other philosophers, in that he denied the world to be an animal; whereas, according to the language and notions of those times, to deny the world's animation, and to be an Atheist, or to deny a God, was one and the same thing; because all the Pagans, who then asserted providence, held the world also to be animated: neither did Epicurus deny the world's animation upon any other account than this, because he denied Providence. And

sequently, he who endeavoured to refer the gods of all nations as it were to one family, and to identify them with those of the Egyptians, undertook a task no less difficult than his, who should take upon himself to prove, that the Mediterranean sea is the same as that which washes the shores of America or Arabia, or in other words, should attempt to show that to be a fact which is altogether impossible. But to try to reduce all the religions of the globe to the standard of the one Platonic sect, is even much more insane. Hence, those who laboured to do so, were obliged to resort to kinds of physical and imaginary interpretations, which the ancient Christians deservedly despised and ridiculed. But it was of the utmost importance to the Platonists to make the more ignorant believe, that all religions harmonized with each other and especially with the dogmas of their own sect, in order that they might not be without an answer to the Christians, who founded their strongest argument against the truth of the ancient superstitions upon the discordance both of the philosophers and their religions: as among other things is shown in Hermias' Irrisio Philosophiæ Gentilis, usually published along with Tatianus.

* Plut. lib. 2. cap. 3. Stob. Ecl. Phys. cap. 25.

[3] I regret that the learned Doctor has not pointed out the passage in which Gassendi suffered such words to escape him. In the writings which he has left behind him on the subject of Epicurus and his philosophy, nothing of the kind is to be found; although he there leaves no stone unturned in order to purge the character of this philosopher of every stain of infamy. As regards the opinion here professed by Dr. Cudworth, that all the ancient philosophers who asserted a god held the world to be animated, I cannot entirely concur in it. I much question whether Socrates, the parent of philosophy, believed in the world's animation, although, as is evident from Xenophon, he entertained no doubt of the being of a god. Nor will what Plato makes him say, persuade me to the contrary; since it is notorious, that Plato attributes many things to him to which he was altogether opposed. The soul ascribed by Aristotle to the world is the shadow and ghost of a soul rather than a soul; at all events, very different from that of Plato and Pythagoras. And yet he did not utterly deny a god; as we have already shown in another place. I pass over the rest of the ancient philosophers.

the ground upon which this opinion of the world's animation was built, was such as might be obvious even to vulgar understandings; and it is thus expressed by Plotinus, according to the sense of the ancients:* Ἄτοπον τὸν οὐρανὸν ἄψυχον λέγειν, ἡμῶν, οἳ μέρος σώματος ἔχομεν τοῦ παντὸς, ψυχὴν ἐχόντων· πῶς γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέρος ἔσχεν, ἀψύχου τοῦ παντὸς ὄντος; "It is absurd to affirm that the heaven or world is inanimate, or devoid of life and soul, when we ourselves, who have but a part of the mundane body in us, are endued with soul. For how could a part have life and soul in it, th[illegible]ead and inanimate?" Now, if the whole world be [illegible]n must it needs be governed by one soul, and not b[illegible]h one soul of the world, and the whole mundane a[illegible]me of the pagan theologers (as namely the Stoic[illegible]he πρῶτος θεὸς, "the first and highest God of [illegible]

Nevertheless, othe[illegible] theologers, though asserting the world's animation [illegible]ould by no means allow the mundane soul to be the [illegible]ty; they conceiving the first and highest God to be an abstract and immoveable mind, and not a soul. Thus the panegyrist, cited also by Gyraldus,† invokes the supreme Deity doubtfully and cautiously, as not knowing well what to call him, whether soul or mind: Te, summe rerum sator, cujus tot nomina sunt, quot gentium linguas esse voluisti; quem enim te ipse dici velis, scire non possumus: sive in te quædam vis mensque divina est, quæ toto infusa mundo omnibus miscearis elementis, et sine ullo extrinsecus accedente vigoris impulsu, per te ipse movearis; sive aliqua supra omne cœlum potestas es, quæ hoc opus totum ex altiore naturæ arce despicias: Te, inquam, oramus, &c. "Thou supreme Original of all things, who hast as many names as thou hast pleased there should be languages; whether thou beest a certain divine force and soul, that infused into the whole world art mingled with all the elements, and without any external impulse moved from thyself; or whether thou beest a power elevated above the heavens, which lookest down upon the whole work of nature, as from a higher tower; thee we invoke," &c. And as the supreme Deity was thus considered only as a perfect mind superior to soul, so was the mundane soul and whole animated world called by these Pagans frequently, Δεύτερος Θεὸς, "The second God." Thus in the Asclepian Dialogue or Perfect Oration, is the Lord and Maker of all said to have made a second god visible and sensible, which is the world.

But for the most part, they who asserted a God, superior to the soul of the world, did maintain a trinity of universal prin-

* En. 4. lib. 3. cap. 7. [De Dubiis Animæ, lib. 1. p. 576.]
† Hist. Deor. p. 12.

ciples, or divine hypostases subordinate; they conceiving, that as there was above the mundane soul a perfect mind or intellect, so that mind and intellect, as such, was not the first principle neither, because there must be νοητὸν in order of nature before νοῦς, an Intelligible before intellect. Which first Intelligible was called by them, τὸ ἓν and τἀγαθὸν, "the One," and "the Good," or unity and goodness itself substantial, the cause of mind and all things. Now as the "Tagathon," or highest of these three hypostases, was sometimes called by them, Ὁ πρῶτος θεὸς, "The first God," and νοῦς or "Intellect," ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, "the second god;" so was the mundane soul and animated world called τρίτος θεὸς, "the third god." Thus Numenius in Proclus upon Plato's Timæus:* Νουμήνιος μὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεοὺς, πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς, ὡς ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττὸς, ὅ τε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος, "Numenius praising three gods, calls the father the first God, the maker the second, and the work the third. For the world, according to him, is the third god; as he supposes also two opificers, the first and the second God." Plotinus† in like manner speaks of this also, as very familiar language amongst those Pagans: Καὶ ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥσπερ σύνηθες λέγειν, τρίτος, "And the world, as is commonly said, is the third god."

But neither they who held the supreme Deity to be an immoveable mind or intellect, superior to the mundane soul (as Aristotle and Xenocrates) did suppose that mundane soul and the whole world to have depended upon many such immoveable intellects self-existent, as their first cause, but only upon one: nor they, who admitting a trinity of divine hypostases, made the supreme Deity properly to be a Monad above mind or intellect, did conceive that intellect to have depended upon many such monads, as first principles co-ordinate, but upon one only. From whence it plainly appears, that the pagan theologers did always reduce things under a monarchy, and acknowledge not many independent deities, but one universal Numen (whether called soul, or mind, or monad) as the head of all. Though it hath been already declared, that those Pagans, who were Trinitarians, especially the Platonists, do often take those their three hypostases subordinate (a monad, mind, and soul) all together, for the τὸ θεῖον, or one supreme Numen; as supposing an extraordinary kind of unity in that trinity of hypostases, and so as it were a certain latitude and gradation in the Deity.

Where by the way two things may be observed concerning the pagan theologers; first, that according to them generally the

* Page 93. † Ennead. 3. lib. 5. sect. 6. [P. 296.]

whole corporeal system was not a dead thing, like a machine or automaton artificially made by men, but that life and soul was mingled with and diffused through it all: insomuch that Aristotle himself taxes those who made the world to consist of nothing but monads or atoms altogether dead and inanimate, as being therefore a kind of Atheists. Secondly, that how much soever some of them supposed the supreme Deity and first Cause to be elevated above the heaven and corporeal world, yet did they not therefore [illegible] the world to be quite cut off from that, or that [illegible] so as to have no commerce with it, nor influence [illegible] as all proceeded from this first Cause, so did the [illegible] to be closely and intimately united with all those [illegible] om itself (though without mixture and confusion [illegible] sist in it, and be pervaded by it. Plutarch, in [illegible] Questions* propounds this among the rest: Τί [illegible] ωτάτω θεὸν πατέρα πάντων καὶ ποιητὴν προσεῖπεν [illegible] called the highest God the father and maker of a [illegible] ch he answers in the first place thus: Τῶν μὲν θεων γεννητων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστι, ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλώγων καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων, "That perhaps he was called the father of all the generated gods, and of men, but the maker of the irrational and inanimate things of the world." But afterward he adds, that this highest God might therefore be styled the father of the whole corporeal world also, as well as the maker, because it is no dead and inanimate thing, but endued with life: Ἐμψύχου γὰρ γέννησις ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι· καὶ ποιητοῦ μὲν, οἷος οἰκοδόμος ἢ ὑφάντης, ἢ λύρας δημιουργὸς ἢ ἀνδρίαντος, ἀπήλλακται τό γενόμενον ἔργον· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννήσαντος ἀρχὴ καὶ δύναμις ἐγκέκραται τῷ τεκνωθέντι, καὶ συνέχει τὴν φύσιν, ἀπόσπασμα καὶ μόριον οὖσαν τοῦ τεκνώσαντος. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐ πεπλασμένοις ὁ κόσμος οὐδὲ συνηρμοσμένοις ποιήμασιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτῷ μοῖρα πολλὴ ζωότητος καὶ θειότητος, ἣν ὁ θεὸς ἐγκατέσπειρεν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ κατέμιξεν, εἰκότως ἅμα πατήρ τε τοῦ κόσμου, ζώου γεγονότος, καὶ ποιητὴς ἐπονομάζεται, "Generation is the making or production of something animate. And the work of an artificer, as an architect or statuary, as soon as it is produced, departeth and is removed from the maker thereof, as having no intrinsic dependence upon him; whereas from him that begetteth, there is a principle and power infused into that which is begotten, and mingled therewith, that containeth the whole nature thereof, as being a kind of avulsion from the begetter. Wherefore since the world is not like to those works that are artificially made and compacted by men, but hath a participation of life and divinity, which God hath inserted into it, and mingled with it, God is therefore rightly styled by Plato, not only the maker, but also the father of the

* Page 100. par.

whole world as being an animal." To the same purpose also Plotinus,* Γενόμενος δὴ, οἷον οἰκός τις καλὸς καὶ ποικίλος, οὐκ ἀπετμήθη τοῦ πεποιηκότος, οὐδ' αὖ ἐκοίνωσεν αὐτὸν· ἔχει γὰρ ψυχὴν, κρατούμενος, οὐ κρατῶν, καὶ ἐχόμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχων, κεῖται γὰρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνεχούσῃ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὐκ ἄμοιρον ἔστιν αὐτῆς, ὡς ἂν ἐν ὕδασι δίκτυον τεγγόμενον ζωῇ, "The world being made as a large and stately edifice, was neither cut off and separated from its Maker, nor yet mingled and confounded with him. Forasmuch as he still remaineth above, presiding over it; the world being so animated, as rather to be possessed by soul than to possess it, it lying in that great Psyche, which sustaineth it, as a net in the waters, all moistened with life." Thus Plotinus supposing the whole corporeal world to be animated, affirmeth it neither to be cut off from its maker (by which maker he here understands the mundane soul), nor yet that mundane soul itself to be immersed into its body the world, after the same manner as our human souls are into these bodies; but so to preside over it, and act it, as a thing elevated above it. And though, according to him, that second divine hypostasis of Nous or Intellect be in like manner elevated above this mundane soul, and again, that first hypostasis or supreme Deity (called by him unity and goodness), above intellect; yet the corporeal world could not be said to be cut off from these neither; they being all three (monad, mind, and soul) closely and intimated united together.

XXX. The Hebrews were the only nation, who before Christianity for several ages professedly opposed the polytheism and idolatry of the pagan world. Wherefore it may be probably concluded, that they had the right notion of this pagan polytheism, and understood what it consisted in, viz. whether in worshipping many unmade, self-originated deities, as partial creators of the world; or else in worshipping, besides the supreme God, other created beings superior to men? Now Philo plainly understood the pagan polytheism after this latter way; as may appear from this passage of his in his book concerning the Confusion of Languages, where speaking of the supreme God (the maker and lord of the whole world), and of his δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὶ, his "innumerable assistant powers," both visible and invisible, he adds:† Καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινες τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδεν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, ὧν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν κατιδὼν Μωϋσῆς φησι· κύριε, κύριε, βασιλεῦ τῶν θεῶν, ἔνδειξιν τῆς παρ' ὑπηκόους ἄρχοντος διαφορᾶς, "Wherefore some men being struck with admiration of both these worlds, the visible and the

* Ennead. 4. lib. 3. cap. 9. [P. 379.] † Page 345.

invisible, have not only deified the whole of them, but also their several parts, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven: they not scrupling to call these gods. Which notion and language of theirs Moses respected in those words of his, *Thou Lord the king of gods*; he thereby declaring the transcendency of the supreme God above all those his subjects called gods." To the same purpose Philo writeth also in his Commentary upon the Decalogue:* Πᾶσαν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην τερθρείαν ἀπωσάμενοι, τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς φύσει [illegible] εν, εἰ καὶ καθαρωτέρας καὶ ἀθανατωτέρας οὐσίας [illegible] ι δ' ἀλλήλων τὰ γενόμενα, καθ' ὃ γέγονεν· ἐπεὶ κ[illegible] ων ὁ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων· καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο καὶ ἱερώ[illegible] μα στηλιτεύσωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἕνα τὸν ἀνωτάτω νομί[illegible] θεὸν, "Wherefore removing all such imposti[illegible] hip no beings, that are by nature brothers and [illegible] though endued with far more pure and immo[illegible] n we are. For all created things, as such, have [illegible] ane and brotherly equality with one another, the maker [illegible] hings being their common father. But let us deeply infix this first and most holy commandment in our breasts, to acknowledge and worship one only highest God." And again afterwards: "Ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν, ὡς θεῶν, πρόπολοί τε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες, "They who worship the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven and world, and the principal parts of them as gods, err, in that they worship the subjects of the prince;" whereas the prince alone ought to be worshipped. Thus, according to Philo, the pagan polytheism consisted in giving religious worship, besides the supreme God, to other created understanding beings, and parts of the world, more pure and immortal than men.[4]

* Page 753.

[4] I have no hesitation in saying, however, that these passages of Philo contain nothing confirmatory of Dr. Cudworth's opinion, that the pagan polytheists worshipped one God, superior to all the other deities. For in the former Philo affirms merely, that Moses held this belief and rebuked the folly of the nations, that called the world and the several parts of the world gods, by this very invocation of the supreme Being. But what, I ask, has this to do with the opinion of the Pagans respecting one God? Does it follow, because they worshipped the world and the several parts of the world as gods and Moses abominated this wickedness, that there was no one so insane as to discard a supreme God, the parent of all things? For my part I think not, being convinced, that the worthy Doctor has here been much too quick-sighted in interpreting Philo. Neither is the other passage of more avail in this matter. In it Philo is showing, that we ought to worship one God and not to pay created beings the homage, which is due only to the Creator. But I cannot understand, how the circumstance of Philo's inculcating the worship of one God and exhorting us to reject superstitions, is to be regarded as proof, that all nations acknowledged one God. To confess the truth, the contrary seems to me to be evident rather from this passage. Indeed I think I can make it plainly appear, that Philo entertained a very different notion of idolatry from Dr. Cudworth and was of opinion, that the nations of antiquity had lost all

Flavius Josephus, in his Judaic Antiquities,[5] extolling Abraham's wisdom and piety, writeth thus concerning him: Πρῶτος οὖν τολμᾷ θεὸν ἀποφήνασθαι δημιουργὸν τῶν ὅλων ἕνα, which some would understand in this manner, "that Abraham was the first who publicly declared that there was one God the Demiurgus or maker of the whole world;" as if all mankind besides, at that time, had supposed the world to have been made not by one, but by many gods. But the true meaning of those words is this, that Abraham was the first, who, in that degenerate age, publicly declared, that the maker of the whole world was the

knowledge of one supreme Deity. To do so, I shall quote two passages, which in my opinion put it beyond all question. One occurs in his Commentary on the Decalogue, p. 751. 752. opp. where Philo is professedly treating upon the religion of the nations ignorant of the true religion: and in the first place divides it into its sects, as follows: Ἐκτεθειώκασι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχάς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ, οἱ δ' ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν, οἱ δὲ τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον, "For some have deified the four elements, the earth, water, air, and fire; others the sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars; others only heaven; and others the whole world." Philo, therefore, as is manifest also from other passages of his, made the whole of the pagan polytheism to consist in the worship of the world or its parts, and did not believe departed men to belong to the number of pagan gods; in which matter indeed he deferred too much to the expositions of the ancient religions put forth by philosophers. Having made this distribution, he boldly asserts of all these sects, that the knowledge of one supreme God was utterly obliterated and extinct among them: Τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύτατον γεννήτην, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀηττήτου στρατιᾶς, καὶ κυβερνήτην, ὃς οἰκονομεῖ σωτηρίως ἀεὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, "But the supreme and most ancient Parent, the prince of the mighty city, the leader of the invincible army, the governor who ever wisely administers all things, they have veiled in obscurity." He then at some length descants upon the folly of those, who held heaven and the stars in the rank of gods, and among other things expressly attributes to some of this class the very opinion, which Dr. Cudworth denies to have ever been entertained by any people: Ἔνιοι περὶ τὰς κρίσεις ἀπονοίᾳ τοσαύτῃ κέχρηνται, ὡς οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα θεοὺς νομίζειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μέγιστον καὶ πρῶτον Θεὸν, τὸν ὄντα ὄντως, "Some are so perverse in their judgment, as not only to believe that the above-mentioned things are gods, but also that each of them is the supreme and greatest God, who is really such." If this be true, there were formerly those, who believed in the existence of a plurality of gods, perfectly equal to each other and not subject to the power of one. The other passage which I shall appeal to occurs in his book on Monarchy, p. 812. where he thus writes: Τινὲς ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀστέρας ὑπέλαβον εἶναι θεοὺς αὐτοκράτορας, οἷς τὰς τῶν γινομένων ἁπάντων αἰτίας ἀνέθεσαν, "Some believed the sun, moon, and the rest of the stars, to be independent gods, to whom they referred the causes of all things." We here see a kind of republic of gods, governing by their own power. But in the sequel he speaks still more plainly and among other things openly asserts, that many acknowledged no other gods but the sun and moon: Οἱ γὰρ ἰδόντες ἥλιον——καὶ σελήνην, πλάνον ἐπλανήθησαν ἀνήνυτον, μόνους εἶναι τούτους θεοὺς ὑποτοπήσαντες, "For some, beholding the sun——and moon, were led into inextricable error——supposing these to be the only gods." For the rest of this argument I refer my reader to Philo himself, who certainly is very far from supporting the opinion of our author.

[5] Lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 28. &c. tom. 1. opp. But this passage, if even we adopt the learned Doctor's interpretation, is not at all to the present question. For Josephus is not stating, what sentiments the nations of antiquity entertained respecting God and religion, much less that those nations acknowledged one supreme Deity, but is merely expounding the doctrine and religious opinions of Abraham, whom no one has ever ventured to deny to have been a worshipper of one God.

one only God, and alone to be religiously worshipped; accordingly, as it follows afterwards in the same writer: Ὧι καλῶς ἔχει μόνῳ τὴν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν εὐχαριστίαν ἀπονέμειν, "to whom alone men ought to give honour and thanks." And the reason hereof is there also set down: Τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν, εἰ καί τι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντελεῖ, κατὰ προσταγὴν τὴν τούτου παρέχειν ἕκαστον, καὶ οὐ κατ' οἰκείαν ἰσχύν, "Because all those other beings, that were then worshipped as gods, whatsoever any of them contri-
buted to the happine [illegible] they did it not by their own power, but by his ap[illegible]ommand;" he instancing in the sun and moon, [illegible]ea, which are all made and ordered by a higher p[illegible]dence, by the force whereof they contribute to o[illegible]if he should have said, that no created being ou[illegible]iously worshipped, but the Creator only. And [illegible] what we read in Scripture concerning Abraham [illegible]led upon the name of the Lord, אל עולם,* the [illegible]le world;" that is, he worshipped no particular created beings, as the other Pagans at that time did, but only that supreme universal Numen, which made and containeth the whole world. And thus Maimonides interprets that place, †התחיל להודיע לעם שאין ראוי לעבוד אלא לאלוה העולם "Abraham began to teach, that none ought to be religiously worshipped, save only the God of the whole world." Moreover, the same Josephus[6] afterwards in his twelfth book brings in Aristæus (who seems to have been a secret proselyted Greek) pleading with Ptolemæus Philadelphus, in behalf of the Jews and their liberty, after this manner: Τὴν βασιλείαν σου διέποντος, τοῦ θεμένου τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς· τὸν γὰρ ἅπαντα συστησάμενον θεὸν, καὶ οὗτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς σεβόμεθα, Ζῆνα καλοῦντες αὐτὸν, ἑτοίμως ἀπὸ τοῦ σύμπασιν ἐμφύειν τὸ ζῆν, τὴν ἐπίκλησιν αὐτοῦ νοήσαντες, "It would well agree with your goodness and magnanimity, to free the Jews from that miserable captivity which they are under: since the same God, who governeth your kingdom, gave laws to them, as I have by diligent search found out. For both they and we do alike worship the God who made all things, we calling him Zene, because he gives life to all. Wherefore for the honour

* Gen. xxi. 23. † De Idol. c. 1. sect. 7. [P. 7. Edit. Voss.]

[6] Cap. 2. sect. 2. p. 586. tom. 1. opp. Havercampi. I should not be disposed to put much faith in this oration of Aristæus. For, I. It is the production of Josephus, who, as is well known, attempted to show, that there was less difference between the religion of the Jews and those of other nations, than people generally supposed; in which he very frequently exceeds all bounds. II. The object of this oration was to propitiate the king, and to excite his compassion. And who is not aware, that in discourses of this kind men attend less to what is in strict conformity with the truth, than to what is calculated to produce an impression upon the minds of those, whom they are addressing. III. Supposing Aristæus to have really believed the Grecian Jupiter to be the same as the God of the Hebrews, still the opinion of a scholar and philosopher like him will be no clue to the religions of the people, who are accustomed to *pay little regard* to what wise men may say and inculcate.

of that God, whom they worship after a singular manner, please you to indulge them the liberty of returning to their native country." Where Aristæus also, according to the sense of Pagans, thus concludes: Know, O king, that I intercede not for these Jews, as having any cognation with them, Πάντων δὲ ἀνθρώπων δημιούργημα ὄντων τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ γινώσκων αὐτὸν ἡδόμενον τοῖς εὐποιοῦσιν, ἐπὶ τούτῳ καὶ σε παρακαλῶ, "But all men being the workmanship of God, and knowing that he is delighted with beneficence, I therefore thus exhort you."

As for the latter Jewish writers and rabbins, it is certain, that the generality of them supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme and universal Numen, and to have worshipped all their other gods only as his ministers, or as mediators between him and them: Maimonides in Halacoth[7] עכו"ם describeth the rise of the pagan polytheism in the days of Enosh after this manner: בימי אנוש טעו בני האדם טעות גדול ונבערה עצת חכמי אותו הדור ואנוש עצמו מן הטועים היה וזו היתה טעותם: אמרו הואיל והאל ברא כוכבים אלו וגלגלים להנחת את העולם ונתנם במרום וחלק להם כבוד והם שמשים המשמשים לפניו ראויים הם לשובחם ולפארם ולחלוק להם כבוד וזהו רצון האל ברוך הוא לגדל ולכבד מי שגדלו וכבדו כמו שהמלך רוצה לכבוד העומדים לפניו וזהו כבודו של מלך "In the days of Enosh, the sons of men grievously erred, and the wise men of that age became brutish (even Enosh himself being in the number of them); and their error was this, that since God had created the stars and spheres to govern the world, and placing them on high, had bestowed this honour upon them, that they should be his ministers and subservient instruments, men ought therefore to praise them, honour them, and worship them; this being the pleasure of the blessed God, that men should magnify and honour those whom himself hath magnified and honoured, as a king will have his ministers to be reverenced, this honour redounding to himself." Again, the same Maimonides in the beginning of the second chapter of that book writeth thus: עיקר הצווי העבודה זרה שלא לעבוד אחד מכל הברואים לא מלאך ולא גלגל ולא כוכב ולא אחד מן היסודות ולא אחד מכל הנבראים מהן ואף על פי שהעובד יודע שהשם הוא האלהים והוא עובד הנברא הזה על דרך שעבד אנוש ואנשי דורו תחלה הרי זה עבד עבודה זרה "The foundation of that commandment against strange worship (now commonly called idolatry) is this, that no man should worship any of the creatures whatsoever, neither angel, nor sphere, nor star, nor any of the four elements, nor any thing made out of them. For though he that worships these things knows that the Lord is God, and superior to them all, and worships those creatures no otherwise than Enosh and the rest of that age did, yet is he nevertheless guilty of strange worship or idolatry." And that, after the

[7] That is, De Idololatria, cap. 1. sect. 1. p. 3.

times of Enosh also, in succeeding ages, the polytheism of the pagan nations was no other than this, the worshipping (besides one supreme God) of other created beings, as the ministers of his providence, and as middles or mediators betwixt him and men, is declared likewise by Maimonides (in his More Nevochim) to have been the universal belief of all the Hebrews or Jews:*
ואתה יודע כי כל מי שעובד עבודה זרה לא יעבדה דעת שאין אלוה בלעדיה
יה ולא דמה מעולם כלל מן העובדים ולא ידמה מן הבאים שהצורה אשר
יעשה מן חמתכות או מן האב ה ההיא היה אשר בראה
השמים והארץ אבל אמנם יעבד דמיון לדבר שהיא אמצעי
ק בו אחד מבעלי תודתנו בינם ובין האלוה וז "You
know, that whosoever lolatry, he doth it not as
supposing that there i besides that which he wor-
shippeth, for it never inds of any idolaters, nor
never will, that that made by them of metal, or
stone, or wood, is that created heaven and earth;
but they worship the images only as the repre-
sentation of something is a mediator between God and
them."[8] Moses Albelda, the author of the book entitled עולת תמיד
"Gnolath Tamid," resolves all the pagan polytheism and idolatry into these two principles, one of which respected God, and the other men themselves:† האמונה לזה מצדו יה ואומרום כי הוא גבוה
מעל גבוה ואא לחדבק בו רק עי תאמצעיום כמנהג המלך בו שהרוצים לשאול
שאלה מה ממנו ישאלוה עי אמצעי ולכן עשים אותה הנא כדי להודיד השפע

* P. 1. c. 36.

[8] I shall not attempt to call in question these testimonies of Maimonides, although I could offer a remark or two upon them perhaps not altogether unimportant. Let me intimate, however, that this great master of the Jews was not wedded to the same opinion as Dr. Cudworth, that there never existed a nation, which did not acknowledge one God, the king and lord of all the others. For there are passages, wherein he expressly states, that before Abraham inculcated the doctrine of one God, all knowledge of this supreme Being was lost to the world, and that the learned as well as unlearned believed in the existence of no deities, except the stars and heavenly bodies. In fact Maimonides comprises the entire history of idolatry, which he supposes to have flourished in the world before Abraham's time, in two periods. In the former of these periods the condition of mankind he tells us, was such as Dr. Cudworth supposes it to have been in all ages, that is, they worshipped the stars and heavenly bodies, but yet did not deny a supreme God, whom all the stars obey: De Idololatria, cap. 1. sect. 23. p. 5. 6. In the latter period he considers much greater corruption to have prevailed, and the ignorant and learned alike to have erred so grossly, as to acknowledge no god but the stars, the knowledge of one supreme Being being utterly eradicated. I shall give his own words, in a translation only, to save space, De Idololatr. cap. 1. sect. 5. p. 6. "In process of time," says he, "the venerable and awful name perished from the mouths and minds of men, so that they no longer recognized it. And now the whole human race . . . . knew nothing, but images. . . . . But even the wise among them, such as the priests and others of that class, did not suppose any other god to exist besides the stars, on account and in resemblance of which those images were made." This distribution Maimonides has in view in the second passage quoted by Dr. Cudworth, when he declares, that though any one should worship many gods after the manner of Enosh, that is, be addicted to the better sort of idolatry, he is nevertheless guilty of strange worship. From which therefore we can by no means infer, that Maimonides supposed all men formerly to have been devoted to that species of religion.

† Fol. 147.

האלהי על ידה: הב טוענין מצד עצמם וזה כי היות האדם בשמי איט יכול להתבורך מעצמו אם לא ישים נכדו דבר מה מחשש יעידהו ויעודדו להכין עצמו בדי שתדבק בו השגחתו יתברך " The idolaters first argued thus in respect of God; that since he was of such transcendent perfection above men, it was not possible for men to be united to, or have communion with him, otherwise than by means of certain middle beings or mediators; as it is the manner of earthly kings, to have petitions conveyed to them by the hands of mediators and intercessors. Secondly, they thus argued also in respect of themselves; that being corporeal, so that they could not apprehend God abstractly, they must needs have something sensible to excite and stir up their devotion and fix their imagination upon." Joseph Albo, in the book called Ikkarim, concludes that Ahab, and the other idolatrous kings of Israel and Judah worshipped other gods upon those two accounts mentioned by Maimonides and no otherwise, namely, that the supreme God " was honoured by worshipping of his ministers," and that there ought to be " certain middles and mediators betwixt him and men,"* אחאב וזולתו ממלכי ישראל ויהודה היו טועין אחר הכהות הגלגל יות משתי צדדין שאמרנו וגם שלמה מעה בזה עם היותם מאמינים במציאות השם ואחדותו אם כשהיו חושבים לגדר את השם בזה ואם כשהיו חושבין לעשות סרסור ואמצעיים בינם ובין השם יתב " Ahab, and other kings of Israel and Judah, and even Solomon himself, erred in worshipping the stars, upon those two accounts already mentioned out of Maimonides, notwithstanding that they believed the existence of God and his unity; they partly conceiving that they should honour God in worshipping of his ministers, and partly worshipping them as mediators betwixt God and themselves." And the same writer determines the meaning of that first commandment (which is to him the second) " Thou shalt have no other gods before my face," to be this, להנכים אותם אמצעיים ביני וביניך או שתחשוב לרומם אותי בעבודתם " Thou shalt not set up other inferior gods as mediators betwixt me and thyself, or worship them so, as thinking to honour me thereby." R. David Kimehi (upon 2 Kings xvii.) writeth thus concerning that Israelitish priest, who, by the king of Assyria's command, was sent to Samaria to teach the new inhabitants thereof to worship the God of that land (of whom it is afterwards said, that they both feared the Lord, and served their idols): אם יאמר להם שלא יהיו עובדים עבודה זרה כלל לא היו מאמינים שהוא דבר שנדלו בו כל האומות מקדם והוא אצלם כמו מושכל ראשון אך אמר להם שיהיו עובדים את אלוהיהם כמו שהיו עובדים ובלבד שתהא בוונת האל בלבם כי אלא האלהים לא ורעו ולא ייטיבו כי אם ברצון האל אלא שעובדים אותם להיותם אמצעיים בינם ובין הבורא " If he should have altogether prohibited them their idolatry, they would not have hearkened to him, that being a thing which

* P. 3. c. 18.

all those eastern people were educated in from their very infancy, insomuch that it was a kind of first principle to them. Wherefore he permitted them to worship all their several gods, as before they had done; only he required them to direct the intention of their minds to the God of Israel (as the supreme) for those gods could neither do them good nor hurt, otherwise than according to his will and pleasure: but they worshipped them to this purpose, that they might be MEDIATORS betwixt them and the Creator." I[illegible]zachon, all the polytheism and idolatry of the P[illegible] to these three heads: first, נבדו משרתי חשם לכבודו [illegible] worshipped the ministers of God, as thinking to [illegible]ereby;" and secondly, עבדו אותם שיהיו מליצים בעדם [illegible] worshipped them as orators and intercessors for th[illegible]nd lastly, עבדו לעץ ואבן לזכרו "When they worship [illegible] wood and stone for memorials of him." And [illegible] true that Isaac Abrabanel (upon 2 Kings xvii.) [illegible]te more species of pagan idolatry, even to the [illegible], yet are they all of them but so many several modes of creature-worship; and there is no such thing amongst them to be found, as the worshipping of many unmade independent deities, as partial creators of the world.

Moreover, those Rabbinic writers commonly interpret certain places of the Scripture to this sense, that the pagan idolaters did notwithstanding acknowledge one supreme Deity, as that Jeremy x. 7, "Who is there that will not fear thee, thou King of nations? For amongst all their wise men, and in all their kingdoms, there is none like unto thee; though they are become altogether brutish, and their worshipping of stocks is a doctrine of vanity;" for Maimonides thus glosseth upon those words: כלומר הכל יודעים שאתה הוא לבדך אבל מעותם וכסילותם שמדמים שזה ההבל רצונך הוא "As if he should say, all the Gentiles know, that thou art the only supreme God, but their error and folly consisteth in this, that they think this vanity of worshipping inferior gods to be a thing agreeable to thy will." And thus also Kimchi in his Commentaries: מי לא יראך אפילו הגוים העובדים האלילים ראוי להם שייראוך כי אתה מלך עליהם בכל חכמי הגוים ובכל מלכותם אומרים מאין כמוך ואינם עובדים הכוכבים אלא להיותם אמצעיים בינך ובינם ואמר חכמי הגוים כי הם יודעים כי הפסל אינו כלום ואם יעבדו הכוכבים לא יעבדים אלא מפני שהם משרתיך להיותם אמצעיים "Who will not fear thee? It is fit, that even the nations themselves, who worshipped idols, should fear thee, for thou art their king; and indeed amongst all the wise men of the nations, and in all their kingdoms, it is generally acknowledged, that there is none like unto thee. Neither do they worship the stars otherwise than as mediators betwixt thee and them. Their wise men know that an idol is nothing; and though they worship stars, yet do they worship them as thy

ministers, and that they may be intercessors for them." Another place is that, Malachi i. 11. which, though we read in the future tense, as a prophecy of the Gentiles, yet the Jews understand it of that present time, when those words were written, "From the rising of the sun to the going down thereof, my name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place incense is offered to my name, and a pure oblation, for my name is great amongst the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts. But you profane it," &c. Upon which words R. Solomon glosseth thus: מי שיש לא עֵן יודע שהוא אלוה שהוא על כולם ובכל מקום מהנדבים לשמי אפ האומות "The pagan Polytheists and idolaters know, that there is one God superior to all those other gods and idols worshipped by them; and in every place are there free-will offerings brought to my name, even amongst the Gentiles." And Kimchi agreeth with him herein: אפ על פי שהגוים עובדים לצבא השמים מידים בי שאני הסבה הראשונה אלא שעובדים אותם שיהיו אמצעיים ביני וביגם "Although the Pagans worshipped the host of heaven, yet do they confess me to be the first Cause, they worshipping them only as in their opinion certain mediators betwixt me and them." Whether either of these two places of Scripture does sufficiently prove what these Jews would have, or no; yet, however, it is evident from their interpretations of them, that themselves supposed the Pagans to have acknowledged one supreme Deity, and that their other gods were all but his creatures and ministers. Nevertheless, there is another place of Scripture, which seems to sound more to this purpose, and accordingly hath been thus interpreted by Rabbi Solomon and others, Psalm lxv. 6, where God is called מבטח כל קעוי ארץ וים רחקים "The confidence of all the ends of the earth, and of them that are afar off in the sea," that is, even of all the pagan world.

Thus we see plainly, that the Hebrew doctors and rabbins have been generally of this persuasion, that the pagan nations anciently, at least the intelligent amongst them, acknowledged one supreme God of the whole world; and that all their other gods were but creatures and inferior ministers; which were worshipped by them upon these two accounts, either as thinking, that the honour done to them redounded to the Supreme, or else that they might be מליצין, סרסורים, and אמצעיים, "their mediators, and intercessors, orators, and negotiators" with him. Which inferior gods of the Pagans were supposed by these Hebrews to be chiefly of two kinds, angels and stars or spheres. The latter of which the Jews, as well as Pagans, concluded to be animated and intellectual; for thus Maimonides expressly:* כל הכוכבים והגלגלים כולן בעלי נפש וריעה והשפל הם וחם חיים ועומדים וכמדין את מי שאמר והיה העולם בל אחד ואחר לפי מדלו ולפי מעלתו

* Jesude Hattotah, c. 3. sect. 9.

משבחין ומפארים ליוצרם כמו המלאכים "The stars and spheres are every one of them animated, and endued with life, knowledge and understanding. And they acknowledge Him, who commanded and the world was made, every one of them, according to their degree and excellency, praising and honouring him, as the angels do." And this they would confirm from that place of scripture, Neh. ix. 6, "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth with all things [illegible], the seas and all that is therein, and thou pre[illegible]; and the host of heaven worshippeth thee:" th[illegible]en being commonly put for the stars.

XXXI. But lastly [illegible]g is plainly confirmed from the Scriptures of the [illegible]t also; that the Gentiles and Pagans, however [illegible] idolaters, were not unacquainted with the kno[illegible]ue God, that is, of the one only self-existent and [illegible]ing, which comprehendeth all things under him: from whence it must needs follow, that their other many gods were all of them supposed to have been derived from this one, and to be dependent on him.

For first, St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans[9] tells us, that these Gentiles or Pagans did τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδικίᾳ κατέχειν, "hold the truth in unrighteousness, or unjustly detain and imprison the same." Which is chiefly to be understood of the truth concerning God, as appears from that which follows, and therefore, implies the Pagans not to have been unfurnished of such a knowledge of God, as might and ought to have kept them from all kinds of idolatry, however, by their default it proved ineffectual to that end; as is afterwards declared: Οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν Θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει,* "They liked not to retain God in the agnition," or "practical knowledge of him." Where there is a distinction to be observed betwixt γνῶσις and ἐπίγνωσις, "the knowledge" and "the agnition" of God; the former whereof, in this chapter, is plainly granted to the Pagans, though the latter be here denied them, because they lapsed into polytheism and

[9] I am not disposed to undervalue this exposition of the apostle's words, which assumes ἐν ἀδικίᾳ to be the same as ἀδίκως, or "unjustly;" nor am I ignorant, that it has been adopted by men of the highest eminence. Nevertheless, the following interpretation, I am convinced, is more elegant and more in accordance with the context: "Who by their injustice have prevented the truth from developing itself in their minds." That the words themselves will bear this interpretation, is unquestionable; neither does any one require to be told, that ἀδικία signifies *impiety* and *depravity* generally. And that the heavenly truth was formerly, as it is daily even now, stifled as it were and suppressed by the impiety, vices, and lusts of mankind, is most manifest. And the more depraved and vicious we are, the less are our minds illumined with the light of reason and true wisdom. Hence, the Gentiles, indulging in a most depraved course of life and imposing no restraint upon their lusts, by this ἀδικία caused their knowledge of God to be gradually extinguished in their minds and the most pernicious errors to usurp the place of truth.

* *Verse 28.*

idolatry; which is the meaning of these words: Μετήλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει,* "They changed the truth of God into a lie." Again, the same apostle there affirmeth, that the τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, "that which may be known of God, was manifest within them, God himself having showed it unto them." There is something of God unknowable and incomprehensible by all mortals, but that of God, which is knowable, his eternal power and godhead, with the attributes belonging thereunto, is made manifest to all mankind from his works. "The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, being clearly seen and understood by the things that are made." Moreover, this apostle expressly declareth the Pagans to have known God, in that censure which he giveth of them, διότι γνόντες τὸν Θεὸν, οὐχ ὡς Θεὸν ἐδόξασαν:† "That when they knew God, they glorified him not as God;" because they fell into polytheism and idolatry. Though the apostle here instanceth only in the latter of those two, their "changing the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds and beasts, and creeping things." The reason whereof is, because this idolatry of the Pagans, properly so called, that is, their worshipping of stocks and stones, formed into the likeness of man or beast, was generally taken amongst the Jews for the grossest of all their religious miscarriages. Thus Philo plainly declareth:‡ Ὅσοι μὲν ἡλίου, καὶ σελήνης, καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ κόσμου, καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁλοσχερεστάτων μερῶν, ὡς θεῶν, πρόπολοί τε καὶ θεραπευταὶ, διαμαρτάνουσι μέν· (πῶς γὰρ οὔ, τοὺς ὑπηκόους τοῦ ἄρχοντος σεμνύνοντες) ἧττον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι, τῶν ξύλα καὶ λίθους, ἀργυρόν τε καὶ χρυσὸν, καὶ τὰς παραπλησίους ὕλας μορφωσάντων, &c. "Whosoever worship the sun, and moon, and the whole heaven, and world, and the chief parts thereof, as gods, do unquestionably err, (they honouring the subjects of the prince) but they are guilty of the less iniquity and injustice than those, who form wood and stone, gold and silver, and the like matters, into statues, to worship them," &c. of which assertion he afterwards gives this account: Τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστον ἔρεισμα τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξέκοψαν, τὴν περὶ τοῦ ζῶντος ἀεὶ θεοῦ προσήκουσαν ὑπόληψιν, "Because these have cut off the most excellent fulcrum of the soul, the persuasion of the ever-living God, by means whereof, like unballasted ships, they are tossed up and down perpetually, nor can be ever able to rest in any safe harbour." And from hence it came to pass, that the polytheism of the Pagans, their worshipping of inferior gods (as stars and demons) was vulgarly called also by the Jews and Christians, idolatry, it being so denominated by them à famosiore specie. Lastly, the apostle plainly declares,

* Verse 25. † Verse 21. ‡ De Decal. p. 753.

that the error of the pagan superstition universally consisted (not in worshipping many independent gods and creators, but) in joining creature worship, as such, some way or other, with the worship of the Creator: Ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα,* which words are either to be thus rendered: "They [religiously] worshipped the creature, besides the Creator," that preposition being often used in this sense, as for example, in this of Aristotle, where he affirmeth concerning Plato, that he did τὸ ἓν καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ πράγματα ποιῆσαι,† (not make "numbers to be the things themselves," as the Pythagoreans had done, but) "unity and numbers to be besides the things;" or, τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, "numbers to exist by themselves, besides the sensibles:" he by numbers meaning, as Aristotle himself there expounds it, τὰ εἴδη, "the ideas" contained in the first intellect (which was Plato's second divine hypostasis) as also by τὸ ἓν, ὃ τοῖς εἴδεσι παρέχεται τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, "that ἕνωσις ἑνώσεως, or unity, which gives being to those ideas," is understood Plato's first divine hypostasis. Or else the words ought to be translated thus: "And worshipped the creature above or more than the Creator, that preposition παρὰ being sometimes used comparatively, so as to signify excess, as for example in Luke xiii. 2, "Think you that these Galileans were ἁμαρτωλοὶ παρὰ πάντας τοὺς Γαλιλαίους, sinners beyond all the Galileans?" And, ver. 4, "Think you, that those eighteen, upon whom the tower of Siloam fell were ὀφειλέται παρὰ πάντας, debtors above all the men that dwelt in Jerusalem?" According to either of which interpretations, it is supposed, that the Pagans did worship the true God, the Creator of the whole world; though they worshipped the creature also, besides him, or (perhaps in some sense) above him, and more than him also. But as for that other interpretation of παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, which Beza chose rather to follow, that "they worshipped the creature, the Creator being wholly passed by," this is no true literal version, but only a gloss or commentary upon the words, made according to a certain preconceived and extravagant opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God or Creator, but universally transfer all their worship upon the creature only. But in what sense the Pagans might be said to worship the creatures, above or beyond, or more than the Creator, (because it is not possible, that the creature, as a creature, should be worshipped with more internal and mental honour than the Creator thereof, looked upon as such) we leave others to inquire. Whether or no, because when religious worship, which properly and only belongeth to the Creator, and not at all to the creature, is transferred from the Creator upon the creature, according to a Scripture interpreta-

* Verse 25. † Met. lib. 1. cap. 6. [P. 272. tom. 4. opp.]

tion and account, such may be said to worship the creature more than the Creator? Or whether, because some of these Pagans might more frequently address their devotions to their inferior gods (as stars, demons, and heroes) as thinking the supreme God either above their worship, or incomprehensible or inaccessible by them? Or lastly, whether because the image and statue-worshippers among the Pagans (whom the apostle there principally regards) did direct all their external devotion to sensible objects, and creaturely forms? However, it cannot be thought that the apostle here taxes the Pagans merely for worshipping creatures above the Creator, as if they had not at all offended, had they worshipped them only in an equality with him; but doubtless their sin was, that they gave any religious worship at all to the creature, though in way of aggravation of their crime it be said, that they also worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Thus we see plainly that the pagan superstition and idolatry (according to the true Scripture notion of it) consisted not in worshipping of many creators, but in worshipping the creatures together with the Creator.[10]

[10] The whole of this disputation of the learned Doctor's is ingenious and erudite. It only remains for us to inquire, whether St. Paul's discourse in this chapter on the pagan superstition pertains generally to all nations, or is to be divided into certain members, and not to be applied to one and the same class. To myself, on a careful examination of the whole, the apostle seems to be speaking of three distinct descriptions of men and of a threefold religion. Most assuredly, those who formerly worshipped false gods were not all of the same opinion, and therefore, cannot be comprehended in the same class. Hence, it is most probable, that St. Paul, when purposing to expose the crimes and errors of mankind, prior to the birth of our Saviour, distributed those who were ignorant of the true religion and estranged from the rational worship of God, into their respective classes. The religion of the wise men and philosophers was peculiar and altogether foreign to the opinions of the people. Next to them stood those who acknowledged one God, but at the same time worshipped heroes, genii, demons, and beings intermediate between God and men. The lowest place was occupied by the rude and uninformed vulgar, who, unable to abstract the mind from sensible objects, had no conception of a Parent and Creator of all things, but were devoted alone to statues, signs, and images. These three kinds of religion St. Paul accurately distinguishes and pourtrays in their own proper colours. He first speaks of the philosophers, in whom there was much of reason and wisdom. These, he tells us, v. 19. 20. by contemplating the divine works had become conscious of the existence of one all-wise and omnipotent God: but, v. 21. having forsaken this knowledge they had betaken themselves to subtle questions and idle disputes about inexplicable things, in which alone they made all wisdom to consist. Wherefore, while appearing to themselves to be supremely wise, they had become fools rather and madmen, v. 22. How truly this is said by the sacred writer, will be obvious to any one who has attentively perused the history of the ancient philosophers. From these St. Paul turns to the multitude, v. 23. whom he censures for changing the glory of God into the images of men and animals, and for directing all their devotion to signs and images, the worship of the one supreme God being altogether neglected and forsaken. Of which sin he immediately subjoins the punishment, v. 24. Last of all, v. 25. he rebukes those, who, although they ought to have paid divine honours to the supreme God alone, had nevertheless joined the creature with the Creator, and were more diligent in their devotions to heroes, demons, and genii, than in the worship of the incorruptible God. In my opinion, the discourse of St. Paul, if distinguished in this manner, is in admirable keeping, and gives a clear and beautiful analysis of the various errors of antiquity: whereas, if understood indiscriminately of all the worshippers of false gods, it appears to labour under a sort of confusion. But in thus

Besides this we have in the Acts of the Apostles an oration which St. Paul made at Athens in the Areopagitic court, beginning after this manner; "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that ye are every way more than ordinarily religious;" for the word δεισιδαιμονεστέρους seems to be taken there in a good sense, it being not only more likely, that St. Paul would in the beginning of his oration thus captare benevolentiam, "conciliate their benevolence," with some commendation of them, but also very unlikely, that he woul[illegible]rshipping of the true God by the name of supers[illegible] followeth: "for as I passed by and beheld your s[illegible]or monuments) I found an altar with this inscription. [illegible] Θεῷ, "To THE UNKNOWN GOD." It is true, that [illegible]atus[1] and Pausanias[2] write, that there were at Athe[illegible]ν θεῶν βῶμοι, "altars of unknown gods:" but th[illegible] this might well be, not that there were altars dedic[illegible]wn gods plurally, but that there were several alt[illegible]d this singular inscription, To THE UNKNOWN GOD. And that there was at least one such, besides this scripture record, is evident from that dialogue in Lucian's works, entitled Philopatris,[3] where Critias useth this form of oath: Νὴ τὸν Ἄγνωστον ἐν Ἀθήναις, "No, by the unknown god at Athens;" and Tryphon, in the close of that dialogue speaketh thus: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἄγνωστον ἐφευρόντες, καὶ προσκυνήσαντες, χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν ἐκτείναντες, τούτῳ εὐχαριστήσομεν, ὡς καταξιωθέντες, &c, "But we having found out that unknown god at Athens, and worshipped him, with hands stretched up to heaven, will give thanks to him, as having been thought worthy to be made subject to this power."

classifying the religions of the pagan nations, the sacred writer follows the example of the Jews of his own time, who in their ridicule of these religions first of all separated the precepts and idle controversies of philosophers from the popular sentiments; as is evident from Philo's book, De Temulentia, p. 269. &c. where he admirably illustrates these words of St. Paul, φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν: as also from Josephus, lib. 2. contra Apion, cap. 16. p. 482. cap. 19. p. 484. and then divided the rest of the multitude into those who, altogether unmindful of a supreme Being devoted themselves to statues and images of gods, and those who, although worshipping the sun, stars, and other created things, did notwithstanding not entirely forget the Creator. See Philo, De Monarchia, lib. 1. p. 812. &c. and elsewhere. If this explanation, then, of St. Paul's words be adopted, we must acknowledge, that all that can be proved from it is merely, that among the nations of antiquity there were some who offered prayers and sacrifices both to God and his creatures, but not that they were all addicted to this custom.

[1] De Vita Apollonii, lib. 6. cap. 3. p. 232.

[2] Lib. 5. p. 199.

[3] The first of the passages here quoted occurs cap. 9. p. 122. the other, cap. 23. p. 203. ed Gesneri. But neither of them proves any thing; for all in this dialogue is said in ridicule and in mockery of the Christian rites, and the profane man, whoever he was, is jeering at St. Paul's oration rather than showing that there really was such an altar at Athens. However, Laur. Ramiresius de Prado, in his Pentecontarch, cap. 16. p. 107. makes use of the same argument in this case as Dr. Cudworth, not to speak of others. I have no doubt, that an altar so inscribed was found by St. Paul at Athens; I merely deny these passages of Lucian to be any proof of that fact.

Which passages, as they do unquestionably refer to that Athenian inscription either upon one or more altars, so does the latter of them plainly imply, that this unknown God of the Athenians was the supreme governor of the world. And so it follows in St. Paul's oration: Ὃν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες εὐσεβεῖτε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλλω ὑμῖν, "Whom therefore you ignorantly worship (under this name of the Unknown God) him declare I unto you, the God that made the world, and all things in it, the Lord of heaven and earth." From which place we may upon firm scripture authority conclude these two things; first, that by the unknown God of the Athenians was meant the only true God, he who made the world and all things in it; who, in all probability was therefore styled by them, Ἄγνωστος Θεὸς, "the unknown God," because he is not only invisible, but also incomprehensible by mortals; of whom Josephus against Appion[4] writeth thus, that he is δυνάμει μόνον ἡμῖν γνώριμος, ὁποῖος δὲ κατὰ οὐσίαν, ἄγνωστος, "knowable to us only by the effects of his power, but as to his own essence, unknowable or incomprehensible." But when in Dion Cassius, the God of the Jews is said to be ἄῤῥητος καὶ ἀειδὴς, not only "invisible" but also "ineffable," and when he is called in Lucan, Incertus Deus, "an uncertain God," the reason hereof seems to have been, not only because there was no image of him, but also because he was not vulgarly then known by any proper name, the Tetragrammaton being religiously forborne amongst the Jews in common use, that it might not be profaned. And what some learned men have here mentioned upon this occasion, of the Pagans sometimes sacrificing προσήκοντι θεῷ, "to the proper and convenient God," without signifying any name, seems to be nothing to this purpose; that proceeding only from a superstitious fear of these Pagans (supposing several gods to preside over several things) lest they should be mistaken, in not applying to the right and proper God, in such certain cases, and so their devotion prove unsuccessful and ineffectual. But that this unknown God is here said to be ignorantly worshipped by the Athenians, is to be understood chiefly in regard to their polytheism and idolatry. The second thing that may be concluded from hence, is this, that these Athenian Pagans did εὐσεβεῖν, "religiously worship the true God, the Lord of heaven and earth;" and so we have a scripture confutation also of that opinion, that the Pagans did not at all worship the supreme God.[5]

[4] Lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 482.

[5] On all this consult the very learned Dissertation of Andr. Basius, De Ara Ignoti Dei, and J. Meursius, De Piræeo, cap. 10. The truth of the opinion, here adopted by Dr. Cudworth respecting the unknown God of the Athenians, I myself attempted to establish some years ago, in my Cogitat. in Varios Novi Fœderis Locos, lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 68. &c. partly by arguments drawn from St. Paul's oration, and partly from numerous testimonies of ancient authors, in which they assert the supreme God of the

Lastly, St. Paul, citing this passage out of Aratus, a heathen poet, concerning Zeus or Jupiter,

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμὲν—

"For we are his offspring," and interpreting the same of the true God, "in whom we live, and move, and have our being;" we have also here a plain scripture acknowledgment, that by the Zeus of the Greekish Pagans was sometimes at least meant the true God. And inde[illegible] that A[illegible]s' Zeus was neither a man born in Crete nor ir[illegible] he Maker and supreme Governor of the whole [illegible]nt both from the antecedent and the subsequent [illegible] Aratus' Phenomena begins thus:

Ἐκ Διὸς ἀ[illegible]

(which in Tully's ve[illegible]e musarum primordia), and then follows a descri[illegible]s or Jupiter:

Τὸν οὔδεποτ' ἄνδρες ἐῶμεν
Ἄρρητον· μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,
Πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα,
Καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες·
Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

To this sense: "Him of whom we men are never silent; and of whom all things are full, he permeating and pervading all, and being every where; and whose beneficence we all constantly make use of and enjoy: for we also are his offspring." Where Theon the scholiast writeth thus: Πάνυ πρεπόντως ὁ Ἄρατος τὴν τῶν ἄστρων διεξιέναι μέλλων θέσιν, τὸν πατέρα τούτων καὶ δημιουργὸν, Δία, ἐν πρώτοις προσφωνεῖ· Δία δὲ νῦν τὸν Δημιουργὸν ἀκουστέον, "Aratus being about to declare the position of the stars, doth, in the first place, very decorously and becomingly invoke Zeus, the father and maker of them: for by Zeus is here to be understood the Demiurgus of the world;" or, as he afterwards expresseth it, Ὁ τὰ πάντα δημιουργήσας θεὸς, "The God who made all things." Notwithstanding which, we must

universe to be unknown. Nor, although aware that many think differently, am I yet induced to abandon this opinion. To the passages there brought forward, let me now add a saying of Sallust, the philosopher, from his book, De Diis, cap. 6. p. 253. wherein he calls the supreme Being, ἄρρητος δύναμις. Μετὰ δὲ τὴν οὕτως ἄρρητον δύναμιν αἱ τῶν θεῶν τάξεις εἰσί, "After this power, which cannot be expressed by words, follow the orders of the gods." But, if in this passage of St. Paul we suppose the unknown God to mean the supreme Parent and Creator of all things, still, I consider, we cannot infer from it, what the learned Doctor here wishes to prove, that all nations worshipped one God, superior to the rest of the gods. For setting aside, that the religions of the Athenians are by no means to be taken as the standard of those of other nations, it appears, that this very altar seen by St. Paul was the monument of a private man or family, consecrated for particular reasons. And it would be very rash and unsafe in us, I fancy, to estimate the religious sentiments of an entire people from the piety of private individuals.

confess, that this scholiast there adds, that some of these passages of the poet, and even that cited by the apostle, *τοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμὲν*, may be understood also in another sense, of the *Ζεὺς φυσικὸς*, "the physical Jupiter;" that is, the air; but without the least shadow of probability, and for no other reason, as we conceive, but only to show his philological skill. However this is set down by him, in the first place, as the genuine and proper sense of those words: *Πρὸς τὸ πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε· εἰ γὰρ αὐτὸς ταῦτα ἐδημιούργησε πρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις βιωφιλὲς, αὐτοῦ ἂν κληθείημεν, αὐτὸν πατέρα καὶ δημιουργὸν ἐπιγραφόμενοι*, "This agreeth with that title of Jupiter, when he is called the father of gods and men: for if he made us, and all these other things for our use, we may well be called his, and also style him our father and maker." And that this was the only notion which the poet here had of Zeus or Jupiter, appears undeniably also from the following words, as:

> *Ὁ δ' ἤπιος ἀνθρώποισι*
> *Δέξια σημαίνει—*

"Who, as a kind and benign father, showeth lucky signs to men;" which to understrnd of the air were very absurd. And:

> *Αὐτὸς γὰρ τά γε σήματ' ἐν οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξεν,*
> *Ἄστρα διακρίνας· ἐσκέψατο δ' εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν*
> *Ἀστέρας*

"For he also hath fastened the signs in heaven, distinguishing constellations, and having appointed stars to rise and set at several times of the year." And from this:

> *Τῷ μιν ἀεὶ πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον ἱλάσκονται,*

"Therefore is he always propitiated and placated both first and last." Upon which the scholiast thus: *Ἴσως δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν σπονδῶν, τῷ τὴν μὲν πρώτην σπονδὴν εἶναι θεῶν τῶν Ὀλυμπίων, δευτέραν δὲ ἡρώων, καὶ τρίτην Διὸς σωτῆρος*, "This perhaps refers to the libations, in that the first of them was for the heavenly gods, the second for heroes, and the last for Jupiter the saviour." From whence it plainly appears also, that the Pagans in their sacrifices (or religious rites) did not forget Jupiter the saviour, that is, the supreme God.

Lastly, from his concluding thus:

> *Χαῖρε, πάτερ, μέγα θαῦμα, μέγ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὄνειαρ·*

Where the supreme God is saluted, as "the great wonder of the world, and interest of mankind."

Wherefore it is evident from Aratus' context, that by his Zeus or Jupiter was really meant the supreme God, the maker of the whole world; which being plainly confirmed also by St.

Paul and the scripture, ought to be a matter out of controversy amongst us. Neither is it reasonable to think, that Aratus was singular in this, but that he spake according to the received theology of the Greeks, and that not only amongst philosophers and learned men, but even the vulgar also.[6] Nor do we think, that that prayer of the ancient Athenians, commended by M. Antoninus* for its simplicity, is to be understood otherwise: Ὕσον, ὕσον, ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ, κατὰ τῆς ἀρούρας τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν πεδίων, "Rain, rain, O good (or gracious) Jupiter, upon the fields and pastures of the Athenians." Upon which the emperor thus: Ἤτοι οὐ δεῖ εὔχεσθαι, ἢ οὕτως ἁπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθέρως, "We should either not pray at all (to God) or else thus plainly and

[6] I. It is uncertain whether St. Paul in his oration to the Athenians alluded to these words of Aratus, or to the sentiment of some other poet, or rather of many of the Greek poets. For certainly Aratus is not the only writer, in which any thing of the kind is to be found; nor does the apostle cite only one poet, but several. Τινὲς, says he, τῶν καθ' ὑμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασι. Consult on the subject J. Chr. Wolf, in his Curæ Philologicæ ad Novi Fœderis Libros Historicos, p. 1267. II. As to the Greek Theon, whoever he was, who has illustrated Aratus' Phænomena with scholia, there was no very grave reason, why the learned Doctor should have been at the trouble either of refuting or of expressing his concurrence with him. For the class of men, commonly called Scholiasts, are too shallow and superficial to be considered as having been able to understand the meaning of the writers they interpret. Their object was principally to show their own knowledge of grammatical matters and ancient customs, and hence they attribute many things to their authors, to which beyond all question they were utter strangers. III. In my opinion, the religion of Aratus was not so holy and pure, as the learned Doctor fancies. I own at the commencement of his poem he says many noble and magnificent things of Jupiter, which might lead one to suppose, that this poet had a much more correct and sublime conception of divine matters than the multitude generally. But if we continue our perusal, and examine the whole context of the poem, we shall see the truth of the remark, already more than once repeated by us, that the majesty of poetry is not to be estimated by the rules of prose. Aratus, who represents his Jupiter as filling the whole universe and as the creator of the stars, tells us a little afterwards, that this Jupiter was born on Mount Ida, was nursed by the Curetes, and was the sun of Saturn; thus showing his own religion to be same as that of the lowest of the people:

Κρήτηθεν κεῖναι δὲ Διὸς μεγάλου ἰότητι
Οὐρανὸν εἰσανέβησαν· ὅ μιν τότε κουρίζοντα
Δίκτῳ ἐν εὐώδει ὄρεος σχεδὸν Ἰδαίοιο
Ἀντρῳ ἐγκατέθεντο, καὶ ἔτρεφον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν
Δικταῖοι Κούρητες, ὅτε Κρόνον ἐψεύδοντο.

"From Crete by the favour of Jupiter they ascended into heaven; because the Dictæan Curetes concealed him when an infant in the fragrant grotto of Dictos, near Mount Ida, and nursed him for a year, at the time when they deceived Saturn." A noble Jupiter truly, and worthy of being compared with the omnipotent Creator of all things! After an interval of several verses, he informs us, that the family of Cepheus was related to Jupiter, p. 61:

Ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ τῶν
Οὐρανὸν εἰς ὄνομ' ἦλθεν, ἐπεὶ Διὸς ἐγγύθεν ἦσαν,

"Moreover the name of these reached heaven, since they were related to Jupiter." What necessity to say more? Aratus supposed Jupiter to be the supreme Governor of all the gods and of the universe; but as regards his origin, he held him to be not at all superior to the rest of mortals.

* Lib. 5. sect. 5. [Sect. 8. p. 146.]

freely." And since the Latins had the very same notion of Jupiter that the Greeks had of Zeus, it cannot be denied, but that they commonly by their Jupiter also understood the one supreme God, the Lord of heaven and earth. We know nothing that can be objected against this from the scripture, unless it should be that passage of St. Paul: "In the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God." But the meaning thereof is no other than this, that the generality of the world before Christianity, by their natural light, and contemplation of the works of God, did not attain to such a practical knowledge of God as might both free them from idolatry, and effectually bring them to a holy life.[7]

XXXII. But in order to a fuller explication of this pagan theology,* and giving yet a more satisfactory account concerning it, there are three heads requisite to be insisted on: first, that the intelligent Pagans worshipped the one supreme God under many several names; secondly, that besides this one God, they worshipped also many gods, that were indeed inferior deities subordinate to him; thirdly, that they worshipped both the supreme and inferior gods, in images, statues, and symbols, sometimes abusively called also gods. We begin with the first, that the supreme God amongst the Pagans was polyonymous, and worshipped under several personal names, according to several notions and considerations of him, from his several attributes and powers, manifestations, and effects in the world.

It hath been already observed out of Origen,† that not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account that hath been given by us of their philosophic theology. Where, by the vulgar theology of the Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin concerning both these: Et civilis et fabulosa ambæ fabulosæ sunt, ambæque civiles, "That both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was fabulous."‡ And by their more arcane or recondite theology, is doubtless meant that which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which

[7] The passage of St. Paul is not inaptly explained by the learned Doctor. But I cannot see, how a prayer by which the Athenians were accustomed to petition Jupiter to refresh their lands with plenteous showers, can be made to bear upon this question. The Athenian people prayed to that Jupiter, who was publicly worshipped, namely, the son of Saturn and husband of Venus, and had no idea of an eternal and self-existent Being.

* P. 314. 315. † P. 114. 115.

‡ Civ. Deor. lib. 4. cap. 8. [Lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 120. tom. 7. opp.]

distinction of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but most expressly by Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so was it owned and much insisted upon, both by Scævola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most learned antiquary; they both agreeing, that the civil theology then established by the Roman laws was only the theology of the vulgar, but not the tr[illegible] at there was another theology besides it, called by [illegible] al, which was the theology of wise men and of t[illegible] eless granting a necessity, that in cities and comm[illegible] sides this natural and true theology (which the gener[illegible] e vulgar were incapable of) there should be another [illegible] ical theology, accommodate to their apprehension[illegible] theology differed from the natural only by a cer[illegible] f fabulosity in it, and was therefore looked upon [illegible] middle, betwixt the natural and the fabulous or poet[illegible] theology.

Wherefore it was acknowledged, that the vulgar theology of the Pagans, that is, not only their fabulous, but even their civil also, was oftentimes very discrepant from the natural and true theology; though the wise men amongst them, in all ages, endeavoured as much as they could, to dissemble and disguise this difference, and by allegorizing the poetic fables of the gods, to bring that theology into some seeming conformity with the natural and philosophic; but what they could not in this way reconcile, was by them excused upon the necessity of the vulgar.

The fabulous theology both of the Greeks and Romans did not only generate all the other gods, but even Jupiter himself also, their supreme Numen, it assigning him both a father and a mother, a grandfather and a grandmother. And though the Romans did not plainly adopt this into their civil theology, yet are they taxed by St. Austin[8] for suffering the statue of Jupiter's nurse to be kept in the capitol for a religious monument. And however this differed nothing at all from that atheistic doctrine of Evemerus,[9] "that all the gods were really no other than

[8] De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 119. Quid, says he, de ipso Jove senserunt, qui ejus nutricem in Capitolio posuerunt? "What notion had they of Jupiter himself, who placed the statue of his nurse in the capitol?" Now this nurse was the goat Amalthea, as those are well aware, who have paid any attention to the fables of the poets.

[9] This is from St. Augustine, who De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 7. p. 119. thus writes: Nonne attestati sunt (Romani) Euemero, qui omnes tales Deos non fabulosa garrulitate, sed historica diligentia homines fuisse mortalesque, conscripsit? "Have they (the Romans) not appealed to Evemerus, who has recorded, not as a prating fabulist, but with the accuracy of the historian, that all such gods were men and mortal?" On the ἱερὰ ἀναγραφὴ of Evemerus, in which he attempted to prove, that all the gods were no other than mortal men, consult Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, tom. 2. opp. p. 360. and the recent disputation upon it by the ingenious J. Jac. Zimmermann, a scholar eminently acquainted with ancient philosophical history, Diss. de Atheismo *Euemeri et Diagoræ*, extant in the Museum Bremens. tom. 1. p. 715.

mortal men," yet was it tolerated and connived at by the politicians, in way of necessary compliance with the vulgar, it being so extremely difficult for them to conceive any such living being or animal, as was never made, and without beginning. Insomuch, that Callimachus,[10] who would by no means admit of Jupiter's sepulchre, either in Crete or Arcadia (but looked upon it as a foul reproach to him) for this reason:

Σὺ δ' οὐ θάνες, ἐσσὶ γὰρ αἰεί,

"Because he was immortal and could never die;" did notwithstanding himself attribute a temporary generation and nativity to him, as Origen[1] and others observe. Nevertheless, the generality of the more civilized and intelligent Pagans, and even of the poets themselves, did all this while constantly retain thus much of the natural and true theology amongst them, that Jupiter was the father both of gods and men; that is, the maker of the whole world, and consequently himself without father, eternal and unmade, according to that Peleadean oracle before cited out of Pausanias:

Ζεὺς ἦν, Ζεύς ἐστι, Ζεύς ἔσσεται.

Again, the civil theology of the Pagans, as well as the poetic, had not only many fantastic gods in it, but also an appearance of a plurality of independent deities; it making several supreme in their several territories and functions; as one to be the chief ruler over the heavens, another over the air and winds, another over the sea, and another over the earth and hell; one to be the giver of corn, another of wine; one the god of learning, another the god of pleasure, and another the god of war; and so for all other things. But the natural theology of the Pagans (so called) though it did admit a plurality of gods too, in a certain sense, that is, of inferior deities subordinate to one supreme; yet did it neither allow of more independent deities than one, nor own any gods at all, but such as were natural, that is, such as had a real existence in nature and the world without, and not in men's opinion only. And these Varro[2] concluded to be no other than, first, the soul of the world, and then the animated parts thereof superior to men; that is, one supreme universal Numen unmade, and other particular generated gods, such as stars, demons, and heroes. Wherefore all the other gods besides these are frequently exploded by pagan writers (as Cicero and others) under the name of Dii Poëtici, that is, "not philosophical, but poetical gods," and Dii Commentitii and Fictitii, that is, "not natural

[10] Hymn. in Jovem, v. 9. &c. p. 7.
[1] Adv. Celsum, lib. 3. p. 713.
[2] Apud Augustin. De Civitate Dei, lib. 5. cap. 4. 5. &c. p. 116. &c. tom. 7. opp. and lib. 7. cap. 5. 6. p. 128. &c.

and real, but feigned and fictitious gods." They in the mean time giving this account of them, that they were indeed nothing else but so many several names and notions of one supreme Numen, according to his several powers and various manifestations, and effects in the world; it being thought fit by the wisdom of the ancient pagan theologers, that all those manifold glories and perfections of the Deity should not be huddled up, and as it were crowded and crumpled together in one general acknowledgment of an invisible being, the Maker of the world, but that they should be distinctly and severally displayed, and each of them adored singly and apart; and this too (for the greater pomp and solemnity) under so many personal names. Which perhaps the unskilful and sottish vulgar might sometimes mistake, not only for so many real and substantial, but also independent and self-existent deities.[3]

We have before proved, that one and the same supreme God, in the Egyptian theology, had several proper and personal names given him, according to several notions of him, and his several powers and effects; Jamblichus[4] himself, in that passage already cited, plainly affirming thus much: Ὁ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς, &c. τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, Ἀμῶν κατὰ τὴν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γλῶσσαν λέγεται, συντελῶν δὲ ἀψευδῶς ἕκαστα καὶ τεχνικῶς Φθὰ, ἀγαθῶν δὲ ποιητικὸς ὢν Ὄσιρις κέκληται, καὶ ἄλλας δι' ἄλλας δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχει, "The demiurgical mind and president of truth, as with wisdom it proceedeth to generation, and bringeth forth the hidden power of the occult reasons, contained within itself, into light, is called in the Egyptian language Ammon; as it artificially effects all things with truth, Phtha; as it is productive of good things, Osiris; besides which it hath also several other names, according to its other powers and energies:" as namely, Neith (or according to Proclus' copy, Νηϊθὰς, Neïthas), the tutelar god of the city Sais, from whence probably the Greek Ἀθηνᾶ was derived (the Athenians being said to have been at first a colony of these Saites), and this is the divine wisdom diffusing itself through all.

[3] In this manner, indeed, the pagan theologers, especially after the rise of Christianity, attempted to conceal the absurdities of their religion and worship: namely, by asserting that the several gods were one supreme Deity, designated by various names. [So Julian explains the pagan religion, that one God was worshipped under various names, cap. 63. p. 454. ed. Lips.] But the folly of all such attempts has already been ably exposed by St. Augustine, in his De Civitate Dei. lib. 4. cap. 11. p. 76. and other places.

[4] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect 8. cap. 3. p. 159. But setting aside, that Jamblichus here puts forth sheer nonsense, invented beyond all doubt by himself, and not by the ancient Egyptians, this passage does not at all bear upon the matter in question. For Jamblichus is not discoursing here of the supreme Being, of whom he had spoken before, and who, he considers, should be worshipped by silence alone, but of the demiurgic mind, which he places far below him. Therefore, the various names enumerated by him are not designations of the one supreme God.

So likewise Serapis, which though some would have to be the sun, is by others plainly described as an universal Numen. As Aristides in his eighth oration upon this god Serapis:* Οἱ μὲν δὴ τῆς μεγάλης πρὸς Αἰγύπτῳ πόλεως πολῖται καὶ ἕνα τοῦτον ἀνακαλοῦσι Δία· ὅτι οὐκ ἀπολέλειπται δυνάμει περιττῇ, ἀλλὰ διὰ πάντων ἥκει, καὶ τὸ πᾶν πεπλήρωκε· τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων θεῶν διῃρηνται αἱ δυνάμεις τε καὶ τιμαὶ, καὶ ἄλλους ἐπ' ἄλλα ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ, ὥσπερ κορυφαῖος πάντων, ἀρχὰς καὶ πέρατα ἔχει, "They, who inhabit the great city in Egypt, call upon this god Serapis as their only Jupiter, he being supposed to be no way defective in power, but to pervade all things, and to fill the whole universe. And whereas the powers and honours of the other gods are divided, and some of them are invoked for one thing, and some for another; this is looked upon by them as the coryphæus of all the gods, who contains the beginning and end of all things, and who is able to supply all wants." Cneph is also described by Eusebius[5] as that divine Intellect, which was the demiurgus of the world, and which giveth life to all things, as he is by Plutarch[6] said to be ἀγέννητος or "unmade;" so that this was also another Egyptian name of God; as likewise was

* P. 95.

[5] Out of Porphyry, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 115. Even supposing Porphyry to have expressed the sentiments of the ancient Egyptians in his description of their god Cneph, which however I consider not to be the case, still it will not follow from what he says, that Cneph was the image of the supreme Being. On the contrary, this philosopher expressly states, that the demiurgic mind, the same which Jamblichus pretends to have been called Amon, Ptha and Osiris, was designated by the name and image of Cneph. But this demiurgic mind, according to the doctrine of the later Platonists, who investigated the Egyptian rites, is much inferior to the supreme Deity. Compare what is cited respecting this same Cneph by Eusebius, lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 41. out of Philo; which can in no way be applied to the supreme God. Other arguments in proof of the same are supplied by Dr. Th. Gale, in his notes on Jamblichus, p. 301. How little reliance is to be placed upon all that we read in the later Platonists, regarding these Egyptian Deities and their names, is manifest even from this alone, that Jamblichus makes Ptha to be the name of the demiurgic mind, or of that virtue which created the world; while Porphyry, in the passage of Eusebius above quoted, p. 115. considers this Ptha to be the offspring of the god Cneph, and Cneph to be the demiurgic mind. Let learned men, then, who expect to find sterling ore among this rubbish of the later Platonists, tell me which of the two is to be believed. For my own part I should say neither, but should repudiate the whole tribe of them, when pretending to expound the religions of the ancients.

[6] He tells us, De Iside et Osiride, p. 357. that the Thebans were the only Egyptians that acknowledged no mortal gods, but held the god Cneph, whom they worshipped, to be unmade. This passage, I consider, does not prove what the learned Doctor thinks may be inferred from it, that Cneph, with the Egyptians, was the name of the supreme Being. For what the Thebans alone did, cannot fairly be attributed to the whole of the Egyptian people. On the contrary, Plutarch's words show, that most of the Egyptians were so insane as to pay homage not only to made but extinct gods; but that the Thebans were wiser than the rest, and asserted their god Cneph to be ungenerated and incorruptible. Besides, it is not certain even, whether or not the Thebans regarded this Cneph as the supreme Deity. For an ungenerated god is not necessarily the one and only God, the creator of all things. It is possible, indeed, for the Thebans to have believed in several gods as existing from all eternity.

Emeph and Eicton in Jamblichus;[7] though these may be severally distinguished into a trinity of divine hypostases. Lastly, when Isis, which was sometimes called Multimammea, and made all over full of breasts, to signify her feeding all things, thus describes herself in Apuleius:[8] Summa numinum, prima cœlitum,

[7] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 158. We have already explained this passage above and shown, that it contains not the slightest shadow or vestige of the most Holy Trinity. Let two remarks be added here. I. There seems to be much probability in the conjecture of Dr. Gale, who supposes the name Emeph to be a corruption, and that Cneph ought to be read in its place. II. It is by no means to be established from Jamblichus, that the two names Emeph and Eicton are to be referred to one and the same nature. For he openly distinguishes those two natures, to which he tells us these names belonged.

[8] Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 258. 259. ed. Elmenhorst. I confess my regret, that the learned Doctor should have allowed himself, on the strength of a few words of a writer so destitute of penetration as Apuleius, to convert Isis into the supreme Being. I shall say nothing of the authority of Apuleius, insignificant as I own I have always considered it; neither shall I urge the point, that a female deity can hardly be the image of the supreme God; but I shall appeal to Apuleius' words themselves, which clearly refute this interpretation. Isis, who extols herself so highly, is the nature of things, and not the sovereign Deity, the parent and creator of nature: En assum, says she, tuis commota, Luci, precibus, *rerum natura parens*, elementorum omnium domina, sæculorum progenies initialis, summa Numinum, regina manium, prima cœlitum, "Behold, I am present, moved, O Lucius, by thy prayers, the parent nature of things, the mistress of all the elements, the earliest progeny of ages, the supreme of deities, the queen of the Manes, the first of the heavenly gods." She subjoins afterwards, that she is worshipped under the names of Diana, Venus, Proserpine; but by no means intimates, as here stated by the learned Doctor, that all the gods and goddesses are contained in her alone. The meaning of this speech of Isis is admirably illustrated by Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 372: Ἡ γὰρ Ἴσις ἐστὶ μὲν τὸ τῆς φύσεως θῆλυ καὶ δεκτικὸν ἁπάσης γενέσεως, καθὸ τιθήνη καὶ παν-δεχὴς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν μυριώνυμος κέκληται, διὰ τὸ πάσας ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τρεπομένη μορφὰς δέχεσθαι καὶ ἰδέας. Ἔχει δὲ σύμφυτον ἔρωτα τοῦ πρώτου καὶ κυριωτάτου πάντων, ὃ τἀγαθῷ ταυτόν ἐστι· κἀκεῖνο ποθεῖ καὶ διώκει, "Isis, therefore, is the female part of nature and the recipient of all generation; accordingly, she is called by Plato the nurse and receiver of all things, and by many others Myrionymos, that is, having an infinity of names; because reason converts her into all shapes and forms. In her is implanted a love of the first and principal nature, namely good; this she desires and pursues." Which nature, according to those who thought thus of Isis, was called Osiris. And that Apuleius favoured this opinion, formerly entertained by many of the Egyptians and Platonists, is abundantly evident from what he states a little afterwards in the same book respecting Osiris, whom he not only distinguishes from Isis, but describes as being much greater and more excellent than her. In the first place, he confesses, that any one initiated into the sacred rites of Isis is far from being a happy man, unless he be also imbued with the religion of Osiris. Dum, says he, p. 270. religiosum scrupulum partim apud sensum meum disputo, partim sacratorum consiliis examino, novum mirumque plane comperior: Deæ quidem me *tantum* sacris imbutum, at *magni Dei, Deumque summi parentis*, invicti Osiridis, necdum sacris illustratum, "While I debate this religious point in my own mind, and examine it by the counsels of the consecrated, I find it altogether novel and strange, that I am imbued *only* with the rites of the goddess, and not yet enlightened with those of the *great God*, and *supreme parent of the gods*, the invincible Osiris." What can be clearer towards confuting those who maintain, that Isis was the supreme Being. Afterwards, in the same book, p. 272. Osiris is called by him Deus Deum magnorum potior, et majorum summus, et summorum maximus, et maximorum regnator, "The God, the most powerful of the great gods, and the supreme of the greater, and the greatest of the supreme, and the ruler of the greatest." Indeed, to speak of Apuleius' religion generally, as far as it can be known from his Metamorphoses, he was of that class *of men, who* studied to reconcile, although in defiance of the truth, the popular religion

deorum dearumque facies uniformis, cujus numen unicum multiformi specie, ritu vario, nomine multijugo totus veneratur orbis; as she plainly makes herself to be the supreme Deity, so doth she intimate, that all the gods and goddesses were "compendiously contained in her alone, and that she (i. e. the supreme God) was worshipped under several personal names, and with different rites, over the whole pagan world." Moreover, this is particularly noted concerning the Egyptians by Damascius[9] the philosopher, that, τὸ νοητὸν διῃρήκασιν εἰς πολλῶν θεῶν ἰδιότητας, "they multiplied the first Intelligible (or the supreme Deity) breaking and dividing the same into the names and properties of many gods." Now, the Egyptian theology was in a manner the pattern of all the rest, but especially of those European theologies, of the Greeks and Romans.

Who likewise, that they often made many gods of one, is evident from their bestowing so many proper and personal names upon each of those inferior gods of theirs; the sun, and the moon, and the earth; the first whereof, usually called Apollo, had therefore this epithet of πολυώνυμος commonly given to

with their own precepts of philosophy. He himself, as appears also from other passages of his book, placed two principles over the universe, one male, if we may so speak, and the other female; that is, an omnipotent and supreme God, and a certain nature, presiding over the administration of this world and the generation of all things, or soul of the world, producing and governing all. To these two natures he referred the whole of the gods, to whom nations paid religious homage; supposing that the supreme God was worshipped in the first place in Osiris, and secondly, in all the other deities of the male sex, or that all the gods were merely different names of that one God; and that the several goddesses, Isis, Minerva, Juno, and the others, represented that one soul of the world, or generative nature. Moreover, he imagined these two principles to be connected together by a certain bond, so that in worshipping one it was impossible not to worship the other at the same time. Quamquam enim connexa, immo unica ratio Numinis religionisque esset, tamen teletæ discrimen esse maximum, aiunt, "For, although the nature of their divinity and religion is intimately connected, nay, one and the same, still there is, we are told, a great difference in the sacred rites." So he says, Metamorphos. lib. 11. p. 220.

[9] I have already more than once stated my opinion of the authority of Damascius. On the worship also, and entire religion of the Egyptians, I have discoursed at great length; so that there will be no difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the argument now in question. The accounts handed down by different authors respecting the gods of the Egyptians prove, that they were by no means all meant for one supreme God, but that they were various men and natures, translated to heaven for various causes. The several tribes, provinces, and cities extolled their respective gods with the highest praises, and scrupled not to hold them forth as superior to the other gods. By these praises, some men, especially the philosophers, at all times predisposed to put a favourable and philosophic interpretation upon the vulgar superstitions, were led to the conclusion, that all the Egyptian deities were types and images of one God. Cneph, Ptha, Eicton, Osiris, and the other gods, were each extolled as supreme by those who delighted in their worship. But as there could not be a plurality of supreme gods, the whole of these names were considered by some to belong to one god, and to designate merely his various attributes. And this course seemed especially convenient to the philosophers subsequent to the birth of our Saviour. Who, being utterly unable to deny the turpitude and absurdity of the popular religions, strenuously endeavoured to diminish the multitude of gods, and to assemble certain companies, as it were, under one roof. But St. Augustine, among others, De Civitate Dei, has already successfully answered them.

him, "the god with many names." Which many proper names of his Macrobius insisteth upon in his Saturnalia, though probably making more of them than indeed they were. And the moon was not only so called, but also Diana, and Lucina, and Hecate, and otherwise; insomuch that this goddess also hath been styled polyonymous as well as her brother the sun. And lastly, the earth, besides those honorary titles, of bona dea, and magna dea, and mater deorum, "the good goddess," and "the great goddess," and "the mother of the gods," was multiplied by them into those many goddesses, of Vesta, and Rhea, and Cybele, and Ceres, and Proserpina, and Ops, &c. And for this cause was she thus described by Æschylus:[10]

> Καὶ Γαῖα πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴ μία,
> Et Tellus multorum nominum facies una.

Now if these inferior gods of the Pagans had each of them so many personal names bestowed upon them, much more might the supreme God be polyonymous amongst them;[1] and so indeed he was commonly styled, as that learned grammarian Hesychius intimates upon that word πολυώνυμον, τὴν μονάδα οὕτως ἐκάλουν, καὶ ἐπίθετον Ἀπόλλωνος, "They called the Monad thus, and it was also the epithet of Apollo;" where by the Monad, according to the Pythagoric language, is meant the supreme Deity, which was thus styled by the Pagans πολυώνυμον, "the being that

[10] In Prometheo Vincto. p. 29. ed. Canteri, Antw. 1580. 12. Grotius, in his Excerpt. Veterum Tragicor. p. 5. has translated this verse as follows:

> Tellusque multis una res sub vocibus.

[1] For my part, I consider this reasoning objectionable in two respects. I. It seems to me to be weak and inconclusive: "The ancients called the inferior gods by various names; therefore, they likewise designated the supreme God by many names." He certainly must be very easy of conviction, who can be swayed by an argument like this. But in such matters, every thing is decided by testimonies and authorities: nothing is proved by conjectures and surmises. II. The very foundation upon which it rests is uncertain. For it may be made a matter of question, whether the ancients did call the sun, moon, and earth, by various names. I am aware, that not a few of those, who endeavoured to reduce the ancient superstitions to the standard of reason, supposed the names of many deities to designate one sun, one moon, and one earth. Macrobius, upon whose theory I have already commented above, fancied he discovered the sun in all the gods. Others imagined, that the names of Diana, Venus, Astarte, Hecate, and other goddesses, pertained to one moon. And many supposed Vesta, Cybele, Rhea, Ops, and other names of goddesses, to designate one earth. But it has very properly been questioned, whether these were not guided by their own imagination, rather than by reason and truth. Every thing that is recorded respecting these gods and goddesses shows, that they were mortals celebrated for their inventions and exploits and ought by no means to be confounded with each other. Hence, there is very little probability in the conceits of those, who, to hide the deformity of the received superstitions, determine, that the many gods are one sun, or moon, or earth. And such being the case, the whole of this argument falls to the ground. If the attainment of truth be our object, we ought to attend to the facts themselves, and to the ancient histories, and on no account rashly to put faith in the commentitious interpretations of later writers.

hath many names." And accordingly Cleanthes thus beginneth that fore-cited hymn of his,

Κύδιστ' ἀθανάτων, πολυώνυμε,

"Thou most glorious of all the immortal gods, who art called by many names." And Zeno, his master, in Laërtius,[2] expressly declareth: Ὁ Θεὸς πολλαῖς προσηγορίαις ὀνομάζεται κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, "God is called by many several names, according to his several powers and virtues;" whose instances shall be afterwards taken notice of. Thus also the writer De Mundo:[3] Εἷς δὲ ὢν, πολυώνυμός ἐστι, κατανομαζόμενος τοῖς πάθεσι πᾶσιν, ἅπερ αὐτὸς νεοχμεῖ, "God, though he be but one, is polyonymous, and variously denominated from his several attributes, and the effects produced by him." Quæcunque voles, (saith Seneca[4]) illi propria nomina aptabis, vim aliquam effectumque cœlestium rerum continentia. Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse quot munera, "You may give God whatsoever proper names you please, so they signify some force and effect of heavenly things: he may have as many names as he hath manifestations, offices, and gifts." Macrobius[5] also, from the authority of Virgil, thus determines: Unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse (or as Vossius corrects it, censeri) numinibus, "That the various effects of one God were taken for several gods;" that is, expressed by several personal names; as he there affirmeth, the divers virtues of the sun to have given names to divers gods, because they gave occasion for the sun to be called by several proper and personal names. We shall conclude with that of Maximus Madaurensis,[6] before cited out of St. Austin: Hujus virtutes per mundanum opus diffusas nos multis vocabulis invocamus, quoniam nomen ejus proprium ignoramus. Ita fit, ut,

[2] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458. An exactly similar passage is extant in the same author, lib. 7. segm. 155. p. 440. where he thus writes according to the sense of the Stoics: Ἓν τε εἶναι θεὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ εἱμαρμένην, καὶ Δία, πολλαῖς τε ἑτέραις ὀναμασίαις προσονομάζεσθαι, "That God, and mind, and fate, and Jupiter, are one, and called by various other names."

[3] Cap. 7. p. 866. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.

[4] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. tom. 1. opp.

[5] Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 272. Sicut, says he, Maro, quum de una Junone diceret: *quo Numine læso*, ostendit, unius Dei effectus varios pro variis censendos esse Numinibus: ita diversæ virtutes solis nomina Dis dederunt, "As Maro, when he says in speaking of Juno alone: *what deity having been offended*, shows that the various effects of one God are to be considered as various deities; so the different virtues of the sun have given names to divers gods." Vossius' correction of this passage occurs, no doubt, in his work, De Idololatria; but I have not thought it worth while to seek for it.

[6] Epist. ad Augustinum: see Augustin. Oper. tom. 2. epist. 16. p. 15. But I know not why the learned Doctor has omitted to mention, that St. Augustine in the answer immediately following this epistle sneers at the opinion of the Platonic philosopher. Vides, says he, among other things, in reference to these words of Maximus, pro tua prudentia, quam locus late iste pateat reprehensioni, "Your good sense will tell you, how very open this passage is to reprehension."

dum ejus quasi quædam membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, totum colere profectò videamur, "The virtues of this one supreme God, diffused throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under many several names, because we are ignorant what his proper name is. Wherefore we thus worshipping his several divided members, must needs be judged to worship him whole, we leaving out nothing of him." With which latter words seemeth to agree that of the poet, wherein Jupiter thus bespeaks the other gods:

> Cœlicolæ, mea membra, Dei; quos nostra potestas
> Officiis divisa facit.

Where it is plainly intimated, that the many pagan gods were but the several divided members of the one supreme Deity, whether, because according to the Stoical sense, the real and natural gods were all but parts of the mundane soul; or else because all those other fantastic gods were nothing but several personal names, given to the several powers, virtues, and offices of the one Supreme.[7]

Now the several names of God, which the writer De Mundo[8] instanceth in, to prove him polyonymous, are first of all such as these: Βρονταῖος, and Ἀστραπαῖος, "the Thunderer" and "Lightener;" Ὑέτιος, "the Giver of rain;" Ἐπικάρπιος, "the Bestower of fruits;" Πολιεὺς, "the Keeper of cities;" Μειλίχιος, "the Mild and Placable;" under which notion they sacrificed no animals to him, but only the fruits of the earth: together with many other such epithets, as Φίλιος, Ξένιος, Στράτιος, Τροπαιοῦχος, Καθάρσιος, Παλαιμναῖος, &c.; and lastly, he is called Σωτὴρ and Ἐλευθέριος, "Saviour," and "Assertor." Answerably to which, Jupiter had many such names given him

[7] From the whole of this and much of what follows we learn merely, that among the philosophers and wise men of antiquity there were those who believed the several names of gods to signify only one deity. Nor was this ever questioned by any one, who paid the slightest attention to ancient records. The Stoics in particular must necessarily have held this opinion, inasmuch as they considered all animated things to be parts and members of one God diffused through the whole of the universe. But we cannot infer from thence, what the learned Doctor has undertaken to prove, that the fact really was as they supposed, and that the long catalogue of gods consisted merely of names, expressing the various virtues of one Deity. If a hundred authors and philosophers could be produced, all concurring in this one opinion: that Venus, Diana, Jupiter, Osiris, Isis, Vulcan, Pluto, Neptune, and all the other gods besides, were names merely of one God or of his various perfections; still it would by no means follow from such unanimity, that these men judged correctly respecting the ancient religions, and that there is nothing to be found fault with in their opinion. On the contrary, it is a wise man's part to see, whether their interpretation is borne out by the facts and accords with the rites and worship of the ancients. If this course be adopted, we shall soon become sensible, I fear, of the utter fallacy of such a notion, and discover this to be the private doctrine of certain philosophers, and not the public religion of the people. That various appellations were applied formerly to one God, according to the variety of benefits which were expected from him, is pretty certain; but this has nothing to do with the present question.

[8] Cap. 7. p. 866.

also by the Latins, as Victor, Invictus, Opitulus, Stator; the true meaning of which last (according to Seneca[9]), was not that which the historians pretend, quod post votum susceptum, acies Romanorum fugientium stetit, "because once after vows and prayers offered to him, the flying army of the Romans was made to stand;" sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnia, "but because all things by means of him stand firm and are established." For which same reason he was called also by them (as St. Austin informs us[10]) "Centupeda, as it were, standing firm upon an hundred feet;" and "Tigillus, the beam, prop, and supporter of the world." He was styled also by the Latins (amongst other titles) Almus and Ruminus, i. e. "He that nourisheth all things as it were with his breasts."* Again that writer De Mundo addeth another sort of names, which God was called by; as Ἀνάγκη, "Necessity," because he is an immoveable essence, though Cicero,[1] gives another reason for that appellation: Interdum Deum necessitatem appellant, quia nihil aliter esse possit, atque ab eo constitutum sit, "They sometimes call God Necessity, because nothing can be otherwise than as it is by him appointed." Likewise Εἱμαρμένη, because all things are by him connected together, and proceed from him unhinderably. Πεπρωμένη, because all things in the world are by him determined, and nothing left infinite (or undetermined). Μοῖρα, because he makes an apt division and distribution of all things. Ἀδράστεια, because his power is such, as that none can possibly avoid or escape him. Lastly, that ingenious fable (as he calls it) of the three fatal sisters, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, according to him, meant nothing but God neither: Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι, πλὴν ὁ Θεὸς, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ γενναῖος Πλάτων φησὶ, "All this is nothing else but God, as the noble and generous Plato also intimates, when he affirmeth God to contain the beginning, and middle, and end of all things." And both Cicero and Seneca tell us, that, amongst the Latins, God was not only called Fatum, but also Natura and Fortuna. Quid aliud est natura, (saith Seneca[2]) quam Deus, et divina ratio, toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta? "What is nature else, but God and the divine reason, inserted into the whole world and all its several parts?" He adding, "that God and nature were no more two different things than Annæus and Seneca." And, Nonnunquam Deum (saith Cicero[3]) Fortunam appellant, quod efficiat multa impro-

[9] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. tom. 1. opp.

[10] De Civitat. Dei, lib. 7. cap. 11. p. 131. tom. 7. opp. In the same passage he treats also of Jupiter's titles Almus and Ruminus.

* Ruma Mamma.

[1] Academic. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 2233. tom. 8. opp.

[2] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427.

[3] Academic. Quæst. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 2233. tom. 8. opp. The passage of Seneca which follows occurs in the same place as the preceding.

visa et nec opinata nobis, propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum, "They sometimes call God also by the name of Fortune, because he surpriseth us in many events, and bringeth to pass things unexpected to us, by reason of the obscurity of causes and our ignorance." Seneca thus concludes concerning these, and the like names of God: Omnia ejusdem Dei nomina sunt, variè utentis sua potestate, "These are all names of one and the same God, variously manifesting his power."

But concerning most of these forementioned names of God, and such as are like to them, it was rightly observed by St. Austin,* that they had no such appearance or show of many distinct gods: Hæc omnia cognomina imposuerunt uni Deo, propter causas potestatesque diversas, non tamen propter tot res etiam tot deos eum esse coegerunt, &c. "Though the Pagans imposed all these several names upon one God, in respect of his several powers, yet did they not therefore seem to make so many gods of them; as if Victor were one god, and Invictus another god, and Centupeda another god, and Tigillus another, and Ruminus another," &c. Wherefore there are other names of God used amongst the Pagans, which have a greater show and appearance of so many distinct deities, not only because they are proper names, but also because each of them had their peculiar temples appropriated to them, and their different rites of worship. Now these are of two sorts: first, such as signify the Deity according to its universal and all-comprehending nature; and secondly, such as denote the same only according to certain particular powers, manifestations, and effects of it in the world. Of the first kind there are not a few. For first of all, PAN, as the very word plainly implies him to be a universal Numen, and as he was supposed to be the Harmostes of the whole world, or to play upon the world as a musical instrument, according to that of Orpheus[4] (or Onomacritus):

Ἁρμονίαν κόσμοιο κρέκων φιλοπαίγμονι μολπῇ·

So have we before showed, that by him the Arcadians and Greeks meant, not the corporeal world inanimate, nor yet as endued with a senseless nature only, but as proceeding from an intellectual principle or divine spirit, which framed it harmoniously; and as being still kept in tune, acted and governed by

* De Civ. Deor. lib. 7. cap. 11. [P. 131.]

[4] Hymn. in Panem, p. 109. ed. Eschenbach. In the same hymn occurs also the verse which follows. Of Pan I have already spoken above. There is nothing, which I should feel less disposed to believe, than that this goat-footed god worshipped by the pastoral Arcadians was the supreme Being or the whole animated universe; although formerly, I am aware, not a few were led by the signification of the name to adopt this opinion. The same, I candidly confess, is my opinion with respect to the other gods, whose names are transferred by the learned Doctor to the supreme Deity.

the same. Which therefore is said to be the universal pastor and shepherd of all mankind, and of the whole world, according to that other Orphic passage:

> Βόσκων ἀνθρώπων γενεὴν, καὶ ἀτίρμονα γαῖαν,
>
> Pascens humanum genus, ac sine limite terram.

And this Pan, Socrates, in Plato's Phædrus, plainly invokes as the supreme Numen. Pan, therefore, is the one only God (for there cannot possibly be more than one Pan, more than one all or universe) who contained all within himself, displayed all from himself, framing the world harmoniously, and who is in a manner all things.

Again, JANUS, whom the Romans first invoked in all their sacrifices and prayers, and who was never omitted, whatsoever god they sacrificed unto, was unquestionably many times taken for a universal Numen, as in this of Martial:[5]

> Nitidique sator pulcherrime mundi.

And again in this of Ovid:*

> Quicquid ubique vides, cœlum, mare, nubila, terras,
> Omnia sunt nostra clausa patentque manu:
> Me penes est unum vasti custodia mundi.

From which passages it also appears, that Janus was not the mere senseless and inanimate matter of the world, but a principle presiding over it. And without doubt all the beginnings of things were therefore referred to this Janus, because he was accounted the most ancient god, and the beginning of all things. St. Austin,[6] concluding him to be the same with Jupiter, therefore quarrels with the Pagans (that is, with their civil theology) for thus making two gods of one:† Cum ergo Janus mundus sit, et Jupiter mundus sit, unusque sit mundus, quare duo dii sunt, Janus et Jupiter? Quare seorsum habent templa, seorsum aras, diversa sacra, dissimilia simulachra? Si propterea, quia alia vis est primordiorum, alia causarum, ex illa Jani, ex ista Jovis nomen accepit: nunquid si unus homo in diversis rebus duas habeat potestates, aut duas artes (quia singularum diversa vis est) ideo duo dicuntur artifices? &c. "Since therefore Janus is the world, and Jupiter is the world, and there is but one world, how can Janus and Jupiter be two gods? Why have they their temples apart, their altars apart, distinct

[5] Epigramm. lib. 10. epigr. 28. p. 411. * Fast. 1. [Ver. 117.]

[6] In this passage, however, he does not give this as his own opinion, but as that of Varro and some other Romans, and endeavours to demonstrate its absurdity. He himself neither supposed Janus to be the world nor Jupiter, but argued against his adversaries upon their own assumptions.

† Civ. Deor. lib. 7. cap. 10. [P. 131.]

sacred things, and statues of different forms? If because the force of beginnings is one, and the force of causes another, he is therefore called Janus from the former, and Jupiter from the latter; I ask whether or no, if one man have two several arts about different things, he therefore be to be called two artificers? Or is there any more reason, why one and the same god, having two powers, one over the beginnings of things, and another over the causes, should therefore be accounted two gods?" Where, when Jupiter and Janus are both said to be the world, this is to be understood properly not of the matter, but the soul or mind of the world, as St. Austin* himself elsewhere declares: Sit Jupiter corporei hujus mundi animus, qui universam istam molem, ex quatuor elementis constructam atque compactam, implet et movet, "Let Jupiter be the mind of this corporeal world, which both filleth and moveth that whole bulk, compounded and made up of the four elements." Nevertheless, as the soul and body both together are called the man, so was the whole animated world by the Pagans called God. Now the forementioned argumentation of St. Austin, though it be good against the Pagans' civil theology, yet their other arcane and natural theology was unconcerned in it, that plainly acknowledging all to be but one God, which for certain reasons was worshipped under several names, and with different rites. Wherefore Janus and Jupiter, being really but different names for one and the same supreme God, that conjecture of Salmasius[7] seems very probable, that the Romans derived their Janus from Ζανὸς, the Ætolian Jupiter.

* Civ. Deor. lib. 4. cap. 11. [P. 76.]

[7] Where Salmasius put forth this conjecture, is more than I can tell. But it has been adopted both by some others, and not long ago by P. Dan. Huet, Prop. 4. cap. 9. sect. 2. p. 228. who proves from it, that Janus and Jupiter are the same. How little importance is to be attached however, to what is here eruditely argued respecting Janus, will be apparent to every one from the following passage of Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 3. p. 147. Incipiamus a Jano, quem quidem ex vobis mundum, annum alii, solem esse prodiderunt nonnulli. Quod si accipiamus, ut verum sit, sequitur, ut intelligi debeat, nullum unquam fuisse Janum, quem ferunt cœlo atque Hecate procreatum, in Italia regnasse primum, Janiculi oppidi conditorem, patrem Fonti, Vulturni generum, Juturnæ maritum, "Let us begin with Janus, whom some of you have pronounced to be the world, others the year, others the sun. Which if we admit to be true, we must necessarily suppose, that no such Janus ever existed, as the one said to have sprung from Cœlus and Hecate, and to have first reigned in Italy, the founder of the town Janiculum, the father of Fontus, the son-in-law of Vulturnus, and the husband of Juturna." In the first place, therefore, the history of Janus, which showed him to have been an ancient king of Italy, exposed the error and folly of that more arcane or rather spurious theology of the Romans. Secondly, these theologists, who fancied themselves to be so wonderfully ingenious in expounding the popular religions, mutually *opposed* and *contradicted* each other. For while they are at issue as to the thing of which Janus is the figure and symbol; while, as Servius on Virgil informs us, one sees in him the sun, another the world, another the year, another Mars, another the air; they plainly prove, that not the slightest credit is to be attached to them and that the whole of this system of religious exposition is to be classed among the sports and vagaries of the human intellect. The same may be said of the other gods here mentioned.

GENIUS was also another of the twenty select Roman gods; and that this was likewise a universal Numen, containing the whole nature of things, appears from this of Festus:[8] Genium appellabant Deum, qui vim obtineret rerum omnium gerendarum, "They called that God, who hath the power of begetting or producing all things, Genius." And St. Austin*[9] also plainly declareth Genius to be the same with Jupiter; that is, to be but another name for the one supreme God: Cum alio loco [Varro] dicit, genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; talem autem mundi animum Deum esse, ad hoc idem utique revocat, ut tanquam universalis Genius, ipse mundi animus esse credatur. Hic est igitur, quem appellant Jovem. And afterwards: Restat ut eum singulariter et excellenter dicant deum Genium, quem dicunt mundi animum; ac per hoc Jovem, "When Varro elsewhere calleth the rational mind of every one a genius, and affirmeth such a mind of the whole world to be God; he plainly implieth, that God is the universal genius of the world, and that Genius and Jupiter are the same. And though Genius be sometimes used for the mind of every man, yet the god Genius, spoken of by way of excellency, can be no other than the mind of the whole world, or Jupiter."

Again, that CHRONOS or SATURN was no particular deity, but the universal Numen of the whole world, is plainly affirmed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, where, commending the fertility of Italy, he writeth thus: Οὐδὲν οὖν θαυμαστὸν τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἱερὰν ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦ Κρόνου τὴν χώραν ταύτην, τὸν μὲν δαίμονα τοῦτον οἰομένους εἶναι πάσης εὐδαιμονίας δοτῆρα, καὶ πληρωτὴν ἀνθρώποις· εἴτε Χρόνον αὐτὸν δεῖ καλεῖν, ὡς Ἕλληνες ἀξιοῦσιν, εἴτε Κρόνον ὡς Ῥωμαῖοι, πᾶσαν δὲ περιειληφότα τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν, ὁπότερον ἄν τις ὀνομάσοι, "Wherefore it is no wonder, if the ancients thought this country to be sacred to Saturn, they supposing this god to be the giver and perfecter of all happiness to men; whether we ought to call him Chronos, as the Greeks will have it, or Cronos as the Romans; he being either way such a god as comprehends the whole nature of the world." But the word Saturn was Hetrurian (which language was originally

[8] De Verborum Significat. lib. 7. in Dion. Godofredus' Auctores Latinæ Linguæ p. 272.

* Civ. Deor. lib. 7. cap. 13. [P. 132.]

[9] St. Augustine, however, is not stating his own but Varro's opinion. What he himself thought of such spurious interpretations of the different religions he declares, after expounding Varro's opinions, in the following words: Sed quum conantur vanissimas fabulas sive hominum res gestas velut naturalibus interpretationibus honorare, etiam homines acutissimi tantas patiuntur angustias, ut eorum quoque vanitatem dolere cogamur, "But even the most acute men, when they attempt to dignify the vainest fables, or the actions of mortals, as it were by physical interpretations, are involved in so great perplexity, that we cannot help being grieved at their own vanity," De Civitat. Dei, cap. 18. p. 135. Nothing can be more just than this observation.

† Rom. Ant. lib. 1. p. 24. Steph.

Oriental) and being derived from סתר signifies "hidden;" so that by Saturn was meant that hidden principle of the universe, which containeth all things; and he was therefore called by the Romans, Deus Latius, "the hidden God;" as the wife of Saturn in the pontifical books is Latia Saturni, and the land itself (which in the Hetrurian language was Saturnia) is in the Roman Latium; from whence the inhabitants were called Latins, which is as much as to say, the worshippers of the hidden God. Moreover, that Saturn could not be inferior to Jupiter, according to the fabulous theology, is plain from hence, because he is therein said to have been his father. But then the question will be, how Saturn and Jupiter could be both of them one and the same universal Numen? To which there are several answers. For first, Plato, who propounds this difficulty in his Cratylus, solves it thus: That by Jupiter here is to be understood the soul of the world, which, according to his theology, was derived from a perfect and eternal mind or intellect (which Chronos is interpreted to be) as Chronos also depended upon Uranus or Cœlus, the "supreme heavenly God," or "first original Deity." So that Plato here finds his Trinity of divine hypostases, archical and universal, Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς, and Ψυχὴ,[10] in "Uranus, Chronos, and Zeus;" or Cœlus, Saturn, and Jupiter. Others conceive that according to the plainer and more simple sense of Hesiod's Theogonia, that Jupiter, who, together with Neptune and Plato, is said to have been the son of Saturn, was not the supreme Deity, nor the soul of the world neither, but only the Æther, as Neptune was the sea, and Pluto the earth. All which are said to have been begotten by Chronos, or Saturn, the son of Uranus; that is, as much as to say, by the hidden virtue of the

[10] The learned Doctor fancies he has discovered more in Plato than is to be found in him. For this philosopher not only does not speak of those principles, but even brings forward sufficient to show, that he had not the slightest idea of applying the histories of Saturn, Jupiter, and Uranus to those three natures. In his Cratylus, indeed, p. 262. he explains the fable of Jupiter's origin from Saturn, by supposing Jupiter to be derived from some great intelligence: Εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκγονον εἶναι τὸν Δία, "But it is probable, that Jupiter is the offspring of a certain great intelligence." But it is difficult to understand the meaning of these words. For a little before he had openly declared Jupiter to be the supreme God, calling him, ἄρχοντα καὶ βασιλέα τῶν πάντων, "the prince and king of all things." In what sense, therefore, the supreme God is said by him to be the son of a certain great intelligence, I own myself at a loss to conceive. Much less do I understand his meaning, when he afterwards speaks of Saturn as being sprung from Cœlus: Ἔστι δὲ, says he, Οὐρανοῦ υἱὸς, ὡς λόγος· ἡ δὲ αὖ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις καλῶς ἔχει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα καλεῖσθαι Οὐρανία, ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω, "He is said to be the son of Cœlus: for ἡ ἐς τὸ ἄνω ὄψις is rightly called Οὐρανία, as ὁρῶσα τὰ ἄνω." Let others explore the sense and force of these words; for my part, I feel no inclination to do so. Of this I am satisfied, that Plato here trifles like the lowest of grammarians. I perceive also that they are mistaken who suppose him to have held Uranus, Saturn, and Jupiter to be respectively what his followers call τἀγαθὸν, νοῦς, and ψυχή. About the rest, let others be solicitous. Also, let those who are so disposed assent to the learned Doctor's conjectures regarding the origin of the words Saturnus, Latium, and others: to myself, I must candidly confess, they appear idle and nugatory

supreme heavenly God. But the writer, De Mundo,* though making Jupiter to be the first and supreme God, yet, (taking Chronos to signify immensity of duration, or eternity) will have Jupiter to be the son of Chronos in this sense, because he doth διήκειν ἐξ αἰῶνος ἀτέρμονος εἰς ἕτερον αἰῶνα, "continue from one eternity to another;" so that Chronos and Zeus are to him in a manner one and the same thing. But we are apt to think that no ingenious and learned Pagan, who well understood the natural theology, would deny, but that the best answer of all to this difficulty is this, that there is no coherent sense to be made of all things in the fabulous theology. St. Austin,[1] from Varro, gives us this account of Saturn, that it is he, who produceth from himself continually the hidden seeds and forms of things, and reduceth or receiveth them again into himself; which some think to have been the true meaning of that fable concerning Saturn's devouring his male children, because the forms of these corporeal things are perpetually destroyed, whilst the material parts (signified by the female) still remain. However, it is plain, that this was but another Pagan adumbration of the Deity, that being also sometimes thus defined by them, as St. Austin[2] likewise informs us,† Sinus quidam naturæ in seipso continens omnia, "A certain bosom, or deep hollow, and inward recess of nature, which containeth within itself all things." And St. Austin himself concludes, that according to this Varronian notion of Saturn likewise, the Pagan Jupiter and Saturn were really but one and the same Numen, De Civ. Dei. lib. 7. cap. 13. Wherefore, we may with good reason affirm, that Saturn was another name for the supreme God amongst the Pagans, it signifying that secret and hidden power, which comprehends, pervades, and supports the whole world; and which produces the seeds or seminal principles and forms of all things from itself. As also Uranus or Cœlus was plainly yet another name for the same supreme Deity (or the first divine hypostasis); comprehending the whole.

In the next place, though it be true that Minerva be sometimes taken for a particular god, or for God according to a particular manifestation of him in the Æther, (as shall be showed afterwards;) yet was it often taken also for the supreme God,

* Cap. 7. p. 869. [Tom. 1. Aristot.]

[1] De Civitat. Dei. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 132. tom. 7. opp.

[2] But in this passage of St. Augustine there is no mention made of Saturn, nor do the words here adduced pertain to Saturn. He is speaking of those who suppose God to be the soul of the world, and the world to be his body: Non enim, says he, ingenii opus est excellentia, ut deposito studio contentionis attendant,———si mundus Deus est, sinu quodam naturæ in se ipso continens omnia, "For there is no need of surpassing intellect, that having laid aside the spirit of contention, they may consider, ———if the world is God, containing all things within himself in a certain bosom or recess of nature." What, I ask, has this to do with Saturn.

† De Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 12. [P. 77.]

‡ Thus in that old inscription: OPTIMUS MAXIMUS CŒLUS ÆTERNUS JUPITER.

according to his most general notion, or as a universal Numen diffusing himself through all things. Thus hath it been already proved, that Neith or Neithas was the same amongst the Egyptians, as Athena amongst the Greeks, and Minerva amongst the Latins; which that it was a universal Numen, appears from that Egyptian inscription in the temple of this god, "I am all that was, is, and shall be." And accordingly, Athenagoras tells us,[3] that Athena of the Greeks was, ἡ φρόνησις διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, "wisdom passing and diffusing itself through all things:" as in the book of Wisdom it is called, ἡ πάντων τεχνῖτις, "the Artifex of all things," and is said διήκειν καὶ χωρεῖν διὰ πάντων, "to pass and move through all things." Wherefore, this Athena or Minerva of the Pagans was either the first supreme Deity, a perfect and infinite Mind, the original of all things; or else a second divine hypostasis, the immediate offspring and first-begotten of that first original Deity. Thus, Aristides, in his oration upon Minerva:* Πάντα μὲν οὖν τὰ κάλλιστα περὶ Ἀθηνᾶν τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀθηνᾶς· κεφάλαιον δὲ εἰπεῖν, τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ καὶ βασιλέως παῖς ἐστι μόνη δὴ μόνου· οὐ γὰρ εἶχεν, ἐξ ὅτου ὁμοτίμου ποιήσειεν αὐτήν· ἀλλ' ἀναχωρήσας αὐτὸς εἰς αὑτὸν, αὐτός ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενᾷ τε καὶ τίκτει τὴν θεόν· ὥστε ἔστι μόνη βεβαίως γνησία τοῦ πατρός, ἐξ ἴσου καὶ ὁμολογοῦντος ἑαυτῷ τοῦ γένους γενομένη, &c., "Wherefore all the most excellent things are in Minerva, and from her: but to speak briefly of her, this is the only immediate offspring of the only maker and king of all things; for he had none of equal honour with himself, upon whom he should beget her, and therefore retiring into himself, he begat her, and brought her forth from himself: so that this is the only genuine offspring of the first father of all." And again: Πίνδαρος δ' αὖ φησι, δεξιὰν κατὰ χεῖρα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὴν καθεζομένην, τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδέχεσθαι· ἀγγέλου μὲν γάρ ἐστι μείζων ἡ δὲ, τῶν ἀγγέλων ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἐπιτάττει πρώτη παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς παραλαμβάνουσα, ἀντ' ἐξηγητοῦ τινος οὖσα τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ εἰσαγωγέως, ὅταν καὶ τούτου δέῃ, "Pindar also affirmeth concerning Minerva, that sitting at the right-hand of her father, she there receiveth commands from him to be delivered to the gods. For she is greater than the angels, and commandeth them some one thing and some another, according as she had first received of her father; she performing the office of an interpreter and introducer to the gods, when it is needful." Where we may observe by the way, that this word *angel* came to be in use amongst the Pagans from Jews and Christians, about this very age that Aristides lived in; after which we meet with it frequently in the writings of their philosophers. Lastly,

[3] Legat. pro Christianis, cap. 19. p. 86. Athenagoras, however, does not declare this to be his own opinion, but that of certain Greeks, which he himself despises and proves to be false.

* P. 192.

Aristides thus concludeth his oration upon Minerva: Σχεδὸν γὰρ δύναμιν τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι λέγων τις αὐτὴν ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι· ὥστε τί δεῖ μικρολογεῖσθαι τὰς ἐν μέρει πράξεις αὐτῆς διηγούμενον, ὅποτ' ἔξεστι τὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἔργα κοινὰ τοῦ Διὸς εἶναι φῆσαι καὶ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς, "He that from what we have said will determine that Minerva is as it were, the power and virtue of Jupiter himself, will not err. Wherefore (not to enumerate all the minute things belonging to Minerva) we conclude thus concerning her, that all the works of Jupiter are common with Jupiter and Minerva." Wherefore, that conceit which the learned and industrious Vossius[4] somewhere seems to favour, that the Pagans' universal Numen was no other than a senseless nature, or spermatic reason of the whole world, undirected by any higher intellectual principle, (which is indeed no better than downright atheism) is plainly confuted from hence, they making wisdom and understanding, under these names of Neith, Athena, and Minerva, to be either the absolutely supreme Deity, or the first begotten offspring of it.[5]

To Minerva may be added Apollo, who, though often taken for the sensible sun animated, and so an inferior Deity, yet was not always understood in this sense, nor indeed then when he was reckoned amongst the twelve Consentes, because the sun was afterwards added to them, in the number of the eight select gods. And that he was sometimes taken for the supreme universal Numen, the maker of the sun and of the whole world, is plainly testified by Plutarch (who is a competent witness in this case, he being a priest of this Apollo) writing thus concerning him in his Defect of Oracles:* Εἴτε ἥλιός ἐστιν, εἴτε κύριος ἡλίου καὶ πατὴρ, καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὁρατοῦ παντὸς, οὐκ εἰκὸς ἀπαξιοῦν φωνῆς τοὺς νῦν ἀνθρώπους, οἷς αἴτιός ἐστι γενέσεως, καὶ τροφῆς, καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ φρονεῖν, "Whether Apollo be the sun, or whether he be the lord and father of the sun, placed far above all sensible and corporeal nature, it is not likely that he should now deny his oracles to them, to whom himself is the cause of generation and nourishment, of life and understanding.[6]

[4] De Idololatria, lib. 7. cap. 1. p. 718.

[5] Of Minerva, the goddess Neith, and the inscription found in the temple of Neith, I have already said what will be sufficient towards determining the truth of the positions advanced in this place. Aristides is not a writer, from whom we can learn the religions of the ancients. Besides, the passages here cited from him do not prove what the learned Doctor is so anxious to inculcate, that the name Minerva designated the supreme God.

* Page 413.

[6] From this passage of Plutarch we cannot, in my opinion, infer what the learned Doctor fancies to be evident from it, that Apollo was sometimes taken for the supreme Being. I. It proves that some did not suppose him to be the sun, but the lord and father of the sun, whom no one beholds. Which opinion, I consider, amounts to this, that Apollo was the nature, which both made the sun and continually governs and controls it. But I see no necessity for our supposing, that they held Apollo to be that first principle, from which all things emanated. As must be known to all, who possess

Moreover, Urania Aphrodite, the Heavenly Venus or Love, was a universal Numen also, or another name of God, according to his more general notion, as comprehending the whole world; it being the same with that Ἔρως, "Love," which Orpheus, and others in Aristotle, made to be the first original of all things: for it is certain that the ancients distinguished concerning a double Venus and Love. Thus Pausanias, in Plato's Symposium:* Ἡ μέν γέ που πρεσβυτέρα καὶ ἀμήτωρ Οὐρανοῦ θυγάτηρ, ἣν δὴ καὶ οὐρανίαν ἐπονομάζομεν· ἡ δὲ νεωτέρα, Διὸς καὶ Διώνης, ἣν δὲ πάνδημον καλοῦμεν· ἀναγκαῖον δὴ καὶ Ἔρωτα, τὸν μὲν ἑτέρᾳ συνεργὸν, πάνδημον ὀρθῶς καλεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ οὐράνιον, "There are two Venus's, and therefore, two Loves; one the older, and without a mother, the daughter of Uranus or heaven, which we call the heavenly Venus; another younger, begotten from Jupiter and Dione, which we call the vulgar Venus: and accordingly are there of necessity two loves, answering to these two Venus's, the one vulgar and the other heavenly." The elder of these two Venuses is in Plato said to be senior to Japhet and Saturn, and by Orpheus,[7] the oldest of all things, and πρῶτος γενέτωρ, "the first begetter of all." Upon which account, perhaps, it was called by the oriental nations Mylitta or Genitrix, as being the fruitful mother of all. This was also the same with Plato's τὸ πρῶτον καλὸν, "the first fair;" the cause of all pulchritude, order, and harmony in the world. And Pausanias,[8] the writer, tells us, that there were temples severally erected to each of these Venuses or Loves, the heavenly and the vulgar; and that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was so called, ἐπὶ ἔρωτι καθαρῷ καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένῳ πόθου σωμάτων, "because the love belonging to it was pure, and free from all corporeal affection:" which, as it is in men is but a particular participation of that first Urania, or heavenly Venus and Love, God himself. And

even a slight acquaintance with ancient matters, it was the prevailing belief in former times, that certain genii or gods were placed over the heavenly bodies, who ruled them at will. They supposed, therefore, that the sun had also its own presiding deity. Hence, that diversity of opinion among the ancients respecting Apollo, to which Plutarch alludes; some considering him to be the sun, others, the god, who governs the sun. II. Apollo is called by Plutarch the cause of life, wisdom, and nourishment. But neither do these words clearly point out the supreme God. For who, I ask, is not aware that all these were ascribed by the ancients to the sun? Macrobius, Saturnal. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 294. says: Sol mundi caput est et rerum sator, omnisque vis ejus non in quodam divisorum ministerio membrorum, sed in sola mente consistit, cujus sedes in capite est, "The sun is the head of the world, and the parent of things, and the whole of its power consists, not in a certain function of the divided members, but in mind alone, the seat of which is in the head." Add Julian's Oration, In Solem.

* P. 108.

[7] These words are not to be found in his hymn to Venus, p. 151. opp. although Venus is there said to produce all things, and is styled γενέτειρα θεά, "goddess mother." But this hymn, as is evident almost from every verse, was not dedicated to the heavenly Venus, but to the one, who was said to have sprung from the froth of the sea and to have passionately loved Adonis.

[8] In Bœotic. lib. 9. cap. 16. p. 742.

thus is Venus described by Euripides, in Stobæus,[9] as the supreme Numen:

> Τὴν Ἀφροδίτην οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὅση θεός;
> Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν εἴποις, οὐδὲ μετρήσειας ἄν,
> Ὅση πέφυκε καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον διέρχεται·
> Αὕτη τρέφει δὲ κἀμὲ καὶ πάντας βροτοὺς, &c.*

To this sense: "Do you not see how great a god this Venus is? but you are never able to declare her greatness, nor to measure the vast extent thereof. For this is she which nourisheth both thee and me, and all mortals, and which makes heaven and earth friendly to conspire together," &c. But by Ovid this is more fully expressed, in his Fastorum:[10]

> Illa quidem totum dignissima temperat orbem,
> Illa tenet nullo regna minora Deo:
> Juraque dat cœlo, terræ, natalibus undis;
> Perque suos initus continet omne genus.
> Illa deos omnes (longum enumerare) creavit;
> Illa satis causas arboribusque dedit.

Where all the gods are said to have been created or made by Venus, that is, by the one supreme Deity. But lastly, this is best of all performed by Severinus Boëtius, a Christian philosopher and poet, in this manner:†

> Quod mundus stabili fide
> Concordes variat vices,
> Quod pugnantia semina
> Fœdus perpetuum tenent:
> Quod Phœbus roseum diem
> Curru provehit aureo; &c.
> Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
> Terras ac pelagus regens,
> Et cœlo imperitans, AMOR, &c.
> Hic si frena remiserit,
> Quicquid nunc amat invicem,
> Bellum continuò geret.
> Hic sancto populos quoque
> Junctos fœdere continet;
> Hic et conjugii sacrum
> Castis nectit amoribus, &c.
> O felix hominum genus,
> Si vestros animos AMOR,
> Quo cœlum regitur, regat.

And to this Urania, or heavenly Venus, was near of kin also that third Venus in Pausanias called Ἀποστροφία, and by the Latins Venus Verticordia, "pure and chaste Love," expulsive of all unclean lusts, to which the Romans consecrated a statue, as

[9] Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 97.

* Thus also by Æschylus: Ἐρᾶ μὴν ἁγνὸς οὐρανὸς, &c. Ἔρως δὲ γαῖαν λαμβάνει, &c.——τῶν δ' ἐγὼ παραίτιος. Grot. Excerp. p. 45.

[10] Lib. 4. v. 91. &c.

† De Cons. lib. 2. Met. 8.

Valerius M. tells us (lib. 8. c. 15.), quo facilius virginum mulierumque mentes à libidine ad pudicitiam converterentur, "to this end, that the minds of the female sex might then the better be converted from lust and wantonness to chastity." We conclude therefore, that Urania, or the heavenly Venus, was sometimes among the Pagans a name for the supreme Deity, as that which is the most amiable being, and first pulchritude, the most benign and fecund begetter of all things, and the constant harmonizer of the whole world.[1]

[1] On the twofold love of the ancients I have already expressed myself at considerable length. The whole of what is here advanced by the learned Doctor, to prove that Venus was a name of the supreme Being, I frankly confess appears to me to be entirely destitute of probability. The Venus worshipped by the Greeks was unquestionably a female, or queen, translated to heaven after death. This is manifest from the whole of her history. Nor in the earlier ages did any one ever dream of a second or third Venus. The causes that subsequently led to the notion of a plurality of Venuses were the two following: I. The Greeks, on visiting foreign nations, from commercial or other motives, found in these also a goddess presiding over the affairs of love. Indeed, no people, devoted to the worship of many gods, was without such a deity; nor, as far as I know, did any nation entrust this department to a male, but all committed it to the administration of a female. These goddesses the Greeks did not scruple to identify with their own Venus, and to call by the same name. The like was afterwards done by the Romans. Hence those four Venuses enumerated by Cicero, De Natur. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 23. and by Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 4. p. 170. nay, the still greater number, which those who have leisure may collect from ancient books and inscriptions. See Car. Patinus, as quoted below, p. 396. ' For every goddess, to whom any nation assigned the empire of love, was called Venus. II. After the Greeks began to devote themselves to philosophy, they soon perceived, that all love was not of one and the same kind, but that blind lust and sensual love differed much from the love, which is founded upon wisdom and reason. I suspect Socrates and Plato to have been the first who taught this among the Greeks, as may be inferred from the Symposium and other works of Plato; unless we are to suppose rather, that many were led by right reason, even without the aid of a master, to the knowledge of this distinction. Be this as it may, the Greeks becoming thus enlightened would naturally consider it as unseemly to commit all love, rational and irrational, honourable and base, chaste and unchaste, to the superintendence of one and the same goddess. The Venus whom they publicly worshipped, with her son Cupid, it was evident, might be called the patroness of wantonness and lust, rather than of true and virtuous love. Therefore, that the latter might not be without its own tutelary deity, they, as it were, dissected one Venus into two goddesses, and invented a *heavenly Venus* together with a *heavenly Cupid*, to be supplicated by those whose minds were inspired with pure and genuine love; the other Venus and Cupid, whom they now distinguished by the title of *terrestrial*, being left to the slaves of carnal and sensual lusts. I am stating nothing new or unusual. For it is easy to show by numerous examples, that the application of philosophic precepts to religion and the history of the gods sometimes wrought important changes in the fables of antiquity, and that the ancients, in order to reconcile the maxims of reason with the public religion, did not hesitate frequently to remodel at will the traditions of the people. No wonder, therefore, that the ancient Greeks should dare to separate their goddess into two deities, that each kind of love might have its protector and patron. In this enterprise they were aided by the theogonies of the ancient poets, which, as may be learnt from Hesiod alone, described *Love* as being the most ancient of the gods. For as this was by no means applicable to that Venus, of whom Homer sings, and who was publicly worshipped in Greece, they considered it to be a sufficient argument for the introduction of two Loves and two Venuses. What the learned Doctor brings forward in this place is not of the slightest weight towards invalidating this hypothesis. Plato speaks of two Venuses; and Pausanias states, that the heavenly Venus was named from pure love. Will any body be led by these testimonies to conclude, that the heavenly Venus was an image of the supreme Being?

Again, though Vulcan, according to the most common and vulgar notion of him, be to be reckoned amongst the particular gods, yet had he also another more universal consideration. For Zeno in Laërtius[2] tells us, that the supreme God was called Ἥφαιστος or Vulcan, κατὰ τὴν εἰς τὸ τεχνικὸν πῦρ διάτασιν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ αὐτοῦ, "As his Hegemonic acted in the artificial fire." Now Plutarch[3] and Stobæus[4] testify, that the Stoics did not only call nature, but also the supreme Deity itself (the architect of the whole world), τεχνικὸν πῦρ, "an artificial fire," they conceiving him to be corporeal. And Jamblichus[5] making Phtha to be the same supreme God, amongst the Egyptians, with Osiris and Hammon, or rather, more properly, all of them alike the soul of the world, tells us, that Hephæstus, in the Greekish theology, was the same with this Egyptian Phtha: Ἕλληνες εἰς Ἥφαιστον μεταλαμβάνουσι τὸν Φθᾶ, τῷ τεχνικῷ μόνον προσβάλλοντες, "Amongst the Greeks Hephæstus (or Vulcan) answers to the Egyptian Phtha." Wherefore as the Egyptians by Phtha, so the Greeks by Hephæstus, sometimes

Euripides and Æschylus, according to poetic wont, proclaim the magnitude of the empire of Love or Venus, that is, if divested of figure, they tell us that all men and animals are impelled to love by a certain instinct of nature. What, I ask, is there in this towards proving the heavenly Venus and the supreme God to be the same? Besides, there is nothing to show us that these poets are speaking of celestial love, and Æschylus does not even mention the name of Love or Venus. Ovid's passage on love is altogether foreign to the question. For a slight inspection of his poem will convince us, that the poet is extolling no other Venus than the one to whom the Romans paid homage, the mother of Æneas:

> Proximus Anchisen, cum quo commune parentis
> Non dedignata est nomen habere Venus,
> Hinc satus Æneas.

Fastor. lib. 4. v. 35. &c. Boëthius, a Christian philosopher and poet, calls the supreme Being Love. This he was able to defend by the example of Holy Writ. But what has this to do with the worshippers of many gods? Does it follow, because Boëthius designated God by the name of Love, that those who formerly worshipped the heavenly Venus worshipped the supreme God, the parent of all things? No one, I fancy, in his senses, would admit it. Thus frequently are the most learned men deluded by some shadow of the truth. Those who are prepossessed with any particular opinion, however sound and rational their views in other respects, are generally on this one point like men afflicted with the jaundice, to whom every thing seems yellow that they look upon. They cannot take up an author without being sure to find in it their own favourite doctrines; and although facts may be against them, still they will never have to seek in vain for words that seem to favour their wishes. On the heavenly Venus and her worship, Car. Patinus in particular has treated very elaborately and copiously in his Commentary, In Antiquum Monumentum Marcellinæ e Græcia nuper allatum. published at Padua, 1688. 4. For the Marcellina to whom this monument is dedicated was ἀρχιερεία Ἀφροδίτης οὐρανίας. On Venus Verticordia or Ἀποστροφία, it will be worth while to peruse what has been collected by Mons. Bayle, Diction. Histor. et Critique, v. Sulpitia, tom. 4. not. A. p. 2676.

[2] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458.
[3] De Placitis Philos. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 881.
[4] Eclog. Phys. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 17.
[5] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.

understood no other than the supreme God, or at least the soul of the world, as artificially framing all things.[6]

Furthermore, Seneca* gives us yet other names of the supreme Deity, according to the sense of the Stoics: Hunc et liberum patrem, et Herculem, ac Mercurium nostri putant, Liberum Patrem, quia omnium parens, &c. Herculem, quod vis ejus invicta sit; Mercurium, quia ratio penes illum est, numerusque, et ordo, et scientia, "Furthermore, our philosophers take this auctor of all things to be Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury; the first, because he is parent of all things, &c. the second, because his force and power is unconquerable, &c. and the third, because there is in and from him reason, number, order, and knowledge." And now we see already, that the supreme God was sufficiently polyonymous amongst the Pagans; and that all these, Jupiter, Pan, Janus, Genius, Saturn, Cœlus, Minerva, Apollo, Aphrodite Urania, Hephæstus, Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, were not so many really distinct and substantial gods, much less self-existent and independent ones; but only several names of that one supreme universal and all-comprehending Numen, according to several notions and considerations of him.

But besides these, there were many other pagan gods called by Servius dii speciales, "special or particular gods;" which cannot be thought neither to have been so many really distinct and substantial beings (that is, natural gods) much less self-existent and independent, but only so many several names or notions of one and the same supreme Deity, according to certain particular powers and manifestations of it. It is true, that some late Christian writers against the polytheism and idolatry of the Pagans, have charged them with at least a trinity of independent gods, viz. Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, as sharing the government of the whole world amongst these three, and consequently acknowledging no one universal Numen. Notwithstanding which it is certain, that according to the more arcane doctrine, and cabala of the Pagans, concerning the natural true theology, these three considered as distinct and independent gods, were

[6] I am either altogether ignorant of the nature of true reasoning, or nothing again can be more illogical than this conclusion. I. The Stoics asserted *Vulcan* to be one of the names of their one supreme God. But who is not aware, that this sect combined the popular religion with the precepts of philosophy in so absurd and stupid a manner, as to excite the ridicule of all wise men? Consult Cicero, De Natura Deor. lib. 3. They certainly are not to be listened to in a question respecting the sacred rites and opinions of antiquity. II. The Stoics called God an *artificial fire*. Be it so. Does this prove *Vulcan* to be the name of the supreme Being? III. On the passage of Jamblichus I have already spoken. Neither the Egyptian Deity *Ptha* nor the Greek Vulcan is the supreme God. I would admit, indeed, that Ptha in the Egyptian was the same as Vulcan in the Greek mythology; but I cannot allow of the two being confounded.

* De Ben. lib. 4. c. 8.

accounted but dii poetici et commentitii, "poetical and fictitious gods," and they were really esteemed no other than so many several names and notions of one and the same supreme Numen, as acting variously in those several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, the earth, and hell. For first, as to Pluto and Hades, called also by the Latins Orcus, and Dis (which latter word seems to have been a contraction of Dives to answer the Greek Pluto) as Balbus in Cicero[7] attributes to him, omnem vim terrenam, "all terrene power," so others commonly assign him the "regimen of separate souls after death." Now it is certain, that, according to this latter notion, it was by Plato understood no otherwise than as a name for that part of "the divine providence which exercises itself upon the souls of men after death." This Ficinus observed upon Plato's Cratylus: Animadverte præ cæteris, Plutonum hic significare præcipuè providentiam divinam ad separatas animas pertinentem, "You are to take notice, that by Pluto is here meant that part of divine providence, which belongeth to separate souls." For this is that which, according to Plato, "binds and detains pure souls in that separate state, with the best vinculum of all, which is not necessity, but love and desire; they being ravished and charmed as it were with those pure delights which they there enjoy." And thus is he also to be understood in his book of laws, writing in this manner concerning Pluto:* Καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον πολεμικοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸν τοιοῦτον θεὸν, ἀλλὰ τιμητέον, ὡς ὄντα ἀεὶ τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένει ἄριστον· κοινωνία γὰρ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι, διαλύσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ κρεῖττον, ὡς ἐγὼ φαίην ἂν σπουδῇ λέγων, "Neither ought military men to be troubled or offended at this god Pluto, but highly to honour him, as who always is the most beneficent to mankind. For I affirm with the greatest seriousness, that the union of the soul with this terrestrial body is never better than the dissolution or separation of them." Pluto, therefore, according to Plato, is nothing else but a name for that part of the divine providence that is exercised upon the souls of men, in their separation from these earthly bodies.[8] And upon this account was Pluto styled

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 27. p. 2994.

* Lib. 8. [P. 642.]

[8] But what authorized Ficinus to attribute this opinion to Plato, of which in his Cratylus, where he treats of the meaning of the name Pluto, not the slightest vestige is to be found? We meet, however, with many such things both in Ficinus and the other interpreters of Plato, who almost all fancy they can present Plato to us much wiser than he really was. The passage here quoted from lib. 8. De Legibus, if it be compared with the words which precede, is of itself sufficient to refute this conceit of Ficinus. For Pluto is there ranked by Plato among the twelve gods to whom sacrifices were offered each month; and the last month of the year is said to have been consecrated to him. And can he, I ask, be considered a supreme God, who was worshipped by the Greeks only in the twelfth month of the year, and openly disregarded by the soldiers, whom Plato is exhorting to a more frequent worship of this Deity?

by Virgil,[9] the Stygian Jupiter. But by others Pluto, together with Ceres, is taken in a larger sense, for the manifestation of the Deity in this whole terrestrial globe; and thus is the writer De Mundo* to be understood, when he tells us that God or Jupiter is οὐρανιός τε καὶ χθόνιος, πάσης ἐπώνυμος ὢν φύσεως τε καὶ τύχης, ἅτε πάντων αὐτὸς αἴτιος ὤν, "both celestial and terrestrial, he being denominated from every nature, forasmuch as he is the cause of all things." Pluto therefore is Ζεὺς χθόνιος or καταχθόνιος, "the terrestrial (also as well as the Stygian and subterranean Jupiter;" and that other Jupiter, which is distinguished both from Pluto and Neptune, is properly Ζεὺς οὐράνιος, "the heavenly Jupiter," God as manifesting himself in the heavens. Hence is it, that Zeus and Hades, Jupiter and Pluto are made to be one and the same thing, in that passage which Julian[10] cites as an oracle of Apollo, but others impute to Orpheus:

Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης,

"Jupiter and Pluto are one and the same God." As also that Euripides, in a place before produced, is so doubtful, whether he should call the supreme God (τὸν πάντων μεδέοντα, "that takes care of all things here below) Zeus or Hades:

Ζεὺς εἴτ' Ἀΐδης
Ὀνομαζόμενος στέργεις,

"Whether thou hadst rather be called Jupiter or Pluto."

Lastly, Hermesianax the Colophonian poet, in those verses of

[9] Æneid, lib. 7. v. 327. I should look for no such important meaning in this title. The Stygian Jupiter is he who holds the same power in the lower regions as the ancients supposed Jupiter to possess in heaven. The name corresponds to the Greek word designating the name Pluto, Ζεὺς χθόνιος; which occurs in Hesiod Oper. et Dies, v. 465. p. 267. in Æschylus, Sophocles, and others. Consult J. Geo. Grævius, Lection. Hesiodeæ, cap. 10. p. 51. Nor have I any doubt, but that Virgil and the other Latin authors, who call Pluto *Jupiter Stygius*, meant to express this very Greek name Ζεὺς χθόνιος. But those who made use of it meant the Pluto depicted by the Greek poets, namely, the god who rules over the infernal regions.

* Cap. 7. p. 869. opp. Aristot.

[10] Orat. 4. in Regem Solem, p. 136. Whoever may have been the author of this oracle, which I consider to belong to some later philosopher of the Platonic school rather than to the Pythian priestess, it is not of the slightest use in the present question. We shall quote it entire:

Εἷς Ζεὺς, εἷς Ἀΐδης, εἷς ἥλιός ἐστι Σάραπις.

Its author supposed the sun alone to be concealed under the names of Jupiter, Pluto, and Serapis, or the names Jupiter, Pluto, and Serapis to be three appellations of one sun. If we agree with him, therefore, we must suppose Pluto to be the sun; an opinion which the emperor Julian certainly adopts and supports by many arguments. It was also entertained by Porphyry, the noblest philosopher of the Platonic sect; as is evident from his words in Eusebius, Præpar. Evangel. lib. 3. par. 11. p. 109. But if Pluto be the sun, how can he be the supreme God, the lord of all things?

his (afterward to be set down) makes Pluto in the first place (with many other pagan gods) to be really one and the same with Jupiter.

That Neptune was also another name of the supreme God, from another particular consideration of him, namely, as acting in the seas (at least according to the arcane and natural theology of the Pagans), is plainly declared by divers of the ancients. Xenocrates in Stobæus,[1] and Zeno in Laërtius,[2] affirm, that God as acting in the water is called Posidone or Neptune. To the same purpose Balbus in Cicero:* Sed tamen his fabulis spretis ac repudiatis, Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, alii per alia, poterunt intelligi, qui qualesque sint, &c. "But these poetic fables concerning the gods being despised and rejected, it is easy for us to understand how God, passing through the nature of every thing, may be called by several names, as through the earth Ceres (and Pluto) through the seas Neptune; and through other parts of the world by other names;" so that all these titular gods were but so many several denominations of one supreme Deity. And Cotta afterward thus represents the sense of this theology:† Neptunum esse dicis animum cum intelligentiâ per mare pergentem, idem de Cerere, "Your meaning is, Neptune is a mind, which with understanding passes through the sea, and the like of Ceres through the earth." Lastly, to name no more, Maximus Tyrius‡ agreeth also herewith: Κάλει τὸν μὲν Δία νοῦν πρεσβύτατον, &c. τὸν δὲ Ποσειδῶ, πνεῦμα διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης ἰὸν, οἰκονομοῦν αὐτῶν τὴν στάσιν καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν, "You are to call Jupiter that princely mind, which all things follow and obey, &c. and Neptune that spirit, which passing through the earth and sea, causes their state and harmony."[3]

Lastly, that these three, Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto, were not three really distinct substantial beings, but only so many several names for one supreme God (according to the true and natural theology of the Pagans), is thus plainly declared by

[1] Eclog. Physic. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 56. [2] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458.
* De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Cap. 28. p. 2996.]
† De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. [Cap. 25. p. 3090.]
‡ Dissert. 30. [Cap. 29. p. 290.]
[3] I am surprised, that the learned Doctor has omitted the testimony of Phornutus, who, in his book De Natur. Deor. cap. 22. p. 192. in Gale's Opuscula Veterum Mythologica, asserts Neptune to be τὴν τεταγμένην κατὰ τὸ ὑγρὸν δύναμιν, "the power which *rules* in the humid or sea," and refers all that is related of Neptune by the ancients to this definition. But supposing this opinion of Maximus and Phornutus to be true, which, however, I consider to be far from the case, still it will be of no weight towards supporting the present argument. Granting Neptune to be a certain power which gives laws to the waters and by reason controls the motions of the seas, as these authors supposed, what should compel us to conclude, that this power is the supreme Being? Is it not possible for these writers to have meant some particular nature subject to the supreme God? The judgment of the Stoics, whose evidence is again appealed to by the learned Doctor, is utterly valueless in this question.

Pausanias in his Corinthiacs;[4] he there expounding the meaning of a certain statue of Jupiter with three eyes (called the country Jupiter of the Trojans) in this manner: Τρεῖς δὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷδε ἄν τις τεκμαίροιτο αὐτὸν· Δία γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύειν, οὗτος μὲν λόγος κοινὸς πάντων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπων. Ὃν δὲ ἄρχειν φασὶν ὑπὸ γῆς, ἔστιν ἔπος τῶν Ὁμήρου Δία ὀνομάζον καὶ τοῦτον,

Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Αἰσχύλος δὲ ὁ Εὐφορίωνος καλεῖ Δία καὶ τὸν ἐν θαλάσσῃ· Τρισὶν οὖν ὁρῶντα ἐποίησεν ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὅστις δὴ οὖν ὁ ποιήσας, ἅτε ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις λήξεσιν ἄρχοντα τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον θεόν, "Now that this statue of Jupiter was made to have three eyes, one may guess this to have been the reason; because first the common speech of all men makes Jupiter to reign in the heaven. Again, he that is said to rule under the earth, is in a certain verse of Homer, called Zeus or Jupiter too, namely, the infernal or subterraneous Jupiter, together with Proserpina. And lastly, Æschylus, the son of Euphorion, calls that God, who is the king of the sea also, Jupiter. Wherefore this statuary made Jupiter with three eyes, to signify that it is one and the same God, which ruleth in those three several parts of the world, the heaven, the sea, and the earth." Whether Pausanias were in the right or no, as to his conjecture concerning this three-eyed statue of Jupiter, it is evident, that himself and other ancient Pagans acknowledged Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto to be but three several names, and partial considerations of one and the same God, who ruleth over the whole world. And since both Proserpine and Ceres were really the same with Pluto, and Salacia with Neptune, we may well conclude that all these, Jupiter, Neptune, Salacia, Pluto, Proserpina, and Ceres, though several poetical and political gods, yet were really taken but for one and the same natural and philosophical God.

Moreover, as Neptune was a name for God, as manifesting himself in the sea, and ruling over it, so was Juno another name of God, as acting in the air. This is expressly affirmed both by Xenocrates in Stobæus,[5] and Zeno in Laërtius. And St. Austin[6] propounding this query, why Juno was joined to Jupiter as his wife and sister, makes the Pagans answer thus to it: Quia Jovem (inquiunt) in æthere accipimus, in aëre Junonem, "Because we call God in the ether Jupiter, in the air Juno." But the reason, why Juno was feminine and a goddess, is thus given by Cicero:[7] Effœminarunt autem eum, Junonique tribuerunt,

[4] Lib. 2. cap. 24. p. 166.

[5] The passages of Laërtius and Stobæus have been indicated above.

[6] De Civitate Dei, lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 74. tom. 7. opp. But St. Augustine repudiates this answer of the philosophers of his own time and exposes its folly.

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 26. p. 2994. tom. 9. opp.

quod nihil est aëre mollius, "They effeminated the air, and attributed it to Juno, a goddess, because nothing is softer than it." Minerva was also sometimes taken for a special or particular god, and then was it nothing (as Zeno informs us) but a name for the supreme God, as passing through the (higher) ether: which gave occasion to St. Austin* thus to object against the pagan theology: Si ætheris partem superiorem Minerva tenere dicitur, et hac occasione fingere poëtas, quod de Jovis capite nata sit, cur non ergo ipsa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Jove superior? "If Minerva be said to possess the highest part of the ether, and the poets therefore to have feigned her to have been begotten from Jupiter's head, why is not she rather called the queen of the gods, since she is superior to Jupiter?" Furthermore, as the supreme God was called Neptune in the sea, and Juno in the air, so by the same reason may we conclude, that he was called Vulcan in the fire. Lastly, as the sun and moon were themselves sometime worshipped by the Pagans for inferior deities, they being supposed to be animated with particular souls of their own; so was the supreme God also worshipped in them both (as well as in the other parts of the world) and that under those names of Apollo and Diana. Thus the Pagans appointing a god to preside over every part of the world, did thereby but make the supreme God polyonymous, all those gods of theirs being indeed nothing but several names of him. Which theology of the ancient Pagans, Maximus Tyrius, treating concerning Homer's philosophy (after he had mentioned his tripartite empire of the world, shared between Jupiter, Neptune, and Pluto) thus declareth:† Εὕροις δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλας παρ' Ὁμήρῳ ἀρχὰς καὶ γενέσεις παντοδαπῶν ὀνομάτων. ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀνόητος ὡς μύθων ἀκούει, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος ὡς πραγμάτων· ἔστιν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρχή, ἀλλ' Ἀθηνᾶ λέγεται, &c. "You may find also in Homer other principles, and the originals of several names; which the ignorant hear as fables, but a philosopher will understand as things and realities. For he assigns a principle of virtue and wisdom, which he calls Minerva; another of love and desire, which he calls Venus; another of artificialness, and that is Vulcan, who rules over the fire. And Apollo also with him presides over dancings, the muses over songs, Mars over war, Æolus over winds, and Ceres over fruits." And then does he conclude thus: Καὶ οὐδὲν μέρος Ὁμήρῳ ἄθεον, οὐδὲ δυνάστου ἄπορον, οὐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μεστὰ θείων ὀνομάτων, καὶ θείων λόγων, καὶ θείας τέχνης, "So that no part neither of nature nor of the world, is to Homer godless (or void of a god) none destitute of a ruler, or without a superior government; but all things full of divine names, and of divine reason, and of divine

* Civ. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 10. [P. 74.]

† Dissert. 16. p. 163.

art." Where his θεῖα ὀνόματα, his "divine names," are nothing but several names of God, as manifesting himself variously in the several things of nature, and the parts of the world, and as presiding over them.

Wherefore, besides those special gods of the Pagans already mentioned, that were appointed to preside over several parts of the world, there are others, which are but several names of the supreme God neither, as exercising several offices and functions in the world, and b[illegible]l gifts upon mankind: as when in giving corn [illegible] called Ceres; in bestowing wine, Bacchus; in m[illegible] their health, Æsculapius; in presiding over traff[illegible]izing, Mercury; in governing military affairs, M[illegible]g the winds, Æolus; and the like.

That the more phi[illegible]s did thus really interpret the fables of the gods [illegible]ir many poetical and political gods to be all of t[illegible]l the same supreme natural God, is evident from the testimonies of Antisthenes, Plato, Xenocrates, Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (who allegorized all the fables of the gods accordingly) and of Scævola, the Roman Pontifex, of Cicero, Varro, Seneca, and many others. But that even their poets also did sometimes venture to broach this arcane theology, is manifest from those fragments preserved of Hermesianax[8] the Colophonian amongst the Greeks, and of Valerius Soranus amongst the Latins; the former thus enumerating the chief pagan gods, and declaring them to be all but one and the same Numen:

> Πλούτων, Περσεφόνη, Δημήτηρ, Κύπρις, Ἔρωτες,
> Τρίτωνες, Νηρεὺς, Τηθὺς καὶ Κυανοχαίτης,
> Ἑρμῆς θ' Ἥφαιστός τε κλυτὸς, Πὰν, Ζεύς τε καὶ Ἥρη,
> Ἄρτεμις, ἠδ' ἑκάεργος Ἀπόλλων, εἷς Θεός ἐστι.
>
> Pluto, Persephone, Ceres, et Venus alma, et Amores,
> Tritones, Nereus, Tethys, Neptunus et ipse,
> Mercurius, Juno, Vulcanus, Jupiter, et Pan,
> Diana, et Phœbus Jaculator, sunt *Deus unus.*

The latter pronouncing universally, that Jupiter Omnipotens is,

[8] Hermesianax the Colophonian, a most celebrated poet, to whom his fellow-citizens dedicated a statue, is often honourably mentioned by Pausanias, Græc. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 23. lib. 6. cap. 17. p. 493. lib. 7. cap. 17. p. 566. and other places. He is also spoken of by Agatharchides in Photius, Biblioth. cod. 250. p. 1337. by Athenæus, Deipnosophist. p. 597. 599. &c. ed. Lugd. Bat. 1637. fol. and by other authors. His verses here adduced are cited by most of those who have attempted to prove the agreement of the Christian and the old pagan religion. But I know not how it happens that they all have omitted the name of the author, in whom they are at this day extant. Even Huet himself, who, Demonstrat. Evangel. prop. 4. cap. 10. p. 243. has aptly converted these verses to his own use, most diligent as he otherwise is in pointing out the passages of authors, does not tell us where they are to be met with. Let others who have plenty of leisure find out to whose care we are indebted for the preservation of this fragment.

Deus unus et omnes,[9]

"one god, and all gods." Whether by his Jupiter he here meant the soul of the world only, as Varro would interpret him, agreeably to his own hypothesis, or whether an abstract mind superior to it; but probably he made this Jupiter to be all gods, upon these two accounts; first, as he was the begetter and creator of all the other natural gods, which were the Pagans' inferior deities (as the stars and demons); secondly, as that all the other poetical and political gods were nothing else but several names and notions of him.

We shall add, in the last place, that St. Austin, making a more full and particular enumeration of the pagan gods, and mentioning amongst them many others besides the select Roman gods (which are not now commonly taken notice of), does pronounce universally of them all, according to the sense of the more intelligent Pagans, that they were but one and the same Jupiter:* Ipse in æthere sit Jupiter; ipse in aëre Juno; ipse in mari Neptunus; in inferioribus etiam maris ipse Salacia; in terra Pluto; in terra inferiore Proserpina; in focis domesticis Vesta; in fabrorum fornace Vulcanus; in divinantibus Apollo; in merce Mercurius; in Jano initiator; in Termino terminator; Saturnus in tempore; Mars et Bellona in bellis; Liber in vineis; Ceres in frumentis; Diana in silvis; Minerva in ingeniis. Ipse sit postremò etiam illa turba quasi plebeiorum deorum; ipse præsit nomine Liberi virorum seminibus, et nomine Liberæ fœminarum. Ipse sit Diespiter, qui partum perducat ad diem; ipse sit dea Mena, quam præfecerunt menstruis fœminarum; ipse Lucina, quæ à parturientibus invocatur; ipse opem ferat nascentibus, excipiens eos sinu terræ et vocetur Opis. Ipse in vagitu os aperiat, et vocetur, Deus Vagitanus. Ipse levet de terra, et vocetur dea Levana. Ipse cunas tueatur, et vocetur dea Cunina. Sit ipse in deabus illis, quæ fata nascentibus canunt, et vocantur Carmentes. Præsit fortuitis, voceturque Fortuna. In Diva Rumina mammam parvulis immulgeat. In Diva Potina potionem immisceat. In Diva Educa escam præbeat. De pavore infantium Paventia nuncupetur. De spe, quæ venit, Venilia; de voluptate Volupia. De actu Agenoria. De stimulis, quibus ad

[9] The verses of Valerius are extant in St. Augustine, whose passage I shall quote entire from De Civitate Dei, cap. 9. p. 131. lib. 7. opp. In hanc sententiam etiam quosdam versus Valerii Sorani exponit idem Varro in eo libro, quem seorsum ab istis de cultu Deorum scripsit: qui versus hi sunt:

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rerumque Deumque
Progenitor, genetrixque Deum, Deus unus et omnis,

"To this purport the same Varro, in a specific work on the worship of the gods, explains also certain verses of Valerius Soranus, which are as follow: 'Omnipotent Jupiter,' &c."

* De Civ. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 11. [P. 76.]

nimium actum homo impellitur, dea Stimula nominetur. Strenua dea sit, strenuum faciendo. Numeria, quæ numerare doceat; Camæna, quæ canere. Ipse sit et Deus Consus, præbendo consilia; et Dea Sentia, sententias inspirando. Ipse dea Juventas, quæ post prætextam excipiat juvenilis ætatis exordia. Ipse sit Fortuna Barbata, quæ adultos barba induit, quos honorare voluerit. Ipse in Jugatino Deo conjuges jungat; et cum virgini uxori zona solvitur, ipse invocetur, et dea Virginensis invocetur. Ipse sit Mutinus, qui [illegible] Græcos Priapus, si non pudet. Hæc omnia, quæ dixi [illegible] que non dixi, hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; [illegible] si [illegible], ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sicut eis [illegible] ibus eum placet esse mundi animum; sive virtutes ejus, [illegible] sententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est, [illegible] us grant, according to the Pagans, that the supreme God is in the ether Jupiter; in the air Juno; in the sea Neptune; in the lower parts of the sea Salacia; in the earth Pluto; in the inferior parts thereof Proserpina; in the domestic hearths Vesta; in the smiths' forges Vulcan; in divination Apollo; in traffic and merchandize Mercury; in the beginnings of things Janus; in the ends of them Terminus; in time Saturn; in wars Mars and Bellona; in the vineyards Liber; in the corn-fields Ceres; in the woods Diana; and in wits Minerva. Let him be also that troop of plebeian gods; let him preside over the seeds of men under the name of Liber, and of women under the name of Libera; let him be Diespiter, that brings forth the birth to light; let him be the goddess Mena, whom they have set over women's monthly courses; let him be Lucina, invoked by women in child-bearing; let him be Opis, who aids the new-born infants; let him be Deus Vagitanus, that opens their mouths to cry; let him be the goddess Levana, which is said to lift them up from the earth; and the goddess Cunina, that defends their cradles; let him be the Carmentes also, who foretell the fates of infants; let him be Fortune, as presiding over fortuitous events; let him be Diva Rumina, which suckles the infant with the breasts; Diva Potina, which gives it drink; and Diva Educa, which affords it meat; let him be called the goddess Paventia, from the fear of infants; the goddess Venilia, from hope; the goddess Volupia, from pleasure; the goddess Agenoria, from acting; the goddess Stimula, from provoking; the goddess Strenua, from making strong and vigorous; the goddess Numeria, which teacheth to number; the goddess Camæna, which teaches to sing; let him be Deus Consus, as giving counsel; and Dea Sentia, as inspiring men with sense; let him be the goddess Juventas, which has the guardianship of young men; and Fortuna Barbata, which upon some more than others liberally bestoweth beards; let him be Deus Jugatinus, which joins man and wife together; and Dea

Virginensis, which is then invoked when the girdle of the bride is loosed; lastly, let him be Mutinus also (which is the same with Priapus amongst the Greeks) if you will not be ashamed to say it. Let all these gods and goddesses, and many more (which I have not mentioned) be one and the same Jupiter, whether as parts of him, which is agreeable to their opinion who hold him to be the soul of the world; or else as his virtues only, which is the sense of many and great pagan doctors."

But that the authority and reputation of a late learned and industrious writer, G. I. Vossius, may not here stand in our way, or be a prejudice to us, we think it necessary to take notice of one passage of his, in his book De Theologia Gentili, and freely to censure the same; where, treating concerning that pagan goddess Venus, he writeth thus:[10] Ex philosophica de diis doctrina, Venus est vel Luna (ut vidimus) vel Lucifer, sive Hesperus. Sed ex poëtica ac civili, supra hos cœlos statuuntur mentes quædam à sideribus diversæ: quomodò Jovem, Apollinem, Junonem, Venerem, cæterosque Deos Consentes, considerare jubet Apuleius. Quippe eos (inquit) natura visibus nostris denegavit: necnon tamen intellectu eos mirabundi contemplamur, acie mentis acrius contemplantes. Quid apertius hic, quam ab eo per Deos Consentes intelligi, non corpora cœlestia vel subcœlestia, sed sublimiorem quandam naturam, nec nisi animis conspicuam? "According to the philosophic doctrine concerning the gods, Venus is either the moon, or Lucifer, or Hesperus; but according to the poetic and civil theology of the Pagans, there were certain eternal minds, placed above the heavens, distinct from the stars: accordingly as Apuleius requires us to consider Jupiter and Apollo, Juno and Venus, and all those other gods called Consentes; he affirming of them, that though nature had denied them to our sight, yet notwithstanding, by the diligent contemplation of our minds, we apprehend and admire them. Where nothing can be more plain (saith Vossius) than that the Dii Consentes were understood by Apuleius, neither to be celestial nor subcelestial bodies, but a certain higher nature perceptible only to our minds." Upon which words of his we shall make these following remarks: first, that this learned writer seems here, as also throughout that whole book of his, to mistake the philosophic theology of Scævola and Varro, and others, for that which was physiological only (which physiological theology of the Pagans will be afterwards declared by us). For the philosophic theology of the Pagans did not deify natural and sensible bodies only, but the principal part thereof was the asserting of one supreme and universal Numen, from whence all their other gods were derived. Neither was Venus, according to this phi-

[10] De Theolog. Gentili, lib. 2. cap. 31. p. 172.

losophic and arcane theology, taken only for the moon, or for Lucifer or Hesperus, as this learned writer conceives, but, as we have already proved, for the supreme Deity also, either according to its universal notion, or some particular consideration thereof. Wherefore the philosophic theology, both of Scævola and Varro, and others, was called natural, not as physiological only, but (in another sense) as real and true; it being the theology neither of cities, nor of stages or theatres, but of the world, and of the wise men in it: philosophy being that properly which considers the absolute truth and nature of things. Which philosophic theology therefore was opposed both to the civil and poetical, as consisting in opinion and fancy only.[1] Our second remark is, that Vossius does here also seem incongruously to make both the civil and poetical theology, as such, to philosophize; whereas the first of these was properly nothing but the

[1] I am convinced, however, that Vossius' doctrine is less objectionable than that which is here espoused by the learned Doctor. I. He complains that Vossius mistook the philosophic theology, which Varro calls *natural*, for the physical theology. But Vossius in this expressed the opinion of Varro himself. For as is evident from the remains of his works, especially those preserved by St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, Varro applied the whole doctrine of the gods to physical science, that is, supposed Jupiter to be the world or the soul of the world, and the other gods to be members, parts, and properties of the nature of things. And St. Augustine himself bears out Vossius' view, and shows that the words *physical* and *natural* have exactly the same meaning in this argument. Dixerit aliquis, says he, De Civit. Dei, lib. 5. cap. 5. sect. 3. p. 117. hæc duo genera, mythicon et *physicum*, id est, fabulosum et *naturale*, discernamus ab hoc civili, de quo nunc agitur: "Some one will say, let us distinguish these two kinds, the mythical and *physical*, that is, the fabulous and *natural*, from the civil of which we are now treating." Nor in reference to this subject do I recollect an instance where an ancient author uses the word natural in any other sense: wherefore, what is here brought forward respecting the meaning of natural theology among the ancients, is entirely unsupported by authority. II. He assumes that there were formerly two kinds of theology in vogue among the ancients, one *physical* and the other natural, and that these were very different from each other. According to him, physical theology is the application of the ancient fables respecting the gods to physical and natural things: in which the Stoics, as is well known, were pre-eminently ingenious. The natural theology he pronounces to be the discipline of those who supposed all the gods to be merely different names of one supreme Being, and referred them all to the one Creator and Parent of all things. I do not deny that there were some who did distinguish these two methods of explaining the history of the gods; but still the generality of those who derived all things from one principle, and sought to reconcile the public religions with their own opinions, followed both kinds at the same time. This is manifest even from the example of the Stoics; Neptune, for instance, with this sect, signified the sea: and yet the same sect supposed this to be a name of the supreme Being as passing through the sea. III. He has no doubt of Scævola, Varro, and all the other wise men of antiquity having acknowledged one God the ruler of all things. On this opinion, were I disposed to be prolix, I might have much to say; but shall refer my readers to previous comments. I shall merely observe, that our worthy author is much mistaken in supposing Varro and Scævola to have followed the same system in expounding the history of the gods. Scævola, the Pontifex Maximus, interpreted the poetic fables historically, and asserted all the gods to have been men. This is openly stated by St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 27. p. 84. Whether he believed in one God or not, or was imbued with no religion at all, is uncertain, as the ancients are silent on the subject. Far otherwise Varro, who connected the whole history of the gods with physical science, and referred the various names of the deities to the parts of the universe.

law of cities and commonwealths, together with vulgar opinion and error; and the second nothing but fancy, fiction, and fabulosity. Poëtarum ista sunt, saith Cotta in Cicero,[2] nos autem philosophi esse volumus, rerum auctores, non fabularum, "Those things belong to poets, but we would be philosophers, authors of things (or realities) and not of fables."[3] But the main thing which we take notice of in these words of Vossius is this, that they seem to imply the Consentes, and select, and other civil and poetical gods of the Pagans, to have been generally accounted so many substantial and eternal minds, or understanding beings superceelestial and independent; their Jupiter being put only in an equality with Apollo, Juno, Venus, and the rest. For which, since Vossius pretends no other manner of proof than only from Apuleius' De Deo Socratis, who was a Platonic philosopher; we shall here make it evident, that he was not rightly understood by Vossius neither:[4] which yet ought not to be thought any derogation from this eminent philologer (whose polymathy and multifarious learning is readily acknowledged by us) that he was not so well versed in all the niceties and punctilios of the Platonic school. For though Apuleius do in that book, besides those visible gods the stars, take notice of another kind of invisible ones, such as the twelve Consentes, and others which (he saith) we may animis conjectare, per varias utilitates in vita agenda, animadversas in iis rebus, quibus eorum singuli curant, "make a conjecture of by our

[2] De Natur. Deor. lib. 3. cap. 31. p. 3096. tom. 9. opp.

[3] Here again I consider Vossius to be unjustly censured. The civil and poetic theology, I am aware, abounded with the most absurd fables: but does this prevent us from supposing, that the people and poets held the gods they worshipped to be natures or minds placed above the heavens, and there enjoying supreme felicity? Indeed I am at a loss to know, how those who possessed the least intelligence could have entertained any other opinion of the gods: and most of the poets, I observe, clearly professed it. Olympus, which the gods of Homer and the other poets inhabit, is a most delightful and happy region, situated far above the heavens. Julian in his Cæsares, p. 307. calls it *οὐρανοῦ τὸ μετέωρον*, "the highest region of heaven:" *Τοῖς μὲν Θεοῖς ἄνω κατ' αὐτὸ, φησὶν, οὐρανοῦ τὸ μετέωρον.*

Οὔλυμπον δ' ὅτι φασὶ Θεῶν ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς ἀεί,

"To the gods above in the highest region of heaven, 'Olympus which they call the everlasting habitation of the gods.'" And Seneca expressly distinguishes heaven from Olympus, Apocolocynth. p. 681. tom. 1. opp. Placet——eum *cœlo* intra dies xxx excedere, *Olympo* intra diem tertium, "I move——that he depart from heaven within thirty days, from Olympus within three." Lastly, why the learned Doctor should say that Vossius makes both civil and poetic theology to philosophize I am at a loss to conceive. If all those who suppose God or the gods to be minds dwelling in a most happy region above heaven, are philosophers, then indeed philosophers will be as numerous as ants.

[4] But Dr. Cudworth is here fighting with shadows. Vossius had not the remotest idea of asserting that all the gods called Consentes were equal and that Jupiter was not superior to any of them: at least his words here censured contain nothing from which such an opinion can be elicited.

minds from the various utilities in human life, perceived from those things which each of these take care of:" yet that he was no bigot in this civil theology is manifest from hence, because in that very place he declares as well against superstition as irreligious profaneness. And his design there was plainly no other, than to reduce the civil and poetical theologies of the Pagans into some handsome conformity and agreement with that philosophical, natural and real theology of theirs, which derived all the gods from one supreme and universal Numen: but this he endeavours to do in the Platonic way, himself being much addicted to that philosophy: Hos deos in sublimi ætheris vertice locatos, Plato existimat veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio, sed prorsus ac retro æviternos, corporis contagione suâ quidem naturâ remotos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto, &c. Quorum parentem, qui omnium rerum dominator atque auctor est, solum ab omnibus nexibus patiendi aliquid gerendive, nulla vice ad alicujus rei mutua obstrictum, cur ego nunc dicere exordiar? Cum Plato cœlesti facundia præditus, frequentissimè prædicet, hunc solum majestatis incredibili quadam nimietate et ineffabili, non posse penuria sermonis humani quavis oratione vel modicè comprehendi, "All these gods placed in the highest ether Plato thinks to be true, incorporeal, animal, without beginning or end, eternal, happy in themselves without any external good. The parent of which gods, who is the Lord and author of all things, and who is alone free from all bonds of doing and suffering, why should I go about in words to describe him? Since Plato, who was endued with most heavenly eloquence, equal to the immortal gods, does often declare, that this highest God, by reason of his excess of majesty, is both ineffable and incomprehensible." From which words of Apuleius it is plain, that according to him, the twelve Consentes, and all the other invisible gods, were derived from one original Deity, as their parent and author. But then if you demand, what gods of Plato these should be, to which Apuleius would here accommodate the civil and poetic gods contained in those two verses of Ennius:

> Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
> Mercurius, Jovi', Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo,

and the rest of this kind, that is, all their other gods, (properly so called) invisible? we reply, that these are no other than Plato's ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which is the divine Intellect (and his second hypostasis) derived from his original Deity, and most simple monad. For as Plato writeth in his Timæus, *ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι,* "This sensible world must needs be the image of another

intelligible one." And again afterwards:* Τίνι τῶν ζώων αὐτὸν εἰς ὁμοιότητα ὁ ξυνιστὰς ξυνέστησε; τῶν μὲν οὖν ἐν μέρους εἴδει πεφυκότων μηδενὶ καταξιώσωμεν· ἀτελεῖ γὰρ ἐοικὸς οὐδέν ποτ' ἂν γένοιτο καλόν· οὗ δ' ἔστι τἄλλα ζῶα καθ' ἓν καὶ κατὰ γένη μόρια, πάντων ὁμοιότατον αὐτῷ εἶναι τιθῶμεν. Τὰ γὰρ δὴ νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει, καθάπερ ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἡμᾶς ὅσα τε ἄλλα θρέμματα συνέστηκεν ὁρατά, "What animal was the pattern, according to whose likeness he that made this great animal of the world, framed it? Certainly, we must not think it to be any particular animal, since nothing can be perfect which is made according to an imperfect copy. Let us therefore conclude it to be that animal which containeth all other animals in it as its parts. For that intelligible world containeth all intelligible animals in it, in the same manner as this sensible world doth us, and other sensible animals." Wherefore Plato himself here and elsewhere speaking obscurely of this intelligible world, and the ideas of it, no wonder if many of his pagan followers have absurdly made so many distinct animals and gods of them. Amongst whom Apuleius accordingly would refer all the civil and poetic gods of the Pagans (I mean, their gods, properly so called invisible) to this intelligible world of Plato's, and those several ideas of it. Neither was Apuleius singular in this, but others of the pagan theologers did the like; as for example, Julian, in his book against the Christians:† Θεοὺς ὀνομάζει Πλάτων τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, ἄστρα καὶ οὐρανὸν· ἀλλ' οὗτοι τῶν ἀφανῶν εἰσιν εἰκόνες· ὁ φαινόμενος τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἥλιος, τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ μὴ φαινομένου· καὶ πάλιν, ἡ φαινομένη τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν σελήνη, καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἕκαστον, εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τῶν νοητῶν· ἐκείνους οὖν τοὺς ἀφανεῖς θεοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας καὶ συνυπάρχοντας, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γεννηθέντας καὶ προελθόντας, ὁ Πλάτων οἶδεν· εἰκότως οὖν φησιν ὁ δημιουργὸς ὁ παρ' αὐτῷ, θεοί, πρὸς τοὺς ἀφανεῖς λέγων, θεῶν, τῶν ἐμφανῶν δηλονότι· κοινὸς δὲ ἀμφοτέρων δημιουργὸς οὗτός ἐστιν, ὁ τεχνησάμενος οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἄστρα γεννήσας, τὰ τούτων ἀρχέτυπα, "Plato indeed speaketh of certain visible gods, the sun, and the moon, and the stars, and the heaven; but these are all but images of other invisible gods; that visible sun, which we see with our eyes, is but an image of another intelligible and invisible one: so likewise, the visible moon, and every one of the stars, are but the images and resemblances of another moon, and of other stars intelligible. Wherefore Plato acknowledged also these other invisible gods, inexisting and co-existing with the Demiurgus, from whom they were generated and produced. That Demiurgus in him thus bespeaking these invisible and intelligible gods; Ye gods of gods, that is, ye invisible gods, who are the gods and causes of the visible gods. There is one common maker there-

* Plato in Tim. p. 30. [Cap. 15. p. 238.] † St. Cyril. cont. Jul. lib. 2. p. 65.

fore of both these kinds of gods: who first of all made a heaven, earth, sea, and stars, in the intelligible world, as the archetypes and paradigms of these in the sensible." Where St. Cyril, in his Confutation writeth thus: Ἔοικε δὲ διὰ τούτων ὁ γενναῖος ἡμῖν Ἰουλιανὸς, τὰς ἰδέας βούλεσθαι καταδηλοῦν, ἃς ποτε μὲν οὐσίας καὶ ὑφεστάναι καθ' ἑαυτὰς διϊσχυρίζεται Πλάτων, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ἐννοίας εἶναι θεοῦ διορίζεται· πλὴν ὅπως περ ἂν ἔχοι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς ἀπαράδεκτον εἶναί φασι τὸν ἐπὶ τῷδε λόγον οἱ ταῦτα τεχνῖται· τὰ γὰρ εἴδη χαιρέτω, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, περιέσματα γάρ ἐστι, καὶ εἴ ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, "This our excellent Julian, by his intelligible and invisible gods, seems here to mean those ideas which Plato sometimes contends to be substances, and to subsist alone by themselves, and sometimes again determineth to be nothing but notions or conceptions in the mind of God. But, however the matter be, the skilful in this kind of learning affirm, that these ideas have been rejected by Plato's own disciples; Aristotle discarding them as figments, or at least such, as being mere notions could have no real causality and influence upon things." But the meaning of this pagan theology may be more fully understood from what the same St. Cyril thus further objecteth against it: Προσεπάγει δὲ, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἐμφανῶν καὶ τῶν νοητῶν δημιουργός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν ὅλων θεὸς, ὁ γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν τεχνησάμενος· ὅτε τοίνυν, καθὰ καὶ αὐτὸς διωμολόγηκεν ἐναργῶς, τούτων τε κἀκείνων γενεσιουργός ἐστιν ὁ ἀγέννητος θεὸς, πῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγεννῆσθαί φησιν αὐτοὺς, συνυπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῷ, πῶς, εἰπέ μοι, τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ συνυπάρξει τὸ γεννητόν; ἐνυπάρξει δὲ κατὰ ποῖον τρόπον; ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀγέννητον ὄντα τὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον, συνυπάρχειν ἀναγκαίως τῷ φύσαντι διϊσχυριζόμεθα, καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν μὲν αὐτῷ, προελθεῖν δὲ γεννητῶς ἐξ αὐτοῦ· ὁ δέ γε τῆς Πλάτωνος εὐρεσιεπείας συνηγόρος ἀκριβὴς, ἀγέννητον μὲν εἶναί φησι τὸν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν, ἐνυπάρχειν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεννηθῆναι καὶ προελθεῖν τοὺς παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότας, τὰ πάντα κυκῶν καὶ συγχέων, The sense whereof seems to be this: "Julian addeth, that the God of the universe, who made heaven and earth, is alike the Demiurgus, both of these sensible, and of the other intelligible things. If, therefore, the ingenit God be alike the creator of both, how can he affirm those things, that are created by him, to co-exist with, and in-exist in him? How can that which is created co-exist with the ingenit God? but much less can it inexist in him. For we Christians indeed affirm that the unmade Word of God doth of necessity co-exist with, and inexist in the father, it proceeding from him, not by way of creation, but of generation. But this defender of Platonic trifles, acknowledging the supreme God to be ingenit, affirmeth, notwithstanding, those things which were made and created by him, to inexist in him; thus mingling and confounding all things." Where notwithstanding, Julian, and

the Platonic Pagans would in all probability reply, that those ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world (which is the first νοῦς, or "Intellect") proceeding from the highest hypostasis, and original Deity, by way of necessary and eternal emanation, are no more to be accounted creatures, than the Christian Λόγος; and therefore might with as little absurdity, be said to exist with and in that first original Deity. But besides, the same Julian, elsewhere in that book of his, accommodates this Platonic notion also to the Pagan gods in particular, in like manner as Apuleius had done before, he writing of Æsculapius, after this canting way:* Ὁ γὰρ Ζεὺς ἐν μὲν τοῖς νοητοῖς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀσκληπιὸν ἐγέννησεν, εἰς δὲ τὴν γῆν διὰ τῆς ἡλίου γονίμου ζωῆς ἐξέφηνεν· οὗτος ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ποιησάμενος πρόοδον, ἑνοειδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀνθρωποῦ μορφῇ περὶ τὴν Ἐπίδαυρον ἐφάνη, &c. "Jupiter, amongst the intelligible things, generated out of himself Æsculapius, and by the generative life of the sun manifested him here upon earth, he coming down from heaven, and appearing in a human form, first about Epidaurus, and from thence extending his salutary power or virtue over the whole earth." Where Æsculapius is first of all, the eternal idea of the medicinal art or skill generated by the supreme God in the intelligible world; which afterward, by the vivific influence of the sun, was incarnated, and appeared in a human form at Epidaurus. This is the doctrine of that Julian, who was so great an opposer of the incarnation of the eternal Logos, in our Saviour Jesus Christ. Neither was this doctrine of many intelligible gods, and powers eternal, (of which the archetypal world consisteth) first invented by Platonic Pagans, after the times of Christianity, as some might suspect; but that there was such a thing extant before amongst them also, may be concluded from this passage of Philo's:† Εἷς ὢν ὁ θεὸς ἀμυθήτους περὶ αὐτὸν ἔχει δυνάμεις ἀρωγοὺς καὶ σωτηρίους τοῦ γενομένου πάσας· δι' αὗ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ὁ ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἀρχέτυπον, ἰδέαις ἀοράτοις συσταθεὶς, ὥσπερ οὗτος σώμασιν ὁρατοῖς· καταπλαγέντες οὖν τινες τὴν ἑκατέρου τῶν κόσμων φύσιν, οὐ μόνον ὅλους ἐξεθείωσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς μερῶν, ἥλιον, καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα οὐρανὸν, ἅπερ οὐδὲν αἰδεσθέντες θεοὺς ἐκάλεσαν, "Though God be but one, yet hath he about himself innumerable auxiliatory powers, all of them salutiferous, and procuring the good of that which is made, &c. Moreover, by these powers, and out of them, is the incorporeal and intelligible world compacted, which is the archetype of this visible world, that consisting of invisible ideas, as this doth of visible bodies. Wherefore, some admiring, with a kind of astonishment, the nature of both these worlds, have not only deified

* Cyr. contr. Jul. lib. 6. p. 200. † De Confus. lib. 345. Par.

the whole of them, but also the most excellent parts in them, as the sun, and the moon, and the whole heaven, which they scruple not at all to call gods." Where Philo seems to speak of a double sun, moon, and heaven, as Julian did, the one sensible, the other intelligible. Moreover, Plotinus himself sometimes complies with this notion, he calling the ideas of the divine Intellect, νοητοὺς θεούς, "intelligible gods;" as in that place before cited, where he exhorteth men, ascending upward above the soul of the world, θεοὺς ὑμνεῖν νοητοὺς, "to praise the intelligible gods," that is, the divine Intellect, which, as he elsewhere writeth, is both εἷς καὶ πολλοὶ, "one and many."[5]

We have now given a full account of Apuleius' sense in that book, De Deo Socratis, concerning the civil and poetical Pagan gods; which was not to assert a multitude of substantial and and eternal deities or minds, independent in them, but only to reduce the vulgar theology of the Pagans, both their civil and poetical, into some conformity with the natural, real, and philosophic theology: and this, according to Platonic principles. Wherein many other of the pagan Platonists, both before and after Christianity, concurred with him; they making the many pagan invisible gods to be really nothing but the eternal ideas of the divine intellect, (called by them the parts of the intelligible and archetypal world) which they supposed to have been the paradigms and patterns, according to which this sensible world, and all particular things therein, were made, and upon which they depended, they being only participations of them. Wherefore, though this may well be looked upon as a monstrous extravagancy in these Platonic philosophers, thus to talk of the divine ideas, or the intelligible and archetypal paradigms of things, not only as substantial, but also as so many several animals, persons and gods; it being their humour thus upon all slight occasions to multiply gods: yet, nevertheless must it be acknowledged, that they did at the very same time declare all these to have been derived from one supreme Deity, and not only so, but also to exist in it; as they did likewise at other times, when unconcerned in this business of their pagan polytheism, freely acknowledge all these intelligible ideas to be really nothing else but νοήματα, "conceptions in the mind of God," or the first Intellect, (though not such slight accidental and evanid ones, as those conceptions and modifications of our human souls are) and consequently, not to be so many distinct substances, persons and gods, (much less, independent ones) but only so many partial considerations of the Deity.[6]

[5] Consult especially Plotinus, in his book, De Intelligibili Pulcritudine, Ennead. 5. lib. 8. cap. 9. p. 550. Compare cap. 3. p. 544.

[6] The learned Doctor gives a much more refined and subtle interpretation to Apuleius' words than was necessary, or the truth will warrant. It is certain, that the

What a rabble of invisible gods and goddesses the Pagans had, besides those their dii nobiles, and dii majorum gentium, "their noble and greater gods," (which were the Consentes and Selecti)

junior Platonists, at least many of them, were so ingenious in their folly, as to assert the existence of eternal ideas or forms of what they called the visible gods, namely, the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies, and to hold these forms in the rank of gods. In this manner, the emperor Julian imagines to himself a twofold sun, Orat. in Solem, the one visible, the other, the eternal pattern of this visible sun, and cognizable to reason alone. Those who are desirous of further information respecting these absurdities, may consult Proclus' Platonic Theology, a work jejune and crabbed in itself, but indispensable to such as are curious on the subject of Platonism. This conceit of the Platonic sect, however, has nothing whatever to do with Apuleius' doctrine concerning the gods, as explained by him in his book, De Deo Socratis. Towards the beginning of this work he distinguishes the celestial gods into the *visible* and *intelligible*. The former, he tells us, are the sun, moon and all the stars; upon the latter, indeed, he expresses himself somewhat obscurely, but says quite sufficient to show that he is not speaking of the forms and patterns of the visible gods. In the first place he includes in this class of intelligible gods those twelve which are comprehended in the well-known verses of Ennius:

Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Diana, Venus, Mars,
Mercurius, Jovi', Neptunus, Vulcanus, Apollo.

If these gods were nothing else than the forms of visible gods, it would follow that Apuleius supposed Juno, Vesta, Minerva, and the rest, to be the forms and ideas of the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies. But nothing can be farther from the truth. Of what heavenly body, I ask, would Neptune be the idea? or Mercury? No Platonist, although it is almost impossible to imagine any thing too absurd to have entered into the head of some one or other of this sect, was ever so insane as to consider the deities, called by the Greeks, Juno, Jupiter, Mercury, Neptune, to be the invisible forms of the visible stars. And as to Apuleius, in particular, we have not the slightest reason for supposing him to have been guilty of such folly. Secondly, he states that these gods which are cognizable to reason alone, are appointed over certain affairs of this world, and that their powers are manifested by their various benefits in life. Potentiæ vero animis conjectatæ, per varias utilitates in vita agenda animadversæ in iis rebus, quas singuli curant, "But their powers are conjectured of by our minds, being perceived from the various utilities in life in those things which they severally take charge of." Now who, I ask can suppose these words to be applicable to the forms or *ἰδέαι* of the sun, moon, and stars? What Platonist ever believed that the forms of the stars superintend certain affairs of human life, and that, although themselves are concealed and invisible, their virtues are manifested in the things of this world? But all these have a clear and consistent meaning, if we suppose Neptune, for example, according to the sense of Apuleius, to be a nature invisible indeed to us, but manifesting his power in the sea and waters, and Vulcan, a nature, in like manner removed from our sight, but revealing his influence in fire. I will add a third consideration, which again clearly invalidates the position of the learned Doctor. He lays it down, that these forms or ideas of the Platonists, which they also called gods, existed, according to the opinion of this sect, in the archetypal world, or second person of the Deity. Whether correctly or not, I shall probably inquire in another place: for the present, I will assume it to be true. But whoever accedes to this opinion cannot but conclude that Apuleius is here most erroneously interpreted. For this author does not place his gods which he holds to be discernible to eason alone, in a intelligible or archetypal world, but in heaven, and that heaven too, in which the stars are fixed. The celestial gods, that is, those who have heaven for their abode, he divides into the visible and invisible. Therefore, those who are invisible, must necessarily occupy the inner heaven. I have thought it worth while to examine more minutely into this interpretation, both for other reasons, and principally to guard others from being misled by it. The opinions of eminent men, especially if they be recommended by their subtlety, and appear to be drawn from the inmost recesses of learning, gain ground rapidly, and lead many not only to put faith in them, but also to abuse them to the support of other theories which they may have adopted. Of the rest of what is eruditely argued in this place, I shall notice

hath been already showed out of St. Austin, from Varro and others; as namely, Dea Mena, Deus Vagitanus, Dea Levana, Dea Cunina, Diva Rumina, Diva Potina, Diva Educa, Diva Paventina, Dea Venilia, Dea Agenoria, Dea Stimula, Dea Strenua, Dea Numeria, Deus Consus, Dea Sentia, Deus Jugatinus, Dea Virginensis, Deus Mutinus. To which might be added more out of other places of the same St. Austin, as Dea Deverra, Deus Domiducus, Deus Domitius, Dea Manturna, Deus Pater Subigus, Dea Mater Prema, Dea Pertunda, Dea Rusina, Dea Collatina, Dea Vallonia, Dea Seia, Dea Segetia, Dea Tutilina, Deus Nodotus, Dea Volutina, Dea Patelena, Dea Hostilina, Dea Flora, Dea Lacturtia, Dea Matura, Dea Runcina. Besides which, there are yet so many more of these pagan gods and goddesses extant in other writers, as that they cannot be all mentioned or enumerated by us; divers whereof have very small, mean and contemptible offices assigned to them, as their names for the most part do imply; some of which are such, as that they were not fit to be here interpreted. From whence it plainly appears, that there was μηδὲν ἄθεον, "nothing at all without a god" to these Pagans, they having so strong a persuasion that divine providence extended itself to all things, and expressing it after this manner, by assigning to every thing in nature, and every part of the world, and whatsoever was done by men, some particular god or goddess by name, to preside over it. Now, that the intelligent Pagans should believe in good earnest that all these invisible gods and goddesses of theirs were so many several substantial minds, or understanding beings, eternal and unmade, really existing in the world, is a thing in itself utterly incredible. For how could any possibly persuade themselves that there was one eternal unmade mind or spirit; which, for example, essentially presided over the rockings of infant's cradles, and nothing else? another over the sweeping of houses? another over ears of corn? another over the husks of grain? and another over the knots of straw and grass, and the like? And the case is the very same for those other noble gods of theirs (as they call them) the Consentes, and Selecti; since there can be no reason given, why those should, all of them, be so many sub-

merely Julian's passage concerning Æsculapius, which the learned Doctor brings forward in confirmation of his opinion upon the religion of Apuleius. This passage, however, is totally at variance with the doctrine imputed to Apuleius. For Julian does not assert Æsculapius to be the pattern or form of a certain star, but imagines a double Æsculapius, one begotten by Jupiter in the ideal world, and the other produced on the earth by the sun; or which is the same thing, to use the language of Apuleius, a *visible* and an *intelligible* Æsculapius. From which we learn, what indeed is evident from other passages of his, that Julian believed in eternal models and forms of all visible things, and even of gods themselves, but by no means that he supposed the Greek and Roman deities, Æsculapius, Venus, Jupiter, and the others, to be merely the ideas of the visible gods or stars.

stantial and eternal spirits self-existent or unmade, if none of the other were such. Wherefore, if these be not all so many several substantial and eternal minds, so many self-existing and independent deities, then must they, of necessity, be either several partial considerations of the Deity, viz. the several manifestations of the divine power and providence personated, or else inferior ministers of the same. And thus have we already showed that the more high-flown and Platonic Pagans (as Julian, Apuleius, and others) understood these Consentes and select gods, and all the other invisible ones, to be really nothing else but the ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world, (which is the divine intellect;) that is indeed, but partial considerations of the Deity, as virtually and exemplarily containing all things: whilst others of them, going in a more plain and easy way, concluded these gods of theirs to be all of them but several names and notions of the one supreme Deity, according to the various manifestations of its power in the world; as Seneca[7] expressly affirmeth, not only concerning fate, nature, and fortune, &c. but also Liber Pater, Hercules, and Mercury, (before mentioned by him) that they were omnia ejusdem Dei nomina, variè utentis suâ potestate, "all names of one and the same God, as diversely using his power;" and as Zeno, in Laërtius,[8] concludes of all the rest: or else, (which amounts to the same thing,) that they were the several powers and virtues of one God fictitiously personated and deified; as the Pagans in Eusebius[9] apologize for themselves, that they did θεοποιεῖν τὰς ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν,* deify nothing but the invisible powers of that God, which is over all." Nevertheless, because those several powers of the supreme God were not supposed to be all executed immediately by himself, but by certain other ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις, "subservient ministers under him, appointed to preside over the several things of nature, parts of the world, and affairs of mankind, (commonly called demons;) therefore were those gods sometimes taken also for such subservient spirits or demons collectively; as perhaps in this of Epictetus:† Πότε ὁ Ζέφυρος πνέυσει; ὅταν αὐτῷ δόξῃ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἢ τῷ Αἰόλῳ· σὲ γὰρ οὐκ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ταμίαν τῶν ἀνέμων, ἀλλὰ τὸν Αἴολον, "When will Zephyrus, or the west-wind, blow? When it seemeth good to himself, or to Æolus; for God hath not made thee steward of the winds, but Æolus.

But for the fuller clearing of the whole pagan theology, and especially this one point thereof, that their Πολυθεία was in great part nothing else but Πολυωνυμία, "their polytheism," or "mul-

[7] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 427. 428.
[8] Lib. 7. segm. 147. p. 458.
[9] But in that very passage, Eusebius shows this apology to be vain and futile.
* Pr. Ev. lib. 3. cap. 13. p. 121. † Lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 85. [Apud Arrian.]

tiplicity of gods," nothing but the polyonomy of one god, or his being called by many personal proper names, two things are here requisite to be further taken notice of; first, that, according to the pagan theology, God was conceived to be diffused throughout the whole world, to permeate and pervade all things, to exist in all things, and intimately to act all things. Thus we observed before out of Horus Apollo,[10] that the Egyptian theologers conceived of God, as *τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου τὸ διῆκον πνεῦμα*, "a spirit pervading the whole world;" as likewise they concluded,[1] *εἶχα θεοῦ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεστάναι*, "that nothing at all consisted without God." Which same theology was universally entertained also amongst the Greeks. For thus Diogenes the Cynic, in Laërtius,[2] *αὐτοῦ πάντα πλήρη*, "all things are full of him." And Aristotle, or the writer De Plantis, makes God not only to comprehend the whole world, but also to be an inward principle of life in animals:* *Τίς οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ ζώου; τί ἄλλο, εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐγενὲς ζῶον, ὃ τὸν οὐρανὸν περιοδεύει, τὸν ἥλιον, τὰ ἄστρα, καὶ τοὺς πλάνητας;* "What is the principle in the life or soul of animals? Certainly no other than that noble animal (or living being) that encompasses and surrounds the whole heaven, the sun, the stars, and the planets.[3] Sextus Empiricus* thus represents the sense of Pythagoras, Empedocles, and all the Italic philosophers: *Μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς κόσμου διῆκον, ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἑνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα*, "That we men have not only a conjunction amongst ourselves with one another, but also with the gods above us, and with brute animals below us; because there is but one spirit, which, like a soul, pervades the whole world, and unites all the parts thereof together." Clemens Alexandrinus writeth thus of the Stoics:‡ *Διὰ πάσης*

[10] Hieroglyph. lib. 1. cap. 64. p. 77. Compare what we have observed at some length above on this passage.

[1] Ibid. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 36. [2] Lib. 6. segm. 37. p. 333.

* Lib. 1. cap. 1. [Tom. 4. opp. Arist. p. 492.]

[3] But there are two things in this passage which, in my opinion, divest it of the importance which Dr. Cudworth ascribes to it. I. It is quite uncertain, what kind of animal it is which Aristotle makes to surround the heaven, stars, and sun; whether it is God or a certain soul, such as many of the ancients supposed to exist in heaven and its parts. Most probably the writer of the book De Mundo meant, that animals have souls derived from that most subtle ether or soul which pervades heaven, the air and the stars. II. Supposing it to be beyond question, that this animal spoken of by Aristotle is God, still, according to him, God would not be a nature diffused through the whole universe, such as the learned Doctor here endeavours to prove the ancients to have believed in, but a nature merely encompassing the heavens and the stars. For no mention is made of the earth or the sea. Besides, if this were Aristotle's meaning, that the life of animals is a portion of God, he would be unworthy of being ranked among the professors of a God and the friends of religion. For what difference is there between this opinion and the impious conceits of Spinoza?

† Adv. Mathem. p. 331. [Lib. 1. Advers. Physic. sect. 127. p. 580.]

‡ Protrept. p. 44. [Cap. 5. p. 58. tom. 1. opp.]

ὕλης, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀτιμοτάτης τὸ θεῖον διήκειν λέγουσι, "They affirm, that God doth pervade all the matter of the universe, and even the most vile parts thereof," which that father seems[4] to dislike; as also did Tertullian,[5] when he represented their doctrine thus: Stoici volunt Deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos, "the Stoics will have God so to run through the matter, as the honey doth the combs." Strabo testifies of the ancient Indian Brachmans:* Περὶ πολλῶν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ὁμοδοξεῖν, ὅτι γὰρ γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος καὶ φθαρτὸς λέγειν κἀκείνους, ὅ τε διοικῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ποιῶν θεὸς, δι' ὅλου διαπεφοίτηκεν αὐτοῦ, "That in many things they philosophized after the Greekish manner, as when they affirm that the world had a beginning, and that it would be corrupted, and that the maker governor thereof pervades the whole of it." The Latins also fully agreed with the Greeks in this: for though Seneca somewhere[6] propounds this question, Utrum extrinsecus operi suo circumfusus sit Deus, an toti inditus? "Whether God be only extrinsically circumfused about his work, the world, or inwardly insinuating do pervade it all?" yet himself elsewhere[7] answers it, when he calls God, Divinum Spiritum per omnia, maxima, ac minima, æquali intentione diffusum, "A divine spirit, diffused through all things, whether smallest or greatest, with equal intention." God, in Quintilian's[8] theology, is spiritus omnibus partibus immistus; and, Ille fusus per omnes rerum naturæ partes spiritus, "a spirit which insinuates itself into, and is mingled with all the parts of the world;" and, "that spirit, which is diffused through all the parts of nature." Apuleius[9]

[4] Clemens does not merely seem to dislike this opinion of the Stoics. He rejects it so openly and indignantly, as to assert that its authors "have brought philosophy into disgrace:" Οἱ καταισχύνουσιν ἀτεχνῶς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. And that justly too; although the learned Doctor would seem to be labouring here to show that the Stoics erred more excusably than is commonly supposed. The same opinion of the Stoics concerning God is severely censured by Clemens in his Stromat. lib. 5. cap. 14. p. 699.

[5] Advers. Hermogenem, cap. 44. p. 149.

* Lib. 15. p. 730.

[6] De Otio Sapientis, cap. 31. p. 347. tom. 1. opp.

[7] De Consolat. ad Helviam, cap. 8. p. 106. But if Dr. Cudworth had quoted the whole of this passage, it would have appeared, that in it Seneca by no means determines what God is, but merely brings forward various definitions of the architect of this world; without indicating which of them is to be preferred to the others: Id actum, says he, ab illo, quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille Deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio, ingentium operum artifex, sive divinus spiritus, &c. . . . . sive fatum, "This was done by him whoever framed the universe, whether he be the supreme God, or an incorporeal reason, the artificer of mighty works, or a divine Spirit, &c. . . . or fate." So far therefore from the words here adduced containing a definition of God as given by Seneca, this philosopher, on the contrary, openly distinguishes between the supreme God of all things and that divine spirit.

[8] Instit. Orator. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 412. The reader, if so disposed, may refer to our previous remarks upon this passage of Quintilian; from which it appears, that it is uncertain whether or not Quintilian has here propounded his own opinion.

[9] De Mundo, p. 68. ed. Elmenhorstii. But Dr. Cudworth ought not to have omitted to mention, that Apuleius a little afterwards rejects this opinion as altogether derogatory

likewise affirmeth, Deum omnia permeare, "That God doth permeate all things;" and that, Nulla res est tam præstantibus viribus, quæ viduata Dei auxilio, sui natura contenta sit, "There is nothing so excellent or powerful, as that it could be content with its own nature alone, void of the divine aid or influence." And again, Dei præstantiam, non jam cogitatio sola, sed oculi, et aures, et sensibilis substantia comprehendit, "That God is not only present to our cogitation, but also to our very eyes and ears, in all these sensible things." Servius, agreeably with this doctrine of the ancient Pagans, determineth, that Nulla pars elementi sine Deo est, "That there is no part of the elements devoid of God." And that the poets fully closed with the same theology, is evident from those known passages of theirs, Jovis omnia plena,[10] and *μεσταὶ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί*,[1] &c. i. e. "All the things of nature, and parts of the world, are full of God;" as also from this of Virgil:*

> Deum namque ire per omnes
> Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.

Lastly, we shall observe, that both Plato and Anaxagoras, who neither of them confounded God with the world, but kept them both distinct, and affirmed God to be *οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον*, "unmingled with any thing;"† nevertheless concluded, *αὐτὸν πάντα κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα*, "that he did order and govern all things, passing through and pervading all things;" which is the very same with that doctrine of Christian theologers:[2]

to the divine glory and majesty, and openly declares, as some also of the early fathers of the church have done, that God is shut up in heaven, and pervades all things merely by his power and virtue. I quote his own words: Quare rectius est atque honestius, sic arbitrari, summam istam potestatem, sacratam cœli penetralibus, et illis, qui longissime separantur, et proximis una eademque ratione, et per se, et per alios, opem salutis afferre, *neque penetrantem* atque adeuntem specialiter singula, nec indecore attrectantem cominus cuncta. Talis quippe humilitas dejecti est et minus sublimis officii, "Wherefore it is more correct and becoming to suppose that this supreme power, consecrated to the inmost recesses of heaven, affords help and protection by itself and others, to the most remote as well as nearest, in one and the same manner, *neither pervading* and approaching each individually, nor indecorously coming into close contact with all things. For such humility belongs to a mean and less sublime office." With this passage of Apuleius compare what is said to the same purport by the author of the book De Mundo.

[10] Eclog. 3. The same sentiment is commended for its excellence by Apuleius De Mundo, p. 68. and St. Augustine De Civitat. Dei. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 74. tom. 3. opp. Dr. Cudworth, I fancy, had Apuleius' words in his mind when he wrote this, as he ascribes the saying not only to Virgil but to many others, which Apuleius also does: Hanc opinionem vates sequuti, profiteri ausi sunt, omnia Jovis plena esse, "The poets, adopting this opinion, hesitated not to avow that all things are full of Jupiter."

[1] This verse of Aratus occurs in the beginning of his Phænomena, and is quoted also by Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. p. 708.

* Virg. Georg. lib. 4. [Vers. 222] † Cratyl. p. 413.

[2] The words here adduced by Dr. Cudworth are those of Joh. Damascenus De Orthodoxa Fide, cap. 13. p. 149. tom. 1. opp. ed. Lequienii: *Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ*, says he, *διὰ πάντων ἀμιγῶς διήκει, καὶ πᾶσι μεταδίδωσι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἐνεργείας κατὰ*

Τὸν θεὸν διὰ πάντων ἀμίγως διήκειν, "that God permeates and passes through all things, unmixedly." Which Plato also there, in his Cratylus, plainly making δίκαιον to be a name for God, etymologizeth it from διὰ ἰὸν, i. e. "passing through all things," and thereupon gives us the best account of Heraclitus' theosophy, that is any where extant (if not rather a fragment of Heraclitus' own) in these words: Ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν ῥοῇ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲ ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι διεξιὸν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι· εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον, οὐ γὰρ ἂν σύνασθ' ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἰέναι παντὸς, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαϊὸν, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐκλήθη ὀρθῶς δίκαιον, εὐστομίας ἕνεκα τὴν τοῦ κ δύναμιν προσλαβὸν, "They who affirm the universe to be in constant motion, suppose a great part thereof to do nothing else but move and change; but that there is something which passes through and pervades this whole universe, by which all those things that are made, are made: and that this is both the most swift and most subtile thing; for it could not otherwise pass through all things, were it not so subtile, that nothing could keep it out or hinder it; and it must be most swift, that it may use all things as if they stood still, that so nothing might scape it. Since therefore this doth preside over, and order all things, permeating and passing through them, it is called δίκαιον, quasi διαϊὸν; the letter Cappa being only taken in for the more handsome pronunciation." Here we have therefore Heraclitus' description of God, namely this: Τὸ λεπτότατον καὶ τὸ τάχιστον, διὰ παντὸς διεξιὸν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεται, "that most subtile and most swift substance,

τὴν ἑκάστου ἐπιτηδειότητα, "For he permeates and passes through all things unmixedly, and imparts to all his own energy, according to the aptitude of each." This together with many other maxims of Damascenus, was afterwards adopted by most of the Greek and Latin theologists, it not having been hitherto determined by the concurrent voice of the learned fathers, whether God fills all things simply by his virtue and power, or by his very nature. This I should be able to demonstrate, were it necessary to my purpose, by not a few testimonies of the ancient fathers. Prior to Damascenus, however, Lactantius had spoken of God in precisely the same strain. Institut. Divinar. lib. 7. cap. 3. p. 784. Non perspexerunt (Stoici) divinum quidem spiritum esse ubique diffusum, eoque omnia contineri, non tamen ita, ut Deus ipse, qui est incorruptus, gravibus et corruptibilibus elementis misceatur, "They (the Stoics) did not fully comprehend, that the divine Spirit is every where diffused and contains all things, but not in such a manner, that God himself, who is incorrupt, should be mingled with gross and corruptible elements." Nor ought we, I consider, to understand Prosperus Aquitanicus in any other sense, who in his poem De Providentia, v. 184. 185. p. 794. opp. thus expresses himself concerning God:

> Sed nusquam non esse Dei est, qui totus ubique
> Et *penetrat* mundi membra omnia *liber* et ambit.

For to say that God freely penetrates the several parts of the world is tantamount to affirming, like Damascenus, that he permeates the world unmixedly.

which permeates and passes through the whole universe, by which all things that are made, are made." Now, saith Plato, some of these Heraclitics say, that this is fire, others that it is heat: but he, deriding both these conceits, concludes with Anaxagoras, that it is a perfect mind, unmixed with any thing; which yet permeating and passing through all things, frames, orders, and disposes all.[3]

Wherefore this being the universally received doctrine of the Pagans, that God was a spirit or substance diffused through the whole world, which permeating and inwardly acting all things, did order all; no wonder if they called him, in several parts of the world and things of nature, by several names; or, to use Cicero's language,[4] no wonder, if Deus pertinens per naturam cujusque rei, per terras Ceres, per maria Neptunus, &c. "If God pervading the nature of every thing, were in the earth called Ceres, in the sea Neptune, in the air Juno," &c. And this very account does Paulus Orosius (in his historic work against the Pagans, dedicated to St. Austin) give of the original of the pagan polytheism:* Quidam, dum in multis Deum credunt, multos Deos, indiscreto timore, finxerunt, "That some, whilst they believe God to be in many things, have therefore, out of an indiscreet fear, feigned many gods:" in which words

[3] In explaining this passage of Plato, Dr. Cudworth assumes more perhaps than every one will as a matter of course admit. I. He affirms Plato to be speaking here of Heraclitus and his opinions. But Plato does not mention Heraclitus. It is therefore a surmise of his own, founded solely upon Plato's statement that he is giving an account of the opinion of those who asserted the universe to be in constant motion. Heraclitus taught that *all things flow*. Hence the learned Doctor supposed this to be the opinion which Plato is discussing; a supposition which, to confess the truth, I consider to be liable to controversy. But II. granting that some dogma of Heraclitus is put forth in this passage, still there would be no certainty of its having reference to God. For he who affirms that something most swift and most subtle pervades and passes through the universe, is not necessarily obliged to suppose this something to be God. If no other arguments could be found to show, that Heraclitus acknowledged a god, certainly his merely imagining some subtle nature to pervade the universe would be of very little avail towards proving his religion. III. Still less ought we to admit the assertion, that Plato makes some of the Heraclitics to have held this subtle and swift thing to be fire, others heat. For there is nothing to warrant the conclusion, that in Plato these opinions are to be referred to the followers of Heraclitus. IV. Neither is it true that Plato, rejecting such conceits, adopts the opinion of Anaxagoras. He speaks of Anaxagoras' opinion, but does not profess any predilection in its favour. I regret, that the learned Doctor's partiality for the opinions he had adopted should so far have influenced him, as frequently to make him fancy he discovers many things in the passages of ancient authors which escape the eyes and attention of others. These very quotations by which he endeavours to prove, that almost all the ancients supposed God to be a nature diffused through the universe, possess very little efficacy for such a purpose. Some of them merely inculcate, that the virtue and power of God are present in every thing; others embody the infamous doctrine of Spinoza, who confounded God and matter; others again speak of the soul of the world. But in so excellent a work we ought to overlook any blemishes of the kind, which have always something useful connected with them, and among other advantages save an immensity of labour to those who are desirous of inquiring into the opinions of antiquity.

[4] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 28. p. 2996.

* Lib. 6. cap. 1. [P. 416.]

he intimates, that the Pagans' many gods were really but several names of one God, as existing in many things, or in the several parts of the world, as the same ocean is called by several names, as beating upon several shores.

Secondly, the pagan theology went sometimes yet a strain higher, they not only thus supposing God to pervade the whole world, and to be diffused through all things (which as yet keeps up some difference and distinction betwixt God and the world), but also himself to be in a manner all things. That the ancient Egyptian theology, from whence the theologies of other nations were derived, ran so high as this, is evident from that excellent monument of Egyptian antiquity, the Saitic inscription often mentioned: "I am all, that was, is, and shall be." And the Trismegistic books insisting so much every where upon this notion, "that God is all things" (as hath been observed), renders it the more probable, that they were not all counterfeit and supposititious; but that, according to the testimony of Jamblichus, they did at least contain δόξας Ἑρμαϊκὰς, some of the old Theutical or Hermaical philosophy in them. And from Egypt, in all probability, was this doctrine by Orpheus derived into Greece, the Orphic verses themselves running much upon this strain; and the Orphic theology being thus epitomized by Timotheus the chronographer: "That all things were made by God, and that himself is all things."[5] To this purpose is that of Æschylus:[6]*

> Ζεύς ἐστιν αἰθὴρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός·
> Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα, χῶ, τι τῶν δ' ἔθ' ὑπέρτερον,

[5] Having already discussed this subject at great length, we shall abstain from any further remarks upon it.

[6] I doubt whether it be clear from these verses, that Æschylus supposed God to be all things, or the several parts of the world to be members of God. On the sense of the former of the passages, as being disconnected from the context which is lost, I shall not venture to determine. But the latter in my opinion, if compared with the verses immediately preceding, pretty clearly show the tragedian not to have been so absurdly impious. These verses are as follows:

> Χώριζε θνητῶν τὸν θεὸν, καὶ μὴ δόκει
> Ὅμοιον αὐτῷ, σαρκικὸν καθεστάναι·
> Οὐκ οἶσθα δ' αὐτόν· ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται, &c.

"Separate God from every thing mortal, nor suppose him to be like thyself and clothed with flesh. Thou knowest him not: sometimes he appears as fire," &c. It is not very probable that he who thus solemnly asserts God to have nothing in common with things corporeal and mortal, would inculcate a little afterwards, that God and this corporeal world are the same, and that all visible things are God himself. For my own part, therefore, I consider Æschylus to have meant, that God, although incomprehensible to the human intellect and devoid of all corporeal concretion, and in short different altogether from men, nevertheless declares his power and influence in the world in divers ways and under a variety of aspects: that there is nothing which God does not make use of as an instrument of his vengeance: that fire, water, wild beasts, lightnings, &c. instantly obey his behests, when the crimes of the wicked are to be punished.

* Grot. Exc. p. 57.

Et terra, et æther, et poli arx est Jupiter,
Et cuncta solus, et aliquid sublimius.

And again:*

Ποτὲ μὲν ὡς πῦρ φαίνεται
Ἄπλαστον ὁρμῇ· ποτὲ δ' ὕδωρ, ποτὲ δὲ γνόφος·
Καὶ θηρσὶν αὐτὸς γίνεται παρεμφερής,
Ἀνέμῳ, νέφει τε, κᾀστραπῇ, βροντῇ, βροχῇ,

Nunc ut implacabilis
Apparet ignis: nunc tenebris, nunc aquæ
Par ille cerni: simulat interdum feram,
Tonitrua, ventos, fulmina, et nubila.

As also this of Lucan, amongst the Latins:†

Superos quid quærimus ultra?
Jupiter est quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris.

Whereunto agree also these passages of Seneca the philosopher:[7] Quid est Deus? Quod vides totum, et quod non vides, totum. And[8] Sic solus est omnia; opus suum et extra et intra tenet, "What is God? he is all that you see, and all that you do not see. And he alone is all things, he containing his own work not only without, but also within. Neither was this the doctrine only of those Pagans who held God to be the soul of the world, and consequently the whole animated world to be the supreme Deity, but of those others also, who conceived of God as an abstract mind, superior to the mundane soul, or rather as a simple Monad, superior to mind also; as those philosophers, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who described God to be one and all things, they supposing that, because all things were from him, they must needs have been first in a manner in him, and himself all things. With which agreeth the author of the Asclepian Dialogue, when he maketh Unus omnia, and Creator omnium, "One all things," and "the Creator of all things," to be but equivalent expressions; and when he affirmeth, that before things were made: In eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt, "They then existed in him, from whom afterwards they proceeded." So likewise the other Trismegistic books, when they give this account of God's being both all things that are, and all things that are not: Τὰ μὲν γαρ ὄντα ἐφανέρωσε, τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, "Because those things that are, he hath manifested from himself, and those things that are not, he still containeth within himself;" or, as it is elsewhere expressed, he doth κρύπτειν, "hide them and conceal them in himself." And the Orphic verses gave this same account likewise of God's being all things: Πάντα τὰ δὲ κρύψας, &c. "Because he first concealed

* Grot. Exc. p. 53. † Lib. 9. v. 580.
[7] Natural. Quæst. lib. 1. præf. p. 485. tom. 1. opp.
[8] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 427.

and hid them all within himself before they were made, and thence afterward from himself displayed them, and brought them forth into light:" or because,

Ζηνὸς δ' ἐνὶ γαστέρι σύῤῥα πεφύκει,

"Before they were produced, they were all contained together in the womb of God."[9]

Now this was not only a further ground of that seeming polytheism amongst the Pagans, which was really nothing but the polyonymy of one God, and their personating his several powers; but also of another more strange and puzzling phenomenon in their theology, namely, their personating also the parts of the world inanimate, and things of nature, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. It was before observed out of Moschopulus,* that the Pagans did ἑνὶ ὀνόματι τό τε τὴν δύναμιν ἔχον, καὶ τὸν ἐπιστατοῦντα τούτῳ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν, "call the things in nature, and the gods, which presided over them, by one and the same name." As for example, they did not only call the god which presideth over those arts that operate by fire, Hephæstus or Vulcan, but also fire itself: and Demeter or Ceres was not only taken by them for that god, who was supposed to give corn and fruits, but also for corn itself. So Dionysius or Bacchus did not only signify the god that giveth wine, but also wine itself. And he instancing further in Venus, and Minerva, and the Muses, concludes the same universally of all the rest. Thus Arnobius,† in his book against the Pagans, in usu sermonis vestri, Martem pro pugna appellatis, pro aqua Neptunum, Liberum Patrem pro vino, Cererem pro pane, Minervam pro stamine, pro obscœnis libidinibus Venerem. Now we will not deny, but that this was sometimes done metonymically, the efficient cause, and the ruling or governing principle, being put for the effect, or that which was ruled and governed by it. And thus was war frequently styled Mars; and that of Terence may be taken also in this sense: Sine Cerere et Libero friget Venus. And Plutarch‡ (who declares his great dislike of this kind of language) conceives, that there was no more at first in it than this: Ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς τὸν ὠνούμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ὠνεῖσθαι φαμὲν Πλάτωνα, καὶ Μένανδρον τὸν ὑποκρίνεσθαι τὰ Μενάνδρου ποιήματα ὑποτιθέμενον, οὕτως ἐκεῖνοι, τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασι τὰ τῶν θεῶν δῶρα καὶ ποιήματα καλεῖν οὐκ ἐφείδοντο, τιμῶντες ὑπὸ ῥᾳθυμίας καὶ σεμνύνοντες, "As we, when one buys the books of Plato, commonly say, that he buys Plato; and when one acts

* On these verses of Orpheus, which are met with in Proclus, Justin Martyr, and others, as well as on the subject matter said by Dr. Cudworth to be expressed in these verses, and in the books of Hermes, I have already treated professedly above.

[9] P. 229. † Lib. 5. [P. 236.]

‡ De Iside et Osiride, p. 379.

the plays of Menander, that he acts Menander; so did the ancients not spare to call the gifts and effects of the gods, by the names of those gods respectively, thereby honouring them also for their utility." But he grants, that afterward this language was by ignorant persons abused, and carried on further, and that not without great impiety:* Οἱ δὲ ὕστεροι ἀπαιδεύτως δεχόμενοι καὶ ἀμαθῶς ἀναστρέφοντες, ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς τὰ πάθη τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς παρουσίας τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ ἀποκρύψεις, θεῶν γενέσεις καὶ φθορὰς, οὐ προσαγορεύοντες μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νομίζοντες, ἀτόπων καὶ παρανόμων καὶ τεταραγμένων δοξῶν αὐτοὺς ἐνέπλησαν, "Their followers mistaking them, and thereupon ignorantly attributing the passions of fruits (their appearances and occultations) to the gods themselves, that preside over them, and so not only calling them, but also thinking them to be the generations and corruptions of the gods, have by this means filled themselves with absurd and wicked opinions." Where Plutarch well condemns the vulgar both amongst the Egyptians and Greeks, for that, in their mournful solemnities, they sottishly attributed to the gods the passions belonging to the fruits of the earth, thereby indeed making them to be gods. Nevertheless the inanimate parts of the world, and things of nature, were frequently deified by the Pagans, not only thus metonymically, but also in a further sense, as Cicero plainly declares:† Tum illud, quod erat à Deo natum, nomine ipsius Dei nuncupabant, ut cum fruges Cererem appellamus, vinum autem Liberum: tum autem res ipsa, in qua vis inest major, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa res nominetur Deus, "Both that which proceeds from God is called by the name of a god, as corn is sometimes thus called Ceres, and wine Liber; and also whatsoever hath any greater force in it, that thing itself is often called a god too." Philo also thus represents the religion of the Pagans, as first deifying corporeal inanimate things, and then bestowing those proper personal names upon them:‡ Ἐκτεθειώκασι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέσσαρας ἀρχάς, γῆν, καὶ ὕδωρ, καὶ ἀέρα, καὶ πῦρ· οἱ δ' ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανήτας, καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας· οἱ δὲ μόνον τὸν οὐρανὸν, οἱ δὲ σύμπαντα κόσμον· τὸν δ' ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρεσβύτατον, τὸν γεννητὴν, τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς μεγάλης πόλεως, τὸν στρατιάρχην τῆς ἀηττήτου στρατιᾶς, τὸν κυβερνήτην ὃς οἰκονομεῖ σωτηρίως ἀεὶ ἅπαντα, παρεκαλύψαντο, ψευδωνύμους προσρήσεις ἐκείνοις ἐπιφημίσαντες, ἑτέρας ἕτεροι· καλοῦσι γὰρ τὴν γῆν Κόρην, Δήμητρα, Πλούτωνα· τὴν δὲ θάλασσαν Ποσειδῶνα, δαίμονας ἐναλίους ὑπάρχους αὐτῷ προσαναπλάττοντες, &c. Ἥραν δὲ τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ τὸ πῦρ Ἥφαιστον, καὶ ἥλιον Ἀπόλλωνα, καὶ σελήνην Ἄρτεμιν, &c. "Some have deified the four elements, the earth, the water, the

* De Iside et Osiride, p. 379.
† De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Cap. 23. p. 2987.]
‡ De Decal. p. 751, 752.

air, and the fire; some the sun and the moon, and the planets and fixed stars; others the heaven; others the whole world. But that highest and most ancient Being, the parent of all things, the chief prince of this great city, and the emperor of this invincible army, who governeth all things salutiferously, him have they covered, concealed, and obscured, by bestowing counterfeit personal names of gods upon each of these things. For the earth they called Proserpina, Pluto, and Ceres; the sea Neptune, under whom they place many demons and nymphs also as his inferior ministers; the air Juno; the fire Vulcan; the sun Apollo; the moon Diana, &c. and dissecting the heaven into two hemispheres, one above the earth, the other under it; they call these the Dioscuri, feigning them to live alternately one one day, and the other another." We deny not here, but that the four elements, as well as the sun, moon, and stars, were supposed by some of the Pagans to be animated with particular souls of their own (which Ammianus Marcellinus[10] seems principally to call spiritus elementorum, "the spirits of the elements," worshipped by Julian) and upon that account to be so many inferior gods themselves. Notwithstanding which, that the inanimate parts of these were also deified by the Pagans, may be concluded from hence; because Plato, who in his Cratylus etymologizeth Dionysius from giving of wine, and elsewhere calls the fruits of the earth τὰ Δήμητρος δῶρα,* "the gifts of Ceres," doth himself nevertheless, in compliance with this vulgar speech, call wine and water as mingled together in a glass (or cup) to be drunk, gods: where he affirmeth, that a city ought to be,† Δίκην κρατῆρος κεκραμένην, οὗ μαινόμενος μὲν οἶνος κεχυμένος ζεῖ, κολαζόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ, καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν, ἀγαθὸν πόμα καὶ μέτριον ἀπεργάζεται, "So tempered as in a cup, where the furious wine poured out bubbles and sparkles, but being corrected by another sober god (that is, by water), both together make a good and moderate potion." Cicero also tells us, that before the Roman admirals went to sea, they

[10] No doubt, the passage here alluded to is the following, Histor. lib. 21. cap. 1. p. 263. Elementorum omnium spiritus, utpote perennium corporum, præsentiendi motu semper et ubique vigens, ex his, quæ per disciplinas varias affectamus, participat nobiscum munera divinandi, "The spirit of all the elements, as of perennial bodies, being always and everywhere active with presentient motion, participates with us in the office of divination from those things which we aim at by various sciences." In these words Ammianus explains the source from which in his opinion men derived the divination, and intimates that all the power of foretelling future things proceeded from *the spirit of the elements*. Which spirit of the elements, if I am not completely deceived, is the soul of the world, diffused through the whole universe of things consisting of four elements. The learned Doctor is mistaken, therefore, 1. in saying, that Ammianus speaks of the spirits of the elements. He mentions only one spirit. 2. In making Arrian state that Julian worshipped these spirits. Nothing of the kind is to be found in Arrian. Thus frequently does imperfection of memory lead even the most learned men into errors.

* De Leg. p. 788. † De Leg. lib. 6.

were wont to offer up a sacrifice to the waves. But of this more afterward. However, it is certain, that mere accidents, and affections of things in nature, were by these Pagans commonly personated and deified; as time, in Sophocles' Electra,[1] is a god: Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς Θεὸς, "For Time is an easy god;" and Love, in Plato's Symposium, where it is wondered at, that no poet had ever made a hymn τῷ Ἔρωτι τηλικούτῳ ὄντι καὶ τοσούτῳ θεῷ, "to Love, being such and so great a god." Though the same Plato, in his Philebus, when Protarchus had called Pleasure a goddess too, was not willing to comply so far there with vulgar speech: Τὸ δ' ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ' ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου· καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτην προσαγορεύω, τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα, ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, "My fear, O Protarchus, concerning the names of the gods is extraordinarily great: wherefore, as to Venus, I am willing to call her what she pleases to be called; but Pleasure, I know, is a various and multiform thing." Wherefore it cannot be denied, but that the Pagans did in some sense or other deify or theologize all the parts of the world, and things of nature. Which we conceive to have been done at first upon no other ground than this, because God was supposed by them, not only to permeate and pervade all things, to be diffused through all, and to act in and upon all, but also to be himself in a manner all things; which they expressed after this way, by personating the things of nature severally, and bestowing the names of gods and goddesses upon them. Only we shall here observe, that this was done especially (besides the greater parts of the world) to two sorts of things; first, such in which human utility was most concerned: thus Cicero:* Multæ aliæ naturæ deorum ex magnis beneficiis eorum, non sine causa, et à Græciæ sapientibus, et à majoribus nostris, constitutæ nominatæque sunt, "Many other natures of gods have been constituted and nominated, both by the wise men of Greece, and by our ancestors, merely for the great benefits received from them." The reason whereof is thus given by him: Quia quicquid magnam utilitatem generi afferret humano, id non sine divina bonitate erga homines fieri arbitrabantur, "Because they thought, that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, this was not without the divine goodness." Secondly, such as were most wonderful and extraordinary, or surprising; to which that of Seneca seems pertinent:† Magnorum fluminum capita veneramur: subita et ex abdito vasti amnis eruptio aras habet: coluntur aquarum calentium fontes; et stagna quædam vel opacitas vel immensa altitudo sacravit, "We adore the rising

[1] Ex Stobæo apud Hug. Grot. Excerpt. Veter. Comicor. et Tragicor. p. 66.
* Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 222. † Ep. 41. [P. 101. tom. 2. opp.]

heads and springs of great rivers: every sudden and plentiful eruption of waters out of the hidden caverns of the earth hath its altars erected to it; and some pools have been made sacred for their immense profundity and opacity.[2]

[2] Erudite as is the whole of this disputation of Dr. Cudworth's, still there are many, I have no doubt, who will consider it little calculated to produce conviction. It is liable to the same objection as many other portions of this work. The learned Doctor always confounds the religion of ancient nations with the theological opinions of certain private individuals, and estimates the public worship of the Greeks and Romans according to the sense of this or that poet or philosopher. His whole object is to show that the ancients converted the virtues of God, the several parts of nature, and other things of the kind into persons, and designated them by the names of gods: from which he considers it to follow as a consequence, that all the deities of antiquity were ultimately referred to one God, and that the Greeks and Romans did not acknowledge so many gods, as is commonly supposed. But how, I ask, does he endeavour to make us believe this? I. He cites certain passages of Cicero, Philo, and others, from which it appears, that the Stoics and some other philosophers, transferred the names of the gods to parts of the universe, and asserted Ceres to be the earth, Bacchus wine, Juno the ether, and Minerva wisdom. But did it escape the learned Doctor's recollection, that the Stoics and those who thought with them on this subject, met with few supporters and were ridiculed by wise men? This is manifest from Cicero's third book De Natura Deor. not to speak of other authorities to the same effect. The ancient fathers of the Christian church, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, St. Augustine, and others, inveighed still more severely against the madness of those who thus maintained the popular deities to be personifications of natural things. The truth is, this is merely a private interpretation of the public religions, which reason tells us is not to be confounded with religion itself, and which few of the ancients adopted. Is it fair indeed to conclude as follows? "The Stoics and others supposed Ceres to be the name of the earth, Neptune of the sea, Vulcan of fire: therefore this was really the fact; therefore the ancients meant nothing more by these names than portions of the universe." For my part I am little influenced by such reasoning. The cause that led many of the ancients to this system of interpretation was threefold. In the first place, some sought by this course to satisfy their own doubts respecting religion. For wise men were not so lost to reason as not to be sensible, that the absurd traditions of the priests were unworthy of the gods. Hence some of them looked round for a sort of philosophic religion, and in order to relieve the minds of the perplexed and yet not to discard the sacred rites and observances, they referred, although in violation of history, the whole worship of the gods to natural science. Such was the object of Varro and others, who, as is well known, discovered gods in the world, in the soul of the world, and in the various parts of the world. Others entered upon this course for the sake of proving, that their own doctrines were not at variance with the popular rites and religions. This was the motive of the Stoics in particular, who laboured to show, that all the Stoical principles were already to be found in the fables of the poets and the histories of the gods, before Zeno was born; just as at this day, Jac. Tollius and others imagine every thing recorded of the gods to have some mystical reference to chemistry. Lastly, others had recourse to these explications in order to meet the arguments of the Jews, and subsequently of the Christians, against their gods: but their fallacy was easily detected and exposed by the early fathers of the church. II. He shows that the poets frequently personified inanimate things, and even abstract notions, and spoke of them as so many self-existent natures and gods. True: such was the custom of the poets formerly, and such it is at the present day. But who would take this to be a proof, that the names of the gods were mere designations of the things of nature, and that the ancients deified the various parts of the world in order to signify God to be all things. To attempt indeed to estimate the religious opinions of the ancients from the figures of the poets, seems to me to be quite as preposterous, as for a Turk or Jew to infer from the works of our own poets, in which faith, hope, piety, concord, are not unfrequently introduced as speaking, that those virtues are worshipped by us in the rank of gods or heroes; or, to speak more appropriately to the present subject, for any one to conclude from the bold figures of Tasso, Petrarch, Marinus, and others, that those saints which are venerated by the Roman Catholic community were not

Now this is that which is properly called the physiological theology of the Pagans, their personating and deifying (in a certain sense) the things of nature, whether inanimate substances, or the

men, but merely the names of various perfections and virtues formerly manifested in the Virgin Mary and her husband Joseph. And here I cannot refrain from briefly remarking to those who delight in reading the early poets, and fancy that they can elicit from them the nature of the ancient religions, that on attentively examining these poets, it appears very uncertain to me, whether in all those passages, in which interpreters discover transformations of things into persons, such figures are in reality to be found. Hesiod enumerates among the descendants of Night many which might be regarded as the names of things rather than of persons, Theogoniæ, v. 224. p. 46. &c.

Μετὰ τὴν δ' Ἀπάτην τέκε καὶ Φιλότητα,
Γῆράς τ' οὐλομένην, καὶ Ἔριν τέκε καρτερόθυμον·
Αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα.

"Afterwards she brought forth deceit and friendship, and destructive old age, and stubborn-minded contention; and dire contention gave birth to painful toil." The same may be supposed of the progeny of Styx, enumerated by the same poet, v. 383, &c. p. 69:

Στὺξ δὲ τέκ', Ὠκεανοῦ θυγάτηρ, Πάλλαντι μιγεῖσα,
Ζῆλον καὶ Νίκην καλλίσφυρον ἐν μεγάροισι,
Καὶ Κράτος, ἠδὲ Βίην, ἀριδείκετα γείνατο τέκνα.

"And Styx, the daughter of Oceanus, consorting with Pallas, brought forth in the mansions emulation and fair-ankled victory, and strength and force, illustrious offspring." Æschylus in the Prometheus Vinctus, and Callimachus in his Hymn. in Jovem. p. 66. &c. described strength and force as the attendants of Jupiter:

Οὐ σοί γε θεῶν ἐσσῆνα πάλαι θέσαν, ἔργα δὲ χειρῶν,
Σή τε βίη, τό τε κάρτος, ὃ καὶ πέλας εἵσαο δίφρου.

"Thee chance has not made the king of the gods, but the works of thy hands, and thy force and the strength which thou hast placed near thy throne." Interpreters tell us, that these and similar passages are instances of *prosopopœia*, and that the poets sung of things and abstract notions, as if they were persons. For my part, however, I am not so sure, that we ought implicitly to believe them. I will state frankly what has occurred to my own mind on a careful examination of these poets. The most ancient nations in my opinion borrowed their proper names from the virtues and vices, and from mental as well as bodily affections, in order to indicate by these names the character of the persons to whom they applied them. The whole, not only of the Greek and Roman, but of barbarous history, presents innumerable instances of such names, so that it cannot be surprising that this custom should have prevailed among the earliest inhabitants of Greece. Hence I consider *force*, *strength*, *virtue*, *fate*, *victory*, *contention*, and other poetic names, to have been the appellations of men, whom Jupiter or others of the more ancient kings and heroes of Greece had chosen as their attendants or ministers, and to have been bestowed upon them both for other reasons and as designations of the qualities of mind or body, for which they were respectively distinguished. In process of time, when the manners and customs of the Greeks had already undergone a change, those who embodied the ancient histories in poetry neither wholly rejected nor adopted the personality in these names, but left their readers in doubt, whether they were recording the achievements of antiquity or describing the origin and affinities of the virtues and vices. Those who may repudiate this conjecture will cause me not the slightest mortification; as I am not one to suppose myself capable of unravelling all the intricacies of ancient fables: nevertheless, should any one feel disposed to apply it to the poets themselves, he will acknowledge perhaps, if not biassed by preconceived opinions, that there is at least as much probability in it as in the hypotheses which have been put forth by others. For the rest, I hope some other more convenient opportunity will be afforded me of offering some further ideas on the names of the ancient deities, and of supporting them by arguments and testimonies.

affections of substances. A great part of which physiological theology was allegorically contained in the poetic fables of the gods. Eusebius indeed was of opinion that those poetic fables were at first only historical and herological, but that afterwards some went about to allegorize them into physiological senses, thereby to make them seem the less impious and ridiculous:* Τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβαλόντες νέοι τινὲς, χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐπιφυέντες, λογικώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν αὐχοῦντες, τὴν δὲ φυσικωτέραν τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνοτέρας εὑρεσιολογίας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσαντες, &c. θεραπεῦσαι δὲ οὖν ὅμως οἵδε τὸ πατρικὸν ἁμάρτημα προθυμηθέντες, ἐπὶ φυσικὰς διηγήσεις καὶ θεωρίας τοὺς μύθους μετεσκευάσαντο, "Such was the ancient theology of the Pagans (namely, historical, of men deceased, that were worshipped for gods) which some late upstarts have altered, devising other philosophical and physiological senses of those histories of their gods, that they might hereby render them the more specious, and hide the impiety of them. For they being neither willing to abandon those fopperies of their forefathers, nor yet themselves able to bear the impiety of these fables (concerning the gods) according to the literal sense of them, have gone about to cure them thus by physiological interpretations." Neither can it be doubted, but that there was some mixture of herology and history in the poetic mythology; nor denied, that the Pagans of latter times, such as Porphyrius and others, did excogitate and devise certain new allegorical senses of their own, such as never were intended; Origen,† before both him and Porphyry, noting this of the Pagans, that when the absurdity of their fables concerning the gods was objected and urged against them, some of them did περὶ τούτων ἀπολογούμενοι ἐπ' ἀλληγορίας καταφεύγειν, "apologizing for these things, betake themselves to allegories." But long before the times of Christianity, those first Stoics, Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, were famous for the great pains which they took in allegorizing these poetic fables of the gods. Of which Cotta in Cicero[3] thus: Magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deindè Chrysippus, commentitiarum fabularum reddere rationem, et vocabulorum, cur quidque ita appellatum sit, causas explicare. Quod cum facitis, illud profecto confitemini, longè aliter rem se habere, atque hominum opinio sit; eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum, "Zeno first, and after him Cleanthes and Chrysippus, took a great deal more pains than was needful, to give a reason of all those commentitious fables of the gods, and of the names that every thing was called by. By doing

* Præpar. Evang. lib. 3. cap. 6. [Lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 73.]
† Lib. 3. c. Cels. p. 123.
[3] De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 24. p. 3089. tom. 9. opp.

which they confessed, that the manner was far otherwise than according to men's opinion, inasmuch as they, who are called gods in them, were nothing but the natures of things." From whence it is plain, that in the poetic theology, the Stoics took it for granted, that the natures of things were personated and deified, and that those gods were not animal, nor indeed philosophical, but fictitious, and nothing but the things of nature allegorized. Origen * also gives us a taste of Chrysippus' thus allegorizing, in his interpreting an obscene picture or fable of Jupiter and Juno, in Samos: *Λέγει γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συγγράμασιν ὁ σεμνὸς φιλόσοφος, ὅτι τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη παραδεξαμένη, ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῇ, εἰς κατακόσμησιν τῶν ὅλων· ὕλη γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ κατὰ τὴν Σάμον γραφῇ, ἡ Ἥρα, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ὁ Ζεύς*, "This grave philosopher, in his writing saith, that matter having received the spermatic reasons of God, containeth them within itself for the adorning of the whole world; and that Juno, in this picture in Samos, signifies matter, and Jupiter God." Upon which occasion that pious father adds: *Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ ἡμεῖς, καὶ διὰ τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους καὶ ἄλλους μυρίους, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος θέλομεν Δία καλεῖν τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν, ἀλλὰ καθαρὰν εὐσέβειαν εἰς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀσκοῦντες, οὐδὲ μέχρι ὀνόματος χραίνομεν τὰ θεῖα*, "For the sake of which, and innumerable other such like fables, we will never endure to call the God over all by the name of Jupiter, but, exercising pure piety towards the Maker of the world, will take care not to defile divine things with impure names." And here we see again, according to Chrysippus' interpretation, that Hera or Juno was no animal nor real god, but only the nature of matter personated and deified; that is, a mere fictitious and poetic god. And we think it is unquestionably evident from Hesiod's Theogonia, that many of these poetic fables, according to their first intention, were really nothing else but physiology allegorized; and consequently those gods nothing but the natures of things personated and deified.[4] Plato himself, though no friend to these poetic fables, plainly intimates as much, in his second De Republica: † *Καὶ θεομαχίας, ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν, οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὔτ' ἐν ὑπονοίας πεποιημένας, οὔτ' ἄνευ ὑπονοιῶν· ὁ γὰρ νέος, οὐκ οἷός τε κρίνειν, ὅ,τι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὃ μη*, "The fightings of the gods, and such other things, as Homer hath feigned con-

* Lib. 4. p. 196.

[4] We have already given a specimen of this, and have shown, that in the history of Saturn and Jupiter, as recorded by Hesiod, certain dogmas of the ancient physiologers lie concealed. But this does not preclude us from supposing Jupiter and Saturn to have been men who were raised to the rank of gods, and had formerly really lived in Greece. For, as we have stated above at some length, the history of the gods in Hesiod and the other poets is an unskilful compound of physical precepts and ancient Grecian history.

† P. 378. [P. 430.]

cerning them, ought not to be admitted into our commonwealth, whether they be delivered in way of allegory, or without allegories; because young men are not able to judge, when it is allegory, and when not."[5] And it appears from Dionysius Halicarnassus, that this was the general opinion concerning the Greekish fables, that some of them were physically, and some tropologically allegorical:* Μηδεὶς ὑπολάβοι με ἀγνοεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν μύθων εἰσί τινες ἀνθρώποις χρήσιμοι, οἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔργα δι' ἀλληγορίας, οἱ δὲ παραμυθίας ἕνεκα συγκείμενοι τῶν ἀνθρωπείων συμφορῶν, &c. "Let no man think me to be ignorant, that some of the Greekish fables are profitable to men, partly as declaring the works of nature by allegories, partly as being helpful for human life," &c. Thus also Cicero:† Alia quoque ex ratione, et quidem physicâ, magna fluxit multitudo deorum, qui induti specie humana fabulas poetis suppeditaverunt, hominum autem vitam superstitione omni referserunt.

Eusebius,[6] indeed, seems sometimes to cast it as an imputation upon the whole pagan theology, that it did θειάζειν τὴν ἄψυχον οὐσίαν, "deify the inanimate nature;" but this is properly to be understood of this part of their theology only, which was physiological, and of their mythology or poetic fables of the gods allegorized; it being otherwise both apparently false, and all one as to make them downright Atheists. For he that acknowledges no animant god, as hath been declared, acknowledges no god at all, according to the true notion of him; whether he derive all things from a fortuitous motion of matter, as Epicurus and Democritus did, or from a plastic and orderly, but senseless nature, as some degenerate Stoics, and Strato the Peripatetic, whose atheism seems to be thus described by Manilius:[7]

[5] This passage may be of use to those who wish to show, that in Plato's time there were already men who allegorized the history of the gods. But it will not assist any one towards proving, that Plato belonged to this class. He does not tell us whether he is favourable to this system or not, but leaves the whole matter undecided.

* Lib. 2. p. 68. † Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 223. [Cap. 24. p. 2990.]

[6] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 3. cap. 1. &c. But Dr. Cudworth, I conceive, misapprehends Eusebius' meaning. He by no means intends to say, that the ancient nations had no other gods except the inanimate parts of nature; for which indeed he would have been justly deserving of the learned Doctor's censure: but he exclaims against those who refer the fables and histories of the gods to physical things, declaring that, if they are to be listened to, the whole family of the gods must be looked upon as merely irrational nature. The same is professed by St. Augustine, De Civitate, lib. 7. cap. 27. sect. 2. p. 140. tom. 7. opp. Ipsas physiologias quum considero, quibus docti et acuti homines has res humanas conantur vertere in res divinas, nihil video, nisi ad temporalia terrenaque opera naturamque corpoream, vel etiam si invisibilem, tamen mutabilem, potuisse revocari: quod nullo modo est verus Deus, "When I examine those physiologies, by which learned and acute men attempt to turn these human into divine things, I see nothing that might not be referred to temporal and terrestrial operations and to a corporeal nature, changeable although invisible: which is by no means the true God."

[7] Astronomic. lib. 1. v. 137. &c. p. 5.

Aut neque terra patrem novit, nec flamma, nec aër,
Aut humor, faciuntque Deum per quatuor artus,
Et mundi struxere globum, prohibentque requiri
Ultra se quidquam.

Neither ought this physiological theology of the Pagans, which consisted only in personating and deifying inanimate substances, and the natures of things, to be confounded (as it hath been by some late writers) with that philosophical theology of Scævola, Varro and others (which was called natural also, but in another sense, as true and real), it being indeed but a part of the poetical first, and afterward of the political theology, and owing its original much to the fancies of poets, whose humour it was perpetually to personate things and natures. But the philosophic theology, properly so called, which, according to Varro,[8] was that, de qua multos libros philosophi reliquerunt; as it admitted none but animal gods, and such as really existed in nature (which therefore were called natural), namely one supreme universal Numen, a perfect soul or mind comprehending all, and his ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις, other inferior understanding beings, his ministers created by him, such as stars and demons, so were all those personated gods, or natures things, deified in the arcane theology, interpreted agreeably thereunto.[9]

St. Austin often takes notice of the Pagans thus mingling, and, as it were, incorporating physiology with their theology, he justly condemning the same; as in his forty-ninth epistle:[10] Neque illinc excusant impii sua sacrilega sacra et simulachra, quòd eleganter interpretantur, quid quæque significent: omnis quippe illa interpretatio ad creaturam refertur, non ad Creatorem, cui uni debetur servitus religionis, illa quæ uno nomine Latria Græcè appellatur, "Neither do the Pagans sufficiently excuse their sacrilegious rites and images from hence, because they elegantly (and ingeniously) interpret, what each of those things signifieth. For this interpretation is referred to the creature, and not to the Creator, to whom alone belongeth religious worship, that which by the Greeks is called Latria." And again in his book De Civ. Deor. lib. 6. cap. 8: At enim habent ista physiologicas quasdam (sicut aiunt), id est, naturalium rationum interpretationes. Quasi verò nos in hac disputatione physiologiam quæramus, et non theologiam; id est, rationem naturæ, et non Dei. Quamvis enim qui verus Deus est, non opinione sed natura sit Deus; non tamen omnis natura Deus est, "But the Pagans pretend, that these things have certain physiological

[8] Apud Augustin. De Civitat. Dei, lib. 5, cap. 5. p. 116. tom. 7. opp.

[9] How much importance is to be attached to this opinion may easily be learnt from what we have remarked a little above in defence of Vossius, whom Dr. Cudworth is here again attacking.

[10] According to the more recent arrangement of the Benedictine editors, ep. 102. Quæst. 3. sect. 20. p. 212. tom. 2. opp.

interpretations, or according to natural reasons; as if in this disputation we sought for physiology, and not theology, or the reason of nature, and not of God. For although the true God be not in opinion only, but in nature God, yet is not every nature God." But certainly the first and chief ground of this practice of theirs, thus to theologize physiology, and deify (in one sense or other) all the things of nature, was no other than what has been already intimated, their supposing God to be not only diffused through the whole world, and in all things, but also in a manner all things; and that therefore he ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature, and parts of the world.

Wherefore, these personated gods of the Pagans, or those things of nature deified by them, and called gods and goddesses, were for all that by no means accounted by the intelligent amongst them, true and proper gods. Thus Cotta, in Cicero,* Cum fruges Cererem, vinum Liberum dicimus, genere nos quidem sermonis utimur usitato: sed ecquem tam amentem esse putas, qui illud, quo vescatur, Deum esse credat? "Though it be very common and familiar language amongst us, to call corn Ceres, and wine Bacchus, yet who can think any one to be so mad, as to take that to be really a god, which he feeds upon?" The Pagans really accounted that only for a god, by the worshipping and invoking whereof they might reasonably expect benefit to themselves, and therefore, nothing was truly and properly a god to them, but what was both substantial, and also animant and intellectual. For Plato[1] writes, that the atheistic wits of his time therefore concluded the sun, and moon, and stars, not to be gods, because they were nothing but earth and stones (or a certain fiery matter) devoid of all understanding and sense; and for this cause, οὐδὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πραγμάτων φροντίζειν δυνάμενα, "unable to take notice of any human affairs." And Aristotle[2] affirmeth concerning the gods in general: Ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα, &c, "That all men conceived them to live, and consequently to act, since they cannot be supposed to sleep perpetually, as Endymion did." The Pagans universally conceived the gods to be happy animals; and Aristotle there concludes the happiness of them all to consist in contemplation. Lucretius himself would not debar men of that language (then vulgarly received amongst the Pagans) of calling the sea Neptune, corn Ceres, wine Bacchus, and the Earth the mother of the gods too, provided that they did not think any of these, for all that, to be truly and really gods:

* De Nat. Deor. lib. 3. p. 345. [Cap. 16. p. 3071. tom. 9.]
[1] De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 665.
[2] Magn. Moral. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 184. tom. 3. opp.

Hic siquis mare Neptunum, Cereremque vocare
Constituit fruges, et Bacchi nomine abuti
Mavolt, quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen;
Concedamus, ut hic terrarum dictitet orbem
Esse deûm matrem, dum non sit re tamen apse.*

And the reason why the earth was not really a goddess, is thus given by him:

Terra quidem vero caret omni tempore sensu.

"Because it is constantly devoid of all manner of sense."† Thus, Balbus in Cicero tells us, that the first thing included in the notion or idea of a god is this, Ut sit animans, "that it be animant," or endued with life, sense, and understanding. And he conceiving the stars to be undoubtedly such, therefore concludes them to be gods: "Quoniam tenuissimus est æther, et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est, quod animal in eo gignatur, idem quoque sensu accerrimo esse. Quare cum in æthere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. Ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda, "Because the ether is most subtle, and in continual agitation, that animal which is begotten in it, must needs be endued with the quickest and sharpest sense. Wherefore, since the stars are begotten in the ether, it is reasonable to think them to have sense and understanding; from whence it follows that they ought to be reckoned in the number of gods." And Cotta‡ in the third book, affirms, that all men were so far from thinking the stars to be gods, that multi ne animantes quidem esse concedant, "many would not so much as admit them to be animals;" plainly intimating, that unless they were animated, they could not possibly be gods. Lastly, Plutarch§ for this very reason, absolutely condemns that whole practice of giving the names of gods and goddesses to inanimate things, as absurd, impious, and atheistical: Δεινὰς καὶ ἀθέους ἐμποιοῦσι δόξας, ἀναισθήτοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις, καὶ φθειρομέναις ἀναγκαίως ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων δεομένων καὶ χρωμένων φύσεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐπιφέροντες· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ νοῆσαι θεοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ οὖν οὐδὲ ἄψυχον ἀνθρώποις ὁ θεός, "They who give the names of gods to senseless and inanimate natures and things, and such as are destroyed by men in the use of them, beget most wicked and atheistical opinions in the minds of men; since it cannot be conceived how these things should be gods, for nothing that is inanimate is a god." And now we have very good reason to conclude, that the distinction or division of pagan gods (used by some) into animal and natural (by natural

* Lib. 2. p. 165. [Verse 654. p. 380. Ed. Havercamp.]
† De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. p. 220. ‡ De Nat. Deor. p. 241. D.
§ De Iside et Osiride, p. 377.

being meant inanimate) is utterly to be rejected, if we speak of their true and proper gods; since nothing was such to the Pagans but what had life, sense, and understanding. Wherefore, those personated gods that were nothing but the natures of things deified as such, were but dii commentitii et fictitii, "counterfeit and fictitious gods;" or, as Origen calls them in that place before cited, τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα, σωματαποιεῖσθαι δοκοῦντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, "figments of the Greeks (and other Pagans) that were but things turned into persons and deified." Neither can there be any other sense made of these personated and deified things of nature, than this, that they were all of them really so many several names of one supreme God, or partial considerations of him, according to the several manifestations of himself in his works. Thus, according to the old Egyptian theology before declared, God is said to have both no name and every name; or, as it is expressed in the Asclepian Dialogue, Cum non possit uno quamvis è multis composito nomine nuncupari, potius omni nomine vocandus est, siquidem sit unus et omnia; ut necesse sit, aut omnia ipsius nomine, aut ipsum omnium nomine nuncupari, "Since he cannot be fully declared by any one name, though compounded of never so many, therefore is he rather to be called by every name, he being both one and all things: so that either every thing must be called by his name, or he by the name of every thing." With which Egyptian doctrine Seneca[3] seemeth also fully to agree, when he gives this description of God: Cui nomen omne convenit, "He to whom every name belongeth;" and when he further declares thus concerning him: Quæcunque voles illi nomina aptabis, and, Tot appellationes ejus possunt esse, quot munera, "You may give him whatsoever names you please," &c. and, "There may be as many names of him as there are gifts and effects of his:" and lastly, when he makes God and nature to be really one and the same thing, and every thing we see to be God. And the writer De Mundo[4] is likewise consonant hereunto, when he affirmeth, that God is πάσης ἐπώνυμος φύσεως, ἅτε πάντων αὐτός αἴτιος ὤν, or, "may be denominated from every nature, because he is the cause of all things." We say, therefore, that the Pagans in this their theologizing of physiology, and deifying the things of nature and parts of the world, did accordingly call every thing by the name of God, or God by the name of everything.[5]

[3] De Beneficiis, lib. 4. cap. 7. p. 427. tom. 1. opp.

[4] Cap. 7. p. 869. tom. 1. opp. Aristotelis.

[5] If the order and elegance of this disputation of the learned Doctor's, equalled the learning and multifarious reading displayed in it, nothing could have been more excellent or deserving of higher praise. But while he is absorbed in the latter and exhausts the treasures of his memory, he frequently neglects the former and mingles and confounds various things which it would have been better to have kept distinct and separate. I shall not repeat what I have already more than once dwelt upon, nor shall I urge, that

Wherefore, these personated and deified things of nature were not themselves properly and directly worshipped by the intelligent Pagans (who acknowledged no inanimate thing for a god) so as to terminate their worship ultimately in them; but either relatively only to the supreme God, or else at most in way of complication with him, whose effects and images they are, so that they were not so much themselves worshipped, as God was worshipped in them. For these Pagans* professed that they did, τὸν οὐρανὸν μὴ παρέργως, μηδὲ ὥσπερ τὰ βοσκήματα θεωρεῖν, "look upon the heaven (and world) not slightly and superficially, nor as mere brute animals, who take notice of nothing, but those sensible phantasms, which from the objects obtrude themselves upon them; or else, as the same Julian, in that oration, again more fully expresseth it:† Τὸν οὐρανὸν οὐχ ὥσπερ ἵππους καὶ βόας ὁρᾷν, ἤ τι τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀμαθῶν ζώων, ἀλλὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ φανέροῦ τὴν ἀφανῆ πολυπραγμονεῖν φύσιν, "Not view and contemplate the heaven and world, with the same eyes that oxen and

opinions are here classed together, which, when all things are considered, possess no affinity beyond the mere coincidence of names. Such are the opinions of Cotta and Balbus, in Cicero, which, although here identified, are indeed diametrically opposite, and such the doctrines of the ancient Egyptians, and those of Seneca or the Stoics, between which there is no slight discrepancy. I shall touch merely upon the conclusion which the learned Doctor draws from this long array of testimonies. Nothing can be more true than what he lays down at the close of his discourse, namely, that those who referred the ancient fables to physical things, of whom the number was formerly very considerable, called every thing by the name of God, and God by the name of every thing. The system which most of them had adopted, and the nature of the doctrines espoused by them, required them to do this. But in considering, as he does, that the opinions of this class, and their physical interpretations of the ancient religions, are true, and that Jupiter, Juno, Ceres and the rest of the deities, were what the Stoics and other philosophers supposed them to be, I hold him to be altogether mistaken. He maintains that most of the gods of antiquity were parts of the nature of things, or that the ancients deified the various parts of nature, for the sake of exhibiting their religion in a more beautiful light than it really deserved. In proof thereof, he cites the authorities of the Egyptian and some other philosophers, who, as is well known, gave a physical interpretation to the public religion. But this is estimating the popular sentiment concerning God from the sense of private individuals; a course which would appear to be unsafe and illogical. But even supposing the religion of ancient nations to have been such as persons possessing more intelligence than the generality have represented it, still, there will be need for endless deliberation, before we can come to any satisfactory conclusion respecting its nature and character. For that a great variety of expositions have been given, is notorious: and the question as to which of these ought to be preferred, would be interminable. The Stoics referred the gods of antiquity to nature; while Aristotle, Metaphys. identified the Grecian deities with his celestial genii. Which of them are we to believe? Zeno and Aristotle are here certainly upon an equal footing, and one opinion is just as probable as the other. To me it has always appeared the safest course, in an inquiry into the opinions of ancient nations, to set aside all that the more intelligent may have invented for the purpose of concealing the deformity of the religions, and instead of adopting the subtleties of learned men, to attend rather to the voice of the poets and priests, and to inspect and examine the public rites.—But I fear I shall somewhat weary my readers, by so often reiterating what I have just observed. As, however, the learned Doctor frequently repeats his opinion, and exhibits it continually in a new dress, I consider it will be consulting their interests, if I follow something of the same rule, and bring forward my objections to it in a different form.

* Julian Orat. 4. [P. 148.] † P. 286.

horses do, but so as from that, which is visible to their outward senses, to discern and discover another invisible nature under it." That is, they professed to behold all things with religious eyes, and to see God in every thing, not only as pervading all things, and diffused through all things, but also as being in a manner all things. Wherefore, they looked upon the whole world as a sacred thing, and as having a kind of divinity in it: it being, according to their theology, nothing but God himself visibly displayed. And thus was God worshipped by the Pagans, in the whole corporeal world taken all at once together, or in the universe, under the name of Pan. As they also commonly conceived of Zeus and Jupiter, after the same manner; that is, not abstractly only (as we now use to conceive of God) but concretely, together with all that which proceedeth and emaneth from him, that is, the whole world. And as God was thus described in that old Egyptian monument, to be "all that was, is, and shall be;" so was it before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptians took the first God and the universe, for one and the same thing; not only because they supposed the supreme God virtually to contain all things within himself, but also because they were wont to conceive of him, together with his overflowing, and all the extent of his fecundity, the whole world displayed from him, all at once, as one entire thing. Thus likewise do the Pagans in Plato[6] confound* *τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν*, and *ὅλον τὸν κόσμον*, "the greatest God," and "the whole world" together, as being but one and the same thing. And this notion was so familiar with these Pagans, that Strabo himself, writing of Moses, could not conceive of his god, and of the God of the Jews, any otherwise than thus:† *Τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν, καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν*, "namely, that which containeth us all, and the earth, and the sea, which we call the heaven and world, and the nature of the whole." By which, notwithstanding, Strabo did not mean the heaven or world inanimate, and a senseless nature, but an understanding Being, framing the whole world, and containing the same, which was conceived together with it: of which, therefore, he tells us, that, according to Moses, no wise man would go about to make any

[6] The words of Plato here intended are no doubt the following, De Legibus, lib. 7. p. 640. *Τὸν μέγιστον Θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας*, "We say that we ought not to inquire into the greatest god and the whole world, nor busy ourselves with investigating the causes of things." But that the Pagans confounded the supreme God and the whole world together, as being one and the same thing, which the learned Doctor considers to be manifest from these words, is less clear to me than I could wish. Plato warns his fellow-citizens from too curiously examining into the nature of the supreme god and the whole world, but does not affirm that the Greeks held the world and God to be the same.

* De Leg. lib. 7. p. 821. † Lib. 16. p. 761.

image or picture, resembling any thing here amongst us. From whence we conclude, that when the same Strabo,[7] writing of the Persians, affirmeth of them, that they did τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡγεῖσθαι Δία, "take the heaven for Jupiter;" and also Herodotus[8] before him, that they did κύκλον πάντα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ Δία καλεῖν, "call the whole circle of the heaven Jupiter," that is, the supreme God; the meaning of neither of them was, that the body of the heaven inanimate was to them the highest God, but that though he were an understanding nature, yet framing the whole heaven or world, and containing the same, he was at once conceived together with it. Moreover, God was worshipped also by the Pagans, in the several parts of the world, under several names; as for example, in the higher and lower ether, under those names of Minerva and Jupiter; in the air, under the name of Juno; in the fire, under the name of Vulcan; in the sea, under the name of Neptune, &c. Neither can it be reasonably doubted, but that when the Roman sea-captains sacrificed to the waves, they intended therein to worship that God who acteth in the waves, and whose "wonders are in the deep."

But besides this, the Pagans seemed to apprehend a kind of necessity of worshipping God thus, in his works, and in the visible things of this world, because the generality of the vulgar were then unable to frame any notion or conception at all of an invisible Deity; and therefore unless they were detained in a way of religion, by such a worship of God as was accommodate and suitable to the lowness of their apprehensions, would unavoidably run into atheism. Nay, the most philosophical wits amongst them confessing God to be incomprehensible to them, therefore seemed themselves also to stand in need of some sensible props, to lean upon. This very account is given by the Pagans, of their practice, in Eusebius:* Ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα Θεὸν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν φάσι, "That God being incorporeally and invisibly present in all things, and pervading or passing through all things, it was reasonable that men should worship him, by and through those things that are visible and manifest." Plato likewise represents this as the opinion of the generality of Pagans in his time:† Τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν καὶ ὅλον τὸν κόσμον φαμὲν οὔτε ζητεῖν δεῖν, οὔτε πολυπραγμονεῖν, τᾶς αἰτίας ἐρευνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι, "That as for the greatest God, and the whole world, men should not busily and curiously search after the knowledge thereof, nor pragmatically inquire into the causes of things, it being not pious for them so to do." The meaning whereof seems to be no other than this, that men ought to con-

[7] Geograph. lib. 15. p. 697.
[8] Histor. lib. 1. cap. 131. p. 55.
* *Præp. Evan.* lib. 3. cap. 13.
† De Leg. lib. 7. p. 821. [P. 640.]

tent themselves to worship God in his works, and in this visible world, and not trouble themselves with any further curious speculations concerning the nature of that which is incomprehensible to them. Which though Plato professeth his dislike of, yet does that philosopher himself elsewhere plainly allow of worshipping the first invisible God in those visible images, which he hath made of himself, the sun, and moon, and stars. Maximus Tyrius* doth indeed exhort men to ascend up, in the contemplation of God, above all corporeal things: Τέλος τῆς ὁδοῦ οὐχ ὁ οὐρανὸς, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ σώματα (καλὰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ θεσπέσια, ἅτε ἐκείνου ἔγγονα ἀκριβῆ καὶ γνήσια, καὶ πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον ἡρμοσμένα), ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ἐπέκεινα ἐλθειν δεῖ, καὶ ὑπερκύψαι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, ἐπὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ τόπον, &c. "The end of your journey (saith he) is not the heaven, nor those shining bodies in the heaven; for though those be beautiful and divine, and the genuine offspring of that supreme deity, yet ought these all to be transcended by you, and your head lifted up far above the starry heavens," &c. Nevertheless, he closes his discourse thus: Εἰ δε ἐξασθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὁρᾷν, καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγονα, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα ὁ Βοιώτιος ποιητὴς λέγει· οὐ γὰρ τρισμύριοι μόνον θεοὶ θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ' ἄληπτοι ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις, &c. "But if you be too weak and unable to contemplate that father and maker of all things; it will be sufficient for you for the present to behold his works, and to worship his progeny or offspring, which is various and manifold. For there are not only, according to the Bœotian poet, thirty thousand gods, all the sons and friends of the supreme God; but innumerable. And such in the heaven are the stars, in the ether demons, &c. Lastly, Socrates himself also did not only allow of this way of worshipping God (because himself is invisible), in his works that are visible, but also commend the same to Euthydemus:† Ὅτι δέ γε ἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ σὺ γνώσῃ, ἂν μὴ ἀναμένης, ἕως ἂν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἴδῃς, ἀλλ' ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾷν τοὺς θεούς, "That I speak the truth, yourself shall know, if you will not stay expecting, till you see the forms of the gods themselves, but count it sufficient for you beholding their works to worship and adore them." Which he afterward particularly applies to the supreme God, who made and containeth the whole world, that being invisible, he hath made himself visible in his works, and consequently was to be worshipped and adored in them. Whether Socrates and Plato, and their genuine followers, would extend this any further than to the animated parts of the world, such as the sun, moon, and stars were to them, we cannot certainly determine. But we think it very probable, that many

* Dissert. 1. [P. 12.] † Xenoph. Memor. lib. 4. [P. 633.]

of those Pagans, who are charged with worshipping inanimate things, and particularly the elements, did notwithstanding direct their worship to the spirits of those elements, as Ammianus Marcellinus tells us Julian did, that is, chiefly the souls of them, all the elements being supposed by many of these Pagans to be animated (as was before observed concerned Proclus*), and partly also those demons, which they conceived to inhabit in them, and to preside over them; upon which account it was said by Plato, and others of the ancients, that πάντα θεῶν πλέως, "all things are full of gods and demons."[9]

XXXIII. But that these physiological gods, that is, the things of nature personated and deified, were not accounted by the Pagans true and proper gods, much less independent and self-existent ones, may further appear from hence, because they did not only thus personate and deify things substantial, and inanimate bodies, but also mere accidents and affections of substances. As for example, first, the passions of the mind; τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνόμισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, saith S. Greg. Nazianzen,[10] "They accounted the passions of the mind to be gods," or at least worshipped them as gods; that is, built temples or altars to their names. Thus was Hope, not only a goddess to the poet Theognis,[1]

* P. 236, 237.

[9] Here also is matter for comment, were I disposed to be prolix. But intelligent readers will of themselves easily collect from preceding observations sufficient towards forming a correct estimate of the present argument. On the passage of Ammianus here cited by Dr. Cudworth I have spoken a above.

[10] This passage of Nazianzen was worthy of being given entire. But Dr. Cudworth seems to have quoted it either from some other author, or from memory, as he does not point out the place where it occurs. I shall therefore produce St. Gregory's own words, which admirably expose the folly of the Greeks in their worship of many gods, Orat. 34. tom. 1. opp. p. 546. Οἱ ἐμπαθέστεροι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ πάθη θεοὺς ἐνομισαν, ἢ θεοὺς ἐτίμησαν, θυμὸν, καὶ μιαιφονίαν, ἀσέλγειαν, καὶ μέθην, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι τῶν τουτοῖς παραπλησίων, οὐδὲ δικαίαν ταύτην ἀπολογίαν εὑράμενοι τῶν οἰκείων ἁμαρτημάτων, "The more vicious of them have even deified the passions, or at least have worshipped them as gods, namely, anger, bloodshed, lust, drunkenness, and others of the kind, having devised this dishonest excuse for their own crimes."

[1] In Sententiis, v. 1131. 1132. p. 115. The sense of this couplet is undoubtedly as follows: "Hope, the good goddess, is alone left amongst men; the other deities, abandoning (namely mankind), have departed into heaven." That is, the word ἔσαν in the second verse is to be joined with the noun οὔλυμπον. Hence in my opinion Dr. Cudworth here mistakes the poet's meaning in supposing him to say, that "the other gods had all forsaken heaven and their ancient mansions, Hope alone being left in Olympus." He refers οὔλυμπον to ἐκπρολιπόντες, and from this construction elicits the interpretation he has given. But in the first place, the thing itself shows that this is altogether foreign to Theognis' meaning. For what can be more improbable than that the gods had deserted heaven, which abounded with every good? Again, the same is clear from the following verses, in which the poet goes on to enumerate other goddesses, whom he in like manner feigns to have departed hence and to *have left*, not heaven, but the *earth*:

Σωφροσύνη Χάριτές τε, ὦ φίλε, γῆν ἔλιπον,

"Temperance and the Graces, O friend, abandoned the earth."

Ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλὴ ἔνεστιν,
Ἄλλοι δ' οὔλυμπονδ' ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν,

(where he fancifully makes her to be the only Numen that was left to men in heaven, as if the other gods had all forsaken those mansions and the world), but also had real temples dedicated to her at Rome, as that consecrated by Attilius in the Forum Olitorium, and others elsewhere, wherein she was commonly pictured or feigned as a woman, covered over with a green pall, and holding a cup in her hand.[2] Thus also Love and Desire were gods or goddesses too, as likewise were care, memory, opinion, truth, virtue, piety, faith, justice, clemency, concord, victory, &c. Which Victory was, together with Virtue, reckoned up amongst the gods by Plautus in the prologue of his Amphitryo; and not only so, but that there was an altar erected to her also, near the entrance of the senate-house at Rome, which having been once demolished, Symmachus earnestly endeavoured the restoration thereof, in the reign of Theodosius; he amongst other things writing thus concerning it,[3] Nemo colendam neget, quam profitetur optandam, "Let no man deny that of right to be worshipped, which he acknowledgeth to be wished for, and to be desirable." Besides all which, Echo was a goddess to these pagans too, and so was Night (to whom they sacrificed a cock), and Sleep and Death itself, and very many more such affections of things, of which Vossius has collected the largest catalogue, in his eighth book De Theologia Gentili. And this personating and deifying of accidental things was so familiar with these Pagans, that, as St. Chrysostome hath observed, St. Paul was therefore said by some of the vulgar Athenians to have been a setter forth of strange gods, when he preached to them Jesus and the resurrection, because they supposed him, not only to have made Jesus a God, but also Anastasis, or resurrection, a goddess too.[4] Nay, this humour of theologizing the things of nature transported these Pagans so far, as to deify evil things also, that is, things both noxious and vicious. Of the former Pliny thus:* Inferi quoque in genera describuntur, morbique, et multæ etiam pestes, dum esse placatas trepido metu cupimus. Ideoque etiam publicè febri fanum in palatio dedicatum est, Orbonæ ad ædem larium ara, et malæ fortunæ Exquiliis, "So great is the number of these gods, that even hell, or the state of death itself, diseases and many plagues are numbered amongst

* Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 7.

[2] See Vossius, De Idololatria, lib. 8. cap. 10. p. 748, who discourses at some length on the temples dedicated to Hope.

[3] Epistolar. lib. 9. ep. 61. p. 441.

[4] But against this interpretation of St. Chrysostom's of the passage in Acts xvii. 18, although adopted by many interpreters of high repute, others have brought forward very powerful arguments: for which consult J. Chr. Wolf, Curæ Philolog. et Critic. ad h. l. p. 1255. 1256.

them, whilst with a trembling fear we desire to have these pacified. And therefore was there a temple publicly dedicated in the palace to the Fever, as likewise altars elsewhere erected to Orbona, and to evil fortune." Of the latter, Balbus in Cicero; Quo ex genere Cupidinis et Voluptatis et Lubentinæ Veneris, vocabula consecrata sunt, vitiosarum rerum et non naturalium, "Of which kind also are those names of lust, and pleasure, and wanton venery, things vicious and not natural, consecrated and deified." Cicero, in his book of laws,[5] informs us, that at Athens there were temples dedicated also to contumely and impudence, but withal giving us this censure of such practices, Quæ omnia ejusmodi detestanda et repudianda sunt,† "All which kind of things are to be detested and rejected, and nothing to be deified but what is virtuous or good." Notwithstanding which, it is certain, that such evil things as these were consecrated to no other end, than that they might be deprecated. Moreover, as these things of nature, or natures of things, were sometimes deified by the Pagans plainly and nakedly in their own appellative names, so was this again sometimes done disguisedly, under other counterfeit proper names: as pleasure was deified under the names of Volupia, and of Lubentina Venus; time (according to the opinion of some), under the name of Cronos or Saturn, which as it produceth all things, so devours all things into itself again; prudence or wisdom likewise, under the names of Athena or Minerva. For it is plain, that Origen[6] understood it thus, when Celsus‡ not only approved of worshipping God Almighty, in the sun, and in Minerva, as that which was lawful, but also commended it as a thing highly pious; he making this reply: *Ἐυφημοῦμεν ἥλιον, ὡς καλὸν θεοῦ δημιούργημα*, &c. *Ἀθηνᾶν μέντοι μετὰ ἡλίου τασσομένην ἐμυθοποίησαν οἱ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι, εἴτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις, εἴτε χῶρις ὑπονοιῶν, φάσκοντες ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς γεγενῆσθαι κεφαλῆς, καθωπλισμένην*, &c. "We speak well of the sun, as a good work of God's, &c., but as for that Athena or Minerva, which Celsus here joineth with the sun, this is a thing fabulously devised by the Greeks (whether according to some mystical, arcane, and

[5] De Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Cap. 23. p. 2988. tom. 9. opp.]

[5] Lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 3354. tom. 9. opp. In Gruter's edition, which Dr. Cudworth tells us, in his note, exhibits the passage a little differently, we read as follows: Araque vetus stat—Esquiliis, Malæ Fortunæ detestatæque; quæ omnia ejusmodi repudianda sunt, "An ancient altar stands—on the Esquiliæ to evil and detested Fortune; all which kind of things are to be repudiated." And this reading, I have no doubt, which is retained also in the late edition of Verburgius, is better than the learned Doctor's emendation.

† Gruter's edition a little otherwise. ‡ C. Cels. lib. 3. p. 421.

[6] The passages themselves of Origen, which he quotes a little afterwards, prove this not to be the case. It is evident from them that the more intelligent Greeks, to avoid censure, interpreted the fable of Minerva in this manner. But Origen himself does not assent to this interpretation, nor does he say whether or not we ought to put faith in such expositions.

allegorical sense, or without it), when they say that she was begotten out of Jupiter's brain all armed." And again afterwards: Ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγηται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, "If it be granted, that by Athena or Minerva be tropologically meant prudence," &c. Wherefore, not only according to the poetical, but also to the political and civil theology of the Pagans, these accidental things of nature, and affections of substances, personated, were made so many gods and goddesses; Cicero himself in his book of laws approving of such political gods as these:* Benè verò, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides, consecratur manu; quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publicè templa sunt, ut illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni) deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent, "It is well, that mind, piety, virtue, and faith, are consecrated (all which have their temples publicly dedicated at Rome), that so they, who possess these things (as all good men do), may think that they have the gods themselves placed in their minds." And himself makes a law for them in his own commonwealth, but with a cautionary provision, that no evil and vicious things be consecrated amongst them: Ast illa, propter quæ datur homini adscensus in cœlum, mentem, virtutem, pietatem, fidem, earumque laudum delubra sunto. Nec ulla vitiorum solemnia obeunto, "Let them also worship those things, by means whereof men ascend up to heaven; and let there be shrines or temples dedicated to them. But let no religious ceremonies be performed to vicious things."

Notwithstanding all which, according to that theology of the Pagans, which was called by Varro natural (whereby is meant not that which was physiological only, but that which is true and real), and by Scævola philosophical; and which is by both opposed, not only to the poetical and fabulous, but also to the political and civil: I say, according to this theology of theirs, these accidental things of nature deified could by no means be acknowledged for true and proper gods; because they were so far from having any life and sense in them, that they had not so much as ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν, "any real subsistance or substantial essence" of their own. And thus does Origen dispute against Minerva's godship, as tropologically interpreted to prudence:† Ἵνα δὲ καὶ τροπολογῆται καὶ λέγηται φρόνησις εἶναι ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ, παραστησάτω τις αὐτῆς τὴν ὑπόστασιν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς ὑφεστηκυίας κατὰ τὴν τροπολογίαν ταύτην, "If Athena or Minerva be tropologized into prudence, then let the Pagans show what substantial essence it hath, or that it really subsists according to this tropology." Which is all one, as if he should have said, let the Pagans then show how this can be a god or goddess, which hath not so much as any substantial essence, nor subsists by

* Lib. 2. [Cap. 11. p. 3354.] † P. 422.

itself, but is a mere accidental affection of substances only. And the same thing is likewise urged by Origen, concerning other such kind of gods of theirs, as Memory the mother of the muses, and the Graces all naked, in his first book; where Celsus contended for a multiplicity of gods against the Jews; that these things having not ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν, "any substantial essence or subsistence," could not possibly be accounted gods, and therefore were nothing else, but Ἑλλήνων ἀναπλάσματα σωματοποιηθέντα ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων, "mere figments of the Greeks, things made to have human bodies, and so personated and deified." And we think there cannot be a truer commentary upon this passage of Origen's, than these following verses of Prudentius, in his second book against Symmachus:*

> Desine, si pudor est, gentilis ineptia, tandem
> Res incorporeas simulatis fingere membris,

"Let the Gentiles be at last ashamed, if they have any shame in them, of this their folly, in describing and setting forth incorporeal things with counterfeit human members." Where accidents and affections of things, such as victory was (whose altar Symmachus there contended for the restoration of), are by Prudentius called res incorporeæ, "incorporeal things," accordingly as the Greek philosophers concluded, that ποιότητες were ἀσώματοι, "qualities incorporeal." Neither is it possible, that the Pagans themselves should be insensible hereof; and accordingly we find, that Cotta in Cicero† doth for this reason utterly banish and explode these gods out of the philosophic and true theology: Num censes igitur subtiliore ratione opus esse ad hæc refellenda? Nam mentem, fidem, spem, virtutem, honorem, victoriam, salutem, concordiam, cæteraque ejusmodi, rerum vim habere videmus, non deorum. Aut enim in nobismet insunt ipsis, ut mens, ut spes, ut fides, ut virtus, ut concordia; aut optandæ nobis sunt, ut honos, ut salus, ut victoria. Quare autem in his vis deorum sit, tum intelligam, cum cognovero, "Is there any need, think you, of any great subtlety to confute these things? For mind, faith, hope, virtue, honour, victory, health, concord, and the like, we see them to have the force of things, but not of gods. Because they either exist in us, as mind, hope, virtue, concord; or else they are desired to happen to us, as honour, health, victory, (that is, they are nothing but mere accidents or affections of things), and therefore how they can have the force of gods in them, cannot possibly be understood." And again, afterwards he affirmeth: Eos, qui dii appellantur, rerum naturas esse, non figuras deorum, that those who, in the allegorical mythology of

* P. 285. † Nat. Deor. lib. 3. [Cap. 24. p. 3088.]

the Pagans, "are called gods, are really but the natures of things, and not the true figures or forms of gods."

Wherefore since the Pagans themselves acknowledged, that those personated and deified things of nature were not true and proper gods; the meaning of them could certainly be no other than this, that they were so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme God, as manifesting himself in all the things of nature. For that vis or force, which Cicero[7] tells us, was that in all these things, which was called God or deified, is really no other, than something of God in every thing that is good. Neither do we otherwise understand those following words of Balbus, in Cicero:* Quarum rerum, quia vis erat tanta, ut sine Deo regi non posset, ipsa res deorum nomen obtinuit, "Of which things because the force is such, as that it could not be governed without God, therefore have the things themselves obtained the names of gods;" that is, God was acknowledged and worshipped in them all, which was paganically thus signified, by calling of them gods. And Pliny,† though no very divine person, yet being ingenious, easily understood this to be the meaning of it: Fragilis et laboriosa mortalitas in partes ista digessit, infirmitatis suæ memor, ut portionibus quisque coleret, quo maximè indigeret, "Frail and toilsome mortality has thus broken and crumbled the Deity into parts, mindful of its own infirmity: that so every one, by parcels and pieces, might worship that in God, which himself most stands in need of." Which religion of the Pagans, thus worshipping God, not entirely all together at once, as he is one most simple being, unmixed with any thing, but as it were brokenly, and by piece-meals, as he is severally manifested in all the things of nature, and the parts of the world, Prudentius thus perstringeth in his second book against Symmachus:‡

> Tu, me præterito, meditaris numina mille,
> Quæ simules parere meis virtutibus, ut me
> Per varias partes minuas, cui nulla recidi
> Pars aut forma potest, quia sum substantia simplex,
> Nec pars esse queo.

From which words of his we may also conclude, that Symmachus the Pagan, who determined that it was one thing that all worshipped, and yet would have victory, and such like other things, worshipped as gods and goddesses, did by these, and all those other pagan gods before mentioned, understand nothing but so many several names, and partial considerations of one supreme

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 23. p. 2988. tom. 9. opp. Res ipsa, in qua *vis* inest major *aliqua*, sic appellatur, ut ea ipsa *vis* nominetur Deus, "The thing itself, in which there is any superior force, is so named, that that very force is called God."

* Nat. Deor. lib. 2. [Chap. 23. p. 2988.] † Nat. Hist. lib. 2. cap. 7.

‡ N. 236. [P. 289.]

Deity, according to its several virtues or powers; so that when he sacrificed to victory, he sacrificed to God Almighty, under that partial notion, as the giver of victory to kingdoms and commonwealths. It was before observed out of Plutarch, that the Egyptian fable of Osiris* being mangled and cut in pieces by Typhon, did allegorically signify the same thing, viz. the one simple deity's being as it were divided (in the fabulous and civil theologies of the Pagans) into many partial considerations of him, as so many nominal and titular gods; which Isis notwithstanding, that is true knowledge and wisdom, according to the natural or philosophic theology, unites all together into one. And that not only such gods as these, victory, virtue, and the like, but also those other gods, Neptune, Mars, Bellona, &c. were all really but one and the same Jupiter, acting severally in the world, Plautus himself seems sufficiently to intimate in the prologue of his Amphitryo in these words:

Nam quid ego memorem, ut alios in tragœdiis
Vidi, Neptunum, Virtutem, Victoriam,
Martem, Bellonam, commemorare quæ bona
Vobis fecissent? Queis benefactis meus pater,
Deûm regnator, architectus omnibus.*

* That Osiris was the supreme Deity, see the Egyptian Inscription in Theo. Smyrn. Mathem. cap. 47. Πρεσβύτατος πάντων βασιλεὺς Ὄσιρις, Osiris the most ancient king of all things."

* In these testimonies, by which the learned Doctor wishes to persuade us that the numerous deities of the ancients were nothing but the perfections and virtues of one supreme God, invested with personality, there is, if I mistake not, less force than he supposes. I. He produces some passages from Cicero. But these passages are from the mouth of Balbus the Stoic, whom Cicero introduces as speaking. They therefore prove merely, that the Stoics interpreted the absurdities of the ancient fables in this manner, and accommodated them to the precepts of their own philosophy. Which as I readily admit, so on the other hand I deny, that the ancient religions are to be estimated from the refined conceits of the Stoics. II. He appeals to a passage of Pliny. But this merely shows the cause, which, according to this philosopher's idea, led mortals to imagine to themselves many gods, but by no means confirms the opinion of those who suppose not a few of the gods of antiquity to have been nothing but divine virtues and properties. III. The testimony borrowed from Prudentius and Symmachus is not of the slightest weight. For, in the first place, I see no reason for supposing the thousand deities spoken of by Prudentius to be mere personifications of the divine virtues. The poet rebukes the Romans for having, as it were, broken the one God, whose power is infinite, into a thousand deities, and distributed the functions of one supreme Being into various gods. Certainly those "diminished god by various parts," who asserted that a multitude of deities had flowed from God, and by the divine will and command discharged various offices in the world. But why many words? The fact of its being affirmed by Prudentius, that those deities, according to the opinion of the Romans, "obey the virtues of the supreme God," proves that he is not speaking of abstract notions or of the divine virtues. For that will be the sense of these words if they be understood of the divine perfections? In the next place the learned Doctor altogether perverts the religion of Symmachus; who certainly neither regarded victory as a virtue of the supreme Deity, nor supposed that all the gods of the Romans were to be referred to one Almighty God. Symmachus, 'tis true, overpowered by the arguments of Christians, did not deny the existence of a supreme God, but at the same time he believed in a number of minor deities, subject to that God, and appointed by him over various affairs and states. I shall prove this to be the case from his own words, Epistol. lib. 10. ep. 61. p. 442. Suus, says he, cuique mos, suus cuique ritus

Whereas there was before cited a passage out of G. I. Vossius' book de Theolog. Gent. which we could not understand otherwise than thus, that the generality of the Pagans by their political (or civil) gods, meant so many eternal minds independent and self-existent; we now think ourselves concerned to do Vossius so much right, as to acknowledge, that we have since met with another place of his in that same book, wherein he either corrects the former opinion, or else declares himself better concerning it, after this manner; that the Pagans generally conceived their political gods to be so many substantial minds (or spirits) not independent and self-existent, nor indeed eternal neither, but created by one supreme mind or God, and appointed by him to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, as his ministers. Which same thing he affirmeth also of those deified accidents and affections, that by them were to be understood so many substantial minds or spirits created, presiding over those several things, or dispensing of them. His words in the beginning of his eighth book (where he speaks concerning these affections and accidents deified by the Pagans), are as followeth: Hujusmodi deorum propè immensa est copia. Ac in civili qui-

est. *Varios custodes* urbibus cunctis *mens divina* distribuit. Ut animæ nascentibus, ita populis fatales genii dividuntur. Accedit utilitas quæ maxime homini Deos asserit, " Each has his own custom, each his own rites. The *divine mind* has distributed *various guardians* among all cities. As souls to men when born, so are *destined genii* dispensed to nations. There is superadded utility, which most of all asserts the gods to man." IV. The interpretation of the fable of Osiris being mangled by Typhon, in which the learned Doctor finds a new confirmation of his opinion, is the subtle device of some one, who was anxious to discover more wisdom and truth in the public religions, than they in reality possessed. On individual conceits and opinions of the kind no wise man places any reliance, especially where they are amply confuted by records and facts. V. But I am much surprised at his affirming in a note, that according to the authority of the inscription in Theon, Osiris was the supreme God. The fact is far otherwise, as this inscription clearly confirms the opinion of those who suppose Osiris to have been a man and an ancient king. I quote the inscription itself from Theon Smyrnæus, Mathematic. cap. 47. p. 164. *Ἐν δὲ Αἰγυπτιακῇ στήλῃ φησὶν Εὔανδρος εὑρίσκεσθαι γραφὴν βασιλέως Κρόνου καὶ βασιλίσσης Ῥίας.* ΠΡΕΣΒΥΤΑΤΟΣ ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΟΣΙΡΙΣ ΘΕΟΙΣ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙΣ, ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΟΥΡΑΝΩι, ΗΛΙΩι ΚΑΙ ΣΕΛΗΝΗι ΚΑΙ ΓΗι, ΚΑΙ ΝΥΚΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΗΜΕΡΑι, ΚΑΙ ΠΑΤΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΟΝΤΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΣΟΜΕΝΩΝ, " Evander says that in an Egyptian column a writing is found of king Saturn and queen Rhea : Osiris the most ancient king of all to the immortal gods, to spirit and heaven, to the sun and moon and earth, and to night and day, and to the father of things that are and of things to come." I am not disposed to inquire into the purport of this inscription, or to examine its truth or falsehood ; one thing is clear from it, that it was dedicated by a man who by no means arrogated to himself divine honours. VI. The learned Doctor himself does not lay much stress upon the passage of Plautus. Indeed it is not of the least efficacy towards proving the truth of his position. For Plautus does not deny, that Neptune, Virtue, Victory, and the rest, are really gods, but merely requires spectators to believe, that the benefits which they are accustomed to ascribe to these gods are to be considered rather as received from Jupiter himself, inasmuch as he rules and disposes all the gods. If Plautus had supposed, that there were no gods besides Jupiter, and that the mere names of the divine virtues were ranked as gods, how could he have made Mercury call Jupiter " his father," and at the same time " the ruler of the gods?"

dem theologia considerari solent, tanquam mentes quædam, hoc honoris à summo Deo sortitæ, ut affectionibus istis præessent. Nempe crediderunt Deum, quem optimum maximum vocabant, non per se omnia curare, quo pacto, ut dicebant, plurimum beatitudini ejus decederet, sed, instar regis, plurimos habere ministros et ministras, quorum singulos huic illive curæ præfecisset. Sic justitia, quæ et Astræa ac Themis, præfecta erat actibus cunctis, in quibus justitia attenderetur; Comus curare creditus est comessationes; et sic in cæteris id genus diis, nomen ab ea affectione sortitis, cujus cura cuique commissa crederetur. Quo pacto si considerentur, non aliter different à spiritibus sive angelis bonis malisque, quam quòd hi reverà à Deo conditi sint; illæ verò mentes, de quibus nunc loquimur, sint figmentum mentis humanæ, pro numero affectionum, in quibus vis esse major videretur, comminiscentis mentes affectionibus singulis præfectas. Facilè autem sacerdotes sua commenta persuadere simplicioribus potuerunt, quia satis videretur verisimile, summæ illi menti, deorum omnium regi, innumeras servire mentes, ut eò perfectior sit summi dei beatitudo, minusque curis implicetur; inque tot famulantium numero, summi numinis majestas magis eluceat. Ac talis quidem opinio erat theologiæ civilis, "Of such gods as these there was an innumerable company amongst the Pagans. And in their civil theology they were wont to be considered, as certain minds (or spirits) appointed by the supreme God, to preside over the affections of things; they supposing that God, whom they called the best and the greatest, did not immediately himself take care of every thing, since that must needs be a distraction to him, and a hindrance of his happiness; but that he had, as a king, many he and she ministers under him, which had their several offices assigned to them. Thus justice, which was called also Astræa and Themis, was by them thought to preside over all those actions, in which justice was concerned; and Comus over all revellings; and the like. Which gods, if considered after this manner, will no otherwise differ from angels good and bad, than only in this, that these latter are beings really created by God, but the former the figments of men only; they, according to the number of affections, that have any greater force in them, devising and imagining certain minds to preside over each of them. And the vulgar might therefore be the more easily led into this persuasion by their priests, because it seemed reasonable to them, that that supreme Mind, who is the king of all the gods, should have many other minds as his subservient ministers under him, both to free him from solicitous care, and also to add to his grandeur and majesty. And such was the doctrine of the civil theology." Where, though Vossius speak particularly of that kind of pagan gods, which were nothing but affections and accidents deified (which no man in his wits could

possibly suppose to be themselves true and proper gods, they having no subsistence of their own) that these by the generality of the vulgar Pagans were conceived to be so many created minds or spirits, appointed by the supreme God, to preside as his ministers over those several affections of substances; yet does he plainly imply the same of all those other political gods of these Pagans likewise, that they were not looked upon by them as so many unmade, self-existent, and independent beings, but only as inferior minds or spirits, created by the supreme God, and by him appointed to preside over the several parts of the world, and things of nature, and having their several offices assigned to them. Wherefore, as to the main, we and Vossius are now well agreed, viz. that the ancient Pagans asserted no such thing as a multitude of independent deities; so that there only remain some particular differences of smaller moment betwixt us.

Ourselves have before observed, that Æolus was probably taken by Epictetus in Arrianus (not indeed for one, but) for many created ministers of the supreme God, or demons collectively, appointed by him to preside over the winds, in all the several parts of the world. And the Pagans in St. Austin seem to interpret those deified accidents, and things of nature, after the same manner, as the names of certain unknown gods or demons (one or more), that were appointed to preside over them respectively, or to dispense the same.* Quoniam sciebant majores nostri nemini talia, nisi aliquo Deo largiente, concedi, quorum deorum nomina non inveniebant, earum rerum nominibus appellabant deos, quas ab iis sentiebant dari; aliqua vocabula inde flectentes; sicut à bello Bellonam nuncupaverunt, non Bellum; sicut à cunis Cuninam, non Cunam; sicut à segetibus Segetiam, non Segetem; sicut à pomis Pomonam, non Pomum; sicut à bobus Bobonam, non Bovem. Aut certè nulla vocabuli declinatione sicut res ipsæ nominantur; ut Pecunia dicta est dea, quæ dat pecuniam, non omninò pecunia dea ipsa putata: Ita Virtus, quæ dat virtutem, Honor, qui honorem, Concordia quæ, concordiam, Victoria, quæ victoriam dat. Ita, inquiunt, cum Felicitas dea dicitur, non ipsa, quæ datur, sed numen illud attenditur, à quo felicitas datur, "Because our forefathers knew well, that these things do not happen to any, without the special gift and favour of some god; therefore were those gods, whose names they knew not, called from the names of those very things themselves, which they perceived to be bestowed by them, there being only a little alteration made in them; as when the God that causeth war was called not Bellum, but Bellona; the God which presideth over infants' cradles, not Cuna, but Cunina; that which

* Civ. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 24. [P. 83. tom. 7. opp.]

giveth corn, Segetia; and that which affordeth apples, Pomona, &c. But at other times, this was done without any declension of the word at all, they calling both the thing and the god, which is the bestower of it, by one and the self-same name. As Pecunia doth not only signify money, but also the goddess which giveth money; Virtus, the goddess which giveth virtue; Honor, the god that bestoweth honour; Concordia, the goddess that causeth concord; Victory, the goddess which affordeth victory. So also when Felicity is called a goddess, by it is not meant that thing which is given, but that divine power from whence it is given." Here, I say, the Pagans may seem to have understood, by those deified things of nature, certain inferior gods or demons (one or more) the ministers of the supreme God, appointed by him to preside over those several things respectively, or to dispense the same. Neither can we deny, but that in so much ignorance and diversity of opinions, as there was amongst the Pagans, some might possibly understand those political gods, and deified things also, after the way of Vossius, for so many single minds or spirits, appointed to preside over those several things respectively throughout the whole world, and nothing else. Nevertheless, it seemeth not at all probable, that this should be the general opinion amongst the civilized Pagans, that all those gods of theirs were so many single created minds or spirits, each of them appointed to preside over some one certain thing every where throughout the whole world, and nothing else. As for example, that the goddess Victory was one single created she-spirit, appointed to bestow victory to whosoever at any time enjoyed it, in all parts of the world; and so, that the goddess Justice should be such another single mind or spirit, created to dispense justice every where, and meddle with nothing else. And the like of all those other accidental things, or affections deified, as virtue, honour, concord, felicity, &c.

And Lactantius Firmianus,* taking notice of that profession of the Pagans, to worship nothing but one supreme God, and his subservient ministers, generated or created by him (according to that of Seneca in his exhortations, Genuisse regni sui ministros deum, "That the supreme God had generated other inferior ministers of his kingdom under him," which were called by them also gods), plainly denies all the pagan gods save one, to be the created ministers of that one supreme, he making this reply: Verum hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari, aut coli volunt, &c. Nec tamen illi sunt, qui vulgo coluntur, quorum et exiguus et certus est numerus, "But these ministers of the divine kingdom, or subservient created spirits, are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, or honoured as such, &c. Nor indeed are

* De Fal. Rel. cap. 7. [Instit. Divin. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 51.]

they those gods, that are now vulgarly worshipped by the Pagans, of which there is but a small and certain number." That is, the pagan gods are reduced into certain ranks, and the number of them is determined by the utilities of human life; of which their noble and select gods are but a few. Whereas, with he, the ministers of the supreme God are, according to their own opinion, not twelve nor twenty, nor three hundred and sixty, but innumerable, stars and demons.

Moreover, Aristotle,* in his book against Zeno (supposing the idea of God to be this, the most powerful of all things, or the most perfect being), objecteth thus, that according to the laws of cities and countries (that is, the civil theology), there seems to be no one absolutely powerful being, but one god is supposed to be most powerful as to one thing, and another as to another: ὥσπερ ἅπαντα ἐπικράτιστον τὸν θεὸν λαμβάνει, τοῦτο δυνατώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον λέγων, οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν νόμον, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἄττους εἶναι ἀλλήλων οἱ θεοί· οὔκουν ἐκ τοῦ δοκοῦντος εἴληφε τὴν κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὁμολογίαν, "Whereas Zeno takes it granted, that men have an idea in their minds of God, as one most excellent and most powerful being of all; this doth not seem to be according to law (that is, the civil theology), for there the gods are mutually better one than another, respectively to several things; and therefore Zeno took not this consent of mankind, concerning God, from that which vulgarly seemeth." From which passage of Aristotle's we may well conclude, that the many political gods of the Pagans were not all of them vulgarly looked upon as the subservient ministers of one supreme God; and yet they generally acknowledging (as Aristotle himself confesseth) a monarchy, and consequently not many independent deities, it must needs follow, as Zeno doubtless would have ly, that these their political gods were but one and the same supreme natural God, as it were parcelled out, and multiplied: that is, receiving several denominations, according to several relations of him, and as he exerciseth different powers, and produceth various effects. And this we have sufficiently proved already to have been the general sense of the chief pagan doctors; that these many political and popular gods were but the synonymy of one natural God, that is, either partial considerations of him, or his various powers and virtues, effects and manifestations in the world, severally personated and deified.

And thus does Vossius himself afterwards confess also; that according to the natural theology, the many pagan Gods were so many several denominations of one God; though this learned philologer doth plainly straiten and confine the notion of natural theology too much, and improperly call the God

* Arist. in Zen. Gor. p. 1246. [Cap. 4. p. 841. tom. 2. opp.]

thereof the nature of things; however, acknowledging it such a nature as was endued with sense and understanding. His words are these:* Dispar verò sententia theologorum naturalium, qui non aliud numen agnoscebant, quàm naturam rerum, eóque omnia gentium numina referebant, &c. Nempe mens eorum fuit, sicut natura esset occupata circa hanc vel illam affectionem, ita numina nominaque deorum variare. Cum igitur ubicunque vim aliquam majorem viderent, ita divinum aliquid crederent; eò etiam devenere, ut immanem deorum dearumque fingerent catervam. Sagaciores interim hæc cuncta, unum esse numen aiebant; putà rerum naturam, quæ licet una foret, pro variis tamen effectis varia sortiretur nomina, vario etiam afficeretur cultu, "But the case is very different as to the natural theologers, who acknowledged no other God, but the nature of things, and referred all the pagan gods to that. For they conceived, that as nature was occupied about several things, so were the divine powers and the names of gods multiplied and diversified. And wherever they saw any greater force, there did they presently conceit something divine, and by that means came they at length to feign an innumerable company of gods and goddesses. But the more sagacious in the meantime affirmed all these to be but one and the same God; to wit the nature of things, which, though really but one, yet according to its various effects, both received divers names, and was worshipped after different manners." Where Vossius calls the supreme God of these natural theologers the nature of things, as if the natural theology had been denominated from physics, or natural philosophy only; whereas we have already showed, that the natural theology of Varro and Scævola, was of equal extent with the philosophic; whose only Numen, that it was not a blind and unintelligible nature of things, doth sufficiently appear from that history thereof before given by us: as also that it was called natural in another sense, as real, and as opposite to opinion, fancy and fabulosity, or what hath no reality of existence any where in the world. Thus doth St. Austin† distinguish betwixt natura deorum, "the true nature of the gods," and hominum instituta, "the institutes of men concerning them." As also he sets down the difference betwixt the civil and natural theology, according to the mind of Varro,‡ in this manner: Fieri potest, ut in urbe, secundum falsas opiniones ea colantur et credantur, quorum in mundo vel extra mundum natura sit nusquam, "It may come to pass, that those things may be worshipped and believed in cities, according to false opinions, which have no nature or real existence any where, either in the world, or without it." Wherefore, if instead of this nature of things,

* Lib. 8. cap. 1. † Civ. Dei. lib. 6. cap. 5. [P. 116. tom. 7.] ‡ Ibid.

which was properly the god of none but only of such atheistic philosophers, as Epicurus and Strato, we substitute that great Mind or Soul of the whole world, which pervadeth all things, and is diffused through all (which was the true God of the pagan Theists), this of Vossius will be unquestionably true concerning their natural theologers, that, according to them, those many poetical and political gods before mentioned were but one and the same natural or real god; who, in respect of his different virtues, powers and effects, was called by several names, and worshipped after different manners; yet nevertheless so, as that, according to those theologers, there were really also many other inferior ministers of this one supreme God (whether called minds or demons), that were supposed to be the subservient executioners of all those several powers of his. And accordingly we had before this full and true account of the Pagans' natural theology set down out of Prudentius:[9]

In uno
Constituit jus omne Deo, cui serviat ingens
Virtutum ratio, variis instructa ministris.

viz. "That it acknowledged one supreme omnipotent God, ruling over all, who displayeth and exerciseth his manifold virtues and powers in the world (all severally personated and deified in the poetic and civil theologies), together with the subservient ministry of other inferior created minds, understanding beings, or demons, called also by them gods."

It is very true, as we have already declared, that the more high-flown Platonic Pagans did reduce those many poetical and political gods, and therefore doubtless all the personated and deified things of nature too, to the Platonic ideas, or first paradigms and patterns of things in the archetypal world, which they affirmed to have been begotten from the supreme Deity, that is, from the first hypostasis of the Platonic trinity; and which were commonly called by them νοητοὶ θεοί, "intelligible gods," as if they had been indeed so many distinct substances and persons. And, as we have also proved out of Philo, that this high-flown paganic theology was ancienter than either Julian or Apuleius; so do we think it not unworthy our observation here, that the very same doctrine is, by Celsus, imputed also to the Egyptian theologers, as pretending to worship brute animals no otherwise than as symbols of those eternal ideas: Καὶ φησί γε ἡμᾶς τῶν μὲν Αἰγυπτίων καταγελᾶν, καί τοι πολλὰ καὶ οὐ φαῦλα παρεχόντων αἰνίγματα, ἐπὰν ἱερῶν ἀϊδίων, καὶ οὐχ (ὡς δοκοῦσι οἱ πολλοὶ) ζώων ἐφημερίων, τιμὰς εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα διδάσκωσιν, Celsus also addeth, "that we Christians deride the Egyptians without cause, they having many mysteries in their religion,

[9] In Apotheosi, ver. 191. p. 169. [10] Orig. cont. Cels. lib. 3. p. 120.

forasmuch as they profess, that perishing brute animals are not worshipped by them, but the eternal ideas." According to which of Celsus it should seem, that this doctrine of eternal ideas, as the paradigms and patterns of all things here below in this sensible world, was not proper to Plato, nor the Greeks, but common with them to the Egyptians also. Which eternal ideas, however supposed to have been generated from that first divine hypostasis of the Platonic and Egyptian trinity, and called intelligible gods, were nevertheless acknowledged by them all to exist in one divine intellect, according to that of Plotinus,[10] οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά, "That the intelligibles exist nowhere of themselves, without Mind or Intellect;" which Mind or Intellect being the second divine hypostasis, these intelligible and invisible gods (however generated from God), yet are therefore said by Julian, in his book against the Christians, both to co-exist with God, and to in-exist in him. To which purpose also is this other passage of Julian's* in his sixth oration: Πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ παρ' ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τῶν ὁπωσοῦν ὄντων τὰς αἰτίας· εἴτε ἀθανάτων ἀθανάτους· εἴτε ἐπικήρων οὐ θνητὰς οὐδὲ ἐπικήρους, ἀϊδίους δὲ καὶ μενούσας ἀεὶ, αἳ καὶ τούτοις εἰσὶν αἰτίαι τῆς ἀειγενεσίας, "For God is all things, forasmuch as he containeth within himself the causes of all things, that any way are; whether of immortal things immortal; or of corruptible and perishing things, not corruptible, but eternal also, and always remaining; which therefore are the causes of their perpetual generation, and new production." Now these causes of all things contained in God are no other than the divine ideas. Wherefore, from hence it plainly appears, that these Platonic and Egyptian Pagans, who thus reduced their multiplicity of gods to the divine ideas, did not therefore make them to be so many minds or spirits, really distinct from the supreme God (though dependent on him too), but indeed only so many partial considerations of one God, as being all things, that is, containing within himself the causes of all things. And accordingly we find in Origen,† that, as the Egyptian theologers called their religious animals symbols of the eternal ideas, so did they also call them symbols of God. Τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων σεμνολογούντων καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων, καὶ φασκόντων εἶναί τινα αὐτὰ καὶ Θεοῦ σύμβολα, "Celsus applauds the Egyptian theologers talking so magnificently and mysteriously of those brute animals worshipped by them, and affirming them to be certain symbols of God."

And now we have given some account of the polyonymy of

[10] This is the title given by Plotinus to one of his books, which now stands as the fifth in the fifth Ennead of his works, p. 519. Ὅτι οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητὰ, καὶ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ.

* P. 347.

† Orig. cont Cels. p. 102.

the one supreme God, in the theologies of the Pagans; or of his being called by many proper, personal names, carrying with them an appearance of so many several gods. First, that God had many several names bestowed upon him, from many different notions and partial considerations of him, according to his universal and all-comprehending nature. Janus, as the beginning of the world, and the first original of the gods. Whom therefore that ancient lyric poet, Septimius Apher, accordingly thus invoked:[1]

> O cane rerum Sator! O PRINCIPIUM DEORUM!
> Stridula cui limina, cui cardinei tumultus,
> Cui reserata mugiunt aurea claustra mundi.

Genius, as the great mind and soul of the whole world. Saturn, as that hidden source and principle, from which all forms and lives issue forth, and into which they again retire; being there laid up as in their secret storehouse: or else, as one of the Egyptian or Hermaic writers expresseth it, that which doth πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν, "make all things out of itself, and unmake them into itself again;" this Hetrurian Saturn, answering to the Egyptian Hammon, that likewise signified hidden, and is accordingly thus interpreted by Jamblichus:[2] Ὁ τὴν ἀφανῆ τῶν κεκρυμμένων λόγων δύναμιν εἰς φῶς ἄγων, "He that bringeth forth the secret power of the hidden reasons of things (contained within himself) into light." God was also called Athena or Minerva, as wisdom diffusing itself through all things: and Aphrodite Urania, the heavenly Venus or Love. Thus Phanes, Orpheus' supreme God (so called according to Lactantius:[3] Quia cum adhuc nihil esset, primus ex infinito apparuerit, "Because when there was yet nothing, he first appeared out of that infinite abyss;" but according to Proclus, because he did ἐκφαίνειν τὰς νοητὰς ἑνάδας, "discover and make manifest the intelligible unities (or ideas) from himself;" though we think the conjecture of Athanasius Kircherus[4] to be more probable than either of these, that Phanes was an Egyptian name), this Phanes, I say, was in the Orphic and Egyptian theology, as Proclus upon Plato's Timæus informs us, styled ἁβρὸς ἔρως, "tender and soft Love." And Pherecydes Syrus[5] likewise affirmed: Εἰς ἔρωτα μεταβεβλῆσθαι τὸν Δία

[1] Apud Terentium Maurum, De Litteris, Syllabis, &c. in Putschii Grammatici Veteres, p. 2396.
[2] De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 3. p. 159.
[3] Divinar. Instit. lib. 1. cap. 5. p. 31.
[4] In Œdipo Ægyptiaco, p. 498.
[5] These words of Pherecydes are cited by Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 3. p. 156, but he does not add that this Pherecydes was the one surnamed from his country *Syrus*, the ancient preceptor of Pythagoras. Wherefore I suspect this to be the saying of another Pherecydes, an Athenian, who wrote a long work on Theogony,

μέλλοντα δημιουργεῖν, "That Jupiter was turned all into love, when he went about to make the world." Besides which, there were other such names of the supreme God, and more than have been mentioned by us; as for example, Summanus amongst the ancient Romans, that afterward grew obsolete: of which St. Austin[6] thus:* Romani veteres nescio quem Summanum, cui nocturna fulmina tribuebant, coluerunt magis quam Jovem, ad quem diurna fulmina pertinebant. Sed postquam Jovi templum insigne ac sublime constructum est, propter ædis dignitatem, sic ad eum multitudo confluxit, ut vix inveniatur, qui Summani nomen, quod audiri jam non potest, se saltem legisse meminerit." "The ancient Romans worshipped I know not what god, whom they called Summanus more than they did Jupiter. But after that a stately and magnificent temple was erected to Jupiter, they all betook themselves thither; in so much that the name of Summanus, now not at all heard, is scarcely to be found in ancient writings."

Again, as the Pagans had certain other gods, which they called special; so were these but several names of that supreme God also, according to particular considerations of him, either as presiding over certain parts of the world, and acting in them; or as exercising certain special powers and virtues in the world; which several virtues and powers of one God, personated and deified by the Pagans, though they had an appearance also of many distinct gods, yet were they really nothing but several denominations of one supreme God; who as yet is considered as a thing distinct from the world and nature.

But lastly, as God was supposed by these Pagans, not only to pervade all things, and to fill all things, but also, he being the cause of all things, to be himself in a manner all things; so was he called also by the name of every thing, or every thing called by his name: that is, the several things of nature and parts of the world were themselves verbally deified by these Pagans, and called gods and goddesses. Not that they really accounted them such in themselves, but that they thought fit in this manner to acknowledge God in them, as the author of them all. For thus the Pagans in St. Austin: Usque adeone, inquiunt, majores nostros insipientes fuisse credendum est, ut hæc nescirent munera divina

commented upon at great length by Claud. Salmasius in his Exercit. Plinian. ad Solinum. p. 590. &c. No one I imagine will disapprove of this conjecture, who only examines the words themselves.

[6] As far as I see, there is nothing either in this passage of St. Augustine or in other sayings of the ancients, wherein mention is made of Summanus, from which it can be inferred that this was formerly a name of the supreme Being. I might observe much the same of the other passages of ancient authors here brought forward; but my limits will not permit, neither am I willing to become tedious by frequent repetitions of one and the same thing.

* Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 23. [P. 82. tom. 7. opp.]

esse, non deos? "Can you think, that our Pagan ancestors were so sottish as not to know that these things are but divine gifts, and not gods themselves." And Cicero also tells us, that the meaning of their thus deifying these things of nature was only to signify that they acknowledged the force of all things to be divine, and to be governed by God; and that whatsoever brought any great utility to mankind, was not such without the divine goodness. They conceiving also, that the invisible and incomprehensible Deity, which was the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all its works and effects, in which it had made itself visible, accordingly as they declare in that place of Eusebius* before cited in part: Μὴ τὰ ὁρώμενα σώματα ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων, μηδέ γε τὰ αἰσθητὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου φήσουσι θεοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐν τούτοις ἀοράτους δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ τῆ τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν· ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα Δεὸν, παντοίαις δυνάμεσι τὰ πάντα πληροῦν, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκειν, καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐπιστατεῖν· ἀσωμάτως δὲ καὶ ἀφανῶς ἐν πᾶσιν ὄντα, καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκοντα, καὶ τοῦτον εἰκότως διὰ τῶν δεδηλωμένων σέβειν, "That they did not deify those visible bodies of the sun, and moon, and stars, nor the other sensible parts of the world themselves, but those invisible powers of the God over all, that were displayed in them. For they affirm, that that God, who is but one, but yet filleth all things with his various powers, and passes through all things, forasmuch as he is invisibly and incorporeally present in all, is reasonably to be worshipped in and by those visible things."

Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, in his book against the Greeks, reduces all the false gods of the Pagans under two general heads; the first, poetical, fictitious, fantastical gods; the second, creatures or real things of nature deified by them. His words are these: Εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς παρὰ ποιηταῖς λεγομένους θεοὺς οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς ὁ λόγος ἔδειξε, καὶ τοὺς τὴν κτίσιν θεοποιοῦντας ἤλεγξε πλανωμένους, &c. "Since this reason or discourse of ours hath sufficiently convinced, both the poetical gods of the pagans to be no gods at all; and also that they, who deify the creatures, are in a great error; and so hath confuted the whole pagan idolatry, proving it to be mere ungodliness and impiety; there is nothing now but the true piety left; he, who is worshipped by us Christians, being the only true God, the lord of nature, and the maker of all substances." From whence we may observe, that, according to Athanasius, the pagan poetic gods were no real things in nature, and therefore they could be no other than the several notions and the powers of the one supreme God deified, or several names of him. So that Athanasius' poetic gods, or οἱ παρὰ ποιηταῖς μυθευόμενοι θεοὶ, "gods fabulously devised by the poets," were chiefly those two kinds of pagan

* Præp. Evan. lib. 3. cap. 13. [P. 121.]

gods first mentioned by us; that is, the various considerations of the one supreme Numen, according to its general notion, expressed by so many proper names; and secondly, his particular powers diffused through the world, severally personated and deified. Which, considered as so many distinct deities, are nothing but mere fiction and fancy, without any reality. And this do the Pagans themselves in Athanasius acknowledge:* *Ἴσως γὰρ, ὡς αὐτοί φασι, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πέπλασται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅλως Ζεὺς, οὐδὲ Κρόνος, οὐδὲ Ἥρα, οὐδὲ Ἄρης· πλάττονται δὲ τούτους, ὡς ὄντας, οἱ ποιηταὶ πρὸς ἀπάτην τῶν ἀκουόντων.* "They say, that the names of those gods are merely fictitious, and that there does nowhere really exist any such Jupiter, or Saturn, or Juno, or Mars; but that the poets have feigned them to be so many persons existing, to the deception of their auditors."[7] Notwithstanding which, that third sort of pagan

* P. 14. [Tom. 1. opp. p. 17.]

[7] Dr. Cudworth misapprehends, or rather perverts, Athanasius' meaning, in order to make us believe that he has this eminent father on his own side. The affirmation of Athanasius, *οὐκ εἶναι Θεοὺς*, "to be no gods," he so interprets as though Athanasius had denied these gods to be persons, and had regarded Jupiter, Mercury, Mars, and the rest as mere notions of the mind or various considerations of the one supreme God. If this were even so, the learned Doctor's argument would derive little support from it, as the religions of the ancients cannot fairly be inferred from the opinions of Athanasius: but nothing can be further from the doctrine of this great champion of the church. For Athanasius, like the rest of the earlier fathers, supposed most of the poetic deities to have been men, who had gained a place among the gods by benefits and noble inventions. This opinion he openly avows in numerous instances in his book Contra Gentes. It will be sufficient to quote one passage: *Οἱ ἀσεβέστατοι*, says he, p. 10, *τῶν ἀνθρώπων πεσόντες καὶ καταπεσόντες ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ θεὸν φαντασίας, λοιπὸν καὶ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥΣ καὶ ἀνθρώπων μορφὰς, τῶν μὲν ζώντων, τῶν δὲ μετὰ θάνατον, εἰς θεοὺς ἀνέθηκαν*, "The most impious of men having lapsed and fallen from all conception of the Deity, henceforward raised up mortals and the forms of mortals, living as well as dead, to the rank of gods." This he immediately proves at great length by examples both of Grecian and Egyptian gods. A little afterwards, p. 11, he maintains that Neptune, Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, Juno, Ceres, Minerva, Diana, males and females, were first classed among the gods by an edict of Theseus. And the meaning of the phrase, *οὐκ εἶναι θεοὺς*, upon which alone Dr. Cudworth's interpretation is founded, he himself shows us in the same book, p. 13, *Εἰ γάρ τις τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς λεγομένων θεῶν—λάβοι τὰς πράξεις, εὑρήσει μὴ μόνον οὐκ ΕΙΝΑΙ αὐτοὺς ΘΕΟΥΣ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς αἰσχίστους γεγονότας*, "If any one takes the acts of those whom they call gods, he will find not only that they are not gods, but that they were the basest of men." That in Athanasius the Pagans, as is observed by the learned Doctor, expounded their doctrines concerning the gods, so as to make them appear to differ but little from the opinion adopted by himself, and attributed by him to Athanasius, is unquestionable. But it is equally certain, that Athanasius explodes and rejects these counterfeit interpretations. At that time, in fact, those who were so ingenious in explaining the poetic fables, had no other object but the defence of the superstitions which they were unwilling to abandon, and therefore betook themselves to these fictions, that they might have something wherewith to oppose the Christians who ridiculed their gods. I am surprised, indeed, that Dr. Cudworth, who pays so much deference to the authority of the fathers, could have allowed himself to disregard their opinions respecting the religions of antiquity, and to adopt in preference the interpretations of the enemies of the Christian truth, in which, although perhaps not entirely destitute of talent, there certainly is very little judgment or sound wisdom. But in his anxiety to crush those who aimed at the complete subversion of all religion and piety, he is sometimes too indulgent towards others who in

gods also mentioned by us, which were inanimate substances and the natures of things deified, may well be accounted poetical gods likewise; because though those things themselves be real and not feigned, yet is their personation and deification mere fiction and fancy: and however the first occasion thereof sprung from this theological opinion or persuasion, that God, who is in all things, and is the cause of all things, ought to be worshipped in all things, especially he being himself invisible; yet the making of those things themselves therefore to be so many persons or gods, was nothing but poetic fiction and phantastry, accordingly as their old mythology and allegorical fables of the gods run much upon this strain.[8]

former times had embraced the most foul and abominable superstitions under the garb of religion.

[8] As Dr. Cudworth brings forward nothing new throughout the whole of this disputation, but merely reiterates his former arguments, or strengthens them by additional passages of ancient authors, we shall not waste the time of our readers by repeating the comments already made upon them. He employs all the great ability and learning he is master of to give a colour and seemliness to the hideous rites of antiquity, and to show that the numerous deities worshipped by ancient nations were merely so many names of the one supreme God, or various considerations or notions of the divine virtues. To establish this point, he assumes much that would not readily be granted by any one conversant with ancient matters, and adopts the precepts and dogmas of individuals as the standard by which the public religions are to be estimated. Nor, indeed, having all his thoughts thus fixed upon this one object, is he always consistent with himself. For sometimes he speaks as though expounding the doctrines of the wise only, and at others, as if treating of the religious opinions of the entire people. This, however, will easily be pardoned, when we consider the other eminent virtues and merits of so great a man, who, although sometimes led away from the side of truth and religion, is, nevertheless, even when swerving from the right path, at all times edifying and instructive. But dismissing these things, let us now briefly advert to that which seems to be the strongest feature in the arguments brought forward by the learned Doctor in support of his cause.

It is notorious that the nations of antiquity, Greeks and Romans as well as barbarous, dedicated temples not only to the virtues, fortitude, love, piety, and the like, but also to the vices, fear, pallor, pleasure, &c. and worshipped the elements, water, fire, air; nay, went so far as to consecrate even diseases themselves. This dedication of the latter he adduces by our worthy author as a striking argument in proof of the opinion which he espouses: that the gods of the ancients were not persons, but merely notions and various considerations of one God, and therefore that, properly speaking, they did not worship many gods but only one supreme and almighty God, represented by various attributes and virtues. For example, victory, virtue, honour, concord are not persons but the names of things and notions. According to his opinion, therefore, those who paid homage to these deities worshipped the supreme Being, who of His own will displayed victory and virtue. In fact he considers the ancients to have supposed that there was nothing at all without a god, and that God was in a certain way all things, and to have been led from that cause to designate all things by the name of God, and God by the name of all things. Which opinion, even if nothing else could be brought against it, is certainly liable to this serious objection, that it is impossible to understand how they could refer terror, pallor, drunkenness, luxury, impudence, lust and disease to the supreme God of all things. But it labours also under other difficulties, which, as being evident of themselves, I should hold it to be mere waste of time to enumerate. It will be better to explain what I consider to be the cause of this ancient custom of consecrating the virtues, vices, diseases and elements: for when the reason is made apparent, error vanishes of itself. Learned men who have touched on this subject are divided into a great variety of opinions; which I am the less concerned at, as I observe from Cicero's De Natura Deor. lib. 3. that even the more ignorant of the Pagans themselves were ignorant of the true meaning of this institution

XXXIV. Hitherto have we declared the sense of the Pagans in general, those also being included who supposed God to be a being elevated above the world, that they agreed in these two

of their ancestors. For time is wont to throw the mantle of oblivion over the dogmas and opinions of antiquity; and hence even the most perspicacious of men are usually unable to determine what may have given rise to this or that custom. Some suppose the sole motive of the ancients to have been that they might thereby impress upon men's minds the love and memory of the virtues and things desirable. And Cicero himself is not far from agreeing to this opinion, who, De Legibus, lib. 2. cap. 11. p. 3353. opp. has the following words: Bene vero, quod mens, pietas, virtus, fides consecratur manu: quarum omnium Romæ dedicata publice templa sunt, ut, illa, qui habeant (habent autem omnes boni), deos ipsos in animis suis collocatos putent, "It is well, that understanding, piety, virtue, faith are consecrated: of all which there are temples publicly dedicated at Rome, that those who possess them (and all good men do possess them) may suppose the gods themselves to be placed in their minds." But if this opinion be correct, what is to become of the vices, diseases and crimes which we know to have likewise had a place among the gods? Others consider the nations to have been so mad and stupid as not to know themselves what they meant by adopting these deities, and to have been led into these errors by their own folly alone: upon the defence of which opinion the most acute J. Le Clerc has bestowed considerable diligence, Artis Criticæ par. 2. sect. 1. cap. 8. sect. 7. p. 218. But although, admitting as I do, that there was no folly too gross for the superstition of ancient nations, still I can hardly bring myself to suppose that they were influenced by no cause or motive in feigning such imaginary deities. I shall pass over the conjectures and opinions of others, and state the conclusion at which I myself have arrived on the subject. I consider, then, that the ancients who consecrated the elements, diseases, virtues and vices, worshipped not the things themselves but the genii that presided over them. It is an opinion of the remotest antiquity, that there exists nothing, however vile and abject, no disease of the mind, no virtue, that is not under the protection and control of some particular demon or genius. The doctrine is said to have been derived originally from the Chaldeans. See Ant. Van Dalen, De Origine ac Progressu Idololatriæ, cap. 4. p. 64. &c. Be this as it may, one thing is unquestionable, and evident even from the authority of Hesiod, Oper. et Dier. v. 121. p. 214. et v. 250. that the earliest inhabitants of Greece were imbued with it: and it is no less certain that the opinion was propagated from the people to the professors of wisdom themselves, having been adopted by Pythagoras and Plato, philosophers of the highest authority. With respect to Plato, indeed, no one can doubt that if the philosophy which he taught his disciples be divested of the doctrine of demons and genii, it loses its most important part. And how prone Pythagoras was to enlarge the empire of demons may be learnt both from many other incidents in his history, and especially from the fact that he at once referred to them the causes of all recondite and abstruse matters. Being asked what occasioned the acute sound emitted from brass, he gravely replied, that it was "the voice of a demon shut up in the brass," φωνήν τινος τῶν δαιμόνων, ἐναπειλημμένην τῷ χαλκῷ, Porphyrius, De Vita Pythagor. p. 42. Who would have expected such an answer from a geometrician? And yet I am not surprised at there having been so many men who thought proper to follow the same course. For what method can be more convenient and expeditious than this towards clearing away all the difficulties which beset those who investigate the causes of things? Adopt this doctrine of demons, and you will be able to account for every thing which for so many ages has exercised and tortured the most ingenious men. If any thing should perplex the mind, a demon will always be at hand to dispel the mists and restore light. From this common persuasion of antiquity, therefore, and not from any mental stupidity or other more abstruse causes, in my opinion flowed all the superstition of those who decreed divine honours to the elements, diseases, and affections of the mind. To begin with the elements, those who worshipped water, fire, ether, were not so foolish as to suppose that these portions of the universe themselves were injurious or beneficial to them, but, like the Chinese of the present day, they paid homage to the minds or genii presiding over these elements. At least the Pythagoreans and Platonists, whose doctrine in this respect agreed with the vulgar opinion, believed spirits to reside in all the elements, which could dispose and employ them at will to the advantage or destruction of mankind. Let those who wish for further information on this matter

things: First, the breaking and crumbling, as it were, of the simple Deity, and parcelling out of the same into many particular notions and partial considerations, according to the various

consult Chalcidius, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, cap. 119. p. 322. and cap. 134. p. 329. With respect to bodily diseases, scarcely any of the ancients, especially the philosophers we have spoken of, entertained a doubt of their being caused by the power and agency of evil demons, who, as they supposed, lost no opportunity of inflicting injury upon mortals: which opinion of the multitude is glanced at, as others have already observed, by Hippocrates in his book De Morbis Virginum et de Morbo Sacro. Of the Platonists consult Porphyry, as one example for all, Περὶ ἀποχῆς, lib. 2. sect. 41. p. 85. And what other notion, I ask, could have been entertained by those who believed in the possibility of curing diseases by the repetition of divine names and barbarous words, by incantations, amulets, and such like absurdities; of whom there existed in former times an incredible number among the the Greeks and Jews, and who are to be found even at the present day among the professors of Christianity? If this class of persons possessed the slightest particle of reason, the whole of their superstition must necessarily have been founded upon an idea that certain demons lie hid in the bodies of the sick, causing all the maladies they are afflicted with, and capable of being expelled by the utterance of awful words, or by the written exhibition of divine names or sentences. In St. Augustine's time degenerate Christians considered no remedy to be so efficacious against fever as the placing of the book of the gospels close to the sick person's head: Ad hoc, says he, perducta est infirmitas hominum, ut gaudeamus, quum videmus, hominem in lecto suo constitutum, jactari *febribus* et doloribus, nec alicubi spem possuisse, nisi *Evangelium ad caput poneret*, "To such a pitch has men's weakness arrived, that we rejoice when we see that a man stretched upon his bed, and struggling with *fevers* and pains, has placed his only hope in *the application of the gospel to his head*," Tract. 7. in Johannem, sect. 12. p. 252. tom. 3. par. 3. opp. What else could these persons have supposed than that the sick man had been attacked with fever through the malice of some wicked demon, whom nothing would be so well calculated to expel as that most holy book which records the history and doctrines of our Saviour? The same idea, I consider, must have been entertained by those who first dreamt of the possibility of curing fever by the word Abracadabra; who indeed were either altogether insane, or imagined the sick person to be possessed by some spirit that was unable to withstand this barbarous word. Therefore those who formerly dedicated temples to *fever*, *pallor*, and other bodily affections, meant doubtless to propitiate thereby the genii who had the power of afflicting mortals with these diseases. The sense of those who sacrificed victims to such deities is expressed in the following verses of Ovid, Fast. lib. 6. v. 161, &c.

Cor pro corde, precor, pro fibris sumite fibras:
Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus.

The mention, indeed, of genii consecrated to certain virtues and vices is less frequent in ancient records, not excepting even those of the Platonists: but the earliest Christians themselves supply us with sufficient evidence of its having been the general belief that no evil or good impulse arises in the minds of men without the influence and inspiration of some genius or other. The *fathers*, when they are about to account for men's rushing headlong into vice and crime, and to explain the reason why some are prone to one vice, some to another, almost invariably have recourse to the power of genii and demons. They suppose that each vice has its own presiding demon, and that these demons insinuate themselves into the minds of men, and excite therein all the various evil commotions and desires which agitate them. Hence they are accustomed also to designate the vices by the names of spirits or demons. This doctrine is set forth the most clearly by Origen, Homilia 15. In Josuam, whose words I shall quote, as they are given by J. B. Cotelerius in his notes Ad Hermæ Pastor, lib. 2. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. p. 85. Est aliquis fornicationis spiritus, est iræ spiritus alius, est avaritiæ spiritus, alius vero superbiæ. Et si invenias, esse aliquem hominem, qui his omnibus malis, aut etiam pluribus, agitetur, omnes hos, vel etiam plures, in se habere inimicos putandus est spiritus. And a little afterwards: Puto, principem fornicationis spiritum unum esse, innumeros vero esse, qui in hoc officio ei pareant.——Similiter et iracundiæ spiritum principem unum esse, arbitror, innumeros vero esse sub ipso agentes, qui per singulos quosque homines hujusce vitii pecata succendant, "There is a spirit of forni-

manifestations of its power and providence in the world; by the personating and deifying of which severally they made, as it were, so many gods of one. The chief ground whereof was this, because they considered not the Deity according to its simple nature, and abstractly only, but concretely also with the world, as he displayeth himself therein, pervadeth all, and diffuseth his

cation, another spirit of anger, a spirit of avarice, and another of pride. And if you find a man agitated by all these evils, or even more than these, you must suppose him to have within himself all these or even more spirits.—There is, I consider, one principal spirit of fornication, and an innumerable host of others that are subservient to it in this office.—In like manner there is one principal spirit of anger, and others without number that act under it, and incite the various individuals to the sins of this vice." This doctrine is manifestly at variance with all the declarations of sacred writ, which represent the nature of man as altogether corrupt, and as filled since the fall of our first parents with all kinds of wicked propensities and desires. And yet it was espoused formerly by most of those who were of any rank or importance in the Latin and Greek churches; from whom, besides Cotelerius as above quoted, Dr. J. Potter, Ad Clementis Alexandr. Pædagog. lib. 2. p. 174, has collected numerous testimonies. I shall add a passage of Basilius Magnus in his Exorcismus, published by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 5. cap. 19. p. 98, 99. vol. 8, Ἀναχώρησον, πᾶν δαιμόνιον κακὸν καὶ ἀκάθαρτον,—ἐπιθυμητικὸν,—μεθυμναῖον, ἢ ταραχοποιητικὸν ἀναιδές, φιλόνεικον, ἀκατάστατον, κ. τ. λ. "Depart every spirit of evil or impurity, of concupiscence, of drunkenness, of disturbance, of impudence, of contention, of restlessness," &c. This Exorcismus of St. Basil confirms the remark made by us a little above, that even the ancient Christians referred all the diseases which afflict the human race to the agency of malignant genii. Nor, unless I am much mistaken, could those who had devoted themselves to the precepts of the Platonists, entertain any very different notion of the vices and diseases of the mind: on which subject, to avoid prolixity, I shall not at present offer any comment. I pass rather to the virtues. These, like the vices, were supposed by the ancient Christians to have each their own genii: for example, they assigned one genius to chastity, another to equity, another to prayer, another to repentance. Should any one require authorities, let him consult, besides the Pastor of Hermas, which is full of such genii, Tertullian's books De Oratione, De Anima, De Baptismo, and others. And although they speak with less clearness of the office of these angels than of the functions of the demons, in which they considered the origin of the several vices to reside, still it is sufficiently manifest that they supposed God to have associated certain spirits with the pious and regenerated, which continually reminded them of the virtues, and by their secret influence incited them to the performance of the various duties of a Christian life. It is not to be believed that the Christians were the first inventors of this doctrine. On the contrary it unquestionably formed a part of those tenets which they had imbibed previously to their adoption of the Christian religion, and which they afterwards combined with the precepts of our Saviour. And such being the case, what necessity is there for inquiring whence originated those temples among the Greeks and Romans, which were dedicated to honour, virtue, concord, love, friendship, and on the other hand to pleasure, lust, and discord? Doubtless from the opinion of men, who supposed mortals to be impelled, and impelled to the vices as well as to the virtues, by the influence of certain genii. Those, therefore, who frequented the temples of the virtues, prayed to the genii whom they believed to have charge of these virtues, to aid them in an upright course of life; while, on the other hand, the object of those who offered sacrifices to the vices, was to propitiate the demons, in whom they supposed were the causes of the vices, and to avert their displeasure. Perhaps some also that delighted in vice besought the gods, presiding over depraved morals, to enable them to indulge their propensities without incurring ignominy and loss of character:

> Labra movet; metuens audiri: pulchra Laverna,
> Da mihi fallere, da justum sanctumque videri,
> Noctem peccatis et fraudibus objice nubem.

Horatii lib. 1. Epist. 16. v. 60, &c.

virtues through all. For as the sun, reflected by grosser vapours, is sometimes multiplied, and the same object beheld through a polyedrous glass, by reason of those many superficies, being represented in several places at once, is thereby rendered manifold to the spectator: so one and the same supreme God, considered concretely with the world, as manifesting his several powers and virtues in it, was multiplied into several names, not without the appearance of so many several gods. Whereas πολυώνυμον with those ancient Pagans, was the same thing with πολυδύναμον, that which hath "many names," all one with that which hath "many powers:" according to this of Callimachus[9] concerning Diana:

> Δός μοι παρθενίην αἰώνιον, ἄππα, φυλάσσειν,
> Καὶ Πολυωνυμίην·

And this of Virgil concerning Alecto:[10]

> Tibi nomina mille,
> Mille nocendi artes.

And accordingly the many pagan gods are, in Plato's Cratylus,[1] interpreted as the many powers of one God diffused through the world. And the pagan theologers seemed to conceive this to be more suitable to the pomp, state and grandeur of the supreme God, for him to be considered diffusively, and called by many names, signifying his many several virtues and powers (polyonymy being by them accounted an honour) rather than to be contracted and shrunk all up into one general notion of a perfect mind, the Maker or Creator of the whole world. The second thing in which the Pagans agreed, is their personating and deifying also the parts of the world, and things of nature themselves, and so making them so many gods and goddesses too. Their meaning therein being declared to be really no other than this: that God, who doth not only pervade all things, but also was the cause of all things, and therefore himself is in a manner all

[9] Hymn. in Dianam, v. 5. 6. p. 50. On which it will be well worth while to read the remarks of Spanheim in his Commentary on this passage, p. 129. 130. The position here assumed by Dr. Cudworth, that the multitude of gods among the ancient Pagans sprung from the multiplicity of names which they applied to their gods, is most eloquently maintained also by his countryman J. Selden, De Diis Syris. I wish, however, they had both employed more convincing arguments. The hymns which are ascribed to the gods in Orpheus, consist almost wholly of names by which the ancients designated their gods. But no one of these names, so far as I know, led men into the error of forming a god out of it. Diana was called Ephesia, Persia, Laphria, redux, conservatrix, felix, victrix. And which of these names, I would ask, has been transformed into a deity? I should say, not one of them

[10] Æneid. lib. 7. v. 324.

[1] The significations of the names, by which the gods were formerly distinguished, are discussed with much ingenuity by Plato in his Cratylus: but I know of no passage in this book, wherein he states that they all imply only one God, considered in his various relations.

things, ought to be worshipped in all the things of nature and parts of the world: as also that the force of every thing was divine, and that in all things that were beneficial to mankind, the divine goodness ought to be acknowledged.

We shall now observe, how both those forementioned principles, of God's pervading all things, and his being all things, which were the chief grounds of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, were improved and carried on further by those amongst them, who had no higher notion of the supreme Deity than as the soul of the world. Which opinion, that it found entertainment amongst so many of them, probably might be from hence, because it was so obvious for those of them that were religious to conceive, that as themselves consisted of body and soul, so the body of the whole world was not without its soul neither; and that their human souls were as well derived from the life and soul of the world, as the earth and water in their bodies were from the earth and water of the world. Now whereas the more refined Pagans, as was before observed, supposed God to pervade and pass through all things ἀμιγῶς, "unmixedly;" these concluded God to be (according to that definition of him in Quintilian, taken in a rigid sense), spiritum omnibus partibus immistum, "a spirit immingled with all the parts of the world:" or else in Manilius' language:

Infusumque Deum cœlo terrisque fretoque,

"Infused into the heaven, earth, and seas:" sacroque meatu conspirare Deum, and "intimately to conspire with his own work the world," as being almost one with it. Upon which account he was commonly called Nature also, that being thus defined by some of the Stoics: Deus mundo permistus, "God mingled throughout with the world;" and, Divina Ratio toti mundo insita, "The divine Reason inserted into the whole world." Which Nature notwithstanding, in way of distinction from the particular natures of things, was called κοινὴ φύσις, and communis natura, "the common nature." And it was plainly declared by them not to be a senseless nature; according to that of Balbus in Cicero: Natura est, quæ continet mundum omnem, eumque tuetur; atque ea quidem non sine sensu, atque ratione, "It is nature, by which the whole world is contained and upheld, but this such a nature as is not without sense and reason." As it is elsewhere said to be perfect and eternal Reason, the divine mind and wisdom containing also under it all the λογοὶ σπερματικοὶ, "the spermatic principles," by which the things of nature (commonly so called) are effected. Wherefore we see, that such naturalists as these may well be allowed to be Theists (Moses himself in Strabo being accounted one of them), whereas those that acknowledge no higher principle of the world than a

senseless nature (whether fortuitous, or orderly and methodical), cannot be accounted any other than absolute Atheists. Moreover, this soul of the world was by such of these Pagans as admitted no incorporeal substance, itself concluded to be a body too, but λεπτότατον καὶ τάχιστον, "a most subtle and most swift body," as was before observed out of Plato (though endued with perfect mind and understanding, as well as with spermatic reasons) which insinuating itself into all other bodies, did permeate and pervade the whole universe, and frame all things, inwardly mingling itself with all; Heraclitus and Hippasus thinking this to be fire, and Diogenes Apolloniates air; whom Simplicius, who had read some of his then extant works, vindicates from that imputation of atheism, which Hippo and Anaximander lie under.[2]

Again, whereas the more sublimated Pagans* affirmed the supreme God to be all, so as that he was nevertheless something above all too, he being above the soul of the world (and probably Æschylus in that forecited passage of his, is to be understood after this manner: Ζεύς τοι τὰ πάντα καί τι τῶνδ' ὑπέρτερον, "Jupiter is the ether, Jupiter is the earth, Jupiter is the heaven; Jupiter is all things, and yet something higher than all, or above all"); those Pagans, who acknowledged no higher Numen than the soul of the world, made God to be all things in a grosser sense, they supposing the whole corporeal world animated to be also the supreme Deity. For though God to them were principally and originally, that eternal unmade soul and mind, which diffuseth itself through all things; yet did they conceive, that as the human soul and body, both together, make up one whole rational animal or man, so this mundane soul, and its body the world, did in like manner, both together, make up one entire divine animal, or God.

It is true indeed, that as the human soul doth principally act in some one part of the body, which therefore hath been called the Hegemonicon and Principale, some taking this to be the brain, others the heart, but Strato in Tertullian[4] ridiculously,

[2] On the argument here propounded by the learned Doctor, and the passages of the ancients by which he supports it, we have already treated at some length. Having once laid down a position he is in the habit of frequently repeating it.

* As Simplicius[3] describeth God to be πάντα πρὸ πάντων, Omnia ante omnia. In Epictet. p. 234.

[3] I have in vain sought for this definition in Simplicius. I suppose our author, however, to have been thinking of these verses of his, which occur p. 236: Τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, ὑπὲρ πάντα ὄντος τὰ ὄντα, οὐδέν ἐστιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα, "Of the cause of all things, which is above all things that exist, there is no peculiar name."

[4] De Anima, cap. 15. p. 169. Nec in superciliorum, says he, meditullio cubat anima, ut Strato (putat) physicus, "Neither does the soul reside in the part between the eyebrows, as Strato the physiologer imagines." Strato unquestionably did suppose the soul to be located in the part of the head intervening between the eyebrows, ἐν μεσοφρύῳ, as Plutarch says, De Placitis Philos. lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 909. His doctrine, therefore, was not much more absurd than that of those who, like Herophilus, consider

the place betwixt the eyebrows; so the Stoics did suppose the great soul or mind of the world to act principally in some one part thereof (which what it was notwithstanding they did not all agree upon), as the Hegemonicon or Principale; and this was sometimes called by them emphatically God. But nevertheless they all acknowledged this mundane soul, as the souls of other animals, to pervade, animate, or enliven and actuate, more or less its whole body, the world. This is plainly declared by Laërtius in the life of Zeno:[5] Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἤδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δ' ἧττον· δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ· οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον, ζῶον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικὸν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, ἢ τὸν οὐρανὸν, ἢ τὸν ἥλιον· ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι, καὶ διὰ τῶν ζώων ἁπάντων καὶ φυτῶν, διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ' ἕξιν, "The Stoics affirm, that the world is governed by mind and providence, this mind passing through all the parts of it, as the soul doth in us: which yet doth not act in all parts alike, but in some more, in some less; it passing through some parts only as a habit (as through the bones and nerves), but through others as mind or understanding (as through that which is called the Hegemonicon or Principale). So the whole world being a living and rational animal, hath its Hegemonicon or principal part too, which according to Antipater is the ether, to Possidonius the air, to Cleanthes the sun, &c. And they say also, that this first God is, as it were, sensibly diffused through all animals and plants, but through the earth itself, only as a habit." Where the whole world, being thus acted and animated by one divine soul, is itself, according to these Stoics, also the supreme God. Thus Didymus in Eusebius:[6] Ὅλον δὲ τὸν κόσμον προσαγορεύουσι θεὸν, "The Stoics call the whole world God;" and Origen against Celsus:* Σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσι εἶναι θεὸν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον, "The Greeks universally affirm the world to be a god, but the Stoics, the first and chief God." And accordingly Manilius:[7]

it to reside in the brain or about the bottom of the brain. Both look for its seat in the head, but they differ as to the place.

[5] Lib. 7. segm. 138. 139. p. 452. But Dr. Cudworth exhibits the sense rather than the very words of Laërtius, as he has here and there omitted many and altered others. In which I should find nothing to complain of, except that he combines the words ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν, &c. with the preceding, as though they were said of the sun: which sense he seems also to express in his English version of these words. But on referring to Laërtius, it will appear that they pertain not to the sun but to the ether. Chrysippus asserted the ether to be the principal god, and to pervade all things: concerning which matter consult the commentators on this passage.

[6] Præpar. Evangel. lib. 25. cap. 15. p. 817.

* Lib. 5. p. 235.

[7] Astronomic. lib. 1. v. 484. 485. p. 16.

Quâ pateat, mundum divino numine verti,
Atque ipsum esse Deum,

"Whereby it may appear the world to be governed by a divine mind, and also itself to be God." As likewise Seneca[8] the philosopher: Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est, et Deus est, "This whole world, within which we are contained, is both one thing, and God." Which is not to be understood of the mere matter of the world, as it is nothing but a heap of atoms, or as endued with a plastic and senseless nature only; but of it as animated by such a soul, as besides sense was originally endued with perfect understanding; and as deriving all its godship from thence. For thus Varro in St. Austin[9] declares both his own and the Stoical sense concerning this point: Dicit idem Varro, adhuc de naturali theologia præloquens, Deum se arbitrari esse animam mundi (quem Græci vocant κόσμον) et hunc ipsum mundum esse Deum. Sed sicut hominem sapientem, cum sit ex corpore et animo, tamen ab animo dici sapientem; ita mundum Deum dici ab animo, cum sit ex animo et corpore, "The same Varro discoursing concerning natural theology, declareth, that, according to his own sense, God is the soul of the world (which the Greeks call Cosmos,) and that this world itself is also God. But that this is so to be understood, that as a wise man, though consisting of soul and body, yet is denominated wise only from his mind or soul; so the world is denominated God from its mind or soul only, it consisting both of mind and body."

Now if the whole animated world be the supreme God, it plainly follows from thence, that the several parts and members thereof must be the parts and members of God; and this was readily acknowledged by Seneca:[9] Membra sumus corporis magni, "We are all members of one great body." And,[10] Totum hoc Deus est, socii ejus et membra sumus, "This whole world is God, and we are not only his members, but also his fellows or companions;" as if our human souls had a certain kind of fellowship also with that great soul of the universe. And accordingly, the soul of the world, and the whole mundane animal, was frequently worshipped by the Pagans, in these its several members; the chief parts of the world, and the most important things of nature; as it were by piecemeal. Nevertheless it doth not at all follow from thence, that these were therefore to them really so many several gods; for then not only

[8] Civ. Dei, lib. 7. cap. 6.
[9] Epistol. 92. p. 323. tom. 2. opp. A very similar passage occurs in the same author, Epistol. 95. p. 355. Several others have been collected by Justus Lipsius in his Physiol. Stoica, lib. 1. dis. 8. p. 16. &c. and Th. Gatakerus, Ad Marc. Antoninum, lib. 4. sect. 22. p. 110.
[9] Epist. 95. p. 355.
[10] Epist. 92. p. 323.

every man, and every contemptible animal, every plant and herb, and pile of grass, every river and hill, and all things else whatsoever, must be so many several gods. And that the Pagans themselves did not take them for such, Origen observes against that assertion of Celsus: "That if the whole were God, then the several parts thereof must needs be gods,"* or divine too: Ὡς εἶναι θεῖα οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα, μέρη ὄντα τοῦ κόσμου, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰ φυτά· εἰ δὲ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ, καὶ τὰ ὄρη, καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι· ἄρ' ἐπεὶ ὅλος ὁ κόσμος θεός ἐστιν, ἤδη καὶ οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ αἱ θάλασσαι θεοί εἰσιν· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο φήσουσιν Ἕλληνες· τοὺς δ' ἐπιστατοῦντας (εἰ ἄρα δαίμονας, ἢ θεοὺς, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι ὀνομάζουσι) ποταμοῖς καὶ θαλάσσαις, τούτους ἂν λέγοιεν θεούς. Καὶ τὸ καθολικὸν Κέλσου γίνεται καὶ καθ' Ἕλληνας ψεῦδος, ὅτι εἰ τὸ ὅλον ἦ θεὸς, πάντως τὰ μέρη τούτου ἐστὶ θεῖα· κατὰ τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖα ἔσται ζῶα, καὶ μυῖαι, καὶ σκνίφες, καὶ σκώληκες, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῶν ὄφεων εἶδος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων· ἅπερ οὐδ' οἱ λέγοντες θεὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον, φήσουσιν, "From hence it would follow, that not only men must be divine and gods, but also all brute animals too (they being parts of the world) and plants to boot. Nay rivers, and mountains, and seas, being parts of the world likewise (if the whole world be God) must, according to Celsus, needs be gods also. Whereas the Greeks themselves will not affirm this; but they would only call those spirits or demons, which preside over these rivers and seas, gods. Wherefore this universal assertion of Celsus is false even according to the Greeks themselves; that if the whole be God, then all the parts thereof must needs be divine or gods. It following from thence, that flies, and gnats, and worms, and all kind of serpents, and birds, and fishes, are all divine animals or gods: which they themselves, who assert the world to be God, will not affirm."

Wherefore, though it be true, that the Pagans did many times personate and deify the chief parts of the world, and things of nature, as well as they did the several powers and virtues of the mundane soul, diffused through the whole world; yet did not the intelligent amongst them therefore look upon these as so many true and proper gods, but only worship them as parts and members of one great mundane animal; or rather, worship the soul of the whole world, their supreme deity, in them all, as its various manifestations. This St. Austin intimates, when writing against Faustus the Manichæan, he prefers even the pagan gods before the Manichean:[1] Jam verò cœlum,

* Lib. 5. p. 234.

[1] Contra Faustum, lib. 20. cap. 5. p. 238. tom. 8. These words however do not occur in St. Augustine in continued order, but are culled by Dr. Cudworth from different parts of this chapter.

et terra, et mare, et aër, et sol, et luna, et cætera sidera omnia, hæc manifesta oculis apparent, atque ipsis sensibus præsto sunt. Quæ cum Pagani tanquam deos colunt, vel tanquam PARTES UNIUS MAGNI DEI (nam universum mundum quidam eorum putant MAXIMUM DEUM) ea colunt, quæ sunt. Vos autem, cum ea colatis, quæ omninò non sunt, propinquiores essetis veræ pietati, si saltem Pagani essetis, qui corpora colunt, etsi non colenda, tamen vera, "Now the heaven, earth, sea, and air, sun, moon, and stars, are things all manifest and really present to our senses; which when the Pagans worship as gods, or as PARTS OF ONE GREAT GOD (for some of them think the whole world to be the GREATEST GOD), they worship things that are; so that you worshipping things, that are not, would be nearer to true piety than you are, were you Pagans and worshipped bodies too; which though they ought not to be worshipped, yet are they true and real things." But this is further insisted upon by the same St. Austin, in his book De Civ. Dei,* where after that large enumeration of the pagan gods before set down, he thus convinces their folly in worshipping the several divided members, parts and powers, of the one great God, after that manner personated: Hæc omnia, quæ dixi, et quæcunque non dixi (non enim omnia dicenda arbitratus sum) hi omnes dii deæque sit unus Jupiter; sive sint, ut quidam volunt, omnia ista partes ejus, sive virtutes ejus, sicut eis videtur, quibus eum placet esse mundi animum; quæ sententia velut magnorum multorumque doctorum est. Hæc, inquam, si ita sunt, quod quale sit, nondum interim quæro, quid perderent, si unum Deum colerent prudentiori compendio? Quid enim ejus contemneretur, cum ipse coleretur? Si autem metuendum sit, nè prætermissæ sive neglectæ partes ejus irascerentur; non ergo, ut volunt, velut unius animantis hæc tota vita est, quæ omnes simul continet deos, quasi suas VIRTUTES, vel MEMBRA, vel PARTES: sed suam quæque pars habet vitam à cæteris separatam, si præter alteram irasci altera potest, et alia placari, alia concitari. Si autem dicitur omnia simul, id est, totum ipsum Jovem potuisse offendi, si PARTES ejus non etiam singillatim minutatimque colorentur, stultè dicetur. Nulla quippe earum prætermitteretur, cum ipse unus, qui haberet omnia, coleretur, "All these things, which we have now said, and many more which we have not said (for we did not think fit to mention all) all these gods and goddesses, let them be one and the same Jupiter: whether they will have them to be his PARTS, or his POWERS, and VIRTUES, according to the sense of those, who think God to be the soul or mind of the whole world; which is the opinion of many and great doctors. This, I say, if it be so, which, what it is, we

* Lib. 4. cap. 11. [P. 76.]

will not now examine; what would these Pagans lose, if in a more prudent compendium, they should worship one only God? For what of him could be despised, when his whole self was worshipped? But if they fear, lest his parts pretermitted, or neglected, should be angry, or take offence; then it is not, as they pretend, the life of one great animal, which at once contains all the gods, as his virtues, or members, or parts, but every part hath its own life by itself, separate from the rest, since one of them may be angry when another is pleased, and the contrary. But if it should be said, that altogether, that is, the whole Jupiter might be offended, if his parts were not worshipped all of them severally and singly; this would be foolishly said, because none of the parts can be pretermitted, when he that hath all is worshipped."[2]

Thus do the Pagans in Athanasius[3] also declare, that they did not worship the several parts of the world, as really so many true and proper gods, but only as the parts, or members, of their one supreme God, that great mundane animal (or whole animated world) taken all together as one thing: Ἀλλ' ἴσως διαιρούμενα μὲν, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὰ λαμβανόμενα, ἐπιδεῆ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνομολογοῦσιν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντα συνάπτοντες, καὶ ὡς ἓν ἀποτελοῦντες μέγα σῶμα, τὸ ὅλον Θεὸν εἶναι φήσουσι, "But the Pagans themselves will acknowledge, that the divided parts of the world, taken severally, are but indigent and imperfect things, nevertheless do they contend, that as they are by them joined all together into one great body (enlivened by one soul), so is the whole of them truly and properly God." And now we think it is sufficiently evident, that though these Pagans verbally personated and deified, not only the several powers and virtues of the one supreme God, or mundane soul, diffused throughout the whole world, but also the several parts of the world itself, and the natures of things; yet their meaning herein was not to make these in themselves really so many several true and proper gods (much less independent ones), but to worship one supreme God (which to them was the whole animated world) in those his several parts and members, as it were by piecemeal, or under so many inadequate conceptions.[4]

[2] In this passage of St. Augustine, as well as in others of the kind to be met with in the ancient Christian writers, these eminent men, let it be observed, by no means affirm, as the learned Doctor supposes, that the ancients worshipped the divine virtues and perfections as gods, but merely, that there were some men both in times past and in their own day who interpreted the absurd religions of the vulgar in this manner. Whereas neither St. Augustine nor any other of the Christian fathers attached much importance to these interpretations. To pass over others, consult St. Augustine himself, Contra Faustum Manich. lib. 20. cap. 9. p. 240. tom. 8. opp.

[3] Orat. contra Græcos, p. 31. tom. 1. opp.

[4] I have so repeatedly stated, how very little can be proved from the whole of these passages of the ancients, that there is no need of further comment. Nevertheless, I shall quote a remarkable passage of Arnobius, which, although confirming some of the

e Pagans therefore were plainly divided in their natural ›gy, as to their opinions concerning the supreme God; of them conceiving him to be nothing higher than a mun-

Doctor's positions, strikes at the very foundation of the opinion he so warmly ;es. In lib. 3. adv. Gentes, p. 151. ed. Heraldi. Arnobius, addressing the , says: In philosophiæ memorabili studio atque ad istius nominis columen audatoribus elevati, universam istam molem mundi, cujus omnes amplexibus ır, tegimur ac sustinemur, animal esse unum, sapiens, rationabile, consultum, ıli asseveratione definiunt: quorum si est vera et fixa certa sententia, etiam illi ;o desinent Dii esse, quos in ejus portionibus paullo ante immutatis nominibus ıebatis. Ut enim homo unus nequit, permanente sui corporis integritate, in s multos scindi, neque homines rursus, multitudinis, junctionis differentia con-, in unius sensus simplicitatemque conflari: ita, si mundus unum est animal, et mentis agitatione rotatur, nec in plura potest Numina dissipari, nec (si ejus læ Dii sunt) in unius animantis conscientiam cogi atque verti. Luna, sol, æther, astra membra sunt et mundi partes. Quod si partes et membra sunt, ia utique sui nominis non sunt. Neque enim partes hoc ipsum esse, quod est, aliqua in re possunt, aut sibi sapere, sibi sentire, quod sine totius animantis ı nullis propriis afficiatur motibus: quo constituto ac posito, summa omnis illuc t neque sol Deus sit, neque luna, neque æther, tellus, et cætera. Sunt enim partes non specialia Numinum nomina: atque ita perficitur, omnia vobis turbantibus tibusque divina, ut in rerum natura unus Deus constituatur mundus, explosis ıs ceteris, "Those who are famed for the study of philosophy, and are pane- by you as the most eminent of their class, with some probability define the mass of this world, by whose embraces we are all encircled, protected, and sus- to be one animal, wise, rational, and intelligent: if which opinion be true and , those will immediately cease to be gods, which a little before by the changing ıes you constituted in its several parts. For as neither can one man, while the ;y of his body remains, be divided into many men, nor on the other hand many ıe difference of multitude and composition being preserved, be combined into ıscious and simplicity of one; so, if the world is one animal and turned by the impulse of one mind, it neither can be dissipated into several deities nor parts are gods) be compounded and converted into the consciousness of one . The moon, the sun, the earth, the ether, the stars, are members and parts of ırld. But if they are parts and members, they therefore are not animals in lves. For in nothing can parts be the same thing that the whole is, nor can that if know and feel, which is not affected by any motions of its own without the of the whole animal: which being established the whole amounts to this, that the sun is a god, nor the moon, nor the ether, earth and the rest. For they ts of the world, not special names of deities: and thus it is brought to pass by ›nfounding and jumbling together all divine things, that the world is constituted y God in the nature of things, all the others being exploded." These words ›r. Cudworth to be perfectly right in his assertion, that there existed formerly few philosophers, especially at the period when Christianity was making rapid s in the world, who regarded this universe as God and knew of no other deity ıe soul of the world. But at the same time the other position which he endea- ;o establish is not equally manifest from them, that this class of men, though y acknowledging many gods, and designating not only the divine perfections tues, but also the several parts and members of this world itself, by the names ies, nevertheless in reality worshipped only one God. Arnobius is disputing this sect and showing it to be a necessary consequence from their own precepts, ere is but one God. But what need, I ask, would there have been for this dis- n, if they had regarded these not as gods, but merely as the names and tions of gods, and had worshipped but one god in the various parts of ırld? Men who require to have it proved to them, that if they wish to consistently to their own dogmas, they cannot possibly help acknowledg- ; God, are evidently very widely separated in opinion from those who profess one God. At any rate, whoever looks upon Arnobius as no mean ty, must necessarily admit the following: I. That those ancient Pagans bsequently to the birth of our Saviour identified God with the soul of the

dane soul: whereas others of them, to use Origen's* language, did ὑπερβαίνειν πᾶσαν τὴν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν, καὶ μηδαμοῦ αὐτῷ νομίζειν ἱδρύσθαι τὸν Θεὸν, ἄνω καὶ δὲ ὑπερ τὰ σώματα ζητεῖν αὐτὸν, "transcend all the sensible nature, and thinking God not at all to be seated there, looked for him above all corporeal things." Now the former of these Pagans worshipped the whole corporeal world, as the body of God; but the latter of them, though they had higher thoughts of God than as a mundane soul, yet supposing him to have been the cause of all things, and so at first to have contained all things within himself; as likewise that the world, after it was made, was not cut off from

world, accommodated the fables of the gods to physical precepts, understanding, for example, the earth by the name of Ceres, the ether by that of Juno, the upper air by Jupiter, and fire by Vulcan. But, nevertheless, II. that they regarded these natural things as real and true gods, and paid homage to the sun, moon, earth, &c., as though they had the power of working good or evil. Whence, III. it follows, that they believed certain parts or emanations of the divine essence to reside in these several parts of the world, which we ought to consider separately from God and worship with the most devout reverence. Therefore, IV. that according to them the several gods which they supplicated were not merely names and designations of one supreme Being, but gods strictly so called. For, as those who suppose our souls to be derived and drawn from the divine nature, do not deny nevertheless that these souls are natures separate and distinct from God, from whom they flowed: so also those who maintained God to be diffused through the whole universe, considered the parts of this Deity, lying concealed in the several things of nature, as abstracted from God himself, and therefore deserving of particular homage and worship. I cannot, I think, more aptly confirm and illustrate the whole of this than by appealing to a still extant work of Phornutus, De Natura Deorum, which is included by Th. Gale in his Opuscula Veterum Mythologica, Physica et Ethica. Dr. Gale supposes this Phornutus to have been a Platonist, Praefat. p. 7. For my own part I should rather consider him as a Stoic, not only on account of what he says on the conflagration of the world, cap. 17. p. 174. which is altogether at variance with Platonic principles, but from the very project itself of explaining the nature of the gods, as well as other things which I now pass over. Be this as it may, his object throughout the whole of this book is to refer the gods of the ancients to the nature of things, and to identify them with the parts and members of the visible world. The supreme God himself he at once avows to be the soul of the world, cap. 2. p. 141. "Ὥσπερ δὲ ἡμεῖς ἀπὸ ψυχῆς διοικοῦμεθα, οὕτω καὶ ὁ κόσμος ψυχὴν ἔχει τὴν συνέχουσαν αὐτὸν καὶ αὕτη καλεῖται Ζεύς, "As we are governed by a soul, so also the world has a soul, which contains it: and this soul is called Ζεὺς or Jupiter." You might suppose this man, since he refers all things to one soul of the world, to have also worshipped this alone and not to have recognized a plurality of gods. But the contrary is evident from the close of this book, p. 236. where he expressly declares it to be a wise man's part indeed to accommodate all that is recorded of the gods to the truth; but yet that we ought by all means "to worship the gods and offer prayer and sacrifice to them," θύειν, εὔχεσθαι καὶ προσκυνεῖν. And why many words? Any one who has at all examined the discipline of the Stoics cannot but be aware, that in supposing God to be a certain power diffused through the whole nature of things, they did not on that account discard a multiplicity of gods. For this sect, although believing God to be fire possessing reason and sense and permeating this universe, nevertheless considered it to be their duty to pay separate homage to Neptune, whom they asserted to be "a soul passing with intelligence through the sea," as also to Ceres and the other deities. See Cicero De Natura Deor. lib. 3. cap. 25. p. 3090. Most foolish, I own, are the whole of these conceits and fraught with the grossest absurdities: but in investigating the opinions of antiquity, we ought by no means to look for what may be consistent with sound wisdom or to suppose that formerly men reasoned as, under better guidance, we do at the present day; but candidly and honestly to record what we find handed down by ancient authors.

* Cont. Cels. p. 260.

him, nor subsisted alone by itself, as a dead thing, but was closely united to him, and livingly dependent on him: these, I say, though they did not take the world to be God, or the body of God, yet did they also look upon it as θεῖον, as that which was "divine and sacred;" and supposed, that God was to be worshipped in all, or that the whole world was to be worshipped, as his image or temple. Thus Plutarch,[5] though much disliking the deifying of inanimate things, doth himself nevertheless approve of worshipping God in the whole corporeal world, he affirming it to be ἱερὸν ἁγιώτατον καὶ θεοπρεπέστατον, "a most holy and most god-becoming temple." And the ancient Persians or Magi, who by no means would allow of worshipping God in any artificial temples made with men's hands, did notwithstanding thus worship God, sub dio, and upon the tops of mountains, in the whole corporeal world, as his natural temple, as Cicero† testifieth: Nec sequor Magos Persarum, quibus auctoribus Xerxes inflammasse templa Græciæ dicitur, quod parietibus includerent deos, quibus omnia deberent esse patentia ac libera, quorumque hic mundus omnis templum esset et domicilium, "Neither do I adhere to the Persian Magi, by whose suggestion and persuasion Xerxes is said to have burnt all the temples of the Greeks, because they inclosed and shut up their gods within walls, to whom all things ought to be open and free, and whose temple and habitation this whole world is." And therefore when Diogenes Laërtius[6] writeth thus of these Magi, that they did θεοὺς ἀποφαίνεσθαι πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ, τῶν δὲ ξοάνων καταγινώσκειν, "make fire and earth and water to be gods, but condemn all statues and images;" we conceive the meaning hereof to be no other than this, that as they worshipped God in no temple, save only that of the whole world, so neither did they allow any other statues or images of him, than the things of nature and parts of the world, such as fire, and earth, and water, called therefore by them, in this sense and no other, gods. For thus are they clearly represented by Clemens Alexandrinus, and that according to the express testimony of Dino:† Θύειν ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ τοὺς Μάγους ὁ Δίνων λέγει, θεῶν ἀγάλματα μόνα τὸ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ νομίζοντας. Οὐκ ἀπεκρυψάμην οὐδὲ τῶν τούτων ἄγνοιαν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ἀποφεύγειν οἴονται τῆς πλάνης, ἀλλ' εἰς ἑτέραν κατολισθαίνουσιν ἀπάτην. Ἀγάλματα μὲν θεῶν οὐ ξύλα καὶ λιθους ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες. οὐδὲ μὲν Ἴβιδας καὶ Ἰχνεύμονας, καθάπερ Αἰγύπτιοι· ἀλλὰ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ, ὡς φιλόσοφοι, "Dinon affirmeth, that the Persian Magi sacrificed under the open heavens, they accounting fire and

[5] See his book De Iside et Osiride, p. 382. For, excepting this, I know of no other passage of Plutarch that can be alluded to.

* De Leg. lib. 2. p. 335.

[6] Proœm. Operis segm. 6. p. 5.

† Protrept. p. 43. [Cap. V. p. 56. Edit. Potteri.]

water to be the only statues and images of the gods. For I would not here conceal their ignorance neither, who, thinking to avoid one error, fall into another; whilst they allow not wood and stones to be the images of the gods, as the Greeks do, nor Ichneumones and Ibides, as the Egyptians, but only fire and water, as philosophers." Which difference betwixt the pagan theologers, that some of them looked upon the whole world as God, or as the body of God, others only as the image, or the temple of God, is thus taken notice of by Macrobius upon Scipio's dream, where the world was called a temple:* Benè autem universus mundus Dei templum vocatur, propter illos, qui æstimant, nihil esse aliud Deum, nisi cœlum ipsum, et cœlestia ista, quæ cernimus. Ideò ut summi omnipotentiam Dei ostenderet posse vix intelligi, nunquam posse videri, quicquid humano subjicitur aspectui templum ejus vocavit; ut qui hæc veneratur ut templa, cultum tamen maximum debeat conditori; sciatque, quisquis in usum templi hujus inducitur, ritu sibi vivendum sacerdotis, "The whole world is well called here the temple of God, in way of opposition to those who think God to be nothing else but the heaven itself, and those heavenly things which we see (or the whole sensible world animated): wherefore Cicero, that he might show the omnipotence of the first supreme God to be such as could scarcely be understood, but not at all perceived by sense, he calleth whatsoever falleth under human sight, his temple; that so he that worshippeth these things as the temple of God, might in the mean time remember, that the chief worship is due to the Maker and Creator of them; as also that himself ought to live in the world like a priest or mysta, holily and religiously." And thus we see, that the Pagans were universally cosmolatræ, or world-worshippers, in one sense or other; not that they worshipped the world as a dead and inanimate thing, but either as the body of God, or at least as the temple or image of him. Neither of which terminated their worship in that, which was sensible and visible only, but in that great mind or soul, which framed and governeth the whole world understandingly; though this was called also by them (not the nature of things, but φύσις κοινὴ, "the common nature," and φύσις τοῦ παντὸς, or τῶν ὅλων, "the nature of the universe," because it contained under it the spermatic reasons, or plastic principles of the whole world.

Furthermore, these pagan Theists universally acknowledging the whole world to be an animal, and that mundane animal also to be a god; those of them who supposed it not to be the first and highest God, did consequently all conceive it, as hath been already observed, to be either a second or at least a third god.

* Lib. 1. c. 14.

And thus Origen:[7] Σαφῶς δὴ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι Θεὸν, Στωϊκοὶ μὲν τὸν Πρῶτον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν Δεύτερον, τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν Τρίτον, "The Greeks do plainly affirm the whole world to be a god; some of them, as the Stoics, the first God; others, as the Platonists, (to whom may be added the Egyptians also) the second god; though some of these Platonists call it the third god." Those of the Platonists who called the mundane animal, or animated world, the second god, looked upon that whole Platonic trinity of divine hypostases (Τἀγαθὸν, Νοῦς and Ψυχὴ) all but as one first God: but those others of them, who called it a third god, supposed a greater distinction betwixt those three hypostases, and made so many several gods of them; the first, a monad or simple goodness; the second, mind or intellect; the third, psyche or the universal soul, which also without any more ado they concluded to be the immediate soul of this corporeal world, existing likewise from eternity with it. Now, this second god, which was the whole animated world as well to the Egyptians as the Platonists, was by them both said to be, not only the temple and image, but also the son of the first God. That the Egyptians called the animated world the son of God, hath been already proved; and that the other Pagans did the like also, is evident from this of Celsus, where he pretends that the Christians called their Jesus, the Son of God, in imitation of those ancient Pagans, who had styled the world so:* Ὁπόθεν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐπῆλθεν αὐτοῖς, Θεοῦ υἱὸν καλεῖν, σημαίνω· Ἄνδρες παλαιοὶ, τόνδε δὲ τὸν κόσμον, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ γενόμενον, παῖδά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἠΐθεον προσεῖπον. Πάνυ γὰρ ὅμοιος οὗτός τε κἀκεῖνος παῖς Θεοῦ, "Whence these Christians came to call their Jesus, the Son of God, I shall now declare; namely, because our ancestors had called the world, as made by God, the son of God, and God. Now, is there not a goodly similitude (think you) betwixt these two sons of God, theirs and ours?" Upon which words of his, Origen writeth thus:† ᾠήθη δὲ υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἡμᾶς λέγειν, παραποιήσαντας τὰ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς ἐκ θεοῦ γενομένου, καὶ υἱοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ καὶ θεοῦ, "Celsus supposed us Christians to have borrowed this appellation of the son of God from the Pagans, they calling the world, as made by God, the son of God, and God." Wherefore, these Pagans, who looked upon the whole animated world only as the second god, and son of God, did unquestionably also worship the first God, in the world, and that probably by personating and deifying his several parts and members too. Thus do we understand what that was which gave occasion to this mistake of late writers, that the Pagans worshipped the inanimate parts of the world, as such, for true and proper gods; viz.,

* Orig. contra Cels. p. 308.
† Orig. contra Cels. 208.
[7] Contra Celsum, lib. 5. p. 235.

their not perceiving that they worshipped these only, as the parts or living members of one great mundane animal, which was to them, if not the first God, yet at least the second God; the temple, image and son of the first God.

And now have we, as we conceive, given a full account of the seeming polytheism of the Pagans, not only in their poetical and fabulous, but also their political or civil theology; the former of which was nothing but fancy and fiction, and the conforming of divine to human things; the latter nothing but vulgar opinion and error, together with the laws and institutes of statesmen and politicians, designed principally to amuse the vulgar, and keep them the better in obedience and subjection to civil laws. Besides which, the intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged *another theology*, which was neither fiction nor mere opinion and law, but nature and philosophy, or absolute truth and reality; according to which natural and philosophic theology of theirs, there was only one unmade self-originated Deity, and many other created gods, as his inferior ministers. So that those many poetical and political gods could not possibly be looked upon otherwise, than either as the created ministers of one supreme God, whether taken singly or collectively; or else as the polyonymy and various denomination of him, according to several notions and partial conceptions of him; and his several powers and manifestations of the world personated and deified. Which latter we have already proved to have been the most generally received opinion of the Pagan theologers; according to that of Euclides,[8] the philosopher, ἓν Τἀγαθὸν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον, "there is one supreme Good (or highest Deity) called by many names:" and, according to that of Antisthenes, before cited, "That the many popular gods were but one and the same natural God," viz. as Lactantius adds,[9] Summæ totius artifex, "The maker of the whole world."

We shall conclude with repeating what hath been already suggested, that though the intelligent Pagans did generally disclaim their fabulous theology, St. Austin telling us, that when the absurdities thereof were urged against them, they would commonly make such replies as these:† Absit, inquiunt, fabularum est ista garrulitas; and again, Rursus, inquiunt, ad fabulas redis, "Far be it from us (say they) to think so or so, this is nothing but the garrulity of idle fables," and, "You would bring us again to fables." And though they owned another theology besides their civil also, which was the natural and philosophical, as the only true; yet did they notwithstanding acknowledge a kind of necessity, that, in those times at least, there should be, besides the natural and philosophical theology, which the vulgar were not so

[8] Apud Diogenem Laërtium, lib. 2. segm. 106. p. 142.
[9] *Lib. 1. cap. 5.* † Civit. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 10. [P. 75.]

capable of, another theology framed and held forth, that might be more accommodate to their apprehensions. Thus that Roman pontifex Scævola, in St. Austin, declareth,[9] Expedire existimat, falli in religione civitates, "That it was expedient (as he thought) that cities and commonwealths should be deceived in their religion, or have something false or fabulous intermingled with it;" he giving this reason for the same, because the natural and philosophic theology contained many things in it, which, though true, yet would be hurtful for the vulgar to know; as for example: Quod verus Deus nec sexum habeat, nec ætatem, nec definita corporis membra, "That the true God, hath neither sex, nor age, nor bodily members; and that Hercules and Æsculapius, &c. were not gods, but men, obnoxious to the same infirmities with others;" and the like. And the learned Varro, in his book of religions,[10] publicly maintained the same doctine: Varro, de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse vera, quæ vulgo dire non sit utile; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter æstimare populum expediat: et ideò Græcos teletas et mysteria reticurnitate parietibusque clausisse, &c. "That there were many things true in religion, which it was not convenient for the vulgar to know; as likewise many things false, of which it was expedient they should think otherwise: and that for this cause, the Greeks enclosed their Teletæ or mysteries within walls, and kept them under a seal of secrecy." Upon which of Varro, St. Austin thus noteth: "Hîc certè totum consilium prodidit sapientium, per quos civitates et populi regerentur, "Varro here plainly discovers and betrays the whole counsel and secrecy of statesmen and politicians, by whom cities and nations were governed, and their very arcanum of government, namely this, That people were to be deceived in their religion, for their own good, and the good of their governors." The same father here adding, "That evil demons were much gratified with this doctrine, and liked this fraud and imposture very well, which gave them an advantage to rule and tyrannize, as well over the deceivers as the deceived." Lastly, Strabo also,[1] though otherwise a grave and sober writer, speaks freely and broadly to the same purpose: Οὐ γὰρ ὄχλόν τε γυναικῶν καὶ πάντος ἰδαίου πλήθους ἐπαγάγειν λόγῳ δυνατὸν φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ προσλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσέβειαν καὶ ὁσιότητα καὶ πίστιν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ δεισιδαιμονίας, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ μυθοποιΐας καὶ τερατείας, It is not possible that women and others of the vulgar sort

[9] De Civit. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 27. p. 84. tom. 7. opp.
[10] Apud Augustinum De Civit. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 31. p. 88. &c. But Varro did not, as Cudworth seems here to hint, write a specific book [On Religions. Whatever of it is met with in St. Augustine, on the subject of the gods and religions, is taken from his book of Antiquities.
[1] Geograph. lib. 1. p. 18.

should be conducted and carried on towards piety, holiness, and faith, merely by philosophic reason and truth; but this must be done by superstition, and that not without the help of fables and prodigious or wonderful narrations." From whence it is plain that Strabo did not only allow a necessity of a civil theology besides the natural and philosophical, but also of a fabulous and poetical one too. And this is a thing the less to be wondered at in these Pagans, because some Christians also seem to acknowledge a kind of truth therein; Synesius himself writing after this manner:[2] Τὸ δὲ ῥᾷστον καταγελάσεται ὁ

[2] In Encomio Calvitiei, p. 73. opp. ed Petavii. Synesius, as is evident from various passages of his works, was convinced that the ancient poets, and especially Homer, concealed the most important precepts under the fables which they recorded of the gods. Nay, he held the opinion common to the Platonists and Pythagoreans, in considering it to be admissible in a philosopher to delude the vulgar with lies, if necessary, and to keep the philosophic truth from their knowledge. It will not be inappropriate to quote a striking passage of his from the Epistol. 15. addressed to his brother, p. 249. Νοῦς μὲν οὖν φιλόσοφος, ἐποπτὴς ὢν τἀληθοῦς, συγχωρεῖ τῇ χρείᾳ τοῦ ψεύδεσθαι· ἀνάλογον γάρ ἐστι φῶς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ὄμμα πρὸς ὄμμα· ᾗ οὖν ὀφθαλμὸς εἰς κακὸν ἂν ἀπολαύσειεν ἀπλήστου φωτός, καὶ ᾗ τοῖς ὀφθαλμιῶσι τὸ σκότος ὀφελιμώτερον· ταύτῃ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὄφελος εἶναι τίθεμαι δήμῳ, καὶ βλαβερὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῖς οὐκ ἰσχύουσιν ἐνατένισαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐνάργειαν, "The philosophic mind, being the inspector of truth, yields to the necessity of lying. For light is analogous to truth and the eye to the common people. And as the eye cannot enjoy excess of light without injury to itself, and as darkness is better for those who are affected in the eyes, so I hold falsehood to be advantageous to the vulgar, and truth to be hurtful to those who are unable to look steadily into the clear light of things." Add his Epist. 142. to Herculanius, p. 279. whom he sharply rebukes for having incautiously made known certain philosophic doctrines to the common people, and most gravely warns him against divulging any mysteries of the kind for the future. Nevertheless, the learned Doctor does him injustice in supposing him to have countenanced this opinion as a Christian and a bishop. For Synesius says only that a philosopher may do so; but he expressly denies it to be allowable in a Christian teacher, and openly declares, even with the solemnity of an oath, that should he be created a bishop, he will by no means follow such a course. I shall quote his own words, from Epist. 105 p. 249. Καλούμενος δὲ εἰς ἱερωσύνην, οὐκ ἀξιῶ προσποιεῖν δόγματα· Ταῦτα Θεὸν, ταῦτα ἀνθρώπους μαρτύρομαι· Οἰκεῖον ἀλήθεια Θεῷ, ᾧ διὰ πάντων ἀναίτιος εἶναι βούλομαι, "But if called to the episcopal office, I am determined not to feign doctrines. To this I call God and men to witness. Truth is allied to God, before whom I wish to be ever free from blame." And a little afterwards: Δόγματα δὲ οὐκ ἀπηλυγάσομαι, οὐδὲ στασιάσει μοι πρὸς τὴν γλῶτταν ἡ γνώμη, "I will never conceal doctrines, neither shall my mind be at variance with my tongue." Therefore, though Synesius considered it not to be inconsistent with the character of a philosopher to deceive the people and delude them with fables, he held it to be altogether unworthy of the office of a Christian bishop. And, preeminent as he was for candour, I have no doubt that he adhered to his promises, and always freely expressed the sentiments of his mind. Not long ago indeed, J. Toland, a man whose moral perversity corresponded with the depravity of his doctrines, thought fit to call Synesius' faith in question, and to charge him with having violated this pledge: see his Clidophorus, or Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy, a dissertation occupying the second place in the book entitled Tetradymus, and published in London, 1720, in 8vo. p. 99. But all that he can bring forward in support of this accusation is, that there are certain traces in Synesius' epistles, which show him to have taken the greatest care lest certain philosophic precepts should come to the knowledge of the public. But this most superficial writer, who took upon himself to ridicule the Christian religion, did not perceive that Synesius distinguishes the doctrine of Christ from the philosophy to which he had been devoted, and wishes himself to be regarded in a two-fold light, as a philosopher and as a Christian teacher. He considered that the truths of Christianity ought

δῆμος, δεῖται γὰρ τερατείας, "That which is easy and ordinary will be contemned by the vulgar or common people; and therefore, there is need of something strange and prodigious in religion for them." Flavius Josephus,[3] making this free acknowledgment concerning the wise men among the Greeks: Ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι δοκοῦσι παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, "That they held the same things concerning God which the Jews did;" adds notwithstanding afterwards, Εἰς πλῆθος δόξαις προκατειλημμένον, τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ δόγματος ἐξενεγκεῖν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν, "That they were afraid to declare the truth of this their doctrine to the vulgar, prepossessed with other opinions." And indeed, they did not think it safe to declare the natural and true theology promiscuously to all; Plato* himself intimating as much in these words: Τὸν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ πάντος εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν, "That as it was hard to find out the maker of this universe, so neither, being found out, could he be declared to the vulgar."[4] Wherefore, since God was so

by no means to be concealed from the people, or the tongue of a bishop discoursing on sacred things be at variance with his real sentiments; but, on the other hand, he held that all the precepts of philosophy are not adapted for the vulgar, and that it is not incompatible with the character of a philosopher to keep some to themselves and their disciples alone, and to delude the people with figments. I speak not of its being uncertain, whether those epistles which Toland appeals to were written before or after he was appointed to the office of bishop. We ought to check, as far as truth will permit, the shameless temerity of those who, in these our own times, seek to injure the sacred cause of Christianity, by loading the ancient prelates with every species of abuse, and scruple not to represent them as crafty and dishonest, because, while confining certain dogmas within their own breasts, they propounded others to the people. I am not indeed so devoted an admirer of the authority of the early fathers, as to feel disposed to defend them, in opposition to truth and facts; but it is sufficient to rouse one's indignation, when men, sheer compounds as it were of vice themselves, fasten their foul calumnies upon those with whose opinions and doctrines they are in many instances almost wholly unacquainted.

[3] Contra Apionem, lib. 2. sect. 16. p. 482. tom. 2. ed Havercamp. But the learned Doctor does not give the words exactly as they stand in Josephus: Ταῦτα περὶ Θεοῦ φρονεῖν οἱ σοφώτατοι παρ' Ἕλλησιν ὅτι μὲν ἐδιδάχθησαν,——ἐῶ νῦν λέγειν, "I mention not at present that the wisest of the Greeks were taught this opinion respecting God (by Moses)." But this passage of Josephus proves nothing in the present question. For who would consider it as conclusive that Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras, and the rest of the principal philosophers, secretly agreed with the Jews, merely because it is so asserted by Josephus, who was himself a Jew, and is here speaking in praise of his own nation? What reply would Josephus have given, if any one had asked him, how he came to know, that Plato had been instructed by Moses, and secretly favoured the Jewish doctrines?

* In Timæo, cap. 13. p. 236. ed. Fabricii.

[4] Besides the passages here adduced, many others are to be met with in ancient authors, to the effect that the plain and simple truth cannot at all times be disclosed to the common people, but ought to be conveyed to them under the guise of fables and symbols. Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. lib. 5. cap 8. p. 671. tells us that this course was generally approved of by philosophers: Οὐ μόνον Αἰγύπτιοι οἱ λογικώτατοι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων ὅσοι φιλοσοφίας ὠρέχθησαν, τὸ συμβολικὸν εἶδος ἐζήλωσαν, "Not only the most intelligent Egyptians, but all those who were devoted to philosophy among the other barbarous nations, admired the symbolical mode of instruction." And to the same purport, Origen and the other ancient Christian fathers. Sallustius, in his book De Diis et Mundo, cap. 3. p. 246. in T. Gale's Scriptor. Mythologic. Τὸ μὲν πάντας τὴν περὶ Θεῶν ἀλήθειαν διδάσκειν ἐθέλειν,

hard to be understood, they conceived it necessary, that the vulgar should be permitted to worship him in his works, by parts and piece-meal, according to the various manifestations of himself; that is, should have a civil theology at least, distinct from the natural and philosophical, if not another fabulous one too.

τοῖς μὲν ἀνοήτοις, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι μανθάνειν, καταφρόνησιν, τοῖς δὲ σπουδαίοις ῥᾳθυμίαν ἐμποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ διὰ μύθων τάληθὲς ἐπικρύπτειν, τοὺς μὲν καταφρονεῖν οὐκ ἐᾷ, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀναγκάζει, "To attempt to teach all men the simple truth, in respect to the gods, would in the unintelligent, from their inability to learn, breed contempt, and in the studious, indolence: whereas, to disguise the truth in fables prevents the former from despising it, and compels the latter to philosophize." Phornutus, De Natura Deor. cap. 35. p. 235. *Οὕτω δὲ ἂν εἰδέναι καὶ τἄλλα τῶν μυθικῶς παραδεδόσθαι περὶ θεῶν δοκούντων ἀναγαγεῖν ———δύναιο, πεισθεὶς, ὅτι οὐχ οἱ τυχόντες ἐγένοντο οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνιέναι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἱκανοὶ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι,* "In this manner you will be able to refer to the truth all the other fabulous accounts handed down on the subject of the gods, being persuaded that the ancients were men of no ordinary wisdom, but able to understand the nature of the world, and happy in their mode of explaining it by means of symbols and figures." Dionysius Halicarnassus, or whatever other author it was, in his Vita Homeri, p. 323. ed. T. Gale: *Εἰ δὲ δι' αἰνιγμάτων καὶ μυθικῶν λόγων τινῶν ἐμφαίνεται τὰ νοήματα, οὐ χρὴ παράδοξον ἡγεῖσθαι,* "Moreover, that he (Homer) expresses his sentiments by figures and certain fabulous narratives, ought not to be deemed strange." *Τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον———τῶν ἀρχαίων ἦθος,* "For this custom of the ancients is the reason," *ὅπως οἱ ἀμαθεῖς μὴ καταφρονῶσι τούτων, ὧν οὐ δύνανται συνιέναι,* "why the ignorant do not despise those things which they cannot understand." And who has not heard of the symbols of Pythagoras, of the hieroglyphics of the Egyptians, and other things of the kind? To declare freely my own mind, however, I have ever entertained very strong doubts on the whole of this matter. I really admit that wise men formerly kept many doctrines to themselves, or taught them only to their more favoured disciples, to avoid provoking the fury of the superstitious multitude; I grant also that moral precepts were frequently put forth in the garb of fable, with the view of being more readily instilled into men's minds; and moreover, that some philosophers were continually repeating certain short and pithy sayings, in order to excite in their hearers the recollection of particular duties and doctrines, without a long circuit of words. But I can never bring myself to believe that any ancient philosopher was so besotted and insane as to impart to the people sound and noble precepts on God and divine things, clothed and disguised in ridiculous, obscene, and most absurd fables. In the first place, I question the authority of almost all the ancient writers who affirm this to have been the case, partly because they bring forward no argument in proof, partly because the very interpretations of these fables, which they foist upon their readers, are forced and admirably at variance with each other, and lastly, because I observe most of these authors to possess more ingenuity than judgment. I speak not of its having been manifestly the interest of almost all those who attributed so much recondite wisdom to the fables, that such should be the general belief, in order that they might the more easily confirm the doctrines which they themselves deemed true by the testimonies of the ancients, whose authority was always held in the very highest estimation. In the second place, I can see no reason why the ancients should have betaken themselves to this course. Wise men, we are told, were anxious to exclude the vulgar, rude and ignorant as it was for the most part, from the knowledge of divine truths, which require a mind already purified and polished by learning. On this account they used the disguise of fables, lest these mysteries should be divulged to the uninitiated. If this be true, then truly these ancient professors of wisdom must have been wonderfully clever and ingenious! They are unwilling that the people should become acquainted with these mysteries: whether wisely or otherwise, I shall not now inquire. But in order to obtain this end, they invent the most foolish and ridiculous fables, and in these, conceal what they consider to be the most important precepts: a course, in my opinion, the most absurd. It certainly would have been much better to have kept these doctrines altogether secret, especially as they were not at all

XXV. We have now dispatched the first of those three proposed to be insisted on, viz. that the Pagans worshipped nd the same supreme God, under many personal names, so nuch of their polytheism was but seeming and phantastical, ndeed nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, naking many poetical and political gods of that one natural and thus worshipping God by parts and piece-meal, ac- g to that clear acknowledgment of Maximus Madaurensis[5] cited: Unius summi Dei virtutes, per mundanum opus is, nos multis vocabulis invocamus; et dum ejus quasi m membra carptim variis supplicationibus prosequimur, colere videmur, "The virtues of the one supreme God d throughout the whole world, we (Pagans) invoke under several names; and so prosecuting, with our supplications, it were divided members, must needs be thought to worship hole, we leaving out nothing of him." We shall proceed

o communicate them, than to have imposed in this manner upon the mul- But first, these clever persons disclose in a certain way that which they wish to know, and which they had the power of keeping to themselves: secondly, stead of selecting honourable and beautiful images, they clothe it in the grossest t absurd fables, and subject themselves to the risk of having that brought to ich they wished to be unknown: and lastly, without the slightest reason, themselves as philosophers by contaminating the ignorant and innocent vulgar foulest errors. The man who wishes to keep all others in ignorance of philo- truths, which he himself has discovered with great labour, although he may nevertheless in some measure excusable: but he who without any necessity those whom he is desirous of excluding from his rites, and when he might en silent, fills them with impious doctrines, dangerous to the welfare of the d subversive of all virtue and morality, ought to be an object of detestation to men, and to be ignominiously expelled from the society of philosophers. Let erefore, who assert that the ancient sages veiled great and important truth in and fables, consider the light they are representing them in by ascribing to ch fallacies and impostures. But some one will object perhaps: What do you the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and the symbols of Pythagoras? Are not these hat there existed men who considered this mode of veiling the truths to be nd beneficial? To speak candidly, I think very little of either, and am not one who are eternally labouring to discover in them hidden treasures. The symbols agoras I hold to be proofs not of profound wisdom but of gross superstition in losopher. For example, he forbade his disciples to eat beans. This precept, standing all that may be said of its recondite sense by so many of the ancients derns, I accept without any interpretation; and that I am not wrong in doing an demonstrate, if necessary, by such arguments, drawn from the history of oras, as no impartial man will be disposed to impugn. But, when once Py- s had acquired a great reputation for learning and wisdom, his unthinking s easily suffered themselves to suppose that every sentence he uttered con- some recondite precept or other of wonderful importance. On the hieroglyphics Egyptians, I have already stated my opinion. Nor do I now abandon it. The n priests having accidentally discovered certain columns of a bygone age, with various figures and characters, and being ignorant of this mode of ancient rashly concluded, that the earliest inhabitants of Egypt had expressed all their and learning in those characters. Each therefore exercised his own genius in ting them, and conceived he would be acting wisely by following the same e, and making known his thoughts by signs and figures of his own. Consult arks professedly upon this subject above.

ud Augustinum Epist. 16. p. 15. tom. 2. opp.

to the second head proposed, that besides this polyonymy of one supreme God in the poetical and civil theology of the Pagans, which was their seeming and phantastic polytheism, they had another real polytheism also; they acknowledging in their natural and philosophic theology likewise a multiplicity of gods, that is, of substantial understanding beings, superior to men, really existing in the world. Which though they were called by them gods, yet were they not therefore supposed to be ἀγέννητοι and αὐτογενεῖς, "unmade and self-existent, or independent beings," but all of them (one only excepted) γεννητοὶ θεοί, "generated gods,"* according to the larger notion of that word before declared; that is, though not κατὰ χρόνον, yet at least, ἀπ' αἰτίας γεννητοί, though not as "made in time," yet as "produced from a superior cause."[6] Plutarch propounding this for one amongst his Platonic questions, why ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς, "the highest and supreme God," was called by Plato, both the father and maker of all things, gives this reply to it in the words before cited: Ἡ τῶν μὲν θεῶν τῶν γεννητῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πατήρ ἐστιν (ὡς Ὅμηρος ἐπονομάζει) ποιητὴς δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων καὶ ἀψύχων, "That perhaps he was said to be the father of all the generated gods and of men (as he is also styled in Homer) but the maker of all other irrational and inanimate beings." From which passage of Plutarch's it plainly appears, that the ὁ ἀνωτάτω Θεὸς, "the one highest God," being every way ἀγέννητος, "unmade" and "unproduced," was thought to be the maker or father of all the other gods, therefore called γεννητοὶ. Which is further plainly declared elsewhere by the same Plutarch in these words:† Πλάτωνος πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τε κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γεννητῶν τὸν ἀγεννητὸν καὶ ἀΐδιον Θεὸν ἐπονομάζοντος, "Plato calleth the one unmade and eternal God the father and maker of the world, and of all other things generated." And though some of those many gods of Plato's were by him also called ἀΐδιοι, or "eternal," yet were they likewise γεννητοὶ too, in another sense, that is, "produced" and "derived," by way of emanation, from that one, who is every way ἀγέννητος, "underived and independent upon any other cause," And thus Proclus universally pronounces:‡ Τὸ εἶναι θεοὺς πάντες οἱ θεοὶ διὰ τὸν πρῶτον ἔχουσι θεὸν, "All the gods owe their being gods to the first God," he adding, that he is therefore called πηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, "the fountain of the godhead."

Wherefore the "many gods" of the intelligent Pagans were

* P. 243, 254.

[6] Every one who has looked into either Plautus or Plotinus will be aware that the junior Platonists made this distinction between generation κατὰ χρόνον and generation ἀπ' αἰτίας. But that the same was observed by all the more intelligent of those who in a certain measure asserted a plurality of gods, as the learned Doctor seems to assume, is more I think than can be proved.

† Sympos. lib. 8. c. 1. [P. 718.] ‡ Theol. P. lib. 3. c. 7. [P. 132.]

derived from one God, and but ὑπουργοὶ δυνάμεις (as Plutarch somewhere calls them), "the subservient powers," or "ministers of the one supreme, unmade Deity." Which (as hath been before observed) was frequently called by these Pagans Θεὸς, "God," κατ' ἐξοχὴν, or in way of eminency; as likewise were those other inferior, or generated gods, in way of distinction from him, called θεοὶ, "the gods." And accordingly the sense of Celsus is thus represented in Origen:* Θεοὺς δημιουργοὺς εἶναι πάντων σωμάτων, μόνης ψυχῆς ἔργον οὔσης Θεοῦ, "That the gods were the makers of the bodies of all animals, the souls of them only being the work of god." Moreover, these inferior gods are styled by Ammianus Marcellinus,† substantiales potestates, "substantial powers," probably in way of distinction from those other pagan gods, that were not substantial, but only so many names and notions of the one supreme god, or his powers severally personated and deified, which substantial powers of Am. Marcellinus,[7] (as divination and prophecy was, by their means, imparted to men) were all said to be subject to that one sovereign Deity called Themis: whom (saith he) the ancient theologers seated in cubili et solio Jovis, "in the bed-chamber and throne of Jupiter;" as indeed some of the poets have made her to be the wife of Jupiter, and others his sister. And Anaxarchus‡ in Plutarch styles her πάρεδρον τοῦ Διὸς, "Jupiter's assessor," though that philosopher abused the fable, and grossly depraved the meaning of it, as if it signified πᾶν τὸ πραχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατοῦντος θέμιτον εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, "That whatsoever is

* Lib. 4. p. 200. † Lib. 22.

[7] Historiar. lib. 21. cap. 1. p. 263. Substantiales, says he, potestates ritu diverso placatæ, velut ex perpetuis sortium venis vaticinia mortalitati suppeditant, "The substantial powers appeased by different rites supply prophecies to mortals as if from perpetual fountains of oracles." Dr. Cudworth, however, appears to me to be guilty of two errors in interpreting this passage. I. He supposes the *substantial powers* to be so called by Ammianus, by way of distinguishing the really subsisting from the fictitious gods. This is a conjecture, resting upon no foundation. In this passage the substantial powers are no doubt those demons which the Platonists, whose doctrine Ammianus appears from various parts of his History to have favoured, supposed to preside over divination. On these gods or demons Jamblichus discourses at some length De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 3. cap. 11. p. 72. &c. But why Ammianus calls these demons substantial is as difficult to be understood as the whole of his style, which much perplexes readers by its harshness and obscurity. In lib. 14. cap. 11. p. 59. he calls Nemesis or Adrastea also substantialem tutelam, "substantial protection," which throws no greater light upon the signification of this word. I suspect Ammianus means by substantial powers those which are not bound to certain parts of the world, but wander about freely and subsist alone. For, like the Platonists, whose precepts he followed, he believed certain genii or demons to reside in the stars, elements, earth, fountains, and the like: according to him these powers were not substantial, since they had no substance of their own, but made use as it were of that of others. Whereas the substantial powers are those which subsist independently of any body of the kind. II. He tells us that Ammianus makes these powers subject to Themis as their sovereign deity. This, however, he states according to his own sense, and not upon the authority of Ammianus, with whom nothing of the kind is to be found.

‡ Vit. Alex. [P. 596. tom. 1. opp.]

done by the sovereign power, is therefore just and right:" whereas the true moral thereof was this, that justice or righteousness sits in council with God, and in his mind and will, prescribes laws to nature and the whole world. Themis therefore was another name of God, amongst the Pagans, according to his universal consideration, besides those before mentioned: and when Plato, in his book of laws,[8] would have men to swear by the names of those three gods, Jupiter, Apollo, and Themis;[*] these were but so many several partial notions of the one supreme Deity; the meaning thereof being no other than this, as Pighius observeth, Timore divino, veritate ipsa, ac æquitate sanciri debere juramenta. In Jove enim summi numinis potestatem, falsi ac perjurii vindicem; in Apolline veritatis lumen; in Themide, jus, fas, atque licitum esse intelligitur. Est enim Themis ipsa lex æterna atque universalis, mundo ac naturæ præscripta; or, according to Cicero, Ratio recta summi Jovis. And Ficinus, in his commentary as to the main agreeth herewith. So that, when the pagan theologers affirmed[9] the Numen of Themis to preside over the spirits of the elements, and all those other substantial powers, from whom divination was participated to men; their meaning therein was clearly no other than this; that there was one supreme Deity ruling over all the other gods, and that the divine mind, which prescribeth laws to nature and the whole world, and contains all the fatal decrees in it, according to the evolution of which things come to pass in the world, was the fountain from whence all divination proceeded; as these secrets were more or less imparted from thence to those inferior created spirits. The philosophy of the pagan theology amongst the Greeks was plainly no other than this; that there is one unmade self-existent Deity, the original of all, and that there are many other substantial powers or spirits, created by it, as the ministers of its providence in the world: but there was much of poetry, or poetic fancy, intermingled with this philosophy, as the flourish to it, to make up their pagan theology.

[8] Lib. 12. p. 685. opp. I am ignorant, however, where Dr. Cudworth discovered that the opinion here expressed was Plato's.

[*] De Dea Themide, p. 39.

[9] In writing this the learned Doctor had in his mind Ammianus alone, whose passage we have just been discussing. But as we remarked before, he is mistaken in stating that Ammianus speaks of the *spirits of the elements:* for Ammianus mentions only one spirit. Into the meaning of the fable concerning Themis I shall not at present inquire. Besides Alb. Pighius, whose book De Themide has been republished by J. Gronovius in his Antiquit. Græc. tom. 9. and the authors mentioned by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 1. cap. 35. p. 241. the celebrated Jo. Fred. Hombergk Zum Vach, in a specific work intitled Themis, seu de Ortu Legis Æternæ secundum Sententiam Græcorum, Magburg. 1725. 4. has displayed much learning in the attempt to develope the truths of this fable. I cannot but acknowledge, however, that the whole history of Themis and every thing recorded of this goddess seem to me to refute the opinion of those who conceive Themis to be the supreme Deity himself, or one of the names by which he was designated by the ancients.

Thus, as hath been before declared, the Pagans held both one God, and many gods, in different senses; one unmade self-existent Deity, and many generated or created gods; Onatus[10] the Pythagorean declaring, that they who asserted one only God, and not many, "understood not what the dignity and majesty of the divine transcendency consisted in, namely in ruling over gods;" and Plotinus[1] conceiving, that the supreme god was most of all glorified, not by being "contracted into one," but "by having multitudes of gods, derived from him, and dependent on him;" and that the honour done to them redounded unto him. Where there are two things to be distinguished; first, that, according to the pagan Theists, God was no solitary being; but that there were multitudes of gods, or substantial powers, and living understanding natures, superior to men, which were neither self-existent, nor yet generated out of matter, but all generated or created from one supreme. Secondly, that forasmuch as these were all supposed to have some influence, more or less, upon the government of the world, and the affairs of mankind, they were therefore all of them conceived to be the due objects of men's religious worship, adoration and invocation; and accordingly was the pagan devotion scattered amongst them all. Nor were the gods of the oriental Pagans neither mere dead statues and images, as some would conclude from the Scripture, but "living understanding beings, superior to men," (though worshipped in images) according to that reply of the Chaldeans, in Daniel to Nebuchadnezzar, when he required them to tell his dream, "There is none other, that can show this thing before the king, except those gods, whose dwelling is not with flesh;" that is, the immortal gods, or who are exalted above the condition of human frailty. Though some conceive,[2] that these words are to be understood of a peculiar sort of gods; namely, that this was such a thing, as could not be done by those demons and lower aërial gods, which frequently converse with men, but was reserved to a higher rank of gods, who are above human converse. Now, as to the former of these two things, that God is no solitary being, but that there are multitudes of understanding beings superior superior to men, the creatures and ministers of one supreme God; the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testaments fully agree with the Pagans herein: "Thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before

[10] Libro Περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ Θείου apud Stobæum in Eclogis Physic. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 4.

[1] I should like him to have pointed out the place where Plotinus has said so. Of all the passages in this author, which treat of the gods, I have not been able to meet with one entirely corresponding to the sentiment here given.

[2] The opinion here glanced at is that of Hugo Grotius, Comm. ad h. l. p. 412. ed. Paris. which I should not positively reject, although I consider the interpretation of those, who suppose the Magians to mean the gods generally, is equally probable.

him;"* and "Ye are come to an innumerable company of angels."† But the latter of them, that religious worship and invocation doth of right belong to these created spirits, is constantly denied and condemned in these writings, that being a thing peculiarly reserved to that one God, who was the creator of heaven and earth. And thus is that prophecy of Jeremy to be understood, expressed in the Chaldaic tongue, that so the Jews might have it in readiness for those Chaldean idolaters, when they came into Babylon: "Thus shall ye say unto them, the gods, that have not made the heavens and the earth, shall perish from the earth, and from under these heavens."‡ That is, there shall come a time when none shall be "religiously worshipped" any where upon the face of the whole earth, save only that God who made the heavens and the earth, and he without images too. Which prophecy, but in part yet fulfilled, shall then have its complete accomplishment, when the kingdoms of this world shall become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ.§ And thus is the controversy rightly stated betwixt the Pagans and the Christians by Lactantius:[3] Sed fortasse quærat aliquis à nobis, quod apud Ciceronem quærit Hortensius; Si Deus unus est, quæ esse beata solitudo queat? Tanquam nos, qui unum esse dicimus, desertum ac solitarium esse dicamus. Habet enim ministros, quos vocamus nuntios. Et est istud verum, quod dixisse Senecam suprà retuli; genuisse regni sui ministros Deum. Verùm hi neque dii sunt, neque deos se vocari aut coli volunt; quippe, qui nihil præter jussum ac voluntatem Dei faciant, "As if we who say, there is but one God, therefore made a solitary and deserted Deity. Whereas we acknowledge, that God hath his ministers, whom we call angels: and we grant that to be true, which was before cited out of Seneca, that God hath generated or created ministers of his kingdom. But these are neither gods, nor would they be called gods, nor worshipped; forasmuch as they only execute the will and command of God." And again afterwards to the same purpose: Si eos multitudo delectat, non duodecim dicimus, nec trecentos sexaginta quinque (ut Orpheus) sed innumerabiles, et arguimus eorum errores in diversum, qui tam paucos putant. Sciant tamen, quo nomine appellari debeant; nè Deum verum violent, cujus nomen exponunt, dum pluribus tribuunt, &c. "If multitude delight them, we say not, that there are twelve, nor yet three hundred and sixty-five, as Orpheus, but innumerable. And we tax their error, on the contrary, who think them to be so few. Nevertheless, let them know by what name they ought to be called, lest they violate the true God, whose

* Dan. vii. 10. † Heb. xii. 22.
‡ Jer. x. 11. § Rev. xi. 15.
[3] Instit. Divin. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 50. 51.

me is profaned when it is given to many." From which pas-
ges of Lactantius it plainly appeareth, that the main contro-
rsy between the Christians and the Pagans was then only
is, "Whether or no the created ministers of the supreme
od might be called gods, and religiously worshipped." But
is pagan objection against the solitary Deity of the Christians
by some ancient Christian writers also otherwise answered;
mely, from those three hypostases or persons of the trinity;
ey affirming upon that account, that though Christians did not
knowledge such a multitude of gods as the Pagans, yet did
ey not therefore make God a solitary and sterile being, before
e creation neither, as the Jews did; but went in a middle way
twixt Jews and Pagans, they interpreting Moses also his
ciamus hominem, to this sense.

XXXVI. We shall now show particularly what these many
ds of the Pagans were. It hath been often observed, that the
agans were divided in their philosophic or natural theology, as
their opinions concerning the supreme God; some of them
inking, τὸ Θεῖον ἐξῃρημένον εἶναι τῆς ὅλης φύσεως, "that the
preme Deity was an abstract being, elevated above nature and
e whole world;" but others, that he was nothing higher than
anima mundi, or "soul of the world." Now the former of
ese two were chiefly amongst the Greeks, the Pythagoreans
d the Platonists, who had accordingly several distinctions
nongst them concerning their gods, as between the ὑπερκόσμιοι
οὶ and the ἐγκόσμιοι, "the super-mundane and the mundane
ds;" the θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and the γεννητοὶ, the "eternal" and the
generated gods;" that word "latter" being now taken in a
rrower and more confined sense, for such as were made in
ne, or had a beginning of their existence: and lastly, the
ητοὶ θεοὶ and the αἰσθητοὶ, the "intelligible" and the "sen-
ble gods."[4] And the ὑπερκόσμιοι, ἀΐδιοι and νοητοὶ θεοὶ,
supermundane, eternal," and "intelligible gods," of these Py-
agoreans and Platonists, were first of all, and principally, those
εἷς ἀρχικαὶ ὑποστάσεις (as Plotinus calls them), those "three
vine hypostases," that have the nature of principles in the uni-
rse, viz. Tagathon or Hen, Nous and Psyche, or Monad, Mind
d Soul. That this trinity was not first of all a mere invention
Plato's, but much ancienter than him, is plainly affirmed by
lotinus in these words:* Καὶ εἶναι τοὺς λόγους τούσδε μὴ
ινοὺς, μὴ δὲ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι μὲν εἰρῆσθαι μὴ ἀνάπεπταμένως,
ὺς δὲ νῦν λόγους ἐξηγητὰς ἐκείνων γεγονέναι· μαρτυρίοις πιστω-
μένοις τὰς δόξας ταύτας παλαιὰς εἶναι, τοῖς αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος
ράμμασιν· ἥπτετο μὲν οὖν καὶ Παρμενίδης πρότερον τῆς τοιαύτης

[4] On all these gods of the junior Platonists no one will be consulted to greater ad-
ntage than Proclus in his Theologia Platonica.
* Ennead 5. lib. 1. [P. 489.]

δόξης, "That these doctrines are not new, nor of yesterday, but have been very anciently delivered, though obscurely (the discourses now extant being but explications of them) appears from Plato's own writings; Parmenides before him having insisted on them."

Now it is well known that Parmenides was addicted to the Pythagoric sect, and therefore probable that this doctrine of a divine triad was one of the arcanums of that school also. Which is further confirmed from hence, because Numenius a famous Pythagorean entertained it as such. And Moderatus (as Simplicius informeth us) plainly affirmeth this trinity of principles to have been a Pythagoric cabala:* Οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν Πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὄν καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ Δεύτερον ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ Τρίτον ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχικὸν, μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, "This (Moderatus) declareth that, according to the Pythagoreans, the first one or unity is above all essence; that the second one, which is that which truly is, and intelligible, according to them, is the ideas; and that the third, which is psychical or soul, partaketh both of the first unity, and of the ideas." Lastly, we have Jamblichus' testimony also in Proclus[§] to the same purpose: Τρεῖς εἶναι θεοὺς τούτους καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ὑμνουμένους, "That there were three gods also praised by the Pythagoreans." Now we have before showed that Pythagoras' philosophy was derived from the Orphic cabala, which Proclus in another place† thus fully testifieth: Ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ παρ' Ἕλλησι Θεολογία τῆς Ὀρφικῆς ἐστι μυσταγωγίας ἔκγονος· πρώτου μὲν Πυθαγόρου παρὰ Ἀγλαοφήμου τὰ περὶ θεῶν ὄργια διδαχθέντος· Δευτέρου δὲ Πλάτωνος ὑποδεξαμένου τὴν παντελῆ περὶ τούτων ἐπιστήμην ἔκ τε τῶν Πυθαγορείων καὶ Ὀρφικῶν γραμμάτων, "All the theology of the Greeks was derived from the Orphic Mystagogia; Pythagoras being first instructed by Aglaophemus in the Orphic Orgia, or mysteries concerning the gods; and Plato being the next who received a perfect knowledge of all these divine things, both out of the Pythagoric and the Orphic writings." And that a trinity was part of that Orphic cabala, we have already proved out of Amelius, he affirming (in Proclus) that Plato's three kings were the same with Orpheus' trinity of Phanes, Uranus, and Cronus. Moreover, since all these three, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Plato, travelling into Egypt, were there initiated in that arcane theology of the Egyptians (called Hermaical), it seemeth probable (as was before observed) that this doctrine of a divine triad was also part of the arcane theology of the Egyptians. It hath

* In Ar. Phys. p. 50.
§ Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 94.
† Theol. Plat. lib. 1. cap. 5. [P. 13.]

been also noted that there were some footsteps of such a trinity in the Mithraic mysteries amongst the Persians, derived from Zoroaster; as likewise that it was expressly contained in the magic or Chaldaic oracles, of whatsoever authority they may be. Moreover, it hath been signified that the Samothracians had very anciently a certain trinity of gods, that were the highest of all their gods, and that called by an Hebrew name too, Cabbirim, or the mighty gods: and that from thence the Roman Capitoline trinity of gods was derived; the second whereof was Minerva, which among the Latins, as Athena among the Greeks, was understood to signify the divine wisdom. Lastly, the ternary, or triad, was not only accounted a sacred number amongst the Pythagoreans, but also, as containing some mystery in nature, was therefore made use of by other Greeks and Pagans, in their religious rites; as Aristotle informeth us:* Διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εἰληφότες ὥσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἁγιστείας τῶν θεῶν χρώμεθα τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ, "Wherefore from nature, and as it were observing her laws, have we taken this number of three, making use of the same in the sacrifices of the gods, and other purifications."[6]

Now since it cannot well be conceived, how such a trinity of divine hypostases should be first discovered merely by human wit and reason, though there be nothing in it (if rightly understood) that is repugnant to reason; and since there are in the ancient writings of the Old Testament certain significations of a plurality in the Deity, or of more than one hypostasis, we may reasonably conclude that which Ploclus asserteth of this trinity, as it was contained in the Chaldaic Oracles, to be true, that it was at first θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, "a theology of divine tradition or revelation," or a divine cabala, viz. amongst the Hebrews first, and from them afterwards communicated to the Egyptians and other nations. Neither ought it be thought any considerable objection to the contrary because the Platonists, Pythagoreans, and other Pagan theologers, did not express this their trinity, in the very words of the Athanasian Creed, nor according to the form of the Nicene council. Forasmuch as this mystery was gradually imparted to the world, and that first but sparingly to

* De Cœlo, lib. 1. cap. 5. [Cap. 1. p. 610. tom. 1. opp.]

[6] On the Orphic, Persian, and Pythagoric trinity I have already said what will suffice to explain the nature of this subject. But such remarks as seem to me to be required by way of illustration or stricture upon the long and crudite digression here entered into on the Platonic trinity, I purpose bringing forward altogether in the Preface. For as our excellent author pays but little attention to arrangement, and frequently separates matters which it would have been better to discuss in connexion, I am afraid to follow his example, and to examine all his conclusions in parts, lest I should confuse and perplex my readers. I pass over other reasons, which lead me to consider it the preferable course to explain the whole of this disputation, which since Dr. Cudworth's time has given rise to various controversies, in continued and uninterrupted order.

the Hebrews themselves, either in their written or oral calaba; but afterwards more fully under Christianity, the whole frame whereof was built thereupon. Nevertheless was it not so distinctly and precisely determined, nor so punctually and scrupulously stated among the Christians neither, till after the rising up of heresies concerning it. Nor when all was done, did the orthodox themselves at first universally agree in the signification of the word Ὁμούσιος, "co-essential," or "consubstantial." Nor lastly, is it a thing at all to be wondered at, that in such a difficult and mysterious point as this, there should be some diversity of apprehensions amongst the reputed orthodox Christians themselves; and much less therefore amongst pagans and philosophers. However, we freely acknowledge, that as this divine cabala was but little understood by many of those who entertained it among the Pagans, so was it by divers of them much depraved and adulterated also.

For first, the Pagans universally called this their trinity, a trinity of gods, τὸν Πρῶτον, τὸν Δεύτερον, and τὸν Τρίτον θεόν, "the first, the second," and "the third god;" as the more philosophical amongst them called it also a trinity of causes, and a trinity of principles, and sometimes a trinity of opificers. Thus is this cabala of the trinity styled in Proclus, ἡ τῶν Τριῶν θεῶν παράδοσις, "the tradition of the three gods." And accordingly is it said of Numenius by him, that τρεῖς ἀνυμνήσας θεοὺς, he did τραγῳδῶν καλεῖν, πάππον, ἔγγονον, ἀπόγονον, "having the three gods, tragically or affectedly called them the grandfather, the son, and the nephew;" Numenius thereby intimating that as the second of these gods was the offspring of the first god, so the third, called the nephew of the first, was derived both from him and from the second; from the first as the grandfather, and from the second, as the father of him. Harpocration likewise, Atticus, and Amelius, are said by Proclus to have entertained this same cabala or tradition of the three gods, the latter of these styling them βασιλέας τρεῖς, and τριττὸν δημιουργόν, "three kings," and "three opificers," or makers of the whole world. In like manner Plotinus, speaking of the second of these three hypostases (that is, νοῦς, "the first mind" or "intellect"), calls him δεύτερον Θεὸν, "the second god:"† Καὶ Θεὸς αὕτη ἡ φύσις, καὶ Θεὸς Δεύτερος, προφαίνων ἑαυτὸν, πρὶν ὁρᾶν ἐκεῖνον· ὁ δὲ ὑπερκάθηται καὶ ὑπερίδρυται ἐπὶ καλῆς οὕτως οἷον κρηπῖδος, ἣ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐξήρτηται· ἔδει γὰρ ἐκεῖνον βαίνοντα μὴ ἐπ' ἀψύχου τινὸς, μὴ δ' αὖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς εὐθὺς βεβηκέναι, ἀλλ' εἶναι αὐτῷ κάλλος ἀμήχανον πρὸ αὐτοῦ προϊόν, "And this nature is God, I say a second God, offering himself to view, before that other god can be seen, who is seated above, this being as it were

* In Timæum Plat. p. 93. † Ibid. ‡ Ennead 5. lib. 5. cap. 3. [P. 522.]

the glorious throne of him. For it is not fit that he should be immediately seated in any that is inanimate; nor in mere soul neither, but that there should be such an immense pulchritude and splendour shining before him, like the pomp and procession before the great king." He also elsewhere mentions all these three gods together, making this world to be an image of them all:* *Εἰκότως οὖν λέγεται οὗτος ὁ κόσμος εἰκὼν ἀεὶ εἰκονιζόμενος· ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ δευτέρου, τοῦ δὲ τρίτου, ἑστηκότος μὲν καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ, καὶ κατὰ συμβέβηκος κινουμένου,* "Wherefore this world may well be called an image, it depending upon that above (as an image in a glass), which is threefold. Whereof the first and second God always stand immoveably; the third likewise is in itself stable too, but accidentally moved by reason of the mobility of matter and things below it." And that we may here give a taste of the mystical theology and enthusiasm of these Platonists too, Porphyrius in his life of Plotinus[7] affirmeth, that both Plotinus and himself had sometimes experience of a kind of ecstatic union with the first of these three gods, that which is above mind and understanding: *Πολλάκις ἐνάγοντι ἑαυτὸν εἰς τὸν πρῶτον καὶ ἐπέκεινα θεὸν ταῖς ἐννοίαις, ἐφάνη ἐκεῖνος ὁ μήτε μορφὴν, μήτε τινα ἰδέαν ἔχων, ὑπὲρ δὲ νοῦν καὶ πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν ἱδρυμένος· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ Πορφύριος ἅπαξ λέγω πλησιάσαι καὶ ἑνωθῆναι,* "Plotinus often endeavouring to raise up his mind to the first and highest God, that God sometimes appeared to him, who hath neither form nor idea, but is placed above intellect, and all that is intelligible; to whom I Porphyrius affirm myself to have been once united in the sixty-eighth year of my age." And again afterwards: *Τέλος αὐτῷ καὶ σκοπὸς ἦν, τὸ ἑνωθῆναι καὶ πελάσαι τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεῷ, ἔτυχε δὲ τετράκις που, ὅτε συνήμην αὐτῷ, τοῦ σκοποῦ τούτου,* "Plotinus' chief aim and scope was, to be united to, and conjoined with the supreme God, who is above all; which scope he attained unto four several times, whilst myself was with him, by a certain ineffable energy." That is, Plotinus aimed at such a kind of rapturous and ecstatic union with the *Τὸ ἓν*, and *Τἀγαθὸν*, "the first of the three highest gods" (called the one and the good), as by himself is described towards the latter end of this last book,[8] where he calls it *ἐπαφὴν*, and *παρουσίαν ἐπιστήμης κρείττονα*, and *τὸ ἑαυτῶν κέντρον τῷ οἷον πάν.ων κέντρῳ συνάπτειν*, "a kind of tactual union," and "a certain presence better

* Ennead 2. lib. 3. cap. 18. [P. 148.]

[7] Cap. 23. p. 137. in Joh. Alb. Fabricii Biblioth. Græc. lib. 4. cap. 26. In this passage Dr. Cudworth has thought proper to omit some words, as not bearing upon the subject. Something similar to this is stated of Jamblichus by Eunapius in his Vitæ Sophistar. p. 23, and of Proclus by Marinus in his Vita Procli, cap 23. p. 26, 27. The truth is, the whole of the Platonic school delighted in the marvellous, and far surpassed any old woman in credulity.

[8] De Bono vel Uno, Ennead 6. lib. 19. cap. 10. p. 772.

than knowledge," and "the joining of our own centre, as it were, with the centre of the universe." Thus we see, that the Platonic trinity is a trinity of gods, of which three gods therefore, the second and the third must of necessity be inferior gods, because otherwise they would be three independent gods; whereas the pagan theology expressly disclaims a plurality of independent and self-originated deities.

But since, according to the principles of Christianity, which was partly designed to oppose and bear down the pagan polytheism, there is one only God to be acknowledged; the meaning whereof notwithstanding seems to be chiefly directed against the deifying of created beings, or giving religious worship to any, besides the uncreated, and the creator of all: moreover, since in the scripture, which is the only true rule and measure of this divine cabala of the trinity, though the λόγος, or word, be said to have been with God (that is, God the father), and also itself to be God (that is, not a creature), yet is it nowhere called another, or second god. Therefore cannot we Christians entertain this pagan language of a trinity of Gods, but must call it either a trinity of divine hypostases, or subsistencies, or persons, or the like. Nevertheless it is observable, that Philo,[9] though, according to his Jewish principles, he was a zealous opposer of the pagan polytheism and idolatry, yet did he not, for all that, scruple to call the Θεῖον Λόγον, "the divine Word," after the Platonic way, Δεύτερον Θεὸν, "a second God;" as not suspecting this to clash with the principles of his religion, or that second commandment of the decalogue, "Thou shalt have no other gods before my face;" possibly because he conceived that this was to be understood of creature-gods only: whereas his second

[9] The passage of Philo here meant is doubtless the one extracted from his first book of Questions and Solutions by Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 323, Διατί ὡς περὶ ἑτέρου θεοῦ φησι τὸ, ἐν εἰκόνι θεοῦ ἐποίησα τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ; παγκαλῶς καὶ σοφῶς τουτὶ κεχρησμῴδηται· θνητὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐδύνατο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν, ὃς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος, "Why as if speaking of another god does he say, 'I have made man in the image of God,' and not in his own? This is beautifully and wisely proclaimed by the divine oracle. For no mortal can be made in the likeness of the supreme God and Father of all things, but of the second God, who is his Word." Now nothing can be more vain and contemptible than such subtlety in his attempting to interpret the divine writer, Moses, upon Platonic principles, with which he was wholly imbued With this may be compared another passage from the same author, De Somniis a Deo Missis, p. 494, in which he in like manner calls the *divine word* God, but only τῇ καταχρήσει, or by an abuse of terms: Καλεῖ δὲ, he adds, θεὸν τὸν πρεσβύτατον αὐτοῦ νυνὶ λόγον, οὐ δεισιδαιμονῶν περὶ τὴν θέσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων, "But he (Moses) calls his most ancient word God, being not scrupulous about the application of names." This passage would in a certain measure excuse Philo, whom Dr. Cudworth here not undeservedly censures. For it shows him to have used the word God in a very qualified sense, when he referred it to any other nature besides the one supreme God worshipped by the Jews, and in short to have confessed that according to its strict and proper meaning it is by no means applicable to what he calls the word. But of this argument, and of Philo's opinion respecting God, we shall speak more fully by and by.

God, the divine Λόγος or "Word," is declared by him to be ἀΐδιος, "eternal," and therefore, according to the Jewish theology, uncreated. However, this language of a second and third god is not so excusable in a Jew, as it might be in a Pagan; because the Pagans, according to the principles of their religion, were so far from having any scrupulosity against a plurality of gods (so long as there was only one fountain of the godhead acknowledged), that they rather accounted it an honour to the supreme God, as hath been already showed, that he should have many other, not only titular gods under him, but also such as were religiously worshipped: wherefore, besides this second and third god, they also did luxuriate in their other many creature-gods. And indeed St. Austin doth upon this account seem somewhat to excuse the Pagans for this their trinity of gods, and principles, in these words:* Liberis enim verbis loquuntur philosophi, nec in rebus ad intelligendum difficillimis offensionem religiosarum aurium pertimescunt. Nobis autem ad certam regulam loqui fas est, ne verborum licentia, etiam in rebus, quæ in his significantur, impiam gignat opinionem. Nos autem non dicimus duo vel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur; sicut nec duos deos vel tres, nobis licitum est dicere, quamvis de unoquoque loquentes, vel de Filio, vel de Spiritu Sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse fateamur, "The philosophers use free language; nor in these things, which are extremely difficult to be understood, did they at all fear the offending of any religious and scrupulous ears. But the case is otherwise with us Christians; for we are tied up to phrases, and ought to speak according to a certain rule, lest the licentious use of words should beget a wicked opinion in any concerning those things that are signified by them." That is, though this might be in a manner excusable in the Pagans, because each of those three hypostases is God, therefore to call them severally gods, and all of them a trinity of gods, and principles; they having no such rule then given them to govern their language by as this, "That though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet are they not three Gods, but one God:" yet is not this allowable for us Christians, to speak of a second or third God or principle, or to call the Holy Trinity a Trinity of Gods, notwithstanding that when we speak of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost severally, we confess each of them to be God.

And indeed when the Pagans thus spake of a first, second and third God, and no more, though having innumerable other gods besides, they did, by this language, plainly imply, that these three Gods of theirs were of a very different kind from all the

* De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap. 23.

rest of their gods; that is, not θεοὶ γεννητοί, but ἀΐδιοι, not "created," but "eternal" and "uncreated ones." And that many of them did really take this whole trinity of Gods for the τὸ Θεῖον in general, the "divine Numen," and sometimes call it the first God too, in way of distinction from their generated gods, will be showed afterward. So that the Πρῶτος Θεὸς, "the first God," was used in different senses by these Pagans, sometimes in a larger sense, and in way of opposition to all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, the "generated" or "created gods," or the gods that were made in time, together with the world; and sometimes again, more particularly, in way of distinction from those two other divine hypostases eternal, called by them the second and third God. Which first of the three Gods is also frequently by them called Θεὸς, "God," emphatically and by way of excellency, they supposing a gradual subordination in these principles.

Neither was this trinity of divine substances only thus ill-languaged by the Pagans generally, when they called it a trinity of Gods; but also the cabala thereof was otherwise much depraved and adulterated by several of the Platonists and Pythagoreans. For first, the third of these three hypostases, commonly called "Psyche," is by some of them made to be ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, "the immediate soul of the corporeal world," informing, acting and enlivening it, after the same manner as the souls of other animals do their respective bodies; insomuch that this corporeal world itself, as together with its soul it makes up one complete animal, was frequently called the third God. This Proclus[10] affirmeth of Numenius the Pythagorean: Ὁ γὰρ κόσμος κατ' αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεὸς, "That the world, according to him, was the third god." And Plotinus, being a great reader of this Numenius, seems to have been somewhat infected by him with this conceit also, though contrary to his own principles, from those words before cited out of him:[1] Ὁ κόσμος θεὸς, ὥσπερ συνηθὲς λέγειν, τρίτος, "The world, as is commonly said, is the third god."

Now, if the world be not a creature, then is there no created being at all, but all is God. But not only Timæus Locrus, but also Plato himself calls it θεῖον γεννητὸν, that is, "a created god," the word γεννητὸν being here put for that which, after it once was not, is brought into being; which is the proper notion of a creature. So that the animated world is, by Plato, made to be only the chief all the γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, that is, the "creature-gods." Wherefore it is plain, that in this trinity of some Platonists and Pythagoreans, wherein the world is made to be the third god, there is a confused jumble of created and uncreated beings together. For the first of those Gods is the father and fountain

[10] Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 93.

[1] This is a mistake, for Dr. Cudworth had not cited these words before, but they are to be found in Plotinus, Ennead 3. lib. 5. cap. 6. p. 296.

of all, or the original of the Godhead. And the second, forasmuch as he is called by them, both ποιητὴς and δημιουργὸς, "the maker" and "the opificer of the whole world," he therefore can be no creature neither: whereas the third, which is said to be the world, was by Numenius himself also expressly called, both ποίημα and τὸ δημιουργούμενον, "the work," or "thing made," that is plainly, the creature of both the former. Proclus[2] thus fully represents his sense: Πατέρα μὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίημα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὥστε ὁ κατ' αὐτὸν δημιουργὸς διττὸς, ὅ τε πρῶτος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος θεὸς, τὸ δὲ δημιουργούμενον ὁ τρίτος, "Numenius called the first of the three Gods the father, the second of them the maker, and the third the work, or thing made: so that, according to Numenius, there were two opificers or creators of the world, the first and the second God; and the world itself (that is, the thing made and created by them both) is said to be the third god."

And that this notion of the trinity is an adulterated one, may be also further concluded from hence, because, according to this hypothesis, they might have said, that there were three hundred and more gods, as well as that there are three; since all the other γεννητοὶ θεοὶ, "generated gods," might have come into the number too, as well as the world, they being parts thereof, and gods that differ not in kind from it, but only in degree. Wherefore these philosophers ought not to have made a trinity of gods, distinguished from all the rest, but rather first to have distributed their gods into θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι and γεννητοὶ, that is, "eternal" or "uncreated," and "created gods," and then to have subdivided those created gods into the whole world, and the parts thereof animated.

But because it may be here alleged in favour of this spurious hypothesis of the trinity, that the world was accounted the third god, only by accident, in respect of its soul, which is properly the third god; though Numenius, with others, plainly affirm the world itself, as ποίημα and δημιουργούμενον, as the "work" or "thing" made, to be the third: we shall therefore reply to this, that even the soul of the mundane animal itself, according to Timæus, and Plato and others, is affirmed to be γεννητὸς θεὸς, "a generated god," that is, such as was produced from non-existence into being, and therefore truly and properly a creature. Which Aristotle[3] observing, therefore took occasion to tax Plato as contradicting himself, in making the soul of the world a principle, that is, the third god, and yet supposing it to be ὕστερον καὶ ἅμα τῷ οὐρανῷ, "not eternal, but made or created together with the heaven," of which something before.

[2] Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 2. p. 93.

[3] See his Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 298. tom. 4. opp. Auscult. Physic. lib. 3. cap. 1. p. 578. tom. 1. opp.

Wherefore we conclude, that this ancient cabala of the Trinity was depraved and adulterated by those Platonists and Pythagoreans, who made either the world itself, or else ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, "an informing soul of the world," to be the third hypostasis thereof, they mingling created and uncreated beings together, in that which themselves, notwithstanding, call a trinity of causes and of principles.

And we think it highly probable that this was the true reason why Philo, though he admitted the second hypostasis of the Platonic and Pythagoric (if not the Egyptian) Trinity, called by him θεῖος Λόγος, "the divine Word," and styled δεύτερος Θεὸς, "the second God;" and as Eusebius[4] adds, δεύτερον αἴτιον, "the second cause;" yet he would not Platonize or Pythagorize any further, so as to take in that third god, or cause, supposed by many of them to be the soul of the whole world, as an animal; because he must then have offered violence to the principles of his own religion, in making the whole created world a god; which practice is, by him, condemned in the Pagans.[5] It is true, that he somewhere[6] sticks not to call God also the soul of the world, as well as the mind thereof, whether he meant thereby τὸν πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου Θεὸν, "that God, who is before the Word," or else rather the "Word" itself, the second God (according to him the immediate Creator and Governor of the same); nevertheless, he does not seem to understand thereby such a deeply immersed soul, as would make the world an animal, and a god, but a more elevated one; that is, ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, "a supermundane soul.[7]

[4] Cap. 13. lib. 7. Præparat. Evangel. Eusebii is thus inscribed: Φίλωνος περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου αἴτιου; which title Dr. Cudworth was thinking of when he wrote this: for in no other place does Eusebius either himself say or prove by any passage of Philo's that the Word was called by this Jewish philosopher δεύτερον αἴτιον.

[5] I should here recommend my readers to consult Philo's book De Abrahamo, p. 360. where he argues against those who supposed the world to be the supreme God, and declares it to be the work of God.

[6] I have been unable to find any other passage in Philo at all applicable to this place, except the following, which occurs in his Allegor. Legis, p. 57: Οἱ γὰρ τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἴσασι, πῶς ἂν περὶ τῶν ὅλων ψυχῆς ἀκριβώσαιν; ἡ γὰρ τῶν ὅλων ψυχὴ Θεός ἐστι κατὰ ἔννοιαν, "How can those who are ignorant of the essence of their own soul, have any accurate knowledge of the soul of the universe? For the soul of the universe is understood as God." Compare, however, his De Opificio Mundi, p. 2.

[7] Long and most weighty are the controversies of learned men on the religion and theological opinions of Philo: on which the subject itself seems to require that we should here offer a few comments. Before doing so, however, I should wish all my readers to bear in mind, that the question is not about the truth itself or what it is right and proper to believe, but merely about the doctrine of Philo, a Jew and tinctured with principles most foreign to the Jewish religion: which, if false and foolish, cannot at all detract from the truth itself, as this rests not on the opinions of men, but solely upon the divine authority. If the trinity professed by Philo be altogether different from that which Christians have received from the lips of our blessed Saviour, the utmost that the Socinians, and the other adversaries of this most holy doctrine can infer from it is, that there was a Jew about the time of Christ, who does not admit of being classed among the professors of Christianity. Should they go farther, as many

To this first depravation of that θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, that "theology of divine tradition," and ancient cabala of the Trinity, by many of the Platonists and Pythagoreans, may be

of them I know have done, and argue from the opinions of Philo, that the ancient Jews were utterly ignorant of our doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, they would be deserving of the ridicule of all sensible men. For to form a judgment of the sentiments of an entire nation from the conceits and fancies of one man, who was besides tinctured with many other dogmas of his own, is just as wise as the attempt to ascertain the condition and strength of a whole army from the armour and physical powers of an individual soldier. In every sect there are men who either disregard the precepts and doctrines of the community which they wish to be members of, or accommodate them to opinions hastily adopted from others and to the idle fictions of their own minds.

I shall first speak of the philosophy of Philo, and then come to his doctrine of the three principles of things or God. The generality of ancient authors consider Philo to have been a Platonist, or imbued at least with a considerable portion of the doctrines formerly taught by Plato to his followers. Consult Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 1. De Trinit. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 13. Joh. Jonsius, De Scriptorib. Histor. Philos. lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 14. and Joh. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 4. cap. 4. p. 104. 105. and in a specific treatise, De Platonismo Philonis, Lips. 1693. 4. Jonsius in particular denies this, and supposes Philo to have been devoted rather to that philosophy which was then in vogue among the Jews: to whose opinion J. Fr. Buddeus, Intro. in Histor. Philos. Ebraeor. sect. 32. p. 216. was formerly not unfavourable. But Fabricius, in the treatise abovementioned, opposes Jonsius. Afterwards, when certain eminent and right-thinking men perceived that the enemies of the doctrine of the Trinity perverted the Platonism of Philo to the disparagement of this doctrine, as though it were Platonic or allied to Platonic principles, they adopted the same opinion. Among these may be mentioned Pet. Allix in his Judgment of the Jewish Church against the Unitarians, cap. 23. p. 354. &c. who contends that Philo was an Eclectic of the school of Potamon; as indeed had the erudite author of the Preface prefixed to the Geneva edition of Philo's works, 1613. fol. also Jo. Van der Wayen, in a specific Dissertation de Λόγῳ, written in reply to J. Le Clerc, and prefixed to Steph. Rittangius's Bilibra Veritatis Francek 1693. in 8vo. p. 39. 54. 74. These roused Le Clerc to set about in good earnest to prove that Philo was clearly imbued with Platonic principles, Epistolæ Critic. ep. 8. p. 210. For my own part, I consider the learned men who have taken a part in this dispute are less at issue with each other than they themselves suppose. In the first place, no man who has read Philo with an impartial mind can be ignorant, that a sort of philosophy predominates in his writings, of which not the slightest vestige can be found in the books of the Old Testament, and that this Jew did not scruple to interpret and explain either the facts or the sayings recorded in the divine writer Moses according to the laws of this philosophy. Indeed, he must be altogether devoid of liberality and candour who would deny this, and maintain that all Philo's opinions were derived from Moses and the sacred volumes of the Hebrews. It remains, therefore, to inquire, under what name this philosophy is to be designated. That Philo was himself the author and inventor of it, is not to be supposed for a moment. For he neither founded any sect whatever, nor in my opinion possessed such powers of intellect as to be able to reject the theories of other philosophers, and to strike out a new and hitherto untrodden path for himself. Besides, most of his precepts are approved of by others also, whose writings have come down to us, and who unquestionably never read Philo, much less made him their master and instructor. It is clear, therefore, that he adopted the philosophy which at that time flourished at Alexandria, either universally or at least among the Jews. And what was the nature of this? The eminent men before spoken of maintain that it was the Platonic; and not without reason, for the primary and fundamental doctrines of Plato are expressly put forth in this writer, as Le Clerc and Petavius have shown by numerous examples. Those who think otherwise observe that Plato is never quoted by Philo as the founder of his tenets, and that Plato's philosophy cannot well be compounded and associated with the Jewish religion; and lastly, that Plato is sometimes refuted by Philo. See Pet. Allix, ibid. p. 355. The first of these objections falls to the ground of itself, if we consider that Philo was a Jew and belonged to a nation who made it their common boast that all the wisdom of the Greeks, and especially of Plato,

added another, that some of them declaring the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the archetypal world, or τὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν παγέντα κόσμον, as Philo calls it,[8] "the world that is compounded

was borrowed fron Moses. Philo's object was to interpret Moses agreeably to the laws of his own philosophy, and to discover in the divine writer the Platonic doctrines to which he was devoted: which he every where does too. It would have been madness in him, therefore, to have confirmed his own opinions by the authority of Plato, whom he considered to owe the more excellent portion of his doctrines to Moses. The two last are of no weight against those who suppose Philo to have been a Platonist, since they refute an opinion to which these are altogether opposed. If the learned men who think Philo was devoted to Platonism were to assert that he received all his philosophy from Plato, these two objections might in that case be most justly urged against them: namely, that the religion of the Jews can in nowise be combined with the Platonic philosophy, and that Philo sometimes openly rejected Plato's dogmas. But not one of them that I know of has done so. The whole of their opinion amounts merely to this, that Philo favoured Plato as far as the Jewish religion professed by him would permit, and did all in his power to make Moses and this religion which rests upon the authority of Moses appear to agree and harmonize with the principal doctrines of Plato. Some other arguments of those who deny Philo to have been a Platonist, as being comparatively of very little force, I shall pass over without notice.

It cannot be denied, however, that there are some dogmas in Philo which are not to be met with in Plato, and some also which are wholly irreconcileable with the tenor of his philosophy. And these, together with others, no doubt led learned men to suppose Philo to have been an Eclectic rather than a Platonist. Pet. Allix, Judgment of the Jewish Church against the Platonists, cap. 23. p. 357. not only strenuously maintains this, but also, to give a greater show of probability, concocts an entirely new theory respecting the age of Potamon, the founder of the Eclectic philosophy; which the learned men who in our own times have written of Potamon and his period, G. Olearius, Jac. Hasæus, and Christ. Aug. Heumann, have not touched upon. The Eclectic philosophy, and its founder Potamon, existed, he tells us, in the time of Plato. Which opinion being at variance with the passage of Suidas, which declares this man to have taught in the reign of the emperor Augustus, Lexicon v. Potamon, Allix takes upon himself to assert that the Augustus mentioned by Suidas is Alexander the Great. So much can the minds of the most learned men be influenced by the force of opinions which they are over desirous of being true. Diogenes Laërtius alone sufficiently refutes this opinion, who records that the Eclectic sect started up a little before his own time, πρὸ ὀλίγου, Procem. de Vitis Philos. sect. 21. With respect to the opinion itself, for the sake of which Allix hazarded this conjecture, there is no reason, that I can see, why those who hold Philo to have been a Platonist should have any material objection to it. For, in the first place, there is nothing to hinder one from calling a Jew who mingled the Platonic philosophy with the precepts of his own religion, in a certain sense an Eclectic. Again, that the junior Platonists and the sect called Eclectic or Potamonic differed in nothing but the name, is well known, and has been demonstrated by me in the Diss. de Turbata a Recentioribus Platonicis Ecclesia, sect. 2. 3. &c. The Eclectics preferred Plato to all other philosophers, and maintained his opinions to be more acute and sagacious than those of any one else on the subject of God and incorporeal things: on which account they by no means refused the name of Platonists. But they were not so devoted to Plato as to consider that his dogmas were in no instance to be departed from or corrected and amplified, and that all the other philosophers were to be disregarded. On they contrary, they selected from all the sects what they conceived to be the best parts, and endeavoured to amalgamate them with the precepts of Plato. And for this reason they wished to be called Eclectics, that they might be distinguished from the rest of philosophers who followed only one leader and despised all the others. Although Philo therefore may have been an Eclectic, he will not on that account cease to be a Platonist. In the same way, I conceive, we may reconcile those, who suppose Philo to have devoted himself to the philosophy of the Hebrews, with the others, who hold him to have maintained Platonic principles. Philo

[8] De Opificio Mundi, p. 4.

and made up of ideas," and containeth in it all kinds of things intelligibly, that are in this lower world sensibly; and further concluding, that all these several ideas of this archetypal and

no doubt adopted the doctrine which was professed by those Jews who at that time inhabited Alexandria. But who is not aware that, long before the birth of our Saviour, these Alexandrine Jews had suffered themselves to be imbued with the precepts which were taught at Alexandria in the schools of the philosophers? Which precepts being either altogether Platonic, or very closely allied to the Platonic, as is testified even by the books usually termed Apocryphal, it is self evident that it can make very little difference whether Philo be supposed to have philosophized after the manner of Plato or of the Alexandrine Jews. Wherefore, to put an end to the whole dispute on the philosophy of Philo, I think we ought to conclude as follows: That Philo, like the rest of the Jews, had adopted the doctrine which was inculcated at that time by the generality of the Alexandrine philosophers: but that this doctrine agreed for the most part with the principles of Plato, although it was mixed up with some other dogmas probably derived from oriental sources, of which at least no explicit mention is to be found in Plato: and yet that Philo was not exclusively devoted to this philosophy, but did all in his power to accommodate it to the law and religion of the Jews.

Enough has been said on Philo's philosophy: let us now proceed to explain, as far as his obscurity will permit, the sentiments entertained by him on the nature and virtues of God. Being a Jew he most unquestionably professed one God, and could admit of nothing repugnant to this doctrine. But still he every where speaks of three natures or divine principles, and associates two virtues with the supreme Being. It becomes, therefore, the chief point of dispute, what were these three principles of Philo, and in what sense he wished this doctrine of his to be understood. And here I observe three opinions in particular to be maintained among those who have taken a part in the debate upon this question. Some of the early fathers of the Christian church entertained no doubt of Philo's having taught the very same as Christians on the subject of one God and of three persons in one divine nature, and of his having derived this doctrine from the books of the Old Testament and the traditions of his ancestors. So especially Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 322. and lib. 11. cap. 15. p. 533. with whom may be joined Isidorus Pelusiota, Epistol. lib. 2. ep. 143. p. 188. who, however, is a little more cautious than Eusebius and acknowledges that Philo in a certain measure adulterated the truth. Of the moderns, many have adopted this opinion, supposing that the Socinians and Jews might be more easily refuted, if it could be shown that the most eminent of the Jews, previously to the introduction of Christianity, entertained the same sentiments as ourselves on the doctrine of the Trinity. See, among others, Pet. Allix and J. Van der Wayen, in the places above indicated; Rich. Kidder, Demonstration of the Messias, par. 3. cap. 5. 6. p. 246. and Georg. Bull, Defensio Fidei Nicenæ, sect. 1. cap. 1. sect. 16. p. 12. opp. And this opinion Dr. Cudworth espouses; which appears also to have been held by Hugo Grotius, De Verit. Religion. Christ. lib. 5. sect. 21. p. 352. To these others are wholly opposed, who flatly deny Philo to have distributed the divine nature into three principles, and suppose that what he says of three divine natures is to be understood merely of the three divine virtues and perfections, which are sometimes personified by Plato. This opinion is most warmly supported by Souverainius, whose book Le Platonisme Devoilé is well known, and by Stephen Nye, in an English work, The Judgment of the Fathers concerning the Doctrine of the Trinity, Lond. 1704. 4to. p. 4. &c. [By Faydit, Apologie pour les S. Peres.] The same is also maintained, although less openly, by Jac. Basnage, Histoire de Juifs, livr. 4. cap. 5. &c p. 102. &c. Between these dissentient parties there is a third, holding as it were the middle place, which grants Philo to have acknowledged three natures in God, but denies that these natures are to be confounded with the three equal persons in the Godhead, adopted by Christians on the authority of sacred writ; maintaining on the contrary that these natures of Philo are altogether unequal, and therefore, that his trinity ought rather to be classed with the errors of the Arians than with the doctrine of true believers. [See Carpzov. Exercit. in Ep. ad Hebræos ex Philone Prolegom. p. 135. on the twofold word of Philo, and other matters.] This opinion had already been defended to a certain extent by Isidorus Pelusiota, as above quoted; but more openly and learnedly, at a later period, by the most learned Jesuit, Dion. Petavius, who, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 1. de Trinit. cap. 2. p. 19. after

intelligible world are really so many distinct substances, and animals and gods, have thereby made that second hypostasis, not to be one God, but a congeries and heap of gods. These are those

citing some of Philo's sayings on the word of God, subjoins: Talibus de Filio Dei præconiis Arianorum Philo perfidiam armavit. Neque, he adds, quibusdam ex nostris, id est, Catholicis, assentiri possum, qui et hujus et aliorum, maxime gentilium, ejusmodi scita, quæ de divinis personis utcumque aliquid tinniunt, cupide deosculantur, atque ad Christiani integritatem dogmatis accommodare student, labe omni erroris et invidia fuco quodam falsæ ac violentæ interpretationis obducta, "By such professions concerning the Son of God, has Philo fortified the unbelief of Arians. Neither can I agree with some of our own, that is, the Catholic community, who eagerly welcome suchlike dogmas both of this and other pagan writers, which in the slightest degree savour of the divine persons, and endeavour to accommodate them to the purity of the Christian doctrine, veiling every stain and blemish of error under a certain disguise of false and forced interpretation." In our own times the most perspicacious writer, J. Le Clerc has followed the footsteps of Petavius, and in his Explic. Principii Evangelii Johannis, and Epistol. Critic. ep. 8. has laboured most strenuously to show that Philo was closely allied to the principles of the Arians. The supporters of this opinion hold Philo to have been a Platonist; from which they infer that his three natures do not differ from Plato's three first principles of things, at the same time supposing Plato's three principles to be vastly different not only in order but in degree also, and therefore to be very similar to the three persons of the Arians.

Before inquiring as to which of these opinions comes nearest to the truth, I should observe, that Philo belongs to that class of writers who often purposely affect obscurity, and fancy themselves to be most wise when they are perplexing the understandings of others by their incomprehensible subtleties. It is therefore the less to be wondered at that men, in other respects the most learned, should sometimes misapprehend his meaning, and attribute opinions to him to which, if his more obscure passages be compared with others that are more intelligible, he will be found to be altogether a stranger. In the next place, it ought most certainly to be borne in mind, that Philo considered religion and divine worship to be of two kinds, one civil and popular, and adapted to the comprehension of men engaged in the ordinary affairs of life, the other sublime and recondite, and capable of being understood by none but the wise and contemplative; that the popular and civil religion inculcates many things which according to the strict words and expressions are by no means conformable to the truth; but that so great is the weakness of mankind that these things ought to be tolerated by wise men; nay, that it is even imprudent to communicate the true and natural religion to the vulgar. In short, that those more gross and crude notions of God and divine things are to be left to the multitude, while the mysteries which the purified mind can alone comprehend, are to be cautiously treasured up and kept from the eyes of the ignorant. [See what I have observed of his secret discipline on Sæc. I. H. E.] This doctrine is every where propounded by Philo, so that I am surprised that learned men should have taken little or no account of it in explaining his opinions. Lest I should be supposed to be speaking here at random, I shall quote a remarkable passage from his book De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, p. 139: Τὰ μὲν τὰ τρία μέτρα ταῦτα καλὸν ἐν ψυχῇ ὥσπερ φυραθῆναι, ... ἵνα τῶν τελείων μύστις γενομένη τελετῶν, μηδένι προχείρως ἐκλαλῇ τὰ θεῖα μυστήρια, ταμιευομένη δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐχεμυθοῦσα ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ φυλάττῃ· γέγραπται γὰρ ἐγκρυφίας ποιεῖν, ὅτι κέκρυφθαι δεῖ τὸν ἱερὸν περὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτοῦ μύστην λόγον, ἐπεὶ θείων παρακαταθήκην ὀργίων οὐ παντός ἐστι φυλάξαι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀκράτορος ψυχῆς νᾶμα ἔξω ῥέων διὰ στόματός τε καὶ γλώττης πάσαις ἀκοαῖς ἐπαντλεῖται· ὧν αἱ μὲν, εὐρυχωρους δεξαμενὰς ἔχουσαι, τὸ ἐπιχεόμενον φυλάττουσιν ἀρεσκείᾳ, αἱ δὲ διὰ στενότητα πόρων ἀδυνατοῦσιν ἄρδεσθαι· τὸ δὲ ὑπερβλύζον ἀκατασχέτως ἐκχεόμενον, σκίδναται πάντῃ, ὡς ἐπαναπλεῖν καὶ ἐπινήχεσθαι τὰ κεκρυμμένα, καὶ φορυτοῦ τρόπον εἰκαίου, τὰ πάσης ἄξια σπουδῆς μετὰ συρμοῦ καταφέρεσθαι, "It is good for these three measures to be mixed and fermented as it were in the soul, ... that becoming initiated in the most perfect rites, it may not readily divulge the divine mysteries to any one, but treasuring them up and maintaining silence may enjoy them in secret. For Scripture speaks of making ἐγκρυφίαι, or cakes baked in the hot ashes, because the sacred and mystical doctrine of the

ods commonly called by them, νοητοὶ θεοὶ, "intelligible gods," ot as before in any way of distinction from the αἰσθητοὶ, the sensible gods" (which is a more general notion of the word)

nmade and his powers ought to be concealed; since it is not every one who can keep ne deposit of the divine orgies. For the streams of the incontinent soul flowing out nrough the mouth and the tongue are discharged into the ears of all. Of which those hat have more capacious receptacles willingly keep what is poured in. But others, on account of the narrowness of the passages, are incapable of being watered; and hat which overflows being incontinently poured forth, is scattered every where, so that that which was hidden rises up and swims on the surface, and the most grave and precious things, like vile mud, are carried away in the flood." If we reject the figures of which Philo is full, I do not think it will require many words to show, that the opinion I have expressed above is contained in this passage. Similar ones are met with in various places, especially in the book De Abrahamo, p. 367. 368. of which passage I shall take some notice by and by. Whoever loses sight of this distinction in Philo's religion and theology, will necessarily fail in interpreting him. For many sayings occur in him which are conformable to the precepts and laws of the popular theology; and again not a few which pertain to what he supposed to be the more secret and arcane religion and philosophy. Which two sciences being widely different, it therefore happens that Philo sometimes appears to be wonderfully at variance with himself; and there are not wanting learned men even who deny it to be possible at this day to determine what opinions and sentiments this Jew was imbued with. But to do away with this discordance, we ought above all things to examine with attention those passages in which he recalls and accommodates the precepts of the popular religion to the principles of the more sublime theology, and explains the opinions of the vulgar according to the doctrines of wise men; with these for guides it will be possible, I fancy, to reach the interior recesses of his philosophy.

I will try whether I can by this method explain what were Philo's sentiments on the divine nature. In the first place then, I do not scruple to charge all those with error who have hitherto supposed that Philo acknowledged three natures in one God in the same way as we Christians. For he does not reckon three principles, like most of the Platonists, but four, or to express his meaning more clearly, above the triad of divine natures, which he introduces, he places a supreme and principal God. This is evident both from many other passages and especially from the following, which occurs in his De Profugis, p. 465: Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἄνευ τροπῆς ἑκούσιον μὲν, ἄπαγε, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀκουσίου γεγονὼς, αὐτὸν τὸν Θεὸν κλῆρον ἔχων, ἐν αὐτῷ μόνῳ κατοικήσει οἱ ἐξ οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας, ἀλλ' ἀβουλήτως χυνσάμενοι σφάλμασι, καταφυγὰς ἔξουσι τὰς εἰρημένας ἀφόβους καὶ πλουσίας· οὕτω δὲ τῶν πρὸς καταφυγὴν πόλεων τοῖς μὲν εἰσι πόσαν, αἳ μακρὰν ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους ἀφεστᾶσι τινες εἶναι; ὁ τοῦ ἡγεμόνος λόγος, καὶ ἡ ποιητικὴ καὶ βασιλικὴ δύναμις αὐτοῦ· τοίνυν γὰρ ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐστί, "He therefore who is without offence, not only voluntary but involuntary, shall have God himself for his portion, and shall dwell in him alone; but those who commit not wilful but involuntary errors, shall have for refuge the happy and rich cities. Therefore of these cities of refuge there are three beyond, which are far removed from our race. What are these? The *word* of the supreme ruler, and his *creative* and *kingly* power; for of these are both heaven and all the world." Here Philo openly speaks of four natures: God himself, the word of God, the maker or framer of the world, and the king or governor of the world. The two latter are called by him in his book De Abrahamo, p. 367. "the God by whom all things were made," and "the lord" or "king." The man being wholly made up of allegory, transfers what Moses says of the cities of refuge to moral things. He distributes men into three classes: those who do not sin at all, those who contaminate themselves with involuntary errors, and those who wilfully offend. The first, according to his opinion, become partakers of God alone; to the second he promises the communion of the three natures which he supposes to be associated with God, the word, the creator, and the lord; to the third he points out a little afterwards three other powers to which they may fly, the propitious, the imperative, and the prohibitory. But as these powers are placed by him out of God, and said to be allied and contiguous to the human race, they do not pertain to the matter in hand. Κοινωνοὶ δὲ, says he, καὶ προσιχεῖς ἡμῖν καὶ ἐφαπτόμεναι τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπικήρου

but from those other gods of theirs (afterwards to be insisted on also) called νοεροὶ θεοὶ, "intellectual gods." Proclus upon Plato's Politia[9] concludes, that there is no idea of evil, for this

γένους, ᾧ μόνῳ συμβέβηκε διαμαρτάνειν, αἳ ἐντός εἰσι τρεῖς, ἡ ἵλεως, ἡ προστακτικὴ τῶν ποιητέων, ἡ ἀπαγορευτικὴ τῶν μὴ ποιητέων· αὗται γὰρ ἥδη ἡμῖν ἐφάπτονται, "But associated with and adjoining and bordering upon the mortal race of men which alone is liable to error, are three within, the propitious, the imperative, and the prohibitory. For these pertain to us." The meaning of this passage will be made appear from what we shall advance by and by; for it possesses no slight weight towards confirming the remarks we are about to offer on the real opinions of Philo. Hence, if I am not altogether mistaken, those men labour to no purpose who attempt to identify the doctrine of this Jew either with the dogma of right-minded Christians on the three persons in the Godhead, or with the errors of the Arians, as he altogether deviates from the rule of both, and subjects three inferior natures to the principal and supreme God. Neither is this a peculiar opinion and confined to Philo alone. For some of the Platonists held the same; of whom Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 93. contends that Plato himself placed the supreme Deity over three principles of things. Nor did Synesius, although he had already enrolled himself among Christians, dissent from it, as is evident from his first Hymn on the Trinity, wherein he openly asserts three natures to have flowed from one God.

But, dismissing these matters, let us revert to the three natures connected by Philo with one God, and endeavour to explain their relation and character. To begin with the two last, which he calls *God* and *King*: it is unquestionable that Philo often speaks of them in such a way as though he regarded them as real persons. But since, as we have already observed, he very frequently expresses himself according to the opinion and sense of the vulgar, it will be proper to look for those passages in which he as it were tempers the popular doctrine with the religion of the wise, or interprets the one from the other. There is a passage of the kind in his book De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini, p. 139: Ἀβραὰμ μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ τάχους καὶ προθυμίας ἴχνη, παρακελεύεται τῇ ἀρετῇ Σαρὰ, σπεῦσαι καὶ φυρᾶσαι τρία μέτρα σεμιδάλεως, καὶ ποιῆσαι ἐγκρυφίας, ἡνίκα ὁ Θεὸς δορυφορούμενος ὑπὸ δυεῖν τῶν ἀνωτάτω δυνάμεων, ἀρχῆς τε αὖ καὶ ἀγαθότητος, εἷς ὢν ὁ μέσος τριττὰς φαντασίας ἐνειργάζετο τῇ ὁρατικῇ ψυχῇ, ὧν ἑκάστη μεμέτρηται μὲν οὐδαμῶς· ἀπερίγραφοι γὰρ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ· μεμέτρηκε δὲ τὰ ὅλα· ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθότης αὐτοῦ μέτρον ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἡ δὲ ἐξουσία μέτρον ὑπηκόων· ὁ δὲ ἡγέμων αὐτὸς ἁπάντων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀσωμάτων· . . . . τὰ μὲν δὴ τρία μέτρα ταῦτα καλὸν ἐν ψυχῇ ὥσπερ φυραθῆναί τε καὶ συνενεχθῆναι, ἵνα πεισθεῖσα τὸν ἀνωτάτω εἶναι Θεὸν, ὃς ὑπερκέκυφε τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ὁρώμενος, καὶ ἐν ταύταις ἐμφαινόμενος, δέξηται χαρακτῆρας ἐξουσίας τε καὶ εὐεργεσίας αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῶν τελείων μύστις γενομένη, "For Abraham coming with great haste and alacrity, commands virtue, Sarah, to hasten and ferment three measures of meal, and to make cakes under the ashes, when God, attended by two supreme powers, dominion and goodness, being himself one in the middle, produced a threefold fancy in the visual soul, each of which it is impossible to measure (for his powers also are not to be circumscribed), but they measure all things. His goodness is the measure of the good, his power the measure of things subject; and the ruler himself is the measure of every thing corporeal and incorporeal. . . . . It is good for these three measures to be fermented, as it were, and commingled in the soul, that being persuaded of the existence of a supreme God, who surpasses his powers, and is either seen without them or appears with them, it may receive impressions of his power and beneficence and be initiated in the most perfect mysteries." Although this passage is exceedingly obscure, neither am I one who is either able or willing to divest it of all its darkness, still it evidently shows that the two natures associated by Philo with God are not persons, but divine virtues and perfections only, which he represents in the character of persons. In the first place we learn from it, that God excited in Abraham τριττὰς φαντασίας, "a threefold phantasy," not in the contemplative soul, but only in his ψυχὴ ὁρατική,

[9] This at the present day is intitled Procli in Platonis Politiam Commentarius, and is appended to his Comm. in Timæum. The passage alluded to by Dr. Cudworth occurs p. 357.

n, because if there were, καὶ ἡ τῶν κακῶν ἰδέα θεὸς ἔσται, ερ πᾶσα ἰδέα θεὸς, ὡς Παρμενίδης εἴρηκεν, "that very idea ·il also would itself be a god, because every idea is a god,

soul in which the senses reside; which according to Philo is much inferior to hich is wholly abstracted from the senses and external things. See his De r. Legis. lib. 2. p. 74. and elsewhere. These three natures, therefore, are merely notions or images, produced in that part of the soul which is subject to the l of the senses. And could he speak in this manner of three natures in reality t and separate from each other? In the next place we may observe, that he asserts these two natures to be ἀγαθότητα, "goodness," and ἐξούσιαν, er." And who, I ask, would believe that goodness and power are things and s distinct and separate from God? Lastly, the very allegory which Philo here according to his own wont, plainly settles the question. According to him, is the image of virtue, or of a wise and contemplative man. The three mea- of meal, which she is commanded to mix, are symbols of the three divine s introduced by him. The action of Sarah mixing the three measures typifies action of the soul elevated above vulgar things, which by contemplation combines itself and as it were commingles the three divine natures, so that all distinction of is done away with. The allegory would have been altogether absurd, if Philo upposed the two powers which accompany God to be self-existent natures or s. On the contrary, his opinion is evidently this: that men subject to the of the senses are accustomed to distinguish three natures in God; but that a an and a soul powerful and free can well understand that the divine virtues are imself, and ought in no wise to be separated from his essence. Whoever is not ced by this passage will probably be more powerfully impressed by another one is book De Abrahamo, p. 367. where he declares his mind more clearly. Philo is reating of the same subject which he discusses in the former passage, and has no of a great mystery being concealed in Moses' account of the three men who ed to Abraham. He first lays down Moses' meaning to be that the soul tened by God perceives his three images: Ἐπειδὰν οὖν ψυχὴ, καθάπερ ἐν βρίᾳ, θεῷ περιλαμφθῇ καὶ ὅλη δι' ὅλων νοητοῦ φωτὸς ἀναπλησθεῖσα ταῖς λῳ κεχυμέναις αὐγαῖς ἄσκιος γίνηται, τριττὴν φαντασίαν ἑνὸς ὑποκειμένου αμβάνει· τοῦ μὲν ὡς ὄντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δυοῖν, ὡς ἂν ἀπαυγαζομένων ούτου σκιῶν, "When therefore the mind is illuminated by God, and, being filled with intellectual light, becomes divested of darkness by the splendours l around, it perceives the three images of one subject, one of the thing itself, the two as shadows cast forth from this." The same, he adds, occasionally happens in corporeal light, of whom a twofold shadow sometimes strikes our eyes. Clear ce this of the opinion which we before attributed to Philo! The three divine s, which he exhibits, are merely three notions or images of one thing. The two bear the same relation to God as shadows to the body they proceed from. as no one regards a body accompanied by a double shadow as a threefold body, ks upon the shadows as real natures, so neither would he consider the two which Philo associates with God, to be individual persons or self-existent s. They are rays of the divine nature and perfections of God. Indeed, should e attribute the same similitude to the three persons of the godhead professed by ans on the authority of sacred writ, which Philo ascribes to his three principles, ld grossly err against the truth, and might justly be accused of Sabellian unbe- But let us again hear Philo, who a little afterwards thus explains his own mean- pecting this Trinity: Πατὴρ μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὁ μέσος, ὃς ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς γραφαῖς ὀνόματι καλεῖται ὁ ὤν· αἱ δὲ παρ' ἑκάτερα πρεσβύταται καὶ ἐγγύταται τος δυνάμεις, ὧν ἡ μὲν ποιητική, ἡ δὲ βασιλικὴ προσαγορεύεται· καὶ ἡ μὲν κὴ Θεός· ταύτῃ γὰρ ἔθηκέ τε καὶ διεκόσμησε τὸ πᾶν· ἡ δὲ βασιλικὴ κύριος, middle one is the father of all, called properly in scripture *I am*; on each side most ancient and nearest powers of the I am, of which one is called creative, er kingly: the former is God, for by it he made and disposed all things, the s lord." These words considered in themselves might lead an incautious reader pose that Philo associates two persons with God: but they will by no means the circumspect. The three names of the Deity mentioned in sacred writ, I Jehovah), God (Elohim) and Lord (Adonai), are referred by our Jew to the

as Parmenides hath affirmed." Neither was Plotinus himself, though otherwise more sober, altogether uninfected with this fantastic conceit of the ideas being all of them gods, he writing

three divine natures into which he divides the Deity. But these three names designate only one God. Therefore Philo's three natures also represent but one God, considered in a threefold manner and respect, namely as the nature which existed of itself from all eternity, as the creator of the universe, and lastly as the king and governor. A clearer proof of this is afforded in the words immediately following: *Δορυφορούμενος οὖν ὁ μέσος ὑφ' ἑκατέρας τῶν δυνάμεων, παρέχει τῇ ὁρατικῇ διανοίᾳ, τότε μὲν ἑνὸς, τότε δὲ τῶν τριῶν φαντασίαν· ἑνὸς μὲν, ὅταν ἄκρως καθαρσεῖσα ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ μὴ μόνον τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀριθμῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γείτονα μονάδος δυάδα ὑπερβᾶσα, πρὸς τὴν ἀμιγῆ καὶ ἀσύμπλοκον καὶ καθ' αὑτὴν οὐδένος ἐπιδεᾶ τὸ παράπαν ἰδέαν ἐπείγηται· τριῶν δὲ, ὅταν μήπω τὰς μεγάλας τελεσθεῖσα τελετὰς, ἔτι ἐν ταῖς βραχυτέραις ὀργιάζηται, καὶ μὴ δύνηται τὸ ὂν ἄνευ ἑτέρου τινὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου καταλαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν δρωμένων, ἢ κτίζον, ἢ ἄρχον· δεύτερος μὲν οὖν, ὥς φασι, πλοῦς οὗτος, μετέχει δ' οὐδὲν ἧττον δόξης θεοφιλοῦς,* "And so thus the one in the middle, attended on each side by his powers, exhibits to the perspicacious mind sometimes the image of one, sometimes of three: of one, when the soul being thoroughly purified and having passed over not only the other multitude of numbers, but also the dyad which is next to unity, hastens on to the simple and unmixed idea, altogether perfect in itself; of three, when being not yet initiated in the great mysteries but still occupied in the inferior orgies, it cannot comprehend the I am by himself alone without some other, but only by his acts, either the creator or the king of all. But this secondary sailing, as it is called, partakes nevertheless of pious opinion." We here have the whole mystery revealed. There are, Philo openly tells us, two classes of men, one rude, vulgar, and led by the eyes, the other perspicacious, and contemplative, and thoroughly purged of the popular doctrines and opinions. The latter, according to him, clearly understand these three powers to be merely three notions of one God, and worship God as he is in himself, namely, most simple and devoid of all composition whatever; the former on the contrary possessing much less penetration, are unable to know God otherwise than by his works, and from that cause distinguish in him, as it were, three persons, God himself, the virtue by which he created all things, and the goodness by which he governs and administers the universe. The latter he considers to entertain better and more exalted notions of God, although the former, he says, are not to be despised, as they cherish an opinion by no means inconsistent with piety towards God. Then follows a comparison drawn from the usages of mankind, by which he attempts to exhibit this doctrine concerning God in a clearer point of view. There is, he informs us, a threefold gradation in human habits, and this gradation is adapted to illustrate the dogma of the three notions of God. Some men worship God without any hope of reward, and these correspond to the Father, who according to him occupies the middle place between the two other virtues. Others are excited by benefits to pay homage to the supreme Being: this class he refers to the power which he places on the right side of the Father. Lastly, many are kept in their duty towards God by the fear of punishment: these he compares with the third or kingly virtue. This comparison is neither elegant nor ingenious; and besides Philo is any thing but consistent in his explication of it. Still there is sufficient light and force in it to confirm what we have stated, as to his meaning being no other than this: that God, though free from all concretion, can nevertheless be considered in a threefold relation and is in reality so considered by men. But the figurative mode of writing in which he wonderfully delights, and the multitude of subtleties, too far removed from vulgar conception, have led men of great perspicacity in other matters to ascribe to him more sound and correct sentiments than he ever entertained, and to place among the professors of three persons in one Godhead a man whom probably it would be much more proper to class among the precursors of the Sabellians. I shall add only one more passage, although many are at hand, which is of itself sufficient to decide the matter. It is evident from those which we have adduce[1], that Philo attributed the construction of this world to a certain virtue, which is placed as he says on the right of the supreme Being and which he calls *God*, and committed its government to the other power on the left hand of God, and denominated by him, *Lord*. But in the passage I am now about to bring forward, he refers

thus concerning the second god, the first mind or intellect:* Γενόμενον δὲ ἤδη τὰ ὄντα σὺν αὐτῷ γεννῆσαι, πᾶν μὲν τὸ τῶν ἰδεῶν κάλλος, πάντας δὲ θεοὺς νοητοὺς, "That he, being begotten

both these actions, the construction and the government of the word, to that God alone *who really is*, no other power being associated with him. Ὁ δὴ ταῦτα ἀκούῃ, says he, ——ὅτι τέ ἐστι καὶ ὑπάρχει θεὸς, καὶ ὅτι πεποίηκε τὸν κόσμον——καὶ ὅτι ἀεὶ προνοεῖ τοῦ γεγονότος, μακαρίαν καὶ εὐδαίμονα ζωὴν βιώσεται, "Whoever shall hear these things,——that God is and exists and that he made the world,——and that he always superintends and governs that which is made, will lead a happy and blessed life," De Mundi Opificio, p. 40 If this passage be attentively considered, it will be obvious to every one that Philo, when he added to the God *who is*, two powers, the *creative* and the *governing*, was speaking merely according to the sense of the vulgar, and that in reality he acknowledged no distinction and no divine person in this God.

Let us now turn our attention to that *reason* or *divine word*, so often magnificently spoken of by Philo, and endeavour to explore its nature. The force and meaning of the names by which he designates this *word* in several passages, is such, that, if estimated according to the received usage of the language, they would naturally lead to the notion of a person, although one inferior to the supreme Being. This λόγος is called by him ἀρχάγγελος, "the prince of angels," who is not ἀγέννητος or "unmade," as God, nor yet γεννητὸς or "made," as men, and who discharges the functions of divine ambassador amongst men and those of hostage and mediator with God; see his book, Quis Rerum Divinarum Hæres, p. 501. Compare his De Somniis, p. 601. 602. and Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 11. cap. 15. p. 533. It is styled, Πρωτόγονος Θεοῦ υἱὸς, to whom God has committed the care of the sacred flock, De Agricultura, lib. 1. p. 152. ἀρχιερεὺς, or "high-priest" of this world, De Somniis, p. 510. and other names of the kind. Which modes of speech bearing a close resemblance to those by which the writers of the divine covenant are wont to celebrate the son of God and his eternal word, a great many of the earlier as well as later fathers of the Christian church were the more easily induced to believe that this Jew proclaimed the true doctrine concerning the son of God and that the word he speaks of is the same with Christ our Saviour. I very much fear, however, that if the shadows be dispelled with which he has obscured his diction, and the meaning of the words he makes use of be estimated by the standard of those passages which are less figurative, we shall have to conclude the same of his word as of his two powers of which we have already treated. What first excites one's suspicion on this subject, is that Philo asserts the world to have been made according to the image of this word. For so in his first book of Questions and Solutions in Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 323. Θνητον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀπεικονισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀνωτάτω καὶ πατέρα τῶν ὅλων ἐδύνατο, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δεύτερον θεὸν, ὃς ἐστιν ἐκείνου λόγος, "For nothing mortal can be fashioned according to the image of the Supreme and Parent of all things, but according to that of the second god, which is his word." The same he states more plainly, De Opificio Mundi, p. 5. &c. in which passage, after saying that man according to the authority of Moses was formed after the likeness of the second god or the word, immediately adds, that this saying pertains to the whole universe, which more than man expresses the divine image. And he forthwith explains what god he supposes this world to have been framed in the likeness of, in the following words: Δῆλον δὲ, ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρχέτυπος σφραγὶς, ὃν φαμὲν εἶναι κόσμον νοητὸν, αὐτὸς ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα, ἰδέα τῶν ἰδεῶν, ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, "But it is evident, that the archetypal seal, which we say is the intelligible world, would be the archetypal model, the idea of ideas, the word of God." Which dogma I cannot at all understand upon the hypothesis of so many grave and eminent men that Philo's word is a divine person. The world was made after the example of this word; hence there must necessarily be the closest resemblance between it and the world. Now the world manifestly consists of elements, stars, animals, plants, trees, men, mountains, rivers, valleys, and an infinity of other things of the kind. Consequently, the whole of these of which our world is composed are unquestionably in this word, in short, the divine word must of necessity be the same kind of thing, the same kind of spirit or genius as

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 7. [P. 489.]

by the first God (that is, by way of emanation, and from eternity) generated all entities together with himself, the pulchritude of the ideas, which are all intelligible gods. Apuleius[10]

the world. Let others see whether they can fancy to themselves such a person or spirit, resembling in form and appearance the sensible world. For my own part, I am utterly unable to comprehend the nature of a person, whose form and image the supreme Being could have placed before him in the construction of the universe and imitated in fashioning and disposing its various parts. A centaur, I should say, or chimæra, or any other monster more terrible and hideous than these, such as the poets have feigned, would be a truer representation of the figure and form of the world, than a person begotten of the Supreme. But if we suppose the word to be merely a certain exemplar produced in the mind by the supreme Being, by thought and reason, if we may so speak, before the creation, and afterwards really expressed in this world, I should find no greater difficulty in this hypothesis than if any one were to say, that an architect caused a royal palace to be erected according to a certain model, which he had at first designed in his own mind and subsequently committed to paper.

What is less intelligible in Philo's doctrine on God's creation of the world after the image of the Word, is expressed more clearly by himself in his book, De Opificio Mundi; from which we shall endeavour, as far as is possible to explain his meaning. In the first place, he tells us, p. 3. 4. that God, long before proceeding to the construction of the visible world, formed a *νοητὸν*, or "intelligible" world, that is, conceived by thought and reflection a specimen or image of the world he was about to form. This dogma he illustrates by a comparison drawn from human affairs. He compares God with a wise architect, who, being commissioned to build a great and splendid city, first of all designs and as it were fabricates in his mind an image and model of the whole work, and when he comes to the operation itself, continually inspects and refers to this mental model. *Τὰ παραπλήσια*, says he, *δὴ καὶ περὶ θεοῦ δοξαστέον, ὃς ἅρα μεγαλόπολιν κτίζειν διανοηθεὶς, ἐνενόησε πρότερον τοὺς τύπους αὐτῆς, ἐξ ὧν κόσμον νοητὸν συστησάμενος ἀποτελεῖ τὸν αἰσθητὸν, παραδείγματι χρώμενος ἐκείνῳ*, "The same is to be supposed of God, who, having designed to build this mighty city, first conceived its forms, from which having fashioned an intelligible world he constructed this sensible one, using the other as a model." Philo always attached the highest importance to this dogma of a model world having been conceived in the mind of God before the construction of the corporeal one, and considers it impossible to refute either the Epicureans or those who hold the world and God to be the same, unless its truth be admitted. Wherefore, in his De Victimas Offerentibus, p. 857. he contends that those who discard the ideas or forms of things, are the eunuchs whom Moses reproaches, and does not scruple to consider such men guilty of the greatest impiety towards God. But these matters I now pass over, and come to what he says of the *νοητὸς*, or "intelligible" world. This world, then, he pronounces to be situated in the word of God. But to enable us to form a clearer conception of his opinion, let us hear his own words. *Καθάπερ οὖν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀρχιτεκτονικῷ προδιατυπωθεῖσα πόλις χώραν ἐκτὸς οὐκ εἶχεν, ἀλλ' ἐνεσφράγιστο τῇ τοῦ τεχνίτου ψυχῇ· τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οὐδ' ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν κόσμος ἄλλον ἂν ἔχοι τόπον, ἢ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, τὸν ταῦτα διακοσμήσαντα*, "As therefore, that city prefigured and predesigned in the architect, had no place externally, but was impressed merely in the mind of the artificer, in like manner, the world consisting of ideas could have no other place except in the divine word which disposed all these things." Now, any one, on attentively examining this passage, will easily perceive, if I mistake not, that according to Philo the *word of God* is nothing more than the wisdom and reason of God, and not a person procreated and generated by him before the creation of the world. He compares this word with the mind of a man about to build a certain city. As the

[10] De Deo Socratis, p. 43. But I see no reason why Apuleius' words, which are applied to all the celestial gods, should be referred to *ideas*, or what the Platonists call *intelligible Gods*. We have already treated of this passage of Apuleius, as also of Julian's dogmas, and the Egyptian worship of beasts, which the learned Doctor here again touches upon.

also (as hath been already noted) grossly and fulsomely imputes the same to Plato, in those words: Quos deos Plato existimat, veros, incorporales, animales, sine ullo neque fine neque exordio,

model of the future city resides in that faculty of the architect which we call intellect, so the form of this world is said to have resided in the word of God. This being the case, the word of God is the same in the supreme Being as intellect and reason in the architect, namely, his supreme wisdom and science, by which he figured and designed the world he was at a definite time about to create. But Philo more explicitly declares this to be his opinion in what follows, p. 5. *Εἰ δέ τις ἐθελήσειε γυμνοτέροις χρήσασθαι τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, οὐδεν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι κόσμον, ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ νοητὴ πόλις ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν, ἢ ὁ τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος λογισμὸς, ἤδη τὴν νοητὴν πόλιν κτίζειν διανοουμένου,* "But if any one wishes to employ plainer words, he would say that the intelligible world is nothing else than the word of God now forming the world: for neither is the intelligible city any thing more than the reasoning of the architect, who is already meditating the building of the city conceived in his mind." These words put an end to all doubt, and suffer no one to remain in ignorance as to the nature of Philo's λόγος. The *νοητὸς* and intelligible world, or the form and idea of the world contained in the divine mind, before he commenced its construction, does not differ from the λόγος, or word of God. The word of God has the same relation to the intelligible world, as the reasoning of the architect to the form conceived in his own mind of the city he is about to build. But these two are in reality not distinct things, but are separated only by thought. Wherefore, neither are the intelligible world and the word of God two really different things, although they can be distinguished by reason and intellect. Which being so, he who should assert Philo's word to be a person or a self-existent nature, would act as wisely as if he were to call the architect's cogitation upon the forthcoming city a distinct nature or individual person. On the contrary, the divine word is nothing but the wisdom and reason itself of the supreme Being, which Philo for certain reasons has clothed in the dress and garb of a person. Should any one fail to be convinced by these considerations, conclusive as they are, and deem the names applied by Philo to his word, of *ambassador, king, angel, high-priest, firstborn son*, to be much too explicit to admit of being understood of a certain mental notion or virtue of the Deity, I would simply ask them to pay some attention to Philo's style, and to mark its redundance in figures and bold metaphors. A writer who departs so far from the vulgar usage of speech, as to say that God consorted with his own science, and from it, as from a wife, generated his only son, namely, this world, can occasion us no surprise when he speaks of divine wisdom as of a certain divine person. And that he clearly expresses himself in the above manner, witness his book, De Temulentia, p. 244. *Τὸν γοῦν τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐργασάμενον δημιουργὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ πατέρα εἶναι τοῦ γεγονότος εὐθὺς ἐν δίκῃ φήσομεν· μητέρα δὲ τοῦ πεποιηκότος ἐπιστήμην, ᾗ συνὼν ὁ θεὸς, οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἔσπειρε γένεσιν· ἡ δὲ παραδεξαμένη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρμα, τελεσφόροις ὠδῖσι τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν αἰσθητὸν υἱὸν ἀπεκύησε, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον,* "Therefore, we can justly call the artificer who made all things, the father also of his creature, and his science its mother, with which God having consorted, not after the manner of man, procreated the creature. But it having received the divine seed brought forth at mature birth the only begotten and beloved sensible son, this world." I have cited this passage the more willingly, as it not only shows that probably no writer abounded more in the metaphorical, and consequently, that his style is not to be estimated according to the ordinary rules of speech, but also makes that evident which we have hitherto put forth as proved, that the word of God means in Philo the reason and wisdom of the supreme Being. For as every one must see, the *ἐπιστήμη* or "science" which God is stated in this passage to have espoused, is that very thing which he calls in so many other passages the *word* or *reason*. Whether Philo says: "The word or reason of God made the world," or expresses himself thus: "God consorted with his own science, and from it begat the world," his opinion is all the same, namely this: "God created this world most wisely, and did not perform the work at random or fortuitously." I shall add another peculiarity of his style, which will be of equal utility to us in deciding upon this question. Philo is accustomed to call the thoughts and dogmas of men, especially the wise, their *spiritual sons*. Thus, in his De Vita Con-

sed prorsus ac retrò æviternos, ingenio ad summam beatitudinem porrecto, &c. And he, with Julian and others, reduces the greater part of the pagan gods to these ideas of the intelligible, or

templat. p 899. when commending the continence of the Therapeutidæ, he tells us they despised bodily pleasures, that by the divine virtue they might conceive and bring forth more holy and celestial sons. Τῶν περὶ σῶμα ἡδονῶν ἐφλογήσαν, οὐ θνητῶν ἐκγόνων, ἀλλ' ἀθανάτων ἐρεχθεῖσαι, ἃ μόνη τίκτειν οἷά τε ἐστιν ἡ θεοφιλὴς ψυχή, σπείραντος εἰς αὐτὴν ἀκτῖνας νοητὰς τοῦ πατρὸς, αἷς δυνήσεται θεωρεῖν τὰ σοφίας δόγματα, "They despised the pleasures of the body, being desirous, not of mortal, but of divine offspring, which the pious soul alone can bring forth, receiving as seed the intelligible rays of the Father, by which it will be able to contemplate the dogmas of wisdom." He who philosophizes so refinedly and figuratively on the thoughts of men, is not departing from his wont, when he calls the reason and wisdom of God, or the divine thoughts and decrees, the first-born son of God. One figure is not more harsh and exceptionable than the other.

I have been led to continue this discussion to a greater length than I had at first intended, as well on account of those notable controversies agitated long ago among learned men on the Theology of Philo, as also for the sake of enabling others to correct certain errors committed by Dr. Cudworth in his explication of it, both in this and in other places. I speak not of my having considered it worth while to bestow some labour upon the task of explaining the doctrines of a man to whose authority the learned are in the habit of appealing on the various departments both of sacred and profane knowledge, although they do not sufficiently guard themselves against the snares in which his tumid and highly figurative style is calculated to entangle his readers. If there be any force in what we have advanced, the opinion of Philo was as follows: That God, as considered by a wise and contemplative man, is a nature so simple as to admit of no distinction even in thought; but that all men are not so happy as to be able to contemplate with eyes so pure, and a mind so serene and perspicuous: hence, that it is permitted to most men, by reason of their great mental infirmity, to divide in a certain way the divine nature, and to subject to the supreme Being, as far transcending all virtues, three inferior powers, namely the *word*, *God* or the beneficent virtue, and the *king;* which, however, are nothing more than his wisdom, goodness, and power; or, which is the same thing, that it is allowable to regard the one God in a threefold relation, as the god who most wisely pre-ordained all things before the creation of the world, as the most powerful maker and creator of the world, and lastly, as the ruler and governor of the same.

But it is not sufficient to know Philo's opinion: we ought also to examine into the causes which led him to entertain it. Before I conclude, therefore, I shall offer a few remarks on this subject. I consider him, then, to have derived his notions not only from the philosophers in whose society he mixed at Alexandria, but also from the Jews themselves. In the first place, with respect to the Egyptian philosophers, it will be known, that prior to the birth of our Saviour they had already begun to descant in their schools upon the three principles of things. From what source they obtained this dogma, whether from Plato or from others more ancient than Plato, and in what sense they understood it, it is not our purpose to inquire in this place. Philo, therefore, having learnt it from these philosophers, and fearing lest the three principles should corrupt or altogether subvert the sacred doctrine of Moses concerning God, he considered that these were to be accommodated to the Jewish religion, and not to be received by him otherwise than in conformity with the law of Moses. With this idea, in place of three real and self-existent principles, as inculcated by the philosophers, he substituted three notions of the mind, or exchanged a trinity of persons, so to speak, for a trinity of names or divine perfections. In this manner he appeared to himself to pay proper regard both to the philosophy he was an admirer of, and to the religion of his ancestors, which he was anxious by all means to preserve inviolate. I can hardly believe, however, that Philo would have attempted any thing of the kind, and spoken of three divine natures, if he had known this doctrine to be unpalatable to his own nation. The Jews at that time took every precaution not to admit any thing injurious to Moses' dogma concerning one God, which they held in the highest reverence. Beyond question, therefore, they would have been grievously offended, if Philo, in opposition to the opinions of his own nation, and unsupported by the testimony or authority of any Jew, had dared to speak thus boldly though obscurely of three divine

archetypal world, as making Apollo, for example, to be the intelligible sun, the idea of the sensible; and Diana the intelligible moon, and the like for the rest. Lastly, it hath been observed also, that the Egyptian theologers pretended, in like manner, to worship these intelligible gods, or eternal ideas, in their religious animals, as symbols of them.

Philo indeed Platonized so far, as to suppose God to have made an archetypal and intelligible world, before he made this corporeal and sensible:* Βουληθεὶς (ὁ Θεὸς) τὸν ὁρατὸν τουτονὶ κόσμον δημιουργῆσαι, προεξετύπου τὸν νοητὸν, ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι, τὸν σωματικὸν ἀπερ-

natures. Consequently, he must necessarily have been convinced that in dividing the divine nature as it were into three persons he was about to broach nothing which would be offensive or dangerous to the Jews. But why many words? We may learn from Philo himself that the Jews of his time made common mention of three persons in one God. For in his De Abrahamo, p. 367. he declares that the opinion of those who hold three natures in one God contains nothing injurious to piety, although those are to be preferred who entirely discard all division from the divine nature. Δεύτερον, says he, μὲν οὖν, ὥς φασι, πλοῦς οὗτος· μετέχει δὲ οὐδὲν ἧττον δόξης θεοφιλοῦς, "This is, as the proverb calls it, a second sailing: nevertheless, it is not foreign to pious sentiment." In the first place, these words can be understood of none but the Jews. For who would suppose a Jew to have ranked philosophers averse to the true religion, among the patrons of piety and of a true sense of God? The philosophers' opinion concerning three principles was not such as to admit of being called holy, good and pious by a Jew; as it rather favoured a multitude of gods. In the next place, these words of Philo must not be accepted as though these Jews, who at that time professed something threefold in God, understood merely three notions or three virtues of God. For I see no reason why he should have affirmed, that those who separated the divine virtues from the divine nature merely in reason and thought, and considered them separately, although they ought to be tolerated, hold improper and unwise notions concerning God; inasmuch as the most acute theologians and philosophers, Jews as well as Christians, including even Philo himself, have done the same, neither is any mortal gifted with such powers of intellect as to be able to comprehend the nature of God by one act of the mind, and without making any distinction. Besides, there are more than three virtues and perfections in God, and consequently there appears no reason why these Jews, in reckoning them, may not have exceeded the ternary number. I am convinced, therefore, that in Philo's time, most of the Jews, though acknowledging God to be one by nature, at the same time believed him to be in a certain respect threefold; which dogma, in all probability, they received partly from sacred writ, and partly from the first founders of their race. But Philo, being anxious to connect the precepts of scripture and the traditions of his ancestors, and fearing moreover, lest the enemies of the Jews, whom he frequently came in contact with, should make this dogma a pretext for accusing them of worshipping a plurality of gods, considered it the safest course to convert the trinity of persons, commonly professed by his countrymen, into a trinity of names and notions. And when we consider that, subsequently to the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead being more clearly expounded by our Saviour, Sabellius and so many others besides him did not scruple notwithstanding to substitute three names and notions of God in lieu of the three persons, can it appear strange or wonderful, I would ask, that the same thing should have been done by a Jew, who was an ardent admirer of philosophy? I have now given what I consider to be Philo's doctrine concerning God. I have also given the causes which, in my opinion, led him to adopt it. Although, therefore, Philo is to be excluded from the number of those who profess the Christian dogma of a triune God, and, on the contrary, is favourable rather to the Sabellians, still he furnishes us with abundant evidence that, previously to the introduction of Christianity, most of the Jews, at least of Alexandria, were imbued with this doctrine.

* De Mun. Opif. p. 6. [P. 3. 4.]

γάσηται, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τοσαῦτα παραδέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη, ὥσαπερ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά· τὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἰδεῶν, συνεστῶτα κόσμον ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ ὑπονοεῖν ἀδύνατον, "God intending to make a visible world, first formed an intelligible one; that so having an incorporeal and most god-like pattern before him, he might make the corporeal world agreeably to the same, this younger an image of that older, that should contain as many sensible kinds in it, as the other did intelligible. But it is not possible (saith he) to conceive this world of ideas to exist in any place." Nay, according to him, Moses himself philosophised also after the same manner in his Cosmopœia, describing, in the first five verses of Genesis, the making of an intelligible heaven and earth, before the sensible: Πρῶτον οὖν παρὰ τοῦ νοητοῦ κόσμου ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίει οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον, καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν καὶ κενοῦ, εἶθ' ὕδατος ἀσωμάτου οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἑβδόμου φωτὸς, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα, &c. "The Creator first of all made an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth; the ideas of air and vacuum; incorporeal water and air; and last of all light, which was also the incorporeal and intelligible paradigm of the sun and stars, and that from whence their sensible light is derived." But Philo does not plainly make these ideas of the intelligible and archetypal world to be so many distinct substances and animals, much less gods; though he somewhere[1] takes notice of those, who admiring the pulchritude of both these worlds, did not only deify the whole of them, but also their several parts; that is, the several ideas of the intelligible world also, as well as the greater parts of the sensible, an intelligible heaven and earth, sun and moon; they pretending to worship those divine ideas in all these sensible things. Which high-flown Platonic notion, as it gave sanctuary and protection to the grossest and foulest of all the pagan superstitions and idolatries, when the Egyptians would worship brute animals, and other Pagans all the things of nature (inanimate substances, and mere accidents), under a pretence of worshipping the divine ideas in them; so did it directly tend to absolute impiety, irreligion, and atheism; there being few that could entertain any thoughts at all of those eternal ideas, and scarcely any who could thoroughly persuade themselves that these had so much reality in them as the sensible things of nature; as the idea of a house in the mind of an architect hath not so much reality in it as a material house made up of stones, mortar, and timber; so that their devotion must needs sink down wholly into those sensible things, and themselves naturally at length fall into this atheistic persuasion, that the good things of nature are the only deities.

* P. 6.

[1] De Confusione Linguarum, p. 345.

Here therefore have we a multitude of pagan gods supermundane and eternal (though all depending upon one supreme), the gods by them properly called νοητοὶ, "intelligible," or the divine ideas. And we cannot but account this for another depravation of the ancient Mosaic cabala of the trinity, that the second hypostasis thereof is made to be the archetypal world, and all the divine ideas as so many distinct substances, animals, and gods; that is, not one God, but a whole world of gods.[2]

[2] I confess, if we insist upon the words of the Platonists, and deal with them according to strict justice, the whole of the corollaries here laid to their charge by Dr. Cudworth may fairly be attributed to them. I know also that some of this sect entertained opinions so glaringly absurd and ridiculous, that any one who should attempt to defend or excuse them, would do great injustice to his own intellect and to truth itself. But if the discipline of this school be considered generally and as a whole, and not estimated from the commentaries of this or that writer, something perhaps will admit of being said in their favour. It is true that what they believed to be the second hypostasis of the divinity was called by them the *archetypal* or *intelligible world*: which doctrine, if taken strictly, is very foolish and absurd. For no one would be able to understand how the exemplar of this world, being compounded and made up of ideas, can be a divine person. But if we examine a little more minutely the dogmas and language of the more intelligent members of this sect, we shall find that they did not assert this in the strict and proper sense. These obscure masters mean nothing more than this: that the form of what they call the archetypal world lies hid in the second divine hypostasis, in the same way, for example, as the form and idea of the books De Natura Deorum existed in the mind of Cicero before he committed them to writing, or that in this hypostasis are the forms and images of all things which can in any manner take place or exist. This being the case, the first charge brought against this sect by Dr. Cudworth falls to the ground, that the second person of their trinity was a thing compounded and made up of many natures, or a certain heap and congeries of gods. As the learned Doctor himself, whose mind is stored with infinite notions and images of things, is not on that account regarded by any one in his senses as a man concreted and compounded of multifarious natures, so neither is it right to consider the divine reason or the second person of the Platonic trinity as a certain congeries of gods, because it contains the forms and images of all things of which this world is composed. I am now assuming this second hypostasis of their trinity to be a person properly and truly so called, reserving to myself the inquiry in another place, whether or not there is more truth in the conjecture of those who suppose it to be merely a divine virtue personified by philosophers.

But some will say: that all the forms, or *ideas*, were called gods by this sect, and consequently that no one can doubt but that this second person we are speaking of contained in his bosom an immense crowd of gods. I confess, indeed, that some passages can be produced wherein all the forms of things are called gods. In the first place, however, these are very few in number; in the next place, they are taken solely from those philosophers, of this sect, who seem to have run mad with these very conceits; and lastly, they are unquestionably figurative. Indeed, I can by no means imagine that any man in his right mind ever seriously believed, that the form and image of a tree, or a fox, or a lion, although eternal, and generated from the divine reason itself, is in the proper and strict sense a god. If there have been any Platonists, whose doctrines admit of being expounded in no other manner than this, which however I doubt, I should rather have to do with Phrygians, who are late indeed in becoming wise, but nevertheless do become so at last, than with such philosophers, who I am certain did not understand the meaning of their own words.

But still the Platonists all speak of νοητοὶ, or "intelligible" gods; and what else are these than the forms or ideas of things? So indeed among others, asserts the learned Doctor, in order to add weight to his opinion. But here again I am at issue with him. I will explain in three words what these νοητοὶ, or "intelligible" gods are according to the doctrine of the Platonists, provided the extreme obscurity of this sect has allowed me to ascertain their meaning. The νοητοὶ gods are not generally the forms and images of all things whatever, but of those only, which the Platonists

But over and besides all this, some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans did further deprave and adulterate the ancient Hebrew or Mosaic cabala of the Trinity (the certain rule whereof is now only the scriptures of the New Testament), when they concluded, that as from the third hypostasis of their trinity, called ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, "the first soul," there were innumerable other particular souls derived, namely the souls of all inferior animals, that are parts of the world: so in like manner, that from their second hypostasis, called ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, "the first mind or intellect," there were innumerable other μερικοὶ Νόες, "particular minds," or intellects substantial derived, superior to the first soul; and not only so, but also, that from that first and highest hypostasis of all, called Τὸ ἕν, and Τἀγαθὸν, "the one," and "the good," there were derived likewise many particular Ἑνάδες and Ἀγαθότητες, "unities" and "goodnesses substantial," superior to the first intellect. Thus Proclus in his Theologic Institutions:[3] Μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον, ἑνάδες· καὶ μετὰ νοῦν τὸν πρῶτον, νόες· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαὶ· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις. "After the first one (and from it), there are many particular Henades or unities; after the first Intellect and from it, many particular Noes, minds or intellects; after the first Soul, many particular and derivative souls; and lastly, after the universal Nature, many particular natures, and spermatic reasons. Where it may be obiter observed, that these Platonists supposed, below the universal Psyche, or mundane soul, a universal φύσις, or "substantial nature" also; but so as that besides it there were other particular λόγοι σπερματικοὶ, "seminal reasons," or plastic principles also.

As for these Noes, and that besides the first universal mind or intellect, there are other particular minds or intellects substantial, a rank of beings not only immutably good and wise, but also every way immoveable, and therefore above the rank of all souls that are self-moveable beings; Proclus was not singular in this, but had the concurrence of many other Platonists with

ranked in the number of gods. [In Porphyry, De Abstinentia, lib. 2. sec. 34. p. 75, the νοητοὶ gods seem to be real gods, who confer benefits upon mortals. They are opposed to statues: from which it would appear that they are deities, which are to be comprehended by thought alone.] It was an axiom of this sect, that there are in God eternal models and forms of all the things that constitute the universe. But many parts of this universe, especially the stars, sun, moon, &c., which they supposed to possess soul and life, were regarded by them as gods. Hence they necessarily supposed also that the forms and images of these gods had existed from eternity in the divine mind. These forms and images of deities are those gods which the Platonic school calls νοητοὶ. Such vagaries of idle minds, absurd and ridiculous as they are, would little deserve the attention bestowed upon them by the learned Doctor, were it not that even Christians are to be found, who abuse them to the corruption of the truth and for acorns like these almost reject the fruit of true wisdom.

[3] These are appended to Proclus' Introduction to the Platonic Theology, and consist of 211 chapters. The words here quoted occur cap. 11. p. 426.

him; amongst whom Plotinus[4] may seem to be one, from this passage of his besides others: Ὅτι ἀθάνατοι δὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ, καὶ νοῦς πᾶς, ἐν ἄλλοις διὰ πλειόνων εἴρηται, "That souls are immortal, and every mind or intellect, we have elsewhere largely proved." Upon which words Ficinus thus: Hîc, et suprà et infrà sæpè, per verba Plotini notabis, plures esse mentium animarumque substantias inter se distinctas, quamvis inter eas unio sit mirabilis, "Here, and from many other places, before and after, you may observe that, according to Plotinus, there are many substantial minds, distinct from souls, though there be a wonderful union betwixt them." Moreover, that there was also above these nocs, or immoveable but multiform minds, not only one perfect Monad, and first Good, but also a rank of many particular Henades or Monades, and Agathotetes, was, besides Proclus and others, asserted by Simplicius also:* Ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν πάντα παράγει, τά τε πρῶτα, καὶ τὰ μέσα, καὶ τὰ ἔσχατα· ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἑαυτῷ παράγει, μιὰ ἀγαθότης πολλὰς ἀγαθότητας, καὶ μία ἑνὰς ἡ ὕπερ πάσας, πολλὰς ἑνάδας, "The highest good (saith he) produceth all things from himself, in several ranks and degrees; the first, the middle, and the last or lowest of all. But the first and the next to himself doth he produce like himself, one goodness many goodnesses, and one unity or henade many henades." And that by these Henades and Autoagathotetes he means substantial beings, that are conscious of themselves, appears also from these following words:† Τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ παραγομένων, διὰ τὸ πρὸς αὐτό ὁμόφυες, οὐκ ἐξέστη τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ, ἀκίνητα ὄντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ ἀεὶ μακαριότητι ἱδρυμένα, οὐκ ἐνδεῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅτι αὐτοαγαθότητές εἰσι, "Those beings, which are first produced from the first good, by reason of their sameness of nature with him, are immoveably and unchangeably good, always fixed in the same happiness, and never indigent of good or falling from it, because they are all essential goodnesses." Where afterward he adds something concerning the νόες also, that though these were a rank of lower beings, and not αὐτοαγαθὰ, not essentially goodnesses, but only by participation; yet, being by their own nature also immoveable, they can never degenerate, nor fall from that participation of good. Notwithstanding which, we must confess, that some of these Platonists seem to take the word Henades sometimes in another sense, and to understand

[4] Ennead b. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 653. But it will require much ingenuity to prove from these words of Plotinus, that this philosopher was addicted to all those metaphysical subtleties in which Proclus wonderfully delighted. Plotinus is not a man that I should feel disposed to praise, or consider never to have violated the laws of sound and pure reason. On the contrary, I am aware he is frequently so hurried away by a sort of philosophic fury as almost to lose his understanding. But still he is much more perspicuous than Proclus, and does not abound with so many absurd conceits.

* In Epict. Ench. p. 9. † P. 11.

nothing else thereby but the intelligible idea before mentioned; though the ancient Platonists and Pythagoreans were not wont to call these unities, but numbers.

And now have we discovered more of the Pagans' inferior gods, supermundane and eternal, viz. besides those νοητοὶ θεοί, those "intelligible gods;" troops of Henades and Autoagathotetes, unities and goodnesses; and also of Noes, immoveable minds or intellects; or, as they frequently call them, θεοὶ ἑνιαῖοι, and θεοὶ νοεροί, "henadical (or monadical) gods," and "intellectual gods."[5]

But since these Noes, or νοεροὶ θεοί, are said to be all of them in their own nature a rank of beings above souls, and therefore superior to that first soul, which is the third hypostasis of this trinity; as all those Henades or ἑνιαῖοι θεοί, those simple monadical gods, are likewise yet a higher rank of beings above the Noes, and therefore superior to the second hypostasis also, the first mind; and yet all these Henades and Noes, however supposed by these philosophers to be eternal, forasmuch as they are particular beings only, and not universal, cannot be placed higher than in the rank of creatures; it follows from hence unavoidably, that both the second and third hypostasis of this trinity, as well the first mind as the first soul, must be accounted creatures also; because no created being can be superior to any thing uncreated. Wherefore Proclus, and some others of those Platonists, plainly understood this trinity no otherwise, than as certain scale or ladder of beings in the universe; or a gradual descent of things from the first or highest, by steps downward, lower and lower, so far as to the souls of all animals. For which cause, Proclus to make up this scale complete, adds to these three ranks and degrees, below that third of souls, a fourth of natures also; under which there lies nothing but the passive part of the universe, body and matter. So that, their whole scale of all that is above body was indeed not a trinity, but a quaternity, or four ranks and degrees of beings, one below another; the first of Henades or Unities, the second of Noes, Minds or Intellects, the third of Souls, and the last of Natures; these being, as it were, so many orbs and spheres, one within and below another. In all which several ranks of being, they supposed one first universal, and unparticipated, as the head of each respective rank, and many particular, or participated ones: as one first universal Henade, and many secondary particular Henades; one first universal Nous, Mind or Intellect, and many secondary and particular Noes or Minds; one first univeral Soul, and many particular souls; and lastly, one universal Nature, and many particular natures. In which scale of beings,

[5] On these gods see Proclus, Theolog. Platonic. lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 38, &c.

they deified, besides the first Τὸ ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, "one" and "good," not only the first mind, and the first soul, but also those other particular Henades and Noes universally; and all particular souls above human: leaving out, besides them and inferior souls, that fourth rank of natures, because they conceived that nothing was to be accounted a god but what was intellectual and superior to men. Wherein, though they made several degrees of gods, one below another, and called some ἀϊδίους, and some γεννητοὺς, some "eternal," and some "generated," or made in time; yet did they no where clearly distinguish betwixt the Deity properly so called, and the creature, nor show how far in this scale the true Deity went, and where the creature began. But as it were melting the Deity by degrees, and bringing it down lower and lower, they made the juncture and commissure betwixt God and the creature so smooth and close, that where they indeed parted was altogether undiscernible; they rather implying them to differ only in degrees, or that they were not absolute but comparative terms, and consisted but in more and less. All which was doubtless a gross mistake of the ancient cabala of the Trinity.[6]

[6] The learned Doctor inveighs with equal force and justice against these metaphysical refinements of the modern Platonists, which are of themselves futile and obscure, and if accurately examined border closely upon the impious opinion of those who deny any difference between God and the universe of things. But still in canvassing the whole theology and philosophy of this sect, it appears to me we ought to lay it down as a rule, that their sayings are to be understood in a milder sense than the words at first view might seem to require: which if taken in their ordinary acceptation certainly savour of the rankest folly. The diction employed by this sect is peculiar, and far removed from the received usage of language, from not observing which learned men have ascribed to them the most foolish opinions, to which however they seem to have been strangers. Despising and neglecting almost all corporeal things, and wholly absorbed in contemplation, these philosophers cared about nothing but the forms, notions, and ideas of things, of which, most fertile as were their imaginations, they invented not a few distinctions. But the more easily to philosophize upon these notions and models of things, it was their custom to transform the notions of their own mind into persons and gods, and to speak of them no otherwise than as of gods and animals. The same, we may observe, obtains with our own philosophers, who frequently represent the forms and notions of things conceived in the mind as self-existent natures, and discourse of the virtues, of that which is called beautiful, good, just, infinite, exactly as though they were discoursing of men. He who does not keep this constantly before his eyes in reading the books of the Platonists, will sometimes, I am afraid, be a very imperfect interpreter of them. And in this light, in my opinion, ought we to view all that Proclus and his class tell us about the *essential*, *intellectual*, *henisean*, and I know not what other gods. To look at the words themselves one might swear they were treating of gods truly so called, and of self-existent natures; but if we examine the whole tenor and context of their doctrine, and inquire what they say of these gods, it will soon become apparent that they speak figuratively, and clothe mere notions in the dress of persons and gods. In a word, the whole of these Platonic gods are nothing but the notions and multiform ideas of things in the divine intelligence. For such was the boldness of this sect, that they scrupled not to meddle with divine intelligence itself, and like mathematicians with their rod and sand, to describe the infinite science of the Supreme Being by their petty distinctions and unmeaning words. But I shall readily forego this opinion if convinced to the contrary by any one who has read their principal authors: nay, I should be inclined even to agree with those who, on well considering the matter, may conclude that these

This is therefore that Platonic trinity, which we oppose to the Christian, not as if Plato's own trinity, in the very essential constitution thereof, were quite a different thing from the Christian; itself in all probability having been at first derived from a divine or Mosaic cabala; but because this cabala (as might well come to pass in a thing so mysterious and difficult to be conceived), hath been by divers of these Platonists and Pythagoreans misunderstood, depraved, and adulterated, into such a trinity, as confounds the differences between God and the creature, and removes all the bounds and land-marks betwixt them; sinks the Deity lower and lower by degrees (still multiplying of it, as it goes), till it have at length brought it down to the whole corporeal world; and when it hath done this, is not able to stop there neither, but extends it further still to the animated parts thereof, stars and demons; the design or direct tendency thereof being nothing else but to lay a foundation for infinite polytheism, cosmolatry (or world-idolatry), and creature-worship. Where it is by the way observable, that these Platonic Pagans were the only public and professed champions against Christianity; for though Celsus were suspected by Origen to have been indeed an Epicurean, yet did he at least personate a Platonist too. The reason whereof might be, not only because the Platonic and Pythagoric sect was the divinest of all the Pagans, and that which approached nearest to Christianity and the truth (however it might by accident therefore prove the worst, as the corruption of the best thing), and by that means could with greatest confidence hold up the bucklers against Christianity and encounter it; but also because the Platonic principles, as they might be understood, would, of all other, serve most plausibly to defend the pagan polytheism and idolatry.[7]

Concerning the Christian Trinity, we shall here observe only three things; first, that it is not a trinity of mere names or words, nor a trinity of partial notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing. For such a kind of trinity as this might be conceived in that first Platonic hypostasis itself, called Τὸ ἓν and Τἀγαθὸν, "the one" and "the good," and per-

philosophers by understanding too much at last came to that pass that they did not understand themselves. Compare, however, what Dr. Cudworth a little afterwards remarks respecting the style of the Platonists, in their vindication.

[7] On the philosophy of the Celsus, whom Origen chastises, it is my intention to treat professedly in a comment on the books of Origen. Dr. Cudworth is correct in his remark, that this foe of the Christians did not belong to the Epicureans. Origen, no doubt, made one Celsus out of two, and confounded the Epicurean with the Platonic Celsus. The principal cause why scarcely any philosophers except the Platonists wrote against the earliest Christians, was unquestionably that at that time this sect overspread almost the whole of the Roman world, the others being neglected, or nearly extinct. The reasons, however, here given by the learned Doctor are deserving of attention.

ıps also in that first person of the Christian Trinity; namely, ' goodness, and understanding or wisdom, and will or active ›wer, three inadequate conceptions thereof. It is true, that lotinus was so high flown as to maintain, that the first and ghest principle of all, by reason of its perfect unity and simplity, is above the multiplicity of knowledge and understanding, ıd therefore does not so much as νοεῖν ἑαυτὸ, in a proper sense, understand itself;" notwithstanding which, this philosopher imself adds, that it cannot therefore be said to be ignorant nor nwise neither; these expressions belonging only to such a eing as was by nature intellectual,* νοῦς μὲν γὰρ μὴ νοῶν, νοήτος, intellectus, nisi intelligat, demens meritò judicatur. ınd he seems to grant, that it hath a certain simple clarity and rightness in it, superior to that of knowledge; as the body of he sun has a certain brightness superior to that secondary light hich streameth from it; and that it may be said to be νόησις ὐτή, "knowledge itself," that does not understand, as motion self does not move. But this can hardly be conceived by rdinary mortals, that the highest and most perfect of all beings hould not fully comprehend itself, the extent of its own fecunity and power, and be conscious of all that proceedeth from it, hough after the most simple manner. And therefore this highown conceit of Plotinus (and perhaps of Plato himself too) has een rejected by latter Platonists, as fantastical and unsafe; for hus Simplicius:† Ἀλλὰ καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχειν ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀκροτάτην, ὐ γὰρ ἄν τι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ παραγομένων ἀγνοήσειεν, "But it ıust needs have also the most perfect knowledge, since it cannot e ignorant of any thing that is produced from itself."[8] And ;t. Austin,[9] in like manner, confutes that assertion of some Christians, that the Λόγος, or "eternal Word," was that very ›isdom and understanding, by which the Father himself was ›ise; as making it nothing but an inadequate conception of God.

* Ennead 6. lib. 7. c. 37. [P. 729.] † In Epict. p. 235.

[8] This may be taken as a specimen of the bombast and insane philosophy of the 'latonists. Plotinus wanted merely to inculcate what is acknowledged by every one aving a right conception of the divine nature, that God does not understand like ıiserable mortals, but in a much more perfect manner, and cannot be comprehended y any human intellect. If he had expressed himself so, he would have been underood by every body, and would have given no cause for censure. But the Platonists ould not condescend to talk like the rest of men, nor admit any thing to be too reconite and abstruse for them to explain and make clear. Hence, if they had nothing to ıy on the subjects themselves, they amused mankind with obscure words, and conealed their ignorance in splendid figures and similitudes. In the last century, Thom. lobbes imitated Plotinus, and denied knowledge, properly so called, in God; which, lthough admitting of easy explanation, it is much safer to leave alone, as it may give se to the gravest errors.

[9] See the beginning of lib. 6. De Trinitate, cap. 2. 3. &c. p. 598. 599. tom. 8. opp. here he is arguing against those who asserted the Son to be that wisdom which is in ıe Father: from which doctrine St. Augustine reminds them it would follow, that the ıe Father without the Son is not wise.

But this opinion, that the Christian Trinity is but a trinity of words, or mere logical notions, and inadequate conceptions of God, hath been plainly condemned by the Christian church in Sabellius and others. Wherefore we conclude it to be a trinity of hypostases, or substances, or persons.

The second thing that we observe concerning the Christian Trinity is this, that though the second hypostasis, or person thereof, were begotten from the first; and the third proceedeth both from the first and second; yet are neither this second nor third creatures; and that for these following reasons. First, because they were not made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, as Arius maintained, that is, from an antecedent non-existence brought forth into being, nor can it be said of either of them, Erat quando non erant, "That once they were not," but "Their going forth was from eternity," and they were both coëve and co-eternal with the father. Secondly, because they were not only eternal emanations (if we may so call them) but also necessary, and therefore are they both also absolutely undestroyable and unannihilable. Now, according to true philosophy and theology, no creature could have existed from eternity, nor be absolutely undestroyable; and therefore that which is both eternal and undestroyable, is ipso facto uncreated. Nevertheless, because some philosophers have asserted (though erroneously) both the whole world's eternity, and its being a necessary emanation also from the deity, and consequently, that it is undestroyable; we shall therefore further add, that these second and third hypostases or persons of the holy Trinity are not only therefore uncreated, because they were both eternal and necessary emanations, and likewise are unannihilable; but also because they are universal, each of them comprehending the whole world, and all created things under it: which universality of theirs is the same thing with infinity; whereas all other beings, besides this holy Trinity, are particular and finite. Now we say, that no intellectual being, which is not only eternal, necessarily existent, or undestroyable, but also universal or infinite, can be a creature.

Again, in the last place, we add, that these three hypostases, or persons, are truly and really one God. Not only because they have all essentially one and the same will, according to that of Origen:* Θρησκεύομεν οὖν τὸν πατέρα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὄντα δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα, ἓν δὲ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς βουλήσεως, "We worship the Father of truth, and the Son the truth itself, being two things as to hypostasis, but one in agreement, consent, and sameness of will:" but also because they are physically (if we may so speak) one also; and have a mutual περιχώρησις and

* Con. Cels. p. 386. [Liv. 8.]

ἐνύπαρξις, "inexistence" and "permeation of one another," according to that of our Saviour Christ, "I am in the Father, and the Father in me; and the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." We grant indeed, that there can be no instance of the like unity or oneness found in any created beings; nevertheless, we certainly know from our very selves, that it is not impossible for two distinct substances, that are of a very different kind from one another, the one incorporeal, the other corporeal, to be so closely united together as to become one animal and person; much less therefore should it be thought impossible for these three divine hypostases to be one God.

We shall conclude here with confidence, that the Christian Trinity, though there be very much of mystery in it, yet is there nothing at all of plain contradiction to the undoubted principles of human reason, that is, of impossibility to be found therein, as the Atheists would pretend, who cry down all for nonsense and absolute impossibility, which their dull stupidity cannot reach to, or their infatuated minds easily comprehend, and therefore even the Deity itself. And it were to be wished, that some religionists and Trinitarians did not here symbolize too much with them, in affecting to represent the mystery of the Christian Trinity as a thing directly contradictious to all human reason and understanding; and that perhaps out of design to make men surrender up themselves and consciences, in a blind and implicit faith, wholly to their guidance; as also to debauch their understandings by this means, to the swallowing down of other opinions of theirs, plainly repugnant to human faculties. As who should say, he that believes the Trinity (as we all must do, if we will be Christians), should boggle at nothing in religion never after, nor scrupulously chew or examine any thing; as if there could be nothing more contradictious, or impossible to human understanding propounded, than this article of the Christian faith.[10]

But for the present, we shall endeavour only to show, that the Christian Trinity (though a mystery, yet) is much more agreeable to reason, than that Platonic, or Pseudo-Platonic trinity before described; and that in those three particulars then mentioned. For first, when those Platonists and Pythagoreans interpret their third god, or last hypostasis of their trinity, to be either the world, or else a ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, such an "immediate soul" thereof, as, together with the world its body, make up one animal god; as there is plainly too great a leap here betwixt their second and third hypostasis, so do they debase the Deity

[10] In these words he most justly censures the English Catholics, who at that time, in order to recommend their absurd dogma of transubstantiation, were greatly exaggerating the difficulties connected with the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus are these patrons of error accustomed to seek the interests and welfare of their own sect at the expense even of the Christian religion.

therein too much, confound God and the creature together, laying a foundation, not only for cosmo-latry, or world-idolatry in general, but also for the grossest and most sottish of all idolatries, the worshipping of the inanimate parts of the world themselves, in pretence as parts and members of this great mundane animal and sensible god.

It is true indeed, that Origen and some others of the ancient Christian writers have supposed, that God may be said, in some sense, to be the soul of the world. Thus in that book, Peri Archōn,* Sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris aptatum est, et ab una anima continetur, ita et universum mundum, velut animal quoddam immane, opinandum puto; quod quasi ab una animâ, virtute Dei ac ratione teneatur. Quod etiam à sanctâ scriptura indicari arbitror per illud, quod dictum est per prophetam; Nonne cœlum et terram ego repleo, dicit Dominus? et cœlum mihi sedes, terra autem scabellum pedum meorum; et quod Salvator, cum ait, Non esse jurandum neque per cœlum, quia sedes Dei est, neque per terram, quia scabellum pedum ejus. Sed et illud quod ait Paulus, Quoniam in ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus. Quomodo enim in Deo vivimus, et movemur, et sumus, nisi quod in virtute suâ universum constringit et continet mundum? "As our own body is made up of many members, and contained by one soul, so do I conceive, that the whole world is to be looked upon as one huge, great animal, which is contained, as it were, by one soul, the virtue and reason of God. And so much seems to be intimated by the scripture in sundry places; as in that of the prophet, Do not I fill heaven and earth? And again, Heaven is my throne, and the earth my footstool. And in that of our Saviour, Swear not at all: neither by heaven, because it is the throne of God; nor by the earth, because it is his footstool. And lastly, in that of Paul to the Athenians, For in him we live, and move, and have our being. For how can we be said to live, and move, and have our being in God, unless because he, by his virtue and power, does constringe and contain the whole world? and how can heaven be the throne of God, and the earth his footstool, unless his virtue and power fill all things both in heaven and earth?" Nevertheless, God is here said by Origen to be but quasi anima, "as it were the soul of the world:" as if he should have said, that all the perfection of a soul is to be attributed to God, in respect of the world; he quickening and enlivening all things, as much as if he were the very soul of it, and all the parts thereof were his living members. And perhaps the whole Deity ought not to be looked upon, according to Aristotle's notion thereof, merely as ἀκίνητος οὐσία, an "immoveable essence;"

* Lib. 2. cap. 1.

for then it is not conceivable, how it could either act upon the world, or be sensible of any thing therein; or to what purpose any devotional addresses should be made by us to such an unaffectible, inflexible, rocky and adamantine Being. Wherefore all the perfection of a mundane soul may perhaps be attributed to God, in some sense, and he called, quasi anima mundi, "as it were the soul thereof:" though St. Cyprian[1] would have

[1] The learned Doctor is mistaken: for St. Cyprian neither entertained this opinion respecting the Holy Spirit, nor consistently could have entertained it. In his book, Ad Demetrianum, p. 216. 217. he writes that the world is daily getting old, and every year loses much of its pristine virtue. Which doctrine cannot well be maintained by one who supposes the power which animates and rules the world to be the Holy Ghost itself. The truth is, that opinion was put forth in a sermon on the Holy Ghost, by Ernaldus or Arnaldus, an abbè living in the twelfth century, and published in a book, De Cardinalibus Christi Operibus; which is usually appended to the works of St. Cyprian; and formerly, when the art of criticism had as yet made but little progress, was universally ascribed to him: hence arose the error. In Dr. Cudworth's time, however, it had already been shown by learned men, that it could by no means be a work of St. Cyprian's, and P. Labbe, De Scriptor. Ecclesiæ, quos attigit Bellarminus, tom. 1. p. 239, on the testimony of many manuscripts, had named Arnaldus as its author. Compare Casim. Oudinus, Comm. de Scriptor. Eccles. tom. 2. p. 1291. This Arnaldus, in the first place, declares the Spirit, which, as Moses records, Gen. i. 2. brooded over the face of the waters, to be the Holy Ghost; which opinion he holds in common with many other early writers; on whom consult J. Casp. Suicer, Thesaur. Ecclesiast. tom. 2. verb. πνεῦμα, p. 755. 756. and Dan. Petavius, Dogm. Theol. tom. 3. De Opificio sex Dier. lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 5. p. 128. In the next place, he tells us that the ancient philosophers had some sort of idea of this, and therefore spoke of a *soul of the world*, whose power is diffused through the universe: this soul of the world being the Holy Ghost under another name. The same opinion was entertained by many of those who, at a later period, contended for the truth of the Christian religion, and sought for traces of the Trinity among pagan nations, as St. Augustine, Steuchus Eugubinus, Phil. Mornæus, and others; of whom it is not now our intention to say any thing. He then boldly asserts the Holy Ghost to be that power or spirit which confines, contains, animates, rules and vivifies all things. Hic Spiritus Sanctus. omnium viventium anima, ita largitate sua se omnibus abundanter infundit, ut habeant omnia rationabilia et irrationabilia secundum genus suum ex eo, quod sunt, et quod in suo ordine suæ naturæ competentia agunt: non quod ipse sit substantialis anima singulis, sed in se singulariter manens de plenitudine sua distributor magnificus proprias efficientias singulis dividit et largitur, "This Holy Spirit, the soul of all living things, thus by its own bounteousness, abundantly infuses itself into all things, rational and irrational, according to their own kind, so that all things have from it their existence, and their acting in their own order conformably to their own nature: not that it is the substantial soul in each, but remaining singly in itself, the magnificent dispenser of its own fulness, it distributes and gives to each their proper efficiencies." This was written in the twelfth century, by a man famed for his sanctity; in which century, however, the dogma was severely censured in others, and branded as infamous. So true it is, that two who think alike do not, however, always think alike, and that in a question as to the truth or falsehood of opinions and doctrines, a great deal depends upon the authority and credit of the party who broaches them.

I fancy I shall render an acceptable and not unprofitable service to many, by briefly showing that this Arnaldus taught nothing new: especially since Dr. Cudworth regards this opinion as singular and confined to St. Cyprian, and the subject has not, to my recollection, been touched upon by any one of the writers who have explained the doctrines of the ancient Christians. [Ephræm. Syri Testim. in Assemanni Biblioth. Orient. tom. 1. This opinion undoubtedly flowed from the Jews. See Beausobre Hist. de Manich. tom. 2. p. 171.] Almost all those whose monuments have come down to us from the earliest ages of Christianity, suppose the supreme Deity to have associated with the matter of which the world is composed a certain spirit, by whose power and influence all things are generated, governed and sustained. Whether they

this properly to belong to the third hypostasis or person of the Christian Trinity, viz. the Holy Ghost, But there is something of imperfection also plainly cleaving and adhering to this

derived this doctrine from Platonic precepts, or invented it themselves, has nothing to do with the present question. On the nature of this spirit, they are of various opinions. Some maintain the soul or spirit of the world to be a nature created by God, and different from the third Person of the Divinity. But they are outweighed both in number and authority by those who deny this difference, and contend that the same spirit which animates and inspires the minds of holy men, controls and contains the universe. The former opinion was held by Theophilus of Antioch among others, who, lib. 2. Ad Autolyc. sect. 18. p. 139. thus writes: Πνεῦμα δὲ τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος, ὃ ἔδωκεν ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ζωογόνησιν τῇ κτίσει, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπῳ ψυχὴν τῷ λεπτῷ τὸ λεπτὸν συγκεράσας, "But that which brooded over the waters, he (Moses) calls Spirit, which God gave to the creation for the production of living things, as the soul to man, commingling the subtle with the subtle." Theophilus, therefore, supposed the same kind of soul to be in the world as in the body of man. But he held this spirit to be widely distinct from the Holy Spirit; as is sufficiently shown by these words of his, lib. 1. sect. 8. p. 25. Ἡ πᾶσα κτίσις περιέχεται ὑπὸ Πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ περιέχον σὺν τῇ κτίσει περιέχεται ὑπὸ χειρὸς Θεοῦ, "The whole creation is contained by the Spirit of God, and the containing Spirit, together with created things, is contained by the hand of God." Compare lib. 1. sect. 11. p. 31. This no one would consider to be applicable to the Holy Spirit. The same was held by Tatian, who, Orat. ad Græcos, cap. 7. p. 19. explicitly declares as follows: Πνεῦμα γὰρ τὸ διὰ τῆς ὕλης διῆκον, ἐλάττον ὑπάρχει τοῦ θειοτέρου Πνεύματος, "For the spirit which pervades matter is much inferior to the Divine Spirit." Irenæus supplies more obscure traces of the same opinion, which, to avoid prolixity, I shall not waste time by repeating. The latter opinion was maintained by many grave and eminent men, distinguished alike for purity of doctrine and for intellectual ability. We shall adduce the testimony of some of these, in order to establish the truth of what we have stated; beginning with St. Gregory, of Nazianzen, whose theological science most of the ancients consider to have been unsurpassed, and who does not hesitate to affirm that the Holy Spirit is that soul of the world discoursed of formerly by the Platonists and other philosophers, Orat. 37. de Spirit. S. tom. 1. opp. p. 595: Ἑλλήνων, says he, οἱ θεολογικώτεροι, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν προσεγγίσαντες, ἐφαντάσθησαν μὲν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, περὶ δὲ τὴν κλῆσιν διηνέχθησαν, νοῦν τοῦ πάντος, καὶ τὸν θύραθεν νοῦν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσαγορεύσαντες, "The more intelligent theologians of the Greeks, and such as come nearer to ourselves, had, in my opinion, a just conception (of the Holy Ghost), but disagreed as to the name, calling it the mind of the universe, the external mind, and the like." With him join St. Cyril, whom no one was supposed to excel in devotion to the pure doctrine, and who, Contra Julianum, lib. 8. p. 275. thus speaks: Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων λογάδες ἀντὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος τρίτον, ὡς ἔφην, εἰσκομίζουσι ψυχὴν, ὑφ' ἧς καὶ ἅπαν ψυχοῦται ζῶον, ἐνιείσης αὐτοῖς, τὴν ζωὴν, καὶ τὰς τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος δυνάμεις τε καὶ ἐνεργείας προσενεμήκασιν αὐτῇ, "The principal of the Greeks in place of the Holy Spirit introduce, as I have said, a third soul, by which all animals are animated and vivified, and have attributed to it the powers and energies of the Holy Spirit." This is sufficiently plain, and places it beyond all doubt, that St. Cyril held the Holy Spirit and the soul of the world, which fills all things with spirit and life to be the same. But I shall add, from what follows, where he illustrates and explains this opinion, some other words of his, even more clear and explicit than these: Κινεῖ γὰρ, says he, τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ συνέχει τὸ πᾶν, καὶ ψυχοῖ, καὶ ζωοποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρα φύσις ἐστὶ παρά γε τὴν τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἢ γοῦν τοῦ Υἱοῦ, ἀλλ' οἷον αὐτὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, κατά γέ, φημι, τὸ ὁμοφυὲς, ἤτοι τὸ ὁμοούσιον, "For the Holy Spirit moves all things that are moved, and contains, and animates, and vivifies the universe, neither is it another nature different from that of the Father or the Son, but as he is in us, namely, according to identity of nature or of substance." In the same century lived Æneas Gazæus, an acute and eminent Christian philosopher, who, in a Dialogue, entitled Theophrastus seu de Immortalitate Animæ, p. 55, philosophizes thus concerning the Holy Spirit: Πατὴρ ἅμα τῷ τόκῳ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἅγιον Πνεῦμα προήνεγκε.——καὶ τούτῳ τῷ Πνεύματι τά τε νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητὰ ἐμπνέων, δυνάμεως

notion of a mundane soul, besides something of paganity likewise, necessarily consequent thereupon, which cannot be admitted by us. Wherefore God, or the third divine hypostasis, cannot

πληροῖ, καὶ συνέχει, καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἕλκει· ἐπιστρέφει γὰρ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ πᾶν ἀνέλκει, οὗ ἂν ἐνάψηται, "The Father, together with the Son, produced the Holy Spirit of the same substance,——and inspiring all things, intellectual and sensual, with this Spirit, fills them with power, and contains and draws them to himself. For the Spirit reverts always to the Father, and draws with it every thing it is instilled into." A philosophy, it must be owned, sufficiently harsh and absurd, but familiar nevertheless to the times in which Æneas lived. At the close of the Dialogue, p. 83. he addresses to the Holy Spirit the following prayer, embodying the same doctrine: Ὦ Πνεῦμα Ἅγιον, δι' οὗ ὁ Θεὸς, ἅπασιν ἐμπνέων συνέχει, καὶ διασώζει, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ τέλειον ἄγει, "O Holy Spirit, by which God inspires, contains and preserves all things, and leads them to perfection." To these, who, in former times, were held free from all taint of heterodoxy, we shall add another, not equally pure, but yet erudite and not unacquainted with philosophy, the author of the Clementines, who wrote, I suspect, in the third century. For he entertains the same opinion although he represents it somewhat differently, supposing the soul or spirit not to reside in the whole universe, but in water, and by water to impart motion, life and health to all things. This spirit, which he supposes to be in water, he holds to be the spirit by means of which men are purified and regenerated in baptism, namely, the Holy Spirit. I shall quote some of his words from Homil. 12. sect. 24. p. 204. tom. 1. Patr. Apostol. Τὰ πάντα τὸ ὕδωρ ποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ὑπὸ πνεύματος κινήσεως τὴν γένεσιν λαμβάνει· τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τούτων ὅλων Θεοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει, "Water produces all things: but water receives the principle of motion from spirit; and spirit has its beginning from the God of the universe." Relying on this doctrine, he afterwards exhorts men to see that they are sprinkled with water according to the precept of the Saviour: for in water is the Holy Spirit, which not only generates and moves the whole nature of things, but also restrains in the mind the influence of all evil propensities: Διὸ προσέλθετε, ἔστι γάρ τι ἐκεῖ ἀπαρχῆς ἱλεῖμον, ἐπιφερόμενον τῷ ὕδατι, τοὺς βαπτιζομένους ἐπὶ τῇ τρισμακαρίᾳ ἐπονομασίᾳ καὶ ῥύεται τῆς ἐσομένης κολάσεως, "Come, therefore, for something merciful from the beginning is there (i. e. the Holy Spirit) borne upon the water, and frees those who are baptized, by a thrice happy invocation, from future punishment." Which argument this author considered to be most powerful towards rebutting those who at that time scoffed at Christians because they taught on the authority of holy writ, that by water men are thoroughly changed and obtain the hope of future life. There is no need, I conceive, of further evidences, although more are not wanting, to show that anciently many of the most eminent doctors of the Christian church assigned the same office to the Holy Spirit that philosophers ascribed to the soul of the world, and that this dogma was branded by no one with the stigma of heresy. The ardent desire which most of the early fathers were inflamed with, of identifying the philosophers, especially the Platonists, with the Christians, was the cause, if I mistake not, that prevented these good men from penetrating all the recesses of this doctrine; from which, by the law of consecution many things can be deduced not only absurd in themselves, but injurious to the Deity. But those of succeeding ages were so far from following their ancestors in this respect, that they on the contrary ranked all who asserted the Holy Spirit to be the soul of the world among the worst corruptors of the heavenly truth. Bernard, a contemporary with the Abbè Arnaldus, severely condemns this opinion in Abelard: Omitto, says he, Epistola 190. p. 1583. 1584. opp. quod dicit, . . . Spiritum Sanctum esse animam mundi: mundum juxta Platonem tanto excellentius animal esse, quanto meliorem animam habet, Spiritum Sanctum, ubi dum multum sudat, quomodo Platonem faciat Christianum, se probat ethnicum, "I pass over his asserting, ... that the Holy Spirit is the soul of the world: that the world according to Plato is an animal so much the more excellent, the better the soul it possesses, namely, the Holy Spirit; where, while he labours hard to make Plato a Christian, he proves himself a heathen." Jo. Sarisberiensis, a celebrated doctor of that age, gives a somewhat milder judgment; and yet he affirms, that those who profess such a sentiment respecting the Holy Spirit lie like the heathens. Metalogic. lib. 4. cap. 16. p. 897. Quod tamen, says he, aut errori gentilium accommodandum est, qui *animam mundi*

be called the soul of the world in this sense, as if it were so immersed thereinto, and so passive from it, as our soul is immersed into, and passive from its body; nor as if the world, and this soul together, made up one entire animal, each part whereof were incomplete alone by itself. And that God, or the third hypostasis of the Christian Trinity, is not to be accounted, in this sense, properly the soul of the world, according to Origen himself, we may learn from these words of his:* Solius Dei, id est, Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, naturæ, id proprium est; ut sine materiali substantia, et absque ulla corporeæ adjectionis societate, intelligatur subsistere, "It is proper to the nature of God alone, that is, of the Father, and of the Holy Ghost, to

. . . . mentiebantur esse *Spiritum Sanctum*, "Which, however, is either to be referred to the error of the Gentiles, who falsely asserted the *soul of the world to be the Holy Spirit.*" They who are aware of the high authority in which St. Bernard was always held will easily conceive that his opinion was most extensively adopted, and that from that period no one who consulted his own safety ventured to resuscitate the ancient doctrine respecting the Holy Spirit; in the condemnation of which they unquestionably would have been somewhat more cautious, if they had read the works of the early Christian fathers. Nevertheless, even after the repurgation of religion, one or two started forth out of the ranks of those philosophers, called *Paracelsists*, *Rosicrucians*, or *Fire-philosophers*, who attempted to revive this doctrine among many other conceits of the Platonic school. Of these I shall notice only Robt. Fludd, a mighty oracle of this class, who in various writings seems to have openly maintained that God himself, in particular the Holy Spirit, constitutes the soul of the world. Anima mundi, says he, in his book De Medicina Catholica, lib. 2. cap. 1. est purior naturæ catholicæ spiritus, lucis divinæ radiis immediate a monade æterna emanantibus formatus, vivificatus, atque amoris sacrosancti unione seu glutine cum ipsis in naturam quandam vivam et spiritualem redactus, "The soul of the world is a pure spirit of universal nature, formed and vivified by rays of divine light, emanating immediately from the eternal monad, and reduced with them by the union or cement of holy love into a living and spiritual nature." This doctrine has been eruditely chastised by Pet. Gassendi in his Examen Philosophiæ Fluddanæ, cap. 1. sect. 1. 11. 12. p. 222. &c. and cap. 2. sect. 13. p. 236. tom. 3. opp. Although Fr. Lanovius, Epistol. ad Marinum Mersennum in the same Gassendi, ibid. p. 267. affirms that Fludd's error in this matter would appear to consist in the mere form of expression; into the truth of which statement I am not now disposed to inquire. Others of this sect handle the subject somewhat more skilfully, or perhaps more clearly explain Fludd's opinion. They assert that the Holy Spirit made this world, or to use the words of J. Sperberus, a philosopher of some eminence in this school: Tanquam architectum, ideas in filio reconditas mundo typice impressisse et infixisse, "As an architect, typically impressed and imprinted upon the world the ideas hidden in his son." Also that the first operation of the Holy Spirit was the production of light, and that this light first produced by the Holy Spirit is the scul of the world. Hæc lux, says Sperberus in his Isagoge in Veram Triunius Dei et Naturæ Cognitionem, Hamb. 1674. 8vo. p. 2. est anima mundi catholica, vel est ipsa natura universalis. Quæ natura est fluvius ille ex Eden (hoc est, filio Dei, qui est patris voluptas et delicium, per Spiritum Sanctum in paradisum, hoc est, universum mundum) derivatus, "This light is the catholic soul of the world, or it is universal nature itself. Which nature is that river flowing out of Eden (that is, out of the Son of God, who is the pleasure and delight of the Father, through the Holy Spirit, into paradise, that is, into the whole world)." According to these, therefore, the soul of the world is not the Holy Spirit, but the first emanation which flowed from it. But let others ascertain what is the real opinion of this sect which surpasses the Platonists in obscurity of style, and speaks as if unwilling to be understood by those who wish to have clear and distinct notions of the mind expressed in clear and intelligible words.

* Περὶ Ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. c. 6.

subsist without any material substance, or body vitally united to it." Where Origen affirming, that all created souls, and spirits whatsoever, have always some body or other vitally united to them; and that it is the property only of the three persons of the holy Trinity, not to be vitally united to any body, as the soul thereof; whether this assertion of his be true or no (which is a thing not here to be discussed) he does plainly hereby declare, that God, or the third hypostasis of the Trinity, is not to be accounted, in a true and proper sense, the soul of the world.

And it is certain, that the more refined Platonists were themselves also of this persuasion; and that their third God, or divine hypostasis, was neither the whole world (as supposed to be animated) nor yet ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος, "the immediate soul of this mundane animal," but only ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, "a supermundane soul;" that is, such a thing as though it preside over the whole world, and take cognizance of all things in it, yet it is not properly an essential part of that mundane animal, but a being elevated above the same. For thus Proclus* plainly affirmeth, not only of Amelius, but also of Porphyrius himself, who likewise pretended to follow Plotinus therein: Μετὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀμέλιον ὁ Πορφύριος οἰόμενος τῷ Πλωτίνῳ συνᾴδειν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τὴν ὑπερκόσμιον ἀποκαλεῖ δημιουργὸν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν αὐτῆς, πρὸς ὃν ἀπέστραπται, τὸ αὐτοζῶον, ὡς εἶναι τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ κατὰ τοῦτον, "After Amelius, Porphyrius thinking to agree with Plotinus, calls the supermundane soul the immediate opificer or maker of the world, and that mind or intellect, to which it is converted, not the opificer himself, but the paradigm thereof." And though Proclus there makes a question, whether or no this was Plotinus' true meaning, yet Porphyrius is most to be credited herein, he having had such intimate acquaintance with him. Wherefore, according to these three Platonists, Plotinus, Amelius, and Porphyrius, the third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity is neither the world, nor the immediate soul of the mundane animal; but a certain supermundane soul, which also was δημιουργὸς, "the opificer and creator of the world," and therefore no creature. Now the corporeal world being supposed, by these Platonists also, to be an animal, they must therefore needs acknowledge a double soul, one ψυχὴν ἐγκόσμιον, "the immediate soul" of this "mundane animal," and another ψυχὴν ὑπερκόσμιον, "a supermundane soul," which was the third in their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, the proper and immediate opificer of the world. And the same, in all probability, was Plato's opinion also; and therefore that soul, which is the only Deity, that in his book of laws he undertakes to prove, was ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, a "supermundane soul," and not the same with that ψυχὴ

* In Timæum, p. 93. 94.

ἐγκόσμιος, "that mundane soul," whose "genesis," or "generation," is described in his Timæus; the former of them being a principle and eternal; and the latter made in time, together with the world, though said to be older than it, because, in order of nature, before it. And thus we see plainly, that though some of these Platonists and Pythagoreans either misunderstood, or depraved the Cabala of the trinity, so as to make the third hypostasis thereof to be the animated world, which themselves acknowledged to be ποίημα and δημιουργούμενον, "a creature" and "thing made;" yet others, of the refined of them, supposed this third hypostasis of their trinity to be not a mundane, but a supermundane soul, and δημιουργὸν, not a creature, but "creator" or "opificer of the world.[2]

And as for the second particular proposed; it was a gross absurdity in those Platonists also, to make the second, in their trinity of gods, and hypostases, not to be one God, or hypostasis, but a multitude of gods and hypostases; as also was that a monstrous extravagancy of theirs, to suppose the ideas, all of them, to be so many distinct substances and animals. Which, besides others, Tertullian in his book de Anima* thus imputes to Plato: Vult Plato esse quasdam substantias invisibiles, incorporales, supermundiales, divinas, et æternas, quas appellat ideas, id est, formas et exempla, et causas naturalium istorum manifestorum, et subjacentium corporalibus; et illas quidem esse veritates, hæc autem imagines earum, "Plato conceiveth, that there are certain substances, invisible, incorporeal, supermundial, divine and eternal; which he calls Ideas, that is, forms, exemplars and causes of all these natural and sensible things; they being the truths, but the other the images." Neither can it be denied, but that there are some odd expressions in Plato, sounding that way, who therefore may not be justified in this, nor I think in some other conceits of his, concerning these ideas: as when he contends, that they are not only the objects of science, but also the proper and physical causes of all things here below; as for example, that the ideas of similitude and dissimilitude are the causes of the likeness and unlikeness of all things to one another by their participation of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be at all doubted, but that Plato himself, and most of his followers very well understood, that these ideas were, all of them, really nothing else but the noëmata, or conceptions, of that one perfect intellect, which was their second hypostasis; and therefore they could not look upon them in good earnest, as so many distinct substances existing severally and apart by

[2] On this question: Whether or not Plato and his principal followers professed two souls of the world, one placed above the world, the other immersed in matter and combined with the world, we shall discourse in the sequel.

* P. 320. Rig.

themselves out of any mind, however they were guilty of some extravagant expressions concerning them. Wherefore, when they called them οὐσίας, "essences or substances" (as they are called in Philo ἀναγκαιόταται οὐσίαι, "the most necessary essences"), their true meaning herein was only this, to signify, that they were not such accidental and evanid things as our conceptions are; they being the standing objects of all science, at least, if not the causes also of existent things. Again, when they were by them sometimes called animals also, they intended only to signify thereby, that they were not mere dead forms, like pictures drawn upon paper, or carved images and statues. And thus Amelius[3*] the philosopher plainly understood that passage of St. John the Evangelist, concerning the eternal Λόγος, he pointing the words otherwise than our copies now do, ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, "that, which was made, in him was life:" this philosopher, glossing after this manner upon it, ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν, καὶ ζωὴν, καὶ ὂν πεφυκέναι, "in whom whatsoever was made, was living, and life, and true being." Lastly, no wonder, if from animals these ideas forthwith became gods too, to such men as took all occasions possible to multiply gods; in which there was also something of that scholastic notion, Quicquid est in Deo, est Deus, "Whatsoever is in God, is God." But the main thing therein was a piece of paganic poetry; these pagan theologers being generally possessed with that poetic humour of personating things and deifying them. Wherefore, though the ideas were so many titular gods to many of the Platonic pagans, yet did Julian himself, for example, who made the most of them, suppose them all συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐνυπάρχειν, "to co-exist with God and in-exist in him," that is, in the first mind, or second hypostasis of their trinity.[4]

[3] Apud Eusebium Præparat. Evangel. lib. 11. cap. 19. p. 540. This interpunctuation of the words of St. John was approved of by many enlightened members of the early church, and is adopted also by some of the moderns. Consult the authors mentioned by the venerable J. Christ. Wolf, in his Curæ Philologicæ ad Johannem, p. 783. There are some things which might be added to the observations of learned men on the subject; but I fear I have already become tedious by my numerous digressions. With the favour of Providence, therefore, I shall in another place bestow some diligence upon the solution of the question: Whether our present copies or those followed by Amelius give the more correct reading.

[*] So Clem. Al. St. Cyril, St. Aug. and other Latins.

[4] They who have paid any attention to the remarks offered by us a little above, on the peculiar style of expression adopted by the Platonists and its causes, will readily acknowledge our learned author's present defence of this sect to be reasonable and judicious. Not only the ancients but the moderns also are greatly at issue with one another upon the question whether the forms and ideas of things which Plato and his followers make a leading point in their philosophy are natures produced from the divine intelligence, and consequently existing separately out of God, or mere notions of the divine mind, and therefore having no such separate and external existence. A long array of authors of each of these opinions is enumerated by J. Brucker, a man unsurpassed in the present day in the study of philosophical history, Historia Doctrinæ de Ideis, sect. 1. sect. 5. p. 53. &c. who joins himself with those that suppose

Lastly, whereas Proclus, and others of the Platonists, intermingle many particular gods with those three universal principles or hypostases of their Trinity, as Noes, Minds, or Intellects

Plato's forms to be natures distinct and separate from the divine intelligence. The latter opinion is here adopted, and learnedly defended by Dr. Cudworth; with whom, after having bestowed no slight care upon the investigation of the Platonic principles, I do not hesitate to express my concurrence. This controversy will never be decided by the authorities and sayings of the ancients, nor indeed ought it to be so decided. For in the first place, the authorities here conflict with authorities, and as many learned and ingenious men are to be found on one side as on the other; and where evidence is so nicely balanced, nothing can be more difficult to a man, however acute and observant of the rules of fair reasoning he may be, than to determine which is to preferred. Again, the statements of others respecting the opinion of any philosopher do not explain what the philosopher himself meant, but merely show the sense in which his dogmas were understood by the author whose words are quoted. Lastly, a philosopher's own expressions and maxims are not always to be estimated from the ordinary power and meaning of words, but are very frequently to be expounded in a much milder sense than would appear at first view, from the general tenor of his doctrine, and from the peculiarity of style adopted by him. For, let it be observed in passing, none more readily incur reprehension, or are accused of graver errors, than those who philosophize upon things abstracted from men's eyes and senses, and cognizable to reason alone; who being unable to find in the popular language that store of words and phrases which is requisite towards expressing the contemplations and images of their own mind, however anxious they may be to make their thoughts intelligible to all, are compelled sometimes to attach a new and unusual power to words, sometimes to employ many words improperly, and in a sense unknown to the vulgar usage, and sometimes to have recourse to figures and metaphors, and to speak of mental images and notions no otherwise than of persons. Hence it frequently happens, when they meet with unthinking and inexperienced readers, that they are accused of the most pernicious errors, and charged with the gravest crimes, of which, however, they are sometimes altogether guiltless. I do not wish to be understood as advocating the cause of the Platonists, against those who consider them to have in many instances broached impious and absurd doctrines; for, by doing so, I should be liable to the charge of inconsistency, having so frequently pointed out the greatest folly and levity in this sect: my object is merely to show the necessity of great caution being exercised in expounding the opinions of others, especially of the more subtle and abstruse kind. Therefore, if regard be paid not so much to the words of Plato and the Platonists, which it must be acknowledged frequently betray great temerity, as to the whole nature and tenor of his discipline, most men I consider will feel disposed to adopt the opinion of Dr. Cudworth respecting their images and eternal forms of things. Indeed, when I see imputed to a man neither obtuse nor unlearned an opinion, which is altogether foolish and absurd, and at the same time not required by the rest of his doctrine, I cannot easily suffer myself to suppose that no injustice is done to him, although some passages of his may be adduced which seem clearly to substantiate such a charge. It would be better, I imagine, to put a more favourable interpretation upon passages of the kind, especially if others are to be found which bear out this interpretation, than to accuse a wise, acute, and erudite philosopher as the author and promulgator of flagitious and insane doctrines. Let us apply this to Plato, and his defenders will be in no lack of materials necessary for his vindication. That he was a philosopher gifted with a sagacious and discerning mind, and possessing no ordinary knowledge of things, will be denied by no one. But the opinion he is said to have entertained is so absurd and ridiculous, that, if expressed only in apt and perspicuous words, its folly would at once be apparent to every man not entirely destitute of common understanding. Any one indeed would be held by me in the light of an idle trifler who should seriously assert, that of the moon which illumines our nights, or of horses which draw our chariots, there exist eternal exemplars or ideas, which are substantial, animated, and external to the divine intelligence. The very word *idea* implies a certain notion or image present to the mind, and not a certain nature really existing and living; wherefore I should regard a man discoursing of a self-existent and animate idea, as ignorant of his own meaning, and as either misap-

superior to the first soul; and Henades and Agathotetes, Unities and Goodnesses superior to the first Intellect too; thereby making those particular beings, which must needs be creatures, superior to those hypostases that are universal and infinite, and by consequence creaturizing of them: this hypothesis of theirs, I say, is altogether absurd and irrational also; there being no created beings essentially good and wise, but all by participation, nor any immoveable natures amongst them, whose οὐσία is their ἐνέργεια, their "essence," their "operation;" but all mutable and changeable, and probably, as Origen and others of the fathers add, lapsible and peccable:* Nulla natura est, quæ non recipiat bonum et malum, exceptâ Dei naturâ, quæ bonorum omnium fons est; et Christi sapientia, sapientiæ enim fons est, et sapientia utique stultitiam recipere non potest; et justitia est, quæ nun-

prehending or perverting the notions and powers of words. Knowing what is meant by an *idea*, and what is meant by a *horse*, if any one says that the *idea of a horse* existed from all eternity, I can without difficulty understand him. But if he adds that this *idea of a horse* wanders about, lives and subsists independently in boundless space, or in the intellectual world, I hear things connected together which are in their whole nature distinct, and which no one would associate, who would not confound even and odd, straight and crooked, beautiful and deformed; of such a man's opinion, therefore, I am unable to form to myself any notion or conception. In short, although himself fancying he is saying something, he appears to me to say nothing. Neither would all this, however, prevent me from ascribing so foolish and futile an opinion to Plato, if I perceived that the rest of the philosophy inculcated by him required any thing of the kind to be instilled into the minds of his followers. For the most learned of men, I am aware, in order to support other dogmas once adopted by them, have not unfrequently broached opinions the most extravagant and senseless. But here I have been unable to observe this. Plato's sole object in being so diligent and copious in inculcating the doctrine of eternal ideas and images of things was to refute those who at that time supposed either the world itself to be God, or the nature of things to have been formed fortuitously; as is evident from his tenth Book De Legibus, and many other parts of his works. To restrain this class of men, it was sufficient to show that God, like a wise architect, before creating the world, designed in his mind, as it were, its entire form, and the forms and images of its various parts. But if he had added, that these forms were really generated from God, and long before the creation lived in a certain intelligible world, he would have afforded matter enough for cavil and ridicule to the men he was anxious to confute, but he would have brought forward nothing in aid of the cause he was advocating. Moreover, seeing that there occur in Plato and his disciples a great number of passages which show the meaning of this sect to have been simply, that the forms of all things existed in the divine intelligence from all eternity, as the form of any meditated work exists in the mind of a smith, I know of nothing more that should prevent us from acquitting, if not the school, at least its principal masters, of so absurd and insane an opinion. Not now to speak of other passages to the same effect, I should wish my readers to examine with attention what Plato says of the nature of ideas in the sixth Book De Republica, and what Proclus advances in his master's behalf in his Comm. 1. in Parmenidem. I am aware, high authorities, including Aristotle himself, can be appealed to in support of those most learned men who dissent from this opinion; with whom were I to wish to hold myself up in comparison, I should be as foolish as Plato would have been, if he supposed his ideas to be animals. I neither commend nor excuse that poetic and figurative style of expression indulged in by the Platonists, by which even perspicacious men have been so far misled as to regard ideas as persons. But neither the authority of the most weighty, nor the faults of careless writers, ought to deter us from bringing the truth to light, especially in a cause from which great help may be obtained towards a right discrimination upon matters of no ordinary importance.

* Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. c. 8. p. 685.

quam profecto injustitiam capiet; et verbum est vel ratio, quæ utique irrationalis effici non potest; sed et lux est, et lucem certum est, quod tenebræ non comprehendent. Similiter et natura Spiritus Sancti, quæ sancta est, non recipit pollutionem; naturaliter enim vel substantialiter sancta est. Siqua autem alia natura sancta est, ex assumptione hoc vel inspiratione Spiritus Sancti habet, ut sanctificetur, non ex suâ naturâ hoc possidens, sed ut accidens; propter quod et decidere potest, quod accidit, "There is no nature, which is not capable both of good and evil, excepting only the nature of God, who is the fountain of all good; and the wisdom of Christ, for he is the fountain of wisdom, and wisdom itself never can receive folly; he is also justice itself, which can never admit of injustice; and the reason and word itself, which can never become irrational; he is also the light itself, and it is certain that darkness cannot comprehend this light, nor insinuate itself with it. In like manner the nature of the Holy Ghost is such as can never receive pollution, it being substantially and essentially holy. But whatsoever other nature is holy, it is only such in way of participation and by the inspiration of this Holy Spirit; so that holiness is not its very nature and essence, but only an accident to it; and whatsoever is but accidental, may fail. All created beings therefore having but accidental goodness and wisdom, may degenerate and fall into evil and folly." Which of Origen's is all one, as if he should have said, there is no such rank of beings as Autoagathotetes, essential goodnesses, there being only one Being essentially good, or goodness itself. Nor no such particular created beings existing in nature, as the Platonists call Noes neither, that is, minds or intellects immoveable, perfectly and essentially wise, or wisdom itself, whose οὐσία is their ἐνεργεία, whose essence is their operation, and who consequently have no flux at all in them, nor successive action (only the eternal Word and Wisdom of God being such); who also are absolutely ununitable to any bodies. It is true, that Origen did sometimes make mention of Νόες, "minds" or "intellects," but it was in another sense, he calling all souls, as first created by God, and before their lapse, by that name; which was as much as if he should have said, though some of the Platonists talk much of their Noes, yet is there nothing answerable to that name, according to their notion of them; but the only Noes really existing in nature are unfallen, but peccable souls; he often concluding, that the highest rank of created beings are indeed no better than those which the Platonists commonly call ψυχαὶ, or "souls." By which souls he understood first of all, beings in their own nature self-moveable and active; whereas the Noes of the Platonists are altogether immoveable and above action. And then again, such beings or spirits incorporeal, as

t not abstractly and separately from all matter, as the Noes ıe Platonists were supposed to do, but are vitally unitable to es, so as, together with those bodies, to compound and make ıne animal. Thus, I say, Origen conceived even of the est angelical and arch-angelical orders, that they were all hem ψυχαὶ, "souls," united to bodies, but such as were , subtle and ethereal: however, he supposed it not im- ible for them to sink down into bodies, more gross and lent. And it is certain, that many of the ancient Christian ers concurred with Origen herein, that the highest created ts were no naked and abstract minds, but souls clothed with corporeal indument. Lastly, Origen's souls were also sup- l to be, all of them, endowed with liberum arbitrium, or e-will," and consequently to be self-improvable and self- irable; and no particular created spirits to be absolutely in own nature impeccable, but lapsible into vicious habits: eas the Platonic Noes are supposed to be such beings as l never fall or degenerate. And the generality of the stian writers seemed to have consented, or conspired with en in this also, they supposing him, who is now the prince evils, to have been once an angel of the highest order. Thus St. Jerome[5] determine: Solus Deus est, in quem peccatum cadit; cætera, cùm sint liberi arbitri, possunt in utramque m suam flectere voluntatem, "God is the only being that solutely incapable of sin; but all other beings, having free- in them, may possibly turn their will to either way;" that evil as well as to good. It is certain that God, in a sense erfection, is the most free agent of all, neither is contingent ty universally denied to him; but here it is made the only lege of God, that is, of the Holy Trinity, to be devoid of um arbitrium, namely, as it implieth imperfection, that is, ability and lapsibility in it.

is true, that some of the Platonic philosophers suppose, even in that rank of beings called by them Souls, though be not essentially immutable, but all self moveable and e, yet there are some of them of so high a pitch and ele- n, as that they can never degenerate, nor sink down into us habits. Thus Simplicius for one:* Ἀλλὰ αἱ μὲν πρῶται ψυχῶν. ἅτε προσεχῶς ὑπὸ αὐτοαγαθῶν παραχθεῖσαι, κᾶν ἔσχον ὀὺς ἐκεῖνα ὑφειμένον, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθότητες, ἀλλὰ ὀρέ- ιι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πλὴν ὡς συνγενεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸ, συμφυῶς τε

pistola 141. On this passage of St. Jerome, and other similar ones of the ancient consult Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theolog. tom. 3. de Opificio sex Dierum, cap. 13. sect. 9. p. 230. &c. On the opinions of Origen, which Dr. Cudworth ompares with the figments of the Platonists, it will be of advantage to read Pet. Huet's Origeniana. An opportunity will perhaps be afforded us in another of offering a few remarks upon them.

n Epist. p. 12. 13.

αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναποσπάστως ὀρέγονται, καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν μονοειδῶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τεταμένην ἔχουσι, οὐδέποτε ἀποκλίνουσιν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ εἴπερ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀντ' ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν αἵρεσις, τάχα οὐκ ἂν εἴη προαίρεσις ἐκείνοις, εἰ μήτις αὐτὴν προαίρεσιν ὡς τὰ πρῶτα ἀγαθὰ αἱρουμένην καλοῖ, "But the first and highest of souls, which were immediately produced from what are essentially good, although they have some abatement in them, they being not goodnesses essentially, but desirous of good, nevertheless are they so near a-kin to that highest good of all, as that they do naturally and indivulsively cleave to the same, and have their volitions always uniformly directed towards it, they never declining to the worser. Insomuch that if Proæresis be taken for the choosing of one thing before another, perhaps there is no such thing as Proæresis to be imputed to them, unless one should call the choosing of the first goods Proæresis." By these higher souls Simplicius must needs understand, either the souls of the sun, moon and stars, or else those of the superior orders of demoniac or angelic beings. Where though he make a question, whether Proæresis or Deliberation belongs to them, yet does he plainly imply, that they have none at all of that lubricous liberum arbitrium or free-will belonging to them, which would make them capable of vice and immorality as well as virtue.

But whatever is to be said of this, there seems to be no necessity at all for admitting that assertion of Origen's, that all rational souls whatsoever, even those of men and those of the highest angelical orders, are universally of one and the same nature, and have no fundamental or essential difference in their constitution; and consequently that all the difference that is now betwixt them, did arise only from the difference of their demeanour, or use of that power and liberty, which they all alike once had. So that thrones, and dominions, and principalities, and powers, were all made such by their merits; and human souls, though now sunk so low, yet are not absolutely incapable of commencing angels, or ascending to those highest altitudes: as it is not impossible, according to him neither, but that the highest angels also, the seraphim and cherubim might, in length of time, not only degenerate into devils, but also sink down into human bodies; his reason for which monstrous paradox is only this, that the divine justice cannot otherwise well be salved, but God must needs be a προσωπολήπτης, "an accepter of persons," should he have arbitrarily made such vast differences amongst intellectual beings. Which ground he also extendeth so far as to the human soul of our Saviour Christ himself, as being not partially appointed to that transcendent dignity of its hypostatic union, but by reason of its most faithful adherence to the divine word and wisdom, in a pre-existent state, beyond all others souls; which he endeavours thus to prove from the scrip-

ture:* Quod dilectionis perfectio, et affectus sinceritas, ei inseparabilem cum Deo fecerit unitatem, ità ut non fortuita fuerit, aut cum personæ acceptione animæ ejus assumptio, sed virtutum suarum sibi merito delata; audi ad eum prophetam dicentem, Dilexisti justitiam et odisti iniquitatem; propterea unxit te Deus, Deus tuus, oleo lætitiæ præ participibus tuis: dilectionis ergo merito ungitur oleo lætitiæ anima Christi, id est, cum verbo Dei unum efficitur. Ungi namque oleo lætitiæ, non aliud intelligitur quam Spiritu Sancto repleri. Præ participibus autem dixit; quia non gratia spiritus sicut prophetis ei data est, sed ipsius verbi Dei in ea substantialis inerat plenitudo, "That the perfection of love, and sincerity of divine affection, procured to this soul its inseparable union with the Godhead, so that the assumption of it was neither fortuitous nor partial, or with prosopolepsy (the acception of persons) but bestowed upon it justly for the merit of its virtues; hear (saith he) the prophet thus declaring to him, 'Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity; therefore hath God, even thy God, anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.' The soul of Christ therefore was anointed with the oil of gladness, or made one with the Word of God, for the merits of love and faithful adherence to God, and no otherwise. For to be anointed with the oil of gladness here properly signifies nothing else but to be replenished with the Holy Ghost. But when it is said, that he was thus anointed above his fellows, this intimateth, that he had not the Holy Ghost bestowed upon him, only as the prophets and other holy men had, but that the substantial fulness of the Word of God dwelt in him." But this reason of Origen's seems to be very weak; because if there be a rank of souls below human, specifically differing from the same, as Origen himself must needs confess (he not allowing the souls of brutes to have been human souls lapsed, as some Pythagoreans and Platonists conceited, but renouncing and disclaiming that opinion, as monstrously absurd and irrational) there can be no reason given, why there might not be as well other ranks and orders of souls superior to those of men, without the injustice of prosopolepsy; as, besides Simplicius, Plotinus and the generality of other Platonists conceived.

But least of all can we assent to Origen, when from this principle, that souls, as such, are essentially endowed with liberum arbitrium, or "free will," and therefore never in their own nature impeccable, he infers those endless circuits of souls upwards and downwards, and so makes them to be never at rest, denying them any fixed state of holiness and happiness by divine grace; such as wherein they might be free from the fear and

* Περὶ ἀρχῶν, lib. 1. cap. 6.

danger of ever losing the same. Of whom St. Austin[6] therefore thus: Illum et propter alia nonnulla, et maximè propter alternantes sine cessatione beatitudines et miserias, et statutis seculorum intervallis ab istis ad illas, atque ab illis ad istas itus ac reditus interminabiles, non immeritò reprobavit ecclesia; quia et hoc, quod misericors videbatur, amisit, faciendo sanctis veras miserias, quibus pœnas luerent, et falsas beatitudines, in quibus verum ac securum, hoc est, sine timore certum sempiterni boni gaudium non haberent, "The church hath deservedly rejected Origen, both for certain other opinions of his, and especially for those his alternate beatitudes and miseries, without end, and for his infinite circuits, ascents and descents of souls from one to the other, in restless vicissitudes and after periods of time. Forasmuch as hereby he hath quite lost that very title of pitiful, or merciful, which otherwise he seemed to have deserved, by making so many true miseries for the best of saints, in which they should successively undergo punishment and smart; and none but false happiness for them, such as wherein they could never have any true or secure joy, free from the fear of losing that good which they possess." For this Origenical hypothesis seems directly contrary to the whole tenor of the gospel, promising "eternal and everlasting life" to those who believe in Christ, and perseveringly obey him, 1 John ii. "This is the promise, that he hath promised us, even eternal life;" and Titus i. 2, "In hope of eternal life, which God, that cannot lie, hath promised;" and, "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life:" and lest this should be taken for a periodical eternity only, John iii. 26, "He that believeth in me shall never die." And possibly this might be the meaning of St. Paul, 2 Tim. i. 10, when he affirmeth of our Saviour Christ, that "he hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel;" not because he was the first who had discovered and published to the world the soul's immortality, which was believed before not only by all the Pharisaic Jews, but also by the generality of Pagans too; but because these, for the most part, held their endless circuits and transmigrations of souls: therefore was he the first who brought everlasting life to light, and gave the world assurance, in the faith of the gospel, of a fixed and permanent state of happiness, and a never-fading crown of glory to be obtained: "Him that overcometh, will I make a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go no more out," Apoc. iii. 12.[7]

[6] De Civit. Dei, lib. 21. cap. 17. p. 481. tom. 7. opp.

[7] To this new interpretation of St. Paul's words, 2 Tim. i. 10. I should prefer the old and vulgar one, which Dr. Cudworth here thinks proper to abandon. My reason *for doing so* is, that those circuits and transmigrations of human souls, which the

Now the reason why we mentioned Origen here, was because he was a person not only thoroughly skilled in all the Platonic learning, but also one who was sufficiently addicted to those

learned Doctor supposes to be meant by the apostle, were not believed in by all those who before the birth of our Saviour held the souls of men to be immortal, but only by some belonging to the class of philosophers. But St. Paul speaks of a certain benefit conferred by the doctrine of our Saviour not upon a certain class of men. Besides, in St. Paul's passage, θάνατος and ζωή are opposed to each other. For Jesus is first said to have abolished *death*, and then to have brought to light *life*, which is contrary to death. But the various wanderings and ascents and descents of souls, such as Origen imagined, are by no means opposed to death: for according to him the souls continue to live, although they are sometimes exalted on high and at others sunk to the earth. Wherefore the words ζωή and ἀφθαρσία, which here manifestly signify something opposed to death, cannot mean those fictitious circuits of souls. I speak not of the very great obscurity under which these words would labour, if St. Paul had said what the learned Doctor attributes to him. Neither is the vulgarly received interpretation imitated against by what he calls our attention to, that a great many taught the soul's immortality even prior to the birth of our Saviour, and therefore that Jesus cannot be said to have been the first who brought that doctrine to light. For the word φωτίζειν used by St. Paul does not mean to propose and inculcate a thing before unheard of, but to clear of all doubt and to throw new light upon a doctrine already propounded, but not yet sufficiently confirmed and established. That such is the case is shown by the very metaphor contained in the word, drawn from light. For that which illumines any thing does not produce and make it, but by bringing light causes a thing already made to be more clearly seen and to be better comprehended in all its parts than before. Wherefore the meaning of the apostle's words is necessarily as follows: Although much was said and written by many in times past on the immortality of human souls, yet the whole of this was not sufficiently clear and established, but Jesus our Saviour, by the rays of his divine doctrine, first dispelled all doubts and caused the truth of this dogma to appear as clear as noon-day. And that this opinion is most true any one will acknowledge who attentively examines the reasonings of the ancient philosophers on the soul's immortality, and compares them with the arguments of our Saviour.

But this being the case, still I consider interpreters have not exhausted the full force of St. Paul's words: being convinced indeed that the passage is to be understood not only of the eternal and happy life of souls, but also of the resurrection of our bodies. I will state my opinion a little more explicitly. In the first place St. Paul says that our Saviour καταργῆσαι, "abolished," "destroyed," death: which manifestly means, that Jesus by his doctrine first caused men to be freed from the fear of death, by which they had hitherto been grievously tormented. In the next place he declares by what means Jesus accomplished this, namely, by putting an end to those things which usually excite the fear of death in men's minds, and by clearly revealing the things opposite to these: Φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου. In order to learn therefore the full force of these words, it will be proper for us to consider the causes, why men entertain so great a fear of death. These are chiefly three. I. They are afraid that the soul will altogether perish and be destroyed together with the body, or that they shall be altogether annihilated. II. Although entertaining no doubt perhaps of the soul's immortality, they nevertheless dread the fate of the soul after death, from a consciousness of their own sins, and stand in awe of the divine justice. III. If they happen to have overcome this fear, still they are grievously alarmed at the destruction of the body, and shudder to think that their members shall one day be scattered and turned into dust. If Jesus, as St. Paul declares, destroyed death and the fear of death, he must necessarily have destroyed these three things, which foster and excite this fear; consequently, it is beyond question, that these three are intended by the apostle in what follows. The word ζωή removes from men's minds two of the above causes of fear. There are, as is well-known, numerous passages in the New Testament wherein this word is used absolutely to signify not only the natural but that eternal and happy life which will be enjoyed by the faithful. See Matt. vii. 14. 18. viii. 9. and many other passages. In the same sense it ought to be understood also in this passage: as is evident not only because the fear

dogmata, he being commonly conceived to have had too great a kindness for them; and therefore, had there been any solidity of reason for either those particular Henades or Noes of theirs, created beings above the rank of souls, and consequently, according to the Platonic hypothesis, superior to the universal Psyche also (which was the third hypostasis in their trinity, and seems to answer to the Holy Ghost in the Christian), Origen was as likely to have been favourable thereunto as any other. But it is indeed manifestly repugnant to reason, that there should be any such particular, that is, created Henades, and *αὐτοαγαθότητες*, "essential goodnesses," superior to the Platonic first Mind; or any such Noes, and *αὐτοσοφίαι*, "essential wisdoms, superior to their universal Psyche; it being all one as if, in the Christian Trinity, besides the first person, or the Father, one should suppose a multitude of particular paternities superior to the second; and also, besides the second person, the Son, or Word, a multitude of particular sons, or words, all superior to the third person, the Holy Ghost. For this is plainly to make a breach upon the Deity, to confound the Creator and creature together; and to suppose a company of such creaturely gods as imply a manifest contradiction in the very notion of them.

of eternal punishments is one of the principal causes why men dread death, and from which Jesus is said to have taken away all power, but also because the apostle has added the words *διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*. For the first and chief doctrine revealed *in the gospel*, is not natural life or the immortality of souls, but the eternal and blessed life promised to all who put faith in the merits of the Redeemer. St. Paul himself briefly and most beautifully explains the whole canon of the gospel, when he says, Acts xvi. 31: *Πίστευσον ἐπὶ κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χρίστον, καὶ σωθήσῃ*, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved." This eternal and happy life, however, comprehends at the same time that other natural life: for unless souls were immortal, they could not live in eternal felicity. There is nothing therefore to prevent us from understanding the word *ζωῇ* of both kinds of life, and from supposing St. Paul to have meant as follows: "Jesus took away all the causes for which men fear death. For he taught by the gospel that God will pardon all the sins of those who have a lively faith in the merits of Christ, and will not only grant life and immortality to their souls on leaving the body, but also will bestow upon them perfect and eternal felicity." The word *ἀφθαρσία* pertains, I am convinced, to the third cause of fear. The apostle on the approach of death recalls every thing to his mind which tends to remove the weakness of men who fear death, and as the corruption of the body is commonly no slight cause of terror in them, he shows that Jesus has abolished this also, proving by unanswerable arguments that our bodies, although about to perish for a time, will notwithstanding at last gain *ἀφθαρσία*, or a state much better than this and free from all corruption. This exposition is considerably strengthened by the fact, that St. Paul elsewhere applies the same term *ἀφθαρσία* to the state in which the bodies of the pious will exist after resurrection, 1 Cor. xv. 53: *Δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν (σῶμα) τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν*, "For this corruptible (body) must put on incorruption;" and a little afterwards: *Ὅταν δὲ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται ἀφθαρσίαν,——τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος γεγραμμένος· κατεπόθη εἰς νῖκος*, "When this corruptible shall have put on incorruption,——then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written: death is swallowed up in victory." To these latter words nothing can be more similar than the passage we are now explaining. In my opinion, therefore, the phrase, *φωτίζειν τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν*, signifies, to purge from all impurity the doctrine of the future restoration of bodies to a better life, (which had been variously contaminated by the Jews, especially the Pharisees,) and to place it beyond all controversy by the most convincing and irrefragable arguments.

Wherefore, we shall here observe, that this was not the catholic doctrine of the Platonic school, that there were such Henades and Noes, but only a private opinion of some doctors amongst them, and that of the latter sort too. For first, as for those Henades, as there are not the least footsteps of them to be found any where in Plato's writings, so may it be plainly gathered from them, that he supposed no such thing. Forasmuch as, in his second epistle, where he describes his Trinity, he doth not say of the first, περὶ τὸ πρῶτον τὰ πρῶτα, "about the first are the first;" as he doth of the second, δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, and of the third, τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα, "about the second are the second, and about the third the third:" but of the first he saith, περὶ τὸν πάντων Βασιλέα πάντ' ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, "about the king of all things are all things, and for his sake are all things; and he is the cause of all things, that are good." Wherefore here are no particular Henades and Autoagathotetes, "Unities" and "Goodnesses," about the first Τὸ Ἕν and Τἀγαθὸν, "One" and "Good;" but all good things are about him, he being both the efficient and final cause of all. Moreover Plotinus, throughout all his works, discovers not the least suspicion neither of these Henades and Agathotetes, this language being scarcely to be found any where in the writings of any Platonists senior to Proclus; who also, as if he were conscious that this assumentum to the Platonic theology were not so defensible a thing, doth himself sometime, as it were, tergiversate and decline it, by equivocating in the word Henades, taking them for the ideas, or the intelligible gods before mentioned. As perhaps Synesius also uses the word, in his first hymn, when God is called by him:

Ἑνοτήτων ἑνὰς ἀγνή,
Μονάδων μονάς τε πρώτη,

"The first Henad of Henades, and the first Monad of Monades;" that is, "the first idea of good, and cause of all the ideas." And as for the particular Noes, Minds, or intellects, these indeed seem to have crept up somewhat before Plotinus' time; he, besides the passage before cited, elsewhere giving some intimations of them, as Ennead 6. lib. 4. cap. 4:* Ἀλλὰ πῶς ψυχαὶ πολλαὶ καὶ νοῖ πολλοὶ, "But how can there be many souls, and many minds, and not only one, but many entia?"[8] From which, and

* P. 847. 848.

[8] Dr. Cudworth has given the sense, not the very words, of Plotinus; which in his Book Quod ens usum idemque simul totum est ubique, p. 647. run as follows: Πῶς ὂν τὸ ὄν, καὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ νοῦς πολλοῦς, καὶ ψυχὰς πολλὰς, εἰ τὸ ὂν πανταχοῦ ἓν, καὶ μὴ ὁμοειδὲς, καὶ νοῦς εἷς, καὶ ψυχὴ μία, "But how can there be ens and entia, and many minds and many souls, if ens is every where one and not merely of the same form, and mind is one, and soul is one?"

other places of his, Ficinus[9] concluded Plotinus himself really to have asserted, above the rank of souls, a multitude of other substantial beings, called νόες, or νοῖ, "minds" or "intellects." Nevertheless, Plotinus speaking of them so uncertainly, and making such an union betwixt all these Noes and their particular respective souls, it may well be questioned, whether he really took them for any thing else but the heads and summities of those souls; he supposing, that all souls have a mind in them, the participation of the first Mind; as also unity too, the participation of the first Unity; whereby they are capable of being conjoined with both:[10] Δεῖ νοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν εἶναι, καὶ νοῦ ἀρχὴν, καὶ αἰτίαν, καὶ θεὸν· ὥσπερ τὸ κέντρον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν· ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ σημεῖον ἐν αὐτῷ· καὶ αἱ γραμμαὶ τὸ ἴδιον προσφέρουσι πρὸς τοῦτο· τῷ γὰρ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἡμεῖς ἐφαπτόμεθα, καὶ σύνεσμεν, καὶ ἀνηρτήμεθα ἐνιδρύμεθα δὲ, οἱ ἂν συννεύωμεν ἐκεῖ, "There must needs be mind in us, as also the principle and cause of mind, God. Not as if he were divided, but because, though remaining in himself, yet he is also considered in many, as capable to receive him. As the centre, though it remain in itself, yet is it also in every line drawn from the circumference, each of them, by a certain point of its own, touching it. And by some such thing in us it is, that we are capable of touching God, and of being united to him, when we direct our intention towards him." And in the next chapter he adds: Ἔχοντες τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐκ ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀγοῦμεν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐνεργείαις τά πολλὰ· οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὅλως ἐνεργοῦσιν· ἐκεῖνα μέν ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείαις αἰεὶ, νοῦς δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸ νοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, &c. "That though we have these things in us, yet

[9] The words of Ficinus here meant are no doubt those which he has prefixed to the cap. 4. of the book just quoted: Sunt enim et mentes et animæ suis proprietatibus in se ipsis inter se differentibus etiam ante corpora, suntque in se invicem naturali quadam cognatione et officii communione conjunctæ, et interea alteritate proprietatis essentiæque distinctæ, non loco, "For minds and souls are in themselves different from each other by their own properties, even before the bodies, and are in themselves mutually connected by a certain natural affinity and communion of office, and nevertheless distinct by the difference of property and essence, not by place." In these words indeed Ficinus distinguishes minds from souls: but on well examining the whole it will appear that he entertained no other opinion than the one which Dr. Cudworth attributes immediately after to Plotinus. For mind and soul are two properties of the same thing, which can be distinguished in thought, and are distinguished by the Platonists, but in reality notwithstanding reside in one and the same nature. This, if I mistake not, is meant by Ficinus, when he says: Alteritate proprietatis essentiæque distinctæ, non loco. There are therefore as many minds as souls: nor was Ficinus, I consider, when he wrote this, thinking of those νόες of Proclus and others. And this certainly was the opinion of Plotinus himself.

[10] These occur Ennead 5. lib. 1. De Tribus Hypostatibus Archicis, cap. 11. p. 492. I wish it to be observed, however, that Dr. Cudworth has not quoted the entire words of Plotinus, but merely culled out those which he supposed would serve his own purpose. In the English version given by him there are more words than correspond to the Greek: it being a frequent custom with him, as we have already remarked elsewhere, to express in his translation what he has omitted in the Greek. This he has *done also* in the words immediately following.

do we not perceive them, being for the most part idle and asleep, as to these higher energies; as some never at all exercise them. However, those do always act; mind, and that which is before mind, Unity; but every thing which is in our souls is not perceived by us, unless come to the whole, when we dispose ourselves towards it," &c. Where Plotinus seems to make the Noes, or "Minds," to be nothing else but something in souls, whereby they partake of the first Mind. And it is said of Porphyrius,[1] who was well acquainted with Plotinus' philosophy, that he quite discarded and rejected these Noes or "Intellects," as substances really distinct from the first Mind, and separate from souls. And it is certain, that such minds as these are nowhere plainly mentioned by Plato, he speaking only of minds in souls, but not of any abstract and separate minds, save only one. And though some might think him to have given an intimation of them in his δεύτερον περὶ τὰ δεύτερα (before mentioned) his "second about the second things, or second things about the second;" yet by these may very well be understood the ideas; as by the third things about the third, all created beings. Wherefore we may conclude, that this Platonic, or rather Pseudo-Platonic trinity, which confounds the differences betwixt God and the creature, and that probably in favour of the pagan polytheism and idolatry, is nothing so agreeable to reason itself, as that Christian Trinity before described, which distinctly declares how far the Deity goes, and where the creature begins; namely, that the Deity extends so far as to this whole Trinity of hypostases; and that all other things whatsoever, this Trinity of persons only excepted, are truly and properly their creatures, produced by the joint concurrence and influence of them all, they being really but one God.

But it is already manifest, that all the forementioned depra-

[1] I am not aware of any record, in which Porphyry has discarded and rejected the νόες, imagined by Proclus and others. But it appears from his other writings, especially his Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά, or "Guides to things intelligible," that he entertained much better and sounder notions upon many things than Proclus, or at least expressed himself more carefully and perspicuously. He distinguishes νοῦς, or "mind," from ψυχή, or "soul." See sect. 5. p. 220. sect. 17. p. 225. sect. 30. p. 230. &c. His νοῦς, however, if I rightly understand the meaning of a man who deals so plentifully in subtleties, is nothing but a certain simple nature, in which reside the notions and forms of things, such as the Platonists supposed the soul to bring with it into the world; whereas his ψυχή, or soul, is a nature occupying a middle station between body and mind, or, as he himself says, τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας μεσόν τι, "something intermediate between indivisible and divisible substance," sect. 5. p. 220. and diffused through the whole body, which reasons and uses to a good or bad purpose the notions stored up in the mind, sect. 17. p. 225. Whether Porphyry supposed these two to be separate natures, or merely two faculties of one nature, which a wise man distinguishes mentally and by reason, I would not undertake to say. The Platonists are wonderfully obscure in their explications of things removed from the senses; concerning which they are accustomed to speak, as though they were self-existent and acted in the same way as persons. But this has already been stated in another place.

vations and adulterations of that divine Cabala of the trinity, and that spurious trinity, described (which, because asserted by some Platonists, was called Platonical, in way of distinction from the Christian) cannot be justly charged, neither upon Plato himself, nor yet upon all his followers universally. But, on the contrary, we shall now make it appear, that Plato and some of the Platonists retained much of the ancient genuine Cabala, and made a very near approach to the true Christian Trinity; forasmuch as their three hypostases, distinguished from all their other gods, seem to have been none of them accounted creatures, but all other things whatsoever the creatures of them.

First, therefore, we affirm that Plato himself does, in the beginning of his Timæus, very carefully distinguish betwixt God and the creature, he determining the bounds between them, after this manner:[2] Ἔστιν οὖν δὲ κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν πρῶτον διαιρετέον τάδε· τί τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον· καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε· τὸ μὲν δὲ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὄν· τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθησεως ἀλόγου, δοξαστὸν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν· πᾶν δὲ αὖ τὸ γιγνόμενον, ὑπ' αἰτίου τινὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι, "We being here to treat concerning the universe, judge it necessary to begin with a distinction, betwixt that which always is, and hath no *ortus* or generation; and that which is made, but never truly is. The former of which, being always like itself and the same, is comprehensible by intellection with reason, or is the object of knowledge; the latter of them, that which is made and perisheth, but never truly is, is not properly knowable, but opinable only, or the object of opinion, together with irrational sense. Now, every thing that is made, must of necessity be made by some cause." The reason why Plato, being to treat of the universe, begins here with this distinction, was, as Proclus[3] well observes, because, Ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς ἡμῶν ἐννοίαις ἀπόκειται, τὸ εἶναί τι ἀεὶ ὄν, "It is either one of our common notions, or a thing mathematically demonstrable, that there must be something eternal, or which was never made, but always was, and had no beginning." And it is evident by sense and experience, that all things are not such, but that some things are made and perish again, or generated and corrupted. Now, the latter Platonists, being strongly possessed with a prejudice of the world's eternity, or that it had no beginning, have offered strange violence to Plato's text in this place, and wrested his words to quite a different sense from what he intended: as if by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, "that which is made," he did not at all mean that which had a beginning, but only that whose duration is flowing and successive, or tem-

[2] Cap. 12. p. 235. ed Fabricii.
[3] Comm. in Timæum Platon. lib. 1. p. 10.

porary, which might notwithstanding be without beginning; and as if he supposed the whole corporeal world to be such, which, though it hath a successive and temporary duration, yet was without any beginning. And the current ran so strong this way, that even Boëtius, that learned Christian philosopher, was himself also carried away with the force thereof, he taking it for granted likewise, that Plato held the eternity of the world in this sense, that is, its being without beginning:* Non rectè quidam (saith he) qui cum audiunt visum Platoni mundum hunc nec habuisse initium temporis, nec habiturum esse defectum, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coæternum putant. Aliud est enim, per interminabilem duci vitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit; aliud interminabilis vitæ totam pariter complexum esse præsentiam; quod divinæ mentis proprium esse manifestum est. Neque Deus conditis rebus antiquior videri debet, temporis quantitate, sed simplicis potius proprietate naturæ, "Some, when they hear Plato to have held that the world had no beginning, nor shall ever have an end, do not rightly from thence infer, that Plato therefore made the world co-eternal with God, because it is one thing always to be, and another thing to possess an endless life all at once, which is proper to the divine mind. Neither ought God to be thought older than the world, in respect of time, but only in respect of the simplicity of his nature." To which purpose he adds afterwards, Itaque si digna rebus nomina velimus imponere, Platonem sequentes, Deum quidem æternum, mundum verò dicemus esse perpetuum, "Therefore, if we would give proper names to things agreeable to their natures, following Plato, we should say, that God was eternal; but the world only perpetual." But as this doctrine of the latter Platonists quite frustrates Plato's design in this place, which was to prove or assert a God, because if the world had no beginning, though its duration be never so much successive, yet would it not follow from thence, that therefore it must needs have been made by some other cause; so is it directly contrary to that philosopher's own words, himself there declaring, that by his τὸ γιγνόμενον, "ortum," or "that which is made," he did not understand only that whose duration is successive, but also τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχον, "that which had a beginning of its generation," and τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενον, "that which begun from a certain epocha of time;" or that which once was not, and therefore must needs be brought into being by some other cause. So that Plato there plainly supposed all temporary beings once to have had a beginning of their duration, as he declareth in that very Timæus of his, that "Time itself was not eternal, or without beginning, but made together with the heaven or world;"

* Consol. Phil. lib. 5. Pro. 6.

was not without beginning; as also, that w
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hath a permanent duration, is uncreated oı
τὸ ὂν μὲν ἀεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, "that
hath no generation, nor was ever made."
is styled in the septuagint translation of
ὁ Ὢν, "He that truly is."

Now, as for this ἀΐδιος οὐσία or φύσις,
which always is, and was never made, P
singularly only, as we Christians now
paganic way plurally also; as when, in
calls the world τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς
created image of the eternal gods." By
there meant doubtless that τὸ πρῶτον, aı
τρίτον, "that first, and "second," and
second epistle to Dionysius, he makes to
things; that is, his trinity of divine hyp
current efficiency, and according to whose
whole was made; as Plotinus also plai
words of his before cited: Οὗτος μὲν ὁ κ
ζόμενος, ἑστηκότων μὲν τοῦ πρώτου, καὶ
τρίτου, "This world is an image always i
renewed (as the image in a glass is) of

d third of his in the forementioned epistle, of a "trinity of ods;"* Ταῦτα οἱ τὸν Πλάτωνα διασαφεῖν πειρώμενοι, ἐπὶ τὸν ῶτον θεὸν ἀνάγουσιν, ἐπί τε τὸ Δεύτερον αἴτιον, καὶ Τρίτον τὴν ὖ κοσμου Ψυχὴν, Θεὸν Τρίτον καὶ αὐτὴν ὁριζόμενοι εἶναι, "These ings do the interpreters of Plato refer to the first God, and to e second cause; and to the third the soul of the world, they ling this also the third God. Wherefore we think there is od reason to conclude, that those eternal or uncreated gods of ato in his Timæus, whose image or statue this whole gene- ed or created and created world is said by him to be, were no ıer than his trinity of divine hypostases, the makers or creators reof. And it was before (as we conceive) rightly guessed, ıt Cicero also was to be understood of the same eternal gods, Platonizing, when he affirmed: A diis omnia à principio facta, hat all things were at first made by the gods:" and à provi- ıtiâ deorum mundum et omnes mundi partes constitutas esse, hat the world and all its parts were constituted by the provi- ıce of the gods."[5]

Præp. Evan. lib. 11. cap. 20. [P. 541.]

The words of Plato, in which Dr. Cudworth fancies he has discovered his *three ostases*, are the following from the Timæus, p. 529. opp. Ὡς δὲ κινηθέν τε αὐτὸ ζῶν ἐνενόησε τῶν ἀϊδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατὴρ, ἠγάσθη καί εὐφρανθείς, "When, therefore, the Father who made it, perceived this beau- image of the eternal Gods, which he had made, to be moved and live, he was sed and delighted." This passage of the philosopher presents two difficulties. t, it is a question what Plato means by the ἄγαλμα, or *image* of the gods; se- lly, it is uncertain who are those *eternal gods*, in whose likeness the thing we are ıking of was expressed. Each of them has furnished matter for controversy to the ous interpreters of Plato As the philosopher in the preceding words is discoursing he soul of the world, some Platonists suppose this soul of the world to be that ge of the divinity, by the motion of which Plato tells us God was delighted. Nor ı this opinion appear to be entirely destitute of probability: to which, indeed, lcidius, no indifferent expositor of the Timæus, was so favourable as not to scruple ccommodate his own version of the Timæus to it. For he thus translates the ek words: Quæ quidem omnia in anima fieri, ——— palam est. Quam quum eri et vivere animadverteret, factum a se simulacrum immortalis divinitatis, genitor ı hilaratus impendio, "That all which things take place in the soul ——— is mani- Which soul when the father perceived to be moved and live, being an image le by him of the immortal divinity, he was exceedingly delighted." I consider, ever, that with Dr. Cudworth we ought to give preference to the opinion of those suppose Plato to be speaking of the world. For the thing itself requires this inter- ation. According to Plato, every soul is endowed with an internal power of ting and moving itself: which motive power, as most persons are aware, he held to proof of the soul's immortality. How, therefore, could God be said to be greatly ghted at seeing the soul of the world move, when he must have known that it pos- ed an inward power of moving itself? Besides, Plato had shown a little before, the soul of the world was generated out of the mind and divinity of the supreme ng itself, and was antecedent to all bodies. And such being the case, how could motion of this soul be the cause of such exceeding delight in God? Did the ty happen to be ignorant that a thing generated and derived from himself would able to move itself? or was he afraid lest a portion of his own nature had been g torpid and dead? But if we assume the world to be here meant by Plato, his ıion will be sufficiently intelligible. When God, says he, saw that the mass of ter which before had been rude and unformed, and tossed about by disorderly ions, after receiving the soul generated from himself was excited by a tranquil and erly motion, he experienced great delight.

But that the second hypostasis in Plato's trinity, viz., Mind or Intellect, though said to have been generated, or to have proceeded by way of emanation from the first, called Tagathon, "the

But what are those *eternal gods*, in whose image Plato tells us the world was made? I shall spare paper and time, and shall not bring forward all the subtle conceits of the Platonists respecting them: in few of which is there any thing sound or consistent. Suffice it that I examine Dr. Cudworth's opinion, and afterwards declare my own thoughts on the matter. The learned Doctor thinks that these ἀΐδιοι θεοί of whom Plato asserts this world to be the image, are the three persons of the divinity or *hypostases*, as the Platonists call them. But what makes, I consider, against this opinion, is first, that Plato speaks of them in such a way as to show that he meant natures distinct and separate from the supreme and Almighty God who made the world. For the supreme God he tells us was greatly pleased when he beheld the world, which he had made after the image of the eternal gods, moved and agitated. Now, if the eternal gods were the supreme God himself, consisting of three persons, and the Creator of the universe, Plato would undoubtedly have said that God was delighted when he saw the orderly motion of the world, which he had made *after his own image*. But as he names distinctly both God himself, the creator of the world, and the eternal gods, he evidently means the latter to be those gods which the opificer and architect of the world used as models in creating it. Again, let any one show how this sensible and visible world can be the express image of the three persons of the Godhead or supreme Being, which is devoid of all body, figure, and form: for my part, I confess myself unable to understand it. What similitude, pray, can there be between a corporeal and changeable nature, endowed with form and figure, and compounded of various parts, and a nature most simple and immutable, devoid of all concretion, and wholly incomprehensible to the human intellect? Dr. Cudworth's quotation from Eusebius is of no use towards proving the truth of this opinion, as it treats, not of this passage of the Timæus, but of the one which occurs in the epistle to Dionysius; which no one will deny is understood by most of Plato's interpreters, as referring to the three principles of things. Neither is there the slightest weight in what he brings forward from Cicero; upon which we have already commented before.

The eternal gods of Plato, if I am not wholly mistaken, are nothing else than the eternal forms or ideas of all things, according to whose exemplar he supposed the supreme Being to have made the world. Lest any should consider this a strange interpretation, I would remark in the first place, that the whole of this world, and its more important parts, the sun, moon, and earth, were regarded by Plato as gods: of which, indeed, if any one were at all sceptical upon the matter, ample testimony might be produced even from the Timæus alone. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that Plato sometimes applies the term God in the singular number to the whole universe, or to the world considered conjointly, and sometimes speaks of several, and calls the sun, moon, earth, and other parts of the world, individually gods. He is speaking of the whole universe, when in the Timæus, p. 524. he discourses as follows: Οὕτως δὴ πᾶς ὄντως ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ περὶ τόν ποτὲ ἰσόμενον θεὸν λογισθείς, "The God who always was, thinking of the god (namely, the world) which was sometime about to be made." I pass over other passages of the same kind: nor do I think it necessary to cite any one of the numerous passages wherein he speaks of the sun, moon, and earth as gods. But, corresponding to this world, which is perceived by the eyes and senses, there was from all eternity, according to Plato, another one intelligible to the mind alone, after which, as a model, God created this visible universe: of which world he copiously discourses both in other places, and especially towards the beginning of his Timæus. Whether this νοητος or intelligible world was placed by him within or without God and the divine intelligence, it is not necessary now to inquire: let us consider merely the matter itself. If then, according to Plato's opinion, this visible world is God, and its more important parts are gods, that eternal model world, which is cognizable only to the mind, and of which this world of ours is the express image, as also its nobler parts will deserve to be called gods. Granting that the sun is a god, and that of this sun, as Julian and so many other Platonists say, there exists an eternal model, whatever may be its nature, will not this eternal idea of the sun be called God, with equal propriety as the sun itself, which was formed after its image? Let us suppose that there existed a city depicted on a tablet from all eternity, and that an archi-

ood," was notwithstanding unquestionably acknowledged to ave been eternal, or without beginning, might be proved by any express testimonies of the most genuine Platonists: but e shall here content ourselves only with two, one of Plotinus riting thus concerning it, Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6: Ἐκποδὼν δὲ ῶν ἔστω γένεσις ἡ ἐν χρόνῳ, τὸν λόγον περὶ τῶν ἀεὶ ὄντων οιουμένοις, &c. "Let all temporal generation here be quite anished from our thoughts, whilst we treat of things eternal, or ich as always are, we attributing generation to them only in espect of causality and order, but not of time." And though 'lotinus there speak particularly of the second hypostasis r Nous, yet does he afterwards extend the same also to the hird hypostasis of that trinity, called Psyche, or the mundane oul; which is there said by him likewise to be the word of the econd, as that second was the word of the first: Καὶ τὸ γεννώενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος Νοῦ, Νοῦν εἶναι, καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτὸν, οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ, καὶ νέργειά τις, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ἐκείνου, "That which is generated rom what is better than mind, can be no other than mind, ecause mind is the best of all things, and every thing else is fter it, and junior to it, as Psyche or Soul, which is in like anner the word of mind, and a certain energy thereof, as Mind the word and energy of the first Good." The other testimony of Porphyrius, cited by St. Cyril out of the fourth book of is philosophic history, where he sets down the doctrine

ct at a certain time built a real city after this model; would it not be proper for any ne to call the city so built an image of that eternal city? Hence, as Plato therefore pposed the existence of certain ideas or forms of gods, he does not speak altogether olishly, when he asserts this world to be the ἄγαλμα of the eternal gods. These ernal forms of the world, the stars, and the elements, therefore, are unquestionably e θεοὶ ἀΐδιοι, of which Plato held this world to be the ἄγαλμα. Other Platonists ll these gods θεοὶ νοητοὶ: of which matter I have already spoken elsewhere. This terpretation is admirably confirmed by the concluding words of the Timæus, in hich the philosopher thus describes the world: Ὁ κόσμος ζῶον ὁρατὸν, τὰ ὁρατὰ εριέχον, ΕΙΚΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΗΤΟΥ, αἰσθητὸς, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος, "The orld is a visible animal, comprehending things visible, *an image of the intelligible od*, sensible, immense, boundless." And what, pray, is this Θεὸς νοητὸς, of which calls this world the image? Undoubtedly that ideal world, so much admired by the hole of this school. And such being the case, it must be evident that the *eternal ods*, of which Plato declares this world to be the image, are the more important of ose parts, of which that νοητὸς world consists. There is no difference between this assage and the one we are treating of, except that he there speaks of several gods, nd here only of one. But we have already shown it to be a custom with Plato hen discoursing concerning the world, to make mention sometimes of one, and sometimes of several gods. The difference between the words νοητὸς and ἀΐδιος I shall ot dwell upon: as all attentive readers of Plato must know, that according to the ws of his discipline these words are equivalent in meaning. This interpretation ill, I venture to say, be found of use, not only towards elucidating many of lato's opinions, which occasionally cause much unprofitable labour to men not suffiently accustomed to his phraseology, but also towards inducing those to be more utious, who idly fancy they can discover in many of his passages the three persons of e divinity.

of Plato after this manner:* Εἰπόντος Πλάτωνος περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ οὕτως· ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τρόπον τινὰ ἀνθρώποις ἀνεπινόητον νοῦν γενέσθαι τε ὅλον καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστῶτα, ἐν ᾧ δὲ τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία τῶν ὄντων· ὁ δὲ καὶ πρώτως καλὸν καὶ αὐτοκαλὸν, παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τῆς καλλονῆς ἔχον τὸ εἶδος· προῆλθε δὲ προαιώνιος ἀπ' αἰτίου τοῦ θεοῦ ὡρμημένος, αὐτογένητος ὢν καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου κινουμένου πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τούτου ἡ πρόοδος γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ τούτου παρελθόντος αὐτογόνως ἐκ θεοῦ, παρελθόντος δὲ οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος χρονικῆς, οὔπω γὰρ χρόνος ἦν· ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ χρόνου γενομένου πρὸς αὐτόν ἐστί τι ὁ χρόνος, ἄχρονος γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ μόνος αἰώνιος ὁ νοῦς, "Plato thus declareth concerning the first Good, that from it was generated a certain mind incomprehensible to mortals; in which subsisting by itself, are contained the things that truly are, and the essences of all beings. This is the first fair, and pulchritude itself, which proceeded or sprung out of God from all eternity as its cause, but notwithstanding after a peculiar manner, as self-begotten, and as its own parent. For it was not begotten from that, as any way moved towards its generation; but it proceeded from God as it were self-begottenly. And that not from any temporal beginning, there being as yet no such thing as time; nor when time was afterwards made, did it any way affect him; for Mind is always timeless, and alone eternal. Here, besides the eternity of Mind or Intellect, the second divin hypostasis in the Platonic trinity, there are other strange an unusual expressions concerning it; for though it be acknowledg to have been generated from the first original Deity, yet is called αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτογένητος, its "own-parent," and "own-offspring," and said to have sprung out αὐτογόνως, "s begottenly.

Now, because this is so great a riddle or mystery, it is w the while to consider its true meaning and the ground the which is thus declared by Porphyrius. Mind, though it "sp from the first good" or "supreme Deity" from "eternity," it said to be "self begotten," because it did not spring fro as any ways moved towards its generation, but as always ing still or quiescent. Which doctrine was before delive Plotinus after this manner:† Οὐ κινηθέντος φατέον γίγνε γὰρ κινηθέντος αὐτοῦ τι γίγνοιτο, τρίτον ἀπ' ἐκείνου τὸ γι μετὰ τὴν κίνησιν ἂν γίγνοιτο, καὶ οὐ δεύτερον· δεῖ οὖν ὁ ὄντος, εἴ τι δεύτερον μετ' αὐτὸ, οὐ προσνεύσαντος, οὐδε βουλ οὐδὲ ὅλως κινηθέντος, ὑποστῆναι αὐτὸ, "That which wa diately generated from the first, did not proceed from i ways moved towards its generation, because then it w have been the second, but the third after that motion.

* St. Cyril. C. Jul. lib. 1. p. 32. † Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6.

e, if there be any second after that first good, it must needs
oceed from that first, as remaining immoveable, and not so
ich as actively consenting thereto, nor willing it, which would
motion. Now, this in Porphyrius' language is paraphrased
be, a being produced from the first good or original Deity,
ογόνως, "self-begottenly," or in a way of self-generation.
it the plain meaning thereof seems to be no other than this,
it though this second divine hypostasis did indeed proceed from
first God, yet was it not produced thence after a creaturely,
in a creating way, by the arbitrary will and command thereof,
by a particular *fiat* of the supreme Deity, but by way of
ural and necessary emanation. Neither was Porphyrius sin-
ar in this language, we finding the very same expression,
αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, "self-parent" and "self-begotten,"
Jamblichus' mysteries: where it is likewise by him applied
to the first principal of all, but to a second divine hypostasis:[6]
τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου, ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ
αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτογονος, "From this one, the self-sufficient
d made himself to shine forth into light; and therefore is he
ed Sui-Pater, and Seipso-genitus, his own father, and self-
otten." But of this God or divine hypostasis in Jamblichus
re afterward. We cannot justify such kind of language as
in the Christian Trinity, because we have no warrant for
rom the scripture; though we are not ignorant that some late
ines have ventured to call the Christian Logos after the same
nner, αὐτόθεον, and ex seipso Deum, "God from himself."[7]

De Mysteriis Ægyptior. sect. 8. cap. 2. p. 158. In Jamblichus, however, we do find the word αὐτόγονος, as given by Dr. Cudworth, but αὐτάρκης, "self-suffi-" Probably, he considered the reading αὐτάρκης of the copies to be a mistake αὐτόγονος, as the word αὐταρκης is used by Jamblichus a little before.

In this disquisition upon the *mind* of Plato, there are some things perhaps which be objected to. I. The question is solely as to Plato's opinion, which the learned or affirms to be much purer than the doctrine of the junior Platonists. And yet he avours to show us what Plato thought, not from Plato himself, but from two disciples e later Platonic school. If the doctrine of the junior Platonists on the three princi- of things is in many respects corrupted and depraved, how can this sect be fairly as the interpreter of the doctrine professed by Plato? In my opinion we ought to Plato himself, and to dismiss those who, as is notorious, found whatever doc- they liked in that philosopher. But all indeed who venture to write any thing Plato's three principles, finding that nothing certain and satisfactory respecting has been inculcated by himself, are obliged to have recourse to his followers for nation: which course I hold to be exceedingly slippery and unsafe. II. The pts of Plotinus and Porphyrius on the three principles, if accurately examined, to be of such a character, as to savour of the doctrines of the Sabellians, much than the true doctrine of the Trinity, as revealed in sacred Writ. For νοῦς υχή, which they speak of as though they were distinct natures, are described by in many other passages, so as to make it appear that nothing but the divine or intelligence, and the power of God exerting itself in the world and created , or two properties and perfections of the supreme Being, are meant by these . And what is no slight confirmation of this opinion is, that they place three hypostases in the soul of man, as well as in God himself, and speak of νοῦς and in a man almost in the same words that they use in reference to the divine mind oul. No one, however, I should imagine, would believe these philosophers to have

Dionysius Petavius having rightly declared the doctrine of Arius, after this manner, that the Father was the only eternal God, and that the Son, or Word, was a creature made by him in time, and out of nothing; that is, after he had not been, produced into being; subjoins these words:* In ea verò professione, quod suprà memoravi, planissimè constat, germanum Platonicum Arium extitisse, "From the profession of this doctrine, it is most undeniably manifest (what was before affirmed) that Arius was a german or genuine disciple of Plato's." But from what we have now cited out of Plato himself, and others of his most genuine followers, it is certain, that Petavius (though otherwise learned and industrious) was herein grossly mistaken, and that Arius was no Platonist at all. And indeed for either Plato or Plotinus to have denied the eternity of that second hypostasis of his, called Nous, or Logos, and the son of the first, would have been all one as if they should have denied the eternity of Wisdom and Understanding itself; because, according to them, this second hypostasis is essentially nothing but *αὐτοσοφία*, "original Wisdom itself," and consequently, that very Wisdom by which God himself is wise. Which how far, or in what sense it is true, we do not here dispute. Nevertheless, Athanasius seems to have been fully of the same opinion with them herein, from this passage of his:† *Καὶ σοφία καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ὁ Κύριος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλης σοφίας δεύτερος, ἀλλὰ μόνος οὗτος δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν*

supposed that three hypostases, truly so called, reside in the souls of men. But I purpose examining into this matter more minutely in another place: at present it will be sufficient to know, that we ought to estimate and judge of any apparent affinity between our own doctrines and those of the Platonists, not so much from their words, as from the whole tenor of their discipline. III. I am aware that the junior Platonic school applied the same phraseology to the three principles they are continually inculcating, as the Christian theologers of that period were in the habit of using in reference to the eternal generation of the Son of God, and the nature and properties of the Holy Spirit. But it has not yet been shown, whether these Platonic philosophers invented these expressions themselves, or borrowed them from the Christians. It is certain, and shall be demonstrated at greater length in another place, that the Platonists of the second and third century after Christ, both laboured with great zeal to accommodate their discipline generally to the doctrines of the Christian religion, and in particular strove hard to make it appear, that there was but little difference between the three persons of the Godhead, as professed by Christians, and their own three principles. For as the Christians were daily gaining strength, and their own numbers proportionably diminishing, they thought they would best consult the interests of their religion by adopting to a certain extent the more important of the Christian precepts, which all confessed to be sublime, and connecting them with the ancient superstitions. I consider it most probable, therefore, that these philosophers were imitators of the Christians in this matter also, and that in order to persuade people the more easily of their being little or no difference between their three principles and the three divine persons of the Christians, they readily adopted those forms of expression by which the latter were accustomed to explain their doctrine of the Trinity. I have observed this in Jamblichus particularly, who was yet living at the time of the Arian controversies, and consequently uses many phrases not of earlier origin than these controversies.

* De Trin. lib. 1. cap. 8. sect. 2. [Tom. 2. Dogmat. Theolog. p. 38.]

† De Sent. Dion. tom. 1. p. 567.

ὁ πατὴρ, &c. "Our Lord is both wisdom and truth, neither is he second from any other wisdom; but it is he alone by whom the Father made all things." And again: Οὔτε γὰρ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ λόγου πατὴρ, "For the Father of the Word is not properly himself the Word." And: Οὐκ ἦν Λόγος ὁ τὸν Λόγον προέμενος, ἦν γὰρ ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. Σοφία γεγέννηται ὁ Κύριος· οὐκ ἦν οὖν σοφία ὁ τὴν σοφίαν ἀνείς· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤμην, φησὶν, ᾗ προσέχαιρεν, "That was not Word, which produced the Word, for the Word was with God. The Lord is Wisdom, therefore that was not Wisdom, which produced Wisdom, that speaks thus of herself, His delight was with me." But those latter words he citeth with approbation out of Dionysius bishop of Alexandria. And the same Athanasius affirmeth Arius, on the contrary, to have maintained, that there was another Word and Wisdom senior to that Word and Wisdom in our Saviour Christ. To conclude, no Platonist in the world ever denied the eternity of that Nous, or universal Mind, which is the second hypostasis of their trinity; but, on the contrary, as hath been already observed, some of them seemed rather to attribute too much to it, in calling it αὐτοπάτωρ and αὐτόγονος, its "own parent" and its "own offspring," as that which was self-begotten, though this but in a certain mystical sense; they otherwise not denying it to have proceeded also from the first good, and to be the offspring thereof.[8] Wherefore Plato, who supposed the world not

[8] Dr. Cudworth himself seems to perceive here, that the Trinity professed by Plotinus and others of the Platonists, is not so much a trinity of persons as of divine notions and virtues, and therefore widely distinct from the Christian doctrine of three divine persons. For if Plotinus' second hypostasis is that wisdom by which God is wise, is it not merely a divine perfection which cannot be distinguished from God himself except in thought? For who would assert the reason or wisdom by which a man is wise to be a distinct and real person in that man? But we ought by no means to confound this doctrine of the Platonists, as the learned Doctor appears here to do, with that style of expression common to Athanasius, who represents Christ our Saviour to be the reason and wisdom by which God reasons and is wise. Although such was by no means the opinion and phraseology of Athanasius alone, but of a great many of the learned fathers who contended with the Arians, from most of whom testimonies have been collected by Dion. Petavius, De Trinitate, lib. 6. cap. 9. p. 347. tom. 2. Dogm. Theol. As many other things escaped those incautious but deserving men, who formerly combated the opinions of the Arians, the propriety and accuracy of which is at this day justly called into question, so this phraseology also, it must be confessed, if considered apart from that controversy, might lead to a suspicion of impure and unsound doctrine. I do not hesitate therefore to agree with St. Augustine, who argued with great zeal against those who had thought proper to adopt it. See De Trinit. lib. 6. cap. 1. p. 598. and lib. 15. cap. 7. p. 689. t. 8. opp. For although it admits of easy explanation, and has long ago been explained by many, still it is safer, I consider, to abstain altogether from expressions, the ambiguity of which might mislead the less sagacious and intelligent. If we look, however, to the meaning and intention of those eminent men, rather than to the words themselves which they employed, in my opinion we shall not find much to condemn in them. The fathers in their contest with the Arians appealed particularly to the celebrated passage of Solomon, Prov. viii. on the divine wisdom, which passage almost all the ancients usually interpret in reference to Christ, and attempted to prove from this and some other passages the eternity of the Son of God. Out of many see Athanasius, Orat. 2. contra Arianos, lib. 1. p. 319.

to have been eternal, asserting the eternity of that second hypostasis of his trinity, thereby plainly made it to be no creature, according to Athanasius's own doctrine:* Εἰ ἀΐδιός ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς, οὐκ ἦν κτίσμα, εἰ δὲ κτίσμα τυγχάνει, οὐκ ἦν ἀΐδιος, "If the Son be eternal, he was no creature; and, on the contrary, if he be a creature, he was not eternal."

Neither is there any force at all in that testimony of Macrobius,[9] which Petavius urgeth to the contrary; wherein the first Cause is said de se mentem creasse, "to have created Mind from itself;" and again this Mind, animam de se creasse, "to have created from itself soul;" because it is certain that these ancient Pagans did not then so strictly confine that word creare (as we Christians now do) to that narrow sense and notion, of the production of things in time; but used it generally for all manner of production or efficiency. But the chief ground of Petavius' mistake herein, besides his prejudice against Platonism in general, was his not distinguishing betwixt that spurious trinity of some Platonists, wherein the third hypostasis was the whole

opp. To evade the force of this argument, Arius, although not denying Christ to be called *wisdom* in the sacred volumes, and even to be in a certain sense God's wisdom, nevertheless contended that the wisdom discoursed of by Solomon is not Christ, but another wisdom residing in God from all eternity, as a perfection or quality; and that this is always meant by Solomon and other sacred authors who make mention of eternal wisdom: in short, that the wisdom and reason by which God is wise, is different from the word which St. John and the wisdom which St. Paul speaks of; that this is external to God and produced by the internal wisdom or λόγος. See Athanasius, Orat. 1. adv. Arian. p. 124. and De Sententia Dionysii contra Arianos, p. 507. tom. 1. opp. But the champions of the true faith would not allow this doctrine of Solomon to be wrested from them. Inflamed with the heat of debate, therefore, they did not hesitate to go so far as to assert that Christ our Saviour is that very wisdom and reason, by which the Father is wise and reasons. A bold assertion, it must be confessed; especially as they might have answered Arius in a far different manner without causing offence to any one: but still not altogether perverse and absurd. For those who talked in this manner by no means used the word *wisdom* in what is called the formal sense, like the Platonists, with whom Dr. Cudworth here classes them, nor ranked this wisdom among the divine qualities; by doing which, indeed, they would have approached more closely to the Sabellians than they themselves supposed. For wisdom, considered as a virtue and perfection of God, is manifestly the same as his essence. The Son, therefore, if these doctors had spoken properly, would according to their opinion be the essence of the Father, and the Father receive his essence, that is, his being and wisdom, from the Son. But Athanasius, to avoid falling into these snares, expressly excluded wisdom from the order of divine qualities: Εἰ δὲ φήσαιεν, says he, Orat. 5. contra Arian. p. 523. tom. 1. opp. ὡς ποιότητα εἶναι ἐν τῷ πατρὶ τὴν σοφίαν, ἢ αὐτοσοφίαν εἶναι, ἀκολουθήσει τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἄτοπα εἰρήμενα, "But if they assert that wisdom is a quality in the Father, or that he is his own wisdom, the absurdities above-mentioned will follow." I do not approve of every thing of the kind that we meet with in Athanasius and others; nor was it approved of by all the Christian fathers who lived in his time. My object here is merely to show that the Platonic philosophers, although they used the same forms of expression as the Nicene fathers, nevertheless widely differed from them in opinion. Compare our remarks upon this subject a little below.

* P. 119. [Tom. 1. opp. in Disput. cum Ario.]

[9] In Somnium Scipionis, cap. 14. p. 73. But Petavius does not urge this passage of Macrobius where he is maintaining Arius to have been a Platonist, but in another place, when explaining the Platonic dogma concerning three principles, lib. 1. De *Trinitate*, cap. 1. sect. 4. p. 17.

animated world (which gave him occasion to write thus, Tertius verò Deus manifestè creatus ab iisdem Platonicis putatur, quem et ποίημα nominant), and that other doctrine of those who made it not to be the world itself, that is a creature, but the opificer or creator thereof.[10]

[10] The question respecting the Platonism of Arius is doubtful and uncertain, nor have learned men who have touched upon it separated those things, which decidedly ought to be separated, before a correct judgment can be arrived at. Hence it comes to pass that they sometimes bring forward arguments which have little bearing upon the point. In my opinion the question, Whether Arius was a Platonist or not? may be taken in a three fold sense. First, Whether Arius was devoted to the Platonic philosophy? Secondly, Whether Platonic principles led him to broach his new doctrine on the Trinity? Thirdly, Whether Arius' doctrine respecting the three persons in the Godhead is entirely similar to the Platonic dogma of three principles? As respects the first question, it being manifest that Arius was imbued with philosophy, I do not hesitate to affirm that that philosophy was no other than the later Platonic, or that new discipline which first originated from Ammonius, and recommended a reconciliation and union of all sects, especial regard being had, however, to the doctrines of Plato. For Arius lived and was educated from boyhood at Alexandria; in which city, as is known to every one acquainted with such matters, no other description of philosophy was at that time taught even among Christians. Besides, some of his precepts evidently savour of the Platonic school; such as that famous dogma of souls existing before the bodies from all eternity, in the defence of which Arius was as zealous as all the rest of the *Platonists*. *In short*, the most eminent fathers openly charge Arius and his disciples with *Platonism*. St. Jerome, in his Dialogue Adv. Luciferianos, p. 142. tom. 2. opp. says: *Subtilis est hæresis* (Ariana), et ideo simplices animæ facile decipiuntur. . . . . Re vera de *Platonis* et Aristophanis in episcopatum alleguntur. Quotus enim quisque est, qui non apprime in his eruditus sit? "The (Arian) heresy is subtle, and therefore simple souls are easily deceived. . . . . In truth they are sent into the episcopacy from the bosom of *Plato* and Aristophanes. For how few are there, who are not eminently versed in these?" In this passage of St. Jerome, let me observe in passing, that instead of *Aristophanis* I should prefer reading *Aristotelis*. For I have no recollection of an Arian being reproached with the study of Aristophanes; but of their unbounded devotion to the subtleties of Aristotle we are told every where. And St. Jerome himself, a little afterwards, has the following words: Accedit ad hoc, quod Ariana hæresis magis cum sapientia seculi facit, et argumentationum rivos de *Aristotelis* fontibus mutuatur, "Besides, the Arian heresy is more in accordance with the wisdom of the age, and borrows its ratiocinative streams from the fountains of Aristotle." Gregory of Nazianzen, Orat. 26. De Moderatione in Disputationibus Servanda, tom. 1. opp. p. 458: Ὁ δὲ ὀλίγος ἐστὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ... καὶ οὐκ οἶδε λόγων στροφὰς, ... ἢ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους τεχνῶν τὴν κακοτεχνίαν, ἢ τῆς Πλάτωνος εὐγλωττίας τὰ γοητεύματα, ὥσπερ Αἰγυπτιακαί τινες μάστιγες, "Another, on the contrary, is of feeble intellect, and knows not the quirks of words, or the crooked artifice of Aristotelic arts, or the wiles of Platonic eloquence, like certain Egyptian plagues." That these Egyptian plagues, of whom St. Gregory complains as being too fond of Aristotle and Plato, are the Arians, no one acquainted with ancient matters will doubt. I am aware that not a few testimonies can be adduced from the early fathers, in which they reproach Arius and his followers with an insane love of Aristotelic subtleties, and that Epiphanius expressly calls them Aristotelians. Hæres. 66. Arianor. sect. 69. p. 795: Ὁμοίως, says he, δὲ ταύτῃ λέξει ἄλλην ἡμῖν ἐφευρίσκουσιν οἱ νέοι Ἀριστοτελικοί· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἀπεμάξαντο τὴν ἰοβολίαν, καὶ κατέλιπον τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος τὸ ἄκακον καὶ τὸ πρᾷον, &c. "Similar to this is another mode of argument invented by these new Aristotelians; for they have exhibited all the venom of that philosopher, and have forsaken the simplicity and mildness of the Holy Spirit," &c. To which effect passages are every where to be found also in Gregorius Nyssenus, Socrates, Sozomenus, and others. But these testimonies do not prove that Arius did not belong to the sect in which we have placed him. For it was usual with these junior Platonists, as is evident from the examples of Porphyry, Ammonius, Simplicius, and so many others, to unite the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and to follow the latter as their principal master and guide in matters pertaining to the art of

But we grant that there may be some more reason to make a question whether Plato himself held the eternity of the mundane soul (commonly said to be the third hypostasis of his trinity) or

reasoning and dialectics, upon which Plato had written scarcely any thing. Nor did these ancient fathers charge the Arians with having imbibed all the philosophy of Aristotle, but merely with conducting their arguments upon Aristotelic principles, and with adapting his rules upon syllogisms and the whole art of disputation to religious controversies, where they ought rather to have studied simplicity as recommended by the sacred writers. Hence it is that the ancients in so many places upbraid this sect with a predilection both for Aristotle and Plato. The French writer, P. Faydit, betrayed his own ignorance, therefore, when not long ago, upon the strength of these passages, he not only made Arius to be an Aristotelian, but even contended that his doctrine concerning the Trinity was to be derived from Aristotelic sources, Apologie du Systeme des S. Peres sur la Trinité, dans la Preface, p. 24. &c. [See also his Alteration du Dogme, p. 355. &c.] Those are not necessarily Aristotelians who, in contending with their adversaries, obey Aristotle's rules on the art of reasoning; much less is it fair to infer that the opinion which we see them defending upon Aristotelic principles was borrowed from Aristotle. Otherwise we should have to refer to the same philosophy the errors both of the Nestorians and Eutychians, who we are told made very frequent use of Aristotle's rules and distinctions in their disputations. Besides, there is nothing in this philosophy at all corresponding to Arius' doctrine concerning the three persons in the Godhead. Consequently he was in a certain respect a Platonist; although it does not follow from thence that his doctrine of the Trinity also was Platonic. For it is possible for a man to have approved of the major part of Plato's discipline without being altogether a Platonist; in which sense, indeed, most of the early fathers of the church were Platonists, who, although adopting many of this philosopher's principles, nevertheless on some points not only abandon but often severely censure him.

Such being the case, let us now inquire, in the second place: Whether the Platonic discipline professed by Arius was the cause of his error respecting the Trinity. If his doctrine were in all respects similar to Platonic decrees, no one could entertain any doubt upon the question. For who, on seeing a disciple of Plato defend a dogma entirely in accordance with the principles of this philosopher, could deny its origin to be Platonic? It is manifestly impossible, therefore, to come to any conclusion upon this point, unless by first deciding that which we propounded as the third question. I must confess I by no means approve of those who are more ingenious than necessary in hunting after causes of errors, and who, if they only detect any similitude between two doctrines, cry out immediately, This is Platonic, this Aristotelian, this Cartesian, this Hobbesian. There is corruption and folly enough in the minds of men to enable them to fall into errors of themselves, by their own perverse reasoning; nor is it necessary for those always to have had a master, who reject the truth, and disturb religion with errors and absurd questions. But as most men, from various causes, are prone to imitation, it so happens that they consider it scarcely possible for any one to be eminently good or evil, unless he be influenced by the force of example. Hence if there existed merely a certain affinity between the doctrines of Plato and Arius, and we had no information from other sources that the latter was imbued with Platonic precepts, I should not regard such affinity as sufficient proof of his having been corrupted by Plato. But it being notorious that he was a devoted Platonist, if his opinion concerning the Trinity were the same as Plato's, there would be no reason for doubting that Plato was the author of the error.

Let us inquire therefore: Whether Plato's doctrine of three principles accords with Arius' opinion on the divine Trinity. Petavius maintains the affirmative and Dr. Cudworth the negative of this question; the latter indeed holding it to be more proper to associate even Athanasius with the Platonists. But few men of high eminence and authority have adopted Dr. Cudworth's view; a great majority, both of Protestants and Catholics, taking the side of Petavius. Christoph. Sandius himself, an Arian, does not hesitate to concur with Petavius, and pronounces Arius to be a genuine Platonist, Nucl. Histor. Eccles. lib. 1. p. 140. Although those who hold this to be a proof of Sandius' candour, as I perceive some to have done, are I fear deceived, and do not see the drift of this astute man. Sandius was aware that most of the Christian

no; because in his Timæus, though he acknowledged it to be senior to the world, yet does he seem to attribute a temporary generation, or nativity to it. Nevertheless, it is no way prob-

fathers who wrote previously to the time of the Nicene Council were accused of Platonism; and relying on the testimonies collected by Petavius, asserted that they all entertained the same opinion as Arius. To establish this he frankly conceded that Arius was a genuine Platonist, that is, an abettor of the same doctrine that had been maintained by the earliest dignitaries of the Christian church; from which it follows, that he inculcated nothing new, but merely revived what all the most eminent had professed prior to the Nicene council. Sand would have been as ready to give his assent, if any one had gone farther and declared Plato to have been a genuine disciple of Moses. But I now pass over this subject, and come to the solution of the question itself, which I consider to be of some moment. Those that assert Arius' doctrine of the Trinity to be Platonic ought first to explain, whether they mean this man to be an imitator of Plato himself or of his later disciples, who lived subsequently to the birth of our Saviour; for, as has long ago been observed, there is a considerable difference between the doctrine of Plato and that of the junior Platonic sect. If they mean Plato himself, I confess my ignorance, whether Arius was a Platonist or not. For whatever Dr. Cudworth and other excellent men may think, what Plato writes on the subject of three principles is so obscure and ambiguous that it is impossible to ascertain his real sentiments respecting them; and to attempt to settle the question by vague conjectures and surmises, I consider to be rash and unsafe. Let us appeal, therefore, to the junior Platonists, and see what agreement there is between them and Arius. But here we meet again with two obstacles, which it will be difficult altogether to remove. In the first place, the discordance of the junior Platonists on the three principles of all things is incredible: whose various opinions are in part enumerated by Proclus, Comm. in Timæum Platonis, lib. 2. p. 93. Secondly, the principal masters of this sect speak so inconsistently and doubtfully upon this subject that they seem to have been unwilling to be understood, and supply us with the means of maintaining either position, namely, that they were or were not the precursors of Arius. Take, for example, the book of that coryphæus of the Platonists, Plotinus, De Tribus Hypostatibus Archicis, a remarkable work of its kind, which at this day occupies the first place in the fifth Ennead, and try to ascertain the writer's opinion from it: having perused the book you will confess, if I mistake not, that you are now more uncertain than before. Sometimes he will appear to you to be narrating fables and to be discoursing of notions of the mind, not of natures and persons, sometimes to be speaking of persons truly so called and their actions. If you read cap. 3. 4. 5. with attention, you will strenuously contend perhaps that the νοῦς of Plotinus is much inferior to what he calls τὸ ὂν and τὸ πρῶτον θεῖον, and his ψυχὴ again far below this νοῦς. And such being the case, a disciple of Plotinus might with some truth be termed an Arian. But proceed to cap. 6. and you will fear perhaps on reading it that you have done the man an injustice. For so magnificently does Plotinus discourse of νοῦς in this chapter, that it seems not to differ from the first principle either in eternity or any thing else. Nevertheless, when all things are considered, I am almost inclined to agree with Dr. Cudworth in opposition to Petavius and others, who hold Arius to have been a Platonist. For in the first place the early fathers who were well acquainted with the doctrine of the Platonists do not commonly refer Arius' error to their school, but rather to the Valentinians and ancient Gnostics. Athanasius, Orat. 2. adv. Arianos, tom. 1. opp. p. 263. thus writes of the Arians: Αἰσχυνθήσονται μὲν προηγουμένως, ὡς τὰ Οὐαλεντίνου καὶ Κερδωκράτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱρετικῶν ζηλοῦντες καὶ φθεγγόμενοι. "They will at least be ashamed, as imitating and echoing Valentine and Cerdo crates and other heretics." And that this opinion of the ancients is not destitute of truth, a modern writer, Geo. Bull, has elaborately attempted to show, Defensio Fidei Nicænæ, sect. 2. cap. 1. sect. 15. p. 134. opp. Another reason for my supposing Arius not to have been a Platonist is, that the very men who condemned him assert Plato to have entertained much better opinions on the three principles than he did, and reckon it as not the least of his faults that he surpassed Plato himself in error. After the Nicene Council, in which we know Arius' heresies were proscribed, Constantine the Great wrote the Oration, Ad Cœtum Sanctorum usually appended to Eusebius' Histor. Eccles. as we learn from this author's Life of Constantine,

able, that Plato's third principle of all things, in his epistle to Dionysius, and that Psyche, or Soul of his, which is the only

lib. 3. cap. 23, p. 496. In this oration, cap. 9. p. 576. 577. the Emperor bestows great commendation upon Plato's doctrine of three principles, and acknowledges this philosopher to have had a glimpse of the truth, although he obscured it with numerous errors: Πλάτων, says he, among other things, πρῶτον μὲν θεὸν ὑφηγήσατο τὸν ὑπὲρ τὴν οὐσίαν· καλῶς ποιῶν· ὑπέταξε δὲ τούτῳ καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ δύο οὐσίας τῷ ἀριθμῷ διεῖλε, μιᾶς οὔσης τῶν ἀμφοτέρων τελειότητος, "Plato indeed first taught the existence of a God above all substance: in which he was right. To this he subjected a second, and in number distinguished two substances, the perfection of both being one." Having explained this at some length, he adds: Μεχρὶ μὲν οὖν τούτου Πλάτων σώφρων ἦν, "Thus far Plato thought wisely." Would Constantine, I ask, have written in this way to the Egyptians, if the Christian fathers of that period had as much as suspected even that the opinions of the Arians and Platonists were altogether in unison? Socrates, after stating that Georgius, one of the main pillars of the Arian sect, was wholly absorbed in the study of Aristotle and Plato, wonders how it happened that this man remained an Arian, as he might have been recalled to his right mind by the reading of Plato alone, Histor. Eccles. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 261. Θαυμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες τῇ Ἀριανῶν θρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν. ——οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ δεύτερον καὶ τὸ τρίτον αἴτιον——ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξας εἰληφέναι φησί, "I am surprised, how these men could remain in the Arian sect.—— For Plato does not say that the second and third cause had any beginning of existence." Either Socrates was ignorant and altogether unacquainted with the history and opinions of his own time, which no one I think will assert, or these words of his are a strong proof that no one at that day ever dreamt of any affinity between the Platonists and Arians. But the schools of the Platonists were every where open, nor was any concealment made of the books of this sect; so that all could easily learn their opinions. It follows therefore, that at that time they expounded their doctrine concerning three principles in such a way as to show an obvious difference between it and the novel conceits of Arius. And of this doubtless Arius was well aware, as we nowhere find him appealing to Plato in support of his opinion, although he might have done so not only without any danger, but even very opportunely and advantageously to himself, as Clemens, Origen, and so many other authors of the highest eminence had long before publicly testified to Plato's having taught correctly and wisely on the subject of the Trinity. To confess the truth, indeed, in whatever sense the doctrine of the Platonists be interpreted, we shall never be able to establish an agreement between them and the Arians truly so called. For suppose the common opinion to be true, that the three Platonic principles are natures or persons in the proper sense of the word: add also, that these persons are different in order, degree, and dignity, in which difference Petavius and his party fancy they have discovered the bond of agreement between the Platonists and Arians: still there will be a grave contest between them respecting the origin of the two latter persons, which, if the principles of each sect be adhered to, will never admit of being decided. The Platonists consider νοῦς, or "mind," as well as ψυχή, to have proceeded from the very essence or bosom of God, or to have been procreated and generated from God: for which reason they totally exclude them from created things, and pronounce them to be of the same nature as God himself. Far otherwise Arius, who declared the son not to have been generated from God, but made by God ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, or "out of things not existing," and placed both the second and third person in the order of created things: with which it was in strict accordance that he should hold the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be three distinct, dissimilar, and independent natures. The great difference of which two opinions must be clear to all who are not ignorant of the true meanings of words. For these and other reasons I am unable I confess to agree with those who suppose Arius to have been misled by the precepts of the Platonists, or his dogma borrowed from the school of Plotinus: nevertheless I do not go to the full extent of Dr. Cudworth's opinion, who holds Athanasius to have been a Platonist: on which I purpose offering some remarks in the Preface. On the passage of St. Cyril, which in a certain respect associates the Platonists and Arians together, I shall speak in the sequel. If thoroughly examined, it will be found to contain nothing at variance with what we have brought forward.

God, that in his tenth De Legibus he goes about to prove against the Atheists, should ever not have been; and therefore it is most reasonable to compound this business, thus, by supposing, with Plotinus and others, that Plato held a double Psyche, or soul, one ἐγκόσμιον, or mundane, which is, as it were, the concrete form of this corporeal world; whereby this world is properly made an animal, and a second, or created God; another ὑπερκόσμιον, "supramundane," or separate; and which is not so much the form, as the artificer of the world. The first of which two Plotinus, calling it the heavenly Venus, thus describeth:* Τὴν δὲ οὐρανίαν λεγομένην, ἐκ Κρόνου, νοῦ ὄντος ἐκείνου, ἀνάγκη ψυχὴν θειοτάτην εἶναι, εὐθὺς ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀκήρατον ἀκηράτου, μείνασαν ἄνω, ὡς μὴ δὲ εἰς τὰ τῇδε ἐλθεῖν, μήτε ἐθελήσασαν μήτε δυναμένην, ὅτι ἦν φύσεως μὴ κατὰ τὰ κάτω φῦσαν βαίνειν. Χωριστὴν οὖσάν τινα ὑπόστασιν, καὶ ἀμέτοχον ὕλης οὐσίαν· ὅθεν αὐτὴν τούτῳ ᾠνίττοντο, τῷ ἀμήτορα εἶναι, ἣν δὲ καὶ θεὸν ἄν τις δικαίως, οὐ δαίμονα εἴποι, ἄμικτον οὖσαν, καὶ καθαρὰν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, &c. ὅθεν οὐδ' ἂν ἐκπέσοι, νοῦ ἐξηρτημένη πολύ μᾶλλον, ἢ ἥλιος ἂν ἔχοι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ὅσον αὐτὸν περιλάμπει φῶς, εἰς αὐτὸν συνηρτημένον· ἐφεπομένη δε τῷ Κρόνῳ, ἢ, εἰ βούλει, τῷ πατρὶ τοῦ Κρόνου οὐρανῷ, ἐνήργησε τε πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ᾠκείωθη, καὶ ἐρασθεῖσα ἔρωτα ἐγέννησε, "This heavenly Venus, which they affirm to have been begotten from Saturn, that is, from a perfect Mind or Intellect, must needs be that most divine soul (the third archical hypostasis) which being immediately begotten, pure from that which is pure, always remains above, so that it neither can, nor will ever descend down to these lower things, so as to be immersed in them; it being of such a nature, as is not inclinable to sink, or lapse downward. A certain separate substance, which doth not at all partake of matter, as the fable intimated, when it called it motherless; and therefore may it well be styled by us, not a demon, but a god. Whence it comes to pass, that this soul can never fall, it being much more closely united and connected with that immoveable Mind or Intellect, than that light which is circumfused about the sun, is connected with the sun. This Venus therefore following Cronus, or rather the father of Cronus, Uranus, acting towards it, and being enamoured with it, begat love:" Χωριστὴν δὲ ἐκείνην τὴν ψυχὴν λέγοντες, τὴν πρώτως ἐλλάμπουσαν τῷ οὐρανῷ, χωριστὸν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον θησόμεθα, "Moreover, as we call this soul itself separate, so is this love of it, or begotten by it, a separate love." After which, he speaks of another soul of the world, which is not separate from it, but closely conjoined therewith, he calling it a lower Venus and Love; namely, that other Venus, which in the fable is said to have been begotten from Jupiter himself (the

* Ennead 3. lib. 5. cap. 2. [P. 293.]]

superior soul of the world) and Dione, a watery nymph. We conclude therefore, that though this lower mundane soul, might, according to Plato, have a temporary production together with the world, or before it, yet that other superior and most divine soul, which Plotinus calls the heavenly Venus and Love, the son of Cronus without a mother, and which was truly the third hypostasis of Plato's trinity, was eternal, and without beginning. And thus, according to the forementioned principle of Athanasius, none of these three hypostases of Plato's trinity were creatures, but all of them divine and uncreated.[1]

[1] According to the promise given by me above, I shall here inquire as briefly as possible into the truth of Dr. Cudworth's position, that Plato assigned two souls to this world, one *ὑπερκόσμιος*, or placed above the world, the other *ἐγκόσμιος*, or immersed in the world and produced from the former. This opinion has long ago been rejected by J. Le Clerc, Epistolæ Critic. ep. 7. p. 203. J. Basnage, Histoire de Juifs, livr. 4. chap. 4. sect. 19. p. 97. and Nic. Hieron. Gundlingius, Otia, Fascic. 2. p. 18. We shall bestow somewhat more diligence than they have done upon the consideration of this question, especially as it will enable us to ascertain whether or not what is called Plato's trinity accords with that of Christians. Plato's doctrine concerning the soul of the world is unquestionably to be looked for in the Timæus: if therefore what is said on the soul of the world in the Timæus be altogether at variance with the doctrine of the junior Platonists of a twofold soul of the world, every candid man will acknowledge that that doctrine is to be ranked among the figments with which this sect contaminated the philosophy of Plato. First of all, therefore, it behoves us to examine the opinion put forth by Plato in the Timæus. After speaking of the construction of the world, sect. 18. p. 242. ed. Fabricii, he goes on to the generation of the soul of the world, and commences the disputation by assigning a reason why he has deferred discoursing of this soul, till he had explained the structure of the corporeal mass, seeing that the soul is more ancient than all body. He then describes the generation of this soul in the following manner, sect. 19. *Τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς, τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ συνεκεράσατο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταυτοῦ φύσεως αὖ πέρι καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου, καὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ξυνέστησεν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ τε ἀμεροῦς αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ σώματα μεριστοῦ· καὶ τρία λαβὼν αὖ τὰ ὄντα, συνεκέρασατο εἰς μίαν πάντα ἰδέαν, τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταυτὸ ξυναρμόττων βίᾳ, μιγνὺς δὲ κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ ἐκ τριῶν ποιησάμενος ἕν, πάλιν ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας, ὅσας προσῆκε, διένειμεν, ἑκάστην δὲ ἔκ τε ταυτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας μεμιγμένην,* "Out of that matter which is indivisible and always in the same state, and that which is divisible and produced in bodies, he formed by admixture a third intermediate kind of matter, having the nature both of the same and of the different: and this he placed between the indivisible and that which is divided in bodies: and having taken the three, he mingled them all into one form, forcibly uniting the nature of the different, being difficult of admixture, with the same, mingling it in matter, and having formed the three into one, he again distributed this whole into suitable parts, each compounded of the same and of the different and of matter." The same subject Plato pursues at greater length in what follows, and goes on to explain or rather mystify it by arithmetical illustrations. But these things I now pass over, as they have little to do with our question and cannot at this day be understood. I am not one to suppose myself capable of divesting these words of Plato of all the darkness that envelopes them: a task I leave to others much superior to me in mental acumen: this however, I consider to be clear from them, that Plotinus' conceit of a twofold soul of the world can in no way be reconciled with this doctrine. In the first place, Plato speaks of only one soul of the world: nor does Dr. Cudworth deny this, although it may be said perhaps that he is treating in this place only of the *ἐγκόσμιος* or mundane soul, all mention of the other being omitted. But the fallacy of this objection may be easily made appear. The *ἐγκόσμιος* soul of Plotinus, is supposed by him to have been generated in some way or other from the *ὑπερκόσμιος* soul or third hypostasis of the divine nature, when this looked upon and was

Which to make yet more evident, we shall further observe, irst, that Plato himself, in that second epistle of his to Dionyiius, after he had mentioned his first, second, and third; that is,

namoured with the first principle. But Plato positively affirms, that the soul of which he speaks was made and created by the supreme Being or principal God. Whoever therefore is disposed to maintain that the discourse here is only of the inferior soul of the world, must at the same time undertake to prove, that all that Plato says in the Timæus respecting God and the works of God pertains solely to the third person or ψυχὴ ὑπερκόσμιος, the supramundane soul. For to that God, of whom the philosopher is speaking throughout the whole of the Timæus, he also attributes the procreation of the soul of the world. This, however, I think, will be attempted by no one, who does not consider himself at liberty to pervert the whole of Plato's doctrine, and to convert light into darkness, for the sake of upholding his own preconceived opinions. For the opificer and creator of the universe, who, as Plato tells us in the Timæus, looking upon that form or ἰδέα, which is always the same, fabricated this world, that is to say the visible God, and the other gods, is understood by every one to be the first and supreme God. Which, if all other proofs were wanting, is manifest even from this, that, cap. 13. p. 236. he affirms "that it is difficult to find out this parent of the universe, and that if found out it is impossible to declare him to the vulgar." Some one perhaps will meet us by saying, that the God whose works Plato is extolling in the Timæus is all the three hypostases or the entire divinity: but even this will not much avail him. For in that case he will be under the necessity of asserting that the ψυχὴ ἐγκόσμιος was generated by the three hypostases conjointly; which is totally at variance with the opinions of Plotinus and Dr. Cudworth. In addition to this there are other things which make it impossible for us to interpret Plato as saying that the inferior world was generated from I know not what superior one. Plato absolutely severs and disconnects the soul, whose origin he is describing, from its parent: as every one will acknowledge, who only considers, that this soul is stated by him to have been compounded by God out of an indivisible and a divisible nature. This divisible nature, whatever it may be, is beyond all question a thing placed out of God, and therefore this soul cannot be associated with God, in whom Plato will not allow of any division whatever. But that new soul of the world imagined by Plotinus remains most intimately connected with its parent, and cannot be separated from it except in thought. Besides, Plato's soul is not of the same nature as its maker: he is pure, simple, indivisible; while it is concrete, mixed and compounded and made up by God, of things indivisible and divisible. See Chalcidius, in Timæum Platonis, cap. 1. sect. 33. p. 288. 289. But the soul of Plotinus has nothing concrete, but retains the simple nature of its parent. Lastly, Who would readily believe that Plato was so forgetful of himself and so indifferent about the matter he was engaged upon as to omit all mention of that nobler soul of the world upon whose virtue the whole universe of things depends, and yet be so copious and elaborate in describing the origin of the inferior and more ignoble soul?

What Dr. Cudworth brings forward from Plato or the Platonists in support of his opinion, may be disposed of without the least difficulty. I. It is incredible, he tells us, that the third principle which Plato speaks of in his epistle to Dionysius, is not of the same nature as the first and second: but these are eternal: therefore that also is eternal. For my part, however, I do not see why it should be incredible that Plato united three principles differing from each other in degree and order. Besides, the passage in this epistle to Dionysius respecting three kings is so short and obscure, that no wise man has ever yet been found to say that he thoroughly understood its meaning. On the third king, Plato expresses his mind in these few words: Καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τριττά. And who, I ask, can make out from them, whether Plato supposed this third king to be eternal, or made and procreated? In short, if I am not greatly mistaken the philosopher clearly lays down a wide distinction between his three kings. For the first of them he extols in the following magnificent terms: Ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνος αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, "For his sake are all things; and he is the cause of every thing beautiful." But of the other two he says nothing of the kind, contenting himself with merely a passing notice of them: which to me seems to be a proof that they were by no means placed by Plato in the same rank as the first king. II. He tells us, that Plato, De Legibus, lib. 10. proves, in

his trinity of divine hypostases, immediately subjoins these words: Ἡ οὖν ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχὴ, περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ὀρέγεται μαθεῖν, καθ' ἅττα ἐστὶ, βλέπουσα εἰς τὰ αὐτῆς συγγενῆ, ὧν οὐδὲν ἱκανῶς ἔχει

opposition to the enemies of the divine nature, the existence of a certain soul of the world; and that this soul is called by him God: consequently, that it is eternal, and not the ἐγκόσμιος but the ὑπερκόσμιος soul. The argument is at once divested of all force, when it is replied, that in Plato's discipline every thing that is called god is not necessarily to be considered eternal. The world, the sun, the heavens, or rather the souls residing in the world, the sun, and the heavens, are gods in Plato's opinion, and yet not on that account eternal, but created by God. Nor can any one at all conversant with the ancient philosophy be ignorant of the distinction observed by Plato between the *eternal* and the *made* gods. But I shall show from the tenth book De Legibus itself, that the learned Doctor betrays too great a partiality for his own opinions, when he fancies he discovers in this book an eternal soul of the world. Plato, in opposition to those who at that time sought the downfall of all religion, proves the existence of gods, De Legibus, lib. 10. p. 667. drawing his principal argument from motion. Matter, he says, is moved: but the power of moving does not naturally exist in matter; from which he concludes that a soul and minds reside in matter: and these minds are undoubtedly gods. This is the substance of Plato's argumentation, by which he supposes those were to be put down who at that day discarded gods. Let it be observed, however, in the first place, that in it Plato is not attempting to demonstrate the existence of one supreme and principal God, but simply of gods: consequently, this argument of his affords no support to Dr. Cudworth's cause. Again, he is speaking not of a ὑπερκόσμιος, but of an ἐγκόσμιος soul, or a soul residing in the world, the sun and the stars. Hear his own words, p. 669. Ψυχὴν δὲ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ΕΝΟΙΚΟΥΣΑΝ ΕΝ ΑΠΑΣΙ τοῖς πάντῃ κινουμένοις μὲν οὖ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φᾶναι; "Must not we necessarily say, that the soul which governs all things, and dwells in all things that are moved, governs also the heavens?" And to remove all cause for doubt, let us add what he subjoins a little afterwards: ΚΛ. Ὦ ξένε, ἀλλὰ ἔκ γε τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων, οὐδ' ὅσιον ἄλλως λέγειν, ἢ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχουσαν ψυχὴν μίαν ἢ πλείους περιάγειν αὐτά. ΑΘ. Κάλλιστα, ὦ Κλεινία, ὑπήκουσας τοῖς λόγοις· τόδε προσυπήκουσον ἔτι. ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον; ΑΘ. Ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα εἴπερ ψυχὴ περιάγει πάντα, ἆρ' οὐ καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον; "Cl. But, my friend, from what has been said, it would be impious to say otherwise than that these things are carried round by one or more souls possessing every virtue. Ath. You have understood these words admirably, O Clinias: but understand also this. Cl. What? Ath. If the sun, moon and all the stars are moved round by a soul, is not each individually also?" Any one who can perceive in these words an eternal soul, disconnected from the world and corporeal things, in short ὑπερκόσμιος or supramundane, must in truth be more than ordinarily keen-sighted. Besides, Plato's chief object is not to prove that there is one soul of the world: for the question, whether there be only one or more than one soul of the world, he leaves undecided. This is already evident from the words I have just quoted: but I shall add another passage, p. 670. from which it is still more apparent: Ὡς ἐπείδη ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ τούτων αἰτίαι ἐφάνησαν, ἀγαθαὶ δὲ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν, θεοὺς αὐτὰς εἶναι φήσομεν, "Since a soul or souls endowed with all virtue have been shown to be the causes of all these things, we shall affirm them to be gods." Indeed, Plato seems to be inclined rather to the opinion of those who suppose a plurality of souls to reside together in the world: he certainly declares expressly, that there are two souls in the world, one beneficent, the other malignant, but not ὑπερκόσμιος and ἐγκόσμιος, p. 669. But of these it is not necessary now to speak, especially as we have already commented at great length upon the subject in another place. Lastly, it ought not to be overlooked, that in some parts of this demonstration against the Atheists, Plato states it to be his only wish to prove that soul is *more ancient than matter and body*: he does not let fall a single word about eternity.

It now remains for us to speak of the authority of the junior Platonists, in which the learned Doctor places a third confirmation of his opinion respecting a twofold soul. In this place he shows us that Plotinus agrees with him: having before made it appear from Proclus, that those great luminaries of the Platonic school, Porphyry and Amelius, are on his side. But it has long ago been evident to men conversant with

τοῦ δὲ βασιλέως πέρι, καὶ ὧν εἶπον, οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, "The mind of man (as parturient) has always a great desire to know what these things are, and to that end does it look upon things cognate

these matters, that the later Platonic sect dealt with Plato as the scholastic doctors have done with Aristotle, and expounded, not the opinions really entertained by Plato, but such as he would have entertained if he had been instructed in the schools of Ammonius and Plotinus. If all the junior Platonists assert with one consentient voice, that Plato held this or that doctrine, and no traces of such doctrine are to be found in his writings, I consider they are by no means to be believed: but if, moreover, the books of Plato now extant contain the very contrary doctrine, in that case I do not hesitate to charge the whole of them with falsehood. So are learned men accustomed to decide on the question regarding the eternity of the world, which these new teachers do not scruple to foist upon their master, although at variance with the whole of the Timæus: nor ought we to determine otherwise in the present question. In order to throw greater light upon the subject, however, I shall add a couple of observations drawn from the interior discipline of Plato: which I am convinced, had they occurred to the minds of Dr. Cudworth and those who have followed his footsteps in this matter, would have led them to the same conclusion as ourselves. One will explain the cause why the junior Platonists feigned a twofold soul of the world: the other will show that this dogma, even if maintained by all the Platonists, affords not the slightest aid to those who deny all difference in the doctrine of the Platonists and Christians on the Trinity.

I. The Platonists who began to make their appearance in the second century after Christ, and proceeded chiefly from the school of Ammonius, meditated a sort of harmony of all sects, and even of the Christian religion and their own. For the Christian religion, as there is abundant evidence to show, they regarded in no other light than as a new philosophical sect, and ranked its founder, our Saviour, in the class of supremely wise and divinely inspired men. Hence they strove to reconcile their own doctrines with the Christian discipline, and in particular to exhibit their celebrated dogma of three principles of things, which, previously to our Saviour's time, had been held in immense estimation among philosophers, in such a light that there should appear to be as little difference as possible between it and the most holy Christian tenet of three persons in the Godhead. The *one* and *good* of Plato, they identified with God the Father; his Λόγος, or reason, with the eternal Son; and his Ψυχή, or soul of the world, with the Holy Spirit: and that too in so artful and plausible a manner as to deceive even many of those who were justly regarded as the chief supporters of Christianity. This scheme nowhere presented greater difficulty than in the comparison of the soul of the world and the Holy Spirit; inasmuch as what Plato says of this soul in the Timæus appeared to be altogether against it. About the eternity of the soul of the world, there was indeed little controversy between them and the Christians: for, holding the whole world to be eternal and without beginning, they would be compelled to maintain the eternity also of the soul of the world. Indeed, if they had asserted the world to be without beginning, but that its soul was made and created at some finite period, they would have talked just as foolishly as a person who should say, that man existed from all eternity, but that his soul was of recent generation. As this opinion of the eternity of the mundane soul seemed to be opposed to the authority of Plato, who discourses largely in the Timæus of its generation, they insisted that in this disputation their master accommodates his language to the capacity of the vulgar and uninformed. See Chalcidius, In Timæum Platon. cap. 2. sect. 26. p. 285. 286. On this point, therefore, their identification of the Holy Spirit and the soul of the world was an easy task. But the rest of the offices which philosophers, after the example of Plato, commonly attributed to the soul of the world, such as its being diffused through all parts of the universe, its being mingled in a respect with matter, and its being the producer and nurse of all plants and trees: these, I say, seemed to be too much at variance with what the Christians, taking scripture for their guide, proclaimed respecting the Holy Spirit and its offices. To get rid, therefore, of this difficulty, some members of the sect invented a twofold soul of the world; one devoid of all matter and concretion, removed from the world, and associated by an indissoluble bond with the Λόγος, or Eternal Reason; the other produced from this simple soul, and diffused through the world: the former of which, but not the latter likewise, they compared

to it, which are all insufficient, imperfect and heterogeneous. But in that King of all things, and in the other, second and third, which I spake of, there is nothing of this kind;" that is, nothing like to these created things.

Secondly, the three hypostases of Plato's trinity are not only all eternal, but also necessarily existent, and absolutely undestroyable. For the first of them can no more exist without the second, nor the first and second without the third, than original light can exist without its splendour, coruscation, or effulgency. And Plotinus, writing against some Gnostics in his time, who would make more of these divine hypostases, or principles, than three, concludes that there can be neither more of them, nor fewer, in this manner:* Οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀρχὰς ἴέναι, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο προθησαμένους, εἶτα νοῦν μετ' αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν πρώτως, εἶτα ψυχὴν μετὰ νοῦν· αὕτη γὰρ τάξις κατὰ φύσιν, μήτε πλείω τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοητῷ, μήτε ἐλάττω· εἴτε γὰρ ἐλάττω, ἢ ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν ταυτὸ φήσουσιν, ἢ νοῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων ἐδείχθη πολλαχῇ, λειπὸν δὲ ἐπισκέψασθαι ἐν τῷ παρόντι, εἰ πλείω τούτων, &c. "Wherefore we ought not to entertain any other principles, but having placed first the simple good, to set Mind, or the supreme Intellect, next after it, and then the universal soul in the third place. For this is the right order, according to nature, neither to make more intelligibles (or universal principles), nor yet fewer than these three. For he that will contract the number, and make fewer of them, must of necessity either suppose Soul and Mind to be the same, or else Mind and the first Good. But that all these three are diverse

with the Holy Spirit professed by Christians. In this way, indeed, all discrepancy between the Holy Spirit and the soul of the world seemed at first sight to be done away with: but, not to mention that only few of the Platonists were found willing to have recourse to such a remedy, the learned of that age could easily have seen that this dogma increased rather than diminished the difference between the Platonic and the Christian Trinity. In the first place, this soul of the world which they call ἐγκόσμιος, and separate from the ὑπερκόσμιος or supramundane soul, is so intimately associated with it, that no union can be more complete: secondly, like this it is eternal and void of all beginning. For as this sect held all things to be eternal, they must necessarily have acknowledged the soul immersed in matter to have been generated from all eternity. Lastly, this same soul of the world, as being generated out of the third essence of the hypostasis, ought to be excluded from the order of those things which the Platonists call created, concrete and mutable: and if so there is an end of the Platonic trinity, and we must abandon all hope of establishing an agreement between their precepts and the Christian doctrine. For according to this, there will not be three but four hypostases in the Deity, the *one and good*, as they call it, *reason*, the *celestial soul* or architect of the world, and the *mundane soul* or simple and eternal nature connected from infinity with matter. This second soul certainly differs in degree from that other more sublime one which has no connexion with matter: but it pertains notwithstanding to the divine nature, and is, so to speak, a necessary portion of it: consequently we are not in error in ranking it as a fourth person of the Divinity. Many of the Platonists, indeed, were by no means averse to a multiplication of the divine persons: and some of them, Proclus among the number, are inclined to make the divine essence consist of four rather than of three persons.

* Ennead 2. lib. 9. c. 1. [P. 199.]

from one another hath been often demonstrated by us. It remains now to consider, that if there be more than these three principles, what natures they should be," &c.

Thirdly, as all these three Platonic hypostases are eternal and necessarily existent, so are they plainly supposed by them, not to be particular, but universal beings; that is, such as do περιέχειν τὸ ὅλον, "contain and comprehend the whole world under them," and preside over all things; which is all one as to say, that they are each of them infinite and omnipotent. For which reason are they also called by Platonic writers, ἀρχαὶ, and αἴτια, and δημιουργοὶ, "principles," and "causes," and "opificers" of the whole world. First, as for Νοῦς, "Mind," or "Understanding;" whereas the old philosophers before Plato, as Anaxagoras, Archelaus, &c., and Aristotle after him, supposed Mind and Understanding to be the very first and highest principle of all; which also the magic or Chaldee oracles take notice of, as the most common opinion of mankind,[2]

Ὃν πρῶτον κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρων,

That "Mind is generally by all men looked upon as the first and highest God:" Plato considering, that unity was, in order of nature, before number and multiplicity; and that there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, an "Intelligible" before "Intellect;" so that knowledge could not be the first; and lastly, that there is a good transcending that of knowledge; made one most simple good, the fountain and original of all things, and the first divine hypostasis; and Mind or Intellect only the second next to it, but inseparable from it, and most nearly cognate with it. For which cause, in his Philebus,[3] though he agrees thus far with

[2] The sense of this oracle, however, is doubtful and uncertain; as will be evident if we quote the entire verses, sect. 2. v. 27. 28. p. 372. ed. Clerici.

Πάντα γὰρ ἐξετέλεσσε Πατὴρ, καὶ νῷ παρέδωκε
Δευτέρῳ, ὃν πρῶτον κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν,

"The Father perfected all things, and delivered them to the second Mind, whch mankind call the first." These verses are a proof that the author of the oracles assigned the first place in the Trinity to *the Father*, the second to *mind*. But it is not clear from them that others were of a different opinion, and supposed mind to hold the first place. Dr. Cudworth indeed so interprets the latter verse: but those who are disposed to agree with him must regard the word πρῶτον as having the noun αἴτιον understood with it. For my part, however, I see no necessity for this. It would be equally, nay, I should say, more convenient and more in accordance with the words of the author to supply the word νοῦν to πρῶτον, making the whole run thus: Ὃν πρῶτον νοῦν κλῄζεται ἔθνεα ἀνδρῶν, to this purport: "Mankind are wont to call the second principle the first mind:" namely, to distinguish it from the other minds. Consequently, the meaning of the writer of the oracles will not be, that he himself is accustomed to assign the second place in the Trinity to *mind*, while the rest of men give it the first place, but simply that this mind which holds the second place in the principles of things is commonly called the first mind: from which it by no means follows that there were some who supposed it to be the first and highest principle.

[3] Opp. p. 80. ed. Ficini.

those ancient philosophers, ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦ παντὸς Νοῦς ἄρχει, "that Mind always rules over the whole universe;" yet does he add afterwards,* ὅτι Νοῦς ἐστι γενούστης τοῦ πάντων αἰτίου, "that Mind is (not absolutely the first principle, but) cognate with the cause of all things;" and that therefore it rules over all things, with, and in a kind of subordination to that first principle, which is, "Tagathon," or the "highest Good." Where, when Plato affirms that Mind, or his second divine hypostasis, is γενούστης with the first, it is all one as if he should have said, that it is συγγενής, and ὁμοειδής, and ὁμογενής, with it; all which words are used by Athanasius, as synonymous with ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential," or "con-substantial." So that Plato here plainly and expressly agrees, or symbolizes, not with the doctrine of Arius, but with that of the Nicene council and Athanasius; that the second hypostasis of the Trinity, whether called Mind, or Word, or Son, is not ἑτερούσιος, but γενούστης or ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential" or "con-substantial" with the first; and therefore not a creature.[4]

* Page 30.

[4] Whether this passage of Plato on νοῦς, or mind, and on its most intimate association with what he calls *the good*, will much assist the cause of Dr. Cudworth, I am very much disposed to doubt. For if what he says in the part of his Philebus referred to be attentively examined, the νοῦς or mind he speaks of, is not a person or divine hypostasis, but the wisdom of God which cannot be separated from his essence except in thought. In the beginning of the disputation, indeed, the philosopher expresses himself as if he was speaking of a person: for he cites the wise men who had asserted νοῦς, or mind, "to be the king of heaven and earth:" Πάντες γὰρ, συμφωνοῦσιν, says he, p. 79. οἱ σοφοί, ὡς νοῦς ἐστι βασιλεὺς ἡμῖν οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς: passages similar to which are to be met with also in other parts of the disputation. But when the whole tenor and contex of his discourse is examined, it becomes sufficiently obvious that he meant simply to inculcate that that the entire universe was framed and is administered by *mind* or supreme wisdom, and consequently, that the fountain of all science and wisdom is in God. And, indeed, he sometimes pretty clearly professes this. For example, p. 80. he says: Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν τῆς αἰτίας δύναμιν, "Therefore you will say that a kingly soul and a kingly mind exist in the nature of Jupiter (or God) himself, by virtue of the cause." He is speaking therefore of a mind that is in God, as a quality or virtue. Nay, the very scope of the entire dialogue shows this to be the case. In it he compares νοῦς or *mind* with *pleasure*, and inquires which of the two is preferable and more conducive to a happy life. Now, if νοῦς were a person, such a comparison would be absurd and futile, and the philosopher would be proposing the most ridiculous question: Whether pleasure or the son of God contributes more to human felicity. The ἡδονὴ, or *pleasure*, which Plato speaks of must necessarily be of one and the same nature as the νοῦς or *mind* it is compared with: and therefore, as no one in his senses would pronounce pleasure to be a person, so neither would he assert mind to be such. But what is of still greater weight, Plato denies the supreme felicity of man to consist in νοῦς or mind alone; and at the close of the dialogue mentions many other things, which in addition to mind are necessary towards a happy life. But if mind were a person and that the second person of the divinity, associated by an indissoluble bond with the first, it would have been insane in Plato to require anything more towards perfect human happiness than the possession of νοῦς or the *second person in the Deity*. To those who are not yet satisfied that Plato's νοῦς, which he discourses of in his Philebus, is not a person but a mental notion and virtue, perhaps no argument will be sufficiently convincing; nevertheless, I shall add one or two things, which, if I mistake not, will remove the doubts of the most sceptical. In the first place, I would call attention to this philosopher's own

And then, as for the third hypostasis, called Psyche, or the ıperior mundane soul, Plato, in his Cratylus, bestowing the ame of Zeus, that is, of the supreme God upon it, and etymo-ɔgizing the same from ζῆν, adds these words concerning it: ʼʼὃ γάρ ἐστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον οὗ ζῆν, ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων, "There is othing which is more the cause of life to us and other animals,

efinition of mind; which is to be found in p. 94. not far from the end of the ialogue. Νοῦς δὲ, says he, ἤτοι ταυτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν, ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατον αἰ ἀληθέστατον, "Mind is either the same as truth, or the most similar to it of all hings, and most true." Let us suppose mind to be a person: therefore, if we are to ollow this definition, truth, to which mind is said to be most similar, will also be a ɜrson. Consequently, those who consider this to be absurd, and are unwilling to rank ruth among persons, must also exclude Plato's mind from the same category. Again, he words νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις, I observe are used by Plato in this dialogue in-liscriminately, and as possessing one and the same signification. I shall give some ɜxamples from p. 94. where he frequently confounds and interchanges these terms. Plato is inquiring, whether there is more moderation in mind or in pleasure. But in his question he employs the word φρόνησις instead of νοῦς, which he otherwise nakes use of. Οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετρίοτητα ὡς οὕτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρόνησεως, ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται, "The next thing to be in-quired into is moderation, whether pleasure possesses more of it than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure." Some will suppose perhaps that φρόνησις is here different from νοῦς, but such supposition is completely overthrown by the answer to the question, which proves beyond a doubt that in Plato's discourse, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς, and φρόνησις are synonymous: Οἶμαι γάρ, ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρότερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα· ΝΟΥ̃Ν δὲ καὶ ʼΕΠΙΣΤΗ̃ΜΗΣ ἐμμε-τρότερον οὐδ' ἂν ἕν ποτε, "I consider, indeed, that nothing can be found more im-moderate than pleasure and joy; and on the contrary, nothing more moderate than mind and wisdom." A little afterwards, he so associates mind and φρόνησις together, as to leave no room for doubt that he meant one and the same thing by them: ʼΑρ' οὖν ΦΡΟ̃ΝΗΣΙΝ μὲν καὶ ΝΟΥ̃Ν οὐδεὶς πώποτε αἰσχρὸν εἶδεν, "No one ever saw mind and wisdom deformed." And again: Τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον ΝΟΥ̃Ν καὶ ΦΡΟ̃ΝΗΣΙΝ τιθεὶς, οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις, "Putting mind and wisdom as the third, you will not depart far from the truth." Lastly, I shall appeal to certain queries concerning mind proposed by Plato at the close of the dialogue. Socrates asks, whether mind or pleasure is more nearly allied to truth. Secondly, whether mind or pleasure is more beautiful. Thirdly, in which of the two there is more moderation. Now, who on hearing these questions will not immediately decide that it is impossible for the mind introduced by Plato in his Philebus to be a divine hypostasis or person? I have been perhaps somewhat prolix on so plain and easy a matter: but I have had my reasons for being so. Those who elicit a trinity from the writings of Plato, reckon his Philebus and the disputation concerning mind in this dialogue among the principal supports of their cause. Hence it was necessary to show at some length that the Platonic trinity would be to be despaired of, if its abettors were in possession of no other arguments in its favour. Besides, I considered it to be worth while to caution the readers of Plato by an example against a hasty and inattentive perusal of the books of a philosopher, whose diction approaches closely to the poetic, and has deceived more than one of the learned even by its flowers and figures. Not to mention that the persons who are once seized with an extravagant admiration of Plato, are generally of that class that they rarely renounce their opinions unless overwhelmed as it were by arguments.

The fallacy of what the learned Doctor here advances respecting the agreement of Plato and Athanasius on the subject of the second person of the divinity, is already apparent from these observations: nor indeed would there be much weight in it, even supposing *mind* in Plato's Philebus to be a divine person. For what sort of reasoning is this: The word γενούστης employed by Plato, and συγγενὴς and ὁμοειδὴς used by Athanasius, are pretty nearly synonymous: therefore Plato and Athanasius do not differ in opinion?

than this prince and king of all things; and that th
was called by the Greeks Zeus, because it is by h
animals live." And yet that all this was properly me
of the third hypostasis of his trinity, called Psyche,
from those words of his that follow; where he ex
poetic mythology before mentioned, making Zeus to
of Chronos: Εὔλογον δὲ, μεγάλης τινὸς διανοίας ἔκ
τὸν Δία, "It is agreeable to reason that Zeus sho
progeny or offspring of a certain great mind." N
and γενούστης are equivalent terms also; and ther
here makes the third hypostasis of his trinity lik
ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential" with the second; as he
made the second co-essential with the first.[5]

It is true, that by the δημίουργος, or "Opificer"
commonly meant Nous or Intellect, his second
(Plotinus affirming as much,* δημιουργὸς ὁ νοῦς Πλά
Demiurgus to Plato is Intellect.") Nevertheless, bo
and Plotinus, and other Platonists, called his third
also δημίουργον, "the artificer" or "opificer" of
world; some of them making him to be the second fr
Intellect; others the third from the first Good, th
cause of all things; who was by Atticus and Am
Demiurgus also. Wherefore, as was before suggested
to the genuine and ancient Platonic doctrine, all
hypostases were the joint-creators of the whole world
things besides themselves, as Ficinus more than on
the tenor thereof,† Hi Tres uno quodam consensu
ducunt, "These three with one common consent

[5] These passages which occur in Plato's Cratylus, a book replete with
logical absurdities, p. 262. opp. are dragged into the present question wi
reason. I. Dr. Cudworth assumes that Plato is speaking in the first
third person of his Trinity, or supramundane ψυχή. This, however, h
proves. For Plato neither makes any mention of a soul or ψυχή, nor
nature which he calls Zeus to be the soul of the world. If the learned
tures that Plato is here speaking of the soul of the world, merely bec
Jupiter to be the cause of life to all, the conjecture is certainly a b
figment of the junior Platonic school respecting the two souls of the wo
been disposed of by us a little above. II. In the other passages whe
called the progeny of a certain great mind, our excellent author do
which the lovers of truth will not very readily approve of. 1. He take
that Zeus or Jupiter is the soul of the world: which Plato, however,
states. 2. He makes the μεγάλη διάνοια, of which Ζεὺς is called the
the second person of the Trinity: but again without the least authori
have repudiated this opinion, I imagine, if he had only paid due attenti
τινὸς: which shows that the discourse is of one thing out of many,
singular and unique nature, such as the second divine hypostasis. 3.
abuses the word ἔκγονος. For who would easily tolerate this reasoning
γενούστης are pretty nearly equivalent in sense: therefore, the third h
Trinity, which is called by Plato ἔκγονος, is equal to the second hypo
he applies the term γενούστης? Something has already been said
passage of Plato elsewhere.

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. [Cap. 8. p. 489.].

† In Plotinus, Enne

things;" and before him Proclus, Πάντα ἀνήρτηται τοῦ ἑνὸς διὰ νοῦ μὲν καὶ ψυχῆς, "All things depend upon the first One, by Mind and Soul;" and accordingly we shall conclude in the words of Porphyrius, that the true and real Deity, according to Plato, extends to three divine hypostases, the last whereof is Psyche or Soul.[6]

From all which it appears, that Arius did not so much Platonize, as the Nicene fathers and Athanasius; who notwithstanding made not Plato, but the Scripture, together with reason deducing natural consequences therefrom, their foundation. And that the Platonic trinity was a certain middle thing also betwixt the doctrine of Sabellius and that of Arius, it being neither a trinity of words only, or logical notions, or mere modes, but a trinity of hypostases; nor yet a jumbled confusion of God and creature (things heterousious) together; neither the second nor third of them being creatures, or made in time, but all eternal, infinite, and creators.

But that it may yet more fully appear how far the most refined Platonic and Parmenidian, or Pythagoric trinity, doth either agree or disagree with the Scripture doctrine, and that of the Christian church in several ages; we shall here further observe two things concerning it. The first whereof is this, that though the genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans supposed none of their three archical hypostases to be indeed creatures, but all of them eternal, necessarily existent, and universal or infinite, and consequently creators of the whole world; yet did they

[6] It is so, as the learned Doctor states. There is a mighty conflict among the Platonists as to which place in the Trinity is to be assigned to the architect or δημιουργὸς of all things. We have already shown from the Timæus that Plato did not distinguish this Creator of the world from the Supreme God: and that many others agreed with him in this opinion is beyond question. But the emperor Julian makes him to be the second from the supreme God; and Plotinus, Porphyry, and others, the third. Nay, Proclus even goes so far as to rank the opificer of the world in the fourth place from the first cause. On which dissension and its causes I am not disposed to waste space and time by entering into a lengthened comment. I cannot, however, but admire the conclusion which the learned Doctor draws from this discord of the Platonists in respect to the opificer of the world and its place in the Triad. He supposes it to be a proof that they ascribed the construction of the world to all the three persons of the divinity, and therefore, may not improperly be classed with the Christians, who it is well-known refer the works which they call *external* to the whole of the most Holy Trinity. We shall easily be enabled to judge whether he is right or not in this supposition by merely exhibiting his argument in its naked form. The Platonists are at variance as to which of their three hypostases, the name of opificer or architect of the world is to be assigned: therefore, they considered this name to belong to all the three persons conjointly and not to any one of them in particular. Most assuredly, if there is no fault in this logic, I should think we ought to approve also of the following: Critics disagree among each other as to the authorship of the dialogue, De Caussis Corruptæ Eloquentiæ, usually appended to Quinctilian: some suppose Quinctilian, some Tacitus, some Suetonius to be the writer: it is evident therefore, from this contest that the work is not to be attributed to any one of these men but to all of them together. The Platonists, I fancy, would have abstained from this controversy, and not spent much thought upon the place of the δημιουργὸς in their Trinity, if they had been unanimous in supposing this office to be, not proper to one person, but common to all.

nevertheless assert an essential dependence of the second hypostasis upon the first, as also of the third both upon the first and second; together with a gradual subordination in them. Thus Plotinus, writing of the generation of the eternal Intellect, which is the second in the Platonic trinity, and answers to the Son or Word in the Christian:* Τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ τέλειον, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀΐδιον γεννᾷ, καὶ ἘΛΑΤΤΟΝ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ γεννᾷ. Τί οὖν χρὴ περὶ τοῦ τελειοτάτου λέγειν; μηδέν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γεννᾷν, ἢ τὰ μέγιστα μετ' αὐτόν· Μέγιστον δὲ μετ' αὐτὸν Νοῦς καὶ Δεύτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ὁρᾷ ὁ Νοῦς ἐκεῖνον, καὶ δεῖται αὐτοῦ μόνου· ἐκεῖνος δὲ τούτου οὐδέν. Καὶ τὸ γεννώμενον ἀπὸ κρείττονος νοῦ, νοῦν εἶναι. Καὶ κρείττων ἁπάντων ὁ Νοῦς, ὅτι τ' ἄλλα μετ' αὐτόν. Οἷον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ λόγος νοῦ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργειά τις, "That which is always perfect, generates what is eternal, and that which it generates, is always less than itself. What shall we therefore say of the most absolutely perfect Being of all? Does that produce nothing from itself? or rather does it not produce the greatest of all things after it? Now, the greatest of all things after the most absolutely perfect Being, is Mind or Intellect; and this is second to it. For Mind beholdeth this as its father, and standeth in need of nothing else besides it: whereas that first principal standeth in need of no mind or intellect. What is generated from that which is better than mind, must needs be mind or intellect; because mind is better than all other things, they being all in order of nature after it and junior to it: as Psyche itself, or the first soul; for this is also the word or energy of mind, as that is the word and energy of the first good." Again, the same is more particularly declared by him, concerning the third hypostasis called Psyche, that as it essentially dependeth upon the second, so is it gradually subordinate, or some way inferior to it:† Ψυχὴν γὰρ γεννᾷ Νοῦς, νοῦς ὢν τέλειος. Καὶ γὰρ τέλειον ὄντα, γεννᾷν ἔδει, καὶ μὴ δύναμιν οὖσαν τοσαύτην ἄγονον εἶναι· Κρεῖττον δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ γεννώμενον, ἀλλ' ἘΛΑΤΤΟΝ ὂν, εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοῦ, "Perfect Intellect generates soul; and it being perfect, must needs generate, for so great a power could not remain sterile. But that which is here begotten also cannot be greater than its begetter; but must needs be inferior to it, as being the image thereof." Elsewhere the same philosopher, calling the first hypostasis of this trinity Uranus, the second Chronos, and the third Zeus, (as Plato had done before) and handsomely allegorizing that fable, concludes in this manner concerning Chronos, or the second of these:‡ Μεταξὺ ὢν πατρός τε ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἥττονος υἱέος, "That he is in a middle state or degree betwixt his father, who is greater, and his son, who is less and inferior." Again, the same thing is

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6. [P. 487.] † P. 489.
‡ P. 551 [Ennead 5. lib. 8. cap. 13.]

by that philosopher thus asserted in general:* Ἐν τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ κάτω χωρεῖν, "In the things generated from eternity, or produced by way of natural emanation, there is no progress upwards, but all downwards, and still a gradual descent into greater multiplicity." We shall cite but only one passage more out of this philosopher, which containeth something of argumentation in it also:† Οὐ ταυτὸν τὸ ἐξ ἐκείνου ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὖν μὴ ταυτὸν, οὐδέ γε βέλτιον, "That which is generated or emaneth immediately from the first and highest Being, is not the very same thing with it, as if it were nothing but that repeated again and ingeminated; and as it is not the same, so neither can it be better than it." From whence it follows that it must needs be gradually subordinate and inferior to it.[7]

Which gradual subordination and essential dependence of the second and third hypostases upon the first, is by these Platonics illustrated several ways. Ficinus resembles it to the circulation of water when some heavy body falling into it, its superficies is depressed, and from thence every way circularly wrinkled. Alius (saith he) sic fermè profluit ex alio, sicut in aqua circulus dependet à circulo, "One of these divine hypostases doth in a manner so depend upon another, as one circulation of water depends upon another." Where it is observable also, that the wider the circulating wave grows, still hath it the more subsidence and detumescence, together with an abatement of celerity, till at last all becomes plain and smooth again. But, by the pagan Platonists themselves, each following hypostasis is many times said to be ἴχνος καὶ τύπος, "a print, stamp, or impression" made by the former, like the signature of a seal upon wax. Again, it is often called by them, εἰκὼν, and εἴδωλον, and μίμημα, "an image," and "representation," and "imitation;" which if considered in audibles, then will the second hypostasis be looked upon as the echo of an original voice; and the third as the repeated echo, or echo of that echo: as if both the second and third hypostases were but certain replications of the first original

[7] As this disputation is solely upon the nature of that Trinity which Dr. Cudworth styles the *genuine Platonic*, and not of the one which was inculcated by the Alexandrine school subsequently to the birth of Christ, and which the learned Doctor acknowledges to be miserably corrupt and wholly unlike the true Platonic, it will doubtless be asked by many, why he explains that Trinity by reference to passages of Plotinus, a man deserving of almost the first place among those whom he calls the corruptors of the old Platonic discipline. Is not this a silent confession that owing to the lack of ancient monuments, and the obscurity of Plato, it is uncertain what this philosopher's opinion was upon the three principles, and that he who attempts any thing on this subject must have recourse to the junior Platonists rather than to Plato himself? But such being the case, what becomes of the whole of the distinction between the genuine opinion of Plato, and the spurious doctrine of the Platonists on the three persons in the Deity?

* P. 513. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 16.] † Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 15. [p. 512.]

Deity with abatement: which though not accidental or evanid ones, but substantial, yet have a like dependence one upon another, and a gradual subordination. Or if it be considered in visibles, then will the second hypostasis be resembled to the image of a face in a glass, and the third to the image of that image reflected in another glass, which depend upon the original face, and have a gradual abatement of the vigour thereof. Or else the second and third may be conceived as two Parhelii, or as a second and third sun. For thus does[8] Plotinus call the universal Psyche, or third hypostasis, *εἰκόνα νοῦ σώζουσάν τι φῶς ἐκείνου*, "the image of Mind (which is the second) retaining much of the splendour thereof." Which similitude of theirs, notwithstanding, they would not have to be squeezed or pressed hard; because they acknowledge that there is something of dissimilitude in them also, which then would be forced out of them. Their meaning amounts to no more than this, that as an image in a glass is said *ἑτέρου εἶναι*, essentially to belong to something else, and to depend upon it; so each following hypostasis doth essentially depend upon the former or first, and hath a subordination to it. But we meet with no expression in any of these pagan Platonists so unhandsome and offensive as that of Philo's, in his second book of allegories: *Σκία δὲ θεοῦ ὁ Λόγος αὐτοῦ ἐστιν, ᾧ καθάπερ ὀργάνῳ προσχρησάμενος ἐκοσμοποίει*, "The Word is the shadow of God, which he made use of as an instrument in the making of the world." Notwithstanding which, the same writer doth call him elsewhere, more honourably, "a second God," and "the son of the first God." As in the same place he doth also declare, that this shadow and image of God is itself the archetype of other things: *Αὕτη δὲ ἡ σκία, καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἀπεικόνισμα, ἑτέρων ἐστὶν ἀρχέτυπον, ὥσπερ ὁ θεὸς παράδειγμα τῆς εἰκόνος, ἣν σκίαν νυνὶ κέκληκα, οὕτως ἡ εἰκὼν ἄλλο γίνεται παράδειγμα*, "This shadow and as it were, image (of the first God) is itself the archetype and pattern of others things below it. As God is the pattern of this image, (which we call his shadow,) so is this image itself another pattern or paradigm also."[9] But this dependence and subordination of the divine hypostases is most frequently illustrated in Platonic writings, by the *ἔκλαμψις* or *ἀπαύγασμα*, the effulgency or out-shining of light and splendour from the sun, and other luminous bodies; the "Nous," or second

[8] Ennead. 5. lib. 1. cap. 6. p. 487.

[9] Both these passages of Philo occur lib. 2. Allegor. p. 79. opp. But the second is exhibited here in a more correct form than in the editions, which have the reading *ἕτερον* and *κέκλημεον* instead of *ἑτέρων* and *κέκληκα*, as required by the context. I have explained Philo's opinion of the Word at great length above, and any one who reads my remarks will easily understand the force and meaning of the words quoted from him in this place. For the learned Doctor's reprehension of them, as harsh and offensive, proceeds solely from his supposing Philo's sentiments concerning the Word to be far different from that which we have shown by most weighty arguments he really entertained.

hypostasis being resembled to that radious effulgency, which immediately encompassing them, is beheld together with them, and, as the astronomers tell us, augments their apparent diameter, and makes it bigger than the true, when they are beheld through telescopes, cutting off those luxuriant and circumambient rays. And the third hypostasis is resembled to the remoter and more distant splendour, which circling still gradually decreaseth. Thus Plotinus,* Πῶς οὖν καὶ τί δεῖ νοῆσαι περὶ ἐκεῖνο μένον, περίλαμψιν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν, ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ μένοντος, οἷον ἡλίου τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ λαμπρὸν, ὥσπερ περιθέον, ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ γεννώμενον μένοντος, "How should we consider this second hypostasis otherwise than as the circumfused splendour which encompasseth the body of the sun; and from that always remaining is perpetually generated anew."

But this essential dependence, and gradual subordination of hypostases, in the Platonic trinity, will yet more fully appear from those particular distinctive characters which are given to each of them. For the first of these is often said to be Ἓν πρὸ πάντων, "one before all things;" a simple unity, which virtually containeth all things. And as Plotinus writes,† Οὕτως εἶχε πάντα ὡς μὴ διακεκριμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐν δευτέρῳ διεκέκριτο τῷ λόγῳ, "This so containeth all things, as not being yet secrete and distinct; whereas in the second they are discerned and distinguished by reason:" that is, they are actually distinguished in their ideas; whereas the first is the simple and second power of all things. Wherefore the second was called by Parmenides, Ἓν πάντα, "one actually all things;" that is, in their distinct ideas. And the third, according to the same philosopher, as Plotinus[10] tells us, was Ἓν καὶ πάντα, "one and all things;" as having still more multiplicity and alterity in it. One effectively all things. That which doth actively display, and produce into being, what was virtually or potentially contained in the first; and ideally or exemplarily in the second. Accordingly, the first of these is sometimes said to be Πάντα ἑνικῶς, "all things unitively;" the second Πάντα νοερῶς, "all things intellectually;" and the third, Πάντα ψυχικῶς, "all things animally;" that is, self-moveably, actively, and productively." Again, the first of these is commonly styled Τ' ἀγαθὸν, "the Good, or Goodness itself, above Mind and Understanding," and also ὑπερούσιον, "above essence," ineffable and incomprehensible. And sometimes also φῶς ἁπλοῦν, "a simple light;" the second Νοῦς, Λόγος, Σοφία, "Unity and Goodness" only by participation, or Ἀγαθοειδὴς, "Boniform," but essentially and formally; Mind, or Understanding, Reason, and Wisdom, all-comprehending, or infinite Knowledge. The third, Ψυχὴ, "Self-moveable Soul;"

* P. 487. [Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6.]
† P. 513. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 15.]
[10] Ennead 5. lib. 1. De Tribus Hypostas. cap. 8. p. 490. opp.

Goodness and Wisdom by participation, but essentially and formally, infinite Self-activity, or Effectiveness; infinite, active, perceptive, and animadversive power. Sometimes it is styled also Ἀφροδίτη and Ἔρως, "Venus" and "Love;" but differently from that of the first Good, which is Love too; but a Love of redundancy, or overflowing fulness and fecundity:* Ὃν γὰρ τέλειον, τῷ μηδὲν ζητεῖν, μὴ δὲ ἔχειν, μὴ δὲ δεῖσθαι, οἷον ὑπερέρρυη, καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκε πάντα, "That which being absolutely perfect, and seeking, or wanting nothing, as it were, overflowed; and by its exuberant redundancy produced all things." Whereas this latter is a Love of infinite activity. Of the first, it is said, by Plotinus, that it is ἀνενέργητος, "above all manner of action," for which cause, the making of the world is not properly ascribed to him, though he be the original fountain of all: according to that of Numenius,† Καὶ γὰρ οὔτε δημιουργεῖν ἐστι χρεῶν τὸν πρῶτον, καὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦντος θεοῦ (τοῦ υἱοῦ) χρὴ εἶναι, καὶ νομίζεσθαι πατέρα τὸν πρῶτον θεόν, "Neither is it fit to attribute the architecture of the world to the first God, but rather to account him the father of that God who is the artificer." Who again speaks further to the same purpose thus: Τὸν μὲν πρῶτον Θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι ἔργων ξυμπάντων καὶ βασιλέα, "It is to be acknowledged, that the first God is void of all manner of work or action, he being the king of all things." Of the second, to whom the energy of intellection is attributed, it is said, notwithstanding, that his οὐσία is his ἐνέργεια, his "essence" his "operation;" and that he is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, though a "multiform," yet an "immoveable nature." He therefore is properly called the Demiurgus, as the contriving architect, or artificer, in whom the archetypal world is contained, and the first paradigm, or pattern of the whole universe. But the third is a kind of moveable deity: Τὸ περὶ νοῦν κινούμενον (as Plotinus speaks) καὶ νοῦ φῶς, καὶ ἴχνος ἐξηρτημένον ἐκείνου, "That, which moveth about Mind, or Intellect, the light or effulgency thereof, and its print, or signature, which always dependeth upon it, and acteth according to it." This is that which reduces both the fecundity of the first simple Good, and also the immoveable wisdom and architectonic contrivance of the second into act or energy. This is the immediate, and, as it were, manuary Opificer of the whole world, and τὸ ἡγεμονοῦν τοῦ παντὸς, "that which actually governs, rules, and presideth over all." Amelius, in that passage of his before cited out of Proclus, calling these three divine hypostases three Minds, and three Kings, styles the first of them, Τὸν ὄντα, "Him that is;" the second Τὸν ἔχοντα, "Him that hath;" and the third Τὸν ὁρῶντα, "Him that beholds." In which ex-

* Plotinus 494. [Ennead 5. lib. 2. cap. 1.
† Eusebius, Præp. Evan. lib. 2. cap. 18. [P. 537.]

pressions, though peculiar to himself, he denotes an essential dependence, and gradual subordination in them.

Now that which is most liable to exception, in this Platonic scale, or gradation of the Deity, seems to be the difference betwixt the first and the second. For whereas the essential character of the second is made to be understanding, reason, and wisdom, it seems to follow from hence, that either the first and the second are really nothing else but two different names, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; or else, if they be distinct hypostases, or persons, that the first of them must needs be ἄνους and ἄλογος, "devoid of mind, reason," and "wisdom;" which would be very absurd. To which, all the reply we can make is as follows: first, that this is indeed one peculiar arcanum of the Platonic and Pythagoric theology (which yet seems to have been first derived from Orpheus and the Egyptians, or rather from the Hebrews themselves), that whereas the pagan theologers generally concluded, νοῦν πάντων προγενέστατον, "that Mind and Understanding, properly so called, was the oldest of all things," the highest principle and first original of the world; those others placed something above it, and consequently made it to be not the first, but the second. Which they did chiefly upon these three following grounds. First, because understanding, reason, knowledge, and wisdom, cannot be conceived, by us mortals, otherwise than so as to contain something of multiplicity in them; whereas it seems most reasonable to make the first principle of all, not to be number or multitude, but a perfect Monad, or Unity. Thus Plotinus:* Ἀόριστον μὲν νόησις ὥσπερ ὄψις, ὁριζομένη δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ· διὸ καὶ εἴρηται ἐκ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τὰ εἴδη καὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, διὸ οὐχ ἁπλοῦς, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ, &c. "Intellection, as well as vision, is in its own nature an indefinite thing, and is determined by the intelligible: therefore it is said, that ideas, as numbers, are begotten from infinite duality and unity; and such is intellect, which consequently is not simple, but many, it contemplating many ideas; and being compounded of two, that which is understood, and that which understands." And again elsewhere:† Τὸ πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου νοητοῦ, οὔτε νοῦς ὄντε κόσμος νοητὸς, ἁπλούστερον δέ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ πολλοῦ πολὺ, ἀλλὰ τὸ πολὺ τοῦτο ἐξ οὐ πολλοῦ, &c. "The principle of every thing is more simple than the thing itself. Wherefore the sensible world was made from Intellect, or the Intelligible; and before this, must there needs be something more simple still. For many did not proceed from many; but this multiform thing Intellect proceeded from that which is not multiform, but simple, as number from unity." To this purpose does he also argue in

* P. 518. [Ennead 5. lib. 4. cap. 2.]
† P. 514. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 16.]

these words:* Εἰ τὸ νοοῦν τι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ μὴ πλήθει τὸ νοῦν μὴ εἶναι· ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον· ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ νοῦς ἔσται, "If that which understands be many, or contain multitude in it, then that which contains no multitude, does not properly understand; and this is the first thing: but intellection and knowledge properly so called are to be placed among things which follow after it, and are second." And he often concludes: Ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ φύσει εἶναι τὸ γινώσκειν, "That knowledge (properly so called, by reason of its multiplicity) belongs to the second rank of being, and not the first."[1] Another ground or reason is, because, in order of nature, there must be Νοητὸν before Νοῦς, something "Intelligible" before "Intellect;" and from hence does Plotinus conclude:† Τὸ νοεῖν οὐ πρῶτον, οὔτε τῷ εἶναι, οὔτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι· ἀλλὰ δεύτερον, καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ ἀγαθὸν· καὶ γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό, &c. "That to understand is not the first, neither in essence, nor in dignity, but the second; a thing in order of nature, after the first Good, and springing up from thence, and that which is moved with desire towards it."[2] Their third and last ground of reason is, because intellection and knowledge are not the highest Good, that therefore there is some substantial thing, in order of nature superior to Intellect. Which consideration Plato much insisteth upon, in his sixth book De Republica. Now upon these several accounts do the Platonists confidently conclude:‡ Ὅτι Θεὸς κρείττων Λόγου καὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθήσεως, παρασχὼν ταῦτα, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὢν ταῦτα, "That the supreme Deity is more excellent and

* P. 535. [Ennead 5. lib. 6. cap. 3.]

[1] If the Platonists were induced to exclude all knowledge and science from the first person, on the ground that science, as consisting of many ideas, would appear to be incompatible with the dignity and perfection of the first person, they indeed consulted ill both for themselves and the Deity. For although they place science in the second person, and discard it from the first, still that second person was eternally generated from the first, and remains indissolubly connected with it. Consequently, if there is any fault, or rather imperfection, in science and knowledge, that will belong equally to the first person, from which the second proceeded and with which it is eternally associated, as it will to the second. But this opinion and reason ought probably to be classed among the subtleties of the Platonic school, which are so plentifully scattered through their books, and in which it is useless to look for any sense or meaning. For my part, indeed, I have by no means so high an estimation of my own powers as to believe myself capable of penetrating into these mysteries, and I leave it to others to consider whether it will be worth their while, or not, to exercise their sagacity in an attempt to unravel them.

† P. 536.

[2] Neither of this reason, owing probably to my own ignorance, am I able to comprehend the full force. There must be something *νοητὸν*, or *intelligible*, before *νοῦς*, or *intellect*: that is, I suppose, if intellect which reasons exists, there must necessarily have been something before intellect, which supplied it with matter to reason upon; therefore the first person of the divinity is without science or knowledge. Let others display their mental acumen in illustrating and explaining this logic: for myself, I am almost inclined to think that those Platonists, if any there were, who delighted in it, from their too great anxiety to appear more than ordinarily wise, had become more than ordinarily foolish.

‡ *Plotinus*, p. 512. [Ennead 5. lib. 3. cap. 14.]

better than the Λόγος (Reason, or the Word) Intellect and Sense, he affording these things, but not being these himself." And:* Τὸ γενόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ λόγος πολὺς καὶ πᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἦν δηλονότι οὐ Λόγος· πῶς οὖν ἐξ οὐ λόγου Λόγος· καὶ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθοειδὲς ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ, "That, which was generated from the first principle, was Logos (Word or Reason) manifold; but the first principle itself was not Word: if you demand therefore, how Word, or Reason, should proceed from that which is not Word or Reason? we answer, as that, which is boniform, from goodness itself." With which Platonic and Pythagoric doctrine exactly agreeth Philo the Jew also:[3] Ὁ πρὸ τοῦ Λόγου, Θεὸς κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ πᾶσα λογικὴ φύσις, τῷ δὲ ὑπερ τῶν πάντων ἐν τῇ βελτίστῃ καί τινι ἐξαιρέτῳ καθεστῶτι ἰδέᾳ, οὐδὲν θέμις ἦν γεννητὸν ἐξομοιωθῆναι, "That God which is before the Word or Reason, is better and more excellent than all the rational nature; neither is it fit that any thing, which is generated, should be perfectly like to that which is originally from itself and above all." And indeed, we should not have so much insisted upon this, had it not been by reason of a devout veneration that we have for all the scripture-mysteries; which scripture seem to give no small countenance to this doctrine, when it makes in like manner an eternal Word and Wisdom to be the second hypostasis of the divine Triad, and the first-begotten Son, or Offspring of God the Father. And Athanasius, as was before observed, very much complieth here also with the Platonic notion, when he denies that there was any λόγος or σοφία, any "Reason" or "Wisdom," before that Word and Son of God which is the second hypostasis of the Holy Trinity. What then, shall we say that the first hypostasis, or person in the Platonic trinity (if not the Christian also) is ἄνους and ἄλογος, "senseless" and "irrational," and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? Or would not this be to introduce a certain kind of mysterious atheism; and under pretence of magnifying and advancing the supreme Deity, monstrously to degrade the same? For why might not senseless matter as well be supposed to be the first original of all things as a senseless, incorporeal being? Plotinus therefore, who rigidly and superstitiously adheres to Plato's text here, which makes the first and highest principle of all to be such a being as, by reason of its absolute and transcendent perfection, is not only above understanding, knowledge, and reason, but also above essence itself (which therefore he can find no other names for, but only Unity and

* P. 514. [Cap. 16.]

[3] This passage of Philo is extracted from his unpublished first book of Questions and Solutions, by Eusebius, Præparat. Evangel. lib. 7. cap. 13. p. 323. It is quoted here, however, incorrectly; for in Eusebius the reading is, not ὑπὲρ τῶν πάντων, but ὑπὲρ τὸν λόγον.

Goodness substantial), and consequently, knowledge and wisdom to be but a second, or postnate thing, though eternal; but notwithstanding, does seem to labour under this metaphysical profundity; he sometimes endeavours to solve the difficulty thereof after this manner, by distinguishing of a double light; the one simple and uniform, the other multiform, or manifold; and attributing the former of these to the supreme Deity only (whose simple original light he resembles to the luminous body of the sun itself), the latter of them to the second hypostasis, as being the ἔκλαμψις or ἀπαύγασμα, the "circumambient fulgor," or "outshining splendour" of that sun. Thus Ennead 5. lib. 6. cap. 4, Τὸ παρέχον τοῦτο τὸ φῶς, φῶς ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν, "That from which this multiform light of Νοῦς or Intellect (the second hypostasis) is derived, is φῶς ἁπλοῦν, another most simple light." As he elsewhere accordingly writeth of the first principle, or supreme Deity, that it is ἐν νοήσει ἑτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν, "in knowledge or understanding, but of a different kind from that understanding of the second hypostasis, called Intellect." Sometimes again, this philosopher subtilly distinguisheth betwixt νοήσις αὐτή, "intelligence itself," and τὸ νοοῦν or τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν, "That which doth understand," or "which hath intelligence in it;" making the first principle to be the former of these two, and the second hypostasis of their trinity to be the latter:* Οὐδ' ἡ νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο οὖν πάλιν αὖ, ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι γίνεται· τοῦτο δὴ οὐδαμῇ δύο, "Intelligence itself doth not understand, but that which hath intelligence. For in that which doth understand there is a kind of duplicity. But the first principle of all hath no duplicity in it." Now that duplicity, which he fancies to be in that which hath intelligence, is either the duplicity of him that hath this intelligence, and of the intelligence itself, as being not the same; or else of him, and the τὸ νοητὸν, "the intelligible," or "object of his intellection;" intellect supposing an intelligible in order of nature before it. And from this subtilty would he infer, that there is a certain kind of imperfection and indigence in that which doth understand, or hath intelligence: Ἐνδεὲς τὸ νοοῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ ὁρῶν, "That which understandeth is indigent as that which seeth." But perhaps this difficulty might be more easily solved, and that according to the tenor of the Platonic hyposthesis too, by supposing the abatement of their second hypostasis to consist only in this, that it is not essentially Τ' ἀγαθὸν, "Goodness itself," but only ἀγαθοειδὴς, "boniform," or "good by participation;" it being essentially no higher than Νοῦς, Λόγος, and Σοφία, "Mind, Reason," and "Wisdom;" for which cause it is called by those names, as the proper charac-

* P. 537.

eristic thereof. Not as if the first were devoid of wisdom, nder pretence of being above it; but because this second is not ssentially any thing higher. As in like manner, the third ypostasis is not essentially wisdom itself, standing or quiescent, nd without motion or action; but wisdom as in motion, or isdom moving and acting.[4]

The chief ground of this Platonick doctrine of an essential ependence, and therefore gradual subordination, in their trinity f divine hypostases, is from that fundamental principle of their heology, that there is but one Original of all things, and μία ηγὴ τῆς θεότητος, "only one Fountain of the Godhead;" from hence all other things whatsoever, whether temporal or eternal, reated or uncreated, were altogether derived. And therefore his second hypostasis of their trinity, since it must accordingly lerive its whole being from the first, as the ἀπαύγασμα from the ῶς, "the splendour" from the "original light," must of necessity have also an essential dependence upon the same; and consequently, a gradual subordination to it.

For though they commonly affirm their second hypostasis to have been begotten from their first, and their third from their second, yet do they by no means understand thereby any such generation as that of men; where the father, son and grandson,

[4] We here have a specimen of the peculiar talent of the school denominated Platonic. Transported at first by a sort of fanatical fury, they dash boldly into imaginary realms, divide and dissect with incredible subtlety the most simple notions of mind, nay subject Deity itself to their intellectual scrutiny, and examine it in all its parts. But as soon as they come to their senses, and find they have laid snares for themselves, they forthwith have recourse to subtle distinctions and similitudes; in which, however, if hard pressed, they again stick fast, so as to be unable to recede. At first they most gravely decide: The first hypostasis has neither knowledge, nor intellect, nor thought. Any one who says to the contrary will be set down as injurious to God. Most acute and imperious truly! But should any one ask: Say you so? Is the Deity devoid of reason and intellect? You will then see these notable philosophers looking about them for a hiding-place. If they can do nothing else, they throw at him a heap of words of which they themselves know not the meaning; and should he not be satisfied with these, he is in danger of being sent to the Acusmatics, and condemned to five years' silence, till he learns to be as mad as his masters. I frankly confess I am too dull of comprehension to be able to see the force of all that is here brought forward from the Platonists on a god without intellect and the causes of this dogma. I would attempt something notwithstanding, and task my reason to the utmost, in order to gain some insight into these mysteries, did I not perceive that the efforts of others far superior to myself have been attended with any thing but success. But putting others out of the question, Dr. Cudworth is here fighting against himself, and in his anxiety to give support to the Platonists deserts his own cause. Certainly the course adopted by him to show that Plotinus did not teach a perfect absurdity when he made the first principle to be above reason and wisdom, seems to me almost to be more intricate than the dogma itself: nor can I understand what he means, when he says that the first principle is not devoid of wisdom because of being above it, but because the second person is not essentially any thing higher and more excellent. But I have already touched upon this opinion of the Platonic sect, and argued it to be a proof that the Triad of Plotinus is not a trinity of persons, but of notions only: I have shown also that the opinion of Athanasius is by no means to be confounded with it. I still adhere to the same sentiments, nor shall abandon them till convinced to the contrary by more powerful arguments than those adduced here by the learned Doctor.

when adulti at least, have no essential dependence one upon another, nor gradual subordination in their nature, but are all perfectly co-equal, and alike absolute. Because this is but an imperfect generation, where that, which is begotten, doth not receive its whole being originally from that which did beget, but from God and nature; the begetter being but either a channel or an instrument, and having been himself before begotten or produced by some other. Whereas the first divine hypostasis is altogether unbegotten from any other, he being the sole principle and original of all things, and therefore must the second needs derive its whole essence from him, and be generated after another manner, namely, in a way of natural emanation, as light is from the sun; and consequently, though co-eternal, have an essential dependence on him, and gradual subordination to him.

Moreover, the Platonists would recommend this their gradation in the Deity, or trinity of hypostasis subordinate, from hence; because by this means there will not be so vast a chasm and hiatus betwixt God and the highest creatures, or so great a leap and jump in the creation, as otherwise there must needs be. Nor will the whole Deity be screwed up in such a disproportionate height and elevation, as would render it altogether uncapable of having any intercourse or commerce with the lower world; it being, according to this hypothesis of theirs, brought down by certain steps and degrees nearer and nearer to us. For if the whole Deity were nothing but one simple monad, devoid of all manner of multiplicity, as God is frequently represented to be; then could it not well be conceived by us mortals, how it should contain the distinct ideas of all things within itself, and that multiform platform and paradigm of the created universe, commonly called the archetypal world. Again, were the Deity only an immoveable mind, as Aristotle's God is ἀκίνητος οὐσία, "an absolutely immoveable substance," whose essence and operation are one and the same; and, as other theologers affirm, that "whatsoever is in God, is God;" it would be likewise utterly unconceiveable, not only, how there should be any liberty of will at all in God (whereas the same theologers, contradicting themselves, zealously contend notwithstanding, that all the actions of the Deity are not necessary, and but few of them such), but also how the Deity should have any commerce or intercourse with the lower world; how it should quicken and actuate the whole, be sensible of all the motions in it, and act pro re natâ accordingly; all which the instincts and common notions of mankind urge upon them. Neither can they be denied, without rasing the very foundations of all religion, since it would be to no more purpose, for men to make their devotional addresses to such an immoveable, inflexible, and unaffectible Deity, than to a senseless adamantine rock. But these difficulties (as the Platonists pre-

tend) are all removed by that third hypostasis in their trinity; which is a kind of moveable deity. And thus are all the phenomena of the Deity, or the different common notions in the minds of men concerning it, though seemingly repugnant and clashing with one another, yet, in their opinion, fairly reconciled and solved by this trinity of divine hypostases subordinate.[5]

Lastly, they pretend also, that according to this hypothesis of theirs, there may be some reasonable satisfaction given to the mind of man, both why there are so many divine hypostases, and why there could be no more; whereas according to other ways, it would seem to have been a mere arbitrary business; and that there might have been either but one solitary divine hypostasis, or but a duality of them; or else they might have been beyond a trinity, numberless.

The second thing which we shall observe concerning the most genuine Platonical and Parmenidian trinity is this: that though these philosophers sometimes called their three divine hypostases, not only τρεῖς φύσεις, "three natures," and "three principles," and "three causes," and "three opificers," but also "three gods," and a first, and second, and third god; yet did they often, for all that, suppose all these three to be really one Θεῖον, one "Divinity," or "Numen." It hath been already proved from Origen and others, that the Platonists most commonly called the animated world the "second God," though some of them, as for example Numenius, styled it the "third God." Now those of them who called the world the second God, attributed

[5] The Platonists I know are accustomed to reason in the way the learned Doctor here represents them. For they seem indeed to have invented such a host of demons, ideas, gods, and genii, for scarcely any other purpose than to fill up the vast and immense chasm intervening between God and matter, and to form a sort of ladder, as it were, by means of which mankind might be able to reach the supreme Deity. But even this is evidence that the sect was imbued with a most perverse notion of God, and therefore forms no recommendation of their doctrine of a disparity of the three hypostases. They who believe God to be omnipresent and infinite, as all must do who obey right reason, although they may not fully comprehend the full force of these words, have no need of steps or ladders by which to ascend to the Deity, and can well dispense with the whole tribe of Platonic demons and genii. The Platonists' great solicitude, therefore, about the means by which they might connect and associate the Deity with nature and created things, is a proof that they supposed God to be a definite nature, circumscribed by certain limits and holding as it were an exalted position; which opinion, indeed, is altogether derogatory to the divine glory and majesty. But their doctrine of the perpetual emanation of all things from God did not permit them to think otherwise; for those who maintain it, if they wish to be consistent, must necessarily place God in one extreme as it were of the universe, and devise orders and gradations of beings, by means of which he is to be reached. As to the difficulties which the Platonists fancy cannot otherwise be removed than by supposing the three persons of the godhead to be similar, they vanish at once if we assume one thing of which no one can entertain a question: That God and things pertaining to God are not to be measured according to the standard of human things, or the strength and extent of our own intelligence. Besides, if this doctrine removes perhaps one difficulty, still so many new doubts and questions arise from it, that it is better to reject the remedy altogether and confess one's own mental incapacity to comprehend divine things, than to pass off unmeaning words for arguments.

indeed (not more, but) less divinity to it, than those who would have it to be the third God. Because these latter supposed that soul of the world to be the third hypostasis of their trinity; but the other taking all these three divine hypostases together, for one supreme and first God, called the world the second God; they supposing the soul thereof to be another soul inferior to that first Psyche, which was properly their third hypostasis. Wherefore this was really all one, as if they should have called the animated world the fourth God; only by that other way of reckoning, when they called it a second God, they intimated, that though those three divine hypostases were frequently called three gods, yet were they notwithstanding, really all but one θεῖον, "Divinity," or "Numen;" or, as Plotinus speaks, τὸ ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, "the divinity which is in the whole world." Thus when God is so often spoken of in Plato singularly, the word is not always to be understood of the first hypostasis only, or the Tagathon, but many times plainly of the πρῶτον, and δεύτερον, and τρίτον, the "first," and "second," and "third" altogether; or that whole divinity, which consisteth or is made up of these three hypostases. And this will further appear from hence, because when the whole world is said in Plato to be the image of the eternal gods, as also by Plotinus, of the first, second, and third, by whom it is always produced anew, as the image in a glass is; this is not to be understood, as if the world being tripartite, each third part thereof was severally produced or created by one of those three; nor yet can it be conceived how there could be three really distinct creations of one and the same thing. Wherefore the world having but one creation, and being created by those three divine hypostases, it follows, that they are all three really but one Creator and one God. Thus when, both in Plato and Plotinus, the lives and souls of all animals (as stars, demons, and men), are attributed to the third hypostasis, the first and great Psyche, as their fountain and cause after a special manner; accordingly as in our creed, the Holy Ghost is styled "the Lord and giver of Life;" this is not so to be understood, as if therefore the first and second hypostases were to be excluded from having any causality therein. For the first is styled by Plato also, αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, "the cause of all good things;" and therefore doubtless chiefly of souls: and the second is called by him and others too, αἴτιον and δημιουργὸς, "the cause and artificer of the whole world." We conclude therefore, that souls being created by the joint concurrence and influence of these three hypostases subordinate, they are really but one and the same God. And thus it is expressly affirmed by Porphyrius in St. Cyril:[6] Ἄχρι τριῶν ὑπο-

[6] Histor. Philosoph. lib. 4. apud Cyrillum contra Julianum, lib. 8. p. 271.

στάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν· εἶναι δὲ τὸν μὲν ἐν ἀνωτάτω θεὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, μετ' αὐτὸν δὲ καὶ δεύτερον, τὸν δημιουργόν· τρίτην δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχήν· ἄχρι γὰρ ψυχῆς τὴν θεότητα προελθεῖν, "That the essence of the divinity proceeds or propagates itself (by way of descent downwards) unto three hypostases or subsistences. The highest God is the Tagathon, or supreme Good; the second next after him is the Demiurgus so called, the architect or artificer of the world; and the soul of the world, that is the third: for the divinity extendeth so far as to this soul." Here we plainly see, that though Porphyrius calls the three divine hypostases three gods, yet does he at the very same time declare, that ἡ θείου οὐσία and θεότης, "the essence of the Godhead" and "the Divinity" extends itself to all these three hypostases, including the third and last also (which they call the "mundane soul"), within the compass of it. And therefore that even according to the Porphyrian theology itself, which could not be suspected to affect any compliance with Christianity) the three hypostases in the Platonic trinity are ὁμοούσιον, "co-essential," both as being each of them God, and as being all one God. St. Cyril himself also acknowledging as much, where he writeth thus of the Platonists: Τρεῖς ἀρχικὰς ὑποστάσεις ὑποτιθέμενοι καὶ αὐτοὶ, καὶ μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρισάμενοι, "That supposing three hypostases, which have the nature of principles (in the universe), they extend the essence of God to all these three hypostases.[7]

[7] To serve his own cause the learned Doctor here imagines not a few things of which it will be necessary to expose the fallacy, lest the authority of so great a man should lead others into error. I. What he states about those who called the world the second or third God, is neither more nor less than a downright fiction, and incapable of being supported by authority or argument. He supposes those who called the world the second God to have comprehended all the three persons under the name of the first God, and to have afterwards subjected the world, or the inferior soul of the world, to this trinity. To invent these and many other things of the kind is an easy task; but to establish and prove them by sufficient evidence and authorities, without which no wise man will admit them, is an affair of no ordinary difficulty. Those who called the world the second God, beyond all question imitated the example of Plato, who styles it so in his Timæus, cap. 18. p. 241. The same had been already done before Plato by Timæus Locrus, De Anima Mundi, p. 546. in Th. Gale's Scriptor. Mythologic. If I show, therefore, from the Timæus itself, that Plato had not the least idea of what is here attributed to those by whom the world was termed the second God, there is no one, I suppose, who will not reject the conjecture of Dr. Cudworth. If the world is called the second God by Plato, in order to distinguish it from the three principal hypostases, we are consequently to suppose the maker and opificer of the world, of which Plato discourses at large in the Timæus, to be the entire divinity, consisting of three persons. And so indeed thinks Dr. Cudworth. But we have already demonstrated above in our observations on the opinion of the later Platonists respecting a two-fold soul of the world, that it is impossible to come to any such conclusion. I shall show this somewhat more at length. All persons conversant with Platonic matters will readily grant, that the eternal forms or ideas of things in which the divine Plato so much delighted, were not placed either by him or his disciples in the first person but in the second, which they call reason or the word, and supposed to have contained the νοητὸς world from eternity. Wherefore if it can be shown from the Timæus that Plato openly separated these forms or ideas from the opificer of the world,

Indeed many conceive, that the Platonists making the three hypostases of their trinity to be thus gradually subordinate one to another, could not, for that very reason, acknowledge them to

this also will be evident that this opificer is not the entire divinity consisting of three persons. But what I have stated is so clear from the Timæus that nothing can be more so. After speaking of God's design of creating the world, he forthwith declares it to be impossible but that the Deity must have had before his eyes as it were a certain model, according to which as a pattern he created it. He therefore inquires what sort of model this is, and concludes a certain νοητὸν world to have existed from all eternity, which the Deity kept in view in constructing this visible universe. See cap. 3. p. 236. where among other things he says as follows: Τούτων δὲ ὑπαρχόντων αὖ, καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τόνδε τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι, "From which it necessarily follows that this world is an image of something." Add cap. 15. p. 238. The Platonists have here an option, whether they choose to assert that this eternal model which the divine architect expressed in creating the world does not differ from God, or that it is distinct and separate from him. If they prefer the former, there is an end of the Platonic trinity; for the second hypostasis will be the same as the first, nor will the eternal models of things be separated from God himself except in thought. For my own part I incline to this opinion, as I have already declared above; but neither Dr. Cudworth, nor a great portion of the Platonists, concur with me; as they both maintain Plato to have placed three separate principles over the universe of things. Let us suppose this model, therefore, to be in reality different from the Creator: but even so it will be manifest that Plato's demiurgus is not a triune God, but only the principal person of the Triad, who, when about to construct the world, placed before his eyes the eternal forms of things stored up in the second person. He who attentively examines either the Timæus, or what we have remarked above against a two-fold soul of the world, will easily collect much more in refutation of this opinion, which has been a frequent cause of error to the readers of Plato.

The true reason that led some of the Platonists to call this world the *second* and others the *third* God, will not readily strike any one, unless he first make up his mind to pay no attention to the later Platonists, in a question regarding the meaning and opinion of Plato. Plato, though abounding in subtleness, the meaning of which he probably was himself unacquainted with, never went so far, however, as either to suppose the creation of this world to be a thing unworthy of God, and foreign to his supreme simplicity, or to discard wisdom from his nature; on the contrary, he not only openly ascribed the whole of this office to the supreme Being, but declared it to have been performed with incredible wisdom. And imagining that so great a work was not accomplished without some exemplar or model, he joined to the principal Deity a νοητὸν, or "intelligible" world, by inspecting which, as it were, he supposed him to have constructed the universe. I shall not at present inquire, whether he placed this world compounded of the eternal forms of things, out of the divine nature, or within God himself; it is clear, however, both from the Timæus and other places, that the opinion of the junior Platonists, who placed the *model world* in the second person of the divinity, or in a certain second God, never once entered the mind of Plato himself. He knew, therefore, of no other principal God besides the maker and architect of the world, and him too as transcendently wise; consequently, since he supposed that the world, on account of the divine soul which he assigned to it, was also to be called God, he could not but call this the second God. At any rate, to show in Plato's Timæus those three notable hypostases of the junior Platonists, would be just as easy as to elicit from the same dialogue the three principles of chemists, salts, sulphur and mercury. But this sect arrogated to themselves much greater sagacity than their master, and as is evident from Plotinus' De Tribus Hypostatibus, and Proclus' Theologia Platonica, hurried away by the zeal of contemplation, imagined a first principle so sublime, pure, simple, and clear as to reduce it almost to nothing, representing it as not only destitute of motion but even of all knowledge. Having adopted this opinion and abandoned the footsteps of Plato, it was natural for them also to remove from it the office of making the world, which required both knowledge and motion. They then concocted a far different notion of the creation. Seeing that they held the world to be eternal, when they speak of its fabrication they are not thinking of a creation like that of the Christians, a production of matter out of nothing, or like that of Plato, an apt and artificial disposition

be one divinity: but the Platonists themselves do upon this very account, and no other, declare all these three to be one divinity, because they have an essential dependence and gradual subor-

of eternal but rude and undigested matter; with them creation is nothing but the production from all eternity of those motions without which this fabric cannot be kept together, and the perfecting of the various generations of animals and things. Wherefore the office of that which this sect calls the opificer, or δημιουργὸς, consists in perpetually agitating matter, in discharging in it the functions of father, in short, in imparting life to all living and animate things. Moreover, as they had deprived the principal God of all knowledge, all thought, and all forms or ideas of things, it was necessary to imagine another divine person or nature, which should occupy the next place from the supreme God, and be the seat and residence of all knowledge, wisdom, and science. And this second and new God prevented them from leaving the appellation of *second God* to the world, as Plato had done; consequently they called this, or rather its soul, the third God. As many therefore as adhere more closely to Plato, and do not scruple to rank wisdom and reason among the most excellent virtues of the supreme Deity, dignify the world by the name of *second God*. While with those who with no ordinary acumen disconnect eternal wisdom and reason from the most high God, and ascribe the power of agitating the world and generating all things to the soul of the world, it is styled the *third God*.

II. That the three principles of the Platonists make up one God, or in a certain way constitute one divine essence, I should be willing to admit; and yet those who consider that Porphyry, and other leaders of the Platonic sect, accommodated in many instances their words and dogmas to the spirit and standard of Christian wisdom, are in my opinion not so foolish and absurd as the learned Doctor supposes. As to his arguing, that according to the sense of the Platonists the world and souls were the joint creation of those three divine persons, I have the gravest reasons for considering this not to be the case. He first appeals to Plato, as asserting this world to be the *image of the eternal gods*. But putting aside that *to be created by any one* and *to be the image of any thing* are two very different things, I have already made it appear, if I mistake not, by cogent arguments, that the ἀΐδιοι θεοὶ of Plato, according to whose image he tells us the world was created, are the eternal forms or ideas of things, and not the three hypostases. Where Plotinus has left on record what Dr. Cudworth adds, that the world is not only an image of all the three persons, but is also perpetually created by them, I leave to others to discover. For my own part, I am afraid the learned Doctor has interpreted this philosopher's words according to his own sense, and has attached a foreign meaning to them. Probably in writing this he had in his mind Plotinus' Book on the question: Utrum Stellæ aliquid agant? Ennead 2. lib. 3. at the close of which, cap. 18. p. 148, the philosopher says something of the three artificers of the world. But whoever supposes these three artificers to be the three divine persons, manifestly mistakes the meaning of Plotinus, as he is there speaking, according to the faulty but yet usual practice of his sect, of three notions of one soul of the world, as if they were three persons. Indeed, the whole nature and tenor of the Platonic philosophy will scarcely allow me to believe that there was any one in that sect who ascribed the power of creating and generating to the three persons together. The nature which these philosophers call creator, or δημιουργὸς, proceeds with a pure and constant motion, and being equably diffused through all parts of the universe excites, generates, and animates the whole of nature. Plotinus, Ennead 8. lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 482. &c. Ψυχὴ μὲν ζῶα ἐποίησε πάντα, ἐμπνεύσασα αὐτοῖς ζωήν . . . . . αὕτη δὲ τὸν μέγαν τοῦτον οὐρανὸν καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκόσμησεν· αὐτὴ δὲ ἐν τάξει περιάγει, κ. τ. λ. "The soul made all animals and breathed life into them. The soul adorned this vast heaven, and perpetually carries it round in order." On the other hand, the first God is, according to their account, entirely devoid of all motion, and endowed with such simplicity and repose as cannot be comprehended by the human intellect. Most of this sect in like manner determine the second person to be altogether destitute of motion; which for this reason they sometimes denominate σοφίαν ἀκίνητον, or "immoveable wisdom," or else κύκλον ἀκίνητον. See Plotinus, De Dubiis Animæ, lib. 2. cap. 16. Ennead 4. lib. 4. p. 409. Consequently, as they make all motion to be absent from the two former principles, and conceive that which they term creation to be a work necessarily requiring motion, I consider it to be evi-

dination in them; the second being but the image of the first, and the third the image both of the first and second. Whereas, were these three supposed to be perfectly co-equal, and to have no essential dependence one upon another, they could not by these Platonists be concluded to be any other than three co-ordinate gods, having only a generical or specifical identity; and so no more one, than three men are one man: a thing which the Platonic theology is utterly abhorrent from, as that which is inconsistent with the perfect monarchy of the universe, and highly derogatory from the honour of the supreme God and first cause. For example, should three suns appear in the heaven all at once, with co-equal splendour, and not only so, but also be concluded, that though at first derived (or lighted and kindled) from one, yet they were now all alike absolute and independent; these three could not so well be thought to be one sun, as three that should appear gradually differing in their splendour, two of them being but the Parhelii of the other, and essentially depending on it; forasmuch as the second would be but the reflected image of the first, and the third but the second refracted. At least those three co-equal suns could not so well be thought to be one thing, as the sun, and its first and secondary splendour (which can neither be beheld without the sun, nor the sun without them) might be accounted one and the same thing.[1]

The Platonists, therefore, first of all suppose such a close and near conjunction betwixt the three hypostases of their trinity, as is nowhere else to be found in the whole world.* To this purpose Plotinus: Ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτὸν, οὐ χωρισθεὶς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μετ' αὐτὸν καὶ μεταξὺ οὐδέν· ὡς οὐδὲ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦ· ποθεῖ δὲ πᾶν τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τοῦτο ἀγαπᾷ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ὦσι μόνα τὸ γεννῆσαν καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον· ὅταν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον ᾖ τὸ γεννῆσαν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης σύνεστιν αὐτῷ, ὡς τῇ ἑτερότητι μόνον κεχωρίσθαι, "Intellect is said to behold the first good; not as if it were separated from it, but only because it is after it, but so as that there is nothing between them; as neither is there betwixt intellect and soul. Every thing which is begotten desires and loves that which begat it, especially when these two (that which begat and

dent that the Platonists could not, consistently with the laws of their philosophy, hold the work of creation to be common to the three persons. Compare what we have remarked above on the controversies of the Platonists respecting the demiurgus of the world.

[1] The learned Doctor here too openly betrays his partiality for the opinions of those who maintain the three persons of the divinity to be different in order and degree, or as we say at the present day, inculcate a *subordination* in the Trinity. And the similitudes by which he attempts to illustrate this matter, if somewhat closely examined, are of such a nature as to verge too closely upon Sabellianism. So difficult is it, without risking offence, to compare an abstruse and incomprehensible dogma with sensible things. In what follows, also, there are some things not altogether faultless, and savouring of the Sabellian rather than the Nicene school.

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 6. [P. 488.]

that which is begotten) are alone, and nothing besides them. Moreover, when that which begot is absolutely the best thing, that which is immediately begotten from it, must needs cohere intimately with it, and so as to be separated from it only by alterity." Which is all one as if he should have said, that these three divine hypostases are so intimately conjoined together, and united with one another, as that they are tantum non, "only not," the very self same. Again, the Platonists further declare, that these three hypostases of their trinity are ἀδιαίρετοι, "absolutely indivisible" and inseparable, as the ἀπαύγασμα is ἀδιαίρετον from the φῶς, "the splendour indivisibly conjoined with the light," or "sun." Which similitude also Athanasius often makes use of to the same purpose. Thirdly, these Platonists seem likewise to attribute to their three divine hypostases just such an ἐμπεριχώρησις, "circuminsession," or mutual in-being, as Christians do. For as their second and third hypostases must needs be in the first, they being therein virtually contained; so must the first likewise be in the second and third; they being as it were but two other editions thereof; or itself gradually displayed and expanded. But to speak particularly, the first must needs be in the second, the Tagathon in the Nous; and so both of them really one and the same God; because the common notions of all mankind attribute understanding and wisdom to the Deity; but according to the principles of Plato, Plotinus, and others, the Deity does not properly understand any where but in the second hypostasis, which is the Mind and Wisdom of it. And the Emperichoresis of the second or third hypostasis, was thus intimated by Plato also:* Σοφία μὲν καὶ Νοῦς ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γενοίσθην. Οὐκοῦν ἐν μὲν τῇ τοῦ Διὸς ἐρεῖς φύσει βασιλικὴν μὲν ψυχὴν, βασιλικὸν δὲ νοῦν ἐγγίγνεσθαι. Where having spoken of that divine Wisdom and Mind which orders all things in the world, he adds: "But Wisdom and Mind can never be without soul (that is, cannot act without it): wherefore, in the nature of Jupiter, is at once contained both a kingly Mind and a kingly Soul. Here he makes Jupiter to be both the second and third hypostases of his trinity, Nous and Psyche; and consequently those two to be but one God. Which Nous is also said to be both the γενούστης, i. e. "of the same kind," and co-essential with the first cause of all things. To conclude: as that first Platonic hypostasis, which is itself said to be above Mind and Wisdom, is properly wise and understanding in the second; so do both the first and the second move and act in the third.[2] Lastly, all these three hypostases, Tagathon, Nous, and

* Phileb. p. 30. [P. 80.]

[2] In expounding this passage of Plato the learned Doctor is not free from error, as will be manifest to any one from what we have stated at large above respecting the meaning of the word νοῦς in the Philebus. In the first place he tells us, these words

Psyche, are said by the Platonists to be one Θεῖον, or "Divinity;" just in the same manner as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference of a sphere, or globe, are all essentially one sphere. Thus Plotinus expressly, writing of the third hypostasis, or Psyche:* Σεμνὸν γάρ τι καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡ τοιαύτη, οἷον κύκλος προσαρμόττων κέντρῳ, εὐθὺς μετὰ κέντρον αὐξηθεὶς, διάστημα ἀδιάστατον· οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει ἕκαστα, εἰ τἀγαθόν τις καὶ τὸ κέντρον τάξειε, τὸν νοῦν κατὰ κύκλον ἀκίνητον, ψυχὴν δὲ κατὰ κύκλον κινούμενον ἂν τάξειε, "For this Psyche, or third hypostasis, is a venerable and adorable thing also; it being the circle fitted to the centre, an indistant distance (forasmuch as it is no corporeal thing). For these things are just so, as if one should make the Tagathon, or first Good, to be the centre of the universe; in the next place, Mind, or Intellect, to be the immoveable circle, or distance; and lastly, Soul to be that, which turns round, or the whole moveable circumference; acted by love, or desire." These three Platonic hypostases therefore, seem to be really nothing else but infinite Goodness, infinite Wisdom, and infinite active Love and Power, not as mere qualities or accidents, but as substantial things, that have some kind of subordination one to another; all concurring together to make up one

of Plato show Jupiter to be the second and third person of the Platonic Triad: which any one who merely looks at the words wil perceive to be far from the case. For Plato neither affirms Jupiter to be νοῦς and ψυχή, nor νοῦς and ψυχή to be in Jupiter. Were this passage to be understood of the three hypostases, Jupiter no doubt would be the first person, νοῦς which is said to be in Jupiter the second, and lastly ψυχή the third. But I perceive the reason why Dr. Cudworth interprets the passage in this manner. He had before expounded a passage from Plato's Cratylus, p. 262. wherein Jupiter is called the offspring of a certain great intelligence, so as to make Jupiter the soul of the world. On which account, if he had here acknowledged Ζεὺς or Jupiter to be the first person of the Triad, he would have weakened the interpretation given by himself of the passage of the Cratylus, and would have afforded sufficient ground for complaint to others that every thing in Plato is uncertain. In the next place, he assumes it as certain and unquestionable that νοῦς and ψυχή in this passage are not only persons but divine persons. But as to the word νοῦς, we have already shown it to have the same meaning in the Philebus as σοφία, ἐπιστήμη, and φρόνησις, and therefore to be the designation not of a person but of a virtue and quality. And this is proved to be the case even from this very passage now under consideration, in which the names νοῦς and σοφία are combined. Nor ought we in my opinion to decide differently respecting the word ψυχή. Persons accustomed to Plato's diction are aware that he applied the term νοῦς to that power, or if you will, that part of the mind which reasons and concludes, and ψυχή to that part in which resides life and the power of motion. And as he supposes this twofold part of the mind, or as others have it twofold soul, to cohere most intimately together, and to be altogether incapable of separation: consequently he sometimes mingles and confounds these two words, frequently using νοῦς in so wide a sense as at the same time to include in it the notion of ψυχή; and reversely employing ψυχή so as to signify νοῦς at the same time. Which he does even in this very dialogue. And such being the case, there is no reason why we should understand the ψυχή which that philosopher states to be in Jupiter, of a certain divine person. On the contrary, the following will be the plain and simple sense of the whole passage, and such as is demanded also by the context: In the supreme Deity reside not only wisdom and prudence, but also life and the power of effecting, moving and inciting.

* P. 409. [Ennead 4. lib. 4. cap. 16.

θεῖον, or "Divinity," just as the centre, immoveable distance, and moveable circumference, concurrently make up one sphere.

We have now given a full account of the true and genuine Platonic and Parmenidian or Pythagoric trinity;[3] from which it may clearly appear, how far it either agreeth or disagreeth with the Christian. First therefore, though some of the latter Platonists have partly misunderstood, and partly adulterated that ancient Cabala of the Trinity, as was before declared, confounding therein the differences between God and the creature, and thereby laying a foundation for infinite polytheism; yet did Plato himself, and some of his genuine followers (though living before Christianity) approach so near to the doctrine thereof, as in some manner to correspond therewith, in those three fundamentals before mentioned. First, in not making a mere trinity of names and words, or of logical notions and inadequate conceptions of one and the same thing; but a trinity of hypostases, or subsistences, or persons. Secondly, in making none of their three hypostases to be creatures, but all eternal, necessarily existent and universal; infinite, omnipotent, and creators of the whole world: which is all one, in the sense of the ancients, as if they should have affirmed them to be Homoousian. Lastly, in supposing these three divine hypostases, however sometimes paganically called three gods, to be essentially one divinity. From whence it may be concluded, that as Arianism is commonly supposed to approach nearer to the truth of Christianity than Plotinianism, so is Platonism undoubtedly more agreeable thereunto than Arianism; it being a certain middle thing betwixt that and Sabellianism, which in general was that mark that the Nicene council also aimed at.

Notwithstanding which, there is a manifest disagreement also betwixt the Platonic Trinity, as declared, and the now received doctrine in the Christian church; consisting in a different expli-

[3] The whole of this disputation, however, is made up chiefly of the sayings and decrees of Plotinus: and will it be possible to learn the true and genuine Platonic, Parmenidian, and Pythagorean doctrine of the trinity from such a writer? Not even Dr. Cudworth himself would say so, who so often confesses that the junior Platonists, of whom Plotinus was unquestionably the leader, vitiated the pure doctrine of Plato respecting the Trinity, and disfigured the truth handed down to him from Moses with their own ridiculous conceits. But taking away Plotinus' authority from this demonstration, how are we to know that he has so far been explaining the true doctrine of Plato and Pythagoras? But should he perchance except Plotinus from the number of those Platonists whom he owns to have contaminated the genuine dogmas of Plato, I should wish to learn by what marks we are to distinguish between those who follow and those who forsake Plato, and what proof there is that Plotinus did not tamper with the precepts of his master. To me, at least, on accurately comparing Plato's Timæus and Plotinus' book De Tribus Principiis Archicis with each other, there appears so great a difference between the doctrines of the two as probably never existed between those of Aristotle and Plato. For specimens of which consult what we have above brought forward respecting the double soul attributed by Plotinus to the world, and the causes why some Platonists, including Plotinus, called the world the *third*, and others the *second god*.

cation of the two latter points mentioned. First, because the Platonists dreamed of no such thing at all as one and the same numerical essence, or substance, of the three divine hypostases. And secondly, because, though they acknowledged none of those hypostases to be creatures, but all God, yet did they assert an essential dependence of the second and third upon the first, together with a certain gradual subordination; and therefore no absolute co-equality. And this is the true reason, why so many late writers have affirmed Platonism to symbolize with Arianism, and the latter to have been indeed nothing else but the spawn of the former; merely because the Platonists did not acknowledge one and the same numerical essence, or substance of all their three hypostases, and asserted a gradual subordination of them; but chiefly for this latter ground. Upon which account some of the ancients also have done the like, as particularly St. Cyril (contra Jul. lib. 1), he writing thus concerning Plato:* Τεθεώρηκε μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὑγιῶς εἰσάπαν; ἀλλὰ τοῖς τὰ Ἀρείου πεφρονηκόσιν ἐν ἴσῳ διαιρεῖ, καὶ ὑφίστησιν, ὑποκαθεμένας τε ἀλλήλαις τὰς ὑποστάσεις εἰσφέρει, "Plato did not thoroughly perceive the whole truth of the trinity, but, in like manner with those who follow Arius, divided the Deity, or made a gradation in it, and introduced subordinate hypostases:" as elsewhere the same pious father also taxes the Platonists, for not declaring the three hypostases of their trinity to be, in his sense, Homoousian, that is, "absolutely co-equal." But though we have already proved, that Platonism can by no means be confounded with Arianism, because it directly confronted the same in its main essentials, which were Erat quando non erat, or the second hypostasis being made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, together with its being mutable and lapsable; since, according to Platonism, the Nous is essentially both eternal and immutable:[4] yet that the most refined Platonism differed from the now received doctrine of the Christian church, in respect of its gradual subordination, is a thing so unquestionably evident, as that it can by no means be dissembled, palliated, or excused.

* P. 34.

[4] Read our copious remarks above on the Platonism of Arius: in opposition to which there is no weight whatever in this passage of St. Cyril: for he does not say that Arius imported his errors into the Christian community from the schools of the Platonists, or that Arius and Plato entirely agreed in their opinions, but merely indicates a certain affinity between the two: in short he states sufficiently clearly in the same passage, that the Platonic doctrine is better and purer than the Arian, and considers its founder, Plato, to have expressed his meaning somewhat obscurely that he might not fall in the same snares in which Socrates had perished: Πλὴν οὖν, says he, ἠγνόησε ὁλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς· οἶμαι δ'ἄν, ὅτι κᾶν ὑγιῶς ἔφη τε καὶ πεφρόνηκεν,——εἰ μὴ τάχα που τὴν Ἀνύτου καὶ Μελίτου γραφὴν ἐδεδίει, "Neither indeed was he altogether ignorant of the truth: nay I should rather suppose he would have said and thought wisely,——if he had not feared the accusation of Anytus and Melitus." And what need of many words? The very nature of the Arian and Platonic doctrine precludes us from regarding the one to be the standard and model of the other.

Over and besides which, it cannot be denied, but the best of Plato's followers were sometimes also further extravagant in their doctrine of the Trinity, and spake at random concerning it, and inconsistently with their own principles; especially where they make such a vast and disproportionate distance betwixt the second and third hypostases thereof; they not descending gradually and orderly, but as it were tumbling down from the former of them to the latter. Thus Plotinus himself, when having spoken magnificently of that soul of the world, which is his third hypostasis, he subjoins immediately:* Ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, καὶ ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν προσελθόντων σκοπῇς, λαβὼν κεκαθαρμένην, εὑρήσεις τὸ αὐτὸ τίμιον, ὃ ἦν ψυχή, "That this soul of ours is also uniform (or of the same species) with that mundane soul; for if any one (saith he) will consider it as in itself, pure and naked, or stript from all things adventitious to it, he shall find it to be in like manner venerable." Agreeably whereunto doth this same philosopher elsewhere call that mundane soul, πρεσβυτέραν καὶ ἀδελφὴν, that is, "but the elder sister of our human souls." Which, as it rankly savours of philosophic pride and arrogancy, thus to think so magnificently of themselves, and to equalize in a manner their own souls with that mundane soul; so was it a monstrous degradation of that third hypostasis of their trinity, and little other than an absolute creaturizing of the same. For if our human soul be ὁμοοειδὴς, "of the same kind" or "species" with the third hypostasis of the trinity; then is it not only ὁμότιμος, "of like honour and dignity," but also, in the language of the Christian church, ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential" with our human souls (as our Saviour Christ, according to the Arians in Athanasius,† is said to be ὁμοούσιος ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, "co-essential with us men"). From whence it will follow, that either that must be a creature, or else our human souls divine. Wherefore unless these Platonists would confine the Deity wholly to their first hypostasis, which would be monstrously absurd for them to suppose that first eternal Mind and Wisdom, by which the world was made, to be a creature; they must of necessity make a vast leap or jump betwixt the second and third of their hypostases; the former of them being that perfect Wisdom which was the architect or Demiurgus of the world, whilst the latter is only the elder sister of all human souls. Moreover, these Platonists, by their thus bringing down the third hypostasis of their trinity so low, and immersing it so deeply into the corporeal world, as if it were the informing soul thereof, and making it to be but the elder sister of our created souls, did doubtless therein designedly lay a foundation for their poly-

* Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 2. [P. 483.]
† Tom. 1. p. 557. [Libro de Sententiâ Dionysius.]

theism and creature-worship (now vulgarly called idolatry), that is, for their cosmo-latry, astro-latry, and demono-latry. For thus much is plainly intimated in this following passage of Plotinus:* Διὰ ταύτην ὁ κόσμος δὲ θεός· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἥλιος θεὸς, ὅτι ἔμψυχος, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα, "This whole corporeal world is made a god by the soul thereof. And the sun is also a god, because animated; as likewise are all the stars therefore gods." Where he afterwards adds: Τὴν δὲ θεοῖς αἰτίαν τοῦ θεοῖς εἶναι, ἀνάγκη πρεσβυτέραν θεὸν αὐτῶν εἶναι, "That which is to these gods, or goddesses, the cause of their being gods, must needs itself be the elder god, or goddess." So that this third hypostasis of the Platonic Trinity, called the mundane soul, is but a kind of sister goddess with the souls of the sun, moon, and stars, though elder indeed than they; they being all made goddesses by her. Where there is a confused jumble of things contradictious together; that soul of the world being at once supposed to be a sister to other souls, and yet, notwithstanding, to deify them; whereas this sisterly relation and consanguinity betwixt them would, of the two, rather degrade and creaturize that mundane soul, which is their third god, or divine hypostasis, than advance and deify those particular created souls. Here therefore we see the inconvenience of these Platonic βαθμοὶ, "stories," stairs and gradations in the Deity, that it is a thing liable to be much abused to creature-worship and idolatry, when the distances are made so wide, and the lowest of the deity is supposed to differ but gradually only from the highest of created beings. And because Porphyrius trod in Plotinus' footsteps here, as elsewhere, this was in all probability the true reason why the Arians (as Socrates recordeth[5]) were by Constantine

* P. 483. [Ennead 5. lib. 1. cap. 2.

[5] The epistle or rather edict of Constantine, commanding the Arians to be called Porphyrians, occurs in Socrates' Histor. Eccles. lib. 1. cap. 9. p. 32. and in Gelasius' Acta Concilii Nicæni, lib. 2. cap. 36. tom. 1. Conciliorum, p. 446. ed. Harduini. This decree is mentioned also by Athanasius in his Epist. ad. Solitariam Vitam Agentes, tom. 1. opp. p. 844. The epistle itself allows no one to remain in ignorance of the reason of this appellation: for the emperor says that they are to be branded with this stigma as being imitators of the manners of Porphyry: "Ἵν' ὧν τοὺς τρόπους μεμίμηνται, τούτων ἔχωσι καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν. And what manners of Porphyry he is alluding to, he clearly indicates in the preceding, where he states that Porphyry wrote books against the Christian religion, and that Arius after his example had done the same. If we follow this epistle, therefore, Arius and his followers acquired the name of Porphyrians on account of having in public writings attacked the true and fundamental doctrine of Christians respecting God and the Son of God, in the same way as Porphyry in a specific work had assaulted the whole Christian discipline. This reason has been approved of generally by learned men, among whom Pet. de Marca, De Concordia Sacerdotii ac Imperii, lib. 2. cap. 10. sect. 10. p. 137. Joh. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Græc. lib. 5. cap. 23. p. 309. and J. Le Clerc, Biblioth. Histor. et Univers. tom. 10. p. 448. deserve honourable mention: they supposing a Porphyrian to be the same as a hater of Christ, and of the truth handed down from Christ. At that age, I suspect, in which Christians were filled with a supreme detestation of Porphyry, this word was applied as a term of reproach and malediction to all who were notorious

called Porphyrianists; not because their trinities were exactly the same, but because Arius and Porphyrius did both of them alike (though upon different grounds) make their trinity a foun-

for their enmity to Christ and his divine discipline. The most learned Urb. Godofr. Siberus, in his Epistol. ad Jo. Fred. Thomæ, is nearly of the same opinion, although he explains its meaning somewhat differently, and supposes the Arians to have been called Porphyrians on account of their having like Porphyry acknowledged nothing divine in our Saviour Jesus. For he who in his doctrines denies all divinity in our Saviour is no other than an adversary and enemy of the Christian religion. These letters are extant in the Miscellan. Lipsiens. published a few years ago by the eminent Car. Frid. Bezoldus, tom. 1. p. 310.

But simple and plain as is this reason for the appellation, and resting moreover on the epistle of the emperor himself, still it has not satisfied every one. Not long since, the most erudite Jo. Fred. Thomæ inquired of the venerable Siberus the cause and origin of the name; and being answered by Siberus in the manner above stated, called in question the authenticity of the epistle itself, ibid. p. 315. In this I imagine he will have but few imitators, seeing that it contains no traces of imposture, and, as I have intimated above, is appealed to by Athanasius; not to mention, that if we reject the authority of this decree or epistle, the whole dispute will be reduced to most vague and uncertain conjectures, all the other ancient authors being silent. I have met with three other opinions respecting the origin of this name, which I shall briefly enumerate and examine: in order to ascertain whether we ought to rest content with the reason supplied in the epistle of Constantine or look about for a new one. The first is the one here rejected by Dr. Cudworth; which supposes the Arians to have been called Porphyrians because they had introduced into the Christian religion the trinity of Porphyrius and the Platonists. This opinion is warmly supported by Christoph. Sandius in his Diss. de Λόγῳ seu Verbo, subjoined to his Interpretationes Paradoxæ quatuor Evangeliorum. Amstelod. 1669.8. p. 292. and in his Nucleus Historiæ Ecclesiast. lib. 2. p. 171. Ideo, says he in the latter place, Constantinus decrevit Arianos vocitandos Porphyrianos, quod Arius et Ariani non solum cum Porphyrianis, sed et omnibus aliis Platonicis et Platoni ipso eamdem de uno Deo et verbo et Spiritu Sancto defenderunt doctrinam, "Constantine ordained that the Arians should be called Porphyrians, because the Arians defended the same doctrine concerning one God and the Word and the Holy Spirit, not only as Porphyry, but also all the rest of the Platonists and Plato himself." The truth is, it was this man's object to have it generally supposed that Plato's sentiments on the divine Triad were the same as those of the earliest Christian fathers, who are known to have approved of Plato in many respects. But in addition to what we have remarked above on the dissimilitude of the Arian and Platonic doctrine, there are two things which entirely demolish this conjecture. In the first place, Porphyry never was of that authority among the Platonists that the whole sect should be named after him, nor did any one in speaking of the Platonists ever make use of the name Porphyrians. Constantine, therefore, had he wished to accuse Arius of Platonic errors, would no doubt have abstained from this epithet, and would have named the man from Plato himself. Secondly, Constantine was so far from deeming Plato to have held impious notions concerning God, that he rather considered this philosopher to have taught more correctly on the subject of the trinity than Arius himself. See his Oratio ad Cœtum Sanctor. cap. 9. p. 576. 577. The second opinion is that adopted by Dr. Cudworth: who considers Arius to have been called a Porphyrian on account of his being supposed like Porphyry to have led men by his doctrine to the worship of many gods. What chiefly induces me to withhold my assent from this is, that this reason goes too far, and pertains not only to Porphyry, but to an infinity of others besides him. There must necessarily have been something peculiar in Porphyry, and belonging to him alone, which led the emperor to select him in particular, and not others, as the means of stigmatizing Arius. Now the inciting of men to the worship of many gods was not the crime of Porphyry alone, but common to a multitude of others and to the whole Platonic sect. With equal justice therefore the Arians might have been called by Constantine Ammonians, Plotinians, Celsians, if he had looked merely to this crime, nor is there any cause why he should have applied the name of Porphyry in particular as a designation of this sect. The third opinion was broached not long since by Jo. Hermann, who in his notes on Jo. Launoius' book

dation for creature-worship and idolatry. But nevertheless, all this (as many other things) was but heedlessly and inadvertently written by Plotinus; he, as it were, drowsily nodding all the while, as it was also but supinely taken up by Porphyrius after him: it being plainly inconsistent with the genuine tenor of both their hypotheses, thus to level the third hypostasis of the trinity with particular created souls, and thereby to make so disproportionate a distance, and so vast a chasm, betwixt it and the second. For Plotinus himself, when in a more sober mood, declares that third hypostasis not to be the immediate informing soul of the corporeal world, but a higher separate soul, or superior Venus, which also was the Demiurgus, the "maker," both of other souls and of the whole world. As Plato had before expressly affirmed him to be the Inspirer of all life, and Creator of souls, or the Lord and Giver of life; and likewise declared, that amongst all those things which are ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς συγγενῆ, "congenerous and cognate with our human souls," there is οὐδὲν τοιοῦτο, "nothing any where to be found at all like unto it." So that Plato, though he were also a star-worshipper and idolater, upon other grounds, yet in all probability would he not at all have approved of Plotinus' ὁμοειδὴς δὲ καὶ ἡμετέρα, "our souls being of the same species with that third hypostasis of the divine triad;" but rather have said, in the language of the Psalmist: "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture."[6]

De Varia Fortuna Aristotelis in Acad. Parisiensi, p. 158. considers that this appellation arose from Arius having abused the philosophy of Porphyry to confirm his own errors. Scilicet, says he, Porphyrius conscripsit quinque vocum institutionem ad Chrysoarum, qua egregie librum Categoriarum illustrat. At hac, quod multis vetustiorum confirmari potest testimoniis, Ariani abutebantur, "Porphyry wrote a treatise on the five words to Chrysoarus, in which he admirably illustrates the book of Categories. But the Arians, as can be shown by many testimonies of the earlier writers, abused this." This opinion is to be commended for its ingenuity, but not for its truth. The book written by Porphyry to Chrysoarus I am not ignorant of; but I have yet to learn what ancient author has recorded that Arius fortified his dogmas from this book in particular. Nay, if there were ancient testimonies extant on this matter, still it would appear to me incredible that the reason of this public reproach intended by him to be in the mouths of all men, should be drawn by the emperor from a book which none but doctors and philosophers were acquainted with, and of which the common people knew absolutely nothing. Constantine would have called Arius an Aristotelian rather, if he had wished to brand the man by an opprobious epithet for his insane love of dialectics: for we learn from many authors that he set the highest value upon the precepts and logical subtleties of Aristotle. See Epiphanius, Hæres. 69. sect. 69. p. 795. It is better, if I am not completely mistaken, to rest satisfied with the reason expressed in Constantine's letter than to rush headlong into new conjectures without any authorities for our guidance.

[6] I. The doctrine formerly inculcated by the Platonists on the origin of our souls from the soul of the world is altogether false and dangerous. Still, provided they had taught any thing sound and excellent on other subjects, I should not on account of this opinion alone accuse this sect of consummate and insufferable arrogance. For many of the Christian fathers, both ancient and modern, though otherwise highly deserving men, were tinctured with the same error. Persons even moderately versed in the

Notwithstanding all which, a Christian Platonist, or Platonic Christian, would, in all probability, apologize for Plato himself, and the ancient and most genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, after this manner.[7] First, that since they had no scriptures, councils, nor creeds, to direct their steps in the darkness of this mystery, and to confine their language to a regular uniformity; but theologized all freely and boldly, and without any scrupulosity, every one according to his own private apprehensions; it is no wonder at all, if they did not only speak many times unadvisedly and inconsistently with their own principles, but also plainly wander out of the right path. And that it ought much rather to be wondered at, that living so long before Christianity, as some of them did, they should in so abstruse a point and dark a mystery, make so near an approach to the Christian truth afterwards revealed, than that they should any where fumble or fall short of the accuracy thereof: they not only extending the true and real Deity to three hypostases, but also calling the second of them, Λόγον, "Reason" or "Word" too

monuments of the ancients are aware that many of the early fathers of the church did not hesitate to affirm, according to the words of Virgil, Georg. lib. 4. ver. 220:

> Esse nobis partem divinæ mentis et haustus
> Æthereos,

and to call our souls portions of the divine essence. See Lactantius, Instit. Divinar. lib. 2. cap. 12. p. 239. lib. 7. cap. 5. and cap. 10. p. 794. and 824. Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. 2. p. 67. Synesius, Ep. 105. p. 248. opp. not to speak of almost the whole body of Mystics, who held this doctrine in the highest reverence. See Pet. Poiret, Œconomie Divine, tom. 1. cap. 10. sect. 24. p. 277. Now I cannot suppose them all to have fallen into this error by reason of excessive pride, being convinced that most of them were led into it by the force and influence of other opinions which they had rashly adopted. II. What the learned Doctor advances in excuse of Plotinus and Porphyry, and in extenuation of their error respecting the origin of souls, is of less weight than he supposes. For although these philosophers invented a twofold soul of the world, one *mundane*, the other *supramundane*, and derived the souls of men from the properly mundane soul, still they associated these two souls of the world so closely and intimately together, that what pertains to one must necessarily pertain also to the other.

[7] That the learned Doctor himself lies concealed under this character of Platonic Christian, has both long ago been observed by others, and is shown by the history and circumstances of the age in which he lived. At that time the Platonic philosophy was much studied in the university of Cambridge, and most of the theologians there, Wilkins, Witchcote, H. More, Cudworth, Worthington, were immoderately devoted to it. See Burnet's History of his own Time, book 2. year 1661. p. 186. 187. Dr. Cudworth therefore was himself a Platonic Christian, and is here defending not so much another's as his own cause. But other English theologians, and in my opinion with some reason, disapproved of and publicly censured this immoderate love of Platonism, fearing that many errors would arise from it. See Sam. Parker's Impartial Censure of the Platonic Philosophy, Oxon. 1660. 4. I hope to say more in the Preface on this subject, which is of much importance towards gaining an insight into the opinions of Dr. Cudworth and other English theologians of that period. As the learned Doctor, however, in this comparison of the Platonic and Christian Trinity, assumes all that he has hitherto advanced on the nature and character of the Platonic triad as true, it will be necessary to revert sometimes to the remarks, which we have here and there made to show its weakness and fallacy.

(as well as Νοῦν, "Mind" or "Intellect") and likewise the Son of the first hypostasis, or Father; and affirming him to be the Δημιουργὸς and Αἴτιον, "Artificer and Cause of the whole world;" and lastly describing him, as the scripture doth, to be the image, the figure and character, and the splendour or brightness of the first. This, I say, our Christian Platonist supposes to be much more wonderful, that this so great and abstruse a mystery, of three eternal hypostases in the Deity, should thus by pagan philosophers, so long before Christianity, have been asserted, as the principal and original of the whole world; it being more indeed than was acknowledged by the Nicene fathers themselves; they then not so much as determining that the Holy Ghost was an hypostasis, much less that he was God.[8]

[8] Many I fear will consider this as a great injustice done to the Nicene fathers. I shall content myself with saying that these words seem to have escaped the learned Doctor unawares. The word ὑπόστασις, it is true, does not occur in the Nicene creed, neither is the name Θεὸς added to the words εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. See the creed itself as exhibited by Athanasius in his Epistola ad Jovianum de Fide, tom. 1. opp. p. 247. But I should by no means be disposed on that account to deny that the Nicene fathers held the Holy Ghost to be either a *person* or a *God*. The fact of their associating the Holy Ghost with the Father and Son, and wishing men to believe in the Holy Ghost equally as in the Father and Son, is, if I am not altogether mistaken, a sufficient proof that the Holy Ghost was considered by them an hypostasis or person. If the Father and Son were held by this council to be persons, which no one can for a moment question, the same must be supposed of the Holy Ghost, which it associates with these two persons. And pray what would be the force of the phrase: I believe in the Holy Ghost, if the Holy Ghost were not a person, but merely a certain notion or virtue of God? Is it credible that men in their senses would have taught their brethren to put firm trust in a certain notion or divine perfection, not different from the nature itself of God? Of the divinity of the Holy Ghost, the Nicene fathers, I confess, have spoken somewhat too obscurely. Not a few of the ancients, I am aware, purposely abstained from using the name God, when speaking of the Holy Ghost, as has been shown by numerous examples by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 14. p. 63. and by Thom. Ittigius, in the Opuscula Varia, edited by Christ. Ludovicus Lips. 1714. 8. p. 415. 417. and whether the Nicene fathers wished to follow in their footsteps, I shall not undertake to determine. But their faith in my opinion is sufficiently cleared by this, that they did not prefix the word Θεὸς to that part of their profession either in which they enjoin us to believe in Jesus Christ, but wrote simply: Καὶ εἰς τὸν ἕνα Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χρίστον; although afterwards, on accouht of the Arians, whose errors in particular they were opposing, they inculcate more at large concerning the divinity of the Son of God. For it follows from it, that the words, πιστεύομεν εἰς ἕνα Θεὸν, standing at the beginning of the formula, pertain to all the three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and therefore that the fathers sufficiently clearly declared the Deity to be common to the three Persons. Indeed, by repeating the word Θεὸς with each of the Persons, it was to be feared that they might seem to some to introduce not three Persons so much as three Gods: but to name God once, and afterwards distinguish three persons, is openly to profess that which ancients as well as moderns so often rightly inculcate, that μίαν φύσιν, "there is one divine nature," but τρεῖς ἐν μιᾷ φύσει ὑποστάσεις, "three Persons in one nature." These remarks have been considered necessary, on account of those who, even in the present day, to give countenance to their own errors, are continually appealing to the Nicene council, which they rashly tell us has determined nothing certain. This, however, is an old accusation, and was long ago put forth by the Macedonians and others, that the bishops assembled at Nice left it open for any one to form what opinion he pleased respecting the Holy Spirit. But it was also

But particularly as to their gradual subordination of the second hypostasis to the first, and of the third to the first and second; our Platonic Christian, doubtless, would therefore plead them the more excusable, because the generality of Christian doctors, for the first three hundred years after the apostles' times, plainly asserted the same; as Justin Martyr, Athenagoras, Tatianus, Irenæus, the author of the Recognitions, Tertullian, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Gregorius Thaumaturgus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Lactantius, and many others.[9] All whose testimonies because it would be too tedious to set down here, we shall content ourselves only with one of the last mentioned:* Et Pater et Filius Deus est; sed ille quasi exuberans fons, hic tanquam defluens ex eo rivus: Ille tanquam sol, hic tanquam radius à sole porrectus, "Both the Father and the Son is God; but he as it were an exuberant fountain, this as a stream derived from him: he like to the sun, this like to a ray extended from the sun."[10] And though it be true that Athanasius,[1] writing against the Arians, does appeal to the tradition of the ancient church, and, amongst others, cites Origen's testimony too; yet was this only for the eternity and divinity of the Son of God, but not at all for such an absolute co-equality of him with the Father, as would exclude all dependence, subordination and inferiority; those ancients so unanimously agreeing therein, that they are by Petavius[2] therefore taxed for Platonism, and having

promptly met by the vigilance of the orthodox fathers. We have evidence of both in the Synodica Amphilochii Iconiensis Epistola, published since Dr. Cudworth's time by Jo. Bapt. Cotelerius in the Monumenta Ecclesiæ Græcæ, tom. 2. p. 99. and included also by Jo. Harduinus in Concilorum, tom. 9. p. 798. from which we shall extract a few words corroborative of some of the things that we have stated: Σεσιγημένου δὲ, says Amphilochius, in Cotelerius, p. 101. τηνικαῦτα τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ζητήματος· διὰ τοῦτο πλατύτερον μὲν οὐδὲν προσίθεσαν· τοῖς μέν τοί γε συνετῶς ἀναγινώσκουσιν αὐτάρκης καὶ ἡ περὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ πίστει διδασκαλία· ὥσπερ εἰς Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν πιστεύειν, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα πιστεύειν ἐδογμάτισαν, μήτε ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἐπεισάγοντες τῇ θείᾳ καὶ μακαρίᾳ τριάδι, μήτε τι τῶν ἐκ τῆς τριάδος ἀποτέμνοντες, εἰς τὴν τῆς πίστεως ἔκθεσιν, "The question respecting the Holy Ghost being at that time at rest, they therefore added nothing more. But to intelligent readers the doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost contained in that creed will seem sufficient. For they taught, that as we believe in the Father and the Son, so ought we to believe in the Holy Ghost, neither introducing any other nature into the divine and blessed Trinity, nor cutting off any thing from the Trinity in that exposition of faith."

[9] Besides Petavius, G. Bull has produced and illustrated the testimonies of all these in his Defensio Fidei Nicænæ, sect. 4, entitled, De Subordinatione Filii ad Patrem, ut ad sui Originem ac Principium, p. 251. &c. opp. Whether, however, these passages have all the force they are supposed to have is very doubtful, and affords matter for longer discussion than we have here an opportunity of entering into.

* Instit. lib. 4. cap. 29. [P. 514.]

[10] The first words of this passage adduced from Lactantius, namely: Et Pater et Filius Deus est, do not expressly occur in that author. I would not deny, however, that he states the same in other words in that place.

[1] See his book or epistle De Synodi Nicænæ contra Hæresem Arianam Decretis, tom. 1. opp. 277.

[2] See lib. 1. De Trinitate, cap. 3. p. 20. and cap. 4. p. 24. tom. 2. Dogm. Theologicor.

by that means corrupted the purity of the Christian faith, in this article of the Trinity. Which, how it can be reconciled with those other opinions of ecclesiastic tradition being a rule of faith, and the impossibility of the visible church's erring in any fundamental point, cannot easily be understood. However, this general tradition or consent of the Christian church, for three hundred years together after the apostles' times, though it cannot justify the Platonists in any thing discrepant from the scripture, yet may it in some measure doubtless plead their excuse, who had no scripture revelation at all to guide them herein; and so at least make their error more tolerable or pardonable.

Moreover, the Platonic Christian would further apologize for these pagan Platonists after this manner: That their intention in thus subordinating the hypostases of their trinity was plainly no other, than to exclude thereby a plurality of co-ordinate and independent gods, which they supposed an absolute co-equality of them would infer. And that they made only such subordination of them, as was both necessary to this purpose, and unavoidable; the juncture of them being in their opinion so close, that there was, μηδὲν μεταξὺ, "nothing intermedious," or that could possibly be thrust in between them. But now again, on the other hand, whereas the only ground of the co-equality of the persons in the holy Trinity is, because it cannot well be conceived, how they should otherwise all be God; since the essence of the Godhead, being absolute perfection, can admit of no degrees; these Platonists do on the contrary contend, that notwithstanding that dependence and subordination, which they commonly suppose in these hypostases, there is none of them, for all that, to be accounted creatures, but that the general essence of the Godhead, or the uncreated nature, truly and properly belongeth to them all: according to that of Porphyrius before cited: Ἄχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν θείου προελθεῖν οὐσίαν, "The essence of the Godhead proceedeth to three hypostases." Now these Platonists conceive, that the essence of the Godhead, as common to all the three hypostases of their trinity, consisteth (besides perfect intellectuality) in these following things: First, in being eternal, which, as we have already shown, was Plato's distinctive character betwixt God and the creature. That whatsoever was eternal, is therefore uncreated; and whatsoever was not eternal, is a creature. He by eternity meaning, the having not only no beginning, but also a permanent duration. Again, in having not a contingent but necessary existence, and therefore being absolutely undestroyable; which perhaps is included also in the former. Lastly, in being not particular but universal, ἓν καὶ πάντα, "one and all things," or that which comprehends the whole; which is all one as to say, in being infinite and omnipotent, and the creator of the whole world. Now, say these

Platonists, if any thing more were to be added to the general essence of the Godhead besides this, then must it be self-existence, or to be underived from any other, and the first original principle, and cause of all: but if this be made so essential to the Godhead, or uncreated nature, as that whatsoever is not thus originally of itself, is therefore ipso facto to be detruded and thrust down into the rank of creatures; then must both the second and third hypostases, as well in the Christian as the Platonic Trinity, upon this supposition, needs be creatures, and not God; the second deriving its whole being and godship from the first; and the third, both from the first and second; and so neither first nor second being the cause of all things. But it is unquestionable to these Platonists, that whatsoever is eternal, necessarily existent, infinite, and omnipotent, and the creator of all things, ought therefore to be religiously worshipped and adored as God, by all created beings. Wherefore, this essence of the Godhead, that belongeth to all the three hypostases, being, as all other essences, perfectly indivisible, it might be well affirmed, according to Platonic grounds, that all the three divine hypostases (though having some subordination in them) yet in this sense are co-equal, they being all truly and alike God or uncreated. And the Platonists thus distinguishing betwixt *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, "the essence of the Godhead," and the "distinct hypostases" or "personalities" thereof, and making the first of them to be common, general and universal, are not without the consent and approbation of the orthodox fathers herein; they determining likewise, that in the Deity, essence or substance differs from hypostasis, as *τὸ κοινὸν* from *τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον*, "that which is common and general differs from that which is singular and individual." Thus, besides many others, St. Cyril:[3] *Ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ γενὸς, ἢ εἶδος, ὑπὲρ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὸν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει*, "The essence or sub-

[3] I am afraid the learned Doctor's memory is in fault here and has named St. Cyril instead of Theodoret: for I find these very words in Theodoret, Dialog. 1. adv. Hereses, entitled *Ἄτρεπτος*, not far from the beginning, tom. 2. p. 297. The mistake was the more easy as the same thing is said by St. Cyril, although in other words, and in a different way, Dialog. 1. de Trinitate, p. 408. tom. 5. opp. ed. Auberti. Peace be with the ashes of those excellent men who formerly were satisfied with this distinction: for I acknowledge they possessed a mind devoted to rectitude and truth. But I regret that they did not either altogether abstain from such like subtleties, or at least employ more caution in explaining them. For from this distinction of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, those seek no slight support to their opinion, who wish us to believe that the Nicene doctors professed one God in genus or species only, but not in number, that is, *three equal Gods*. Certainly, whoever chooses to look to the words rather than the intention of those Doctors, may with some plausibility reason as follows: There is as much difference between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* as between genus and individual. In God, therefore, there are three individuals, which, however, are comprised in one genus: and consequently the three Persons in the divinity differ in the same way as Peter, Paul and John, who are three individuals, having however but one genus, namely human nature. But of this elsewhere.

stance of the Deity differs from the hypostasis, after the same manner as a genus or species differs from an individuum." So that, as well according to these fathers as the Platonists, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which all the three persons agree in, is not singular, but generical or universal; they both supposing each of the persons also to have their own numerical essence. Wherefore, according to this distinction, betwixt the essence or substance of the Godhead, and the particular hypostases (approved by the orthodox fathers), neither Plato, nor any intelligent Platonist, would scruple to subscribe that form of the Nicene council, that the Son or Word is ὁμοούσιος, "co-essential," or "con-substantial," and "co-equal" with the Father. And we think it will be proved afterwards, that this was the very meaning of the Nicene council itself, that the Son was therefore co-essential or con-substantial with the Father, merely because he was God, and not a creature.

Besides which, the genuine Platonists would doubtless acknowledge also all the three hypostases of their trinity to be homoousian, co-essential or con-substantial, yet in a farther sense than this; namely, as being all of them one Θεῖον, or "Divinity." For thus, besides that passage of Porphyrius before cited, may these words of St. Cyril be understood concerning them:[4] Μέχρι τριῶν ὑποστάσεων τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ προσήκειν ἰσχυρίζονται, "That, according to them, the essence of God extendeth to three hypostases, or comprehendeth three hypostases in it:" that is, not only so as that each of these three is God; but also that they are not so many separate and divided Gods, but all of them together one God or divinity. For though the Platonists, as Pagans, being not so scrupulous in their language as we Christians are, do often call them three Gods, and a first, second, and third God; yet notwithstanding, as philosophers, did they declare them to be one Θεῖον or divinity; and that, as it seems, upon these several accounts following. First, because they are indivisibly conjoined together, as the splendour is indivisible from the sun. And then, because they are mutually inexistent in each other, the first being in the second, and both first and second in the third. And lastly, because the entireness of the whole divinity is made up of all these three together, which have all μίαν ἐνέργειαν, "one and the same energy" or "action" ad extrà. And therefore, as the centre, radious distance, and moveable circumference, may be all said to be co-essential to a sphere; and the root, stock, and boughs or branches, co-essential to an entire tree; so, but in a much more perfect sense, are the Platonic "Tagathon," "Nous," and "Psyche," co-essential to that ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεῖον, "that divinity in the

[4] Contra Julian. lib. 8. p. 270.

whole universe." Neither was Athanasius[5] a stranger to this notion of the word ὁμοούσιος also, he affirming: * Τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια καὶ ἀδιαίρετα εἶναι τῆς ἀμπέλου, "That the branches are co-essential with, and indivisible from the vine;" and illustrating the Trinity by that similitude. Neither must it be thought that the whole Trinity is one, after the very same manner that each single person thereof is in itself one, for then should there be a trinity also in each person. Nor that it is so called undivided, as if three were not three in it (which were to make the mystery contemptible): but because all the three hypostases, or persons, are indivisibly and inseparably united to each other, as the sun and the splendour, and really but one God. Wherefore, though there be some subordination of hypostases, or persons, in Plato's trinity (as it is commonly represented), yet this is only ad intra, "within the Deity" itself, in their relation to one another, and as compared amongst themselves; but ad extra, "outwardly," and to us, are they all one and the same God, concurring in all the same actions; and in that respect, without any inequality, because in identity there can be no inequality.

Furthermore, the Platonic Christian would, in favour of these Platonists, urge also, that, according to the principles of Christianity itself, there must of necessity be some dependence and subordination of the persons of the Trinity, in their relation to one another; a priority and posteriority, not only τάξεως, but also ἀξιώματος, of "dignity" as well as "order," amongst them. First, because that which is originally of itself, and underived from any other, must needs have some superiority and preeminence over that which derives its whole being and godship from it, as the second doth from the first alone, and the third from the first with the second. Again, though all those three hypostases, or persons, be alike omnipotent ad extrà, or "outwards," yet ad intrà, "inwards," or "within the Deity itself, are they not so; the Son not being able to beget the Father, nor the Holy Ghost to produce either Father or Son; and therefore neither of these two latter is absolutely the cause of all things, but only the first. And upon this account was that first of these three hypostases

[5] It is not true, that St. Athanasius makes use of this similitude of the vine to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity. He is there disputing against the Arians, who maintained the Son of God to be ὁμοούσιος with us, and for proof appealed to the saying of our Saviour, John xv. 1. To refute these, he contends that this passage pertains to his human not his divine nature, and points out our own affinity in body with Christ our Saviour: Ὥσπερ ἐστὶ τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς· οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμογενῆ τὰ σώματα ἔχομεν τῷ σώματι τοῦ Κυρίου, "As the branches are from the vine and co-essential with it, so we also have bodies of the same kind as the body of the Lord." By this comparison, therefore, Athanasius is not explaining the nature of the divine Trinity, but the relation and affinity of our bodies to Christ.

* De Sent. Dionys. p. 556. [Tom. 1. opp.]

(who is the original fountain of all) by Macrobius styled,[6] omnipotentissimus Deus, "the most omnipotent God;" he therein implying the second and third hypostases, Nous and Psyche, to be omnipotent too, but not in a perfect equality with him, as within the Deity they are compared together: however ad extrà or "outwardly," and to us, they being all one, are equally omnipotent. And Plotinus writeth also to the same purpose:* Εἰ τέλειόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ δύναμις ἡ πρώτη, δεῖ πάντων τῶν ὄντων δυνατώτατον εἶναι, &c., "If the first be absolutely perfect, and the first power, then must it needs be the most powerful of all beings; other powers only imitating and partaking thereof." And accordingly hereunto would the Platonic Christian further pretend, that there are sundry places in the Scripture which do not a little favour some subordination and priority both of order and dignity, in the persons of the Holy Trinity; of which none is more obvious than that of our Saviour Christ, "My Father is greater than I:" which to understand of his humanity only, seemeth to be less reasonable, because this was no news at all, that the eternal God, the Creator of the whole world, should be greater than a mortal man, born of a woman. And thus do divers of the orthodox fathers, as Athanasius himself, St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and St. Chrysostom, with several others of the Latins, interpret the same to have been spoken, not of the humanity, but the divinity of our Saviour Christ.[7] Inso-

[6] In Somnium Scipionis, lib. 1. cap. 17. p. 87.

* P. 517. [Ennead 5. lib. 4. cap. 1.]

[7] The passages of the ancient doctors, who have not scrupled to refer this saying of our Saviour to his divine nature, have been collected by Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 2. de Trinitate, cap. 2. p. 70, &c., Sam. Clarke in his celebrated work, The Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 141. and Mich. Lequien, in his notes, Ad Damasceni lib. 1. De Orthodoxa Fide, p. 136. Also those of such as consider Christ to be speaking here of his human nature, are pointed out by the same Petavius, ibid. sect. 11. p. 73. [See Wolle, Hermeneutica N. T. p. 163. &c.] For my own part, I approve of neither interpretation. For, putting other things out of the question, our Saviour is manifestly speaking here of his whole person, and not separating one nature from the other. Although, to tell the truth, most of the ancient interpreters who applied the words of Christ to his human nature, do not appear to have supposed, as Dr. Cudworth imagines them to have done, that the human nature is here compared simply and absolutely with the divine, but that the Son of God is called inferior to the Father, by reason of his having assumed the human nature, and clothed himself in human flesh. See the authorities collected by J. Casp. Suicer, in his Thesaur. Eccles. tom. 2. p. 1368. Neither, as the learned Doctor seems to suppose, did those who sought to discover the sense of this saying, confine themselves to these two interpretations. For other interpretations of the ancients have already been enumerated by Photius, Epistolar. 226. p. 262. who himself has struck out a new and altogether singular one, and considers Christ to have spoken not according to the truth, but agreeably to the notion and opinion of his disciples at that time imbued with numerous errors. The thoughts of certain later writers, most of whom however differ in words rather than in sentiment, I shall pass over, contenting myself with the mention of only one, Fred. Adolph. Lampius, a very recent and most erudite interpreter, who would persuade us that the words are to be understood de ea officii Christi mediatorii parte, qua defunctus est, antequam ad dextram patris exaltaretur, "of that part of Christ's mediatorial office discharged by him before he was exalted to the right hand of the Father," Comm. in Johann. tom. 2. p. 191. For my part, I think these eminent men would have found less diffi-

ıuch that Petavius himself,* expounding the Athanasian creed, ·riteth in this manner: Pater major Filio, ritè et catholicè ·onuntiatus est à plerisque veterum; et origine prior sine repre- ensione dici solet, "The Father is, in a right catholic manner, firmed by most of the ancients to be greater than the Son; ıd he is commonly said also, without reprehension, to be before ım in respect of original." Whereupon he concludeth the ue meaning of that creed to be this, than no person in the rinity is greater or less than other, in respect of the essence of ıe Godhead common to them all; Quia vera Deitas in nullo ıse aut minor aut major potest, "Because the true Godhead ın be nowhere greater or less;" but that, notwithstanding, there ıay be some inequality in them, as they are hic Deus, and hæc ersona; "this God," and "that person." It is true indeed, ıat many of those ancient fathers do restrain and limit this in- ıuality only to the relation of the persons one to another, as

ılty in this passage, and would have more easily repressed the Arians and others who ıused it, if they had not chosen to consider it apart from the context, instead of com- ıring and combining it with the preceding words. Our Saviour had said: that his ·parture from this earth to the heavenly Father would be an occasion for joy rather ıan for sorrow to his friends, if they really loved him, and subjoins the following ason: "Οτι ὁ πατήρ μου μείζων μοῦ ἐστι. These words therefore contain the ason, why Christ was to be congratulated on account of his departure from the earth. ow, I wish all reasonable men to judge whether this reason can be any other than the ıange from a state of misery and wretchedness to a far more glorious and happy ate. Hence, our blessed Lord's meaning, I am convinced, is simply this: "There is) cause for your being grieved at my going to the Father: for the Father is placed in r greater glory and felicity than I now am; of whose glory, when taken away from ence, I shall be made partaker." Nor does the word μείζων preclude this interpre- tion. For any one having even a slight acquaintance with the Greek language is vare that this word in its metaphorical sense can imply not only superiority of nature ıd dignity, but of glory, splendour, and felicity. Petavius, I observe, ibid. sect. 12. 73. 74. makes Calvin and Beza to be principal supporters of this opinion; but he ther incorrectly represented the meaning of these men, or shamefully suffered himself be led away by his anxiety to censure what he calls the *heretics*, when he wrote that ıis explication accords with the opinion of those ancient doctors who maintained ıat Christ's words were to be understood of his human nature. There is certainly a ide difference between those who hold Christ to be inferior to the Father as regards s human nature, and those who assert that the Father is called greater than Christ, ecause at that time he was superior to him in glory and felicity. Of our own coun- ymen, Henr. Bened. Slarck, in his Notæ Selectæ ad Difficiliora N. T. Loca, Lipsiæ, '24. 4. p. 109. according to the testimony of Joh. Christoph. Wolf, Curæ Philol. l N. T. p. 946. does not dissent from this opinion. This explication, however, is so ain and simple, that it has occurred no doubt to many others, whose suffrages time ill not permit us at present to collect. Whoever wishes, therefore, to judge of the lue of the other explications of this passage, let him adopt this as a rule: Every terpretation that assigns either no reason at all or an insufficient one, why Christ was be congratulated on account of his return to heaven, ought to be rejected. ccording to which standard, if we examine the opinion of the Arians or that the ancient fathers, to which Dr. Cudworth here attaches some importance, shall easily perceive the fallacy of both. For what sort of reasoning would is be: Rejoice at my going to the Father: for I am much inferior to the ıther in nature, degree, order, and dignity? Away with the Platonic Christian, who here imagined to be speaking, if he is able to adduce nothing from Scripture except is passage in support of his opinion.

* De Trinitate, p. 863.

the Father's begetting, and the Son's being begotten by the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeding from both; they seeming to affirm that there is otherwise a perfect equality amongst them. Nevertheless several of them do extend this difference further also, as for example, St. Hilary, a zealous opposer of the Arians, he in his book of Synods writing thus:[8] Siquis unum dicens Deum, Christum autem Deum, ante secula Filium Dei, obsecutum Patri in creatione omnium, non confitetur, anathema sit. And again, Non exæquamus vel conformamus Filium Patri, sed subjectum intelligimus. And Athanasius himself, who is commonly accounted the very rule of orthodoxality in this point, when he doth so often resemble the Father to the ἥλιος, or to the φῶς, the "sun," or the "original light," and the Son to the ἀπαύγασμα, the "splendour" or "brightness of it," (as likewise doth the Nicene council and the Scripture itself;) he seems hereby to imply some dependence of the second upon the first, and subordination to it; especially when he declareth, that the three persons of the Trinity are not to be looked upon as three principles, nor to be resembled to three suns, but to the sun and its splendour, and its derivative light:* Οὐδὲ γὰρ τρεῖς ἀρχὰς εἰσάγομεν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν, "For it appears from the similitude used by us, that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did;) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendour; so that we acknowledge only one principle."[9]

[8] These words it is true are to be met with in St. Hilary, De Synodis seu de Fide Orientalium, p. 1178. 1182. opp. ed. Bened. They are not his own, however, but the decrees of the Sirmian Council in the year 357, against Plotinus, translated by him from the Greek, and illustrated. The former words constitute the *third canon* of this council, the latter are part of the *eighteenth*. See Joh. Harduini Concilia, tom. 1. p. 702. 703. 704. But as St. Hilary approves of these laws of the Sirmian Council, it is fair to attribute to him the sentiment contained in them. In both canons those Sirmian fathers speak very incautiously, not to use a harsher term, and in words at least detract from the glory and majesty of our Saviour.

* Contra Ar. Or. p. 467. [Tom. 1. opp.]

[9] This passage will be of little avail to those who maintain that Athanasius held the Father and the Son to be widely different and dissimilar. Those who have treated of the laws of interpretation tell us, that comparisons made use of by authors are not to be stretched further than their purpose requires: which rule, if applied to this passage, will divest it of all suspicion of error. Athanasius is disputing against those who charged the orthodox Christians with introducing three gods, and among other things brings against them the similitude now in question, from which he affirms it to be evident that the charge is without foundation. By this comparison, therefore, he merely wishes to expose the grievous mistake of those who proclaim that the three persons of Christians are so many gods; but by no means intended to show by it what difference there is between the Father and the Son. Those who expound Athanasius' meaning, cannot fairly go beyond these limits unless they wish to offend against that well-known precept of the critics, which tells them in every similitude to attend to what is called the *third* term of the comparison.

As also where he approves of this of Dionysius of Alexandria,* Ὁ δέ γε Θεὸς αἰώνιον ἐστι φῶς, οὔτε ἀρξάμενον, οὔτε λῆξόν ποτε· οὐκοῦν αἰώνιον πρόσκειται καὶ σύνεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, ἄναρχον καὶ ἀειγενὲς προφαινόμενον αὐτοῦ, "God is an eternal light, which never began, and shall never cease to be; wherefore there is an eternal splendour also co-existent with him, which had no beginning neither, but was always generated by him, shining out before him." For if the Son of God be as the splendour of the sun ἀειγενὴς, "always generated," then must he needs have an essential dependence upon the Father, and subordination to him. And this same thing further appears from those other resemblances, which the same Dionysius maketh, of the Father and the Son, approved in like manner also by Athanasius; viz., to the fountain and the river; to the root and the branch; to the water and the vapour; for so it ought to be read, ὕδατος, and not πνεύματος,[10] as appeareth from his book of

* P. 565. [Lib. de Sententiâ Dionys. contra Arian. tom. 1.

[10] The passage of Athanasius here corrected by the learned Doctor, is from his book, De Sententia Dionysii, p. 565. tom. 1. opp. Καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα δὲ τῆς πηγῆς καὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ, καὶ τῆς ῥίζης, καὶ τοῦ βλαστοῦ, καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, καὶ τῆς ἀτμίδος, καταισχύνει τοὺς Χριστομάχους, τοὐναντία θρυλλοῦντας κατ' αὐτοῦ, "For these similitudes of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the breath and the vapour, put to shame the foes of Christ spreading adverse reports against him" (Dionysius). From this passage Dr. Cudworth would exclude the word πνεύματος and read ὕδατος in its stead: in my opinion, however, no alteration ought to be made in it. For among the resemblances of Dionysius by which he was accustomed to illustrate the doctrine of the divine Triad, and the generation of the Son from the Father, there is one also drawn from the *breath of the mouth*, or πνεῦμα, and *vapour*. This will be manifest to any one who attentively examines the following words of Dionysius, which are preserved by Athanasius, De Sententia Dionysii, tom. 1. opp. p. 560. Φωτὸς μὲν ὄντος τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ Χρίστος ἐστὶν ἀπαύγασμα· ΠΝΕΥΜΑΤΟΣ δὲ ὄντος, (πνεῦμα γάρ, φησὶν, ὁ θεὸς) ἀναλόγως πάλιν ὁ Χρίστος ΑΤΜΙΣ λέγεται· ΑΤΜΙΣ γάρ, φησὶν, ἐστι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, "If God be light, Christ is splendour: if he be breath (for God he says is breath) Christ again is analogously called vapour. For he is, says he, the vapour of the power of God." Into the truth and propriety of these similitudes of Dionysius we shall not inquire; it being sufficient for us that they show the passage of Athanasius to need no emendation. For as in that saying of Athanasius, so in these words of Dionysius, πνεῦμα and ἀτμὶς are combined and considered no otherwise than as cause and effect. Nor could it have escaped the learned Doctor that there are some of the ancient fathers who compare the generation of the Son of God with the generation of our words, and assert that the word of God was produced by the breath of God, in the same way as our words are by the breath of our mouth. Lactantius, Divinar. Instit. lib. 4. cap. 8. p. 426. Deus procedentem de ore suo *vocalem spiritum*, quem non utero sed mente conceperat, inexcogitabili quadam majestatis suæ virtute ac potentia in effigiem, quæ proprie sensu ac sapientia vigeat, comprehendit, "God, by a certain incomprehensible virtue and power of his majesty, composed the vocal breath proceeding out of his mouth, which he had conceived not in the womb but in the mind, into an image, which should abound in sense and wisdom." And a little afterwards: Quod si quis miretur, ex Deo Deum *prolatione vocis ac spiritus* potuisse generari, si sacras voces prophetarum cognoverit, desinet profecto mirari, "But should any one wonder how God could be generated from God by the *production of the voice and breath*, on becoming acquainted with the sacred words of the prophets, he will certainly cease to wonder." So much the less ought the learned Doctor to have been offended with the word πνεύματος in Athanasius.

the Nicene synod,* where he affirmeth the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father: Ὡς τοῦ φωτὸς ἀπαύγασμα, ὡς ὕδατος ἀτμὶς, "as the splendour of the light, and as the vapour of the water;" adding, Οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα, οὔτε ἡ ἀτμὶς, αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστὶν, ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ ἥλιος· οὔτε ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ ἀπόῤῥοια τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας, "For neither the splendour nor the vapour is the very sun and the very water; nor yet is it alien from it, or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby." Now all these similitudes, of the fountain and the river, the root and the branch, the water and the vapour, (as well as that of the sun and the splendour) seem plainly to imply some dependence and subordination. And Dionysius doubtless intended them to that purpose, he asserting, as Photius informeth us,[1] an inferiority of power and glory in the second, as likewise did Origen before him; both whose testimonies, notwithstanding, Athanasius maketh use of, without any censure or reprehension of them. Wherefore, when Athanasius and the orthodox fathers, writing against Arius, do so frequently assert the equality of all the three Persons, this is to be understood in way of opposition to Arius only, who made the Son to be unequal to the Father, as ἑτεροούσιον, "of a different essence from him," one being God and the other a creature; they affirming on the contrary, that he was equal to the Father, as ὁμοούσιος, "of the same essence with him;" that is, as God, and not a creature. Notwithstanding which equality, there might be some subordination in them, as hic Deus and hæc persona (to use Petavius' language) "this God and that person."[2]

* P. 275. [Tom. 1. opp.]

[1] Plotinus, nowhere that I remember, accuses Dionysius of corrupting the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But he relates out of Steph. Gobarus, Biblioth. cod. 132. p. 901. that St. Basil did not think very favourably of Dionysius, while Athanasius, on the other hand, altogether approved of his doctrines. In opposing the Sabellians, this great man certainly made use of phrases and forms of expression by no means elegant, or adapted to explain the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Hence it happened that he was not only subjected to much crimination in former times, but also at the present day is held by many excellent men to have uttered words unworthy of and derogatory to God. See Pet. Dan. Huet, Origenian. lib. 2. cap. 2. qu. 2. sect. 10. 25. But Dionysius rendered more prudent by these slanders of his adversaries, refuted the charges in a specific *Apology*, and towards the close of his life discoursed of the divine persons with much greater modesty and reverence.

[2] It is not my intention to defend all that the early Christian fathers have suffered to escape them in explaining the doctrine of three persons in one God: in which there is much, it must be confessed, that is not in conformity with the strict rule of scriptural theology, or will stand the test of severe criticism: their comparisons especially, drawn from human and natural things, not even excepting those in which Athanasius was accustomed to indulge, are calculated to shock the minds of those who entertain a right conception of things divine, and who deny that the Deity is to be estimated according to the frail and miserable circumstances of mortals. Still, however, I cannot

And thus does there seem not to be so great a difference betwixt the more genuine Platonists, and the ancient orthodox fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity, as is by many

agree with those who press those similitudes and images too closely, and, like the learned Doctor, consider them to be a sufficient proof that the ancient Christian fathers belonged to that class who suppose the natures of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to differ in degree and dignity. What in the first place indisposes me from doing so is, that these very similitudes from which Dr. Cudworth concludes Dionysius and Athanasius to have held the Son to be inferior to the Father, and the Holy Ghost inferior to both Father and Son, if interpreted too rigidly and invidiously, would subject these doctors to the charge of Sabellianism; a crime from which they were notoriously most free. For the sun, the splendour of the sun, and the radiance surrounding the sun, are no other light than one and the same sun striking the eyes in different ways: neither are water and vapour distinguished by any thing else than the mere mode of existence. The same may be said of the fountain and the river that flows from it. Those, therefore, who deny these comparisons to be sufficient to establish against the ancient doctors of the church the charge of Sabellianism, must admit at the same time, that no use whatever can be made of them towards determining what sentiments those who employed them entertained in reference to the divine Trinity. In the second place I am induced to put a more favourable construction upon these comparisons than at first view seems to be required, for this reason also, that their authors very frequently acknowledge that there is much dissimilitude in them, and that human and visible things supply nothing so perfect as to be a genuine image of the divine nature. I have observed in ancient authors many passages to this effect: some of which I shall here adduce in order to correct the impressions of those who draw matter for the gravest charges from the similitudes employed by the Christian fathers. The first is a striking passage of Cosma, surnamed *Indicopleustes*, in which he tells us that all comparisons of the Trinity are unworthy of the Deity, not even excepting those by which the apostles illustrated this mystery. Thus after bringing forward certain similitudes himself, Topograph. Christianæ, lib. 5. p. 258. tom. 2. Collect. Novæ Patr. Græcor. a Bernh. Montfaucon. Curatæ, he proceeds as follows: Ἐχρήσαντο δὲ καί τινες πατέρες παραδείγμασι σωματικώτερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς Τριάδος· οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀπὸ ἀενάου πηγῆς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς δύο ποταμοὺς προχεομένους· οἱ δὲ δένδρῳ, ὡς ῥίζῃ, καὶ κλάδῳ, καὶ καρπῷ· πάντες δὲ, εἴτε ἀπόστολοι, εἴτε πατέρες, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, σωματικώτερον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐμπνευσθέντες ἐξεῖπον, ὡς ἐν παραδείγμασι, λειπόμενα μέντοι πάνυ τῆς θείας οὐσίας· ἐν δὲ τῇ μελλούσῃ καταστάσει, ὡς πνευματικοὶ ἀνιστάμενοι πάλιν, ἀκριβέστερον γνωσόμεθα περὶ θεοῦ, "Certain of the fathers, however, made use of similitudes respecting the holy Trinity after a more corporeal manner: some speaking of it as of two rivers flowing out of an eternal fountain; others comparing it to a tree, as consisting of root, branch, and fruit: but they all, whether apostles or fathers, spoke as men after a corporeal manner, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit; using examples falling far short of the divine essence. But in a future state, as having risen again in spirit, we shall have a more accurate knowledge of God." The next is St. Hilary, who intimates not only that human comparisons little correspond to the glory and majesty of divinity, but also that the corruptors of the truth were principally the cause why the Christian fathers had recourse to such like adumbrations, De Trinitate, lib. 7. sec. 29. p. 935, Admonuisse, says he, nos in exordio sermonis nostri, meminimus, *humanas comparationes* divinis non satisfacere exemplis: tamen pro parte intelligentiæ nostræ sensum formis corporalibus erudiri, "I remember having observed in the beginning of my discourse, that human comparisons are not adequate to the divine examples: nevertheless that on the part of our intelligence the sense is instructed by bodily forms." Afterwards, having instanced some comparisons of the kind, he thus goes on, sec. 30. p. 937: Hæc—ad intelligentiam fidei tantum comparata sint, non etiam ad Dei dignitatem, ut nos potius intelligentiam invisibilium ex corporalibus sumeremus, non utique ut aliquid naturæ Dei satisfaceret comparationis exemplum,—sed quia simpliciorum fidem furor hæreticus turbaret, ut id de Deo credi non oporteret, quod difficile, nisi per corpoream comparationem, posset intelligi, "These—are to be considered as accommodated merely to our understanding of the faith, not also to the dignity of God, that we rather might obtain

conceived. However, our Platonic Christian would further add, that there is no necessity at all from the principles of Platonism itself, why the Platonists should make any other or more subordination in their Trinity, than the most severely orthodox fathers themselves. For according to the common hypothesis of the Platonists, when the character of the first hypostasis is supposed by them to be infinite goodness; of the second, infinite wisdom; and of the third, infinite active love and power (these not as accidents and qualities, but as all substantial), it is more easy to conceive

a knowledge of invisible from corporeal things, not certainly that any example used in comparison should fully represent the nature of God,—but because the faith of the more simple was unsettled by the madness of heretics, as that in reference to God that which can with difficulty be understood except by corporeal comparison ought not to be believed." Our third testimony is from St. Cyril of Alexandria, who discoursing of divine generation and the three persons in one God, says, amongst other things as follows, Adv. Julianum. lib. 8. p. 264, 265, Μικρὰ μὲν λίαν τῶν παραδειγμάτων ἡ παράθεσις· ἱκανὴ δὲ οὖν ὅμως ἀναβίβασαι τὸν νοῦν εἰς τὰ ἐπέκεινα λόγου τοῦ καθ' ἡμᾶς· ἐπειδὴ γάρ, εἴ τι πρὸς γένεσιν τὴν τῆς ἀνωτάτω πασῶν οὐσίας ὑποκάθηται δόξαν, καὶ οὐδεν ἐστιν ὁλοτρόπως προσεοικὸς αὐτῇ καὶ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἔχον ταύτῃ τοι καὶ μάλα εἰκότως τὴν ἐκ τῶν παραδειμάτων ἐρανιζόμεθα, ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν τι καὶ μόλις βραχὺ συναγείροντες, εἰς ἀμυδρὰν καὶ μετρίαν τῶν ζητουμένων παράστασιν, "The comparisons propounded are exceedingly weak and imperfect: nevertheless they are sufficient to elevate the mind to things which are above our reason. For since whatever is brought forward is far below the glory of the supreme essence of all, and nothing is wholly similar or equal to it, we therefore not unreasonably ask for the use of comparisons, collecting one thing from many, and that too a mere trifle, as an obscure and slight demonstration of what we are inquiring into." St. Augustine is complained of by many, and not altogether without reason, for too free and bold a use of images respecting the divine Trinity. And yet he himself in various places ascribes but little importance to his comparisons; as for instance in the following words from his book Contra. Sermon. Arianor. cap. 16. tom. 8. opp. p. 450, Quatenus sint autem ista similia, et rursus quantum dissimilia illi incommutabili Trinitati, quæ Deus est, longum est enucleatissime disputare. Sed ideo tantum hoc commemorandum putavi, ut etiam de ipsa creatura aliquid adhiberem, unde isti, si possunt, intelligant, quam non sit absurdum, quod de patre, filio, et spiritu sancto dicimus, &c. "In what respect these are similar, and again how far they are dissimilar, to the incommutable Trinity, which is God, would be matter for long and elaborate discussion. But I have thought it right to speak of this simply on this account, that I might make use also of something borrowed from created things, from which those may understand, if they can, how that should not be absurd, which we say of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," &c. The last evidence we shall quote is Joh. Damascenus, De Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 1. p. 137. tom. 1. opp. Ἀδύνατον γὰρ εὑρεθῆναι ἐν τῇ κτίσει ἀπαραλλάκτως ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος παραδεικνύουσαν· τὸ γὰρ κτιστὸν, καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ ῥευστὸν, καὶ τρεπτὸν, καὶ περιγραπτὸν, καὶ σχῆμα ἔχον, καὶ φθαρτὸν, πῶς σαφῶς δηλώσει τὴν πάντων τούτων ἀπηλλαγμένην ὑπερούσιον θείαν οὐσίαν, "For it is impossible for any image to be found in created things, representing in itself the nature of the holy Trinity without any point of dissimilitude. For how can a thing created, and compound, and perishable, and changeable, and endowed with figure, and corruptible, clearly express the superessential divine essence, which is exempt from all these?" Many more passages of the kind might be adduced, if necessary, from the books now extant of the ancient fathers of the church. And seeing that they thought thus modestly and wisely of the nature and use of their comparisons, I do not understand with what justice they are charged by many persons with the gravest errors for no other reason than because the similitudes by which they illustrate the mystery of the divine Triad are not sufficiently elegant, and do not fully and adequately express its dignity and majesty.

that all these are really but one and the same God, than how there should be any considerable inferiority in them.[3] But besides this, there is another Platonic hypothesis (which St.

[3] The learned Doctor here expresses himself more briefly and obscurely than I could wish. I shall endeavour, however, to explain his meaning; and for whatever error I may be guilty of must rest upon his obscurity for my excuse. The characteristic of the first person he tells us, according to the Platonic doctrine, is goodness, of the second *wisdom*, of the third *love* and *power*. This doctrine he considers to go far towards proving an agreement between the Christian and Platonic dogmas respecting the divine Trinity; it being easy to understand from it how three persons constitute one God, but difficult to conceive how one is inferior to another. For we can readily comprehend, in the case even of our own souls, how goodness, wisdom, and love form one nature, but why goodness should be inferior to wisdom, or wisdom to love, or what should so disconnect and separate these three, as to render one subject to another, is not equally plain and intelligible. According to the learned Doctor, therefore, this doctrine of the Platonists, if rightly understood, admirably illustrates the unity of the divine essence in three persons; while, on the other hand, it affords scarcely any vestige of *subordination* or subjection, just as little or no difference is observable in the three virtues or perfections above mentioned. This, if I am not much mistaken, is Dr. Cudworth's meaning, expressed as it is by him somewhat obscurely. Now I will admit all that he lays down as the groundwork of this opinion, namely, that the Platonic sect thought as he here represents them to have done; I will grant also, that it is much easier for us to conceive how three virtues can constitute one nature, than to understand the difference that separates these virtues, confining my inquiries to the subject itself. In my opinion, however, the very thing added by Dr. Cudworth, that these three names, *goodness*, *wisdom*, *love*, are names not of three virtues or qualities, but of three persons, or really existing natures, entirely destroys the force of this subtle argumentation. For if these three words were to imply three modes or three notions or perfections, Dr. Cudworth's reasoning would have been intelligible, and we should have no reason to complain of this dogma of a triune God being involved in infinite darkness; for every one is aware that one nature can be viewed in various respects, and be endowed with many perfections. In that case, however, there would be an end of all distinction, and there would be no more difference between the three persons of the divine nature than between three faculties of one soul, or three modes of action. The Sabellians, as they are called, therefore, would be right; nor have I any doubt but that the Socinians themselves, and the Jews, would willingly adopt this Trinity. But if *goodness*, *wisdom* and *love* are the names of three persons, I am at a loss to understand what aid these names can afford us towards a more clear conception of the divine Trinity. For the expressing an abstruse thing by different names does not change its nature; and therefore, if instead of the words *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, men make use of the names *goodness*, *love*, *wisdom* in the same notion, they do not thereby render it more intelligible than before how three in God are one. The same may be said of all those who, after the example of St. Augustine, De Trinitate, lib. 14. cap. 8. tom. 9. opp. p. 675. &c. fancied they discovered images of the divine Trinity in our soul and its faculties. If the words *memory*, *intelligence*, and *love*, which St. Augustine and an infinity of others after him employed in this matter, retain the same signification which they possess when applied to the human soul, we can better understand indeed, what is meant by a triune God, but at the same time we lose the whole mystery. But if these names receive a new meaning and signify really existing natures, we come back again to the old difficulties, and have gained nothing by this image, inasmuch as the change of names can produce no change in the thing itself. Such being the case, Dr. Cudworth's Platonic Christian will have a twofold risk to encounter. Should he acknowledge the names *goodness*, *love*, *wisdom* to be designations of qualities and perfections, the Trinity of the Platonists will differ entirely from the Christian Trinity; but if he declares that persons are meant by these names, what I would ask have we gained towards removing the barriers that separate us from the Platonists? Will the unity in the Trinity be made more intelligible thereby? Will the *subordination* of persons in the Platonic Trinity disappear, because the names of things in which no difference in dignity is discernible are applied to those persons? There is a vast difference and disparity between *a king*, the *son of a king*, and the *minister* of both; but

Austin* hinteth from Porphyrius, (though he professeth he did not well understand it) where the third hypostasis is made to be a certain middle betwixt the first and second. And this does Proclus also sometimes follow, calling the third in like manner, μέσην δύναμιν, "a middle power," and σχέσιν ἀμφοῖν, "the relation of both the first and second to one another." Which agreeth exactly with that apprehension of some Christians, that the third hypostasis is as it were the nexus betwixt the first and the second, and that love whereby the Father and Son love each other.[4] Now, according to this latter Platonic hypothesis, there

let us discard these names and substitute these three in their stead, *lord*, *governor*, *magistrate*, will this change of names cause the persons themselves, who before were so widely separated, to be equal to each other?

* De Civit. Dei. lib. 10. cap. 23. Cum dicit medium, non postponit, sed interponit.

[4] To give a clearer insight into what is here stated I shall quote St. Augustine's own words: Quæ (Porphyrius) dicat esse principia, tamquam Platonicus, novimus. Dicit enim Deum patrem et Deum filium, quem Græce appellat paternum intellectum vel paternam mentem. De Spiritu autem sancto aut nihil, aut non aperte aliquid dicit: quamvis, quem alium dicat horum medium, non intelligo. Si enim tertiam, sicut Plotinus, ubi de tribus principalibus substantiis disputat, animæ naturam etiam iste vellet intelligi, non utique diceret horum medium, id est, patris et filii medium. Postponit quippe Plotinus animæ naturam paterno intellectui: iste autem, quum dicit medium, non postponit, sed interponit, "What he (Porphyry), as a Platonist, says are principles we know. For he says God the Father and God the Son, whom in Greek he calls the paternal intellect or mind. But of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing at all or nothing clearly, although I don't know what else he can call middle between these. For if he also, like Plotinus, when discoursing of the three principal substances, meant the nature of the soul to be understood as the third, he would not have said middle between these, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the nature of the soul after the paternal intellect; whereas he, by using the term middle, does not place it after but between." To me St. Augustine appears to have written this without due consideration. For he reasons thus: Whatever is intermediate between two natures cannot be subject to them or inferior in order; therefore as Porphyry calls the nature which he adds to the Father and the Son, *middle*, it cannot possibly be the same nature that Plotinus calls *mind* and the *third hypostasis*; consequently Plotinus and Porphyry differ in their theology. The worthy father here creates unnecessary difficulties, and forgets that there is nothing to hinder a nature from being *intermediate* between two others, and at the same time the *third* in order. For a thing is said to be μέσον or *middle* in two ways, either in respect to *nature* or *order*. Whatever is made up, as it were, and compounded of two natures, or possesses any thing of a twofold kind, is sometimes called *middle*; in which sense the word *middle* is the same as *mixed*. Cicero De Optimo Genere Orator. cap. 1. p. 322. tom. 2. opp. Oratorum si quis ita numeret plura genera, ut alios grandes,—alios tenues, alios eis interjectos et tamquam *medios* putet, "If any one should reckon more kinds of orators, so as to suppose some as copious, others as barren, and others as interposed and as it were *intermediate* between them." Here the intermediate orators are compounded, as it were, of the copious and barren. But those also are called intermediate who hold the second or middle place between two. It does not necessarily follow, however, that that which is intermediate in the former way, namely, in respect to *nature*, is intermediate in respect to *order* also. The number three, to give an example especially appropriate to this subject, is intermediate as regards its nature between unity and the number two, as being compounded of the monad and dyad; but in respect to order it occupies not the middle but the third place. Cicero supplies us with another example; as he calls the oratorical foot the *pæon*, which consists of an *iambus* and a *trochee*, both intermediate between the iambus and trochee, and at the same time the *third*, namely, in degree and order, De Oratore, cap. 57. p. 744. tom. 2. opp. Ita Pæona probat (Ephorus), eoque ait uti omnes, sed ipsos non sentire, quum utantur, esse autem *tertium* ac *medium* inter illos, "Thus he

would seem to be not so much a gradation or descent, as a kind of circulation in the Trinity. Upon all which considerations, the Platonic Christian will conclude, that though some junior Platonists have adulterated the notion of the Trinity, yet either there is no such great difference betwixt the genuine Platonic trinity, rightly understood, and the Christian; or else, that as the same might be modelled and rectified, there need not to be.

But though the genuine Platonists do thus suppose the three hypostases of their trinity to be all of them, not only God, but also one God, or μία θεότης, "one entire Divinity;" upon which latter account the whole may be said also by them to have one singular or numerical essence: yet notwithstanding must it be acknowledged, that they nowhere suppose each of these three hypostases to be numerically the very same, or to have no distinct singular essences of their own; this being, in their apprehensions, directly contradictious to their very hypothesis

(Ephorus) approves of the pæon, and says that all use it, and when they do use it are not themselves aware that it is the *third* and *intermediate* between those." The Platonists, who call the third hypostasis a certain *middle*, or μέση δύναμις between the first and second, use this word in the former signification, and mean simply that the third person is mixed up as it were of the two former, and owes something to both. Thus they suppose the first hypostasis to be the most perfect *monad*, the second, which they call reason or wisdom, to comprise a multitude, and the third to be compounded in a certain manner of unity and multitude. In the first hypostasis they place infinite *goodness*, in the second infinite *wisdom*; and suppose that the third person derives both goodness and wisdom from these. Whoever reads Plotinus' book De Tribus Hypostatibus with attention can have no doubt of this being the case; for Plotinus both declares the third hypostasis to be *one*, cap. 2. p. 483. and in another place says that it is *number* or *multitude*. See cap. 3. 6. p. 484. 487. Compare Proclus' Theologia Platonica, lib. 3. cap. 11. p. 135. &c. where he discusses the whole of this subject with great copiousness and subtlety, declaring that the third hypostasis is μέση or *intermediate* between that which is ἄπειρον, or *infinite*, and that which is *finite*, that is, is compounded as it were of both. But this intermediate nature ascribed by the Platonists to the third hypostasis, does not prevent it from holding the third place in the divine Triad, and being inferior to the other two. And this being the case, it is evident that St. Augustine did not take a correct view of the entire Platonic discipline. when he fancied Plotinus to be at variance with Porphyry, because one calls the soul of the world the intermediate and the other the third nature; neither did Dr. Cudworth make use of due diligence when he thought it right to follow in his footsteps, and to abuse his authority towards lessening the discrepancy between the Platonic and the Christian Trinity. Because the Platonists call their third hypostasis intermediate, the learned Doctor considers it to be a proof that they do not place it very far below the first and second hypostasis, and therefore that the subordination in the Platonic Trinity is not so great as would appear; on the contrary, that the doctrine of the Platonists respecting the third hypostasis is not far removed from the opinion of those Christians who assert the Holy Ghost to be the bond or connecting link between the Father and Son. The worthy Doctor, I conceive, would have written nothing of the kind if he had been less anxious to establish a harmony between the Platonists and Christians. Concerning those who called the Holy Ghost the bond between the Father and Son consult Dion. Petavius, Dogm. Theolog. tom. 2. lib. 7. De Trinitate, cap. 12. sect. 8. p. 410. &c. It were to be wished, indeed, that they had exercised more prudence and caution, and had abstained from introducing into a doctrine so far above human comprehension notions and words, of which no examples are to be met with in sacred writ. Nevertheless, they are far removed in opinion from those Platonists who call their third hypostasis a μέση δύναμις, and merely illustrate the intimate connexion of the three persons by an image borrowed from human affairs.

itself, and all one, as if they should affirm them indeed not to be three hypostases, but only one. Nevertheless, the Christian Platonists would here also apologize for them after this manner; that the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church were generally of no other persuasion than this, that that essence or substance of Godhead, which all the three persons or hypostases agree in, as each of them is God, was not one singular and individual, but only one common and universal essence or substance; that word substance being used by them as synonymous with essence, and applied to universals likewise, as it is by the Peripatetics, when then they call a man, or animal in general, substantiam secundam, "a second substance." Now this is evident from hence, because these orthodox fathers did commonly distinguish, in this controversy of the Trinity, betwixt Οὐσία and Ὑπόστασις, "the essence or substance of the Godhead," and the hypostases or persons themselves, after this manner; namely, that the hypostasis or person was singular and individual, but the essence or substance common and universal. Thus does Theodoret* pronounce of these fathers in general: Κατάγε τὴν τῶν πατέρων διδασκαλίαν, ἣν ἔχει διαφορὰν τὸ κοινὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ἴδιον, ἢ τὸ γένος ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἄτομον, ταύτην ἔχει Ἡ ΟΥ'ΣΙ'Α πρὸς ΤΗ'Ν ΥΠΟ'ΣΤΑΣΙΝ, "According to the doctrine of the fathers, as that which is common differs from that which is proper, and the genus from the species or individium, so doth essence or substance, differ from hypostases;" that is to say, that essence or substance of the Godhead, which is common to all the three hypostases, or whereby each of them is God, was concluded by the fathers not to be one singular or individual, but one general or universal essence and substance; Theodoret, notwithstanding, there acknowledging that no such distinction was observed by other Greek writers betwixt those two words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, "essence or substance" and hypostasis, as that the former of them should be restrained to universals only, generical or specifical essences or substances; but that this was peculiar to the Christian fathers, in their doctrine concerning the Trinity. They in the mean time not denying but that each hypostasis, prosopon, or person, in the Trinity, might be said in another sense, and in way of opposition to Sabellius, to have its own singular, individual, or existent essence also; and that there are thus, τρεῖς οὐσίαι,* "three singular existent essences" in the Deity, as well as τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, "three hypostases;" an hypostasis being nothing else to them, but an existent essence:[5] however, for distinction's sake, they here

* Dial. 1. adv. Hær. [Tom. 2. opp. p. 297.]
† Greg. Nyssen. adv. Eunom. lib. 12. [P. 301. tom. 2. opp.]
[5] Add of the same Gregory, whom Dr. Cudworth cites in his note, lib. 1. adv. Eunomium, in Appendice opp. Gregorii Nysseni, Paris. 1618. fol. p. 97. It ought

thought fit thus to limit and appropriate the signification of these two words, that a singular and existent essence should not be called essence, but hypostasis; and by *οὐσία*, "essence" or "substance," should be meant that general or universal nature of the Godhead only, which is common to all those three singular hypostases or persons, or in which they all agree. We might here heap up many more testimonies for a further confirmation of this; as that of St. Basil:* Ὃν ἔχει λόγον τὸ κοινὸν πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον, τοῦτον ἔχει ἡ οὐσία πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν, "What common is to proper, the same is essence or substance (in the Trinity) to the hypostases." But we shall content ourselves only with this full acknowledgment of D. Petavius:† In hoc uno Græcorum præsertim omnium judicia concordant, *οὐσίαν*, id est, essentiam sive substantiam, aut naturam (quàm *φύσιν* vocant) generale esse aliquid et commune, ac minimè definitum; *ὑπόστασιν* verò proprium, singulare, et circumscriptum, quod ex illo communi, et peculiaribus quibusdam notis ac proprietatibus veluti componitur, "In this one thing do the judgments and opinions of all the Greeks especially agree, that Usia, essence or substance, and nature, which they call Physis (in the trinity) is something general, common, and undetermined; but hypostasis is that which is proper, singular, and circumscribed, and which is, as it were, compounded and made up of that common essence or substance, and certain peculiar notes and properties, or individuating circumstances."

But besides this, it is further certain, that not a few of those ancient fathers, who were therefore reputed orthodox, because they zealously opposed Arianism, did entertain this opinion also, that the three hypostases or persons of the Trinity, had not only one general and universal essence of the Godhead, belonging to them all, they being all God; but were also three individuals, under one and the same ultimate species, or specific essence and substance of the Godhead; just as three individual men (Thomas, Peter, and John) under that ultimate species of man; or that specific essence of humanity which have only a numerical difference from one another. Wherefore an hypostasis, or person (in the Trinity) was accordingly thus defined by some of these fathers (viz. Anastasius and Cyril[6]) to be Essentia cum suis qui-

here to be remarked generally, that the Nicene Doctors, and those immediately following them, employ the words *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* promiscuously in reference to the Trinity, and frequently confound the two; but that those who are a little further removed from the Nicene period circumscribe the meaning of each word, as Theodoret has done.

* Ep. 369. [Ep. 349 tom. 2. opp. p. 1046. Edit. Paris, 1638.]

† De Trin. lib. 4. c. 7. [Sect. 2. p. 215. tom. 2. Dogmat. Theolog.]

[6] This definition is met with in the *Ἔκθεσις σύντομος τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως*, or *Concise Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, extant under the names of Anastasius and St. Cyril, and supposed by learned men to be a compilation from the writings of both

busdam proprietatibus ab iis, quæ sunt ejusdem speciei, numero differens, "an essence or substance, with its certain properties (or individuating circumstances) differing only numerically from those of the same species with it." This doctrine was plainly asserted and industriously pursued (besides several others both of the Greeks and Latins), especially by Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Martyr, and Damascen; whose words, because Petavius[7] hath set them down at large, we shall not here insert. Now these were they who principally insisted upon the absolute co-equality and independent co-ordination of the three hypostases or persons in the Trinity, as compared with one another. Because, as three men, though one of them were a father, another a son, and the third a nephew, yet have no essential dependence one upon another, but are naturally co-equal and unsubordinate, there being only a numerical difference betwixt them; so did they in like manner conclude, that the three hypostases, or persons of the Deity (the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost), being likewise but three individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, and differing only numerically from one another, were absolutely co-equal, unsubordinate, and independent: and this was that which was commonly called by them their ὁμοουσιότης, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality. Wherefore it is observable, that St. Cyril, one of these theologers, finds no other fault at all with the Platonic trinity, but only this, that such an Homo-ousiotes, such a co-essentiality or consubstantiality as this, was not acknowledged therein: Ἐλελοίπει δ' ἂν πρὸς τοῦτο αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν, εἰ τὸν τῆς ὁμοουσιότητος λόγον ἐφαρμόττειν ἤθελον ὑποστάσεσι ταῖς τρισὶν, ἵνα καὶ μία νοοῖτο τῆς θεότητος φύσις, τὸ τρισχιδὲς οὐκ ἔχουσα πρὸς ἑτερότητα φυσικὴν, καὶ τό γε δὴ δεῖν ἀλλήλων ἐν μείωσιν ὁρᾶσθαι ὑποστάσεις, "There would have been nothing at all wanting to the Platonic trinity for an absolute agreement of it with the Christian, had they but accommodated the right notion of co-essentiality or consubstantiality to their three hypostases; so that there might have been but one specific nature or essence of the Godhead, not futher distinguishable by any natural diversity, but numerically only, and so no one hypostasis any way inferior or subordinate to another." That is, had these Platonists complied with that hypostasis of St.

these fathers. It was first edited by Theod Beza, and was afterwards included in the fifteenth volume of the Magna Bibliotheca, published at Paris, 1645, p. 677.

[7] De Trinitate, lib. 4. cap. 9. sec. 4. &c. tom. 2. Dogm. Theol. It is my intention to discuss the whole of this subject in the Preface. For since the time of Dr. Cudworth and Petavius the same charge has been brought against many of the Nicene doctors by several others also, of equal ability and learning; whose arguments are considered by a great many as very difficult to be refuted.

[8] Contra Julian. lib. 8. p. 270.

Cyril and others, that the three persons of the Trinity were but three independent and co-ordinate individuals, under the same ultimate species or specific essence of the Godhead, as Peter, Paul, and John, under that species or common nature of humanity, and so taken in this co-essentiality or consubstantiality of theirs, then had they been completely orthodox. Though we have already showed that this Platonic trinity was, in another sense, Homo-ousian; and perhaps it will appear afterwards, that it was so also in the very sense of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius. Again, these theologers supposed the three persons of their trinity to have really no other than a specific unity or identity; and because it seems plainly to follow from hence, that therefore they must needs be as much three gods as three men are three men; these learned fathers endeavoured with their logic to prove, that three men are but abusively and improperly so called three, they being really and truly but one, because there is but one and the same specific essence or substance of human nature in them all; and seriously persuaded men to lay aside that kind of language. By which same logic of theirs they might as well prove also, that all the men in the world are but one man, and that all Epicurus' gods were but one god neither. But not to urge here, that, according to this hypothesis, there cannot possibly be any reason given why there should be so many as three such individuals in the species of God, which differ only numerically from one another, they being but the very same thing thrice repeated; and yet that there should be no more than three such neither, and not three hundred, or three thousand, or as many as there are individuals in the species of man; we say, not to urge this, it seems plain, that this trinity is no other than a kind of Tritheism, and that of gods independent and co-ordinate too. And therefore some would think, that the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity, taken with all its faults, is to be preferred before this trinity of St. Cyril and St. Gregory Nyssen, and several other reputed orthodox fathers; and more agreeable to the principles both of Christianity and of reason. However, it is evident from hence, that these reputed orthodox fathers, who were not a few, were far from thinking the three hypostases of the Trinity to have the same singular existent essence, they supposing them to have no otherwise one and the same essence of the Godhead in them, nor to be one God, than three individual men have one common specifical essence of manhood in them, and are all one man. But as this trinity came afterwards to be decried for tritheistic; so in the room thereof started there up that other trinity of persons numerically the same, or having all one and the same singular existent essence; a doctrine which seemeth not to have been

owned by any public authority in the Christian church, save that of the Lateran council[8] only.

And that no such thing was ever entertained by the Nicene fathers and those first opposers of Arianism, might be rendered probable in the first place from the free confession and acknowledgment of D. Petavius (a person well acquainted with ecclesiastic antiquity), and for this reason especially, because many are much led by such new names and authorities: In eo præcipuam vim collocasse patres, ut æqualem patri naturâ excellentiâque filium esse defenderent, citra expressam SINGULARITATIS mentionem, licet ex eo conjicere. Etenim Nicæni isti præsules, quibus nemo melius Arianæ sectæ arcana cognovit, nemo, qua re opprimenda maximè foret, acrius dijudicare potuit, nihil in professionis suæ formulâ spectarunt aliud, nisi ut æqualitatem illam essentiæ, dignitatis, æternitatis astruerent. Testatur hoc ὁμοουσίου vox ipsa, quæ arx quædam fuit catholici dogmatis. Hæc enim æqualitatem potius essentiæ, quam SINGULARITATEM significat, ut capite quinto docui. Deinde cætera ejusdem modi sunt in illo decreto, ut, &c. "The chief force, which the ancient fathers opposed against the Arian heretics, was in asserting only the equality of the Son with the Father, as to nature or essence, without any express mention of the SINGULARITY of the same. For those Nicene bishops themselves, who did understand best of any the secrets of the Arian faction, and which way it should especially be oppugned, aimed at nothing else in their confession of faith, but only to establish that equality of essence, dignity,

[8] He means no doubt the fourth general Lateran Council, assembled under the auspices of Pope Innocent III. A.D. 1215. The Acts are extant in J. Harduinus' Concilior. tom. 7. p. 1. &c. The Abbè Joachim had at that period propounded a doctrine somewhat similar to that which Dr. Cudworth tells us a little above was taught by some of the ancient theologians: namely, he had denied "a true, simple, and real unity of essence of the three persons:" asserting on the contrary, that there is in God "only *a unity of concord*, as many men are called one people, and many believers one church." See Natalis Alexander, Histor. Eccles. sæc. 13. cap. 331. To meet this error the Lateran Council at once decided in their first decree as follows: Firmiter credimus, et simpliciter confitemur, quod unus solus est verus Deus,—Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, tres quidem personæ, sed una essentia, substantia seu natura simplex omnino," "We firmly believe and simply confess that the true God is one only,—Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three persons but one essence, substance, or nature, perfectly simple." And in the second law they decree as follows: Nos autem, sacro et universali concilio approbante, credimus et confitemur cum Petro, quod una quædam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quæ veraciter est Pater, Filius, et Spiritus sanctus, tres simul personæ ac singulatim quælibet earumdem. Et ideo in Deo Trinitas est solummodo, non quaternitas; quia quælibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia, sive natura divina, quæ sola est universorum principium, præter quod aliud inveniri non potest, "But we, with the approval of this sacred and universal council, believe and confess with St. Peter, that there is one supreme, incomprehensible, and ineffable, which is truly the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the three persons together, and each of them separately. And therefore there is in God only a Trinity, not a quaternity; because each of the three persons is that supreme thing, namely divine substance, essence, or nature, which alone is the principle of all things, besides which no other can be found."

* De Trin. lib. 4. cap. 13. [Sec. 7. p. 248. tom. 2. Dogmat. Theolog.]

and eternity between them. This does the word Homo-ousios itself declare, it signifying rather equality, than SINGULARITY of essence, as we have before showed. And the like do those other passages in the same decree; as, That there was no time when the Son was not; and, That he was not made of nothing, nor of a different hypostasis, or essence." Thus does Petavius clearly confess, that this same singularity of numerical essence was not asserted by the Nicene council, nor the most ancient fathers, but only an equality or sameness of generical essence; or else that the Father and Son agreed only in one common essence or substance of the Godhead, that is, the eternal and uncreated nature.

But the truth of this will more fully appear from these following particulars: first, Because these orthodox Anti-arian fathers did all of them zealously condemn Sabellianism, the doctrine whereof is no other than this, that there was but one hypostasis, or singular individual essence, of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and consequently that they were indeed but three several names, or notions, or modes, of one and the self-same thing. From whence such absurdities as these would follow, that the Father's begetting the Son was nothing but one name, notion, or mode of the Deity's begetting another; or else the same Deity, under one notion, begetting itself under another notion. And when again the Son, or Word, and not the Father, is said to have been incarnated, and to have suffered death for us upon the cross, that it was nothing but a mere logical notion or mode of the Deity, that was incarnate and suffered, or else the whole Deity under one particular notion or mode only. But should it be averred notwithstanding, that this trinity, which we now speak of, was not a trinity of mere names and notions, as that of the Sabellians, but of distinct hypostases or persons; then must it needs follow (since every singular essence is an hypostasis, according to the sense of the ancient fathers) that there was not a trinity only, but a quaternity of hypostases, in the Deity. Which is a thing that none of those fathers ever dreamed of.

Again, the word Homo-ousios, as was before intimated by Petavius, was never used by Greek writers otherwise than to signify the agreement of things numerically differing from one another in some common nature or universal essence, or their having a generical unity or identity, of which sundry instances might be given. Nor indeed is it likely that the Greek tongue should have any name for that which neither is a thing in nature, nor falls under human conception, viz. several things having one and the same singular essence. And accordingly St. Basil interprets the force of this word thus:* Ἀναιρεῖ τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς

* In Epist. [Epist. 300. p. 1070. tom. 2. opp.]

ὑποστάσεως· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῷ τί ἐστιν ἑαυτῷ ὁμοούσιον, ἀλλ' ἑτερὸν ἑτέρῳ, "That it plainly takes away the sameness of hypostasis, that is, of singular numerical essence (this being that which the ancient fathers meant by the word hypostasis), for the same thing is not homo-ousios, co-essential or consubstantial with itself, but always one thing with another." Wherefore as τὸ ὁμοούσιον and συγγένεια, are used by Plotinus as synonymous, in these words concerning the soul,* θείων μεστὴ διὰ συγγένειαν καὶ τὸ ὁμοούσιον, "that it is full of divine things, by reason of its being cognate or congenerous, and homo-ousios with them;" so doth Athanasius in like manner use them, when he affirmeth,† τὰ κλήματα εἶναι ὁμοούσια καὶ συγγενῆ τῆς ἀμπέλου, "that the branches are homo-ousious [co-essential or consubstantial] and congenerous with the vine, or with the root thereof." Besides which, the same father uses ὁμογενὴς, and ὁμοειδὴς, and ὁμοφυὴς, indifferently for ὁμοούσιος, in sundry places; none of which words can be thought to signify an identity of singular essence, but only of generical or specifical. And thus was the word homo-ousios plainly used by the council of Chalcedon,[9] they affirming that our Saviour Christ was ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα, καὶ ὁμοούσιος ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα, "co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, as to his divinity; but co-essential or consubstantial with us men, as to his humanity." Where it cannot reasonably be suspected that one and the same word should be taken in two different senses in the same sentence, so as in the first place to signify a numerical identity, but in the second, a generical or specifical only. But lastly, which is yet more, Athanasius himself speaketh in like manner of our Saviour Christ's being homo-ousious with us men:‡ Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁμοούσιός ἐστιν ἡμῖν υἱὸς, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡμῖν ἔχει γένεσιν, ἔστω κατὰ τοῦτο ὁ υἱὸς ἀλλότριος κατ' οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἄμπελος τοῦ γεωργοῦ, "If the Son be co-essential or con-substantial (or of the same essence or substance) with us men, he having the very same nature with us, then let him be in this respect a stranger to the essence or substance of the Father, even as the vine is to the essence of the husbandman." And again, a little after, in the same epistle: Ἢ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἴδιον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας, ἐφρόνει τοῦτον ὁμοούσιον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, "Or did Dionysius,§ think

* Ennead 4. lib. 7. cap. 10. [P. 464.]

† Epist. De Sent. Dion. p. 556. [Tom. 1 opp.]

[9] In the Definitio Fidei, as it is called, which is extant in the Actio 5. of this council, tom. 2. Concilior. p. 456. ed. Harduini.

‡ Tom. 1. p. 556. [De Sentent. Dionys.]

§ Thus also in his first Epistle to Serapion: Ἄνθρωποί γ' οὖν ὅμοιοι καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα ἔχοντες ὁμοούσιοί ἐσμεν ἀλλήλων, "We men being alike, and having the sameness of nature, are consubstantial with one another." And p. 170. Ὥσπερ οὖν μαίνοιτ' ἄν τις λέγων, τὴν οἰκίαν ὁμοούσιον τοῦ οἰκοδόμου, καὶ τὸ σκάφος τοῦ

you, when he affirmed the Word not to be proper to the essence of the Father, suppose him therefore to be co-essential or consubstantial with us men?" From all which it is unquestionably evident that Athanasius did not, by the word homo-ousios, understand that which hath the same singular and numerical essence with another, but the same common generical or specifical only; and consequently, that he conceived the Son to be co-essential or consubstantial with the Father after that manner.[10]

Furthermore, the true meaning of the Nicene fathers may more fully and thoroughly be perceived, by considering what that doctrine of Arius was which they opposed and condemned. Now Arius maintained, the Son or Word to be κτίσμα, "a creature, made in time," and "mutable," or "defectible;" and for that reason, as Athanasius tells us, ἑτεροούσιον and ἀλλοτριούσιον, "of a different essence or substance from the Father" (that which is created being supposed to differ essentially or substantially from that which is uncreated). Wherefore the Nicene fathers, in way of opposition to this doctrine of Arius, determined that the Son or Word was not thus ἑτεροούσιος, nor ἀλλοτριούσιος, but ὁμοούσιος τῷ Πατρὶ, "co-essential or consubstantial with the Father;" that is, not a creature, but God; or agreeing with the Father in that common nature or essence of the Godhead. So that this is that οὐσία, "essence" or substance" of the ancient fathers, which is said to be the same in all the three hypostases of the Trinity, as they are called God; not a singular existent essence, but the common, general, or universal essence of the Godhead, or of the uncreated nature, called by St. Hilary,* Natura una, non unitate personæ, sed generis, "one nature, not by unity of person, but of kind." Which unity of the common or general essence of the Godhead is the same thing also with that equality, which some of the ancient fathers so much insist upon against Arius; namely, an equality of nature, as the Son and Father are both of them alike God, that essence of the Godhead (which is common to all the three persons) being, as all other essences, supposed to be indivisible. From which equality itself also does it appear, that they acknowledged no identity of singular essence, it being

ναυπηγοῦ, οὕτως πρεπόντως ἄν τις εἴποι, πάντα υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον εἶναι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ πατρός, "It were madness to say, that a house is co-essential or consubstantial with the builder, or a ship with the shipwright; but it is proper to say, that every son is co-essential or consubstantial with his father.

[10] The true meaning of the word ὁμοούσιος in Christian as well as profane Greek authors has been treated of at much greater length by Dion. Petavius, De Trinitate, lib. 4. cap. 5. p. 204. tom. 2. Dogm. Theolog. and Geor. Bull, Defensio Fidei Nicænæ, sec. 2. cap. 1. p. 25. &c. opp. Add Mich. Psellus in the Variæ Quæstiones, edited by Joh. Alb. Fabricius, at the end of vol. 5. Biblioth. Græcæ, quæst. 5. sec. 73.

* De Synodis. [Seu Fide Orientalium, sec. 76. p. 1193. opp.]

absurd to say, that one and the self-same thing is equal to itself. And with this equality of essence did some of these orthodox fathers themselves imply, that a certain inequality of the hypostases or persons also, in their mutual relation to one another, might be consistent. As for example, St. Austin writing thus against the Arians:* Patris ergo, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti, etiamsi disparem cogitant potestatem, naturam saltem confiteantur æqualem, "Though they conceive the power of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost to be unequal, yet let them, for all that, confess their nature at least to be equal." And St. Basil likewise:† "Though the Son be in order second to the Father, because produced by him, and in dignity also (forasmuch as the Father is the cause and principle of his being) yet he is not, for all that, second in nature, because there is one divinity in them both." And that this was indeed the meaning, both of the Nicene fathers, and of Athanasius, in their Homo-ousiotes, their co-essentiality or consubstantiality, and co-equality of the Son with the Father, namely, their having both the same common essence of the Godhead; or that the Son was no creature, as Arius contended, but truly God or uncreated likewise, will appear undeniably from many passages in Athanasius, of which we shall here mention only some few. In his epistle concerning the Nicene council, he tells us, how the Eusebian faction subscribed the form of that council, though afterward they recanted it:‡ *Πάντων τε ὑπογραψάντων ὑπέγραψαν καὶ οἱ περὶ Εὐσέβιον τούτοις τοῖς ῥήμασιν, οἷς αἰτιῶνται νῦν οὗτοι· λέγω δὲ τῷ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ τῷ ὁμοουσίῳ, καὶ ὅτι μήτε κτίσμα ἢ ποίημα, μήτε τῶν γεννητῶν ἐστιν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ υἱός· ἀλλὰ γέννημα καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας ὁ λόγος*, "All the rest subscribing the Eusebianists themselves subscribed also to these very words, which they now find fault with; I mean, of the essence or substance, and co-essential or consubstantial, and that the Son is no creature or factor, or any of the things made, but the genuine offspring of the essence or substance of the Father." Afterwards he declareth, how the Nicene council at first intended to have made use only of scripture words and phrases against the Arians;§ *τῆς συνόδου βουλομένης τὰς μὲν τῶν Ἀρειανῶν τῆς ἀσεβείας λέξεις ἀνελεῖν· τὰς δὲ τῶν γραφῶν ὁμολογουμένας φωνὰς γράψαι, ὅτι τε υἱός ἐστιν οὐκ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ σοφία, ἀλλ' οὐ κτίσμα οὐδε ποίημα· ἴδιον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς γέννημα*, "as that Christ was the Son of God, and not from nothing, but from God, the word and wisdom of God, and consequently, no creature or thing made. But when they perceived that the Eusebian faction would evade all those expressions by equivocation,

* Cont. Serm. Arian. c. 18. [P. 451. tom. 8. opp.]
† 3 Cont. Eunom. [P. 79. tom. 2. opp. Edit. Par. 16. 15.
‡ Page 251. § Page 267.

ναγκάσθησαν λοιπὸν λευκότερον εἰπεῖν τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ· καὶ ράψαι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν, ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ ἐκ υῦ Θεοῦ κοινὸν καὶ ἴσον, τοῦ τε υἱοῦ καὶ τῶν γεννητῶν νομίζεσθαι, 'they conceived themselves necessitated, more plainly to declare, hat they meant by being from God, or out of him; and there-ore added, that the Son was out of the substance of God, hereby to distinguish him from all created beings." Again, a ittle after, in the same epistle, he adds: 'Η σύνοδος τοῦτο νοοῦσα, αλῶς ὁμοούσιον ἔγραψεν, ἵνα τήν τε τῶν αἱρετικῶν κακοήθειαν ναστρέψωσι· καὶ δείξωσιν ἄλλον εἶναι τῶν γεννητῶν τὸν λόγον· αὶ γὰρ τοῦτο γράψαντες εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ λέγοντας ἐξ ὐκ ὄντων τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ κτιστόν· ἢ τρεπτόν· ἢ ποίημα· ἢ ξ ἑτέρας οὐσίας, τούτους ἀναθεματίζει ἡ ἁγία καὶ καθολικὴ Εκκλησία, "The synod perceiving this, rightly declared, that he Son was Homo-ousios with the Father; both to cut off the ubterfuges of heretics, and to show him to be different from the reatures. For after they had decreed this, they added imme-liately, They who say that the Son of God was from things that re not, or made, or mutable, or a creature, or of another sub-tance or essence, all such does the holy and catholic church nathematize. Whereby they made it evident that these words, Of the Father, and co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, were opposed to the impiety of those expressions of the Arians, that the Son was a creature, or thing made, and mutable, and that he was not before he was made; which he that affirmeth, contradicteth the synod, but whosoever dissents from Arius, must needs consent to these forms of the synod." In this same epistle,* to cite but one passage more out of it: Χαλκὸς, στίλβων, καὶ χρυσὸς, &c. ἀλλ' ἑτεροφυῆ καὶ ἑτεροούσια ἀλλήλων· εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ υἱὸς οὕτως ἐστὶν, ἔστω κτίσμα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς, καὶ μὴ ὁμοούσιος, εἰ δὲ υἱός ἐστι λόγος, σοφία, εἰκὼν τοῦ Πατρὸς, ἀπαύγασμα, εἰκότως ὁμοούσιος ἂν εἴη, "Brass and gold, silver and tin, are alike in their shining and colour; nevertheless in their essence and nature are they very different from one another. If therefore the Son be such, then let him be a creature as we are, and not co-essential (or consubstantial); but if he be a Son, the word, wisdom, image of the Father, and his splendour, then of right should he be accounted co-essential and consubstantial."† Thus in his epistle concerning Dionysius, we have ἕνα τῶν γεννητῶν εἶναι τὸν Υἱὸν, and μὴ ὁμοούσιον τῷ Πατρὶ, "the Son's being one of the creatures," and "his not being co-essential or consubstantial with the Father," put for synonymous expressions, which signify one and the same thing.

Wherefore it seemeth to be unquestionably evident, that when the ancient orthodox fathers of the Christian church maintained,

* Page 272. † Page 561.

against Arius, the Son to be homo-ousios, co-essential or consubstantial with the Father, though that word be thus interpreted, "Of the same essence or substance," yet they universally understood thereby, not a sameness of singular and numerical, but of common or universal essence only; that is, the generical or specifical essence of the Godhead; that the Son was no creature, but truly and properly God. But if it were needful, there might be yet more testimonies cited out of Athanasius to this purpose. As from his epistle De Synodis Arimini et Seleuciæ,* where he writeth thus, concerning the difference betwixt those two words, Ὁμοιούσιον, "of like substance," and Ὁμοούσιον, "of the same substance:" Οἴδατε γὰρ καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὅτι τὸ ὅμοιον οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σχημάτων καὶ ποιοτήτων λέγεται ὅμοιον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐσιῶν οὐχ Ὁμοιότης, ἀλλὰ ταυτότης ἂν λεχθείη· ἄνθρωπος γοῦν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅμοιος λέγεται οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν . . . τῇ γὰρ οὐσίᾳ Ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσι· καὶ πάλιν ἄνθρωπος κυνὶ οὐκ Ἀνόμοιος λέγεται, ἀλλ' Ἑτεροφυής· Οὐκοῦν τὸ Ὁμοφυὲς καὶ Ὁμοούσιον, τὸ δὲ Ἑτεροφυὲς καὶ ἑτεροούσιον, "For even yourselves know, that similitude is not predicated of essences or substances, but of figures and qualities only. But of essences or substances, identity or sameness is affirmed, and not similitude. For a man is not said to be like to a man, in respect of the essence or substance of humanity, but only as to figure or form; they being said, as to their essence, to be congenerous, of the same nature or kind with one another. Nor is a man properly said to be unlike to a dog, but of a different nature or kind from him. Wherefore that which is congenerous, of the same nature, kind, or species, is also Homo-ousion, co-essential or consubstantial (of the same essence or substance) and that, which is of a different nature, kind or species, is Heterousion (of a different essence or substance)." Again, Athanasius, in that fragment of his against the hypocrisy of Meletius, &c. concerning consubstantiality, writeth in this manner: Ὁ τοίνυν ἀναιρῶν τὸ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ, λέγων δὲ ὅμοιον, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ εἶναι Θεὸν· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἐξηγούμενος τὸ Ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ὅμοιον, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἑτέραν τὴν οὐσίαν λέγει, Θεῷ δὲ ὁμοιωμένην· οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἶναι πρεπόντως λέγει μὴ φρονῶν ὁμοούσιον, ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπου οὐσίας· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κατά οὐσιαν, ἐκ Θεοῦ ὁ υἱὸς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὁμοιώματι, καθάπερ ἀνδριὰς ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ ὡς ἄνθρωπος Θεῷ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁμοούσιον μὲν λέγων, ὁμοούσιον δὲ οὐ φρονῶν· Οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν βούλεται τὸ Ὁμοούσιον ἀκούεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν, περὶ μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας· ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν συνήθειαν, καὶ ἵνα διαβάλλῃ ταύτην. Ἑλληνικὴν φῆσιν εἰρηκέναι τὸ ὁμοούσιον ῥῆμα τοῦ ἐν Ἕλλησιν ἔθους ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ κείμενον ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν

* Page 929.

φύσιν παραστῆσαι, &c. "He that denies the Son to be Homo-ousios, consubstantial with the Father, affirming him only to be like to him, denies him to be God. In like manner he, who retaining the word Homo-ousios or consubstantial, interprets it notwithstanding only of similitude or likeness in substance, affirmeth the Son to be of another different substance from the Father, and therefore not God, but like to God only. Neither doth such a one rightly understand those words, 'Of the substance of the Father,' he not thinking the Son to be so consubstantial, or of the essence and substance of the Father, as one man is consubstantial, or of the essence or substance of another who begat him. For he who affirmeth, that the Son is not so of God, as a man is of a man, according to essence or substance; but that he is like him only, as a statue is like a man, or as a man may be like to God, it is manifest, that such a one, though he use the word Homo-ousios, yet he doth not really mean it. For he will not understand it, according to the customary signification thereof, for that which hath one and the same essence or substance; this word being used by Greeks and Pagans in no other sense than to signify that which hath the same nature; as we ought to believe concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." Where we see plainly, that though the word Homo-ousios be interpreted, "that which hath one and the same essence or substance," yet is this understood of the same common nature, and as one man is of the same essence or substance with another. We might here also add to this the concurrent testimonies of the other orthodox fathers; but, to avoid tediousness, we shall omit them, and only insert some passages out of St. Austin to the same purpose. For he, in his first book, contra Maxim. chap. the 15th,[1] writeth thus: Duo veri homines, etsi nullus eorum filius sit alterius, unius tamen et ejusdem sunt substantiæ. Homo autem alterius hominis verus filius nullo modo potest nisi ejusdem cum patre esse substantiæ, etiamsi non sit per omnia similis patri. Quocirca verus Dei filius, et unius cum patre substantiæ est, quia verus filius est; et per omnia est patri similis, quia est Dei filius, "Two true men, though neither of them be son to the other, yet are they both of one and the same substance. But a man, who is the true son of another man, can by no means be of a different substance from his father, although he be not in all respects like unto him. Wherefore the true Son of God is both of one substance with the Father, because he is a true Son, and he is also in all respects like to him, because he is the Son of God." Where Christ, or the Son of God, is said to be no otherwise of one substance with God the Father, than here amongst men the son is of the same sub-

[1] Cap. 16. sect. 11. p. 503. tom. 7. opp. ed. Benedict.

stance with his father, or any one man with another.* Again, the same St. Austin, in his Respons. ad Sermonem Arianorum,[2] expresseth himself thus: Ariani nos vocitant Homoousianos, quia contra eorum errorem, Græco vocabulo ὁμοούσιον defendimus, Patrem, Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum; id est, unius ejusdemque substantiæ, vel, ut expressiùs dicamus, essentiæ (quæ οὐσία Græcè appellatur) quod planiùs dicitur unius ejusdemque naturæ. Et tamen siquis istorum, qui nos Homoousianos vocant, filium suum non cujus ipse esset, sed diversæ diceret esse naturæ, exhæredari ab ipso mallet filius, quam hoc putari. Quanta igitur impietate isti cæcantur, qui cum confiteantur unicum Dei filium, nolunt ejusdem naturæ cujus pater est confiteri, sed diversæ atque imparis, et multis modis rebusque dissimilis, tanquam non de Deo natus, sed ab illo de nihilo sit creatus; gratiâ filius, non naturâ, "The Arians call us Homo-ousians, because, in opposition to their error, we defend the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be in the language of the Greeks Homo-ousios, that is, of one and the same substance; or, to speak more clearly, essence, this being in Greek called Ousia, which is yet more plainly thus expressed, of one and the same nature. And yet there is none of their own sons who thus call us Homo-ousians, who would not as willingly be disinherited as be accounted of a different nature from his father. How great impiety, therefore, are they blinded with, who, though they acknowledge that there is one only Son of God, yet will not confess him to be of the same nature with his Father, but different and unequal, and many ways unlike him, as if he were not born of God, but created out of nothing by him, himself being a creature, and so a son, not by nature, but grace only." Lastly (to name no more place), in his first book De Trinitate,[3] he hath these words: Si Filius creatura non est, ejusdem cum Patre substantiæ est. Omnis enim substantia, quæ Deus non est, creatura est; et quæ creatura non est, Deus est. Et si non est Filius ejusdem substantiæ, cujus est Pater, ergo facta substantia est, "If the Son be not a creature, then is he of the same substance with the Father; for whatever substance is not God, is creature; and whatever is not creature, is God. And therefore if the Son be not of the same substance with the Father, he must needs be a made and created substance, and not truly God.

Lastly, that the ancient orthodox fathers, who used the word

* To the same purpose is that in his second Book, ch. 6; Diversa quidem substantia est Deus Pater, et Homo Mater: non tamen diversa substantia est Deus Pater et Deus Filius: sicut non est diversa substantia, Homo Mater, et Homo Filius.

[2] Cap. 36. p. 458. tom. 8. opp. In this passage of St. Augustine Dr. Cudworth has omitted these words: Ac per hoc et ipse creatura sit, "and thereby is himself also creature," which follow after the words, de nihilo creatus.

[3] Cap. 6. p. 534. 535. tom. 8. opp.

Homo-ousios against Arius, intended not therein to assert the Son to have one and the same singular or individual essence with the Father, appeareth plainly from their disclaiming and disowning those two words, Ταυτοούσιον and Μονοούσιον. Concerning the former of which, Epiphanius thus:* Καὶ οὐ λέγομεν Ταυτοούσιον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ λέξις παρά τισι λεγομένη, Σαβελλίῳ ἀπεικασθῇ· Ταυτὸν δὲ λέγομεν τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τῇ οὐσία, καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, "We affirm not the Son to be Tauto-ousion (one and the same substance with the Father) lest this should be taken in way of compliance with Sabellius; nevertheless do we assert him to be the same in Godhead, and in essence, and in power." Where it is plain, that when Epiphanius affirmed the Son to be the same with the Father in Godhead and essence, he understood this only of a generical or specifical, and not of a singular or individual sameness; namely, that the Son is no creature, but God also, as the Father is; and this he intimates to be the true and genuine sense of the word Homo-ousios; he therefore rejecting that other word Tauto-ousios, because it would be liable to misinterpretation, and to be taken in the Sabellian sense for that which hath one and the same singular and individual essence, which the word Homo-ousios could not be obnoxious to. And as concerning that other word Mono-ousios, Athanasius himself, in his "Exposition of Faith," thus expressly condemns it: Οὔτε γὰρ νιοπατέρα φρονοῦμεν, ὡς οἱ Σαβέλλιοι Μονοούσιον καὶ οὐχ Ὁμοούσιον, "We do not think the Son to be really one and the same with the Father, as the Sabellians do, and to be Mono-ousious, and not Homo-ousios; they thereby destroying the very being of the Son." Where ousia, "essence" or "substance," in that fictitious word Mono-ousios, is taken for "singular" or "existent essence," the whole Deity being thus said, by Sabellius, to have only one singular essence or hypostasis in it: whereas in the word Homo-ousios is understood a common or universal, generical or specifical essence; the Son being thus said to agree with the Father in the common essence of the Godhead, as not being a creature. Wherefore Athanasius here disclaimeth a Mono-ousian trinity, as Epiphanius did before a Tauto-ousian; both of them a trinity of mere names and notions, or inadequate conceptions of one and the same singular essence or hypostasis; they alike distinguishing them from the Homo-ousian trinity, as a trinity of real hypostases or persons, that have severally their own singular essence, but agree in one common and universal essence of the Godhead, they being none of them creatures, but all uncreated or creators. From whence it is plain, that the ancient orthodox fathers asserted no such thing as one and the same singular or numerical essence, of the several

* Hæres. 76. not. 7. [Hæres. Anomœor. p. 920. Tom. 1. opp.]

persons of the trinity; this, according to them, being not a real trinity, but a trinity of mere names, notions, and inadequate conceptions only, which is thus disclaimed and declared against by Athanasius:[4] Τριὰς δέ ἐστιν οὐχ ἕως ὀνόματος μόνου, καὶ φαντασίᾳ λέξεως, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ὑπάρξει Τριάς, "The trinity is not a trinity of mere names and words only, but of hypostases truly and really existing." But the Homo-ousian Trinity of the orthodox went exactly in the middle, betwixt that Mono-ousian trinity of Sabellius, which was a trinity of different notions or conceptions only of one and the self-same thing, and that other Hetero-ousian trinity of Arius, which was a trinity of separate and heterogeneous substances (one of which only was God, and the other creatures); this being a trinity of hypostases or persons numerically differing from one another, but all of them agreeing in one common or general essence of the Godhead or the uncreated nature, which is eternal and infinite. Which was also thus particularly declared by Athanasius:* Οὔτε ἔλαττόν τι φρονεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ Ἐκκλησία, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τοὺς νῦν κατὰ Καιάφαν Ἰουδαίους, καὶ εἰς Σαβέλλιον περιπέσῃ· οὔτε πλεῖον ἐπινοεῖ, ἵνα μὴ εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πολυθεότητα κατακυλισθῇ, "The catholic church doth neither believe less than this Homo-ousian trinity, lest it should comply with Judaism, or sink into Sabellianism; nor yet more than this, lest, on the other hand, it should tumble down into Arianism, which is the same with Pagan polytheism and idolatry;" it introducing in like manner the worshipping of creatures, together with the Creator.

And now, upon all these considerations, our Platonic Christian would conclude, that the orthodox trinity of the ancient Christian church did herein agree with the genuinely Platonic trinity, that it was not Mono-ousian, one sole singular essence, under three notions, conceptions, or modes only, but three hypostases or persons. As likewise, the right Platonic trinity does agree with the trinity of the ancient orthodox Christians in this, that it is not Hetero-ousian, but Homo-ousian, "co-essential" or "consubstantial;" none of their three hypostases being creatures, or particular beings, made in time; but all of them uncreated, eternal, and infinite.

Notwithstanding all which, it must be granted, that though this Homo-ousiotes, or co-essentiality of the three persons in the trinity, does imply them to be all God, yet does it not follow from thence of necessity that they are therefore one God. What then? shall we conclude that Athanasius himself also entertained that opinion before mentioned and exploded, of the three persons

[4] These words of Athanasius are from his Epistle to Serapion, wherein he demonstrates Spiritum Sanctum non esse rem creatam, "that the Holy Ghost is not a created thing," tom. 1. opp. p. 202.

* Ad. Serap. Ep. p. 202.

ı the trinity being but three individuals under the same species ıs Peter, Paul, and Timothy) and having no other natural nity or identity, than specifical only? Indeed some have condently fastened this upon Athanasius, because in those "Diaıgues of the Trinity,"[5] published amongst his works, and there ntitled to him, the same is grossly owned, and in defence hereof this absurd paradox maintained, that Peter, Paul, and Timothy, though they be three hypostases, yet are not to be ccounted three men, but only then when they dissent from one nother, or disagree in will or opinion. But it is certain, from everal passages in those dialogues themselves, that they could ıot be written by Athanasius; and there hath been also another ather found for them, to wit, Maximus the martyr. Notwithtanding which, thus much must not be denied by us, that Athaıasius, in those others his reputedly genuine writings, does someime approach so near hereunto, that he lays no small stress upon his homo-ousiotes, this co-essentiality and common nature of the Godhead, to all the three persons, in order to their being one God. For thus, in that book entitled, "Concerning the Common Essence of the Three Persons," and the chapter inscribed, Ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ τρεῖς θεοί, "That there are not three Gods," doth Athanasius lay his foundation here. When to that question proposed, "How can it be said that the Father is God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, and yet that there are not three Gods?" the first reply which he makes is this: Ὅπου κοινὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, κοινὸν καὶ ὄνομα τῆς ἀξίας· οἷον ὁ θεὸς τὰ εἰς πλήθη διῃρημένα ἀπὸ μιᾶς φύσεως, ἑνὶ ὀνόματι καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτε ὀργίζεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τῇ ὀργῇ ὑποκείμενον, ἕνα ἄνθρωπον καλεῖ· καὶ ὅτι διαλλάσσεται τῷ κόσμῳ, ὡς ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ

[5] Dialog. 1. p. 160. tom. 2. opp. To enable the reader more readily to understand the whole question, it may be worth while to subjoin the very words. In a colloquy between an Arian and an orthodox believer, the former asks, how there can be three persons in one divine nature. The latter answers: Ὡς Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου καὶ Τιμοθέου τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, καὶ μία ἀνθρωπότης, "As of Peter, Paul, and Timothy, there are three hypostases, but only one ἀνθρωπότης or humanity." From which it follows, replies the Arian, that there are three Gods. This the orthodox believer denies, and in his defence asserts positively that Peter, Paul, and Timothy are not three men but one only, as long as they do not disagree: Ὅτι τρεῖς εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ὅταν ἀνόμοιον ἔχωσι καρδίαν, ὡς Ἕλλην, καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, καὶ Χριστιανός· ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ λέγωσι, καὶ μή ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς σχίσματα, τρεῖς μέν εἰσιν ὑποστάσεις, εἷς δὲ ἐν Κυρίῳ, μίαν ψυχὴν ἔχοντες καὶ μίαν καρδίαν· καὶ τρεῖς μέν εἰσιν ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτερότητι φύσεως ἢ καρδίας, "Because they are then three men, when they have an unlike heart, as a Greek, a Jew, and a Christian: but when they are of the same mind and there is no dissension between them they are three hypostases indeed, but one in the Lord, having one soul and one heart: and they are three in number, but not by a difference of nature or heart." What remarks I may have to offer on this passage, as well as on the whole of Dr. Cudworth's disputation on the opinions of Athanasius and others respecting the Divine Trinity, I shall reserve for the Preface. As to the author of these Dialogues critics are not yet agreed, although they all pronounce them not to be the work of Athanasius.

διαλλάσσεται, "Where there is a communion of nature, there is also one common name of dignity bestowed. And thus doth God himself call things, divided into multitudes from one common nature, by one singular name. For both when he is angry with men doth he call all those who are the objects of his anger by the name of one man; and when he is reconciled to the world is he reconciled thereto as to one man." The first instances which he gives hereof are in Genesis vi. 3, 4: "My spirit shall not always strive with man," and "I will destroy man whom I have created." Upon which Athanasius makes this reflection: Καίτοι οὐκ ἦν εἷς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἄπειροι· ἀλλὰ τῷ ὀνόματι τῆς φύσεως, τὸν πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἐκάλεσεν ἄνθρωπον διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας, "Though there was not then only one man, but infinite myriads of men, nevertheless by the name of one nature doth the Scripture call all those men one man, by reason of their community of essence or substance." Again, he commenteth in like manner upon that other scripture passage, Exodus xv. 1: "The horse and his rider hath he thrown in the sea:"* Ὅτε ἐξῆλθε Φαραὼ κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν, πίπτων μετὰ μυρίων ἁρμάτων ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ, καὶ ἦσαν πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ βυθισθέντες μετ' ἐκείνου, καὶ ἵπποι πολλοὶ· ὁ δὲ Μωσῆς εἰδὼς, ὅτι πάντων τῶν βυθισθέντων μία ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἵππων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν λέγει, ἵππον καὶ ἀναβάτην ἔρριψεν εἰς θάλασσαν· τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκάλεσεν ἕνα ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὰ πλήθη τῶν ἵππων ἐκάλεσεν ἵππον ἕνα, διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς φύσεως, "When Pharaoh went out to the Red Sea, and fell with infinite chariots in the same; and there were many men that were drowned together with him, and many horses; yet Moses knowing that there was but one common nature of all those that were drowned, speaketh thus both of the men and horses; The Lord hath thrown both the horse and the rider into the sea: he calling such a multitude of men but one singular man, and such a multitude of horses but one horse." Whereupon Athanasius thus concludeth:† Εἰ οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅπου συγκέχυται τὰ τῆς φύσεως· ὅπου διάφορα τὰ τῆς μορφῆς καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ βουλῆς· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν οὔτε γνώμη ἴση, οὔτε μορφὴ, οὔτε ἰσχύς· καὶ διάφοροι γλῶτται, διὸ καὶ ἄνθρωποι μέροπες λέγονται· ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως πᾶσα ἡ οἰκουμένη εἷς ἄνθρωπος ἐκλήθη· ὅπου δὲ ἀμέριστος ἡ ἀξία, μία βασιλεία, μία δύναμις, καὶ βουλὴ, καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἰδιάζουσα τὴν τριάδα ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως, Ἕνα λέγω Θεόν, "If therefore amongst men, where the things of nature are confounded, and where there are differences of form, power and will (all men not having the same disposition of mind, nor form, nor strength), as also different languages (from whence men are

* Page 213. 214. † Page 214.

called by the poets Meropes), nevertheless, by reason of the community of nature, the whole world is called one man; might not that Trinity of persons, where there is an undivided dignity, one kingdom, one power, one will, and one energy, be much rather called one God?" But though it be true, that Athanasius in this place (if at least this were a genuine fœtus of Athanasius) may justly be thought to attribute too much to this *κοινὸν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, "a common nature, essence, or substance," of all the three persons, as to the making of them to be truly and properly one God; and that those scripture passages are but weakly urged to this purpose: yet it is plain, that he did not acquiesce in this only, but addeth other things to it also, as their having not only one will, but also one energy or action; of which more afterwards. Moreover, Athanasius elsewhere plainly implieth, that this common essence or nature of the Godhead is not sufficient alone to make all the three hypostases one God. As in his fourth oration against the Arians,* where he tells us, that his trinity of divine hypostases cannot therefore be accounted three gods nor three principles, because they are not resembled by him to three original suns, but only to the sun, and its splendour, and the light from both.[6] Now three suns, according to the language of Athanasius, have *κοινόν τῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίας*, "a common nature, essence, and substance," and therefore are co-essential or consubstantial; and since they cannot be accounted one sun, it is manifest, that, according to Athanasius, this specific identity or unity is not sufficient to make the three divine hypostases one God. Again, the same Athanasius, in his Exposition of Faith, writeth thus: *Οὔτε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις, μεμερισμένας καθ' ἑαυτὰς, ὥσπερ σωματοφυῶς ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ, λογίσασθαι, ἵνα μὴ πολυθεΐαν ὡς τὰ ἔθνη, φρονήσωμεν*, "Neither do we acknowledge three hypostases, divided or separate by themselves (as is to be seen corporeally in men) that we may not comply with the pagan polytheism." From whence it is evident, that neither three separate men, though co-essential to Athanasius, were accounted by him to be one man, nor yet the community of the specific nature and essence of the Godhead can alone, by itself, exclude polytheism from the trinity. Where-

* Page 467.

[6] To save the reader the trouble of referring to Athanasius, I shall again cite his own words: *Οὐδὲ γὰρ——τρεῖς ἀρχὰς, ἢ τρεῖς πατέρας εἰσάγομεν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Μαρκίωνα καὶ Μανιχαῖον, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τριῶν ἡλίων ὑπεθέμεθα τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ ἥλιον καὶ ἀπαύγασμα καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἡλίου ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι φῶς· οὕτω μίαν ἀρχὴν οἴδαμεν, τὸν δὲ δημιουργὸν φάσκομεν οὐχ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον ἔχειν θεότητος, ἢ τὴν τοῦ μόνου Θεοῦ, διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ πεφυκέναι*, "For we do not introduce three principles or three fathers, like the Marcionists and Manichæans, since we do not bring into the comparison three suns, but one sun and its splendour, and one light from both: so we acknowledge one principle, and say that the Creator has no other mode of divinity than that of the only God, because of his having been produced from him."

fore the true reason why Athanasius laid so great a stress upon this homo-ousiotes, or co-essentiality of the trinity, in order to the unity of the Godhead in them, was not because this alone was sufficient to make them one God, but because they could not be so without it. This Athanasius often urges against the Arians, as in his fourth oration, where he tells them: Πολλοὺς ἂν εἰσάγοιεν [θεοὺς] διὰ τὸ ἑτεροειδὲς αὐτῶν, "That they must needs introduce a plurality of gods, because of the heterogeneity of their trinity." And again afterwards determining, that there is ἓν εἶδος τῆς θεότητος, "one species of the Godhead," in Father, Son, and Spirit, he adds: Οὕτω καὶ ἕνα διὰ τῆς τριάδος ὁμολογοῦμεν εἶναι τὸν θεόν· καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερον λέγομεν τῆς πολυειδοῦς τῶν αἱρετικῶν θεότητος, ὅτι τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος . . . . ἀνάγκη λέγειν αὐτοὺς δύο θεούς, ἕνα μὲν κτιστὴν, τὸν δὲ ἕτερον κτιστόν, "And thus do we acknowledge only one God in the Trinity; and maintain it more religiously than those heretics do who introduce a multiform Deity, consisting of divers species; we supposing only one universal Godhead in the whole. For if it be not thus, but the Son be a creature, made out of nothing, however called God by these Arians, then must he and his father of necessity be two gods; one of them a creator, the other a creature." In like manner, in his book of the Nicene council,* he affirmeth concerning the Arians: Τρεῖς θεοὺς τρόπον τινὰ κηρύττουσιν εἰς τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ξένας, ἀλλήλων παντάπασι κεχωρισμένας, διαιροῦντες τὴν ἁγίαν μονάδα, "That they make in a manner three gods, dividing the holy monad into three heterogeneous substances, separate from one another." Whereas, the right orthodox Trinity, on the contrary, is elsewhere thus described by him:† Τριὰς τοίνυν ἁγία καὶ τελεία ἐστὶν, ἐν πατρὶ, καὶ υἱῷ, καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι θεολογουμένη, οὐδὲν ἀλλότριον ἢ ἔξωθεν ἐπιμιγνύμενον ἔχουσα, οὐδὲ ἐκ δημιουργοῦ καὶ γεννητοῦ συνεστα-μένη, ἀλλ' ὅλη τοῦ κτίζειν καὶ δημιουργεῖν οὖσα, "The holy and perfect Trinity theologized in the Father, Son, and Spirit, hath nothing alien, foreign, or extraneous intermingled with it; nor is it compounded of heterogeneous things, the creator and creature joined together." And whereas the Arians interpreted that of our Saviour Christ, "I and my Father are one," only in respect of consent or agreement of will, Athanasius showing the insufficiency hereof, concludeth thus: Ἀνάγκη λοιπὸν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν νοεῖν καὶ τὴν υἱοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἑνότητα, "Wherefore besides this consent of will, there must of necessity be another unity of essence or substance also, acknowledged in the Father and the Son." Where, by unity of essence or substance, that Athanasius

* Page 275. † Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

lid not mean a unity of singular and individual, but of general or universal essence only, appears plainly from these following words;* Τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεννητὰ κἂν συμφωνίαν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα, ἀλλ' ἐν κινήσει καὶ μετουσίᾳ ταύτην ἔχει, ὥσπερ ὁ μὴ φυλάξας ἐκβέβληται τῶν οὐρανῶν· ὁ δὲ υἱὸς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας ὢν γέννημα, οὐσίᾳ καὶ ἕν ἐστιν αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, "For those things which are made or created, though they may have an agreement of will with their Creator, yet have they this by participation only, and in a way of motion; as he, who retaining not the same, was cast out of heaven. But the Son, being begotten from the essence or substance of the Father, is essentially or substantially one with him." So that the opposition here is betwixt unity of consent with God in created beings, which are mutable, and unity of essence in that which is uncreated, and immutably of the same will with the Father. There are also many other places in Athanasius, which, though some may understand of the unity of singular essence, yet were they not so by him intended, but either of generic or specific essence only, or else in such other sense as shall be afterwards declared. As for example, in his fourth oration:† Τὴν μίαν ἐν τριάδι θεότητα φρονοῦμεν, "We acknowledge only one Godhead in the Trinity;" where the following words plainly imply this to be understood, in part at least, of one common or general essence of the Godhead, Εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ποίημα καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, &c., "Because if it be not so, but the Word be a creature, made out of nothing, he is either not truly God, or if he be called by that name, then must they be two gods, one a creator, the other a creature." Again when in the same book it is said:‡ Ἕν εἰσιν ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τῇ ἰδιότητι καὶ οἰκειότητι τῆς φύσεως, καὶ τῇ ταυτότητι τῆς μιᾶς θεότητος, "That the Son and the Father are one thing in the propriety of nature, and in the sameness of one Godhead;" it is evident from the context, that this is not to be understood of a sameness of singular essence, but partly of a common and generical one, and partly of such another sameness or unity, as will be hereafter expressed. Lastly, when the three hypostases are somewhere[7] said by him to be μία οὐσία, "one essence or substance," this is not to be understood neither in that place, as if they had all three the same singular essence, but in some of those other senses before mentioned.

* Ep. de Syn. Arim. et Sel. p. 923. † Page 468. ‡ Page 456.

[7] Dr. Cudworth, I suspect, is here alluding to those questions which occur in tom. 2. opp. Athanasii, p. 436. but are denied by most critics to be Athanasius'. Of these the sixth question is as follows: Ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ πόσας οὐσίας ὁμολογεῖς; "How many essences do you acknowledge to be in God?" To this he answers: Μίαν οὐσίαν λέγω, μίαν φύσιν, "I say one essence, one nature." Then follows the seventh question: Ὑποστάσεις δὲ πόσας ὁμολογεῖς; "How many hypostases do you acknowledge?" To which he replies: Τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις ὁμολογῶ, τρία πρόσωπα, "I acknowledge three hypostases, three persons."

But though Athanasius nowhere declares the three hypostases of the Trinity to have only one and the same singular essence, but, on the contrary, denies them to be mono-ousian; and though he lay a great stress upon their εἰδικὴ ἑνότης, their "specific" or "generic unity," and co-essentiality, in order to their being one God, forasmuch as without this they could not be God at all; yet doth he not rely wholly upon this, as alone sufficient to that purpose, but addeth certain other considerations thereunto, to make it out, in manner as followeth. First, that this Trinity is not a trinity of principles, but that there is only one principle or fountain of the Godhead in it, from which the other are derived. Thus doth he write in his fifth oration: Μία ἀρχὴ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο εἷς Θεὸς, "There is but one principle, and accordingly but one God." Again, in his book against the Sabellianists:* Οὔκ εἰσι δύο θεοὶ, ὅτι μηδὲ δύο πατέρες, μηδὲ ἑτερούσιος τοῦ γεννήσαντος ὁ γεγεννημένος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὰς εἰσάγων δύο, δύο κηρύττει θεοὺς, αὕτη Μαρκίωνος ἡ δυσέβεια, "There are not two gods, both because there are not two fathers, and because that which is begotten is not of a different essence from that which begat. For he that introduceth two principles, preacheth two gods; which was the impiety of Marcion." Accordingly, the same Athanasius declareth:† Τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀρχὴν καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ πηγὴν εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, "That the essence or substance of the Father is the principle, and root, and fountain of the Son." And in like manner doth he approve of this doctrine of Dionysius: Ὅτι πηγὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς, ποταμὸς δὲ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προχεόμενος ὁ Υἱός, "That God (the Father) is the first fountain of all good things, but the Son a river poured out from him." To the same purpose is it also, when he compareth the Father and the Son to the water and the vapour arising from it; to the light and the splendour; to the prototype and the image. And he concludeth the unity of the Godhead from hence, in this manner:‡ Τὴν θεῖαν Τριάδα εἰς ἕνα, ὥσπερ εἰς κορυφήν τινα, τὸν Θεὸν τῶν ὅλων τὸν παντοκράτορα λέγω, συγκεφαλαιοῦσθαι καὶ συνάγεσθαι πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. "The divine Trinity must needs be collected and gathered up together, under that omnipotent God of the whole world, as under one head." But the chief force of this consideration is only to exclude the doctrine of the Marcionists, who made more independent and self-existent principles and gods. Notwithstanding which, it might still be objected, that the Christian Trinity is a trinity of distinct subordinate gods; in opposition whereunto, this argument seems only to prepare the way to what follows; namely, of the close conjunction of these three hypostases into one God: forasmuch as, were they three independent principles, there could not be any coalescence of them into one.

* Page 656. † Et Syn. Arim. De Sel. p. 920. ‡ De Syn. Nic. p. 275.

In the next place therefore, Athanasius further addeth, that these three divine hypostases are not *μεμερισμέναι* and *κεχωρισμέναι*, "separate" and "disjoined" beings, but *ἀδιαίρετοι*, "indivisibly united to one another." Thus in his fifth oration: *Πατέρα καὶ Υἱὸν ἓν ὄντας τῇ θεότητι, καὶ τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον εἶναι τὸν Λόγον ἀπὸ τοῦ Πατρός*, "The Father and the Son are both one thing in the Godhead, and in that the Word, being begotten from him, is indivisibly and inseparably conjoined with him." Where, when he affirmeth the Father and the Son to be one in the Godhead, it is plain, that he doth not mean them to have one and the same singular essence, but only generical and universal; because in the following words he supposes them to be two, but indivisibly and inseparably united together. Again, in his book De Sent. Dionys.: *Ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετος τοῦ Πατρὸς ὁ Υἱός, ὥς ἐστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς*, "The Son is indivisible from the Father, as the splendour is from the light." And afterwards, in the same book, he insisteth further upon this point, according to the sense of Dionysius, after the same manner: *Ὁ δὲ ἴδιον καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τῆς τοῦ Πατρὸς οὐσίας τὸν Υἱὸν εἶναι διδάσκει, ὥς ἐστιν ὁ Λόγος πρὸς τὸν νοῦν καὶ ποταμὸς πρὸς τὴν πηγήν· εἰ μὲν οὖν διαιρεῖν καὶ ἀποξενοῦν τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν τις δύναται, ἢ τὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τὴν πηγὴν μερίσαι καὶ τειχίσας διελεῖν, ἢ τὸ ἀπαύγασμα ἅμα διελεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτὸς*, &c. "Dionysius teacheth, that the Son is cognate with the Father, and indivisible from him, as reason is from the mind, and the river from the fountain. Who is there, therefore, that would go about to alienate reason from the mind, and to separate the river from the fountain, making up a wall between them? or to cut off the splendour from the light? Thus also in his epistle to Serapion, that the Holy Ghost is not a creature:* * *Ἡ διελέτωσαν πρῶτον αὐτοὶ τοῦ ἀπαυγάσματος τὸ φῶς, ἢ τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ σοφοῦ, ἢ μὴ εἰπάτωσαν, πῶς ἐστι ταῦτα*, "Let these men first divide the splendour from the light, or wisdom from him that is wise; or else let them wonder no more how these things can be." Elsewhere Athanasius calls the whole Trinity, *Τριάδα ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἡνωμένην πρὸς ἑαυτὴν*, "a Trinity undivided and united to itself." Which Athanasian's indivisibility of the Trinity is not so to be understood, as if three were not three in it; but first of all, that neither of these could be without the other, as the original light or sun could not be without the splendour, nor the splendour without the original light, and neither the one nor the other of them without a diffused derivative light. Wherefore, God the Father being an eternal sun, must needs have also an eternal splendour and an eternal light. And secondly, that these are so nearly

* Page 194.

and intimately conjoined together, that there is a kind of *συνέχεια*, "continuity," betwixt them; which yet is not to be understood in the way of corporeal things, but so as is agreeable to the nature of things incorporeal.

Thirdly, Athanasius ascendeth yet higher, affirming the hypostases of the Trinity not only to be indivisibly conjoined with one another, but also to have a mutual inexistence in each other, which later Greek fathers[8] have called *ἐμπεριχώρησιν*, their "circuminsession." To this purpose does he cite the words of Dionysius:* *Ἀπόῤῥοια γὰρ νοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀπὸ καρδίας διὰ στόματος ἐξοχετεύεται, ἕτερος γενόμενος τοῦ ἐν καρδίᾳ λόγου· καὶ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἑκάτερος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ· ἕτερος ὢν ἑατέρου, καὶ ἓν εἰσιν ὄντες δύο· οὕτω καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἕν, καὶ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐλέχθησαν εἶναι*, "For reason is the efflux of the mind, which in men is derived from the heart into the tongue, where it is become another reason or word, differing from that in the heart; and yet do these both mutually exist in each other, they belonging to one another; and so, though being two, are one thing. Thus are the Father and the Son one thing, they being said to exist in each other." And Athanasius further illustrates this also by certain similitudes; as that again of the original light and the splendour, he affirming *φῶς εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι, καὶ ἀπαύγασμα ἐν τῷ ἡλίῳ*, "That the original light is in the splendour, and again the splendour in the sun," and also that of the prototype and the image, or the king and his picture; which he thus insisteth upon:† *Ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τοῦ βασιλέως τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τῷ βασιλεῖ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι εἰδός ἐστιν*, "In the picture is contained the form and figure of the king, and in the king the form and figure of the picture. And therefore, if any one, when he had seen the picture, should afterward desire to see the king, the picture would by a prosopopœia bespeak him after this manner:‡ *Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἕν ἐσμεν, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἰμὶ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν ἐμοί· καὶ ὃ ὁρᾷς ἐν ἐμοὶ, τοῦτο ἐν ἐκείνῳ βλέπεις, καὶ ὃ ἑώρακας ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τοῦτο βλέπεις ἐν ἐμοί· ὁ γὰρ προσκυνῶν τὴν εἰκόνα, ἐν αὐτῇ προσκυνεῖ τὸν βασιλέα*, I and the king am one, for I am in him, and he is in me; and what you take notice of in me, the same you may observe in him also; and what you see in him, you may see likewise in me: he therefore, that worshippeth the image, therein worshippeth the king, the image being nothing but the form of the king." Elsewhere, in the fourth oration, he thus insisteth upon this particular:§ *Ἔστι γὰρ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, ὥσγε νοεῖν ἔξεστιν, ἐπειδὴ σύμπαν τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Υἱοῦ, τοῦτο τῆς πατρὸς οὐσίας ἴδιόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἐκ φωτὸς*

[8] Whose testimonies are collected and illustrated by Dion. Petavius, Lib. 4. de Trinitate, cap. 16. p. 263. tom. 2. Dogm. Theolog.

* Page 665. [Tom. 1. opp. Libro de Sentent. Dionys. p. 565.]

† Orat. 4. p. 457. ‡ Ibid. § Page 456.

ἀπαύγασμα, καὶ ἐκ πηγῆς ποταμὸς, ὥστε τὸν ὁρῶντα τὸν Υἱὸν ὁρᾶν τὸ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἴδιον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἴδιον, τοῦτο ὁ Υἱὸς τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀπαυγάσματι ὁ ἥλιος, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ ἡ πηγή, "The Son is in the Father, as may be conceived from hence; because the whole being of the Son is proper to the essence of the Father, he being derived from it, as the splendour from the light, and the river from the fountain: so that he who sees the Son, sees that which is the Father's own and proper. Again, the Father is in the Son, because that which is the Father's own and proper, that is the Son; accordingly as the sun is also in the splendour, the mind in reason, and the fountain in the river." What cavils the Arians had against this doctrine, Athanasius also informs us:* Ἤρξαντο διασύρειν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Κυρίου λεγόμενον, Ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ, καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί· λέγοντες, πῶς δύναται οὗτος ἐν ἐκείνῳ, κἀκεῖνος ἐν τούτῳ χωρεῖν; ἢ πῶς ὅλως δύναται ὁ Πατὴρ μείζων ὢν ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ ἐλάττονι ὄντι χωρεῖν; καίτοι τί θαυμαστὸν, εἰ ὁ Υἱὸς ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ; ὅπουγε καὶ περὶ ἡμῶν γέγραπται, Ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμεν, "Here the Arians begin to quarrel with that of our Lord, I am in the Father, and the Father in me; objecting, How is it possible, that both the former should be in the latter, and the latter in the former? or how can the Father, being greater, be received in the Son, who is lesser? And yet what wonder is it, if the Son should be in the Father; since it is written of us men also, That in him we live, and move, and have our being?" In way of reply whereunto, Athanasius first observes, that the ground of this Arian cavillation was the grossness of their apprehensions, and that they did τὰ ἀσώματα σωματικῶς ἐκλαμβάνειν, "conceive of incorporeal things after a corporeal manner." And then does he add: Οὐ γὰρ, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι νομίζουσιν, ἀντεμβιβαζόμενοι εἰς ἀλλήλους εἰσὶν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀγγείοις κενοῖς ἐξ ἀλλήλων πληρουμένοις, ὥστε τὸν μὲν Υἱὸν πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ Πατρός, τὸν δὲ Πατέρα πληροῦν τὸ κοῖλον τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν μὴ εἶναι πλήρη καὶ τέλειον, "For the Father and the Son are not, as they suppose, transvasated and poured out one into another, as into an empty vessel; as if the Son filled up the concavity of the Father, and again, the Father that of the Son; and neither of them full or perfect in themselves. For all this is proper to bodies: wherefore though the Father be, in some sense, greater than the Son; yet notwithstanding may he be in him after an incorporeal manner." And he replieth to their last cavil thus: "That the Son is not so in the Father, as we ourselves are said to live and move, and be in God:" Αὐτὸς γὰρ ὡς ἐκ πηγῆς τοῦ Πατρός ἐστι ζωὴ, ἐν ᾧ τὰ πάντα ζωογονεῖται καὶ συνέστηκεν, οὐ

* Orat. 4. [P. 453.]

γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν ζωῇ ζῇ, &c. "For he himself, from the fountain of the Father, is that life, in whom all things are quickened and consist; neither does he, who is the life, live in another life, which were to suppose him not to be the life itself. Nor (saith he) must it be conceived, that the Father is no otherwise in the Son, than he is in holy men corroborating of them; for the Son himself is the power and wisdom of God, and all created beings are sanctified by a participation of him in the Spirit." Wherefore this perichoresis, or mutual in-being of the Father and the Son, is to be understood after a peculiar manner, so as that they are really thereby one; and what the Son and Holy Ghost doth, the Father doth in them, according to that of Athanasius: Ἡ τοῦ Υἱοῦ θεότης τοῦ Πατρὸς θεότης ἐστί· καὶ οὕτως ἐν τῷ Υἱῷ τὴν τῶν πάντων πρόνοιαν ποιεῖται, "The Godhead of the Son is the Godhead of the Father; and so the Father exercises a providence over all things in the Son."

Lastly, the same Athanasius, in sundry places, still further supposes those three divine hypostases to make up one entire divinity, after the same manner as the fountain and the stream make up one entire river; or the root, and the stock, and the branches one entire tree. And in this sense also, is the whole Trinity said by him to be μία θεότης, and μία φύσις, and μία οὐσία, and εἷς Θεὸς, "one divinity," and "one nature," and "one essence," and "one God." And accordingly the word "Homoousios" seems here to be taken by Athanasius, in a further sense, besides that before mentioned; not only for things agreeing in one common and general essence, as three individual men are co-essential with one another; but also for such as concurrently together make up one entire thing, and are therefore jointly essential thereunto. For when he affirmeth: Τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι ῥίζης ὁμοφυὲς, and τὰ κλήματα ὁμοούσια τῆς ἀμπέλου, "That the tree is congenerous or homogenial with the root," and "the branches co-essential with the vine;" his meaning is, that the root, stock, and branches, are not only of one kind, but also all together make up the entire essence of one plant or tree. In like manner, those three hypostases, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are not only congenerous and co-essential, as having all the essence of the Godhead alike in them, but also as concurrently making up one entire divinity. Accordingly whereunto, Athanasius further concludes, that these three divine hypostases have not a consent of will only, but essentially one and the self-same will, and that they do also jointly produce ad extra, μίαν ἐνέγειαν, "one and the self-same energy, operation, or action;" nothing being peculiar to the Son as such, but only the economy of the incarnation:* Ὁμοία ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστι τῇ φύσει ἡ

* Ep. ad Serap. p. 202.

Τριάς· καὶ μία ταύτης ἡ ἐνέργεια· ὁ γὰρ Πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ Λόγου, ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ· καὶ οὕτως ἡ ἑνότης τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος σώζεται· καὶ οὕτως εἷς Θεὸς ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ κηρύττεται, ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων, καὶ διὰ πάντων, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν· ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν ὡς Πατὴρ, ὡς ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγή· διὰ πάντων δὲ διὰ τοῦ Λόγοῦ· ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἐν τῷ Πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ, "The Trinity is like itself, and by nature indivisible, and there is one energy or action of it; for the Father by the Word, in the Holy Ghost, doth all things. And thus is the unity of the whole Trinity conserved, and one God preached in the church: namely, such as is above all, and by or through all, and in all. Above all, as the Father, the principle, and fountain; through all, by the Word; and in all, by the Holy Spirit." And elsewhere he writeth often to the same purpose. Thus have we given a true and full account, how, according to Athanasius, the three divine hypostases, though not "mono-ousios," but "homo-ousios" only, are really but one God or divinity. In all which doctrine of his there is nothing but what a true and genuine Platonist would readily subscribe to. From whence it may be concluded, that the right Platonic trinity differs not so much from the doctrine of the ancient church, as some late writers have supposed.

Hitherto hath the Platonic Christian endeavoured partly to rectify and reform the true and genuine Platonic trinity, and partly to reconcile it with the doctrine of the ancient church. Nevertheless, to prevent all mistakes, we shall here declare that wheresoever this most genuine Platonic trinity may be found to differ, not only from the Scripture itself, (which yet notwithstanding is the sole rule of faith) but also from the form of the Nicene and Constantinopolitan councils; and further from the doctrine of Athanasius too, in his genuine writings, (whether it be in their inequality, or in any thing else) it is there utterly disclaimed and rejected by us. For as for that creed, commonly called Athanasian, which was written a long time after by some other hand; since at first it derived all its authority, either from the name of Athanasius, to whom it was entitled, or else because it was supposed to be an epitome and abridgment of his doctrine; this (as we conceive) is therefore to be interpreted according to the tenor of that doctrine, contained in the genuine writings of Athanasius. Of whom we can think no otherwise, than as a person highly instrumental and serviceable to divine providence, for the preserving of the Christian church from lapsing by Arianism, into a kind of paganic and idolatrous Christianity; in religiously worshipping of those which themselves concluded to be creatures; and by means of whom especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, (which before fluctuated in some loose uncertainty) came to be more punctually stated and settled.

Now the reason why we introduced the Platonic Christian here thus apologizing, was first: because we conceived it not to be the interest of Christianity that the ancient Platonic trinity should be made more discrepant from the Christian than indeed it is. And secondly, because, as we have already proved, the ancient and genuine Platonic trinity was doubtless anti-Arian, or else the Arian trinity anti-Platonic; the second and third hypostases in the Platonic trinity, being both eternal, infinite, and immutable. And as for those Platonic βαθμοὶ, or "gradations," so much spoken of, these (by St. Cyril's[9] leave) were of a different kind from the Arian, there being not the inequality of creatures in them to the Creator. Wherefore Socrates, the ecclesiastic historian, not without cause wonders, how these two presbyters, Georgius and Timotheus, should adhere to the Arian faction, since they were accounted such great readers of Plato and Origen:* *Θαυμάσαι οὖν μοι ἔπεισι, πῶς οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες, τῇ Ἀρειανῶν θρησκείᾳ παρέμειναν, ὧν ὁ μὲν Πλάτωνα ἀεὶ μετὰ χεῖρας εἶχεν, ὁ δὲ τὸν Ὠριγένην ἀνέπνεεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ Πλάτων τὸ Δεύτερον καὶ τὸ Τρίτον αἴτιον, ὡς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν, ἀρχὴν ὑπάρξεως εἰληφέναι φησί· καὶ Ὠριγένης συναΐδιον πανταχοῦ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρί,* "It seems to me wonderful how those two persons should persist in the Arian persuasion; one of them having always Plato in his hands, and the other continually breathing Origen. Since Plato nowhere affirmeth his first and second cause (as he was wont to call them) to have had any beginning of their existence; and Origen every where confesseth the Son to be co-eternal with the Father."

Besides which, another reason for this apology of the Christian Platonist was, because as the Platonic Pagans after Christianity did approve of the Christian doctrine concerning the Logos, as that which which was exactly agreeable with their own; so did the generality of the Christian fathers, before and after the Nicene council, represent the genuine Platonic trinity as really the same thing with the Christian, or as approaching so near to it, that they differed chiefly in circumstances, or the manner of expression. The former of these is evident from that famous passage of Amelius, contemporary with Plotinus, recorded by Eusebius, St. Cyril, and Theodoret:† *Καὶ οὗτος ἄρα ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καθ' ὃν αἰεὶ ὄντα, τὰ γινόμενα ἐγίνετο, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος ἀξιώσειε, καὶ νὴ Δί' ὃν ὁ Βάρβαρος ἀξιοῖ ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀρχῆς τάξει τε καὶ ἀξίᾳ καθεστηκότα, πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι· δι' οὗ πάντ' ἁπλῶς γεγενῆσθαι· ἐν ᾧ τὸ γενόμενον ζῶν καὶ ζωὴν καὶ ὂν πεφυκέναι· καὶ εἰς τὰ σώματα πίπτειν καὶ σάρκα ἐνδυσάμενον,*

[9] Who lib. 8. adv. Julianum, p. 270. and lib. 1. p. 34. compares the Porphyrian and Platonic Trinity with the Arian.

* Lib. 7. cap. 6. [P. 343.] ‡ Præp. Evan. lib. 11. cap. 9. [Cap. 19. p. 540.]

φαντάζεσθαι ἄνθρωπον, μετὰ καὶ τοῦ τηνικαῦτα δεικνύειν τῆς φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον ἀμέλει· καὶ ἀναλυθέντα πάλιν ἀποθεοῦσθαι, καὶ Θεὸν εἶναι, οἷος ἦν πρὸ τοῦ εἰς τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καταχθῆναι, "And this was the Logos or Word, by whom existing from eternity, according to Heraclitus, all things were made, and whom that barbarian also placeth in the rank and dignity of a principle, affirming him to have been with God, and to be God: and that all things were made by him, and that whatsoever was made, was life and being in him. As also that he descended into a body, and being clothed in flesh, appeared as a man, though not without demonstration of the divinity of his nature. But that afterwards being loosed or separated from the same, he was deified, and became God again, such as he was before he came down into a mortal body." In which words, Amelius speaks favourably also of the incarnation of that eternal Logos. And the same is further manifest from what St. Austin writeth concerning a Platonist in his time,* Initium sancti evangelii, cui nomen est secundum Johannem, quidam Platonicus, sicut à sancto sene Simpliciano, qui posteà Mediolanensi ecclesiæ præsedit episcopus, solebamus audire, aureis literis conscribendum, et per omnes ecclesias in locis eminentissimis proponendum esse dicebat, "We have often heard from that holy man Simplicianus, afterward bishop of Milan, that a certain Platonist affirmed the beginning of St. John's gospel deserved to be writ in letters of gold, and to be set up in all the most eminent places throughout the Christian churches." And the latter will sufficiently appear from these following testimonies: Justin Martyr, in his apology, affirmeth of Plato,† Δευτέραν χώραν τῷ παρὰ Θεοῦ λόγῳ δίδωσι· τὴν δὲ τρίτην τῷ λεχθέντι ἐπιφέρεσθαι τῷ ὕδατι πνεύματι, &c., "That he gave the second place to the Word of God; and the third to that Spirit which is said to have moved upon the waters." Clemens Alexandrinus, speaking of that passage in Plato's second epistle to Dionysius, concerning the first, second, and third, writeth thus:‡ Οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω, ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα μηνύεσθαι, τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα· τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός, "I understand this no otherwise, than that the Holy Trinity is signified thereby, the third being the Holy Ghost, and the second the Son, by whom all things were made, according to the will of the Father." Origen also affirmeth the Son of God to have been plainly spoken of by Plato, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus:§ Ὁ πάντ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος εἰδέναι Κέλσος, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος παρατιθέμενος, ἑκὼν, οἶμαι, σιωπᾷ τὸν περὶ υἱοῦ θεοῦ λόγον, τὸν παρὰ Πλάτωνι λεγό-

* De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap. 29. [P. 202. tom. 7. opp. † P. 93. [Apol. 2.]
‡ Stromat. lib. 5. p. 598. [P. 710. Edit. Potteri.] § Lib. 6. c. Cels. [P. 280.]

μενον ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑρμείαν καὶ Κορίσκον ἐπιστολῇ, "Celsus, who pretendeth to know all things, and who citeth so many other passages out of Plato, doth purposely (as I suppose) dissemble and conceal that which he wrote concerning the Son of God, in his epistle to Hermias and Coriscus,[10] where he calls him the God of the whole universe, and the prince of all things, both present and future: afterwards speaking of the Father of this prince and cause." And again, elsewhere in that book, he writeth to the same purpose:* Ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐβουλήθη τὸ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς λελεγμένον, οὗ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτέρω ἐμνήσθημεν, περὶ τοῦ διακοσμήσαντος τόδε τὸ πᾶν, ὡς ὄντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ, παραθέσθαι· ἵνα μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὃν πολλάκις ἐσέμνυνεν, ἀναγκασθῇ παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι ὁμὲν δημιουργὸς τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς υἱός ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς πατήρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, "Neither would Celsus (here speaking of Christians making Christ the Son of God) take any notice of that passage in Plato's epistle before mentioned, concerning the framer and governor of the whole world, as being the Son of God; lest he should be compelled by the authority of Plato, whom he so often magnifieth, to agree with this doctrine of ours, that the Demiurgus of the whole world is the Son of God; but the first and supreme Deity, his Father." Moreover, St. Cyprian, or whoever were the author of the book inscribed De Spiritu Sancto,[1] affirmeth the Platonists first and universal Psyche, to be the same with the Holy Ghost in the Christian theology, in these words: Hujus sempiterna virtus et divinitas, cum in propria natura ab inquisitoribus mundi, antiquis philosophis, propriè investigari non posset; subtilissimis tamen intuiti conjecturis compositionem mundi, et distinctis elementorum affectibus, præsentem omnibus animam adfuisse dixerunt; quibus, secundum genus et ordinem singulorum, vitam præberet et motum, et intransgressibiles figeret metas, et stabilitatem assignaret; et universam hanc vitam, hunc motum, hanc rerum essentiam, animam mundi vocaverunt.† In the next place Eusebius Cæsariensis gives a full and clear testimony of the concordance and agreement of the Platonic, at least as to the main, with the Christian trinity, which he will have to have been the Cabala of the ancient

[10] The following are not Origen's words, but Dr. Cudworth's, who thus explains the passage of Plato cited by Origen.

* Contra Cels. lib. 6. p. 308.

[1] This book, De Spiritu Sancto, is part of a work, De Cardinalibus Christi Operibus, formerly ascribed to St. Cyprian, but at the present day, much more correctly, to the Abbé Arnaldus, a writer of the twelfth century. See Casim. Oudinus' Commentar. de Scriptor. Eccles. tom. 2. p. 1290. It is still added, however, as an Appendix to the genuine works of St. Cyprian. The words here cited occur not far from the beginning of the book, De Spiritu Sancto, p. 114. ed. Baluzii. This witness, therefore, is to be excluded from the list of those ancient ecclesiastical fathers who supposed the Platonic Trinity to be closely allied to the Christian.

† Præp. Evan. lib. 11. cap. 20. [P. 541.]

Hebrews, thus: Τῶν παρ' Ἑβραίοις λογίων μετὰ τὸν περὶ πατρὸς καὶ Ὑιοῦ λόγον, ἐν τρίτῃ τάξει τὸ Ἅγιον Πνεῦμα καταλεγόντων· καὶ τήν γε ἁγίαν καὶ μακαρίαν Τριάδα τοῦτον ὑποτιθεμένων τὸν τρόπον, ὡς ἂν τῆς τρίτης δυνάμεως πᾶσαν ὑπερβεβηκυίας γεννητὴν φύσιν· οὖσαν πρώτην μὲν τῶν διὰ τοῦ Ὑιοῦ συστασῶν νοερῶν οὐσιῶν, τρίτην δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου Αἰτίου· θέα ὅπως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων τοιαῦτά τινα ᾐνίξατο διὰ τῆς πρὸς Διονύσιον ἐπιστολῆς, &c. "The oracles of the Hebrews, placing the Holy Ghost after the Father and the Son, in the third rank, and acknowledging a holy and blessed trinity after this manner, so as that this third power does also transcend all created nature, and is the first of those intellectual substances, which proceed from the Son, and the third from the first cause: see how Plato enigmatically declareth the same things in his epistle to Dionysius, in these words, &c. These things the interpreters of Plato refer to a first God, and to a second cause, and to a third the soul of the world, which they call also the third God. And the divine Scriptures in like manner rank the holy Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the place or degree of a principle." But it is most observable what Athanasius affirmeth of the Platonists; that though they derived the second hypostasis of their trinity from the first, and the third from the second, yet they supposed both their second and third hypostases to be uncreated; and therefore does he send the Arians to school thither, who, because there is but one Ἀγέννητος, "one self-originated Being," would unskilfully conclude that the Word or Son of God must therefore needs be a creature. Thus, in his book concerning the decrees of the Nicene council:† Ἐχρήσαντο παρ' Ἑλλήνων λοιπὸν τὴν λέξιν τοῦ Ἀγεννήτου· ἵνα προφάσει καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος, ἐν τοῖς γεννητοῖς πάλιν καὶ τοῖς κτίσμασι συναριθμῶσι τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον· δι' οὗ αὐτὰ τὰ γεννητὰ γέγονεν· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοοῦντες τὸ ὄνομα οὕτως ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, ἔδει μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς παρὰ τῶν αὐτοῖς δεδωκότων αὐτό, ὅτι καὶ ὃν λέγουσιν ἐκ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ Νοῦν, καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Νοῦ ψυχὴν· καίτοι γινώσκοντες τὸ ἐξ ὧν εἰσιν, οὐκ ἐφοβήθησαν, ὅμως, καὶ αὐτὰ εἰπεῖν Ἀγένητα· εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες οὐκ ἐλαττοῦσι τὸ πρῶτον, ἐξ οὗ καὶ ταῦτα πέφυκε· καὶ ἢ καὶ αὐτοὺς οὕτω λέγειν, ἢ μηδόλως λέγειν, περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴσασιν, "The Arians, borrowing the word Agennetos from the Pagans, (who acknowledge only one such) make that a pretence to rank the Word or Son of God, who is the creator of all, amongst creatures or things made. Whereas they ought to have learned the right signification of that word Agennetos from those very Platonists who gave it them. Who, though acknowledging their second hypostasis of Nous or Intellect to be derived from the first, called Tagathon, and their third hypostasis or Psyche from the

* Page 278.

second; nevertheless doubt not to affirm them both to be ageneta or uncreated, knowing well, that hereby they detract nothing from the majesty of the first, from whom these two are derived. Wherefore the Arians either ought so to speak as the Platonists do, or else to say nothing at all concerning these things which they are ignorant of." In which words of Athanasius, there is a plain distinction made betwixt ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος, that is "unbegotten" and "uncreated;" and the second person of the Trinity, the Son or Word of God, though acknowledged by him, not to be Ἀγέννητος, "unbegotten," (he being begotten of the Father, who is the only "Agennetos") yet is he here said to be Ἀγένητος, "uncreated;"[2] he declaring the Platonists thus to have affirmed the second and third hypostases of their trinity not to be creatures, but uncreated. Which signal testimony of Athanasius concerning the Platonic trinity, is a great vindication of the same. We might further add St. Austin's* confession also,[3] that God the Father, and God the Son, were by the Platonists acknowledged in like manner, as by the Christians; though concerning the Holy Ghost, he observes some difference betwixt Plotinus and Porphyrius, in that the former did postponere animæ naturam paterno intellectui, the latter interponere; "Plotinus did postpone his Psyche, or soul, after the paternal Intellect; but Porphyrius interponed it betwixt the Father and the Son, as a middle between both." It was before observed, that St. Cyril of Alexandria affirmeth nothing to be wanting to the Platonic trinity, but only that Homo-ousiotes of his and some other fathers in that age, that they should not only all be God, or uncreated, but also three co-equal individuals, under the same ultimate species, as three individual men: he conceiving that gradual subordination that is in the Platonic trinity, to be a certain tang of Arianism. Nevertheless, he thus concludeth,[4] Πλὴν οὐκ ἠγνόηκεν ὁλοτρόπως τὸ ἀληθὲς. "That Plato notwithstanding was not altogether ignorant of the truth, but that he had the knowledge of the only begotten Son of God, as likewise of the Holy Ghost, called by him Psyche; and that he would have every way expressed himself rightly, had he not been afraid of Anitus and Melitus, and that poison which Socrates drunk." Now, whether this were a fault or no in the Platonists, that they did not suppose their hypostases to be three

[2] On these words, ἀγέννητος and ἀγένητος, and on their varied signification and distinction, as well as synonymous use, in ancient Christian writers, consult the copious and erudite commentary of Dion. Petavius, Dogmat. Theol. tom. 2. De Trinitate, lib. 5. cap. 1. &c. p. 270. &c.

* De Civitate Dei. [Lib. 10. cap. 23.]

[3] De Civitate Dei, lib. 10. cap. 23. On this passage of St. Augustine we have discoursed at some length above, and have shown that he misapprehended the meaning of the Platonists on the middle nature of the third principle.

[4] Adv. Julianum, lib. 1. p. 34.

individuals under the same ultimate species, we leave to others to judge. We might here add the testimony of Chalcidius, because he is unquestionably concluded to have been a Christian;[5]

[5] Of this opinion, besides Dr. Cudworth, are many most eminent and learned men, enumerated by J. Alb. Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 554. who himself also not only adopts it, but also professedly endeavours to show throughout his Annotations on Chalcidius, that this philosopher was wholly imbued with Christian precepts. On the contrary, there are not a few others who hold this erudite interpreter of Plato to have adhered to the religion of Plato, and not to have passed over to the ranks of the Christians. Not long ago, a learned writer [Guzetus, according to Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. Med. Ævi. p. 1032. where he states it to be his purpose to examine into the matter some other time] put forth in P. des Molets Memoires de Litterature, tom. 1. par. 1. p. 138. a Dissertation on Chalcidius, wherein he warmly supports this opinion: although the author brings forward scarcely any thing new, and does not prove Chalcidius to have been a Pagan so much as expose the weakness of the arguments of those who rank him among Christians. For myself, I adopt the views of neither party, but consider Chalcidius to have been, like many Platonists of that period, an eclectic, who did not approve entirely either of the Pagan or the Christian religion, but compounded a sort of religion out of both, or selected from each what he held to be true, and repudiated the rest. To those who are acquainted with the history of Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries, it is well known that among the philosophers of that period there were some who took upon themselves the office of mediator as it were between the Christians and Pagans, and endeavoured to bring about a sort of harmony of the two religions: to which class if I show Chalcidius to have belonged, I fancy I shall be doing a not altogether unprofitable service. For we can scarcely know what weight is to be attached to the authority of any witness, till we have first of all ascertained his religion. Wherefore, as we have sometimes occasion to make use of Chalcidius' testimony in matters of no small moment, it is manifestly our interest to know to what religion he belonged. I shall first, therefore, adduce the arguments of the most erudite J. Alb. Fabricius, upon the strength of which he considers Chalcidius is to be ranked among the professors of Christianity, collected from his Annotations on that writer, and interspersing the observations of others, shall examine into the force of each: afterwards, I shall point out such traces as I have met with in Chalcidius of a superstition foreign to the discipline of Christ; from which it will appear that this man was thoroughly neither a Pagan nor a Christian, but intermediate between both. But lest the ambiguity of the word Christian should occasion any obscurity in this disputation, I shall here state in the outset, that I call him a Christian who holds the books of the Old and New Testament to be divinely inspired, confesses Christ to be the sole Redeemer of the human race, and in short, adopts all those dogmas in which all sects of Christians put faith, and on the other hand, rejects every thing which tends to weaken or subvert the first foundations of Christianity. But a Pagan I call one who believes in many gods, and holds that these gods are to be worshipped; who denies Christ to be the only Saviour, and despises and repudiates the books which Christians consider divine, or even inculcates such doctrines as would necessarily lead to conclusions of the kind. The reason why I adopt such wide definitions in this question will be easily understood by every intelligent man conversant with these matters. If it be made appear, therefore, that neither of these definitions applies to Chalcidius, it will be evident, at the same time, that neither Christians nor Pagans can claim this philosopher exclusively to themselves.

I. Chalcidius calls the Jews a *more holy sect.* Quod quidem, says he, cap. 4. sect. 54. p. 299. verum esse testatur eminens quædam doctrina sectæ sanctioris et in comprehensione divinæ rei prudentioris, quæ perhibet Deum, absoluto illustratoque sensili mundo, genus humanum instituentem, corpus quidem ejus, parte humi sumta, juxta hanc effigiem ædificasse formasseque, vitam vero eidem ex convexis accersisse cœlestibus, "Which is proved to be true by an eminent doctrine of that more holy, and in the comprehension of divine matters more prudent sect, which says, that God having finished and adorned the sensible world, in making man, took a portion of earth and formed his body according to this image, but gave him life from heaven." The epithet here applied to the Jews, is considered by Fabricius to be a sign of Christian sentiments: Judæos, says he, sanctioris sectæ titulo non appellaturus fuisset,

though his language indeed be too much paganical, when he calls the three divine hypostases, a chief, a second, and a third God:* Istius rei dispositio talis mente concipienda est; originem quidem

nisi Christianus, "Had he not been a Christian, he would not have called the Jews by the title of more holy sect." I consider however, that there is not so much in this name as the excellent writer supposes. For, although I grant it to be a proof that Chalcidius was not wholly enslaved by pagan superstition, inasmuch as he praises a nation held in the greatest detestation by the Pagans; still, we cannot, I think, infer from it that he was altogether devoted to Christian principles. For I see no reason why a Platonic philosopher who believes in God and in his providence over human affairs, may not suppose a portion of divine and true wisdom to have been formerly in Moses, and at the same time repudiate Christ and his doctrine. A sort of friendship had long ago grown up, especially in Egypt, between the Jews and the philosophers who called themselves followers of Plato. The Jews who studied philosophy, did not scruple to adopt the institutes of Plato, and lest this might appear to be done against the authority of Moses, not only sought for traces of the Platonic doctrines in Moses' writings, but affirmed also that Plato had borrowed a great portion of them from Moses. For evidence of this, consult Philo, an author read by Chalcidius, and on whose philosophy we have discoursed above, cap. 13. sect. 266. p. 381. Among the Platonists, doubtless, there were some who considered this not to be incredible: to which number I suspect Chalcidius to have belonged, who so often appeals to the philosophy of the Hebrews. And even the present passage supplies me with two things not a little confirmatory of this opinion. 1. As Chalcidius was not ignorant that the Christians agreed with the Jews in attributing divine authority to Moses, it is strange he cites only Hebrew, and not also Christian testimonies. Learned men who have read Chalcidius, are aware that his work is addressed to a Christian, whoever he was, named Osius. His discourse, therefore, would have had much greater weight with this man, whom he was desirous of conciliating, if he had asserted that both Hebrews and Christians, as acknowledging the divine authority of Moses, approached closely to the doctrine of Plato. Nevertheless, he quotes to this Christian only Hebrew testimonies; which is a clear proof that he did not think so favourably of the Christians as of the Jews, whose philosophy he held to be in accordance with the precepts of Plato. 2. The opinion here attributed by Chalcidius to the Hebrews is not Moses', but that of certain Jews who interpreted Moses according to the sense of Plato. Thus he asserts a twofold soul in man: one *vital* and the other *rational*. The former he tells us was derived from God, when he formed man, from the stars and heavenly bodies, and placed in man; the latter was breathed into him afterwards by the same Creator, from himself or from his own nature. Postque, says he, (Deum Hebræi docent) intimis ejus (hominis nimirum recessibus) inspirationem proprio flatu intimasse, "And afterwards that God breathed into his (man's) inmost recesses an inspiration by his own breath." Compare cap. 9. sect. 217. p. 357. and cap. 13. sect. 298. p. 388. This philosophy of a double soul, one derived from the stars, the other from God himself, would be in vain looked for in the writings of Moses. From which it is easy to understand that Chalcidius had not read Moses himself, which a Christian would naturally do, but rather had lent too ready an ear to the Platonic Jews, especially Philo, in their interpretations of Moses' doctrines. And that the Jews long prior to the time of Chalcidius, had cherished this doctrine and ascribed it to Moses, is shown both by many other things, and also by the fact, that Josephus, Antiq. Judaic. lib. 1. cap. 1. sect. 2. p. 6. thus speaks of the soul given by God to man: Καὶ ΠΝΕΥΜΑ ἐνῆκεν αὐτῷ καὶ ΨΥΧΗΝ, "He placed in him a spirit and a soul." In which words ψυχὴ undoubtedly means the *natural* and *vital soul*, and πνεῦμα the *rational soul* of Chalcidius.

II. From these remarks my opinion will be already evident as to the second argument advanced by learned men in proof of Chalcidius being a Christian. Chalcidius, in many places speaks in laudatory terms of the Hebrew philosophy: the passages themselves in which he mentions these doctrines have been carefully collected by Fabricius, Biblioth. Latin. lib. 3. cap. 7. p. 555. 556. This they consider would

* Page 277. [Cap. 7. sect. 186. p. 346. 347. Edit. Fabricii.]

rerum esse summum et ineffabilem Deum; post providentiam ejus secundum Deum, latorem legis utriusque vitæ tam æternæ quam temporariæ; tertium esse porro substantiam, quæ

scarcely have been done by him unless he had been a Christian. For my part, I think otherwise, and am satisfied that he might have commended the Jews, and still disagreed with the Christians. Besides, as I have already intimated, in appealing to the Hebrews and their philosophy, he sometimes attributes to them dogmas which are neither to be met with in Moses, nor in the other books of the Old Testament; from which it was manifest that he was little conversant with the facts and opinions handed down to the Jews upon divine authority, that is, was indebted for what he records of the Hebrew philosophy to the Jewish masters rather than to Moses. Thus, cap. 13. sect. 298. 388. 389. the Hebrews, he informs us, taught: Deum mutis et agrestibus animantibus animam rationis expertem ex silva dedisse, "That God gave to the mute animals of the field a soul devoid of reason from matter." Which every one knows is nowhere written by Moses. Cap. 7. sect. 129. p. 328. he says that according to the Hebrews, astra esse signa futurorum proventuum, "the stars are signs of future events:" which even Fabricius himself disapproves of, and denies to belong to Moses. To avoid prolixity, I pass over others of the same kind. But why Chalcidius, in writing to a Christian, should have so repeatedly appealed to the evidence and authority of the Jews, will readily be understood by those who are not unacquainted with the circumstances of the period in which he lived. The later Platonists, as they are called, before Constantine took upon himself the protection of the Christian religion, had inflicted various evils and injuries upon its professors, and had not only openly attacked the doctrine of Christ in their writings, but excited the civil authorities and the multitude against those that were devoted to it. Hence, after Constantine had given peace and external security to the Christian community, this sect was in the highest degree obnoxious to most Christians, nor could many of the prelates easily persuade themselves to look favourably upon the Platonic name and discipline. To avert in some measure this odium, Chalcidius no doubt considered it as his wisest course to fortify himself on all occasions by the authority of the Hebrews, and with Philo, Josephus, and others, for his guides, to remind the Christian doctor, Osius, that the Platonists inculcated scarcely any thing more than had before been inculcated by Moses, an author whom Christians by universal consent acknowledged to be divine.

III. Chalcidius sometimes quotes the testimony of Moses, see cap. 7. sect. 152. p. 336. This is brought forward by learned men as a third argument to show that this philosopher was a follower of Christ; with whom I cannot agree, for this reason, that it is manifestly possible for any one to hold Moses in high estimation, and still to reject Christ and his precepts. All those, indeed, who take Christ for their master, must necessarily recognize Moses and his authority: but all who hold Moses to be divine, do not consider themselves obliged to admit the authority of Christ also. Besides, to say the least of it, it is still very doubtful and uncertain whether Chalcidius did hold Moses to be a man divinely inspired. No slight ground for doubting on this matter is afforded by a remarkable passage occurring in cap. 13. sect. 274. p. 380. Hebræi silvam generatam esse confitentur: quorum sapientissimus Moses non humana facundia, sed divina, *ut ferunt*, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, "The Hebrews acknowledge matter to have been generated: the wisest of whom, Moses, moved not by human eloquence, but, *as they say*, by divine inspiration, declared so at the beginning of the book on the generation of the world." All those who deny that Chalcidius is to be ranked among Christians, appeal to this passage in particular, and insist upon its being manifest from the phrase, *as they say*, that he at least entertained a doubt as to the divine authority of Moses: if which were the case, there is no one who would not exclude him from the Christian community. Fabricius, however, has laboured to show on the authority of Josephus, Agathias, and St. Basil, that the Greek phrase, ὥς φασι, is not always a sign of doubting, but used by the best writers even of those things which they believed to be most certain. See Biblioth Græc. vol. 6. lib. 5. cap. 5. p. 261. Not. in Chalcidium, p. 380. But supposing this to be so, still this passage of Chalcidius will not on that account be free from all suspicion. For setting aside that the illustrious scholar has produced no example from Latin authors to show that the expression, *ut ferunt*, is usually

secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quædam custos legis æternæ. His subjectas esse rationabiles animas, legi obsequentes, ministras verò potestates, &c. Ergo summus Deus jubet, se-

applied by them in the same sense as the Greek, ὅς φασι, no one, I imagine, will deny that *ut ferunt* is frequently an indication of doubt in the mind of the writer, and of the thing he is speaking of being left undetermined. And this being unquestionable, it must be manifest at the same time, that these words of Chalcidius admit of being taken in a twofold sense, and that both sides of the question: whether they imply doubt or asseveration, may be maintained from them. Hence, it will at least be matter for endless controversy, whether or not Chalcidius believed Moses to be divinely inspired, nor will this philosopher ever be entirely freed from suspicion. However, it being the common and certainly the most rational rule of all interpreters to understand the words of an author in the usual and ordinary sense, when there is no necessity for the contrary, most men, I am afraid, will consider that there is much more probability in the opinion of those who hold Chalcidius to have doubted, than of those who suppose him in this case to have made a positive affirmation.

IV. Somewhat greater stress is laid by those who contend for Chalcidius having been a Christian on that striking passage of his wherein he speaks of the Magi, and of the star which was seen by them, cap. 7. sec. 125. p. 325. Est quoque alia sanctior et venerabilior historia, quæ perhibet ortu stellæ cujusdam non morbos mortesque denunciatas, sed descensum Dei venerabilis ad humanæ conservationis rerumque mortalium gratiam. Quam stellam quum nocturno itinere suspexissent Chaldæorum profecto sapientes viri et consideratione rerum cœlestium satis exercitati, quæsisse dicuntur recentem ortum Dei: repertaque illa majestate puerili veneratos esse, et vota tanto Deo convenientia nuncupasse, quæ tibi multo melius sunt comperta, quam ceteris, "There is also another more sacred and venerable history which says that the rising of a certain star foretold, not diseases and death, but the descent of the glorious God for the sake of human salvation and mortal affairs. Which star having been beheld by the wise men of the Chaldeans, versed in the contemplation of celestial things, they are said to have sought for the recent birth of God: and having found the august child, to have worshipped him, and presented unto him gifts suitable to so great a God; which things are much better known to thee than to others." So far Chalcidius. Hoc, says Fabricius, satis perspicue Christianum se prodit Chalcidius, "By this Chalcidius sufficiently declares himself to be a Christian." Others, however, think differently, and among these W. Cave, Histor. Litter. Scriptor. Eccles. tom. 1. p. 106, who considers that Chalcidius' Christianism may be overthrown even by this passage: Semel meminit stellæ Christum recens natum præmonstrantis, cujus in historia Evangelica fit mentio: de quibus nihilominus haud satis pro Christiani scriptoris more loquitur, "He makes mention once of the star that foreshowed the recent nativity of Christ, an account of which is given in the gospel history: of which matters, however, he does not speak sufficiently in the spirit of a Christian writer." For myself, I assent to neither party, considering the passage to be of little avail either to those who rank Chalcidius among the Pagans, or those who maintain him to have been a Christian. The philosopher relates the history of the star seen by the Magi: which history, however, he neither rejects nor admits. To me, however, it seems probable, I confess, that had Chalcidius been devoted to Christian doctrines, he would have spoken somewhat more confidently of this star. If he had been writing to a man imbued with pagan superstitions it perhaps might have been prudent in him to make mention of this matter in such a way as not to incur the censure of his friend. But the book is addressed to a Christian, and one too, as these very words intimate, a doctor and teacher of the Christians. Why does he not therefore freely speak out his sentiments, and assert that the sacred volumes have fully convinced him of the truth of this history? But some one perhaps will say: Chalcidius however calls this history *more sacred and venerable*, which he would hardly have done if he had not considered it to be true. But the words which precede sufficiently show that this history is so termed by him comparatively, and by no means simply and absolutely. For he had been narrating certain things out of the works of the Egyptians and out of Homer; and to these narratives he prefers this history, not signifying thereby that it is entirely free from controversy, but merely that it is more worthy to be believed than the figments of the Egyptians and Homer. But in order to throw clearer light upon the subject, and to

cundus ordinat, tertius intimat. Animæ verò legem agunt. "This thing is to be conceived after this manner; that the first original of things is the supreme and ineffable God; after his

make it appear that Chalcidius did not hold every thing to be true, which he relates and yet does not openly impugn and repudiate, I wish it to be observed that he considered it to be the part of a wise man to relate every thing handed down by grave and illustrious authors without doubt or hesitation, although it may be of such a character as not easily to admit of being believed. This opinion he openly declares in the words which follow, cap. 7. sect. 126. p. 326. Plato exponit ea, quæ Orpheus et Linus et Musæus de divinis potestatibus vaticinati sunt, non quo delectaretur, *aut crederet*, sed quod tanta esset auctoritas vaticinantium, ut iis asseverantibus parcius credi non oporteret, "Plato gives an account of those things which Orpheus and Linus and Musæus sung on the divine powers, not that he was satisfied with *or believed* them, but because the authority of those poets was so great, that on their assertion it was necessary to pay no slight credence to them." Chalcidius therefore, according to this saying, thought it right that things recorded by great men, although appearing to us to be at variance with the truth, should nevertheless be related and expounded by us in such a way as to imply that we believe them. For although he speaks only of what he considers Plato to have done; still no one would say, that the man whose sole delight was in Plato condemned this custom of his master, or did not consider himself at liberty to do what in Plato he held to be blameless. Wherefore, if Chalcidius had even narrated this history of the Magi so as to indicate his own recognition and approval of it, still we could by no means infer from thence that the man entertained no doubts as to its truth. For as this narrative had come from men at that time held in vast estimation and respect, and moreover, as Chalcidius' book is addressed to a man who was convinced of the divine origin of that history, the laws of what he considered to be philosophical prudence would seem to him to require that he should so relate it as not to give the least ground for suspicion that he harboured any doubts on the matter.

V. What Chalcidius has left on record every where regarding angels, affords another argument to those who number him among Christians. Fabricius does not deny, Not. in Chalcid. p. 313. that mention is sometimes made of the ἀγγελικὸν γένος, or angels, even by those writers who were notoriously opposed to the Christian religion: nevertheless he considers certain things to be said respecting angels by Chalcidius, that clearly indicate a mind devoted to the Christian doctrine. The passage chiefly relied on by him is this, cap. 7. sect. 131. p. 328. Hujus porro generis illud est æthereum, quod in secundo loco commemoravimus positum, quos Hebræi vocant sanctos angelos, stareque eos dicunt ante Dei contemplationem venerabiles, summa atque acri intelligentia, ... iidemque speculatores et exsequutores, dæmones opinor, tamquam δαήμονες dicti, "Of this class, moreover, there is that ethereal one which we have spoken of as occupying the second place, and which the Hebrews call angels, and say that they stand before the contemplation of God venerable and endowed with consummate intelligence, ... and also sentinels and ministers, called demons, I suppose, as being δαήμονες." After something more on the same subject, our Platonist proceeds as follows, sect. 132. p. 329. Nec nos terreat nomen, promiscue bonis et improbis positum: quoniam nec angelorum quidem terret, quum angeli partim Dei sint ministri, et qui ita sunt, sancti vocantur: partim adversæ potestatis satellites, ut optime nosti. Igitur juxta usurpatam penes Græcos loquendi consuetudinem tam sancti sunt dæmones, quam polluti et infecti, "Nor let us be terrified at the name applied promiscuously to the good and the bad; for neither does that of angels terrify us, as angels are partly ministers of God, and those who are so are called holy; partly the minions of an adverse power, as thou knowest right well. Therefore, according to the usage of language among the Greeks, there are holy as well as polluted and infected demons." On these words, the illustrious man comments as follows: Ex hoc autem loco clarissime opinor patere, Christianum esse Chalcidium, qui hæc scribit: nam et Christianam de angelis bonis malisque doctrinam dilucide proponit, et eam distinguit a Græcorum consuetudine, quibus dæmones non semper malos spiritus denotant, sed æque late patet hoc nomen, ut nostris nomen angelorum, "From this passage I consider it to be most manifest that Chalcidius who writes so was a Christian: for he both clearly propounds the Christian doctrine of good and bad angels, and distinguishes it by a reference to the Greek usage, according to which demons do not always denote evil spirits, the word

providence, a second God, the establisher of the law of life both eternal and temporary; and the third (which is also a substance, and called a second Mind or Intellect) is a certain keeper of this

being equally extensive in meaning as the name of angels with ourselves." Now the excellent author will pardon me when I confess myself to be by no means convinced by this observation that Chalcidius is to be enrolled among Christians. He expounds the Christian doctrine concerning angels, and, I will add, approves of it too. But both might have been done by a man who otherwise had nothing in common with Christians. For in the first place, this doctrine was not at that time so abstruse and recondite as to be known only to those who were initiated in our religion; neither, in the second place, ought any one that adopts and approves of the whole Christian doctrine respecting angels, to be necessarily regarded on that account as a professor of Christianity. For it is not one of the fundamental doctrines of our religion, and therefore might be admitted by men who in other respects are violently opposed to the precepts and institutions of Christ. The Platonic sect, as every one at all acquainted with ancient matters must be aware, had many things in common with the Christians: for which reason their principal philosophers were bold enough to pretend that our Saviour had borrowed many things from Plato. Consult Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. 6. p. 283. and others. To these belonged the doctrine concerning angels; which, considered on the whole, is the same with Christians as with Platonists. Both acknowledged that there are good and bad genii; both that the evil genii plot against good men and dwell in the evil and wicked, and that the good are a protection to the pious and are the messengers of God. What first separated the two sects was the difference of words by which they explained their respective opinions. For the Platonists, with Plato for their guide, used the name δαίμων in so wide a sense as to apply it both to good and bad genii: which custom of theirs is here excused by Chalcidius to Osius. But the Christians, following the authority of sacred writ, always employed the word δαίμων in a bad sense, and designated by it only the evil genii. See Origen, Adv. Celsum, lib. 5. p. 234. In process of time, however, after the Christian religion had taken deeper root in the world, the Platonists themselves chose to adopt the Christian usage rather than retain the more extensive meaning of the word δαίμων. On this we have the testimony of St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, lib. 9. cap. 19. p. 178. tom. 7. opp. Nos autem, sicut scriptura loquitur, secundum quam Christiani sumus, angelos quidem partim bonos, partim malos, nunquam vero bonos dæmones legimus. ..... Et hanc loquendi consuetudinem in tantum populi usquequaque sequuti sunt, ut eorum etiam, qui Pagani appellantur, et deos multos ac dæmones colendos esse contendunt, nullus fere sit tam litteratus et doctus, qui audeat in laude vel servo suo dicere: dæmonem habes: sed cuilibet hoc dicere voluerit, non se aliter accipi, quam male dicere voluisse, dubitare non possit, "Now we, keeping to the language of scripture, according to which we are Christians, read of angels both good and bad, but never of good demons. ..... And the nations everywhere have so far followed this custom, that scarcely one of those even who are called Pagans, and who contend for the worship of many gods and demons, is so learned as to dare to praise even his own servant by saying to him: Thou hast a demon; not doubting but that to whomsoever he should think proper to say so, he would not be understood otherwise than as meaning to speak ill of him." Add cap. 14. p. 155. And such being the case, I consider it to be quite clear that the fact of any Platonist understanding, and explaining and commending the Christian dogma concerning angels is of little or no weight towards proving his attachment to the Christian religion. A little after the words we have hitherto been discussing, Chalcidius calls the evil genii *fallen angels;* which learned men take to be a sign of his being well versed in the language of scripture, as the same term occurs in the Epistle of Jude, ver. 6. and 2 Pet. ii. 4. But the words themselves show that it is altogether uncertain whether this Platonist borrowed the name from the sacred volume or from some other source; it being well known that malignant spirits were so designated by others also, besides Christian writers. I shall quote the very passage from cap. 7. sect. 134. p. 330. which seems to me to refute rather than assist those who make Chalcidius to have been a Christian: Hos quidam et hujusmodi dæmones proprie vocant *desertores angelos*, quibus nulla quæstio referenda est super nomine, "These and suchlike demons some properly call *fallen angels*, with whom no question is to be started in respect to the name."

eternal law. Under these three are rational souls, subject to that law, together with the ministerial powers, &c. So that the sovereign or supreme God commands, the second orders, and the

VI. The remaining arguments brought forward by learned men in proof of Chalcidius having been imbued with Christian principles, are of less moment. He makes mention, cap. 7. sect. 174. p. 343. of the *divine law*. Nos vero, says he, divinam legem sequentes, repetemus ab exordio, digesto ordine, quæ de fato Plato veritatis ipsius instinctu (ut mihi quidem videtur) loquutus est, "But we, following the divine law, shall repeat from the beginning, in digested order, what Plato, inspired (I consider) by truth itself, has said of fate." In these words they suppose the *divine law* to mean the *holy scripture*. Etiam hoc loco, says Fabricius, Christianum Chalcidius profitetur, refutatoque fato astrologico, divinam præfert legem, hoc est sacræ scripturæ de providentia divina res humanas moderante certissimam doctrinam, "Even in this passage Chalcidius professes himself to be a Christian, and having shown the fallacy of the astrological fate, prefers the divine law, that is, that most certain doctrine of scripture concerning divine providence controling human affairs." But I am either altogether mistaken, or the divine law in this passage by no means denotes sacred writ. In the first place, if what the illustrious scholar supposes were the case, Chalcidius' discourse would be manifestly foolish and absurd. For he would say this: Ego, viam mihi monstrantibus sacris litteris, Platonis de fato sententiam enarrabo, "Following the path pointed out by scripture, I shall explain Plato's opinion respecting fate." Let others, if they are able, inform us how Plato's doctrine of fate can be explained by the authority of scripture: to me it is altogether incomprehensible. Again, throughout the whole of this disputation on fate, he adduces not a single testimony from scripture in order to show and illustrate Plato's opinion. Hence, if the divine law meant the sacred writ of Christians, he would have said absolutely nothing, and would not have fulfilled his promise. Lastly, Chalcidius himself is his own best interpreter, and clearly indicates what he means by the divine law, sect. 175. p. 343. Sequitur hanc providentiam fatum: *divina lex* promulgata intelligentiæ sapienti modulamine ad rerum omnium gubernationem, "This providence is followed by fate, the divine law promulgated by the wise regulation of intelligence for the government of all things." And afterwards, sect. 178. p. 344. Talis est, opinor, etiam *lex* illa *cœlestis*, quæ fatum vocatur, sciscens hominibus honesta, prohibens contraria, "Such in my opinion is that heavenly law called fate, which points out things honourable to men, and prohibits the contrary." With Chalcidius then the *divine law* is *fate*; but fate, as far as it pertains to man, is nothing else with him but *right reason*, as the latter words show beyond all controversy, or the *law of nature*, by the light of which mortals know what is just and unjust. The meaning, therefore, of his words is this: Nos vero, recta sanaque ratione duce, Platonis de fato decreta explanabimus, "But we, with right reason for our guide, shall explain Plato's doctrine on fate."

VII. Lastly, it is reckoned also among the signs of Chalcidius' leaning to Christian tenets, that he sometimes appeals to the testimony of scripture. Cap. 13. sect. 275. p. 381. Quod autem cœlum, quamve terram *scriptura* loquatur, intelligendum, "But we must understand of what heaven or of what earth the scripture speaks." A little after: Aliud igitur verum cœlum, et aliud quiddam esse soliditatem, *scriptura* testatur, "Scripture therefore testifies that the true heaven is one thing, and solidity something else." They add also, that in the same place he calls Moses a prophet. For my part I consider neither of the two to be of any weight. Of Moses I have already spoken above. In my opinion, a man unquestionably may call Moses a prophet, and still not profess the Christian faith. And the word scripture is continually in the mouth even of those who openly repudiate Christ and his doctrine, when they are discussing matters pertaining to Christians. It occurs hundreds of times in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologica-politicus, and yet no one on that account would rank this man among Christians.—Such are the chief grounds upon which learned men profess themselves to be led to a favourable opinion of Chalcidius' religion. For my own part, conceding it to be manifest from them that this philosopher did not belong to the enemies of Christians and to the superstitious worshippers of many gods, still I deny that they are of sufficient weight to warrant us in placing him among the professors of the Christian faith.

In corroboration of this view, I shall now proceed to quote passages from Chalcidius'

third executes. But souls are subject to the law." Where Chalcidius, though seeming indeed rather more a Platonist than a Christian, yet acknowledgeth no such beings as Henades and

book, which are indicative of a man still struggling in the most intense darkness, and inculcating opinions altogether hostile to Christian precepts. In this class of opinions I shall by no means include those which, although deviating entirely from the rule of scripture, are nevertheless not thoroughly subversive of the very foundations of Christianity and were formerly espoused by men who are well known to have lived and died in the Christian faith. Of this kind is the dogma concerning the eternity of the world, of which in more passages than one he clearly indicates his approval. See cap. 1. sect. 23. p. 284. 285. Mundus sensilis, says he, among other things, est opus Dei: origo igitur ejus caussativa, non temporaria. Sic mundus, sensilis licet et corporeus, a Deo tamen factus atque institutus, æternus est, "The sensible world is the work of God: its origin therefore is causative not temporary. Thus the world, although sensible and corporeal, yet being made and produced by God, is eternal." In another passage, cap. 13. sect. 281. p. 383. the opinion of Aristotle, qui mundum dixit esse sine genitura et sine interitu, "who asserted the world to be without generation and without corruption," is affirmed by him to be, et nobilem et præclaram, et ad Platonici dogmatis considerationem satis accommodatam, "noble and excellent, and sufficiently accommodated to the consideration of the Platonic dogma." Such also are his opinions on souls migrating from one body to another, and passing through various bodies, cap. 7. sect. 195. p. 349. on souls existing before the bodies, cap. 9. sect. 172. p. 360. on the soul of the world, cap. 1. sect. 26. p. 285. on the souls of men being generated from the divine nature itself, cap. 1. sect. 23. p. 284. and the like. All these dogmas argue him to be ignorant of the genuine and unadulterated religion of Christ, and yet they do not prevent him from being a Christian in the sense above-mentioned. Wherefore we shall dismiss them entirely from this disputation, being determined to confine ourselves to those dogmas of his which will not admit of his being called a Christian even in the wider acceptation of the term.

In the first place, then, I hold it to be no slight confirmation of my opinion, that Chalcidius, while he so often quotes the testimony of the Jews, Solomon, Moses, never once appeals to any of the divine authors of the new covenant, although having numerous opportunities of doing so; that he in no one instance mentions the name of Christ; and lastly, that in writing to a Christian Doctor he does not let fall a single word indicative of his being a professor of the Christian faith. This philosopher was writing at a time when the Christian religion had prevailed over the gods of the nations, and was addressing his book to a man to whose keeping this religion was intrusted. Why therefore does he give not the slightest intimation of being a follower of those rites which at that time were sanctioned by the support of emperors? When a man has nothing whatever to lose, but every thing to hope, from declaring himself to be devoted to a certain religion, and moreover has excellent and various opportunities of testifying his sentiments, if, notwithstanding, he so acts as though he were altogether ignorant of that religion, he condemns himself by his own silence, and proves that he has no part nor share in it.

Another argument for thinking unfavourably of Chalcidius' religion is afforded by what he says in many places of the three principles of things: which I am the more anxious should be carefully attended to because Dr. Cudworth numbers this philosopher among those authors from whom we may learn the affinity existing between the Platonic and Christian Trinity. I shall first cite those passages on the subject that are more striking than the rest, and shall then offer some comments in illustration. The most remarkable one occurs cap. 7. sect. 174. p. 343. Principio cuncta, quæ sunt, et ipsum mundum contineri regique, principaliter quidem a summo Deo, qui est summum bonum, ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam, existimatione intellectuque melior, quam cuncta expetunt, quum ipse sit plenæ (probably plenus) perfectionis, et nullius societatis indigus: de quo plura dici nunc, exorbitare est: deinde a providentia, quæ est post illum summum secundæ eminentiæ, quam νοῦν Græci vocant. Est autem intelligibilis essentia æmulæ bonitatis propter indefessam ad summum Deum conversionem: estque ei ex illo bonitatis haustus, quo tam ipsa ornatur, quam cetera, quæ ipso auctore honestantur. Hanc igitur Dei voluntatem tamque sapientem tutelam rerum omnium Providentiam homines vocant, non, ut plerique existimant, ideo

Noes; but only three divine hypostases, and under them rational souls. But we shall conclude with the testimony of Theodoret in his book De Principio: Τὴν Πλάτωνος διάνοιαν ἀναπτύσσοντες

dictam, quia præcurrit in videndo atque intelligendo proventus futuros, sed quia proprium est divinæ mentis intelligere, qui est proprius mentis actus, et est mens Dei æterna. . . . . Sequitur hanc providentiam fatum. . . . . Obsequitur huic ea, quæ secunda mens dicitur, id anima mundi tripartita, ut supra comprehensum est: ut si quis periti legislatoris animam legem vocet, " In the first place, that all things in existence, and even the world itself, are contained and governed principally by the supreme God; who is the supreme good, transcending all substance and all nature, superior to thought and intellect, whom all things desire, as he is full of perfection, and in want of no society; of whom it is superfluous to say more at present: secondly, by providence, which is of the second eminence next to the supreme, which the Greeks call νοῦς. It is the intelligible essence of emulous goodness, because of an unwearied conversion to the supreme God; and it has from him a delibation of goodness, by which it is itself adorned, as well as other things, which are beautified by its agency. Therefore, this will of God and wise protection of all things, mankind call Providence, not, as most men suppose, because it goes before in seeing and understanding future events, but because to understand which is the proper action of mind, is a property of the divine mind, and is the eternal mind of God. . . . . This providence is followed by fate. . . . . And this is obeyed by what is called the second mind, that is the tripartite soul of the world, as is comprehended above; just as if any one should call law the soul of a wise legislator." Another passage, on precisely the same subject, occurs cap. 7. sect. 186. p. 346, 347. which I shall not quote here as it has already been given by Dr. Cudworth. The remaining sayings of the kind are much less copious and explicit than these, and therefore to avoid unnecessary prolixity, shall be passed over. Now these statements of Chalcidius respecting the three principles of things, if they do not prove him to have been totally opposed to the Christian religion, at least show us that he cannot with any justice be classed in the number of Christians properly so called. In the first place, it is an evidence of the badness of his cause that in discoursing of these principles, although he congratulates himself wonderfully upon the concurrence of the Hebrews, he never once mentions either the Christian Trinity, or the Son, or the Holy Ghost. This philosopher must have known that the Christians of that period asserted the dogmas of Plato on the three principles to be closely allied to their own doctrine on the three persons in the godhead, and that any one would necessarily gain great favour with most of them who should endeavour to prove and substantiate this affinity. Undoubtedly, therefore, had he been tinctured with Christian precepts, he would have availed himself of so favourable an opportunity to show that the doctrines taught by Plato were either the same as those inculcated by Christians, or at least very similar to them, especially as he scrupled not in so many passages to appeal to the testimony of the Jews in confirmation of Plato's opinions. As he does not do this, however, it certainly will warrant us in supposing him to have had not the least regard for the religion of Christians, or that most holy dogma of our discipline respecting the three persons in the divine nature. Again, these words of Chalcidius concerning three principles are evidence of a vast distinction between the Trinity of the Platonists of that period and that of the Christians; far different from what the learned Doctor imagines, who, contenting himself with one ambiguous passage, has neglected the much more perspicuous one which we have quoted. The Christians hold the three persons in their godhead to be equal to each other, in eternity as well as in nature and dignity. But Chalcidius, as is clear from the above passage, so disjoins and disconnects his three principles as entirely to destroy all equality between them. Of the first and second I shall speak presently, and shall now merely touch upon the third. This he asserts to be the second mind, the tripartite soul of the world, which obeys fate or the divine law. Consequently, this nature is altogether different from the two former, and is much inferior to them. For whilst the two former natures, the supreme God and his Providence or Reason, are unquestionably, according to the sense of Chalcidius, most simple, wholly devoid of all concretion and partition, and lastly, placed above

[8] Or rather De Principiis or Sermone secundo de Affection. Græcor. Curand. tom. 2. opp. p. 496.

ὁ Πλωτῖνος καὶ ὁ Νουμήνιος, τρία φασὶν αὐτὸν εἰρηκέναι ὑπέρχρονα καὶ ἀΐδια, τἀγαθὸν, καὶ νοῦν, καὶ τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ψυχὴν· ὃν μὲν ἡμεῖς Πατέρα καλοῦμεν, Τἀγαθον ὀνομάζοντα, Νοῦν δὲ ὃν

all matter and the world; the soul of the world, on the contrary, which is this third nature, in the first place is diffused through the universe and combined, as it were, with matter; secondly, is made and compounded by God out of many things, which is wholly inconsistent with perfection; and lastly is distributed, as it were into certain parts, which is altogether foreign to the simplicity of the Supreme Being and his mind. Chalcidius calls the soul of the world *tripartita*, and the sense in which he understood the phrase is clear from the following words, cap. 7. sect. 142. p. 333. At vero in substantia positum fatum *mundi anima est*, tripartita in ἀπλανῆ sphæram, inque eam, quæ putatur erratica, et in sublunarem tertiam: quarum elatum quidem ad superna dici Atropon, mediam Clotho, imam Lachesin: Atropon, quod aplanes in nulla sit deflexione; Clotho propter varie perplexam tortuosam vertiginem, qua proveniunt ea, quæ diversæ naturæ devius motus importat; Lachesin vero, quasi sortitam id munus, ut omnia prædictarum opera effectusque suscipiat, "But the fate placed in substance is the *soul of the world*, divided by a threefold division into the ἀπλανὴς sphere, and that which is supposed to be erratic, and the third or sublunary: of which the one elevated to the highest regions is called Atropos, the middle Clotho, and the lowest, Lachesis: Atropos, because the aplanes is subject to no deflexion; Clotho, on account of the variously perplexed and tortuous winding, from which proceed those things which the irregular motion of diversified nature produces; but Lachesis, from being, as it were, allotted the office of receiving all the works and effects of the aforementioned." If which were true, the universe would be inhabited not so much by one as by three souls, of a totally distinct nature. For as those three regions of the world here spoken of are altogether different in nature and constitution: so they each would require a soul distinct in office and nature from the other souls. This same soul of the world, Chalcidius having Plato for his guide tells us at great length, is concreted and compounded of the divisible and the indivisible, that is, of the essence of God himself, and of matter and the elements of things. Out of much that he says on the subject I shall here quote that portion in which he briefly explains both the dogma itself and its cause, cap. 1. sect. 33. p. 288. Ista ergo descriptio, quæ partium, ex quibus anima dicitur constare, geniturum seu *coagmentationem* delineat, ostendit, rationem animæ corporisque conjungi. Quippe corpus animalium quod inspiratur animi vigore, habet certe superficiem, habet etiam soliditatem. Quæ igitur cum vitali vigore penetratura erat tam superficiem, quam soliditatem, *similes soliditatis, similes etiam superficiei vires habere debuit, siquidem paria paribus congregantur*, "This description, therefore, which delineates the generation and *coagmentation* of the parts of which the soul is said to consist, shows that reason is united both with soul and body. For the body of animals which is inspired with the vigour of soul has surface and it has also solidity. Consequently, that which was to penetrate with vital vigour both the surface and solidity, necessarily had powers similar to the solidity, and similar also to the surface, since like combines with like." Now, no one, I imagine, who reads this, will venture to assert for the future that Chalcidius entertained sentiments on the Trinity similar to those of Christians, although in the passage here quoted by the learned Doctor, he applies the word *God* to each of his principles. For his third nature is separated by a vast interval from the two former ones. But lastly, it is not even certain whether Chalcidius' three Gods are three persons truly so called, or three principles, or merely three virtues of God, or three modes of conceiving and comprehending one and the same God. There are certainly those who maintain the latter opinion. The third principle, which he calls *fate*, and the *soul of the world*, I shall pass over for the present, and admit it to be a person: although Chalcidius himself tells us, cap. 7. sect. 142. p. 333. that there are some who deny that *providence* (that is, the second person of the divine nature) and *fate* are different, and maintain them to be one and the same. But what I shall now adduce prevents me saying the same of the second person. Our Platonist supposes the supreme God and first principle of all things to be devoid of both intelligence and will, as do Plotinus and the rest of that class, who affect subtleties they themselves are unable to unravel: of whom we have already spoken before. For he expressly states that he is *better than thought and intellect*: and a little afterwards calls the second person of the divine nature the *will* of God. Which have the same meaning as if he had declared explicitly: *The principal God*

ἡμεῖς Λόγον προσαγορεύομεν, τὴν δὲ τὰ πάντα ψυχοῦσαν καὶ ζωοποιοῦσαν δύναμιν, Ψυχὴν καλοῦντα, ἣν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον οἱ θεῖοι προσαγορεύουσι λόγοι· καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἑβραίων φιλο-

has neither intelligence nor will. But as no one can form a conception of a nature altogether destitute of *will* and *intelligence*, it is most probable that those Platonists who referred will and intelligence to the second person, and excluded them from the principal God, did not profess two distinct principles, but merely separated intelligence and will from the supreme God in thought, and considered him in a two-fold respect, first as a nature self-existent from all eternity and the best, and then as intelligent and having volition. Therefore, that mind of Chalcidius which he calls an *intelligible essence emulous of goodness*, will not be a person, but only a mode of considering God or a perfection separated from the divine nature in thought. Which opinion any one will much more readily estimate the probability of, who shall attentively examine the remarks made by us above on the custom common to Philo and the other Platonists, of speaking of things in the same way as of persons. Another consideration that induces me to regard Chalcidius' second principle not as a real person, but merely as a motion or divine virtue, is this, that he not only calls it *providence*, but also the *mind* of God. Now, the mind of God he defines in these words: Mens Dei est æternus actus de intelligendo, "The mind of God is an eternal act regarding understanding." or as Fabricius rightly expounds these words, "an eternal act of understanding." Neither providence, nor the mind of God, nor the eternal act of understanding signifies a person, but a thing rather and a virtue, which was in the supreme God from all eternity, and yet can in a certain way be separated from his nature in thought; as the mind of man and his act of understanding cannot in reality be separated from his nature. Moreover, our Platonist in another passage says, that the mind or intellect of God, and what Plato calls *idea*, are the same. Est enim hæc, says he, cap. 13. sect. 329. p. 398. posita inter naturam vere existentem constantem, eamdemque semper, nimirum ideam, quæ intellectus Dei æterni est æternus, et inter eam naturam, quæ est quidem, sed non eadem semper, id est, silvam, "For this is placed between the really existing nature, which is constant and always the same, namely, the *idea, which is the eternal intellect of the eternal God*, and that nature which is indeed, but not always the same, that is matter." But as is evident from numerous passages, Chalcidius did not hold the *idea* to be a person, but placed it in the mind and intelligence of the supreme Being. See sect. 337. p. 401, where he comments largely upon the *idea*, and says, among other things, juxta nos esse primum intelligibile, juxta Deum intellectum ejus, juxta silvam mensuram rerum corporearum, "that with respect to us it is the first intelligible, with respect to God his intellect, with respect to matter, the measure of corporeal things." If, therefore, the *idea* and the mind of God, or Chalcidius' second God differ in nothing but the name only, this second principle will not be a person, but merely a notion and divine virtue. Against all these things those who entertain a different opinion will scarcely be able to bring forward any thing except this one, that Chalcidius, notwithstanding, speaks explicitly of mind as of a person. But I have over and over again intimated and proved by examples that it was very customary with the Platonists after the example of their master to imitate the poetic style of speaking, and to personify notions and virtues.

One who holds the existence of more gods than one, ought undoubtedly to be excluded from the community of Christians, although he may suppose these gods to be inferior to the supreme Deity. Those vulgar and commentitious gods of ancient nations, such as Jupiter, Saturn, Mars, and the rest, as also the demi-gods and heroes, are openly repudiated by Chalcidius, see cap. 7. sect. 127. p. 326. This indeed exempts the man from the number of those whose minds were darkened by the deeper shades of superstition. But still, he acknowledges certain other gods, and sets up a second supreme Deity: for he represents the sun and stars not only as endowed with soul, but also as gods or divine natures. After speaking of the inconstancy apparent in the motions of the stars, he thus proceeds, cap. 5. sect. 76. p. 309. Quæ quidem inconstantia non ita, ut nobis videtur, provenit. Nulla enim in *divinis actibus* inconstantia: sed, ut ita videatur, fit exeo. Which inconstancy does not take place, as appears to us. For there is no inconstancy in divine acts: but its appearing so is occasioned by this," &c. The motions of the stars he scruples not to call *divine acts*. A little lower down, p. 310. he speaks of the sun in particular in these

σοφίας καὶ θεολογίας σεσύληται, "Plotinus and Numenius, explaining Plato's sense, declare him to have asserted three supertemporals or eternals, Good, Mind, or Intellect, and the Soul of

words: Fieri tamen non potest, ut contra *naturam suam divinitate preditum* fiat aliquid aut patiatur inordinatum, "It is, however, impossible for it to do or suffer any thing irregular, *contrary to its own divine nature.*" In another passage, cap. 7. sect. 129. p. 327. he says of the stars, prudentis naturæ esse ob æternam actum suorum constantiam, nulli pœnitudini obnoxias, "that they are of a prudent nature, by reason of the eternal constancy of their acts, and subject to no repentance." Having explained these and other things he goes on to demons, and declares them to be of a middle nature between the stars or the gods residing in the stars and men; whence it is again self-evident that he ranked the stars as gods. For what but gods are more excellent than the demons themselves? But it will be worth while to quote the very commencement of this disputation, as possessing no inconsiderable weight towards determining the present question, sect. 130. p. 328. Quare quum sit *divinum quidem et immortale genus animalium cœleste, siderum;* temporarium vero et occiduum passionique obnoxium terrenum,———necesse est, aliquod genus medium fore, quod tam cœlestis, quam terrenæ naturæ sit particeps, idque et immortale esse et obnoxium passioni. Talis porro natura dæmonum est, opinor, habens cum *divinitate* (stellis) consortium propter immortalitatem, habens etiam cum occiduis cognationem, "Wherefore, since the *celestial and starry race of animals are divine and immortal,* but the terrestrial temporary and perishable, and subject to passion,———there must needs be a certain middle race, partaking both of the celestial and terrestrial nature, and immortal as well as subject to passion. Such, moreover, I consider, is the nature of demons, having connexion with divinity (the stars) by reason of immortality, and also having affinity to the perishable." Chalcidius, therefore, counted as many gods as the heavens have stars. I shall add also what he records of the sun, from Plato, cap. 11. sect. 245. p. 368. Idem auctor (Plato) solem quidem simulacrum esse ait invisibilis Dei, oculum vero solis et solstitiale quiddam, ut sit eminens sol intelligibili mundo suus, huic similis in sensili globus iste ignitus lucifer, cujus simulacrum id lumen, quo illustratur visus animalium, "The same author (Plato) says that the sun indeed is the image of the invisible God, but the eye of the sun and a something solstitial, so that he is *his own eminent sun to the intelligible world;* similar to this in the sensible world is that fiery luminous globe, whose image is that light by which the sight of animals is illumined." Chalcidius, indeed, seems here to be merely explaining Plato's opinion: but no one can entertain a doubt of his having himself approved of it, as he adopts all Plato's decrees. Therefore, in the world which the Platonists call νοητὸς, or comprehensible to the mind, he supposes there is a certain *intelligible* sun, and that this is God, to which the sun that is visible to our eyes corresponds. For Plato's saying: *The sun is the image of the invisible God,* means, he tells us, that he is *his own eminent sun to the intelligible world:* which shows that he held that sun which he denominates *eminent* to be God.

That Chalcidius in several places notices and commends the arts of divination, I consider to be another sign of profane and unchristian principles. I am far from supposing that no one can ascribe any importance to divination and the science of things future, without repudiating the whole discipline of Christ: nor am I ignorant of there being many who place a great value on astrology, chiromancy, and other absurdities of the kind, and yet do not on that account abandon the Christian faith. But a man who is smitten with those modes of divination, which, prior to the birth of our Saviour, contributed not a little towards upholding the superstition prevalent among the Greeks and Romans, such as oracles, augaries, auspices, and not only attributes great virtue to them, but even supposes propitious demons to preside over them, cannot in any way, that I can understand, hold a place among those who are properly called followers of Christ. But such was our Chalcidius, as the following words of his will testify, cap. 7. sect. 183. p. 346. Aut enim alitum volatu, aut extis, aut oraculis homines præmonentur, prædicente *aliquo propitio dæmone,* qui sit eorum omnium, quæ deinceps sequuntur, socius: perinde ut si medicus juxta disciplinam medendi prædicat vel exitium vel sanitatem, "Mankind are forewarned either by the flight of birds, or by entrails, or by oracles, the prediction proceeding from a certain propitious

the universe; he calling that Tagathon, which to us is Father; that Mind or Intellect, which to us is Son or Word; and that Psyche, or a power animating and enlivening all things, which our Scriptures call the Holy Ghost. And these things (saith he) were by Plato purloined from the philosophy and theology of the Hebrews."

demon, who is associated with all those things that are to follow hereafter: just as if a physician according to the science of medicine should predict either death or recovery." He who considers that oracles, auguries, and auspices are not to be made light of, and tells us that a propitious demon exerts his own influence and virtue in these kinds of divination, attacks the very foundations of Christianity, to which nothing can be more opposed, and tacitly acknowledges that he is not displeased with the rites, ceremonies, and worship, by which the priests were accustomed to appease the demons presiding over oracles and divination. But this amounts to an approval of what constituted the very soul and vitality, as it were, of the pagan religion.

Lastly, if I shall make it appear that Chalcidius dissents from Moses, or what he supposes to be Moses' opinions, nay combats and refutes them, every one, I should imagine, will be convinced that he neither held Moses to be an author inspired by the supreme Being, nor his books to be divine. But to reject the divine authority of Moses is tantamount to making war against the first principles of the Christian religion. This I shall prove, therefore, by a clear and indisputable example. He commences an inquiry, cap. 13. sect. 298. p. 388. &c. into Plato's real opinion concerning matter. Towards the beginning of the disputation, however, he confesses that this question is an obscure and doubtful one, inasmuch as the Platonists are divided into a great variety of opinions on the subject. Wherefore he first enumerates the chief of these opinions, and among the rest reviews also the dogma, copiously discussed by us in another place, of those who maintain that Plato ascribed a twofold soul to the world, one a maleficent, turbulent, and disorderly soul, and therefore proper to matter. But this opinion, he tells us, was common also to the Hebrews or to Moses. Quibus, says he, Hebræi concinunt, quum dicunt, homini quidem a Deo datam esse animam ex inspiratione cœlesti, quam rationem atque animam rationalem appellant: mutis vero et agrestibus ex silva rationis expertem, jussu Dei, vivis animantibus et bestiis, terræ gremio profusis: quorum in numero fuerit etiam illa serpens, quæ primitias generis humani malis suasionibus illaqueaverit, "With whom the Hebrews agree when they say that to man a soul was given by God from heavenly inspiration, which they call reason and the rational soul: but to dumb animals and beasts of the field scattered over the bosom of the earth, by God's command, an irrational soul from matter: in the number of which was also that serpent, which by evil persuasion ensnared the first parents of the human race." If Chalcidius had believed the philosophy of the Hebrews to be entirely unexceptionable, and Moses to have been instructed by God himself, he would not have considered himself at liberty to dissent from this opinion, and to espouse another in opposition to it. This, however, he thinks proper to do, and not only asserts matter to be devoid of all soul, form, and quality, but even refutes this opinion of the Hebrews as he supposes along with others. Recta igitur, says he among other things, sect. 314. p. 392. nostra est opinio, neque ignem, neque terram, neque aquam, neque spiritum esse silvam; sed materiam principalem et corporis primam subjectionem, in qua non qualitas, non quantitas, non figura, non forma sit ex propria natura; sed virtute opificis hæc ei conjuncta et connexa sunt, ut ex his universo corpori et singillatim perfectio, et communiter varietas comparetur, "Our opinion, therefore, is right, that matter is neither fire, nor earth, nor water, nor spirit; but the principal material or first subject of body, in which there is not of its own nature, either quality, or quantity, or figure, or form: but by the virtue of the opificer these have been combined and connected with it, so as from them to give to body universally and individually a perfection and common variety.—From these considerations I am led to the opinion that Chalcidius is neither to be classed altogether among those who held the whole of the Christian religion in detestation and abhorrence, nor, on the other hand, among its genuine supporters, but is to be referred rather to that middle class of philosophers, who neither wholly liked nor disliked the Christians, but selected for themselves what seemed probable out of both religions, and constructed for themselves a peculiar philosophy on divine matters, founded, however, principally upon the authority of Plato.

Wherefore, we cannot but take notice here of a wonderful providence of almighty God, that this doctrine of a trinity of divine hypostases should find such admittance and entertainment in the pagan world, and be received by the wisest of all their philosophers, before the times of Christianity; thereby to prepare a more easy way for the reception of Christianity amongst the learned Pagans. Which that it proved successful accordingly, is undeniably evident from the monuments of antiquity. And the junior Platonists, who were most opposite and adverse to Christianity, became at length so sensible hereof, that besides their other adulterations of the Trinity before mentioned, for the countenancing of their polytheism and idolatry, they did in all probability, for this very reason, quite innovate, change, and pervert the whole Cabala, and no longer acknowledge a trinity, but either a quaternity, or a quinary, or more of divine hypostases; they first of all contending, that before the Trinity, there was another supreme and highest hypostasis, not to be reckoned with the others, but standing alone by himself. And we conceive the first innovator in this kind to have been Jamblichus, who in his Egyptian Mysteries,[7] where he seems to make the Egyptian theology to agree with his own hypothesis, writeth in this manner: Πρὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῶν, ἐστι θεὸς εἷς, πρῶτος καὶ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ καὶ βασιλέως· ἀκίνητος ἐν μονότητι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἑνότητος μένων· οὔτε γὰρ νοητὸν αὐτῷ ἐπιπλέκεται, οὔτε ἀλλό τι· παράδειγμα δὲ ἵδρυται τοῦ αὐτοπάτορος αὐτογόνου καὶ μονοπάτορος θεοῦ τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ· μεῖζον γάρ τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ πηγὴ τῶν πάντων, καὶ πυθμὴν τῶν νοουμένων πρώτων ἰδεῶν ὄντων· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ὁ αὐτάρκης θεὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐξέλαμψε, διὸ καὶ αὐτοπάτωρ καὶ αὐτάρκης· ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος καὶ θεὸς θεῶν· μονὰς ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς, προούσιος καὶ ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας, "Before those things, which truly are, and the principles of all, there is one God superior to the first God and king, immoveable,

[7] Sec. 8. cap. 2. p. 158. But the learned Doctor has not examined this passage of Jamblichus. For there is not the least mention in it of the Platonic doctrine of three principles of things, nor of one supreme and most simple God, which some of that sect placed above their three principles. Jamblichus speaks only of two principles or divine hypostases, one the most simple God who is superior to every thing that can be conceived, the other produced and generated from this God. From these two principles, he tells us, sprung the ethereal, empyrical, and celestial gods: Αὗται μὲν οὖν, says he, εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πρεσβύταται πάντων, ἃς Ἑρμῆς πρὸ τῶν αἰθερίων καὶ ἐμπυρίων θεῶν προτάττει καὶ ἐπουρανίων, "These, therefore, are the oldest principles of all, which Hermes places before the ethereal, empyrical, and celestial gods." But the modes of expression made use of by this philosopher in reference to the generation and origin of the second god from the first, very much resemble the phrases by which the Christian doctors of that period were accustomed to explain the eternal generation of the Son of God from the Father; as might easily be shown, if necessary, from many passages of St. Basil, St. Cyril, and others. Wherefore I am inclined to consider that Jamblichus borrowed both the thing itself which he was treating of concerning the generation of the second from the first god, and the phraseology which he employs, from the Christians, and imitated their doctrine in this as he did also in many other matters.

and always remaining in the solitude of his own unity; there being nothing intelligible, nor any thing else mingled with him; but he being the paradigm of that God truly good, which is self-begotten and his own parent. For this is greater, and before him, and the fountain of all things, the foundation of all the first intelligible ideas. Wherefore, from this one did that self-sufficient God, who is Autopator, or his own parent, cause himself to shine forth; for this is also a principle, and the God of gods, a monad from the first one, before all essence." Where, so far as we can understand, Jamblichus's meaning is, that there is a simple unity in order of nature, before that Tagathon, or monad, which is the first of the three divine hypostases. And this doctrine was afterwards taken up by Proclus, he declaring it in this manner:* Πανταχοῦ ὁ Πλάτων ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἐπὶ τὰς ἑνάδας ἀνατρέχειν εἴωθεν· μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατὰ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν πρὸ τοῦ πλήθους ἓν ἀεί ἐστι, καὶ πᾶσα θεία τάξις ἀπὸ μονάδος ἄρχεται· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριάδος προϊέναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὸν θεῖον, ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῆς τριάδος ἡ μονάς· ἔστω μὲν οὖν καὶ οἱ δημιουργικοὶ τρεῖς ἀλλά τις ὁ πρὸ τῶν τριῶν εἷς, οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν θείων τάξεων ἐκ πλήθους ἄρχεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τριάδος ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ τὸν δημιουργικὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μονάδος, "Plato every whereas cends from multitude to unity, from whence also the order of the many proceeds; but before Plato, and according to the natural order of things, one is before multitude, and every divine order begins from a monad. Wherefore, though the divine number proceed in a trinity, yet before this trinity must there be a monad. Let there be three demiurgical hypostases; nevertheless, before these must there be one, because none of the divine orders begins from multitude. We conclude, that the demiurgical number does not begin from a trinity, but from a monad, standing alone by itself before that trinity." Here Proclus, though endeavouring to gain some countenance for this doctrine out of Plato, yet, as fearing lest that should fail him, does he fly to the order of nature, and from thence would infer, that before the trinity of demiurgic hypostases, there must be a single monad or henad, standing alone by itself, as the head thereof. And St. Cyril of Alexandria, who was junior to Jamblichus, but senior to Proclus, seems to take notice of this innovation in the Platonic theology, as a thing then newly crept up, and after the time of Porphyry:† Ἀλλ' οἵ γε προειρημένοι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιλέγουσι, φάσκοντες μὴ δεῖν ΤΑ'ΓΑΘΟ'Ν συναριθμεῖν τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ· ἐξῄρησθαι γὰρ ἀπὸ πάσης κοινωνίας διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἁπλοῦν πάντη καὶ ἄδεκτόν τινος συμβάσεως· Ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ΝΟΥ (ἀρχὴ γὰρ οὗτος) τὴν τριάδα μίαν σωθῆναι, "But those before mentioned contradict this doctrine

* In Timæo, lib. 2. p. 93. † Contra Julian. lib. 8. p. 271.

(of Porphyrius and the ancient Platonists) affirming, that the Tagathon ought not to be connumerated or reckoned together with those which proceed from it, but to be exempted from all communion, because it is altogether simple, and incapable of any commixture or consociation with any other. Wherefore these begin their trinity with Nous or Intellect, making that the first." The only difference here is, that Jamblichus seems to make the first hypostasis of the trinity after a monad to be Tagathon, but St. Cyril, Nous. However, they both meant the same thing, as also did Proclus after them. Wherefore it is evident, that when, from the time of the Nicene Council and Athanasius, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity came to be punctually stated and settled, and much to be insisted upon by Christians, Jamblichus and other Platonists, who were great antagonists of the same, perceiving what advantage the Christians had from the Platonic trinity, then first of all innovated this doctrine, introducing a quaternity of divine hypostases, instead of a trinity, the first of them being not co-ordinate with the other three, nor consociated or reckoned with them; but all of them, though subordinate, yet universal, and such as comprehend the whole; that is, infinite and omnipotent; and therefore none of them creatures. For it is certain, that before this time, or the age that Jamblichus lived in, there was no such thing at all dreamed of by any Platonist, as an unity before and above the trinity, and so a quaternity of divine hypostases; Plotinus positively determining, that there could neither be more nor fewer than three; and Proclus himself acknowledging the ancient tradition, or Cabala, to have run only of three gods; and Numenius, who was senior to them both, writing thus of Socrates:* Τρεῖς θεοὺς τιθεμένου Σωκράτους, that he also (before Plato) "asserted three gods;" that is, three divine hypostases, and no more, as principles; therein following the Pythagoreans.[8]

* Euseb. Præp. Evang. lib. 14. cap. 5. [P. 728.]

[8] At what time this dogma of Proclus and others of the Platonic school, which acknowledges a supreme God above the divine Triad of the other Platonists, first made its appearance, and from what authors it sprung, I would by no means undertake to determine. I cannot agree, however, with the learned Doctor, who supposes it to have been invented by Platonists hostile to Christianity subsequently to the period of the Nicene Council. For at that time when the Christian religion was now every where flourishing, it is very improbable that Platonists would purposely pervert the ancient doctrine of their sect in order that it might not appear to have any thing in common with the precepts of Christians. For it was greatly to the interest of this sect that they should not seem to be totally at variance with the Christian discipline, which then reigned triumphant, and was supported by the authority of the most powerful potentates. For which very reason their principal masters and leaders, Hierocles, Themistius, and others, laboured with much greater diligence to accommodate their doctrines to the standard of the Christian religion than to show that the two disciplines were irreconcileably at variance. Of the doctrine now in question, however, there exist traces long prior to the time of Jamblichus and Proclus. I shall not now speak of Philo: who nevertheless, as I have already shown before, reckoned not three, but four divine natures: but

Moreover, the same Proclus, besides his Henades and Noes before mentioned, added certain other fantastic trinities of his own also; as this, for example, of the first essence, the first life, and the first intellect (to omit others), whereby that ancient

I shall produce a passage of Hermes preserved by St. Cyril of Alexander, in which I fancy I can discover that one God who is superior to the three secondary principles. *Λέγει δὲ καὶ Ἑρμῆς ἐν λόγῳ τρίτῳ τῶν πρὸς Ἀσκλήπιον· οὐ γὰρ ἐφικτόν ἐστιν εἰς ἀμνήτους τοιαῦτα μυστήρια παρέχεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τῷ νοῖ ἀκούσατε ἓν μόνον ἦν φῶς νοερὸν πρὸ φωτὸς νοεροῦ, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ νοῦς νοὸς φωτεινὸς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἦν, ἢ τούτου ἑνότης, αὐτοῦ ἑαυτῷ ὤν, ἀεὶ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ* ΝΩΙ῾, *καὶ* ΦΩΤΙ῾, *καὶ* ΠΝΕΥ῾ΜΑΤΙ *πάντα περιέχει*, "Hermes also says in the third discourse to Asclepius: It is impossible that such mysteries should be divulged to the rude and uninitiated; but hear in thy mind: There was only one intellectual light before intellectual light, and it is always mind of mind clear and luminous, nor was there any thing else than the unity of this, always existing in itself, always by its own mind, and light, and spirit embracing and containing all things;" Cyrillus, lib. 1. adv. Julian. p. 35. I would not assert that these words proceeded from Hermes himself: but no one, I imagine, who is acquainted with Hermes' writings, will doubt that this testimony is anterior to the age of Jamblichus. Now this Hermes, whoever he was, speaks of one most simple and supreme light, which he calls *νοῦς νοὸς*, "mind of mind." To this light he afterwards subjects three others, *νοῦς*, *φῶς*, and *πνεῦμα*, "mind, light," and "spirit," since he states that the supreme light governs and contains all things *by his mind, light*, and *spirit*. We have here, therefore, one God whom nothing surpasses, and three minor natures, to which he has entrusted the government and control of the world. To which doctrine the more eminent of the Platonists themselves do not seem to have been very averse. We have seen above that Plotinus, Porphyry, and Amelius imagined a twofold soul of the world, one celestial and remote from all matter, the other immersed in and diffused through matter. But they who dissect and divide the soul of the world into two natures, certainly differ very little if at all from those who place one supreme God over the three principles: both hold four principles, although they explain their notions of them in not one and the same manner. It must be owned, therefore, that this opinion did not spring either from Jamblichus after the Nicene period, or from Proclus, as Dion. Petavius, De Trinit. lib. 1. cap. 1. sec. 4. &c. p. 15. &c. supposes, but was many years anterior to these philosophers. Should any one ask me the cause of the Platonists coming to this opinion, my answer would be, that they were led to it by that immoderate love of subtleties and desire of expounding unknown things, which always characterized this sect. Let learned men, however, say whether they will be satisfied with what I am now about to adduce on this subject. In the first place the Platonists were certain of there being three demiurgic powers, as they called them, or three divine natures placed over the construction and government of this universe. But whatever makes, takes care of, protects, governs, and contains any thing, or contributes towards its construction and administration, must necessarily possess a certain power of understanding and operating. When the Platonists, therefore, raised themselves so high by their intellectual acumen as to inculcate that the Supreme Being is devoid of all intelligence, wisdom, care, and operation, which as we have more than once remarked, was done by many of them, it was a consequence of this opinion that they should separate him altogether from the control of the world, and remove him from the creative natures, which they however still held to be three. Again, there was an ancient opinion of the Egyptians and the oriental philosophers generally, which had been adopted by the Platonic sect, that the nature of the supreme Deity is so abstruse and recondite as not to admit of being discussed and explained by mortals. But of what they called the three *archical hypostases*, good, mind, and spirit, they had long ago been disputing, and still continued to do so every day. Wherefore that they might not seem to be inconsistent with themselves and to violate that primary doctrine of their master concerning the divine reason, they placed the nature of the Supreme Being above their three hypostases; and commanded their disciples to be silent rather than speak of it, as being wholly incomprehensible to mortals. I might perhaps, if I were so inclined, elicit other reasons from the interior recesses of the Platonic philosophy. But what is the use of enumerating all the reasons and causes of the absurd doctrines professed by the Platonic school?

Cabala and θεοπαράδοτος θεολογία, "theology of divine tradition," of "three archical hypostases," and no more, was disguised, perverted, and adulterated.

But besides this advantage from the ancient pagan Platonists and Pythagoreans, admitting a trinity into their theology, in like manner as Christianity doth (whereby Christianity was the more recommended to the philosophic Pagans), there is another advantage of the same extending even to this present time, probably not unintended also by divine providence; that whereas bold and conceited wits precipitantly condemning the doctrine of the trinity for nonsense, absolute repugnancy to human faculties, and impossibility, have thereupon some of them quite shaken off Christianity, and all revealed religion, professing only theism; others have frustrated the design thereof, by paganizing it into creature-worship or idolatry; this ignorant and conceited confidence of both may be returned, and confuted from hence, because the most ingenious and acute of all the Pagan philosophers, the Platonists and Pythagoreans, who had no bias at all upon them, nor any scripture revelation, that might seem to impose upon their faculties, but followed the free sentiments and dictates of their own minds, did notwithstanding not only entertain this trinity of divine hypostases eternal and uncreated, but were also fond of the hypothesis, and made it a main fundamental of their theology.

It now appears from what we have declared, that as to the ancient and genuine Platonists and Pythagoreans, none of their trinity of gods, or divine hypostases, were independent, so neither were they γενητοὶ θεοί, "creature gods," but uncreated; they being all of them not only eternal, and necessarily existent, and immutable, but also universal, that is infinite and omnipotent: causes, principles, and creators of the whole world. From whence it follows, that these Platonists could not justly be taxed for idolatry, in giving religious worship to each hypostasis of this their trinity. And we have the rather insisted so long upon this Platonic trinity, because we shall make use of this doctrine afterwards, in our defence of Christianity, where we are to show, that one grand design of Christianity being to abolish the pagan idolatry, or creature-worship, itself cannot justly be charged with the same from that religious worship given to our Saviour Christ, and the Trinity (the Son and Holy Ghost), they being none of them, according to the true and orthodox Christianity, creatures; however the Arian hypothesis made them such. And this was indeed the grand reason why the ancient fathers so zealously opposed Arianism, because that Christianity, which was intended by God Almighty for a means to extirpate pagan idolatry, was thereby itself paganized and idolatrized, and made highly guilty of that very thing which it

so much condemned in the Pagans, that is, creature-worship. This might be proved by sundry testimonies of Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nyssen, Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Hilary, Ambrose, Austin, Faustinus, and Cyril of Alexandria; all of them charging the Arians as guilty of the very same idolatry with the Gentiles or Pagans, in giving religious worship even to the Word and Son of God himself (and consequently to our Saviour Christ), as he was supposed by them to be but a creature. But we shall content ourselves here only to cite one remarkable passage out of Athanasius, in his fourth oration against the Arians:* *Διὰ τί οὖν οἱ Ἀρειομανῖται, τοιαῦτα λογιζόμενοι καὶ νοοῦντες, οὐ συναριθμοῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, καὶ γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι ὥσπερ οὗτοι τῇ κτίσει λατρεύουσι παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα τὰ πάντα Θεόν——εἰ δὲ οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύουσιν, οὗτοι δὲ ἑνὶ γενητῷ καὶ ἀγενήτῳ, οὐδ' οὕτω διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· ὅ τε γὰρ παρ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενος εἷς γενητὸς ἐκ πολλῶν ἐστι, καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ πάλιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ἑνὶ τούτῳ φύσιν ἔχουσι, καὶ οὕτως γὰρ κἀκεῖνοι κτίσματά εἰσιν· ἄθλιοι καὶ πλέον ὅσον ἐβλάβησαν κατὰ Χριστοῦ φρονοῦντες· ἐξέπεσον γὰρ τῆς ἀληθείας· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ἰουδαίων προδοσίαν ὑπερέβησαν ἀρνούμενοι τὸν Χριστόν· τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι συγκυλίονται, κτίσμασι καὶ διαφόροις θεοῖς λατρεύοντες οἱ θεοστυγεῖς,* "Why therefore do not these Arians, holding this, reckon themselves amongst the Pagans or Gentiles, since they do in like manner worship the creature, besides the Creator? For though the Pagans worship one uncreated and many created gods, but these Arians only one uncreated, and one created, to wit, the Son or Word of God; yet will not this make any real difference betwixt them; because the Arians' one created is one of those many pagan gods; and those many gods of the Pagans or Gentiles, have the same nature with this one, they being alike creatures. Wherefore these wretched Arians are apostates from the truth of Christianity, they betraying Christ more than the Jews did, and wallowing or tumbling in the filth of pagan idolatry; worshipping creatures, and different kinds of gods." Where, by the way, we may take notice, that when Athanasius affirmeth of the Arians, what St. Paul doth of the Pagans, that they did *τῇ κτίσει λατρεύειν παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα*, his meaning could not well be, that they worshipped the creature more than the Creator; forasmuch as the Arians constantly declared, that they gave less worship to Christ the Son or Word of God, he being by them accounted but a creature, than they did to the Father the Creator; but either that they worshipped the creature besides the Creator, or the creature instead of the Creator, or in the

* Pages 468, 469.

room of him, who was alone of right to be religiously worshipped. Again, when the same Athanasius declareth that the Greeks, Gentiles, or Pagans, did universally worship ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, "only one uncreated," he seems to imply that the Platonic trinity of hypostases, affirmed by him to be all uncreated, were by them looked upon only as one entire divinity.[9]

But the principal things which we shall observe from this passage of Athanasius, and those many other places of the fathers where they parallel the Arians with the Pagans, making the former guilty of the very same idolatry with the latter, even then, when they worshipped our Saviour Christ himself, or the Word and Son of God, as he was by them supposed to be nothing but a creature, are these following; first, that it is here plainly declared by them, that the generality of the Pagans did not worship a multitude of independent gods, but that only one of their gods was uncreated or self-existent, and all their other many gods looked upon by them as his creatures. This, as it is expressly affirmed by Athanasius here, that the Greeks or Pagans did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ καὶ πολλοῖς γενητοῖς λατρεύειν, "worship only one uncreated and many created gods;" so is it plainly implied by all those other forementioned fathers, who charge the Arians with the guilt of Pagan idolatry: because, had the Pagans worshipped many uncreated and independent gods, it would not therefore follow, that the Arians were idolators, if the Pagans were. But that this was indeed the sense of the fathers, both before and after the Nicene council, concerning the Pagan polytheism and idolatry, that it consisted not in worshipping many uncreated and independent gods, but only one uncreated and many created, hath been already otherwise manifested; and it might be further confirmed by sundry testimonies of them; as this of St. Gregory Nazianzen in his thirty-seventh oration;[10] Τί δαί; οὐχὶ καὶ παρ' Ἕλλησι, φαῖεν ἄν, Μία Θεότης; ὡς οἱ τὰ τελεώτερα παρ' ἐκείνοις Φιλοσοφοῦντες, "What then, would some say, is there not one divinity also amongst the Pagans, as they who philosophize more fully and perfectly amongst them, do declare?" And that full and remarkable one of Irenæus,[1]

[9] We have already more than once repeated what will be sufficient in explanation of this subject.

[10] Page 601. tom. 1. opp.

[1] Either a too great partiality for the opinion he had himself adopted or a lapse of memory at the time of writing, has caused the learned Doctor to exhibit this passage of Irenæus differently from the reading of all the editions. Irenæus' own words, as they stand in the Latin version, are these: Illi enim creaturæ potius, quam creatori, servientes, et his, qui non sunt Dii, verumtamen primum deitatis locum attribuunt fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo, "For they, serving the creature and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator, did notwithstanding attribute the first place of the deity to God the maker of this universe." The passage, if read even in this manner, is not a little calculated to prove the learned Doctor's position; still it is less so than it would be, were it such as he has here given it.

where he plainly affirmeth of the Gentiles:* "Ita creaturæ potius quam Creatori serviebant, et his qui non sunt dii, ut primum deitatis locum attribuerent uni alicui et summo fabricatori hujus universitatis Deo, "That they so served the creature, and those who are not gods, rather than the Creator; that notwithstanding they attributed the first place of the Deity to one certain supreme God, the maker of this universe." The second thing is, that Athanasius, and all those other orthodox fathers who charged the Arians with pagan idolatry, did thereby plainly imply, those not to be incapable of idolatry who worship one sovereign Numen, or acknowledge one supreme Deity, the maker of the whole world; since not only the Arians unquestionably did so, but also, according to these fathers, the very Pagans themselves. The third thing is, that in the judgment of Athanasius, and all the orthodox Anti-Arian fathers, to give religious worship to any created being whatsoever, though inferior to that worship which is given to the supreme God, and therefore according to the modern distinction, not λατρεία, but δουλεία, is absolutely idolatry. Because it is certain, that the Arians gave much an inferior worship to Christ, the Son or Word of God, whom they contended to be a mere creature, made in time, mutable and defectible, than they did to that eternal God who was the Creator of him. As those fathers imply the Pagans themselves to have given much an inferior worship to their πολλοὶ γενητοὶ θεοὶ, their "many gods," whom themselves looked upon as creatures, than they did ἑνὶ ἀγενήτῳ, to that "one uncreated God."

Now if the Arians, who zealously contended for the unity of the Godhead, were nevertheless by the fathers condemned as guilty of idolatry, for bestowing but an inferior kind of religious worship upon Christ, the Son or Word of God himself, as he was supposed by them to be a creature; then certainly cannot they be excused from that guilt who bestow religious worship upon these other creatures, angels and souls of men, though inferior to what they give to the supreme omnipotent God, the Creator of all. Because the Son or Word of God, however conceived by these Arians to be a creature, yet was looked upon by them as the first, the most glorious, and most excellent of all creatures, and that by which, as an instrument, all other creatures, as angels and souls, were made; and therefore, if it were idolatry in them to give an inferior kind of religious worship to this Son and Word of God himself, according to their hypothesis, then can it not possibly be accounted less, to bestow the same upon those other creatures made by him as angels and men deceased. Besides which, the Word and Son of God, however

* Lib. 2. cap. 9. [Page 129. Edit. Grabii, p. 126. Edit. Massueti.]

supposed by these Arians to be a creature, yet was not really such; and is in scripture unquestionably declared to be a true object of religious worship ("Worship him, all ye gods;") so that the Arians, though formally idolators, according to their own false hypothesis, yet were not materially and really so: whereas these religious angel and saint worshippers must be as well materially as formally such. And here it is observable, that these ancient fathers made no such distinction of religious worship, into Latria, as peculiar to the supreme God, it being that whereby he is adored as self-existent and omnipotent, or the Creator of all; and Doulia, such an inferior religious worship as is communicable to creatures; but concluded of religious worship universally, and without distinction, that the due object of it all was the Creator only, and not any creature. Thus Athanasius plainly in his third oration: *Εἰ γὰρ ὡς τῇ δόξῃ ὑπερέχων προσεκυνεῖτο, ἔδει καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποδεδεηκότων τὸν ὑπερέχοντα προσκυνεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐστιν οὕτως, κτίσματι γὰρ κτίσμα οὐ προσκυνεῖ, ἀλλὰ κτίσμα θεόν,* "If the Son or Word of God were to be worshipped (though a creature) because transcending us in glory and dignity, then ought every inferior being to worship what is superior to it: whereas the case is otherwise; for a creature doth not religiously worship a creature, but only God the Creator." Now they who distinguish religious worship into Latria and Doulia, must needs suppose the object of it in general to be that which is superior to us, and not the Creator only; which is here contradicted by Athanasius. But because it was objected against these orthodox fathers by the Arians, that the humanity of our Saviour Christ, which is unquestionably a creature, did share in their religious worship also; it is worth the while to see what account Athanasius gives of this:* *Οὐ κτίσμα προσκυνοῦμεν, μὴ γένοιτο· Ἑθνικῶν γὰρ καὶ Ἀρειανῶν ἡ τοιαύτη πλάνη· ἀλλὰ τὸν Κύριον τῆς κτίσεως σαρκωθέντα τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ Λόγον προσκυνοῦμεν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ σὰρξ αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν κτισμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦ γέγονε σῶμα, καὶ οὔτε τὸ τοιοῦτον σῶμα καθ' ἑαυτὸ, διαιροῦντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου, προσκυνοῦμεν, οὔτε τὸν Λόγον προσκυνῆσαι θέλοντες, μακρύνομεν αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς· ἀλλ' εἰδότες τὸ, ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο, τοῦτον καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενον ἐπιγινώσκομεν θεόν,* "We give no religious worship to any creature, far be it from us; for this is the error of the Pagans and of the Arians: but we worship the Word of God, the Lord of the creation incarnated. For though the flesh of Christ, considered alone by itself, were but a part of the creatures, nevertheless was it made the body of God. And we neither worship this body by itself alone, divided from the Word, nor yet intending to worship the Word,

* Ad. Adelph. page 157. [Tom. 1. opp.]

do we remove it at a great distance from this flesh; but knowing that of the scripture, 'the Word was made flesh,' we look upon this Word even in the flesh as God." And again to the same purpose:* Καὶ γινωσκέτωσαν, ὅτι τὸν Κύριον ἐν σαρκὶ προσκυνοῦντες, οὐ κτίσματι προσκυνοῦμεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν κτίστην, ἐνδυσάμενον τὸ κτιστὸν σῶμα, "Let these Arians know at length, that we who worship the Lord in flesh, worship no creature, but only the Creator clothed with a creaturely body." And for the same cause was it, that Nestorius afterwards, dividing the Word from the flesh, the divinity of Christ from the humanity, and not acknowledging such an hypostatic union betwixt them as he ought, but nevertheless religiously worshipping our Saviour Christ, was therefore branded by the Christian church with the name of Ἀνθρωπολάτρης, "a man-worshipper," or "idolator." To conclude, they who excuse themselves from being idolators no otherwise, than because they do not give that very same religious worship to saints and angels which is peculiar to God Almighty, and consists in honouring him as self-existent, and the Creator of all things, but acknowledge those others to be creatures; suppose that to be necessary to idolatry which is absolutely impossible, viz., to acknowledge more omnipotents, as creators of all, than one, or to account creatures as such creators; as they imply all those to be incapable of idolatry who acknowledge one supreme God the Creator of the whole world: which is directly contradictious to the doctrine of the ancient church.

Hitherto in way of answer to an atheistic objection against the naturality of the idea of a God, as including oneliness in it, from the pagan polytheism, have we largely proved, that at least the civilized and intelligent Pagans generally acknowledged one sovereign Numen; and that their polytheism was partly but fantastical, nothing but the polyonymy of one supreme God, or the worshipping him under different names and notions, according to his several virtues and manifestations; and that though, besides this, they had another natural and real polytheism also; yet this was only of many inferior or created gods, subordinate to one supreme ἀγένητος, or "uncreated."

Which, notwithstanding, is not so to be understood, as if we did confidently affirm that opinion of many independent deities never to have so much as entered into the mind of any mortal. For since human nature is so mutable and depravable as that, notwithstanding the connate idea and prolepsis of God in the minds of men, some unquestionably do degenerate and lapse into atheism, there can be no reason why it should be thought absolutely impossible for any ever to entertain that false conceit of more independent deities. But as for independent gods in-

* Page 160.

visible, we cannot trace the footsteps of such a polytheism as this any where, nor find any more than a ditheism, of a good evil principle; only Philo and others seem to have conceived, that amongst the ancient Pagans, some were so grossly sottish as to suppose a plurality of independent gods visible, and to take the sun, and moon, and all the stars for such. However, if there were any such, and these writers were not mistaken, as it frequently happened, it is certain that they were but very few; because, amongst the most barbarian Pagans at this day, there is hardly any nation to be found without an acknowledgment of a sovereign Deity, as appears from all those discoveries which have been made of them since the improvement of navigation.

Wherefore, what hath been hitherto declared by us, might well be thought a sufficient answer to the forementioned atheistic objection against the idea of God. Notwithstanding which, when we wrote the contents of this chapter, we intended a further account of the natural and real polytheism of the Pagans, and their multifarious idolatry, chiefly in order to the vindication of the truth of Christianity against Atheists; forasmuch as one grand design hereof was unquestionably to destroy the pagan polytheism and idolatry, which consisted in worshipping the creature besides the Creator.

But we are very sensible, that we have been surprised in the length of this chapter, which is already swelled into a disproportionate bigness; by means whereof we cannot comprehend, within the compass of this volume, all that belongs to the remaining contents, together with such a full and copious confutation of the atheistic grounds, as was intended. Wherefore we shall here divide the chapter, and reserve those remaining contents, together with a further confutation of atheism, if need be, for another volume, which, God affording life, health, and leisure, we intend shall follow. Only subjoining, in the mean time, a short and compendious confutation of all the atheistic arguments proposed.

CHAPTER V.

SECTION I.

1. THE first atheistic argument, that there is no idea of God. That in answer to this, the idea of God hath been already declared; viz. a perfect, understanding Being, unmade, or self-existent from eternity, and the cause of all other things. In which, nothing inconceivable nor contradictious. That these confounded Atheists themselves, who deny, that there is any idea of God at all, must notwithstanding, of necessity, suppose the contrary; because otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing. And that they agree also with Theists in the same idea; the one denying the existence of that which the other asserteth, that an understanding Nature is the original of all things. This idea of God, as containing oneliness and singularity in it, not only largely defended and made good against that objection from the pagan polytheism; but also proved, that the generality of mankind have a natural prolepsis or "anticipation" in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a Being. Atheists but monsters and anomalies of mankind. This a sufficient confutation of the first atheistic argument. 2. Nevertheless, that Atheists may not pretend any of their strength to be concealed, all their particular exceptions against the idea of God here declared, being five. Their first exception, that we can have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to sense; much less any evidence of the existence thereof. The answer. First, that whereas the atheists suppose sense to be the only knowledge, or at least original knowledge; sense, as such, is not knowledge or understanding; because if it were, then every one that sees light and colours, or feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold. Plainly proved also from that atomic philosophy (which the Epicurean atheists so much pretend to) that there is a higher faculty of the soul, which judges of sense, detects the fantastry thereof, resolves sensible things into intelligible principles, &c. No passion able to make a judgment, either of itself or of other things. The confounded Democritus himself sometimes acknowledged sense to be but seeming and fantasy, and not to reach to the absolute truth and reality of things. He therefore exploded qualities out of the rank of entities, because unintelligible; concluding them to be but our own fantasms. Undeniably evident, that we have ideas, notions, and thoughts of many things, that never were in sense, and whereof we have no genuine fantasms. Atheists attend not to their own cogitations. That opinion, that there is nothing in the understanding which was not before in sense, false and atheistical. Men having a notion of a perfect, understanding Being, the cause of all things, as the object of their devotion; the Atheists, notwithstanding, would here persuade them that they have none, and that the thing is a nonentity, merely because they have no sensible idea, or fantasm thereof. And so may they as well prove, not only reason and understanding, appetite and volition, to be nonentities, but also fancy and sense itself; neither of these falling under sense, but only the objects of them. Were God indeed corporeal, as some

mistaken Theists suppose, yet his essence chiefly consisting in mind and understanding, this of him could not possibly be subject to sense. But that there is also substance incorporeal, which therefore in its own nature is insensible, and that the Deity is such, will be elsewhere demonstrated. 3. Though the evidence of singular bodies existing depend upon the information of sense, yet the certainty of this very evidence, not from sense alone, but a complication of reason and understanding with it. Sense fantastical, not reaching to the absolute truth of things, and obnoxious to delusion. Our own imaginations, taken for sensations and realities in sleep, and by melancholized persons when awake. Atomic Atheists themselves assert the existence of such things as they have no sense of; atoms, membranes, or exuvious images of bodies, nay incorporeal space. If the existence of nothing, to be acknowledged, which falls not under sense, then not the existence of soul and mind. God the great mind that rules the whole universe; whence our imperfect minds derived. The existence of that God whom no eye can see, demonstrated by reason from his effects. 4. The second atheistic pretence against the idea of God, and his existence, from Theists' own acknowledging him to be incomprehensible; from whence they infer him to be a non-entity. Here perhaps it may be granted, in a right sense, that whatsoever is altogether inconceivable, is either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. How that of Protagoras, that every man is the measure of all things to himself, in his sense false. Whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot clearly comprehend, not therefore to be presently expunged out of the catalogue of beings. Nevertheless, according to Aristotle, the soul and mind in a manner all things. This a crystalline globe, or notional world, that hath some image in it of whatsoever is contained in the real globe of being. 5. But this absolutely false, that whatsoever cannot be fully comprehended by us is therefore utterly inconceivable and consequently nothing. For we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, nor have such an adequate conception of any substance as perfectly to master and conquer the same. That of the sceptics so far true, that there is something incomprehensible in the essence of every thing, even of body itself. Truth bigger than our minds. Proper to God Almighty (who alone is wise) perfectly to comprehend the essences of all things. But it follows not from hence, that therefore we have no idea nor conception at all of any thing. We may have a notion or idea of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same by our imperfect minds, as we may see and touch a mountain, though we cannot enclasp it all round within our arms. This therefore a false theorem of the Atheists, that what cannot be fully comprehended by men's imperfect understandings, is an absolute non-entity. 6. Though God more incomprehensible than other things, because of his transcendent perfection, yet hath he also more of conceptibility: as the sun, dazzling our sight, yet hath more of visibility also than any other object. The dark incomprehensibility of the Deity, like the azure obscurity of the transparent ether, not any thing absolutely in itself, but only relative to us. 7. This incomprehensibility of the Deity, so far from being an argument against its existence, that certain, on the contrary, were there nothing incomprehensible to our imperfect minds, there could be no God. Every thing apprehended by some internal congruity. The scantness and imperfection of our narrow understandings must needs make them asymmetral or incommensurate to what absolutely perfect. 8. Nature itself intimates, that there is something vastly bigger than our mind and thoughts, by those passions implanted in us, of devout

veneration, adoration, and admiration, with ecstacy and pleasing horror. That of the Deity, which cannot enter into the narrow vessels of our minds, must be otherwise apprehended, by their being plunged into it, or swallowed up and lost in it. We have a notion or conception of a perfect Being, though we cannot fully comprehend the same; because ourselves being imperfect, must needs be incommensurate thereunto. Thus no reason at all, in the second atheistic pretence, against the idea of God, and his existence, from his confessed incomprehensibility. 9. The third follows, that infinity, supposed to be essential to the Deity, is a thing perfectly inconceivable, and therefore an impossibility and nonentity. Some passages of a modern writer to this purpose. The meaning of them. That there is nothing of philosophic truth in the idea or attributes of God, nor any other sense in the words, than only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own minds. That the word infinite signifies nothing in the thing itself so called, but only the inability of our understandings and admiration. And since God, by Theists, is denied to be finite, but cannot be infinite, therefore an inconceivable nothing. Thus another learned well-willer to atheism, that we have no idea of infinite, and therefore not of God. Which, in the language of Atheists, all one as to say, that he is a nonentity. Answer. This argument, that there can be nothing infinite, and therefore no God, proper to the modern and neoteric Atheists only; but repugnant to the sense of the ancients. Anaximander's ἄπειρον, "infinite matter," though Melissus' ἄπειρον, "the true Deity." Formerly both Theists and Atheists agreed in this, that there must be something or other infinite, either an infinite mind or infinite matter. The ancient Atheists also asserted a numerical infinity of worlds. Thus do Atheists confute or contradict Atheists. 10. That the modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason also, and their very selves, than they do their predecessors, when they would disprove a God from hence, because there can be nothing infinite. For first, certain, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal without beginning: because if there had been once nothing, there could never have been any thing. But hardly any Atheists can be so sottish, as in good earnest to think there was once nothing at all, but afterwards senseless matter happened to be. Notorious impudence in them who assert the eternity of matter, to make this an argument against the existence of a God, because infinite duration without beginning an impossibility. 11. A concession to the Atheists of these two things; that we neither have a fantasm of any infinite, because there was never any in sense; and that infinity is not fully comprehensible by finite understandings neither. But since, mathematically certain, that there was something infinite in duration, demonstrated from hence, against Atheists, that there is something really existing, which we have neither any fantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend in our minds. 12. Further granted, that as for infinity of number, magnitude, and time, without beginning; as we have no fantasm, nor full comprehension of them, so have we neither any intelligible idea, notion, or conception: from whence it may be concluded, that they are nonentities. Number infinite in Aristotle, only in a negative sense, because we can never come to an end thereof by addition. For which very reason also there cannot possibly be any number positively infinite, since one or more may always be added. No magnitude so great neither but that a greater may be supposed. By infinite space, to be understood nothing but a possibility of more and more body, further and further infinitely, by divine power; or that the world could never be made so great, as

that God was not able to make it still greater. This potential infinity, or indefinity of body, seems to be mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Lastly, no infinity of time past, because then there must needs be time past, which never was present. An argument of a modern writer. Reason therefore concludes, neither world, nor time, to have been infinite in past duration. 13. Here will the Atheist think he has got a great advantage for disproving the existence of a God; they who thus take away the eternity of the world, taking away also the eternity of a God. As if God could not be eternal otherwise, than by a successive flux of infinite time. 14. But we say, that this affordeth a demonstration of a God; because, since both the world and time had a beginning, there must of necessity be something whose duration is not successive, but permanent, which was the Creator of them both. Wherefore the Atheists can here only make grimaces, and quibble upon nunc-stans; as if this standing eternity of the Deity was nothing but a pitiful moment of time standing still; and as if all duration must needs be the same with ours, &c. 15. Concluded, that infinite and eternal are not words which signify nothing in the thing itself, but only the idle progress of our minds, or our own ignorance, stupid astonishment, and veneration; not mere attributes of honour and compliment, but attributes belonging to the Deity (and that alone), of the most philosophic truth. And though we have no adequate comprehension thereof, yet must we have some notion of that, which we can demonstrate to belong to something. 16. But the thing which the Atheists principally quarrel with is infinite power or omnipotence; which they pretend also to be utterly inconceivable, and impossible, and a name of nothing. Where indeed our modern Atheists have the joint suffrage of the ancients also, who concerned themselves in nothing more than disproving omnipotence, or infinite power. 17. This omnipotence, either wilfully or ignorantly misrepresented by Atheists, as if it were a power of doing things contradictious. An irony of a modern Atheist, that God could turn a tree into a syllogism. The absurd doctrine of Cartesius, that God could have made twice two not to have been four; or the three angles of a triangle not to have been equal to two right. This to make one attribute of the Deity devour and destroy another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. To suppose God to understand and be wise only by will, really to give him no understanding at all. God not so omnipotent as that he can destroy the intelligible natures of things; which were to baffle and befool his own wisdom. Infinite power, that which can do all that is possible; that is, conceivable, or implies no contradiction. The very essence of possibility, conceptibility. And thus all the ancient Theists. Absurd for Atheists to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable. 18. But because Atheists look upon infinity as such a mormo, we shall take off the vizard from it, by declaring, that it is really nothing else but perfection. Infinite understanding and knowledge, perfect understanding, without any defect, and the knowledge of all things knowable. Infinite power, perfect power, or a power of doing all things possible. Infinite duration, perfection of essence. Because infinity, perfection; therefore nothing which includeth any thing of imperfection in the essence of it, can be truly and properly infinite; as number, magnitude, and time: all which can but counterfeit infinity. Nothing one way infinite, which is not so every way, or a perfect being. 19. Now, that we have an idea of perfection, plain from that of imperfection. Perfection first in order of nature, as the rule and measure. This not the want of imperfection, but imperfection the want

of perfection. A scale, or ladder of perfections in nature, perceived by means of that idea which we have of a being absolutely perfect, the measure of them. Without which, we could not take notice of imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense of. Boëthius, that whatsoever is imperfect in any kind, implies something in that kind perfect from whence it was derived. And that the nature of things took not beginning from any thing incomplete and imperfect; but descended downward, from what was absolutely perfect, by steps and degrees, lower and lower. 20. Wherefore, since infinite the same with perfect, we having a notion of the latter must needs have of the former. And though the word infinite be negative, yet is the sense positive. Finite the negation of infinite, as which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite of finite. However, in things incapable of true infinity, infinity being here a mere imaginary thing and nonentity, can be only conceived by the negation of finite, as nothing is, by the negation of something. An infinite being nothing but a perfect being, such as never was not, and could produce all things possible or conceivable. 21. The fourth atheistic pretence against the idea of God, that it is an arbitrarious compilement of contradictious notions. Where first we deny not, but that as some religionists extend the divine power to things contradictious, so may others compound contradictions together in the nature of the Deity. But it does not follow from thence, that theology itself is therefore contradictious, no more than that philosophy is so, because some philosophers also hold contradictious things; or that nothing is absolutely true, neither in divinity nor philosophy, but all seeming and fantastical; according to the Protagorean doctrine. 22. But though it be true, that whatsoever really implies a contradiction, is a nonentity; yet is this rule obnoxious to much abuse, when whatsoever men's shallow understandings cannot reach to, is therefore presently cried down by them as an impossibility, or nothing. As when the Atheists, and Materialists, explode incorporeal substance upon this pretence; or make it only an attribute of honour, expressing the veneration of men's minds, but signifying nothing in nature, nor having any philosophic truth. But the Atheists' true meaning in this objection, and what kind of contradictions they are, which they impute to all theology, may appear from a passage of a modern writer: namely such as these; when God is said to perceive sensible things, and yet to have no organs of sense; as also to understand, and yet to have no brains. The undisguised meaning of the writer, that religion is not philosophy, but law, and all mere arbitrary constitution; nor God a subject of philosophy, as all real things are; he being no true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but only of men's brains and fancies; and his attributes signifying neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion, towards what they fear. And so may any thing be said of God, no matter what, so it be agreeable to civil law. But when men mistake attributes of honour for attributes of philosophic truth; that is, when they will suppose such a God really to exist; then is all absurd nonsense and contradiction. God's understanding without brains, no contradiction. 23. Certain, That no simple idea, as of a triangle, or a square, can be contradictious to itself; much less can the idea of a perfect Being, the most simple of all. This indeed pregnant of many attributes, which, if contradictious, would render the whole a nonentity; but all the genuine attributes of the Deity, as demonstrable of a perfect Being, as the properties of a triangle, or a square; and therefore can neither be contradictious to it, nor one another. Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, not only not contradictious,

but also all necessarily connected together. In truth all the attributes of the Deity, but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same perfect Being, taken into our minds, as it were by piecemeal. 24. The idea of God, neither fictitious, nor factitious. Nothing arbitrarious in it; but a most natural and simple idea, to which not the least can be added, nor any thing detracted from it. Nevertheless, may there be different apprehensions concerning God; every one that hath a notion of a perfect Being, not understanding all that belongeth to it; no more than of a triangle, or of a sphere. Concluded therefore, that the attributes of God, no confounded nonsense of religiously astonished minds huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and complement; but the attributes of necessary philosophic truth; and such as do not only speak the devotion of men's hearts, but also declare the real nature of the thing. Here the wit of a modern atheistic writer ill placed. (Though no doubt but some either out of superstition, or ignorance, may attribute such things to the Deity, as are incongruous to its nature.) Thus the fourth atheistic pretence againt the idea of God, confuted. 25. In the next place, the Atheists think themselves concerned, to give an account of this unquestionable phenomenon; the general persuasion of the existence of a God, in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion; whence this should come, if there were no real object for it in nature. And this they would do by imputing it, partly to the confounded nonsense of astonished minds, and partly to the imposture of politicians. Or else to these three things; to men's fear, and to their ignorance of causes; and to the fiction of law-makers and civil sovereigns. 26. In the first of these atheistic origins of religion; that mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in continual solicitude and fear concerning future events, and their good and evil fortune. And this passion of fear raises up in them for an object to itself, a most affrightful phantasm; of an invisible, understanding Being, omnipotent, &c. They afterwards standing in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worshipping the creature of their own fear and fancy. 27. The second atheistic origin of theism and religion; that men having a natural curiosity to inquire into the causes of things, wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, are prone to feign causes invisible and supernatural. As Anaxagoras said, never to have betaken himself to a God, but only when he was at a loss for necessary material causes. Wherefore no wonder, if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes of all, or most things, have betaken themselves to a God, as to a refuge and sanctuary for their ignorance. 28. These two accounts of the phenomena of religion; from men's fear and solicitude, and from their ignorance of causes and curiosity, joined together by a modern writer. As if the Deity were but a mormo or bugbear, raised up by men's fear, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes. The opinion of other ghosts and spirits also deduced from the same original. Men's taking things casual for prognostics, and being so addicted to omens, portents, prophecies, &c., from a fantastic and timorous supposition that the things of this world are not disposed of by nature, but by some understanding person. 29. But lest these two accounts of the phenomenon of religion should prove insufficient; the Atheists superadd a third, imputing it also to the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns; who perceiving an advantage to be made from hence, for the better keeping men in subjection, have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance; and cherished those seeds of religion in them, from the infirmities of their nature: confirming their belief of ghosts and spirits,

miracles, prodigies, and oracles, by tales, publicly allowed and recommended. And that religion might be every way obnoxious to their designs, have persuaded the people that themselves were but the interpreters of the gods, from whom they received their laws. Religion an engine of state; to keep men busily employed; entertain their minds; render them tame and gentle, apt for subjection and society. 30. All this not the invention of modern Atheists. But an old atheistic cabal; that the gods made by fear. Lucretius; that the causes of religion, terror of mind and darkness; and that the empire of the gods owes all its being to men's ignorance of causes, as also, that the opinions of ghosts proceeded from men's not knowing how to distinguish their dreams, and other frightful fancies from sensations. 31. An old atheistic surmise also; that religion a political invention. Thus Cicero; the Atheists in Plato, that the gods are not by nature, but by art and laws only. Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, his poem to this purpose. 32. That the folly and falseness of these three atheistic pretences, for the origin of religion, will be fully manifested. First, as to that of fear and fancy. Such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly believe the existence of that for which no manner of ground, neither in sense, nor reason, highly tending also to his own disquiet; nothing less than distraction. Wherefore, the generality of mankind here affirmed by Atheists, to be frighted out of their wits, and distempered in their brains; only a few of themselves, who have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober, or in their right senses. The sobriety of Atheists nothing but dull stupidity and dead incredulity; they believing only what they can see or feel. 33. True, that there is a religious fear, consequent upon the belief of a God; as also, that the sense of a Deity is often awakened in men's minds by their fears and dangers. But religion no creature of fear. None less solicitous about their good and evil fortune than the pious and virtuous; who place not their chief happiness in things alien, but only in the right use of their own will. Whereas the good of Atheists wholly in things obnoxious to fortune. The timorous complexion of Atheists, from building all their politics and justice upon the foundation of fear. 34. The Atheists' grand error here; that the Deity, according to the general sense of mankind, nothing but a terriculum, a formidable, hurtful, and undesirable thing. Whereas men every where agree in that divine attribute of goodness and benignity. 35. Φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, taken by none but a few ill-natured men, painting out the Deity according to their own likeness. This condemned by Aristotle in the Poets (he calling them therefore liars), by Plutarch in Herodotus, as spoken universally; Plutarch himself restraining the sense thereof to his evil principle. Plato's ascribing the world to the divine goodness, who therefore made all things most like himself. The true meaning of this proverb; that the Deity affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men. Lucretius' hidden force, that hath, as it were, a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, could be no other than the Deity. Those amongst Christians who make the worst representations of God, yet fancy him kind and gracious to themselves. 36. True, that religion often expressed by the fear of God. Fear prima mensura Deitatis, the first impression that religion makes upon men in this lapsed state. But this not a fear of God, as mischievous and hurtful, nor yet as a mere arbitrary Being, but as just, and an impartial punisher of wickedness. Lucretius' acknowledging men's fear of God to be conjoined with a conscience of duty. A natural discrimination of good and evil, with a sense of an impartial justice presiding over the world, and both rewarding and punishing. The fear of God, as either a

hurtful or arbitrary and tyrannical being (which must needs be joined with something of hatred), not religion, but superstition. Fear, faith, and love; three steps and degrees of religion, to the son of Sirach. Faith better defined in scripture than by any scholastics. God such a being, as if he were not, nothing more to be wished for. 37. The reason why Atheists thus mistake the notion of God, as a thing only to be feared, and consequently hated; from their own ill-nature and vice. The latter disposing them so much to think that there is no difference of good and evil by nature, but only by law; which law, contrary to nature, as restraint to liberty. Hence their denying all natural charity, and acknowledging no benevolence or good will, but what arises from imbecility, indigency, and fear. Their friendship at best no other than mercatura utilitatum. Wherefore, if there were an omnipotent Deity, this (according to the atheistic hypothesis) could not have so much as that spurious love or benevolence to any thing, because standing in need of nothing, and devoid of fear. Thus Cotta in Cicero. All this asserted also by a late pretender to politics; he adding thereunto, that God hath no other right of commanding than his irresistible power; nor men any obligation to obey him, but only from their imbecility and fear, or because they cannot resist him. Thus do Atheists transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; an omnipotent Being, that hath neither benevolence nor justice in him. This indeed a mormo, or bugbear. 38. But as this a false representation of theism, so the atheistic scene of things most uncomfortable, hopeless, and dismal, upon several accounts. True, that no spiteful designs in senseless atoms; in which regard, Plutarch preferred even this atheistic hypothesis before that of an omnipotent, mischievous Being. However, no faith, nor hope neither, in senseless atoms. Epicurus' confession, that it was better to believe the fable of the gods, than that material necessity of all things, asserted by the other atheistic physiologers, before himself. But he not at all mending the matter, by his supposed free will. The panic fear of the Epicureans, of the frame of heaven's cracking, and this compilement of atoms being dissolved into a chaos. Atheists running from fear plunge themselves into fear. Atheism, rather than theism, from the imposture of fear, distrust, and disbelief of good. But vice afterwards prevailing in them makes them desire there should be no God. 39. Thus the Atheists, who derive the origin of religion from fear, first put an affrightful vizard upon the Deity, and then conclude it to be but a mormo or bugbear, the creature of fear and fancy. More likely of the two that the opinion of a God sprung from hope of good than fear of evil; but neither of these true, it owing its being to the imposture of no passion, but supported by the strongest and clearest reason. Nevertheless, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation of a God also, in men's minds, preventing reason. This called by Plato and Aristotle a vaticination. 40. The second atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, from the ignorance of causes, and men's innate curiosity (upon which account the Deity said by them to be nothing but an asylum of ignorance, or the sanctuary of fools) next to be confuted. 41. That the Atheists, both modern and ancient, here commonly complicate these two together, fear and ignorance of causes; making theism the spawn of both; as the fear of children in the dark raises bugbears and spectres. Epicurus' reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology; that by finding out the natural causes of things he might free men from the terror of a God, that would otherwise assault their minds. 42. The Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out material causes for some of those phenomena which the unskilful vulgar solve only from a Deity;

therefore confident that religion had no other original than this ignorance of causes: as also, that nature, or matter, does all things alone without a God. But we shall make it manifest that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes lead to a Deity; and that Atheism, from ignorance of causes, and want of philosophy. 43. For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless matter, can possibly assign any cause of himself, his own soul, or mind; it being impossible that life and sense should be naturally produced from what dead and senseless; or from magnitudes, figures, sites, and motions. An atheistic objection nothing to the purpose; that laughing and crying things are made out of not-laughing and crying principles: because these result from the mechanism of the body. The Hylozoists never able neither to produce animal sense and consciousness, out of what senseless and inconscious. The Atheists, supposing their own life and understanding, and all the wisdom that is in the world, to have sprung merely from senseless matter and fortuitous motions; grossly ignorant of causes. The philosophy of ourselves, and true knowledge of the cause of our own soul and mind, brings to God. 44. Again, Atheists ignorant of the cause of motion, by which they suppose all things done; this phenomenon being no way solvable, according to their principles. First, undeniably certain that motion not essential to all body or matter as such, because then there could have been no mundane system, no sun, moon, earth, &c., all things being continually torn in pieces, and nothing cohering. Certain also, that dead and senseless matter, such as that of Anaximander, Democritus, and Epicurus, cannot move itself spontaneously by will or appetite. The Hylozoists further considered elsewhere. Democritus could assign no other cause of motion than this, that one body moved another from eternity infinitely; without any first cause or mover. Thus also a modern writer. To assert an infinite progress in the causes of motion, according to Aristotle, to assign no cause thereof at all. Epicurus, though an exploder of qualities, forced here to fly to an occult quality, of gravity. Which, as absurd in infinite space, and without any centre of rest; so indeed nothing but to make his own ignorance, and he knows not why, to be a cause. The motion of body, from the activity of something incorporeal. Though motion taken for translation, be a mode of matter; yet as it is taken for the vis movens, a mode, or energy, of something that is incorporeal and self-active. The motion of the whole corporeal universe originally from the Deity. Thus the ignorance of the cause of motion another ground of atheism. 45. Thirdly, the Atheists also ignorant of the cause of that grand phenomenon, the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, the "regular and artificial frame of the mundane system," and of the bodies of animals; together with the harmony of all. They, who boast they can give causes of all things, without a God, able to give no cause of this, but only that it happened by chance so to be. This, either to make the absence of a cause, a cause (chance being but the absence of an intending cause); or their own very ignorance of the cause, and they know not why, to be a cause; or to make one contrary, the cause of another; (confusion of order and harmony, chance of art and skill,) or lastly, to deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause. 46. But here the Atheists make several pretences for this their ignorance. First, that the world is not so well made, but that it might have been much better; and many flaws to be found therein: whereas a God, or perfect being, would have bungled in nothing, but have made all things after the best manner. But this a twelfth atheistic argumentation, and the confutation thereof to be expected afterward. Reason, why some modern Theists give Atheists so much advantage here,

as to acknowledge things be ill made; whilst the ancient Pagan Theists stood their ground, and generously maintained, that Mind being the Maker of all things, and not blind fortune or chance, nor arbitrary will, and irrational human omnipotent; the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best, in order to the good of the whole, (so far as the necessity of things would admit) the measure and rule of nature and providence. 47. Again, the Atomic and Epicurean Atheists pretend, that though many things serve for uses, yet it does not therefore follow, that they were made intentionally for those uses; because things that happen by chance, may have uses consequent. Thus Lucretius, and the old atheistic philosophers before Aristotle, of the parts of the bodies of animals, and all other things. The answer, that when things consist of many parts, all artifically proportioned together, with much curiosity, as for example, the eye; no man who considers the anatomy thereof, and its whole structure, can reasonably conclude, that it happened so to be made; and the use of seeing followed: but that it was made intentionally for the use of seeing. But to maintain that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing followed, but also ears, and a mouth, and feet, and hands, and all the other parts organical and similar, (without any of which, the whole would be inept or useless) all their several uses, un-intended, following; gross insensibility and stupidity. Galen of the use of parts. 48. Democritus' dotages; countenanced also by Cartesius' book of Meteors, (first written with design to solve all those phenomena without a God,) but unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, we acknowledge, that God and nature do all things in the most frugal and compendious way; and that the mechanic powers are taken in, so far as they will serviceably comply with the intellectual platform. But nature not mechanical and fortuitous only, but also vital and artificial; the Archeus of the whole world. 49. Again, Atheists further pretend, that though it may well seem strange, that matter fortuitously moved, should, at the very first, fall into such a regularity and harmony, as is now in the world; yet not at all strange, that atoms, moving from all eternity, and making all manner of combinations and contextures, and trying all experiments, should after innumerable other inept and discongruous forms, at length fall into such a system as this. They say, therefore, that the earth, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals; some wanting feet, some hands, some without a mouth, &c. to which the ancients added Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimeras; mixedly boviform and hominiform animals. Though Epicurus, ashamed to own these, would seem to exclude them, but without reason. But because we have now no such irregular shapes produced out of the earth, they say, that the reason is, because none could continue and propagate their kind by generation, but only such as happened to be fitly made. Thus Epicurus, and the Atheists before Aristotle. They also add hereunto their infinite worlds; amongst which they pretend, not one of a thousand, or of ten thousand, hath so much regularity in it as this of ours. Lastly, they presage likewise, that this world of ours shall not always continue such, but after a while, fall into confusion and disorder again; and then we may have Centaurs, Scyllas, and Chimeras, as before. 50. Nevertheless, because this universal and constant regularity of things, for so many ages together, is so puzzling; they would persuade us that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, from eternity, without any care or thought, were at length taught, by the necessity of things, and driven to a kind of trade, or habit of artificialness and methodicalness. 51. To all which atheistic pretences replied first, That this is an idle dream, or

impudent forgery, that there was once an inept mundane system ; and in this world of ours, all manner of irregular shapes of animals : not only because no tradition of any such thing ; but also because no reason possibly to be given, why such should not be produced out of the earth still, though they could not continue long. That also another atheistic dream, that in this world of ours, all will quickly fall into confusion and nonsense again. And as their infinite worlds an impossibility, so their assertion of the irregularity of the supposed other worlds well enough answered, by a contrary assertion ; that were every planet a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having all more or fewer such habitable planets moving round about them, and none of them desert or uninhabited, there would not be found so much as one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all ; the divine act being infinite. 52. Again, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms should, in length of time, grow artificial, and contract a habit, or trade of acting as regularly, as if directed by perfect art and wisdom : this atheistic fanaticism. 53. No more possible, that dead and senseless matter, fortuitously moved, should at length be taught, and necessitated by itself, to produce this artificial system of the world ; than that a dozen or more persons, unskilled in music, and striking the strings as it happened, should at length be taught, and necessitated to fall into exquisite harmony ; or that the letters in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, though having so much philosophic sense, should have been all scribbled at random. More philosophy in the great volume of the world, than in all Aristotle's and Plato's works : and more of harmony than in any artificial composition of vocal music. That the divine art and wisdom hath printed such a signature of itself upon the matter of the whole world, as fortune and chance could never counterfeit. 54. But in the next place, the Atheists will, for all this undertake to demonstrate, that things could not possibly be made by any intending cause, for ends and uses ; as eyes for seeing, ears for hearing ; from hence because things were all in order of time as well as nature, before their uses. This argument seriously propounded by Lucretius in this manner ; if eyes were made for the use of seeing, then of necessity must seeing have been before eyes : but there was no seeing before eyes ; therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. 55. Evident, that the logic of these Atheists differs from all other mortals ; according to which, the end, for which any thing is designedly made, is only in intention first, but in execution last. True, that men are commonly excited from experience of things, and sense of their wants, to excogitate means and remedies ; but it doth not therefore follow, that the maker of the world could not have a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful for animals, and so make them bodies intentionally for those uses. That argument ought to be thus framed : whatsoever is made intentionally for any end, as the eye for that of seeing, that end must needs be in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the actual existence of that which is made for it : but there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were eyes ; therefore eyes could not be made intentionally for the sake of seeing. 56. This the true scope of the premised atheistic argument, however disguised by them in the first propounding. The ground thereof, because they take it for granted that all knowledge is derived from sense, or from the things known, pre-existing without the knower. And here does Lucretius triumph. The controversy therefore at last resolved into this ; whether all knowledge be in its own nature junior to things : for if so, it must be granted, that the world could not be made by any antecedent knowledge. But this afterwards

fully confuted; and proved, that knowledge is not in its own nature, ectypal, but archetypal; and that knowledge was older than the world, and the maker thereof. 57. But Atheists will except against the proving of a God, from the regular and artificial frame of things; that it is unreasonable to think there should be no cause in nature for the common phenomena thereof; but a God thus introduced to solve them. Which also, to suppose the world bungled and botched up. That nature is the cause of natural things, which nature does not intend, nor act for ends. Wherefore, the opinion of final causality for things in nature but an idolum specûs. Therefore rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology. 58. The answer: Two extremes here to be avoided, one of the atomic Atheists who derive all things from the fortuitous motion of senseless matter; another of bigotical religionists, who will have God to do all things himself immediately, without any nature. The middle betwixt both, that there is not only a mechanical and fortuitous, but also an artificial nature, subservient to the Deity, as the manuary opificer, and drudging executioner thereof. True, that some philosophers have absurdly attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies, to inanimate bodies. Nevertheless, this no idol of the cave, or den, to suppose the system o the world to have been framed by an understanding Being, according to whose direction, nature, though not itself intending, acteth. Balbus' description of this artificial nature in Cicero. That there could be no Mind in us, were there none in the universe. That of Aristotle true, that there is more of art in some things of nature, than in any thing made by men. Now the causes of artificial things, as a house or clock, cannot be declared without intention for ends. This excellently pursued by Aristotle. No more can the things of nature be rightly understood, or the causes of them fully assigned, merely from matter and motion, without intention or mind. They who banish final or mental causality from philosophy, look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than oxen and horses. Some pitiful attempts of the ancient Atheists to solve the phenomena of animals, without mental causality. Democritus and Epicurus so cautious as never to pretend to give an account of the formation of the fœtus. Aristotle's judgment here to be preferred before that of Democritus. 59. But nothing more strange, than that these Atheists should be justified in this their ignorance by professed Theists and Christians; who atomizing likewise in their physiology, contend that this whole mundane system resulted only from the necessary and unguided motion of matter, either turned round in a vortex, or jumbled in a chaos, without the direction of any mind. These mechanic Theists more immodest than the atomic Atheists themselves; they supposing these their atoms, though fortuitously moved, yet never to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms; but from the very first, all along, to have ranged themselves so orderly, as that they could not have done it better, had they been directed by a perfect Mind. They quite take away the argument for a God, from the phenomena, and that artificial frame of things, leaving only some metaphysical arguments; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtlety, cannot do so much execution. The Atheists gratified to see the cause of theism thus betrayed by its professed friends; and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them. 60. As this great sensibility of mind, to look upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brute animals do; so are there sundry phenomena, partly above the mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, which therefore can never be solved, without mental and final causality. As in animals, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart (being a muscular constriction

and relaxation) to which might be added others in the macrocosm ; as the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic ; or the earth's diurnal motion upon an axis not parallel with that of its annual. Cartesius' confession, that according to mechanic principles, these should continually come nearer and nearer together; which, since they have not done, final or mental causality here to be acknowledged, and because it was best it should be so. But the greatest phenomenon of this kind, the formation and organization of animals; which these mechanists never able to give any account of. Of that posthumous piece of Cartesius, De la Formation du Fœtus. 61. Pretended, that to assign final causes, is to presume ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty, or to be privy to his counsels. But the question, not whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, or know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly conclude things therefore to be so; but whether any thing in the world be made for ends, otherwise than would have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. No presumption nor intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to say, that eyes were made by him intentionally for the sake of seeing. Anaxagoras' absurd aphorism, that man was therefore the most solert of all animals, because he chanced to have hands. Far more reasonable to think, (as Aristotle concludeth) that because man was the wisest of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. More proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him that hath pipes to bestow musical skill. 62. In the last place, mechanic Theists pretend, and that with some more plausibility, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to perform all those mean and trivial offices of nature himself immediately. This answered again : that though the divine wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole for ends, yet is there an artificial nature under him, as his inferior minister and executioner. Proclus' description hereof. This nature, to Proclus, a god or goddess ; but only as the bodies of the animated stars were called gods, because the statues of the gods. 63. That we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these mechanic Theists, who derive all things in the mundane system, from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any Mind, or God ; but that they are imperfect Theists, or have a certain tang of the atheistic enthusiasm, (the spirit of infidelity) hanging about them. 64. But these mechanic Theists counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not fortuitous nor mechanical ; namely, the Hylozoists, who acknowledge the works of nature to be the works of understanding, and deride Democritus' rough and hooky atoms, devoid of life ; they attributing life to all matter as such, and concluding the vulgar notion of a God to be but an inadequate conception of matter, its energetic nature being taken alone by itself as a complete substance. These Hylozoists never able to satisfy that phenomenon of the one agreeing and conspiring harmony throughout the whole universe ; every atom of matter, according to them, being a distinct percipient ; and these unable to confer notions with one another. 65. Nor can the other cosmo-plastic Atheists (to whom the whole world, but one huge plant or vegetable, endowed with a spermatic artificial nature, orderly disposing the whole, without sense or understanding), do any thing towards the solving of this or any other phenomena ; it being impossible that there should be any such regular nature, otherwise than as derived from, and depending on a perfect mind. 66. Besides these three phenomena, of cogitation, motion, and the artificial frame of things, with the conspiring harmony of the whole, (no way solvable by Atheists) here further added, that those who asserted the novity of the world,

could not possibly give an account neither of the first beginning of men and other animals, not now generated out of putrefaction. Aristotle sometimes doubtful and staggering concerning the world's eternity. Men and all other animals not produced at first by chance, either as worms out of putrefaction, or out of eggs, or wombs, growing out of the earth; because no reason to be given why chance should not as well produce the same out of the earth still. Epicurus' vain pretence that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, was now grown effete and barren. Moreover, men and animals, whether first generated out of putrefaction, or excluded out of wombs or egg-shells, supposed by these Atheists themselves, to have been produced in a tender, infant-like state, so that they could neither supply themselves with nourishment, nor defend themselves from harms. A dream of Epicurus, that the earth sent forth streams of milk after those her new-born infants and nurslings, confuted by Critolaus in Philo. Another precarious supposition, or figment, of Epicurus; that then no immoderate heats, nor colds, nor any blustering winds. Anaximander's way of solving this difficulty; that men were first generated and nourished in the bellies of fishes, till able to shift for themselves; and then disgorged upon dry land. Atheists swallow any thing rather than a god. 67. Wherefore here being dignus vindice nodus, a Θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς reasonably introduced in the Mosaic cabala, to solve the same. It appearing from all circumstances put together, that this whole phenomenon surpasses, not only the mechanic but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion therein. However, not denied, but that the ministry of spirits (created before man, and other terrestrial animals) might be here made use of. As in Plato, after the creation of immortal souls by the supreme God, the framing of mortal bodies is committed to junior gods. 68. Furthermore, Atheists no more able to solve that ordinary phenomenon, of the conservation of species, by the difference of sexes, and a due proportion of number kept up between males and females. Here a providence also, superior as well to the plastic as mechanic nature. 69. Lastly, other phenomena, as real, though not physical; which Atheists cannot possibly solve, and therefore do commonly deny; as of natural justice or honesty, and obligation; the foundation of politics, and the mathematics of religion. And of liberty of will, not only that of fortuitous self-determination, when an equal eligibility of objects; but also that which makes men deserve commendation and blame. These not commonly distinguished as they ought. Epicurus' endeavour to solve liberty of will, from atoms declining uncertainly from the perpendicular, mere madness and phrenzy. 70. And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence, to solve the phenomenon of theism from the fiction and imposture of politicians; we having proved that philosophy and the true knowledge of causes infer the existence of a God. Nevertheless, this is to be here further answered. 71. That statesmen and politicians could not have made such use of religion, as sometimes they have done, had it been a mere cheat and figment of their own. Civil sovereigns in all the distant places of the world could not have so universally conspired, in this one piece of state-craft or cosenage; nor yet have been able to possess the minds of men every where, with such a constant awe and dread of an invisible nothing. The world would long since have discovered this cheat, and suspected a plot upon their liberty, in the fiction of a god; at least governors themselves would have understood it; many of which, notwithstanding, as much awed with the fear of this invisible nothing as any others. Other cheats and juggles, when once detected, no longer practised. But religion, now as much

in credit as ever, though so long since decried by Atheists for a political cheat. That Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, prevailed over the craft and power of all civil sovereigns, and conquered the persecuting world by suffering deaths and martyrdoms. This presignified by the prophetic spirit. 72. Had the idea of God been an arbitrarious figment, not conceivable, how men should have universally agreed in the same, and the attributes belonging thereunto (this argument used by Sextus): not that civil sovereigns themselves should so universally have jumped in it. 73. Furthermore; not conceivable how this thought or idea of a God should have been formed by any, had it been the idea of nothing. The superficialness of Atheists, in pretending that politicians, by telling men of such a thing, put the idea into their minds. No notions or ideas put into men's minds by words, but only the phantasms of the sounds. Though all learning be not remembrance, yet is all human teaching but maieutical or obstetricious; not the filling of the soul as a vessel, by pouring into it from without; but the kindling of it from within. Words signify nothing to him that cannot raise up within himself the notions or ideas correspondent to them. However, the difficulty still remains; how statesmen themselves, or the first inventor of this cheat, could have framed any notion at all of a nonentity. 74. Here the Atheists pretend that, there is a feigning power in the soul, whereby it can make ideas and conceptions of nonentities; as of a golden mountain or a centaur: and that by this, an idea of God might be framed, there be no such thing. Answer: That all the feigning power of the soul consisteth only in compounding ideas of things, that really exist apart, but not in that conjunction. The mind cannot make any new conceptive cogitation, which was not before; as the painter or limner cannot feign foreign colours. Moreover, the whole of these fictitious ideas, though it have no actual, yet hath it a possible entity. The Deity itself, though it could create a world out of nothing, yet can it not create more cogitation or conception than is, or was always contained in its own mind from eternity; nor frame a positive idea of that which hath no possible entity. 75. The idea of God no compilement or aggregation of things, that exist severally, apart in the world; because then it would be a mere arbitrarious thing, and what every one pleased; the contrary whereunto hath been before manifested. 76. Again: some attributes of the Deity, nowhere else to be found in the whole world; and therefore must be absolute nonentities, were there no God. Here the painter must feign colours, and create new cogitation, out of nothing. 77. Lastly: upon supposition that there is no God, it is impossible, not only that there should be any for the future, but also that there should ever have been any; whereas all fictitious ideas must have a possible entity, since otherwise they would be unconceivable, and no ideas. 78. Wherefore, some Atheists will further pretend, that besides this power of compounding things together, the soul hath another ampliating or amplifying power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him might be fictitiously made; those attributes, which are nowhere else to be found, arising by way of amplification or augmentation of something found in men. 79. Answer: First, that, according to the principles of these Atheists, that all our conceptions are nothing but passions from objects without, there cannot possibly be any such amplifying power in the soul, whereby it could make more than is. Thus Protagoras in Plato: No man can conceive of any thing but what he suffers. Here also (as Sextus intimateth), the Atheists guilty of that fallacy, called a circle or diallelus. For having first undiscernedly made the idea of imperfection from

perfection, they then go about again, to make the idea of perfection out of imperfection. That men have a notion of perfection, by which as a rule, they judge things to be imperfect, evident from that direction given by all theologers, to conceive of God, in way of remotion or abstraction of all imperfection. Lastly: finite things added together can never make up infinite; as more and more time backward can never reach to eternity without beginning. God differs from imperfect things, not in degree, but kind. As for infinite space, said to consist of parts finite; we certain of no more than this, that the finite world might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely; for which very cause it could never be actually infinite. Gassendus' objection, that the idea of an infinite God might as well be feigned as that of infinite worlds. But infinite worlds are but words or notions ill put together or combined; infinity being a real thing in nature, but misapplied, it being proper only to the Deity. 80. The conclusion, that since the soul can neither make the idea of infinite, by amplification of finite; nor feign or create any new cogitation, which was not before; nor make a positive idea of a nonentity; certain, that the idea of God no fictitious thing. 81. Further made evident, that religion not the figment of civil sovereigns. Obligation in conscience the foundation of all civil right and authority. Covenants, without this, nothing but words and breath. Obligations, not from laws neither, but before them; or otherwise they could not oblige. Lastly, this derived, not from utility neither. Were obligation to civil obedience made by men's private utility, then could it be dissolved by the same. Wherefore, if religion a fiction or imposture, civil sovereignty must needs be so too. Had religion been a fiction of politicians, they would then have made it every way pliable and flexible; since otherwise it would not serve their turn, nor consist with their infinite right. But religion in its own nature, a stiff, inflexible thing, as also justice, it being not factitious, or made by will. There may therefore be a contradiction betwixt the laws of God and of men; and in this case does religion conclude, that God ought to be obeyed rather than men. For this cause atheistic politicians of latter times declare against religion as inconsistent with civil sovereignty; it destroying infinite right, introducing private judgment, or conscience, and a fear greater than that of the leviathan; to wit, of him who can inflict eternal punishment. Senseless matter the Atheist's natural god; the leviathan, or civil sovereign his artificial one. Religion thus disowned and disclaimed by politicians, as inconsistent with civil power, could not be the creature of political art. Thus all the three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion, from fear, ignorance of causes, and fiction of politicians, fully confuted. 82. But because, besides those ordinary phenomena, before mentioned, there are certain other extraordinary ones that cannot be solved by Atheists, which, therefore, they will impute, partly to men's fear and ignorance, and partly to the fiction and imposture of civil governors (viz. apparitions, miracles, and prophecies); the reality of these also to be briefly vindicated. 83. First, as for apparitions; though much of fabulosity in these relations, yet unquestionably something of truth. Atheists, imputing these things to men's mistaking their dreams and fancies for sensations, contradict their own fundamental principle, that sense is the only criterion of truth; as also derogate more from human testimony than they ought. 84. That some Atheists, sensible hereof, have acknowledged the reality of apparitions, concluding them nevertheless to be the mere creatures of imagination; as if a strong fancy could produce real substances or objects of sense. The fanaticism of Atheists, who will

rather believe the greatest impossibilities than endanger the being of a God. Invisible ghosts permanent easily introduced one supreme Ghost of the whole world. 85. Democritus yet further convinced, that there were invisible beings superior to men, independent upon imagination, and permanent (called by him idols) but having nothing immortal in them; and therefore that God could be no more proved from the existence of them than of men. Granted by him, that there were, not only terrestrial, but also aëreal and ethereal animals; and that all those vast regions of the universe above were not desert and uninhabited. Here something of the fathers, asserting angels to have bodies; but more afterwards. 86. To this phenomenon of apparitions may be added those two others, of witches and demoniacs; both of these proving, that spirits are not fancies, nor inhabitants of men's brains only, but of the world: as also, that there are some impure spirits, a confirmation of the truth of Christianity. The confident exploders of witchcraft suspicable for atheism. As for demoniacs or energumeni, certain from Josephus, that the Jews did not take these demons or devils for bodily diseases, but real substances, possessing the bodies of men. Nor probable that they supposed, as the Gnostics afterward, all diseases to be the infestation of evil spirits; nor yet (as some think), all demoniacs to be madmen. But when there were any unusual and extraordinary symptoms, in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, they supposing this to be supernatural, imputed it to the infestation of some devil. Thus also the Greeks. 87. That demoniacs and energumeni are a real phenomenon; and that there are such also in these times of ours, asserted by Fernelius and Sennertus. Such maniacal persons, as not only discover secrets, but also speak languages, which they had never learned, unquestionably demoniacs or energumeni. That there have been such in the times since our Saviour, proved out of Psellus; as also from Fernelius. This for the vindication of Christianity, against those who suspect the scripture demoniacs for figments. 88. The second extraordinary phenomenon proposed: that of miracles and effects supernatural. That there have been such things amongst the Pagans, and since the times of Christianity too, evident from their records. But more instances of these in scripture. 89. Two sorts of miracles. First, such as, though they cannot be done by ordinary causes, yet may be effected by the natural power of invisible spirits, angels, or demons. As illiterate demoniacs speaking Greek. Such amongst the Pagans that miracle of the whetstone cut in two with a razor. Secondly, such as transcend the natural power of all second causes and created beings. That late politico-theological treatise, denying both these sorts of miracles, inconsiderable, and not deserving here a confutation. Supposed in Deuteronomy, that miracles of the former sort might be done by false prophets, in confirmation of idolatry. Wherefore, miracles not sufficient to confirm every doctrine. Accordingly, in the New Testament do we read of *τέρατα ψεύδους*, "lying miracles;" that is, miracles done in confirmation of a lie, and by the power of Satan, &c. God permitting it, in way of probation of some, and punishment of others. Miracles done for the promoting of creature-worship or idolatry, instead of justifying the same, themselves condemned by it. 90. Had the miracles of our Saviour been all of the former kind only, yet ought the Jews, according to Moses' law, to have acknowledged him for a true prophet, he coming in the name of the Lord, and not exhorting to idolatry. Supposed in Deuteronomy that God would not permit false prophets to do miracles, save only in the case of idolatry, or when the doctrine is discoverable to be false by the light of nature,

because that would be an invincible temptation. Our Saviour, that eximious prophet, foretold, by whom God would again reveal his will to the world; and so more out of flaming fire. Nevertheless, some miracles of our Saviour Christ's such also as could be done only by the power of God Almighty. All miracles evince spirits; to disbelieve which is to disbelieve sense, or unreasonably to derogate from human testimony. Had the Gentiles entertained the faith of Christ without miracles, this itself would have been a great miracle. 91. The last extraordinary phenomenon, divination or prophecy. This also evinces spirits (called gods by the Pagans); and thus that of theirs true; if divination, then gods. 92. Two sorts of predictions likewise, as of miracles. First, such as might proceed from the natural presaging power of created spirits. Such predictions acknowledged by Democritus, upon account of his idols. Not so much contingency in human actions by reason of men's liberty of will, as some suppose. Another sort of predictions of future events imputable only to the supernatural prescience of God Almighty. Epicurus' pretence, that divination took away liberty of will; either as supposing or making a necessity. Some Theists also denying the prescience of God Almighty, upon the same account. Certain, that no created being can foreknow future events, otherwise than in their causes. Wherefore predictions of such events, as had no necessary antecedent causes, evince a God. 93. That there is foreknowledge of future events, unforeknowable to men, formerly the general persuasion of mankind. Oracles and predictions amongst the Pagans, which evince spirits, as that of Actius Navius. Most of the Pagan oracles, from the natural presaging power of demons. Nevertheless some instances of predictions of a higher kind amongst them; as that of Vectius Valens, and the Sibyls. Thus Balaam divinely assisted to predict our Saviour. Scriptures triumphing over pagan oracles. Predictions concerning our Saviour Christ, and the conversion of the Gentiles. Amongst which that remarkable one of the seventy weeks. 94. Other predictions concerning the fates of kingdoms, and of the church. Daniel's fourth ten-horned beast, the Roman empire. This prophecy of Daniel's carried on further in the Apocalypse. Both of them prophetic calendars of times, to the end of the world. 95. That this phenomenon of Scripture prophecies cannot possibly be imputed by Atheists, as some others, to fear, or ignorance of causes, or to the fiction of politicians. They not only evince a Deity, but also the truth of Christianity. To this purpose, of more use to us, who now live, than the miracles themselves recorded in Scripture. These five extraordinary phenomena all of them evince spirits to be no fancies, but substantial inhabitants of the world; from whence a God may be inferred. Some of them immediately prove a Deity. 96. Here have we not only fully confuted all the atheistic pretences from the idea of God, but also, by the way, already proposed several substantial arguments for a Deity. The existence whereof will now be further proved from its very idea. True, that some of the ancient Theists themselves declare God not to be demonstrable. Thus Alexander Aprodis. Clemens Alexand. But their meaning therein no more than this, that God cannot be demonstrated à priori from any antecedent necessary cause. Not follow from hence, that therefore no certainty, or knowledge of the existence of a God; but only conjectural probability, faith, and opinion. We may have a certain knowledge of things, the ὅτι whereof cannot be demonstrated à priori; as, that there was something or other eternal, without beginning. Whensoever a thing is necessarily inferred from what is altogether

undeniable, this may be called a demonstration. Many geometrical demonstrations such: or of the ὅτι only. 97. A special position of Cartesius; that there can be no certainty of any thing, no not of geometrical theorems, nor common notions; before we be certain of the existence of a God, essentially good, who therefore cannot deceive. From whence it would follow, that neither Atheists, nor such Theists as assert an arbitrary Deity, can ever be certain of any thing; as that two and two are four. 98. However some appearance of piety in this assertion; yet is it a foundation of eternal scepticism, both as to all other things, and the existence of a God. That Cartesius here went round in a circle, proving the existence of a God from our faculties, and then the truth of our faculties from the existence of a God; and consequently proved nothing. If it be possible that our faculties might be false, then must we confess it possible that there may be no God; and consequently remain for ever sceptical about it. 99. Wherefore a necessity of exploding and confuting this new sceptical hypothesis, of the possibility of our faculties being so made, as to deceive us in all our clearest perceptions. Omnipotence itself cannot make any thing to be indifferently true or false. Truth not factitious. As to the universal theorems of abstract science, the measure of truth no foreign or extraneous thing, but only our own clear and distinct perception. Here whatsoever is clearly perceived, is; the very essence of truth, perceptibility. Granted by all, that there can be no false knowledge or understanding. The perception of the understanding never false, but only obscure. Not nature, that erreth in us, but we ourselves, in assenting to things not clearly perceived. Conclusion; that omnipotence cannot create any understanding faculties, so as to have as clear and distinct conceptions of all falsehoods and nonentities, as of truths; because whatsoever is clearly and distinctly perceived, hath therefore an entity; and omnipotence itself (to speak with reverence) cannot make nothing to be something, or something nothing. This no more, than that it cannot do things contradictious. Conception the measure of power. True, that sense as such is but fantastical and relative; and were there no other perception, all truth would be private, relative, and seeming, none absolute. This probably the reason, why some have suspected the same of knowledge also. But mind and understanding reaches beyond fancy and appearance, to the absoluteness of things. It hath the criterion of truth within itself. 100. Objected; that this an arrogance, for creatures to pretend to an absolute certainty of any thing. Answer; that God alone is ignorant of nothing, and infallible in all things: but no derogation from the Deity, to suppose, that he should make created minds such, as to have a certainty of something; as the whole to be greater than the part, and the like: since otherwise they would be but a mere mockery. Congruous to think, that God hath made men so, as that they may possibly attain to some certainty of his own existence. Origen, that knowledge is the only thing that hath certainty in it. 101. Having now some firm ground or footing to stand upon, a certainty of common notions, without which nothing could be proved by reason; we shall endeavour, by means hereof, to demonstrate the existence of a God from his idea. 102. Cartesius' undertaking to do this with mathematical evidence; as this idea includeth in it necessary existence. This argument hitherto not so successful, it being by many concluded to be a sophism. That we shall impartially set down all that we can, both for it and against it; leaving others to make a judgment. 103. First, against the Cartesian demonstration of a God. That because we can frame an idea of a necessarily existent being, it does not at all follow that it

is; since we can frame ideas of things that never were, nor will be. Nothing to be gathered from hence, but only that it is not impossible. Again, from this idea, including necessary existence, nothing else inferrible, but that what hath no necessary existence, is not perfect; and that if there be a perfect being, its existence always was, and will be necessary; but not absolutely that it doth exist. A fallacy, when from the necessity of existence affirmed only hypothetically, the conclusion is made absolutely. Though a perfect being must exist necessarily, yet not therefore follow, that it must and doth exist. The latter a thing indemonstrable. For the Cartesian demonstration of a God. As from the notion of a thing impossible, we conclude, that it never was nor will be; and of that, which hath a contingent schesis to existence, that it might be, or might not be; so from that, which hath necessary existence in its nature, that it actually is. The force of the argumentation not merely hypothetical, if there be a perfect Being, then is its existence necessary; because this supposes, that a necessary existent being is contingent to be, or not to be: which a contradiction. The absurdity of this will better appear, if, instead of necessary existence, we put in actual. No Theists can otherwise prove, that a God, though supposed to exist, might not happen by chance to be. Nevertheless God, or a perfect Being, not here demonstrated à priori, when from its own idea. The reader left to make a judgment. 104. A progymnasma, or prelusory attempt, towards the proving of a God from his idea, as including necessary existence. First, from our having an idea of a perfect being, implying no manner of contradiction in it, it follows, that such a thing is possible. And from that necessary existence included in this idea, added to the possibility thereof, it further follows that it actually is. A necessary existent being, if possible, is; because upon the supposition of its non-existence, it would be impossible for it ever to have been. Not so in contingent things. A perfect being is either impossible to have been, or else it is. Were God possible, and yet not, he would not be a necessary, but contingent being. However, no stress laid upon this. 105. Another plainer argument, for the existence of a God, from his Idea. Whatsoever we can frame an idea of in our minds, implying no contradiction, this either actually is, or else, if it be not, is possible to be. But if God be not, he is not possible to be. Therefore he is. The major before proved, that we cannot have an idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible existence. 106. A further ratiocination from the idea of God, as including necessary existence, by certain steps. First, certain, that something or other did exist of itself from eternity, without beginning. Again, whatsoever did exist of itself from eternity, did so exist naturally and necessarily, and therefore there is a necessary existent Being. Thirdly, nothing could exist of itself from eternity naturally and necessarily, but what contained necessary self-existence in its nature. Lastly, a perfect Being, and nothing else, containeth necessary existence in its nature. Therefore it is. An Appendix to this argument; that no temporary successive being could be from eternity without beginning. This proved before. 107. Again, the controversy betwixt Atheists and Theists first clearly stated from the idea of God, and then satisfactorily decided. Premised; that as every thing was not made, so neither was every thing unmade. Atheists agree in both. The state of the controversy betwixt Theists and Atheists; whether that, which being itself unmade, was the cause of all other things made, were the most perfect, or the most imperfect being. A certain kind of Atheistic Theism, or Theogonism, which acknowledging a God, or soul of the world, presiding over the whole, sup-

posed him, notwithstanding, to have emerged out of Night and Chaos; that is, to have been generated out of senseless matter. 108. The controversy thus stated easily decided. Certain, that lesser perfection may be derived from greater, or from that which is absolutely perfect; but impossible, that greater perfection, and higher degrees of entity, should rise out of lesser and lower. Things did not ascend, but descend. That life and sense may naturally rise from the mere modification of dead and senseless matter, as also reason and understanding from sense; the philosophy of the kingdom of darkness. The Hylozoists so sensible of this, that there must be some substantial unmade life and understanding; that atheizing, they thought it necessary to attribute life and understanding to all matter, as such. This argument a demonstration of the impossibility of atheism. 109. The controversy again more particularly stated, from the idea of God, as including mind and understanding in it; viz. whether all mind were made or generated out of senseless matter; or whether there were an eternal unmade mind the maker of all. This the doctrine of Theists, that Mind the oldest of all things; of Atheists, that it is a post-nate thing, younger than the world, and an umbratile image of real beings. 110. The controversy thus stated again decided. Though it does not follow, that if once there had been no corporeal world or matter, there could never have been any; yet it is certain, that if once there had been no life nor mind, there could have never been any life or mind. Our imperfect minds, not of themselves from eternity, and therefore derived from a perfect unmade mind. 111. That Atheists think their chief strength to lie here, in their disproving a God, from the nature of understanding and knowledge. According to them, things made knowledge, and not knowledge things. All mind and understanding the creature of sensibles, and a fantastic image of them; and therefore no mind their creator. Thus does a modern writer conclude, that knowledge and understanding is not to be attributed to God, because it implieth dependence upon things without; which is all one, as if he should have said, that senseless matter is the more perfect of all things, and the highest Numen. 112. A compendious confutation of the premised atheistic principles. Knowledge not the activity of sensibles upon the knower, and his passion. Sensible things themselves not known by the passion, or fancy of sense. Knowledge not from the force of the thing known, but of the knower. Besides phantasms of singular bodies, intelligible ideas universal. A late atheistic paradox, that universals nothing but names. Axiomatical truths in abstract sciences no passion from bodies by sense, nor yet gathered by induction from many singulars; we at once perceiving it impossible that they should be otherwise. An ingenious observation of Aristotle's, that could it be perceived by sense, the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right; yet would not this be science, or knowledge properly so called: which is of universals first, and from thence descends to singulars. 113. Again, we have conceptions of things incorporeal, as also of such corporeals as never did exist, and whose accuracy sense could not reach to; as a perfect straight line, and plain superficies, an exact triangle, circle, or sphere. That we have a power of framing ideas of things, that never were nor will be, but only possible. Inferred from hence, that human science itself, not the mere image and creature of singular sensibles, but proleptical to them, and in order of nature before them. But since there must be νοητὸν before νοῦς, "intelligibles" before "intellection;" the only true account of knowledge and its original is from a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and the extent of its own power, or the possibilities of all

things, their relations and immutable truths. And of this one perfect mind all imperfect minds partake. Knowledge therefore, in the nature of it, supposeth the existence of a perfect omnipotent Being, as its νοητὸν, or "intelligible." This comprehending itself, the first original knowledge, a mind before the world, and all sensibles, not ectypal, but archetypal, and the framer of all. Wherefore not atheism, but theism, demonstrable from knowledge and understanding. This further confirmed from hence; because there are eternal verities, such as were never made, nor had any beginning. That the diagonal of a square incommensurable to the sides, an eternal truth to Aristotle, Justin Martyr's αἰώνια δίκαια, or "eternal morals," geometrical truths, not made by any man's thinking, but before all men; as also before the world and matter itself. 114. Now if there be eternal verities, the simple reasons and intelligible essences of things must needs be eternal likewise. These called by Plato things, that always are, but were never made, ingenerable and incorruptible. However Aristotle quarrels with Plato's ideas, yet does he also agree with him in this, that the forms or species of things were eternal, and never made; and that there is no generation of them; and that there are other things besides sensibles, the immutable objects of science. Certain, that there could be no immutable science, were there no other objects of the mind, but sensibles. The objects of geometrical science no material triangles, squares, &c. these, by Aristotle, said to be no where. The intelligible natures of things to Philo, the most necessary essences. 115. Now if there be eternal truths, and intelligibles, whose existence also is necessary; since these can be no where but in a mind; there must be an eternal necessarily existing mind, comprehending all these ideas and truths at once, or being them. Which no other than the mind of a perfect, omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things, the extent of its own power. 116. Wherefore there can be but one only original mind; which all other minds partake of. Hence ideas, or notions exactly alike in several men; and truths indivisibly the same: because their minds all stamped with the same original seal. Themistius; that one man could not teach another, were there not the same notion both in the learner and teacher. Nor could men confer together, as they do, were they not one Mind, that all partaked of. That anti-monarchial opinion, of many understanding beings eternal and independent, confuted. And now have we not only asserted the idea of a God, and confuted all the atheistic pretences against it; but also, from this idea, demonstrated his existence.

HAVING in the second chapter revealed all the dark mysteries of atheism, and produced the utmost strength of that cause; and in the third made an introduction to the confutation of those atheistic grounds, by representing all the several forms and schemes of atheism, and showing both their disagreements amongst themselves, and wherein they all agree together against Theists; we have been hitherto prevented of that full and copious confutation of them intended by us, by reason of that large account given of the pagan polytheism: which yet was no impertinent digression neither, it removing the grand objection against the naturality of the idea of God, as including oneliness in it; as also preparing a way for that defence of Christianity

edsigned by us against Atheists. Wherefore that we may not here be quite excluded of what was principally intended, we shall subjoin a contracted and compendious confutation of all the premised atheistic principles. The *first* whereof was this, that either men have no idea of God at all, or else none but such as is compounded and made up of impossible and contradictious notions; from whence these Atheists would infer him to be an *inconceivable nothing.* In answer whereunto, there hath been something done already, it being declared in the beginning of the fourth chapter, what the idea of God is, viz. a perfect understanding nature, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. And as there is nothing either inconceivable, or contradictious in this idea, so have we showed, that these confounded Atheists do not only, at the same time when they verbally deny an idea of God, implicitly acknowledge and confess it, forasmuch as otherwise, denying his existence, they should deny the existence of nothing; but also that they agree with Theists in this very idea; it being the only thing which Atheists contend for, that the first original and head of all things is no perfect understanding nature, but that all sprung from Tohu and Bohu, or dark and senseless matter fortuitously moved. Moreover, we have not only thus declared the idea of God, but also largely proved, and made it clearly evident, that the generality of mankind in all ages have had a prolepsis or anticipation in their minds concerning the real and actual existence of such a being; the Pagans themselves, besides their other many gods (which were understanding beings superior to men), acknowledging one chief and sovereign Numen, the Maker of them all, and of the whole world. From whence it plainly appears, that those few Atheists, that formerly have been, and still are, here and there up and down in the world, are no other than the monsters and anomalies of human kind. And this alone might be sufficient to repel the first atheistic assault made against the idea of God.

Nevertheless, that we may not seem to dissemble any of the Atheists' strength, we shall here particularly declare all their most colourable pretences against the idea of God, and then show the folly and invalidity of them. Which pretences are as follow: first, *That we have no idea nor thought of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same.* Secondly, *That Theists themselves, acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, he may be from thence inferred to be a nonentity.* Thirdly, *That the Theists' idea of God including infinity in it, is therefore absolutely inconceivable and impossible.* Fourthly, *That theology is an arbitrarious compilement of inconsistent and contradictious notions.* And lastly, *That the idea and existence of God owes all its being, either to the confounded*

nonsense of astonished minds, or else to the fiction and imposture of politicians.

We begin with the first; that we can have no idea, conception, or thought of any thing, not subject to sense; nor the least evidence of the existence of any thing, but from the same. Thus a modern atheistic writer:[1] "Whatsoever we can conceive, hath been perceived first by sense, either at once or in parts; and a man can have no thought representing any thing not subject to sense." From whence it follows, that whatsoever is not sensible and imaginable, is utterly inconceivable, and to us nothing. Moreover, the same writer adds: "That the only evidence[2] which we have of the existence of any thing, is from sense;" the consequence whereof is this, that there being no corporeal sense[3] of a Deity, there can be no evidence at all of

[1] He means Hobbes, whose words here quoted are to be found in the Leviathan, part 1, on Man, chap. 1. p. 3. But I wish it here to be observed, that Cudworth is accustomed commonly to quote Hobbes' words translated into English, and does not render them literally, but often explains them somewhat freely, and also at times joins together words written by him in different places. Whence it happens (more especially since he does not point out the exact passages in Hobbes' books) that I have spent much labour in searching for them, and have sometimes even doubted which of several passages similar to each other was most accordant with the English words. What is here quoted by Cudworth runs thus in English:—"Whatsoever we can conceive hath been perceived by sense, either at once or in parts: and a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense." I find nothing in Hobbes more exactly correspondent to this than what I have here produced: Nulla est animi conceptio, quæ non fuerat anteà genita in aliquo sensuum, vel tota simul, vel per partes. Ab his autem primis conceptibus omnes postea derivantur. A similar passage is to be found chap. 3. p. 9: Ut nullam habemus imaginationem, quæ non antè fuit in sensione, vel tota, vel per partes; ita nulla est transitio ab unâ cogitatione ad aliam, cujus similis non extiterat antè in sensione. "That we have no imagination (or idea) which was not previously in the sensation, either whole or in parts; so that there is no transition from one thought to another, the like of which had not before existed in sensation." In chap. 2. p. 5. he thus speaks: Imaginatio earum rerum tantùm est, quas antè simul vel per partes sensù perceperimus, "Imagination is only of those things which we have before perceived by sense, either at once or in parts." Hobbes gives so wide a meaning to the word *imaginatio*, as to comprehend under it that power of understanding and forming ideas which is found in the human mind. Imaginatio, says he, Leviathan, chap. 2. p. 8. quæ in homine a sermone vel aliis signis voluntariis nascitur, appellatur intellectus, "The *imagination* which is produced in man by discourse or other voluntary signs is called understanding."

[2] These words I cannot find in Hobbes' Latin works. I have therefore translated them myself from the English, almost word for word.

[3] I almost think that the admirers of Hobbes, who will not allow that he was among the deniers of a Supreme Deity, will have some objections to make to what is here stated. 1. Hobbes teaches that all the ideas that are in our minds arise from some one of the senses, and that what cannot be perceived by the senses is a nonentity. Many passages of his place this beyond a doubt. But from this tenet it does not immediately follow that God does not exist; but all that can be fairly drawn from it is that he who enforced it either altogether abrogated the divine nature, or imagined to himself a God perceptible to the senses, that is, a corporeal Deity. Hobbes certainly did the latter, and professes his belief in a Deity furnished with a very ethereal body. See Leviathan, part 1. on Man, chap. 12. p. 66. part 3. chap. 34. p. 184. and also in the Appendix to the Leviathan, chap. 1. p. 345. 2. It is also true that Hobbes has declared that all the evidence we have of any existence arises from the senses. But those who favour him will again deny that from this it can be inferred that the existence of the Deity is not admitted by him, or the reality of a great Supreme placed by

his existence. Wherefore, according to the tenor of the atheistic philosophy, all is resolved into sense, as the only criterion of truth, accordingly as Protagoras in Plato's Theætetus[4] concludes "knowledge to be sense;" and a late writer of our own determines "sense to be original knowledge."[5] Here have we a wide ocean before us, but we must contract our sails. Were sense knowledge and understanding, then he that sees light and colours, and feels heat and cold, would understand light and colours, heat and cold, and the like of all other sensible things: neither would there be any philosophy at all concerning them. Whereas the mind of man remaineth altogether unsatisfied, concerning the nature of these corporeal things, even after the strongest sensations of them, and is but thereby awakened to a further philosophic inquiry and search about them, what this light and colours, this heat and cold, &c. really should be; and whether they be indeed qualities in the objects without us, or only phantasms and sensations in ourselves. Now it is certain, that there could be no suspicion of any such thing as this, were sense the highest faculty in us; neither can sense itself ever decide this controversy; since one sense cannot judge of another or correct the error of it; all sense, as such (that is, as fancy and apparition) being alike true. And had not these Atheists been notorious dunces in that atomic philosophy which they so much pretend to, they would clearly have learned from thence, that sense is not knowledge and understanding, nor the criterion of truth as to sensible things themselves; it reaching not to the

him among doubtful questions. That though the very nature of God does not meet our senses, but escapes our sight, still that all knowledge of the Deity may in a certain manner be said to proceed from the senses, because from a contemplation of the divine works which are exposed to our senses we attain to a knowledge of their author, that is, God; and that therefore he who shall declare that our senses alone make known God to us is not to be accounted altogether absurd and irrational, provided only he rightly understand this; though at the same time by this opinion he may entirely disallow that idea of God which we call interior and innate. Certainly Hobbes has expressed his own opinion in this way. "The knowledge," says he, Leviathan, part 1. chap. 12. p. 55. "of one eternal, infinite, omnipotent Deity, may more easily be gathered from an investigation of the causes, powers, and operations of natural bodies than from an anxiety about futurity."

[4] Page 118. Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, πάντων χρήματων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι, "Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things, of existences as they are, of nonexistences as they are not." Socrates explains the force and meaning of this saying in the same place: Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπίσταμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο, ὃ ἐπίσταται· καὶ ὥς γε νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις, "It appears to me that whatever any one knows, he perceives by sense what he knows; and, as it now appears, knowledge is nothing else than sensible perception."

[5] The English words are: "Sense to be original knowledge." I suspect that some passage of this kind is found among the writings of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, of whose piety towards God Cudworth had but a poor opinion. But Bacon's doctrine concerning sense was very different from Hobbes' opinion, as appears from his *Novum Organon Scientiarum*, in which he sometimes refutes those who say that "sense is the measure of things." See p. 44. and elsewhere.

essence or absolute nature of them, but only taking notice of their outside, and perceiving its own passions from them, rather the things themselves: and that there is a higher faculty in the soul, of reason and understanding, which judges of sense; detects the phantastry and imposture of it; discovers to us that there is nothing in the objects themselves like to those forementioned sensible ideas; and resolves all sensible things into intelligible principles; the ideas whereof are not foreign and adventitious, and mere passive impressions upon the soul from without, but native and domestic to it, or actively exerted from the soul itself; no passion being able to make a judgment either of itself or other things. This is a thing so evident, that Democritus himself could not but take notice of it, and acknowledge it, though he made not a right use thereof; he, in all probability, continuing notwithstanding a confounded and besotted Atheist; Sextus Empiricus having recorded this of him:[6] Ἐν τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς διανοίας· ὧν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνῶσιν κατάγει, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει, ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀπλανές· λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν, Γνώμης δὲ δύο εἰσὶν ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη· ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης μὲν, τάδε σύμπαντα, ὄψις, ἀκοὴ, ὀδμὴ, γεῦσις, ψεῦσις· ἡ δὲ γνησίη ἀποκεκρυμμένη δὲ ταύτης, "Democritus in his Canons affirmeth, that there are two kinds of knowledges, one by the senses, and another by the mind. Of which that by the mind is only accounted knowledge, he bearing witness to the faithfulness and firmness thereof for the judgment of truth. The other by the senses he calleth dark, denying it to be a rule and measure of truth. His own words are these: There are two species of knowledge, the one genuine, the other dark and obscure. The dark and obscure knowledge is seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But the genuine knowledge is another more hidden and recondite." To which purpose there is another fragment also of this Democritus preserved by the same Sextus:[7] Νόμῳ γλυκὺ, καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμὸν, νόμῳ ψυχρὸν· νόμῳ χροιή· αἰτία δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· ὅπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητὰ, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, "Bitter and sweet, hot and cold, are only in opinion or fancy. Colour is only in opinion; atoms and vacuum alone in truth and reality. That which is thought to be, are sensibles; but these are not according to truth, but atoms and vacuum only." Now the chief ground of this rational discovery of the ancient atomists, that sensible things, as heat and cold, bitter and sweet, red and green, are no

[6] Lib. 7. advers. Mathemat. sect. 138. 139. page 400.
[7] Id. ibid. sect. 135. page 399.

real qualities in the objects without, but only our own fancies, was because in body there are no such things intelligible, but only magnitude, figure, site, motion and rest. Of which we have not only sensible ideas, passively impressed upon us from without, but also intelligible notions, actively exerted from the mind itself. Which latter notwithstanding, because they are not unaccompanied with sensible phantasms, are by many unskilfully confounded with them. But besides these, we have other intelligible notions, or ideas also, which have no genuine phantasms at all belonging to them. Of which whosoever doubts, may easily be satisfied and convinced, by reading but a sentence or two, that he understands, in any book almost, that shall come next to his hand; and reflexively examining himself, whether he have a phantasm, or sensible idea, belonging to every word, or no. For whoever is modest and ingenuous, will quickly be forced to confess, that he meets with many words, which though they have a sense or intelligible notion, yet have no genuine phantasm belonging to them. And we have known some, who were confidently engaged in the other opinion, being put to read the beginning of Tully's Offices, presently nonplussed and confounded in that first word quanquam; they being neither able to deny, but that there was a sense belonging to it, nor yet to affirm, that they had any phantasm thereof, save only of the sound or letters. But to prove, that there are cogitations not subject to corporeal sense, we need go no further than this very idea or description of God; a substance absolutely perfect, infinitely good, wise and powerful, necessarily self-existent, and the cause of all other things. Where there is not one word unintelligible to him, that hath any understanding in him, and yet no considerative and ingenuous person can pretend, that he hath a genuine phantasm, or sensible idea, answering to any one of those words, either to substance, or to absolutely perfect, or to infinitely, or to good, or to wise, or to powerful, or to necessity, or to self-existence, or to cause; or indeed to all, or other, or things. Wherefore it is nothing but want of meditation, together with a fond and sottish dotage upon corporeal sense, which hath so far imposed upon some, as to make them believe, that they have not the least cogitation of any thing not subject to corporeal sense; or that there is nothing in human understanding or conception which was not first in bodily sense; a doctrine highly favourable to atheism. But since it is certain, on the contrary, that we have many thoughts not subject to sense, it is manifest, that whatsoever falls not under external sense, is not therefore inconceivable and nothing. Which whosoever asserts, must needs affirm life and cogitation itself, knowledge or understanding, reason and memory, volition and appetite, things of the greatest moment and reality, to be nothing

but mere words without any signification. Nay, fancy and sense itself, upon this hypothesis, could hardly escape from becoming nonentities too, forasmuch as neither fancy nor sense falls under sense, but only the objects of them; we neither seeing vision, nor feeling taction, nor hearing audition, much less hearing sight, or seeing taste, or the like. Wherefore though God should be never so much corporeal, as some Theists have conceived him to be; yet since the chief of his essence, and as it were his inside, must by these be acknowledged to consist in mind, wisdom, and understanding, he could not possibly, as to this, fall under corporeal sense (sight or touch) any more than thought can. But that there is substance incorporeal also, and therefore in itself altogether insensible, and that the Deity is such is demonstrated elsewhere.

We grant indeed, that the evidence of particular bodies, existing hic et nunc, without us, doth necessarily depend upon the information of sense; but yet nevertheless, the certainty of this very evidence is not from sense alone, but from a complication of reason and understanding together with it. Were sense the only evidence of things, there could be no absolute truth and falsehood, nor certainty at all of any thing; sense, as such, being only relative to particular persons, seeming and fantastical, and obnoxious to much delusion. For if our nerves and brain be inwardly so moved and affected, as they would be by such an object present, when indeed it is absent, and no other motion or sensation in the mean time prevail against it and obliterate it; then must that object of necessity seem to us present. Moreover, those imaginations that spring and bubble from the soul itself, are commonly taken for sensations by us when asleep, and sometimes in melancholic and fanciful persons also, when awake. That atheistic principle, that there is no evidence at all of any thing as existing, but only from corporeal sense, is plainly contradicted by the atomic Atheists themselves, when they assert atoms and vacuum to be the principles of all things, and the exuvious images of bodies to be the causes both of sight and cogitation: for single atoms, and those exuvious images, were never seen nor felt; and vacuum, or empty space, is so far from being sensible, that these Atheists themselves allow it to be the one only incorporeal. Wherefore they must here go beyond the ken of sense, and appeal to reason only for the existence of these principles: as Protagoras, one of them, in Plato, professedly doth: * Ἄθρει περισκοπῶν μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι, οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι, ἢ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἁπτῇ ταῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι, ὡρ ἐν οὐσίας μέρει, "Have a care, that none of the profane and uninitiated in

* Theæt. p. 155. Steph.

the mysteries overhear you. By the profane, I mean (saith he) those who think nothing to exist but what they can feel with their fingers, and exclude all that is invisible out of the rank of being." Were existence to be allowed to nothing, that doth not fall under corporeal sense, then must we deny the existence of soul and mind in ourselves and others, because we can neither feel nor see any such thing. Whereas we are certain of the existence of our own souls, partly from an inward consciousness of our own cogitations, and partly from that principle of reason, that nothing cannot act. And the existence of other individual souls is manifest to us, from their effects upon their respective bodies, their motions, actions, and discourse. Wherefore since the Atheists cannot deny the existence of soul or mind in men, though no such thing fall under external sense, they have as little reason to deny the existence of a perfect mind, presiding over the universe, without which it cannot be conceived whence our imperfect ones should be derived. The existence of that God, whom no eye hath seen nor can see, is plainly proved by reason[8] from his effects, in the visible phenomena of the universe, and from what we are conscious of within ourselves.

[8] No one, I think, will deny, that much has been here well and acutely said by this learned man against those who measure all knowledge and human understanding by sense. But I am almost inclined to think, that the point in dispute is not explained with sufficient aptitude and accuracy, and that many things are confounded together which, in my opinion, had better have been kept distinct. For this great man sometimes seems as if he disputed against those who will have all the existing universe to be corporeal; of which opinion indeed was Hobbes, whom he principally opposes. Sometimes he uses arguments applicable only to those who maintain, that no idea can be formed in our minds excepting of corporeal existences; and these, indeed, he reduces to the last push. But sometimes he seems to have to do with those who contend that all our inward ideas are primarily derived from the assistance of our senses, but are afterwards cherished, strengthened, increased, and amplified by reflection. But it is proper, in my opinion, carefully to distinguish these three things, lest what ought to separated should be confounded, and an injury should be done to those who are not plainly ill-intentioned.

Those who hold the *first* of these opinions, and assert the whole universe to be corporeal, must admit that knowledge is nothing else than sense, or that we have no entire and true ideas, properly so called, of any other than corporeal objects. But they must (1.) at the same time, unless they are far gone in folly, allow to our minds a power of understanding and judging, an ability to connect and separate ideas, nor can they deny that, by the assistance of this faculty and the help of the imagination, a man can form in his mind and can make use of abstract ideas of things. Thus they must admit, that by the power of thought figures can be disjoined from the things to which they belong, affections and powers from the things and persons in which they inhere, and can be treated of in the same manner as if they had a separate existence. Certain it is, that whenever any one treats, teaches, and disputes about any thing whatsoever, he must have some idea of it formed in his mind. But Hobbes, though he avers that all things are corporeal, subtlely reasons concerning geometrical figures, and in the Leviathan itself copiously explains the nature of the imagination, the memory, virtues, and vices; which he could not by any possibility have done unless he were sure that the mind could form abstract ideas of things, and subject these to contemplation and discussion in the same manner as real existences. From which it is evident, that he who asserts that no perfect ideas of any other than corporeal objects exist in our minds, does not on that account abrogate and deny all rational mental ideas. 2. The same persons will not disallow the existence of some very

The second pretence of Atheists against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is, because Theists themselves acknowledging God to be incomprehensible, it may be from thence

subtle bodies which escape the power and penetration of all our senses, and can be known by us in no other way than by their effects. There can be no doubt that Hobbes entertained this view; nor do I think there is any one, ancient or modern, among those who have confined universal existence to corporeality, but what has been of the same opinion. But they will not deny that we have some idea though perhaps an imperfect one, of these more subtle bodies. For who will say, that we have in us no form or image whatever of a thing we certainly know to exist? It is therefore further evident, that by this class of reasoners a power is granted to our minds of imagining and forming an idea of things which affect none of our senses, and whose existence is known only by reasoning. Those who rightly weigh this will perceive, I think, that much is said by Dr. Cudworth here which does not bear on Hobbes and his friends. They will say that the idea of a powerful, able, learned man, is an adventitious thing drawn from external objects, and brought by the senses into the mind; and that this is no reason why our minds should not collect together all the visible effects of power, and form for themselves an idea of power abstracted from man, which may afterwards be copiously reflected upon and discussed.

Those who entertain the *second* opinion, and allow of no internal images of any but corporeal existences, are pressed by so many arguments of our author, that what they can object I do not understand. But I have for a long time doubted whether any wise man ever did hold this opinion. Certain I am, that many of those who have had this sentiment ascribed to them, have differed rather in words than in reality from those who think otherwise. Those who seem to favour this doctrine either deny that any thing except corporealities exists, or they admit of some natures destitute of all bodily substance. If they intend the *former*, they will still allow (to give one example out of many), that there is in mankind an invisible power of reasoning and judging; that they understand the nature of this power from its effects, and hence can form some idea of it in their minds. But if they grant this, they will at the same time concede that there may be and exist in us the forms and representations of things which our senses cannot realize. If, however, they approve of the *latter* supposition, and will not deny that there are other natures than corporeal in the universe, I cannot at all imagine how they can affirm that there are no ideas in our minds excepting of corporeal objects. To speak candidly, I fear that most of those who dispute whether or not there are any ideas in our minds of aught else than corporeal things, only disagree because they do not both assign the same meaning to the words *notion* and *idea*. Those who deny that we have any other than corporeal ideas, seem to understand by the word *notion* or *idea*, a full and complete representation of something actually having an external existence. If this be the case, their meaning will be this: that we have in us no real representations and perfect images of any thing but what affects the senses, or is corporeal. This opinion, however, does not prevent their granting that other notions (though imperfect and incomplete) may be formed and imagined of other things, which do not meet our senses. But they who maintain that there are in our minds ideas of other than corporeal existences, assign a wider meaning to the word *notion*, *idea*, or *image*, and intend by it, every form that can be framed by the mind, and every mental conception of whatever sort it be. If this conjecture of mine be incorrect, it will at least admonish those who enter into controversy on subjects of this nature, that above all things the words they wish to use should be defined and restricted within their own limits before commencing the discussion.

The *third* opinion, namely, of those who consider that all ideas proceed primarily from the senses, and are afterwards amplified by reasoning, is also here confuted by Dr. Cudworth, though in rather a covert and obscure manner. For since he follows the doctrines of the Platonists, and makes no doubt but that by our very nature we have innate and internal forms and representations of many things, it was impossible but that he should repudiate and reject this opinion. It is however plain, that those who favour this sentiment are not so utterly devoid of reason as to assert all knowledge to be nothing else than sense. For although they think that our senses give rise to all the knowledge we have, yet they do not therefore assert that we have no ideas except of objects coming under the cognizance of our senses. Which if indeed they affirmed,

inferred that he is a nonentity. Which argumentation of the Atheists supposes these two things: first, that what is incomprehensible is altogether inconceivable; and then, that what is inconceivable is nothing. The latter of which two, perhaps, may be granted to them, that what is so utterly inconceivable, as that no man can frame any manner of idea or conception of it, is therefore either in itself, or at least to us, nothing. Because, though that o Protagoras be not true, in his sense:* Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν, "That man is the measure of all things, either as existing or not existing;" he meaning indeed nothing else thereby, but that there was no absolute truth or falsehood of any thing, but all was relative to particular persons, and fantastical or seeming only. And though it must not be granted, that whatsoever any man's shallow understanding cannot easily and fully comprehend, is therefore presently to be expunged out of the catalogue of beings; which is the reason, or rather infidelity of the Anti-trinitarians; yet is there notwithstanding some truth in that of Aristotle, that ψυχή πως πάντα, "the rational soul or mind is in a manner all things;" it being able to frame some idea and conception or other of whatsoever is in the nature of things, and hath either an actual or possible existence, from the very highest to the lowest. Mind and understanding is, as it were, a diaphanous and crystaline globe, or a kind of notional world, which hath some reflex image, and correspondent ray, or representation in it, to whatsoever is in the true and real world of being. And upon this account may it be said, that whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is indeed a nonentity.

But the former is absolutely denied by us, that whatsoever is incomprehensible is inconceivable; and therefore when we affirm, that God is incomprehensible, our meaning is only this, that our imperfect minds cannot have such a conception of his nature, as doth perfectly master, conquer, and subdue that vast object under it; or at least is so fully adequate and commensurate to the same, as that it doth every way match and equalize

they would overthrow their own tenets, and destroy that empire of reason to which they ascribe so much.

None of these opinions, I must ingenuously confess, seems to me to be of such a nature that no one can embrace it without being an enemy to God and to all religion. Those who conclude the whole universe to be corporeal, and maintain that none but bodily substances exist, will perhaps be rash enough to affirm, that God himself is partaker of some kind of body, though perhaps a most subtle one; which indeed Hobbes, and many others better than he, have done. The same may be said of the second sect, if indeed such a sect ever existed. But the third opinion has been embraced by so many able and worthy men, who have in several other ways testified their piety towards God, that it seems to me highly unjust indiscriminately to reckon among Atheists all those who believe that the whole of human knowledge has its origin in corporeal existences.

* Plato Theæt. [p. 118.]

it. Now it doth not at all follow from hence, because God is thus incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understandings, that he is utterly inconceivable by them, so that they cannot frame any idea at all of him, and he may therefore be concluded to be a non-entity. For it is certain, that we cannot fully comprehend ourselves, and that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing, as that we can perfectly master and conquer it. It was a truth, though abused by the sceptics, that there is ἀκατάληπτόν τι, "something incomprehensible" in the essence of the lowest substances. For even body itself which the Atheists think themselves so well acquainted with, because they can feel it with their fingers, and which is the only substance that they acknowledge either in themselves or the universe, hath such puzzling difficulties and entanglements in the speculation of it, that they can never be able to extricate themselves from. We might instance also in some accidental things, as time and motion. Truth is bigger than our minds, and we are not the same with it, but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature, and are rather apprehenders than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state, that we have not a perfectly comprehensive knowledge, or such as is adequate and commensurate to the essences of things; from whence we ought to be led to this acknowledgment, that there is another perfect Mind or understanding Being above us in the universe, from which our imperfect minds were derived, and upon which they do depend. Wherefore, if we can have no idea or conception of any thing, whereof we have not a full and perfect comprehension, then can we not have an idea or conception of the nature of any substance. But though we do not comprehend all truth, as if our mind were above it, or master of it, and cannot penetrate into, and look quite through the nature of every thing, yet may rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions, of whatsoever is in the orb of being proportionate to their own nature, and sufficient for their purpose. And though we cannot fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfection, yet may we have an idea or conception of a Being absolutely perfect; such a one as is nostro modulo conformis, "agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling;" as we may approach near to a mountain, and touch it with our hands, though we cannot encompass it all round, and enclasp it within our arms. Whatsoever is in its own nature absolutely inconceivable, is nothing; but not whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by our imperfect understandings.

It is true indeed, that the Deity is more incomprehensible to us than any thing else whatsoever, which proceeds from the fulness of its being and perfection, and from the transcendency

of its brightness; but, for the very same reason may it be said also, in some sense, that it is more knowable and conceivable than any thing. As the sun, though, by reason of its excéssive splendour, it dazzle our weak sight, yet it is notwithstanding far more visible also, than any of the nebulosæ stellæ, "the small misty stars." Where there is more of light there is more of visibility; so where there is more of entity, reality, and perfection, there is there more of conceptibility and cognoscibility; such an object filling up the mind more, and acting more strongly upon it. Nevertheless, because our weak and imperfect minds are lost in the vast immensity and redundancy of the Deity, and overcome with its transcendent light and dazzling brightness, therefore hath it to us an appearance of darkness and incomprehensibility; as the unbounded expansion of light, in the clear transparent ether, hath to us the apparition of an azure obscurity; which yet is not an absolute thing in itself, but only relative to our sense, and a mere fancy in us.

The incomprehensibility of the Deity is so far from being an argument against the reality of its existence, as that it is most certain on the contrary, that were there nothing incomprehensible to us, who are but contemptible pieces, and small atoms of the universe; were there no other being in the world, but what our finite and imperfect understandings could span or fathom, and encompass round about, look through and through, have a commanding view of, and perfectly conquer and subdue under them; then there could be nothing absolutely and infinitely perfect, that is, no God. For though that of Empedocles be not true in a literal sense, as it seems to have been taken by Aristotle:[9] Γαίᾳ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν, &c. "That by earth we see earth, by water water, and by fire fire; and understand every thing by something of the same within ourselves:" yet is it certain, that every thing is apprehended by some internal congruity in that which apprehends, which perhaps was the sense intended by that noble philosophic poet. Wherefore it cannot possibly otherwise be, but that the finiteness, scantness, and imperfection of our narrow understandings must make them asymmetral, or incommensurate, to that which is absolutely and infinitely perfect.

And nature itself plainly intimates to us, that there is some such absolutely perfect Being, which, though not inconceivable, yet is incomprehensible to our finite understandings, by certain passions which it hath implanted in us, that otherwise would want an object to display themselves upon; namely, those of devout veneration, adoration, and admiration, together with a kind of ecstasy and pleasing horror; which, in the silent language of nature, seem to speak thus much to us, that there is some object in the world, so much bigger and vaster than our mind

[9] De Anima, lib. 1. cap. 2. p. 3. tom. 2. opp.

and thoughts, that it is the very same to them that the ocean is to narrow vessels; so that when they have taken into themselves as much as they can thereof by contemplation, and filled up all their capacity, there is still an immensity of it left without, which cannot enter in for want of room to receive it, and therefore must be apprehended after some other strange and more mysterious manner, viz. by their being as it were plunged into it, and swallowed up or lost in it.[10] To conclude, the Deity is indeed incomprehensible to our finite and imperfect understandings, but not inconceivable; and therefore there is no ground at all for this atheistic pretence, to make it a nonentity.[1]

[10] I. What is here observed by our learned author respecting the testimony of our secret passions of the mind to the being of a God, though true, seems not sufficiently calculated for refuting the madness of Atheists. For in this method of argumentation he begs the question, and takes for granted, that there are in us certain innate ideas, and that these are given us by nature with a specific design. If this were conceded by those who deny the existence of a Deity, they would contradict themselves, and at once confess that existence of God which they disallow. But those who are averse to the admission of the divine existence, pertinaciously deny that the case is thus, and contend that these passions are the results of opinions and sentiments inculcated into us from early infancy. But to draw arguments from premises to which the opponents deny all authority, is to act contrary to reason, and to violate the laws of controversy. II. What he adds respecting the mind of man and the Deity mutually absorbing each other, savours of the Platonic school, and is not sufficiently clear for general comprehension. The Platonists, to whose works Dr. Cudworth was much addicted, are accustomed, when they treat theologically of the Deity, to use many such forms of speech, which, by an appearance of sublimity, strongly affect the mind. But if they be more accurately examined, they give rise to such confused ideas that their authors seem not to understand their own meaning. Indeed, I think it greatly preferable clearly to explain the sensations of one's own mind, than by figurative expressions of this kind to give occasion of error to those who labour under a certain superfertility of imagination.

[1] That among the number of those who have thought there was no God, there are and have been some who have disputed as foolishly as they are here supposed to do by our learned author, I will not deny; but I have myself met with no one expressly using this argument against the divine existence, as it is here set forth. There are, besides Dr. Cudworth, several respectable and learned men who recount this very argument as among the first and principal reasons of the Atheists; to all whom I think it rash to refuse confidence. See John Francis Buddeus' Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 6. p. 512. and Peter Poiret's Cogitationes Rationales de Deo, Animâ, et Malo, lib. 3. cap. 6. But an adherent of that party encountered me a few years since, who, as he seemed to himself to be acute, and to excel his associates in ability, not only felt the want of many things in the reasonings of his own partizans, but also complained, that the defenders of a supreme Deity did not always bring to the controversy all the candour that was requisite. He confidently denied that this argument, of which we are now speaking, was rightly explained by those who advocate the existence of God, and also that there were any, at least of the more intelligent of his own persuasion, who made use of it as it is explained by those on our side. He granted that no rational person could reason thus: Whatever cannot be in all its parts conceived of by our minds is nothing and non-existent; for that the internal nature of innumerable things is unknown to us, the existence of which nevertheless can be denied by no one who would not be thought mad. But he said the question ought to be stated thus. That is nothing and non-existent, the idea of which is made up of particulars that mutually contradict and destroy each other. But the generally received idea of God is made up of particulars thus mutually repugnant and contradictory. Infinite justice contradicts infinite mercy; infinite power is directly repugnant to infinite goodness. Therefore the antitype of this idea is a nonentity. If this be the true and genuine opinion of this profane sect, it can be overturned as easily as Dr. Cudworth has destroyed the other argumentation here exposed. For, I. This argument does not refer to God, but only to

We come to the third atheistic argumentation: That because infinity (which according to theology is included in the idea of God, and pervadeth all his attributes) is utterly inconceivable, the Deity itself is therefore an impossibility, and nonentity. To this sense sound sundry passages of a modern writer:[2] as, "Whatsoever we know, we learn from our phantasms; but there is no phantasm of infinite, and therefore no knowledge or conception of it." Again,[3] "Whatsoever we imagine is finite,

that idea of God which exists in most men's minds. For if there be any force at all in it, it will only amount to this: that so great is the depravity of human nature, that it has thoughts of God widely different from what are accordant with reason. From which indeed it would follow, if the premises were correct, that God is not such a being as most men imagine him to be. But those who think that it can also hence be inferred that there is no God, argue as ridiculously as if it were to be contended that there is no country of Abyssinia, or no emperor of the Abyssinians, because only very few formerly had true and correct ideas of that country and emperor. The errors of mankind respecting certain things neither destroy the things themselves, nor the truth of them; and therefore it does not follow, even if all mankind laboured under the grossest error respecting God, that this universal error would cause the Deity to be nonexistent. II. I do not understand in what way those who follow this method of reasoning, can prove that the idea of God is made up of conflicting and entirely irrelevant particulars. It is necessary that those who conclude that any two things are mutually repugnant, should have a perfect knowledge and clear view of the nature of both. No one could determine a triangle and a square to be reciprocally inconsistent with each other, unless he were acquainted with both figures. But we confess that all the attributes of Deity are infinite; that is, that the amplitude and greatness of the divine powers and perfections far exceed the grasp of our understanding. Wherefore Atheists, if they wished to show that the attributes ascribed by us to God are mutually repugnant, and that therefore the very idea of God is a nullity, should either affirm as an axiom that there is nothing boundless and infinite, or assert for themselves a power of declaring a repugnancy and discord between things that are incomprehensible. If they prefer the former of these alternatives, they turn their own arms against themselves; since, take which way they will, they cannot dispense with something *infinite* in explaining the causes and origins of things; if they prefer the latter, they show themselves worthy of being classed among the veriest tiros in logic.

[2] These are the words of Hobbes in his Physica, part 4. cap. 26. p. 204. Dr. Cudworth has made two omissions. First, after the words, "phantasm of infinite," he has left out the words, "either in magnitude or in time;" and secondly, he has omitted after "conception of it," the words, "for neither man nor any other being, excepting what is itself infinite, can have any conception of the infinite." In order that the meaning of this writer may be rendered clearer to every reader, I have thought it best to quote the entire passage of which Dr. Cudworth merely gives the sense.

[3] Hobbes's Leviathan, part 1. cap. 3. p. 12. Dr. Cudworth again extracts only a summary of Hobbes's words; but I have preferred to give the passage entire. "Whatever we imagine is finite. There is therefore no idea or conception that can arise from this word '*infinite*.' The human mind cannot comprehend the idea of infinite magnitude, nor can it conceive of infinite swiftness, infinite force, infinite time, or infinite power. When we say that any thing is infinite, we merely mean that we cannot conceive of its bounds or limits: and can have no other idea than that of our own incapacity. Therefore the name of God is not used that we may conceive of him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power inconceivable) but that we may honour him." In order fully to understand the author's meaning, these passages should be compared with the 15th chapter of his book De Cive, where he speaks of "the kingdom of God in nature," and in sect. 14. p. 117, among other things he thus speaks: "Though the word '*infinite*' signifies a conception of the mind, yet it does not follow that we have any conception of an infinite being. For when we say that any thing is infinite we do not intend any quality in the thing itself, but a want of power in our

and therefore there is no conception or idea of that which we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite time, or of infinite power. Wherefore the name of God is used not to make us conceive him, but only that we may honour him." The true meaning whereof (as may be plainly gathered from other passages of the same writer) is thus to be interpreted; that there is nothing of philosophic truth and reality in the idea or attributes of God; nor any other sense in those words, but only to signify the veneration and astonishment of men's own confounded minds. And accordingly the word infinite is declared to signify nothing at all in that which is so called (there being no such thing really existing), but only the inability of men's own minds, together with their rustic astonishment and admiration. Wherefore when the same writer[4] determines that God must not be said to be finite, this being no good courtship nor compliment; and yet the word infinite signifieth "nothing" in the thing itself, nor hath any conception at all answering to it; he either does plainly abuse his reader, or else he leaves him to make up this conclusion, that since God is neither finite nor infinite, he is an unconceivable nothing.[5] In like manner,

own minds; as if we should say that we know not whether it has limits or where. Nor can it be reverently said of God, that we have an idea of him in our minds; for an idea is our conception, and there is no conception of any thing but what is finite." See also Element. Philos. sect. 1. or Physics, cap. 26. p. 204.

[4] There can be no doubt that our author here refers to that passage of Hobbes which is to be found in his book De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 117. Hobbes is there refuting, in the first place, those who say that "the universe is God;" who, he affirms, deny that God is the first cause of the world, and therefore actually deny his existence. He also refutes those who assert the world to be eternal, or who deny the providence of God. He then proceeds thus: "Moreover in those attributes which signify greatness and power, any thing signifying finitude or limitation is far from being a mark of veneration. For we do not properly honour God if we attribute to him less power or greatness than it is possible for us to do. But all finite degrees are less than is possible for us to attribute to him; for it is always easy for us to assign and attribute to him more than any given finite quantity. Therefore shape is not attributed to God; for all shapes are finite; nor can he be said to be conceived or comprehended by the imagination of any faculty of our minds; for whatever we conceive of is finite." See also Hobbes's Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170. wherein he expresses the same opinion.

[5] So several other learned and able men besides Dr. Cudworth have interpreted Hobbes's meaning, and make no doubt but that the whole of his philosophy tends to the highest impiety towards God. But though I feel certain that this writer was opposed to religion, yet I think it more cautious, and more worthy of a wise man, to leave all decisive judgment on his motives to him who alone searches the recesses of our hearts, and only to judge of his intentions from his words. It is unworthy, I will not deny, of any one zealous for the honour of God and of religion, to make apologies for those who in many ways plainly show that they are not so much concerned for religion and for God; but nothing is further from propriety and justice than to interpret any author's words, which are susceptible of a favourable construction, in the worst possible sense, for no other reason than that he who indited them betrays in other passages a mind tainted with profane opinions. If, therefore, we only regard Hobbes's words, and dismiss all suspicious feelings, I think we shall find he has said nothing but what may be favourably understood, and what has been said by many others who have incurred no accusation for irreligion. First of all, he does not affirm that the word *infinite* has no power or signification whatever; but he only maintains that *we have no conception of infinitude*, or that our minds are unable to conceive of the bounds and limits of those things

another learned well-willer[6] to atheism declareth, that he who calleth any thing infinite, doth but rei quam non capit, attribuere nomen, quod non intelligit, "attribute an unintelligible name

which we call infinite. He confesses, therefore, that the word *infinite* possesses a certain power, and signifies that our minds cannot comprehend the limits of that existence to which it is applied. Nor does he therefore assert the attributes and perfections assigned to God to be mere words and names. On the contrary, he plainly enough declares, that when we ascribe infinite power and other attributes to God, we are sufficiently acquainted with the fact itself, but do not understand the measure or limit of what we term power, &c. I know that many, and among them that venerable and now sainted man, John Francis Buddeus, in his Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 5. p. 515. have found fault with Hobbes because he denies a *positive* conception of the infinite, and allows only a *negative* one. "What Hobbes asserts," says he, "is therefore most false; that the word *infinite* only signifies that we cannot conceive the limits of what is so called. For he erroneously passes over what is positive in the idea of an infinite being, and allows only of what is negative." How this should be understood he explains just before in these words: "For first of all we conceive of a certain supreme degree of perfection: then we confess that this perfection is so great that we cannot reach its bounds and limits." The fault of Hobbes is therefore determined by this great man to consist in his not having a mental conception of the highest degree of perfection when he says that God and his perfections are infinite. To me it seems quite otherwise, nor do I think that there is any real difference in this matter between Hobbes and this worthy man himself, if I properly understand the meaning of each. For Hobbes, as appears from his own words, when he speaks of infinite power, swiftness, or strength, first of all has a mental conception of the highest degree of perfection, that is the highest degree of power, strength, or swiftness. But at the same time he denies that he can understand how far the limits of this highest degree of power may extend. He confesses that when we speak in this way we can conceive of the nature of the thing itself to which infinity is ascribed, but that the limits or measure of it are not understood by us. If Hobbes had said that when we call any thing infinite we mean that we cannot attain to its limits, and yet at the same time had been of opinion that we have no plain *positive conception* of the thing or being that we call infinite, he would have spoken in a manner worse than foolish or idiotic; for he would have affirmed that we cannot reach the boundaries and limits of a thing that is nothing and non-existent; a more irrational supposition than which it is impossible to conceive of. I do not lay any stress on this further consideration—that this worthy author seems to me to speak less to the point than the case requires, when he says that "when we call any thing infinite we confess we cannot attain to its limits." This is the very opinion of Hobbes which this great man rejects. Though we do indeed use the word *infinite* in this sense respecting some things, yet when we apply it to the Deity and the divine perfections we not only mean that we cannot reach the limits of God and his attributes, but we also declare that God and his attributes have no bound or limits. I do not say this for the sake of opposing, but only of explaining the opinion of this late author, which I feel certain was in itself correct. From these considerations it is therefore plain, that if in other respects the English philosopher had reasoned correctly respecting God and religion, his sentiments respecting infinity would have left his friends sufficient room for his defence. It is also evident, that neither did Hobbes contradict himself when in one place he denied the propriety of calling the Deity finite, and in another determined that being to be infinite, to the limits of which we are not able to attain; nor is there any sufficient reason to conclude positively that by his dissertation on infinity he wished to induce others to believe in the non-existence of God. For if it be the duty of a wise man always to take care not to be led to accuse others on mere suspicions, it is of the greatest importance to pay attention to this when he brings any one into question respecting atheism, than which there can be no weightier crime, no fault more disgraceful to a rational human being.

By the way, I know not how it has happened that very acute authors, who have so

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[6] Who this was I have not, with all my pains, been able to discover; so that I cannot tell whether he is here justly accused, or whether any defence can be made for him.

to a thing inconceivable; because all conception is finite, and it is impossible to conceive any thing that hath no bounds or limits. But that which is mistaken for infinite, is nothing but a confused chaos of the mind, or an unshapen embryo of thought; when men going on further and further, and making a continual progress, without seeing any end before them, being at length quite weary and tired out with this their endless journey, they sit down, and call the thing by this hard and unintelligible name, infinite." And from hence does he also infer, that because we can have no idea of infinite, as to signify any thing in that which is so called; we therefore cannot possibly have germanam ideam Dei, "any true and genuine idea or notion of God." Of which they who understand the language of Atheists, know very well the meaning to be this: that there is indeed no such thing, or that he is a nonentity.

Now since this exception against the idea of God, and consequently his existence, is made by our modern and neoteric Atheists; we shall, in the first place, show, how contradictious they are herein to their predecessors, the old philosophic Atheists; and consequently how inconsistent and disagreeing Atheists in several ages have been with one another. For whereas these modern Atheists would have this thought a sufficient confutation of a Deity, that there can be nothing infinite; it is certain, that the ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being of this

strenuously and ingeniously disputed with this philosopher, have not observed in his sentiments respecting the nature of infinity another latent error, which, though it does not lead to the denial of a Deity, is yet very derogatory to his supreme perfection. When we say that God and his attributes are *infinite*, we mean that in reality they have no bounds or limits, no limitation whatever. But with Hobbes the word *infinite* only means that being whose limits the human mind cannot conceive of or attain to. In philosophical language we attribute to God and the divine perfections an *absolute infinitude*, but Hobbes seems to acknowledge in the supreme Deity nothing but a *relative infinitude*. Thus it appears that God and his attributes are called by Hobbes infinite only because our weak minds cannot comprehend their extent, or discern their bounds and limits. Therefore in his definition of infinity, and determination that God is infinite, he tacitly insinuates that there is nothing properly infinite, but that whatever is called infinite is so termed only because it is infinite relatively to our understanding, or because neither our reason nor our imagination can reach its limits. For though the limits of any thing may escape the penetration of our minds, yet this does not prevent it from having limits and being finite. Certainly the general tenor of Hobbes's writings, in reference to the Deity, leads us to believe that the supreme Being which he imagined was finite, and that all the properties of that Being were in his view circumscribed by bounds and limitations. For he plainly says as much when he speaks thus of infinitude: "When we say that any thing is infinite, *we do not mean any property in the thing itself*, (that is, if I mistake not, we do not assert that that thing has really no bounds), but only point out a deficiency in our own minds (that is, we confess we cannot reach the limits of that thing); as though we should say we know not *whether or where it terminates*." De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 117. He who in calling God infinite simply means by this expression that "he knows not whether or where God terminates," certainly does not assert that God is actually unconfined by bounds or limits, or that his power, wisdom, and other perfections are entirely unlimited; but merely informs others that though it is possible God may be finite, yet he himself knows not how far his limits may extend.

persuasion, that some of them, as Anaximander expressly, made Ἄπειρον, or "infinite," the "principle" of all things; that is, "infinitely extended and eternal matter, devoid of all life and understanding." For though Melissus' Ἄπειρον, or "infinite," which he made the first principle, was a most perfect being, eminently containing all things (as hath been already showed) and therefore the true Deity; Anaximander's Ἄπειρον, or "infinite," yet however called Θεῖον, or divine by him (it being the only divinity which he acknowledged) was nothing but senseless matter, an atheistic Infinite. Wherefore both Theists and Atheists in those former times did very well agree together in this one point, that there was something or other infinite, as the first principle of all things; either infinite mind or infinite matter; though this latter atheistic infinity of extended matter be indeed repugnant to conception (as shall be proved afterwards) there being no true infinite, but a perfect Being, or the holy Trinity. Furthermore, not only Anaximander, but also, after him, Democritus and Epicurus, and many others of that atheistic gang, heretofore asserted likewise a numerical infinity of worlds, and therefore much more than an infinity of atoms, or particles of matter. And though this numerical infinity of theirs were also inconceivable and impossible; yet does it sufficiently appear from hence, that these ancient philosophic Atheists were so far from being abhorrent from infinity, as a thing impossible, and a nonentity, that they were on the contrary very fond thereof; and therefore never went about to disprove a Deity after this manner, because there can be nothing infinite.[7]

[7] If indeed any Atheist in his senses ever argued in this manner; which however I greatly doubt. Unless I am very much mistaken, there is not so great a difference respecting *infinity* between ancient and modern Atheists as our learned author seems to think. All who formerly denied the existence of God, yet admitted the existence of something infinite, although in different ways; nor can their modern followers, unless they wish to be considered mad, do otherwise than grant, in some way or other, something to be infinite. No individual of this party was ever so stupid and foolish as to dare to deny that something, of whatever kind, has existed from all eternity. For whoever should go so far as this, as our learned author himself shows a little farther on, would offend more grievously than even schoolboys against the first rudiments of reasoning; and would affirm that this world produced itself out of nothing; than which it is impossible to imagine any thing more absurd. Therefore all Atheists will admit of something infinite in duration and time, nor do any of them deny all infinity. As regards Hobbes in particular, against whom our author principally disputes, so far is he from denying all infinity, that he not only teaches that time and space are unlimited, but also adopts the same opinion respecting unlimited time as Dr. Cudworth himself; that it is destitute of all succession, nor can be divided in any way into parts; which seems to me much the same as if he had said with the schoolmen, that "eternity is all duration existing at once." To quote his own words, Element. Philos. part 2. cap. 7. p 53. "Respecting unlimited space and time it cannot be said that they are wholes or units. Not wholes, for they cannot be made up of any number of parts; for any number of finite parts whatever, taken together, will only make a finite whole. Not units, for a unit is so called only as compared to something else; but two infinite spaces or two infinite times cannot be supposed to exist." The learned Doctor seems therefore, I think, to have given a little more scope than was necessary to his hatred of this profane and

But, in the next place, we shall make it manifest, that these modern Atheists do no less contradict plain reason and their very selves also, than they do their predecessors in that impiety, when they thus go about to disprove the existence of a God, because there can be nothing infinite, neither in duration, nor in power, nor in any other regard. For first, though it should be doubted whether there be a God or no, yet must it needs be acknowledged to be as indubitable, as any thing in all geometry, that there was something or other infinite in duration, or eternal, without beginning: because, if there had been once nothing at all, there could never have been any thing, that common notion, or principle of reason, having here an irresistible force, that nothing could ever come from nothing. Now, if there were never nothing, but always something, then must there of necessity be something infinite in duration, and eternal without beginning. Wherefore it cannot be accounted less than extreme sottishness and stupidity of mind in these modern Atheists, thus to impugn a Deity from the impossibility of infinite duration without beginning. But in the next place, we must confess it seems to us hardly conceivable, that any Atheist whatsoever could possibly be so prodigiously sottish, or so monstrously infatuated, as really to think, that once there was nothing at all, but that afterwards senseless matter happened (nobody knows how) to come into being, from whence all other things were derived. According to which hypothesis it would follow also, that matters might as well some time or other happen again to cease to be, and so all things vanish into nothing. To conclude therefore, these Atheists must of necessity be guilty of one or other of these two things; either of extreme sottishness and stupidity, in acknowledging neither God, nor matter, nor any thing, to have existed infinitely from eternity without beginning; or else, if they do acknowledge the pre-eternity of matter, or its infinite past-duration without beginning, then, of the most notorious impudence, in making that an argument against the existence of a God, which themselves acknowledge to matter.[8]

Nevertheless, we shall here readily comply with these modern Atheists thus far, as to grant them these two following things:

wicked herd, when he asserts that they deny all infinity, and thence argue against the existence of God, because there can be nothing infinite. But, nevertheless, almost all who have undertaken in modern times to enumerate or confute the arguments of Atheists against a Deity, have in this particular followed him. Thus the authority of one great man is often the occasion of error to many. Yet at the same time Dr. Cudworth has on this occasion given so many excellent and learned observations, that this ought to be reckoned among his minor faults, into which he was perhaps led by the ardour of disputation.

[8] But our learned author might as well have omitted the whole of this discussion, since no Atheist ever denied the existence of something from all eternity. If any of them even let drop aught at all resembling this, he indeed must either have been crazy or entirely ignorant and foolish.

First, That we can have no proper and genuine phantasm of any Infinite whatsoever, because we never had corporeal sense of any, neither of infinite number, nor of infinite magnitude, and therefore much less of infinite time or duration, and of infinite power; these two latter things, time and power, themselves not falling under corporeal sense. Secondly, That as we have no phantasm of any infinite, so neither is infinity fully comprehensible by our human understandings, that are but finite. But since it is certain, even to mathematical evidence, that there was something infinite in duration, or without beginning, insomuch that no intelligent Atheist, upon mature consideration, will ever venture to contradict it; we shall from hence extort from these Atheists an acknowledgment of the falseness of these two theorems of theirs, that whatsoever we have no phantasm or sensible idea of, as also whatsoever is not fully comprehensible by us, is therefore a pure nonentity or nothing; and enforce them to confess, that there is something really existing in nature, which we have neither any phantasm of, nor yet can fully comprehend with our imperfect understandings.

Nay, we will yet go further in compliance with them, and acknowledge likewise, that as for those infinities of number, of corporeal magnitude, and of time or successive duration, we have not only no phantasm, nor full intellectual comprehension of them, but also no manner of intelligible idea, notion, or conception. For though it be true, that number be somewhere said by Aristotle[9] to be infinite, yet was his meaning there only in such a negative sense as this, that we can never possibly come to an end thereof by addition, but may in our minds still add number to number infinitely; which is all one as if he should indeed have affirmed, that there can be no number actually and positively infinite, according to Aristotle's own definition of Infinite, elsewhere given,[10] namely, that to which nothing can be added; no number being ever so great, but that one or more may still be added to it. And as there can be no infinite number, so neither can there be any infinity of corporeal magnitude; not only because if there were, the parts thereof must needs be infinite in number, but also because, as no number can be so great, but that more may be added to it; so neither can any body or magnitude be ever so vast, but that more body or magnitude may be supposed still further and further; this addition of finites never making up infinite. Indeed infinite space, beyond the finite world, is a thing which hath been much talked

[9] Metaphys. lib. 11. cap. 11. p. 434. tom. 4. opp. et Phys. Auscultat. lib. 3. cap. 5. p. 486. tom. 1. opp. et cap. 8. p. 491.

[10] Phys. Auscultat. lib. 3. cap. 9. p. 492. tom. 1. opp. Οὐ γὰρ οὗ μηδὲν ἔξω, ἀλλ' οὗ ἀεί τι ἔξω ἐστι, τοῦτο ἄπειρόν ἐστι, "For not that which hath nothing beyond, but that which has always something beyond, is infinite."

of; and it is by some supposed to be infinite body, but by others to be an incorporeal infinite; through whose actual distance notwithstanding (mensurable by poles and miles) this finite world might roll and tumble infinitely. But as we conceive, all that can be demonstrated here is no more than this, that how vast soever the finite world should be, yet is there a possibility of more and more magnitude and body still to be added to it, further and further, by divine power, infinitely; or that the world could never be made so great, no not by God himself, as that his own omnipotence could not make it yet greater.[1] Which potential infinity, or indefinite increaseableness of corporeal magnitude, seems to have been mistaken for an actual infinity of space. Whereas, for this very reason, because more could be added to the magnitude of the corporeal world infinitely, or without end, therefore is it impossible, that it should ever be positively and actually infinite; that is, such as to which nothing more can possibly be added. Wherefore we conclude concerning corporeal magnitude, as we did before of number, that there can be no absolute and actual infinity thereof; and that how much vaster soever the world may be, than according to the supposition of vulgar astronomers, who make the starry sphere the utmost wall thereof; yet is it not absolutely infinite, such as really hath no bounds or limits at all, nor to which nothing more could, by divine power, be added. Lastly, We affirm, likewise, concerning time, or successive duration, that there can be no infinity of that neither, no temporal eternity without beginning: and that not only because there would then be an actual infinity, and more than an infinity of number; but also because, upon this supposition, there would always have been an infinity of time past, and consequently an infinity of time past which was never present. Whereas all the moments of past time must needs have been once present; and if so, then all of them, at least save one, future too; from whence it will follow, that there was a first moment, or beginning of time. And thus does reason conclude, neither the world, nor time itself, to have been infinite in their past duration, nor eternal without beginning.[2]

Here will the Atheist think presently, he hath got a great advantage to disprove the existence of a God: Nonne, qui æter-

[1] Our author here touches on a most subtle question, which, like all other philosophical disputations concerning infinity, is surrounded by innumerable difficulties: whether God, possessing infinite power, can create an infinite magnitude. We shall give our own opinion on this and similar questions by and by, when we come to the end of the whole discussion on infinitude.

[2] All this seems to differ widely from the opinions respecting infinity commonly received among philosophers Wherefore Dr. Cudworth has lately incurred the censure of of the learned Le Clerc, whose stricture on this discussion respecting the nature of infinity may be seen in the Bibliothèque Choisie, tom. 5. p. 48. &c. I will hereafter, if I can, explain clearly what I consider to be the most correct view of this very difficult and very obscure question.

nitatem mundi sic tollunt, eâdem operâ etiam mundi conditoris æternitatem tollunt? "Do not they who thus destroy the eternity of the world, at the same time destroy also the eternity of the Creator? For if time itself were not eternal, then how could the Deity, or any thing, be so?" the Atheist securely taking it for granted, that God himself could not be otherwise eternal, than by a successive flux of infinite time; but we say that this will, on the contrary, afford us a plain demonstration of the existence of a Deity. For since the world and time itself were not infinite in their past duration, but had a beginning, therefore were they both certainly made together by some other being, who is, in order of nature, senior to time, and so without time, before time; he being above that successive flux, and comprehending in the stability and immutable perfection of his own being, his yesterday, and to-day, and for ever. Or thus: something was of necessity infinite in duration, and without beginning; but neither the world, nor motion, nor time, that is, no successive being was such; therefore is there something else, whose being and duration is not successive and flowing, but permanent, to whom this infinity belongeth. The Atheists here can only smile, or make faces, and show their little wit in quibbling upon nunc-stans, or a "standing now" of eternity; as if that standing eternity of the Deity (which with so much reason hath been contended for by the ancient genuine Theists) were nothing but a pitiful small moment of time standing still, and as if the duration of all beings whatsoever must needs be like our own; whereas the duration of every thing must, of necessity, be agreeable to its nature: and therefore, as that whose imperfect nature is ever flowing like a river, and consists in continual motion and changes one after another, must needs have accordingly a successive and flowing duration, sliding perpetually from present into past, and always posting on towards the future, expecting something of itself, which is not yet in being, but to come; so must that, whose perfect nature is essentially immutable, and always the same, and necessarily existent, have a permanent duration, never losing any thing of itself once present, as sliding away from it, nor yet running forwards to meet something of itself before, which is not yet in being; and it is as contradictious for it ever to have begun, as ever to cease to be.[3]

[3] This dispute, respecting the eternity of God, whether it be immutable and free from all succession, or whether it includes in itself difference of time, is one of those questions which are attended with great difficulty. Most modern theologians agree with Dr. Cudworth, and follow the whole school of the Platonists, and the most renowned of the fathers. But since eternity is a thing far beyond all comprehension or understanding, it is not wonderful that there should be some, and those not of the lowest class of mankind, nor yet hostile to the divine perfections, who deny that they can understand this notion of eternity. I shall have presently, I dare say, an opportunity of saying something on this point.

Now whereas the modern Atheists pretend to have proved that there is nothing infinite, neither in duration nor otherwise, and consequently no Deity, merely because we have no sense nor phantasm of Infinite, nor can fully comprehend the same; and therefore will needs conclude, that the words infinite and eternal signify nothing in the thing itself, but either men's own ignorance and inability to conceive when, or whether, that which is called eternal began; together with the confounded nonsense of their astonished minds, and their stupid veneration of that which their own fear and fancy has raised up as a bugbear to themselves; or else the progress of their thoughts further and further backward indefinitely (though they plainly confute themselves in all this, by sometimes acknowledging matter and motion infinite and eternal, which argues either their extreme sottishness or impudence):[4] we have showed, with mathematical evidence and certainty, that there is really something infinite in duration, or eternal; by which therefore cannot be meant men's own ignorance, or the confounded nonsense of their devotion, nor yet the idle progress of their minds further and further indefinitely, which never reaches infinite, but a reality in the thing itself, namely this, that it never was not, nor had any beginning. Moreover, having demonstrated concerning this infinity and eternity, without beginning, that it cannot possibly belong to any successive being, we confidently conclude against these Atheists

[4] Unless I am mistaken, this very observation of our author, that Atheists often treat of the eternity of matter and motion, might have led him to reflect that none of that sect were ever so stupid and foolish as to deny all infinity and affirm that there was no God because there is nothing infinite. There exists, I am aware, not unfrequently in the minds of those who take upon themselves to contend with God himself, an incredible degree of ignorance, which leads them to confound black and white, and mingle together things most widely different. But I can scarcely persuade myself that any one who had not entirely renounced the use of his understanding, ever attained to such a pitch of folly as himself to oppose and overthrow the very foundations of his own opinions. To give one example out of many, nothing is held more sacred among the sect of Atheists than this axiom: "Out of nothing, nothing is produced." But if there is nothing infinite, this maxim, in whatever way it be understood, will be altogether puerile and absurd. But nevertheless, let us suppose that any one so far forgot himself as to deny the Divine existence by such an argument as this: "Nothing is infinite; therefore there is no God;" what shall we reply to him? Will a long disputation be necessary in order to convince him of the existence of something infinite? I can scarcely think so. For whoever can so far impose upon his own mind as to reject all infinity, could also easily persuade himself that all arguments urged against him were merely captious and sophistical. The more subtlely we might reason against him, the more cautious he would become, and the more uniformly suspicious of unfairness. We will therefore take a shorter way, as I think, by which, if he have any sense left, we may silence him and convict him of folly. Let there be nothing infinite. We will not deny it. What then? Is there no God? Nonsense! As if that of which men form a wrong idea must necessarily be nonexistent. The argument would be tolerable if it were stated thus: Nothing is infinite; therefore the Being we call God is not infinite. But he who thus reasons: There is no God, because nothing is infinite, argues as accurately and as much to the point, as one who should reason in this way: There is no such devil as is represented by painters; therefore there is no devil at all.

also, that it was not matter and motion, or this mundane system, but a perfect immutable nature, of a permanent duration (that is, a God) to whom it belonged. To sum up all, therefore, we say, that infinite and eternal are not words that signify nothing in the thing itself, nor mere attributes of honour, compliment, and flattery, that is, of devout and religious nonsense, error, and falsehood; but attributes belonging to the Deity, and to that alone, of the most philosophic truth and reality. And though we, being finite, have no full comprehension and adequate understanding of this infinity and eternity (as not of the Deity) yet can we not be without some notion, conception and apprehension thereof, so long as we can thus demonstrate concerning it, that it belongs to something, and yet to nothing neither but a perfect immutable nature. But the notion of this infinite eternity will be yet further cleared in the following explanation and vindication of infinite power.

For the Atheists principally quarrel with infinite power, or omnipotence, and pretend, in like manner, this to be utterly inconceivable and impossible, and subjected in nothing. Thus a modern atheistic writer[5] concludes, that since "no man can con-

[5] It belongs to considerate and impartial judges to decide whether our author has here correctly expressed Hobbes' mind and meaning, or has allowed himself to be carried away by the heat of controversy. I will quote that philosopher's own words, on which Dr. Cudworth no doubt had his eye, out of the Leviathan, c. 3. p. 12. "The human mind cannot comprehend the idea of infinite magnitude, nor can it conceive of infinite swiftness, infinite force, infinite time, or *infinite power*. Therefore the name of God is not used that we may conceive him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and *power* inconceivable) but that we may honour him." A little after he thus proceeds: "No one can conceive anything excepting as in some place, indeed with some finite magnitude, and divisible into parts; nor can any thing be altogether in one place and altogether in another at the same time. For none of these suppositions have ever taken place, or can possibly occur in sensation; but they are unmeaning expressions, made use of on the authority of certain erring philosophers and fallacious schoolmen." Dr. Cudworth seems to have been of opinion that these last words of Hobbes' have reference also to "infinite power;" and that therefore the phrase "infinite power" is enumerated by him as being among "unmeaning expressions." And into this opinion he has drawn after him the worthy Buddeus, who in his Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, chap. 5. p. 516. plainly writes that "infinite duration and infinite power are reckoned by Hobbes among unmeaning expressions." But (not to insist on what I have already stated) Hobbes is sufficiently vindicated by the context and current of the discourse, from which it incontrovertibly appears that he only says that those use "unmeaning expressions" who say that "any thing can be altogether in one place and altogether in another at the same time," or who profess that they can "conceive something which is in no place, and endued with no finite magnitude." He does not therefore say that "infinite power" is an unmeaning phrase, but only ranks the language of those who say that they can conceive of and mentally comprehend infinite magnitude, or affirm that a thing can be in several places at the same time, among expressions that have nothing in them but sound. For if Hobbes' opinion were such as is here attributed to him by Dr. Cudworth, and the divine omnipotence were entirely rejected by him, he would contradict himself, since in another passage he assigns to omnipotence the second place among the divine attributes. For in the Leviathan, chap. 31. p. 170. he speaks thus: "Among the attributes which by the light of nature we know to belong to God, the first is existence, the second is *omnipotence*, in that he is the maker and ruler of all things. Those therefore who say that the world is eternal do not honour God as much as is possible,

ceive infinite power, this is also but an attribute of honour, which the confounded nonsense of astonished minds bestows upon the object of their devotion, without any philosophic truth and reality." And here have our modern Atheists indeed the suffrage and agreement of the ancient philosophic Atheists also with them, who, as appears from the verses before cited out of Lucretius, concerned themselves in nothing more than asserting all power to be finite, and omnipotence, or infinite power, to belong to nothing.

First, therefore, it is here observable, that this omnipotence, or infinite power, asserted by Theists, has been commonly either ignorantly mistaken, or wilfully misrepresented by these Atheists, out of design to make it seem impossible and ridiculous, as if by it were meant a power of producing and doing any thing whatsoever, without exception, though never so contradictious; as a late atheistic person,[6] seeming to assert this divine omnipotence and infinite power, really and designedly, notwithstanding, abused the same, with this sceptic irony, "That God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could turn this tree into a syllogism." Children indeed have sometimes such childish apprehensions of the divine omnipotence; and Ren. Cartesius[7] (though

nor do they who deny that he takes care of human affairs. Thirdly," he proceeds, "those do not give God all possible honour who say that he is *finite*, for what is finite is capable of addition," &c. It may perhaps be said, that this was written to save appearances, and to entrap his readers; but to this I would answer, that none but God could positively know whether this were the case or not. We must estimate a man's meaning by his words; God alone can tell whether his mind and his words correspond.

[6] Who this is I can by no means find out. That similar things have been said by some who despise God and religion, I am not unaware.

[7] Vide Respons. ad Objectiones sextas, sect. 6. p. 160. edit. Amstel. 1685. 4to. The passage runs thus: "It is inconsistent to suppose that the will of God was not from eternity indifferent towards all things that ever have or ever will take place; for nothing good or true, nothing to be believed, done, or passed over, can be imagined, the idea of which was in the Divine intellect before his will determined to make it such as it is. Nor do I here speak of priority of time, but that it was not prior in order even, or by nature, or by consecutive reasoning, as we say, in such a way as that any idea of goodness should impel God to choose one thing rather than another. As, for example, he did not will to create the world in time because it would be better so than if he had created it from eternity; nor did he will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles because he knew it could not possibly be otherwise. But, on the contrary, because he willed to create the world in time, therefore it is better than if it had been created from eternity; and because he willed that the three angles of a triangle should be necessarily equal to two right angles, therefore this is now true, and cannot be otherwise; and so on of other things." A little after, sect. 8. p. 163. he adds as follows: "Nor is there any need to inquire how God from eternity could have made it true that twice four should not be eight, &c.; for I confess that this cannot be understood by us." See also his Epistles, vol. 1. ep. 110. p. 351. and ep. 115. p. 372; and vol. 2. ep. 6. p. 21. ed. Amsterdam, 1682. 4to. Some think that Des Cartes embraced this sentiment, lest he should seem by his opinions to deny what the Romanists call "transubstantiation." See Le Clerc's Ontologia, chap. 4. sect. 8. p. 351. and chap. 14. sect. 11. p. 406. Nor are they, I think, far wrong in this supposition. Nevertheless some learned men have remarked, in order to save this great man's credit, that Des Cartes has in other places reasoned more correctly, as in the fifth of his Metaphysical Meditations, p. 31. where he clearly declares that "the

otherwise an acute philosopher) was here no less childish, in affirming, that all things whatsoever, even the natures of good and evil, and all truth and falsehood, do so depend upon the arbitrary will and power of God, as that, if he had pleased, twice two should not have been four, nor the three angles of a plain triangle equal to two right ones, and the like; he only adding, that all these things, notwithstanding, when they were once settled by the divine decree, became immutable; that is, I suppose, not in themselves, or to God, but unto us: than which no paradox of any old philosopher was ever more absurd and irrational. And, certainly, if any one did desire to persuade the world, that Cartesius, notwithstanding all his pretences to demonstrate a Deity, was indeed but an hypocritical Theist, or personated and disguised Atheist, he could not have a fairer pretence for it out of all his writings, than from hence; this being plainly to destroy the Deity, by making one attribute thereof to devour and swallow up another; infinite will and power, infinite understanding and wisdom. For to suppose God to understand, and to be wise only by his will, is all one as to suppose him to have really no understanding at all. Wherefore we do not affirm God to be so omnipotent, or infinitely powerful, as that he is able to destroy or change the intelligible natures of things at pleasure; this being all one as to say, that God is so omnipotent and infinitely powerful, that he is able to destroy, or to baffle and befool his own wisdom and understanding, which is the very rule and measure of his power. We say not therefore, that God, by his omnipotence, or infinite power, could make twice two not to be four, or turn a tree into a syllogism; but we say, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can produce and do all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable, and implies no manner of contradiction; the very essence of possibility being no other than conceptibility. And

natures of things are eternal and immutable." If this be indeed the case, Des Cartes is inconsistent with himself, and most evidently confirms the opinion of those who think that he was actuated by religious partiality in speaking otherwise in the places we have pointed out. But on a careful and attentive perusal of this fifth Meditation, I cannot at all discover that Des Cartes in it differs from himself or from those passages in which he affirms the natures of things to be mutable. For although he there determines the natures of things to be "true, eternal, and immutable," yet he means this to be understood, not in respect to God, but only as regards mankind, who, he avers, cannot possibly imagine to themselves any other forms or essences of the things than such as they were once formed and appointed by God. According to Des Cartes, the natures of things are eternal and immutable, because God has from eternity willed them to be such as they now are; not that they are such, if we take into the account his own power, which is so great as to be able to change them. But this dogma of Des Cartes' which some of his followers have rejected and others have approved, is for the most part explained by them in such a perplexed and confused manner, that the authors themselves seem not to have understood their own meaning. Nor is this very wonderful, since it is of that description that its falsehood is apparent as soon as it is explained in clear and perspicuous expressions.

thus has the point been stated all along, not only by Christian Theists, but even the ancient pagan Theologers themselves, that omnipotence, or infinite power, is that which can do all things that do not imply a contradiction, or which are not inconceivable. This appearing from that of Agatho, cited before out of Aristotle,[8] "That nothing is exempted from the divine power, but only to make πεπραγμένα ἀγένητα, "what hath been done to be undone," or the like hereunto. Now infinite power being nothing else but a power of doing whatsoever is conceivable, it is plainly absurd to say, that a power of doing nothing but what is conceivable is inconceivable.[9]

[8] Lib. 6. ad Nicomach. cap. 2. p. 98. tom. 3. opp. Τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι· διὸ ἀγαθῶς Ἀγαθών·

Μόνου γὰρ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεὸς στερίσκεται,
Ἀγένητα ποιεῖν, ἅσσ' ἂν ᾖ πεπραγμένα,

"But what is done cannot be made to be undone; as Agathon well says:

'One thing alone the power of God can shun,
That things once done shall ere be made undone.'"

See also that famous passage of Celsus in Origen, Contra Celsum, lib. 5. p. 240. where he expressly states that God can do nothing either contrary to holiness or contrary to the nature of things: Ἀλλ' οὔτε γε τὰ αἰσχρὰ ὁ Θεὸς δύναται, οὐδὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν βούλεται, "For God can neither do any thing disgraceful, nor will any thing contrary to nature." What Celsus calls τὰ παρὰ φύσιν, are the same as others call things mutually repugnant or contradictory. Origen himself approves this opinion of Celsus, and says it also had the approbation of all Christians, pp. 246. 247. He says, among other things, that when Christians assert that God can do all things, they always except τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα and ἀδιανόητα. The interpreter obscurely renders the first word *nonexistentia*, "non-existences." More properly it should be, "things that cannot be brought to pass."

[9] Our author here ingeniously and learnedly disputes against Des Cartes and those of his disciples who think it a part of piety and reverence towards God to affirm that he can cause to be simultaneously existent things which are in their own nature entirely incongruous. But it is easy to prove by the best authorities that he is incorrect in his supposition that Des Cartes was the originator and author of this opinion, before whom it was unknown both to Christian and heathen philosophers. In this however he is supported by that respectable philosopher Gerard de Vries, who in his Philosophemata Miscellanea, subjoined to his Exercitationes Rationales de Deo, Divinisque Perfectionibus, Utrecht, 1685, 4to. in a Dissertation entitled, De Contradictoriis Deo Possibilibus, sect. 1. p. 336. confidently avers that not one person before Des Cartes ever held so absurd an opinion, except an enthusiast named Valentine Weigel, who was acutely confuted by John Crocius, in his Anti-Weigelium, quest. 2. preliminary sections 2. 3. p. 27. Speaking of Des Cartes, De Vries says, "He was the founder of a most absurd opinion which still prevails among his followers." How little almost all authors differ from this opinion is evident from the fact that whenever they touch upon this controversy, whether God can or cannot effect things contradictory, they name none but the Cartesians as maintaining the affirmative. See, among others, Zachary Grapius, in his Theologia Recens Controversa, part 1. quest. 24. p. 92. and Peter Bayle, Pensées sur les Comètes, part 2. sect. 114. p. 554. and Peter Van Maestricht, in his Gangræna Novitatum Cartesianarum, last sect. chap. 9. p. 246. &c. I will undertake to show that this supposition is incorrect, and that many others besides Des Cartes, and who had no connexion with him, have taught the same thing. But I will leave out of the consideration those (and they are a great number) who have left on record their opinion that "God is able to do impossibilities," the passages relating to which opinion have been collected out of ancient authors by Dionysius Petavius in his Dogmata Theologica, vol. 1. book 5. De Deo, cap. 7. sect 6. p. 223. For I grant that this expression may be understood of those things which to us appear to be

But, because the Atheists look upon infinity as such a desperate and affrightful thing, we shall here render it something more easy, and take off that frightful vizard from it, which makes

beyond possibility, or which in regard to us are actually impossible; nor is it necessary to understand it of those things which on their own account are unaccomplishable, or are impossible in their own nature. Nor do I now allude to those who have affirmed that "God can do all things, except lie," which is asserted by Clemens Romanus in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 27. p. 164. in the first volume of the Patres Apostolici, and has been repeated by many after him. For I think it too dangerous, from any such generalities of expression to deduce the opinion of any one, which might perhaps have been correctly enough expressed by the authors, had they still survived. I shall name as the principal among the ancient Christian divines, who have advocated the opinion mentioned above, Tertullian, who in his book against Praxeas, chap. 10. p. 351. plainly avers that it is in God's power to make himself to be his own son, that is, that God could at the same time be both Father and Son; which is immediately seen to be a self-contradictory proposition. The "Monarchians," against whom Tertullian is there disputing, drew from the infinite power of God this argument to defend their cause: "Nothing is difficult to God; therefore it was not difficult for God to make himself both Father and Son, contrary to the usual course of human affairs." To cut this knot Tertullian first of all grants that nothing is difficult to God; but then he adds that God does not do all that he is able to accomplish. "For," says he, "it does not follow that because he can do all things, that therefore he has done them." He confesses then that there is nothing to prevent the truth of the assertion made by the Monarchians, "that God could make himself to be both Father and Son;" but he denies that God willed to do this. And this is most plainly apparent from the following words, with which he closes his disputation against this mode of reasoning: "According to this reasoning, something will be difficult to God, namely, whatever he has not done, not because he could not, but because he would not. Therefore because, if he willed to make himself son to himself, he could have done it, and because if he could have done it he has done it, you will then prove that he both could and would, if you have proved that he has done it." Whoever can persuade himself that the divine power is so great that God could beget and procreate himself from all eternity, will as easily believe that he could make a triangle be at the same time a square, and a mountain at the same instant a valley. After Tertullian, I have met with no one who thus boldly decides upon what God can do, previously to the age in which Paschasius Radbertus, more plainly than had before been done, defended that conversion of the bread and wine into the body and blood of our Saviour which is commonly called Transubstantiation. For this dogma cannot be defended, except we allow that God can make those things to be simultaneously true, which by the very nature of things cannot be so, as, for example, that the accidents should remain when the substance is gone; that is, that that which is a nonentity should nevertheless exist, and not only exist, but be long, broad, moist, round, sweet, heavy, or hard, and many other things of the same kind, which have been more ably than elsewhere enumerated, by the most acute of English divines, William Chillingworth, in his well-known book, The Religion of Protestants a safe Way to Salvation, vol. 2. chap. 4. p. 277. &c. Wherefore, not only Paschasius Radbertus, at the beginning of his book, De Sacramento Cœnæ, cap. 1. but also those who have embraced his views, plainly avow their approbation of this opinion. Subsequently, several of the schoolmen, as they are called, have freely disputed on this subject, and as the error of transubstantiation constantly increased among Christians, not a few of this sect have maintained that God can unite into one whole things that are in their nature entirely opposite. And the whole university of Paris, which formerly possessed a decided pre-eminence, has plainly given in its adhesion to this tenet, since it enumerates among the principal errors of Thomas Aquinas, his affirmation that God cannot perform things self-contradictory. The words of the Parisian divines are quoted by John Launoy, in his work, De Variâ Aristotelis Fortunâ in Academiâ Parisiensi, cap. 10. pp. 214. 215. "Whence they also say, that in the philosophical determinations and natural principles in cap. 15. of the same book, he has manifestly erred, where in showing how God Almighty may be said to be unable to do certain acts, among other things he has said that God is not able to

it seem such a mormo, or bugbear to them, by declaring, in the next place, that infinity is really nothing else but perfection. For infinite understanding and knowledge is nothing else but

make one and the same thing to be and not to be, that is, contradictories co-existent; and afterwards adds that a contradiction is involved in contraries, and things which so oppose as mutually to destroy each other. For if a thing be white and black, it follows that is white and not white." Who can doubt that previously to the Reformation there were a great number of the most celebrated doctors who favoured the same opinion, since in those times the authority of the Parisian divines was so great that their enunciations and decrees were regarded as equal to divine revelations? Nor at the present time can any who adopt the Romish doctrine of the Lord's supper be of a different opinion, unless they wish to be inconsistent with themselves. For though perhaps some of them, impelled by the force of truth, may deny it, yet they are accustomed, as soon as the controversy has made any progress, immediately to betake themselves to the infinite power of God as to their sheet-anchor. Whence it is evident that they *implicitly* (to speak scholastically) believe that God can perform contradictory things, though they are unwilling *explicitly* to confess it, for fear of being caught in those snares which, as they are aware, are laid for those who are of this opinion. I do not precisely know whether in the number of our own divines, [Lutherans] there has been any one who has openly and without circumlocution declared that the power of God was so great as to be able to accomplish what is impossible in the very nature of things. But there are some whose sentiments do not seem very widely to differ from this. Among those indeed who are called "Reformed" [Calvinists] some have accused us all of this error, since we maintain a real presence of the body and blood of Jesus Christ in the Lord's Supper; but it is evident that these learned men do us an injury. For we do not assert that God can do contradictory things; but only entertain such a reverence of the Deity as not to hesitate to believe his words, even when the thing promised appears to rank among impossibilities. Let those who think us in this to be in fault, take care lest they attribute more power to their own minds than is proper, and consider every thing to be contradictory which exceeds our comprehension. Peter Van Maestricht, in his Gangræna Novitatum Cartesianarum, p. 267. expressly accuses that most worthy divine, John Gerard, of the error we have been alluding to. Nor can it be denied that this good man has given some occasion for this suspicion with regard to him. For in his Theological Common Places, vol. 1. De Naturâ Dei, sect. 127. p. 274. he says, "We do not deny this rule, that God cannot do, or *more properly speaking, would not do*, things really contradictory." The meaning of which sentence seems to be, that God could indeed do things of this kind, but does not do them, that is, wills not to do them; which opinion we have shown above to be that of Tertullian. But since I am ignorant whether Gerard may not more clearly have expressed his meaning in other places, I can say nothing decisive upon the matter, but must leave it in doubt. Some have entertained a similar suspicion in reference to John Hülsemann, who, though in other respects a very acute theologian, is well known to have averred that "God can perform things contradictory, both materially and formally." But he is defended by the late John Hermann von Elswich, in his notes on John Launoy's De Variâ Fortunâ Aristotelis, &c. p. 215; and who has also observed in his Vindiciæ Scripturarum, art. 5. that Hülsemann most correctly treated of the divine power. Whether Brentius can be cleared with equal facility, I very much doubt; for in his Confessio Wurtembergica de Eucharistiâ, contained in Christian Matthew Pfaff's Acts and Monuments of the Church of Wurtemburg, p. 197. he has not hesitated to affirm that so great is the power of God that "he can change the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. We also believe," he adds, "that God's omnipotence is such, that it can in the Eucharist either annihilate the substance of bread and wine, or can change it into the body and blood of Christ. But that God has exercised this his absolute omnipotent power in the Eucharist, does not seem to be declared." But perhaps this excellent man held the same sentiments as all the modern divines of our purer communion; but at the time when he wrote this he did not perceive all the consequences which at the present day we see to be connected with the doctrine of transubstantiation, and therefore did not rank it among opinions that may be called self-contradictory. It may certainly happen that a person may have imbibed correct principles, and yet be mistaken in the

perfect knowledge, that which hath no defect or mixture of ignorance with it or the knowledge of whatsover is knowable. So in like manner, infinite power is nothing else but perfect power, that which hath no defect or mixture of impotency in it; a power of producing and doing all whatsoever is possible, that is, whatsoever is conceivable. Infinite power can do whatsoever infinite understanding can conceive, and nothing else; conception being the measure of power, and its extent, and whatsoever is in itself inconceivable being therefore impossible. Lastly, Infinity of duration, or eternity, is really nothing else but perfection, as including necessary existence and immutability in it; so that it is not only contradictious to such a Being to cease to be, or exist, but also to have had a newness or beginning of being, or to have any flux or change therein, by dying to the present, and acquiring something new to itself, which was not before. Notwithstanding which, this Being comprehends the differences of past, present, and future, or the successive priority and posteriority of all temporary things: and because infinity is perfection, therefore can nothing, which includeth any thing of imperfection in the very idea and essence of it, be every truly and properly infinite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and successive duration. All which can only, mentiri infinitatem, "counterfeit and imitate infinity," in their having more and more added to them infinitely, whereby notwithstanding they never reach it, or overtake it. There is nothing truly infinite, neither in knowledge, nor in power, nor in duration, but only one absolutely perfect Being, or the holy Trinity.

Now, that we have an idea or conception of perfection, or a perfect Being, is evident from the notion that we have of imperfection, so

application of general rules. Among the divines of the Reformed Church, besides those who on this subject follow Descartes, I have at hand one whom I may with the utmost propriety term a favourer of this error respecting the divine power, namely, Henry Burton, whose Annotations on Clement's Epistle to the Corinthians, first published at London, 1647, were translated into Latin by Le Clerc, and appended to the second volume of the Patres Apostolici. For at p. 479. of that volume, he asserts that God of his own accord does not do things self-repugnant, because he wills not to do so; but that yet he is able to do them; for which opinion he is corrected by Le Clerc. To Barton may also be joined Sir Thomas Browne, an English author of great but dubious reputation, who, in his Religio Medici, part 1. sect. 26. p. 29. adopts the same opinion, whether sincerely or feignedly I cannot tell. "Whoever," says he, "measures the divine power by the capacity of his own mind, restrains it within too confined limits. I believe that God can do all things. How God can do those things which *imply a contradiction* I do not understand, but I do not therefore venture to deny his ability to do them. I do not deny his ability, but I only say that he wills not to do those things which we commonly assert that he is utterly unable to perform. This is certainly the most respectful way, nor do I in this give any countenance to paradoxes." We have spoken above of the fanatical Weigel; and at present I do not recollect any more to associate with Des Cartes: but no more are needed to prove what I have already asserted; that it is a mistake to suppose that Des Cartes was the first broacher of this opinion, or that none have embraced it but his followers and friends.

familiar to us; perfection being the rule and measure of imperfection, and not imperfection of perfection; as a straight line is the rule and measure of a crooked, and not a crooked line of a straight: so that perfection is first conceivable, in order of nature, before imperfection, as light before darkness, a positive before the privative or defect. For perfection is not properly the want of imperfection, but imperfection of perfection. Moreover, we perceive divers degrees of perfection in the essences of things, and consequently a scale or ladder of perfections, in nature, one above another, as of living and animate things above senseless and inanimate, of rational things above sensitive; and this by reason of that notion or idea which we first have of that which is absolutely perfect, as the standard; by comparing of things with which, and measuring of them, we take notice of their approaching more or less near thereunto. Nor indeed could these gradual ascents be infinite, or without end, but they must come at last to that which is absolutely perfect as the top of them all. Lastly, we could not perceive imperfection in the most perfect of all those things which we ever had sense or experience of in our lives, had we not a notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect, which secretly comparing the same with, we perceive it to come short thereof. And we might add here, that it is not conceivable neither, how there should be any lesser perfection existent in any kind were there not first something perfect in that kind, from whence it was derived; this of Boëtius [10] being the very sense and language of nature in rational beings: Omne, quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id diminutione perfecti imperfectum esse perhibetur. Quò fit, ut, si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse videatur, in eo perfectum quoque aliquid esse, necesse sit. Etenim sublatâ perfectione, unde illud, quod imperfectum perhibetur, exstiterit, ne fingi quidem potest. Neque enim a diminutis inconsummatisque natura rerum cepit exordium; sed ab integris absolutisque procedens, in hæc extrema, atque effœta dilabitur, "Whatsoever is said to be imperfect, is accounted such by the diminution of that which is perfect; from whence it comes to pass, that if in any kind any thing appear imperfect, there must of necessity be something also, in that kind, perfect. For perfection being once taken away, it could not be imagined from whence that which is accounted imperfect should have proceeded. Nor did the nature of things take beginning from inconsummate and imperfect things, but proceeding from things absolute and complete, thence descended down to these lower, effete, and languid things." But of this more elsewhere.[1]

[10] De Consolat. Philos. lib. 3. p. 69. 70. Edit. Vallini.

[1] Our author has here expressed the opinion of the Platonists, whom he closely followed. For they maintain that all men naturally have impressed and implanted in their minds an idea of an absolutely perfect nature. Of which number also was

Wherefore, since *infinite* is the same with *absolutely perfect*, we having a notion or idea of the latter, must needs have of the former. From whence we learn also, that though the word

Boetius, with whose words our author closes his discussion. But] most others think differently, and contend that by the contemplation of things not entirely perfect, we attain by degrees to a knowledge of an absolutely perfect nature, and therefore deny that we bring with us into the world any innate idea of the kind. Wherefore it is no wonder that Dr. Cudworth's opinion has had few favourers, and has been controverted by some, especially by Le Clerc, in the Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 59. What my opinion is will be manifest from the following remarks. 1. It is of little or no consequence, in this controversy against the Atheists, whether we agree with Dr. Cudworth, or embrace the opposite opinion. All that we seek to maintain against that profane sect is, that no man in his senses but must confess that there is an absolutely perfect nature of the kind in question, from which all other things have proceeded. Whence it follows by the very fact itself, that an idea of the kind, though perhaps imperfect, is to be found in the minds of all the rational part of mankind. Now, if an Atheist will grant us this, it will be of no importance to us whether he supposes this idea to be born with us, or to have come from without, and to have been occasioned by the contemplation of the existences with which we are surrounded. 2. If our learned author supposes that there is really innate in the minds of all men an explicit idea of an absolutely perfect nature (which was indeed the opinion of the Platonists, whose follower he is), he will be opposed both by experience and by reason. The idea of an absolutely perfect being properly consists of two propositions, one of which is, that there is an eternal cause of all things, and the other, that this eternal cause of all things is possessed of infinite perfections. But our daily observation shows that there are many men and not of contemptible understandings, who have made no doubt of the first proposition, but constantly affirm that there is a God, or an eternal cause of all things, though they have often conjoined many imperfections with the idea they entertain of God. Some have believed that God is corporeal; some have measured him by their own mental capacity; some have contaminated and obscured their idea of God by the gravest errors. Whence could so many and such great mistakes arise in the minds of men, if they had always present within them an interior and innate idea of an absolutely perfect nature? Would not this idea of an absolutely perfect nature have resisted all the aberrations of the mind, have prevented all persons from any unworthy thoughts of God, and have taken away all the disagreement that at present subsists among men, respecting the nature of God? Perhaps it will be said that this idea is indeed present, but through the fault of mankind it cannot exert its power, nor cure the errors of the mind. How can it be proved, I should like to know, that this idea is present? We can know what is concealed in our minds only by its operations and effects. Since then this idea has no operation, nor gives any token of its presence in this way, by what proof can we be certified that it really is present, and is concealed within our own minds? Moreover, since in our] author's opinion perfection is the same as infinity, if there be in all mankind an explicit idea of perfection, there must also be in them a mental representation of infinity; but how a finite and limited mind can take in a full idea of infinity, is beyond my comprehension, and perhaps that of all others, who unanimously confess that we have no absolute idea of infinity; which Dr. Cudworth himself does not deny, as is plain from what has already preceded. By far the most preferable opinion, therefore, is that which supposes that the inward idea of God which manifests its influence as soon as we begin to use our reasoning powers, is not at first complete in all its parts, but is perfected and improved by meditation, education, and an attentive consideration of the works of Deity. Nor, 3. are the arguments here adduced by our author of sufficient weight to induce us to give up this opinion. His first position is, that perfection is the measure of imperfection, but that imperfection is not the measure of perfection. This is an old dogma of the Platonists, the meaning of which no doubt is, that no one can know what is imperfect, without first knowing what is perfect; wherefore, unless we had within us an idea of an absolutely perfect nature, none of us could know that the things we behold were devoid of perfection. But though we do not wish to detract any thing from the correctness of this tenet, it does not thence necessarily follow that we are endued by nature with an idea of an absolutely perfect

infinite be in the form thereof negative, yet is the sense of it, in those things which are really capable of the same, positive, it being all one with absolutely perfect; as likewise the sense of the word finite is negative, it being the same with imperfect. So that finite is properly the negation of infinite, as that which in order of nature is before it; and not infinite the negation of finite.[2] However, in those things which are capable of no true infinity, because they are essentially finite, as number, corporeal magnitude, and time, infinity being there a mere imaginary thing, and a non-entity, it can only be conceived by the negation of finite; as we also conceive nothing, by the negation of something; that is, we can have no positive conception thereof.

We conclude, to assert an infinite being, is nothing else but to assert a being absolutely perfect, such as never was not, or had no beginning, which could produce all things possible and conceivable, and upon which all other things must depend. And

being. It is indeed evident from it, that those who judge of the excellency and utility of things have within them a standard of something perfect, according to which they form their decisions; but this will by no means prove that this standard is implanted by nature and innate; for it may, notwithstanding, be collected and produced within us from meditation and a contemplation of outward existences. A similar answer may be given to the second argument: That men are accustomed to distribute the beings found in the universe into various classes, and to prefer and esteem some rather than others; but this they could by no means do, unless they had within them some idea of perfection with which they could compare and contrast visible objects. This reasoning will indeed prove that there is in the minds of those who distinguish created beings into their several grades a certain standard or rule of perfection, to which they look when they wish to set upon any thing its proper value; but it does not prove that this standard or rule is actually present in all minds, as they are born into the world. Nor is his third argument of greater weight: That nothing is seen by us in so perfect a form, but that we may observe some deficiency in it; but that we could not observe this unless our minds were imbued with an idea of that which is complete and perfect. We can easily admit all this argumentation; for it does not at all make against us. For this argument shows indeed the presence of the idea in question, in the minds of those who discover the faults and blemishes even of those things which approach nearest to perfection; but it does not point out its origin and causes, or prove that it is coeval with ourselves. But 4. our author concludes not amiss, that since we have an idea of an absolutely perfect being, we must necessarily also have some notion of something infinite.

[2] To the best of my apprehension, neither of the two words, *finite* and *infinite*, can be absolutely said to be positive, or absolutely *negative*. But a twofold idea is common to them both, of which the one denies and the other affirms something. For these words have a double meaning and power, one *grammatical* and the other *philosophical*, as is the case with nearly all the words used in philosophical explanations. The grammatical sense is the individual power and purport of the word, but the philosophical sense is the explanation of the nature of the thing to which the words are applied. If the words *infinite* and *finite* are regarded grammatically, there can be no doubt but that the former has a negative, the latter an affirmative signification. For the *infinite* properly means that which is without bounds, and the *finite* that which is contained by limits. But the case is different if we regard the philosophical ideas attached to these words. For the *infinite*, with philosophers, is identical with the most complete and perfect nature; but *finite* existences are those which are at the greatest distance from perfection. So that if these words are viewed under this aspect, *infinite* will doubtless have a *positive* sense, and *finite* a *negative*: and in this last sense Dr. Cudworth uses these two words in this passage.

this is to assert a God; one absolutely perfect Being, the original of all things: God, and Infinite, and Absolutely Perfect, being but different names for one and the same thing.[3]

[3] This discussion on the nature of infinity will appear to many novel and singular, since it widely departs from the common and usual method of treating this argument. Our ears are accustomed to the words, infinite time, infinite magnitude, infinite number, and many propositions are constantly laid down by philosophers respecting these infinities. So that he who denies all infinity whatever to magnitude, time, and number, and will by no means admit that any of these can possibly be infinite, cannot but appear to those who have been otherwise instructed as prone to what Cicero once called admirabilia, "paradoxes." Hence also Le Clerc, who, as I have already said, was in other respects a subtle and most acute genius, plainly professes his dissent from Dr. Cudworth on the nature of infinity, and many since have thought that the matter was explained by our author with more subtlety than truth. But if his remarks be more attentively examined and tried by our internal first principles of reasoning, it will be apparent that they possess much more truth than they seem at first sight to have. Several who have undertaken to philosophize respecting infinity (as might be instanced in many examples) have only had in view the grammatical import of the word *infinite;* whence it has resulted that they have confounded those things which are truly infinite with those which are only improperly so called, merely in respect to ourselves; and they have reasoned as if something actually existed infinite in magnitude, time, or number. But Dr. Cudworth has in this discussion almost entirely laid aside this grammatical meaning, and has only had regard to the internal nature of the thing really designated by this word; on which account he seems widely to differ from other philosophers. I could wish that he had explained and expanded his meaning with less intricacy and more order, and then it would have been involved in less obscurity. But doubtless a desire of brevity prevented him from going into more of length and detail. I will therefore endeavour to treat more simply these matters, which are in other respects surrounded with great difficulties, and will try to explain them apart from those subtleties which have occurred to my mind while thinking about them. I shall proceed as if nothing had been written on the subject; in which course, if perchance I may fall into error, I shall be easily pardoned by those who reflect that in nothing do finite minds sooner fail than in discussions respecting infinity; which reason Des Cartes alleged for his own silence on the subject. "Since we ourselves are finite," says he, "it were absurd for us to determine aught respecting infinity, and thus to endeavour to limit and comprehend it," Princip. Philos. part 1. sect. 26. p. 7.

In the first place, every rational person will admit, that something has existed from all eternity, and that whatever has thus eternally existed must exist necessarily and without a cause. This is so certain, that no one can deny it, consistently with reason. For though no mortal may understand what it is that has been eternally existent by an absolute necessity, yet that this is its nature is as certain as that two and two make four. From this idea, of which it is impossible to divest the mind, immediately arises the idea of infinity. For two consequences are plain and evident. 1. That which is necessarily and self-existent cannot be contained and confined within any particular locality, but must be every where, or if we may so speak, must be universally and equally present throughout infinity. For if this nature were absent from any locality, or were contained within specific limits, some cause would have immediately to be assigned why it were not present in a particular spot. But then this nature would not be necessarily uncaused and self-existent; but there would be another cause, apart from it, by means of which it was confined and restrained; that is, it would not be what it is. This reflection leads us to that infinity which some call that of *fulness*, or *plenitude*, and which we more correctly call with theologians *immensity*. No human mind indeed has penetration enough to explain and comprehend the nature and mode of this infinity; for if any one possessed sufficient penetration he would no longer be a human being, circumscribed within certain limits, both as regards his mind and body. But no one, I think, will deny the proposition who has learned the art of reasoning, and understands the properties necessarily attaching to particular existences. 2. What is necessarily and self-existent must be fraught with all the perfections of which we can form any idea. For should any perfection be wanting to this

We come now to the fourth atheistic objection: That theology is nothing but an arbitrarious compilement of inconsistent and contradictious notions. Where, first, we deny not, but that

external nature, or should any limit be assigned to the perfections it possesses, doubtless there would be some cause why something was deficient in it. But as soon as we imagine the presence of any such cause, we deny that the subject of discussion is necessarily and self-existent, without any cause, and allow that there was something pre-existent and more powerful. From which considerations it is again manifest that *infinity of perfection* is what no one can deny without renouncing his reason. The *infinite* therefore is properly that which has existed necessarily from all eternity; and since what has existed by necessity and without a cause cannot but be immense and absolutely perfect, and immensity is undoubtedly to be reckoned among perfections, it is evident that it may be properly said that *infinite* and *absolutely perfect* are words of like signification. Wherefore, if Dr. Cudworth gives so wide an acceptation to the word *perfection*, as to comprehend under it an infinity of locality (as I suspect he does), I do not see how he is wrong in saying that *infinity* is nothing else than *perfection*, and on the other hand, that *perfection* is nothing else than *infinity*. His language is indeed rather different from what is usual among those who discuss this subject; but still he has expressed the matter itself with propriety and accuracy. From these considerations proceed the following corollaries, which will, I think, tend to throw some light on this argument.

1. There is in all human minds an idea of *infinity;* for they possess an idea of an eternal and necessary existence. Whoever therefore denies that there is aught infinite either in regard to locality, or in respect of attributes and perfections, denies that any thing is eternal, that is, they speak absurdly, and overthrow the first foundations of reason.

2. Whatever is necessary and self-existent is also infinite; and on the other hand, whatever is not necessary and self-existent cannot be infinite. For what is not necessarily existent must have some cause; and what is produced by any cause, must of necessity be bounded by its cause. Therefore it can neither possess universal perfection, nor can be universally present, nor can have existed from eternity.

3. Matter cannot be infinite, either as regards duration or locality: for it is destitute of several perfections, as is universally known by daily experience. But what is deficient even in one attribute is manifestly bounded by some cause. Whatever then is finite and limited in respect of perfection, can by no means be unlimited and infinite with respect to duration and locality. Whatever doctrines are different from these are self-repugnant and contradictory; for they affirm that matter is bounded by some cause, and yet that it possesses properties which are consistent only with a nature that is necessary and self-existent.

4. Those who grant that any thing has necessarily existed from all eternity, and yet deny the existence of a God, are ignorant of their own meaning, and are as much in error as if any one should say, that there was a king in the commonwealth, and yet should deny that any one in it had the power of making and administering laws. That nature, in which all imaginable virtues and perfections are inherent, is God. To deny, therefore, the existence of such a nature, is precisely to contend that there is nothing but what is bounded by some cause, and contained within definite limits. But whoever entertains this persuasion must at the same time admit that nothing has a necessary and uncaused existence. But if there is nothing necessary and uncaused, there is at the same time nothing eternal; and those who deny the existence of any thing eternal will do well to take care that they do not afford matter of ridicule to all rational persons. To deny a God is therefore completely to overthrow and destroy the foundations of all rational discussion, and to sin against the first axioms of reason.

I might, if I chose, make further deductions from what has been already said; but since I do not wish to be more subtle or more protracted than is proper, I will content myself with these. I know that many other questions are usually started by those who are called philosophical doctors concerning the nature of infinity; and I will readily permit those who are so inclined, to employ their minds about them, if they will allow to me and others the liberty of saying, that it is safer for mankind to measure themselves by their own standard, than to wish to know every thing which by

as some Theologers (or bigotical Religionists) of later times extend the divine omnipotence to things contradictious and impossible, as to the making of one and the same body, to be all of it, in

common consent is allowed to be above our ability, and of a peculiarly abstruse nature. I am also aware that some philosophers have not hesitated to circumscribe within certain definitions what they term *infinity*; but I am persuaded that many of these have disguised their own ignorance by words to which they themselves have not attached any meaning. Some have magisterially declared, that "infinite locality is but a point; infinite duration is a moment." But those who speak thus seem to me either to speak without meaning, or to utter contradictory assertions. "A point" and "a moment" are doubtless words having a finite signification, and therefore they who call infinity either "a point" or "a moment," at once say that it is finite. But if they do not wish these words to be taken in this acceptation (which must certainly be the case if they would not appear ridiculous), they should either clearly explain to us what ideas they attach to these words when applied to infinity, or must at least confess that they have ventured to explain a subject, the nature of which they do not comprehend, in words of whose force and power they are ignorant; that is, that they have endeavoured to throw upon a most obscure topic light drawn from the densest gloom.

Thus much being premised, I will now proceed in order to the consideration of those things, to which Dr. Cudworth (differently from other philosophers) denies that infinity can in any way be ascribed; namely, *magnitude* or *extension*, *number*, and *time*. Whoever will remember that the word *infinite* is taken by him in the philosophical sense, and is used by him as synonymous with *absolutely perfect*, will immediately perceive that nothing whatever has been committed by him worthy of reprehension. For since the things in question are nothing in themselves, but only *properties*, *modes*, *and relations* of real existences, it is plain that they are not of a kind to partake of the highest imaginable perfection. He therefore who inquires, "whether number be infinite or not?" does not mean, "whether there be in number all the perfections and attributes we can possibly conceive of?" but only inquires, "whether there be any number without bound or limit?" The same may be said of space, magnitude, and time. In short, those who call God *infinite* use the word in the sense we have called philosophical; but those who treat of infinite magnitude, time, space, and number, have in their minds the grammatical meaning, and simply seek to ascertain whether these things are confined within definite limits. But Dr. Cudworth seems to have expressly denied to these things all infinity whatever, whether in the philosophical or grammatical sense of the word; so that it remains to be seen by us whether time, magnitude, and number are without limit or not.

I will begin with *magnitude* or *extension*. Magnitude or extension, as all are aware, is the property of all things. But there are two classes of existences that can possess this property, *body* or *matter*, and *space*. We will speak of each separately. The first inquiry then will be, Whether body or matter is infinite in extension? or, Whether infinity is, or is not, inconsistent with the nature of matter? Or again, to change the mode of expression, Whether that nature which we call matter is as widely extended as it possibly can be, and as much so as we suppose the divine nature and essence to be? To solve this question, I would first observe, that those who maintain that matter is infinite must choose one of two alternatives: either, that matter is, by its own nature, infinite, or what is the same thing, that it has been necessarily and in itself infinite from all eternity; or, on the contrary, that God has formed and created out of nothing an infinite quantity of matter. If they adopt the first view, they are easily convicted of error. For, since what is necessarily and self-existent cannot but possess all possible and imaginable perfections, while matter is, on the contrary, of that kind of existences which are subject to defects and changes, it is plain that it cannot have been self-existent from all eternity. I pass over other arguments, by which very acute authors have lately proved that the dictates of right reason are violated by those who suppose matter to be self-existent. See Jacques Abbadie, De la Vérité de la Religion Chrétienne, sect. 1. cap. 6. sect. 4. p. 49. &c. Dion. Petavius, Dogmata Theol. vol. 1. lib. 3. cap. 5. 6. p. 143. &c. and many others besides. But if they prefer the latter supposition, the controversy will take a widely different turn. I am not unaware of what has been said from Des Cartes' time downwards on the infinity of

several distant places at once; so may others sometimes unskilfully attribute to the Deity things inconsistent or contradictious to one another, because seeming to them to be all perfections.

matter, in which I must confess are many subtle and acute thoughts; but I am at the same time aware that the controversy has been sometimes carried on on both sides as if our puny and narrow minds were adequate to the comprehension of the infinite. Some, therefore, of Des Cartes' followers (from whom their master does not widely differ) have denied that matter is finite, because its limits are beyond the comprehension of our minds. But there have been others again, who, by nearly the same argument, have sought to prove that matter is finite, because no matter can be imagined so great that nothing can be added to it. In my opinion, neither of these are right. For what wise man, I should like to know, would be so presumptuous as to measure all truth by the power and compass of his own mind, and would deny the existence of any thing because his own mental weakness prevented him from forming a complete idea of it? I will take a simpler method, and will at once deny that matter can possibly be infinite, for this reason alone, that infinity and matter are entirely inconsistent with each other, or, in a word, *contradictory*. Every one, I suppose, will admit that matter consists of parts, and is therefore divisible. (See Bibliothèque Française, vol. 21. p. 254.) But what is infinite, as it has no bound, so also it cannot consist of parts, nor can be in any way divisible. For if it could be divided and separated into parts, it would then have a boundary, and would not be infinite. Those, therefore, who hold that matter was made infinite by God, maintain the following supremely absurd proposition: That God has done things utterly impossible to be done, namely, has made the same thing divisible and indivisible, possessed and not possessed of parts, infinitely extended, and yet definitively circumscribed. I will explain my meaning more clearly. Those who assert that matter was created infinite by God, will not deny that he can, by his wondrous might and power, subtract and take away something from this infinite matter, or annihilate some part of it. For who would be so mad as to affirm that God could educe from nothing an infinite quantity of matter, and deny that he could again destroy and reconvert into nothing any portion of it? But if God could do this, must there not be some boundary to that matter which we have been calling infinite? For whatever can have any part subtracted and broken off must necessarily have some boundary, which if it had not, not infinite power itself could take aught from it. But what has any boundary, or what can be deprived even of the smallest part, will be termed infinite only by those who are ignorant of the meaning of the word. To proceed. Let us suppose God to restore to the material universe that part of it which he had taken away: what then? Will matter, which was finite when that part was taken away, again become infinite when it is restored? Those who maintain the infinity of matter cannot but admit this. But then they will oppose their own views, and fall into difficulties from which they cannot escape but by the renunciation of their opinion. That portion which we suppose God to have removed and separated from infinite matter is certainly finite; therefore, if it be again added to the matter from which it was taken, it will still be finite; for assuredly it would be absurd and irrational to suppose that this portion would be converted from finite to infinite on being added to its whole. But if this be admitted will it not be the same thing as granting matter to be finite? For we have two finites; the finite part separated from its whole, and the finite whole deprived of its part. These two finites are supposed to be again joined and united by God. Is it possible, then, that this union of two finites can make an infinite? Can that matter which was finite become infinite by the addition of a finite portion? Certain I am, that no sane and rational person can ever imagine that from two finites joined and united, that is from two things circumscribed by bounds and limits when combined and associated, can result an infinite existence, destitute of all bounds. It would be much less absurd to affirm, that the riches of Crœsus could be made up from the halfpence of two beggars, or that the union of two candles could compose the sun. It appears then that those who call matter infinite make use of words without any real ideas, and that the thing itself is to be reckoned among those which cannot by any means be done and are called *contradictory*. Wherefore I think that Dr. Cudworth is correct in supposing that not even the infinite power of God can create any magnitude to which nothing further can be added. For since infinity is entirely repugnant to the nature of matter, and God himself cannot do what

As for example, though it be concluded generally by theologers, that there is a natural justice and sanctity in the Deity, yet do some notwithstanding contend, that the will of God is not de-

is contradictory, it is plain that those who suppose the Deity able to create matter without bound or limit, do not so much honour and reverence God as they overthrow those first principles of reasoning from which all deductions respecting the divine attributes are drawn; since, while they appear to themselves to make many affirmations, they in reality affirm nothing at all. Many arguments to the same purpose occur to my mind: but since they are more abstruse, and require more explanation than I have room for here, I prefer to defer them until another occasion.

Respecting *space* Dr. Cudworth seems to me to have reasoned no worse than he has respecting magnitude, whatever may be thought by those who are opposed to his philosophy. First of all, I grant the existence of a nature in which bodies move and revolve, that is, space. For though I endeavour with all my power to imagine the abrogation of space after the subtraction of corporeal beings, as Des Cartes and many other philosophers have supposed, I am unable to accomplish it. I might almost say, that in the same way that all human minds have an idea of an eternal and self-existent being, they have also implanted in them an innate idea of space, which it is impossible for any one entirely to eject and extirpate. If any one inquire of me the nature of this existence which I have called space, I must answer that I am ignorant of it, but yet am certain of the existence of the thing so designated. If it be more closely demanded to what class of beings space belongs, I must refer for my answer to Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, lib. 2. cap. 13. p. 192. Peter Gassendi's Physics, sect. 1. lib. 2. cap. 1. p. 182. of the first volume of his works, Newton, Clarke, and others. Is space then finite or infinite? (See on this subject the Bibliothèque Germanique, tom. 37. p. 127.) I know that some famous authors, to whose merits and learning I in other respects pay deference, have not hesitated to attribute infinity to space. Nor is this a modern opinion, but derived from those whose piety and virtue are now above suspicion. But I think Dr. Cudworth has acted more wisely in departing from this opinion, and denying that space can possibly be called infinite. Space, of whatever kind it may be, must either have been self-existent from all eternity, or must have been created and made by God. If the former alternative be taken, either it will not differ from God himself, or rather from the immensity of God, or else will exist apart from God. But I think no person who is aware that to be self-existent is one and the same thing as to be possessed of every perfection, will affirm that space is necessarily and self-existent apart from and exclusive of God; and therefore that nothing can be self-existent except God. Since therefore this is the case, if space be not made or created, then it will be nothing else than the divine immensity, or God himself. Certainly some of the most eminent Christian fathers have been of this opinion, as Theophilus of Antioch, Arnobius, and others, and among the Jews, long before these, Philo, in his book De Profugis, p. 360. who has said that God *τόπον εἶναι πάντων*, "is the place of all things." See what has been collected on this subject by J. Alb. Fabricius upon the tenth book of Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, p. 639. Nor does the sentiment of Johannes Damascenus seem to me at all different, when he says, De Orthodoxâ Fide, lib. 1. cap. 13. p. 149. of the first volume of his works: Ὁ Θεὸς ἑαυτοῦ τόπος ἐστὶ, τὰ πάντα πληρῶν, καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα ὢν, καὶ αὐτὸς συνέχων τὰ πάντα, "God is his own place, filling all things, and being over all things, and himself containing all things." Since the authority of Damascenus was very great in the Greek church, it is not wonderful that a considerable number of the Greek divines have after him inculcated this doctrine, and that it is even expressed, almost in the very words of Damascenus, in the Confession of the Greek Church, edited by Laurence Norman, quæst. 15. p. 34. ed. Lips. 1695, 8vo. Among modern philosophers this sentiment has been unhesitatingly avowed by David Derodon, a very famous author of the last century, in his Principles of Philosophy, as has been remarked by Peter Bayle, Lettres Choisies, tom. 3. n. 256. p. 373. And perhaps there is no real difference between this opinion and that of some recent philosophers, who suppose God "to have, in infinite space as in his sensorium, a thorough perception of all things, and to embrace them all as present within his own presence." See the immortal Sir Isaac Newton's Optics, quæst. 20. p. 315. of the Latin edition. See also some extracts in the Bibliothèque Anglaise of Armand de la Chapelle, tom. 10.

termined by any antecedent rule or nature of justice, but that whatsoever he could be supposed to will arbitrarily, would therefore be ipso facto just; which is called by them the divine

part 2. p. 358. &c. taken from the 31st volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society, or rather from a Dissertation of the great Dr. Edmund Halley's, contained in those Transactions. John Raphson has openly advocated this sentiment in his Demonstration of a Deity, p. 36. &c. London, 1712, 8vo.; and so have others, whose names are of less importance. I will pass over the very great difficulties with which this opinion is encumbered, and of which its own advocates are not ignorant; for it will be sufficient for my present purpose if I show that it is not inconsistent with Dr. Cudworth's doctrine respecting infinity. If God himself, or the divine immensity, be infinite space, the state of our question is altogether changed; for it is no longer an inquiry respecting the infinity of space, but respecting the nature of God himself, whom neither Dr. Cudworth nor any one else, who has learned the right use of reason, will deny to be infinite. Those who inquire into the limits and boundaries of space regard it as a thing separate and distinct from God; which if they did not, they need not trouble themselves with the solution of the question, whether space is circumscribed by bounds or not. Thus far have we replied to those who deny that space was made or created by God. But those who prefer the second alternative, and grant that space was thus made and created, will be more quickly hampered in their opinion by those difficulties in which we have just now seen those entangled who attribute infinity to matter. God either is or is not able to withdraw and abstract some portion from the infinite space he has made. If space cannot be thus diminished, the absurd result will follow, that God cannot destroy what he has made. But if God can detract aught from space, it will not be infinite but finite. For not another Solomon could understand how what is without any bound or limit could be either augmented or decreased. On this subject also we may therefore follow Dr. Cudworth, and take it for granted that more investigations and assertions than proofs, respecting space and its infinity, have commonly been in vogue.

I now come to *number*; which, unless I am mistaken, I shall prove with equal or greater ease, to be utterly incapable of being termed *infinite*. It is well known that number is nothing in itself, but only as applied to objects and actions; whence it is evident that when we speak of the infinity of number we only inquire whether the multiplicity of certain objects or actions be so great as to be absolutely without bound or limit. But even this statement of the question will at once show how those who do not hesitate to ascribe infinity to number involve themselves in contradictions. This will, however, appear much more clearly, if we more accurately investigate the force and meaning of the words *number* and *numbering*. I know not what number means if it be not a multiplicity of objects or actions, each of which separately is finite and limited. And *to number* means to examine how great is the multiplicity of any finite objects or actions, so that it may be known what are the bounds or limits of this or that multiplicity. He who numbers an army investigates within what limits is included a multitude of men whom he sees before him. He who numbers a flock seeks to know by what number or amount is limited the flock that he has in view. Whoever will compare these definitions with the meaning of the word *infinite* will doubtless immediately perceive that the word *infinite* cannot, without manifest contradiction, be joined with the word number, and that these two words are of such a kind that they mutually abrogate and destroy each other. What, pray, is infinity? Is it not that which is destitute of all bound or limit? But what is number? A multiplicity circumscribed within its own bounds. What is numbering? The ascertainment and investigation of the bounds and limits of any aggregation or multiplicity. What is meant then by the expression, *an infinite number*? Unless I am greatly mistaken, it implies that there is some multiplicity at once finite and infinite, divisible and indivisible, numerable and innumerable. What is the meaning of one who talks of numbering infinity? Certainly this, that he seeks to ascertain the boundaries of that which has no bounds. I cannot tell what error it is that is called in logic "a contradiction in terms," if those who speak in this fashion are free from it. I think I shall be able to throw further light on this subject, if I sum up the whole matter in a few questions. I will therefore first inquire of those who do not think infinity to be inconsistent with the nature of numbers, whether there must not be in every number some

sovereignty, and looked upon as a great perfection; though it be certain, that these two things are directly contradictious to one another, viz. that there is something φύσει, in its own nature

extreme from which any one who is about to ascertain the extent of the number may begin? They will answer in the affirmative. Certainly to affirm that any number is destitute of an extreme, or that any thing entirely destitute of a beginning can be numbered, is it to deny and affirm the same thing in a breath. But what is infinite has no extreme whatever, is equally destitute of beginning and of end. Aristotle correctly observes, in the 8th book of his Physics, cap. 5. sect. 4. p. 587. Τῶν ἀπείρων οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν πρῶτον, "Infinites have no beginning." What then is an *infinite number?* A number that is not a number, a thing bounded and not bounded at one extremity, finite and infinite. Secondly, I ask, does not number consist of several things, each of which is finite? This again will be allowed, I think, by all wise men. But if this be granted, I proceed to inquire, Can a number of finites make up an infinite? This will be denied, unless they grant the absurd conclusion that there is finitude in infinity. Indeed, if I have any knowledge at all of these matters, he who affirms that an infinite whole can be made up of several finite existences, affirms and denies in the same breath that it is infinite at all. What then is an infinite number? A finite infinity, that is nothing whatever. Thirdly, I inquire whether number be not a multiplicity of separate parts? which I think no one will deny. For if number has no parts, or be a continuous whole, it could not by any means be numbered, and therefore would not be number. Let those then who think that number can be infinite tell me whether infinity admits of parts and division. This I must deny; for if infinity had any parts there would be throughout it aggregation, finiteness, and bounds; while, on the contrary, reason informs us that what is properly infinite is the most simple thing imaginable. Therefore an infinite number is the same thing as a number that is not a number, or an innumerable number.

Two plausible objections to what has been said have, however, occurred to me. First, it is possible that some will recall to our memory the actions of the Deity; and will say that as God has always been in action, and has acted from all eternity, therefore the number of the divine actions must be boundless and infinite. But it will be sufficient to reply to any one making this objection, that we are not here discussing any thing respecting the Deity and divine things, which we allow and profess to be infinite. Again, the very persons who urge this against us deny that the actions and works of God can be numbered; in which denial they also deny that what is infinite and destitute of limit can be numbered. It is therefore a very improper and inaccurate expression to say, that the number of the divine actions is infinite; for that which is in itself innumerable cannot with propriety be called a number. Those who wish to wear the appearance of rationality in their words should admit that no number can be made of the operations of Deity, and that it is impossible in any way to bring the divine actions under the category of number. Finally, although in our mind and intellect we distinguish the divine operations into separate portions, and in some sense may be said to number them, yet those who measure divine things by an accurate standard, and not according to human modes of thought, are well aware that there is in them nothing of divisibility, but that the divine volition and power has willed and performed all things in one continuous and undivided action. For if the divine actions and operations were mutually divided and disjoined, and therefore really could be numbered just as human actions can, the divine nature would be subject to the same imperfections as the human, and the attributes of Deity would be separate and distinct from his essence.

In the next place perhaps the *mathematical* or *physical infinity* may be objected to us. It is indeed a well-known fact that the most eminent mathematicians and physical philosophers have laid it down as a principle that matter can be infinitely divided; or, what, as I imagine, amounts to the same thing, have contended that the number of particles of which matter consists is infinite. If any dare to call this doctrine into doubt, they are condemned by many of this class as guilty of ignorance and stupidity. If it might be permitted me to cut this knot rather than untie it, I should say that nothing is clear to me on this subject, since I have little time to spend in this literary trifling. Nor do I say thus much without the authority of a very great name. Des Cartes, whom mathematicians will never assert to have halted in the porch of their

just and unjust, or a natural sanctity in God; and that the arbitrary will and command of the Deity is the only rule of justice and injustice. Again, some theologers determining, That what-

temple of science, says, in his Epistles, part 1. ep. 67. ad Dr. Henr. More, p. 187 (see Bibliothèque Germanique, vol. 37. p. 124), "As respects the extent of the universe, the number of parts into which matter is divisible, and similar particulars, whether they be actually infinite or not, I must confess I do not know. I only know that I can perceive no limit to them; and therefore, with respect to myself, I call them indefinite." Not to rely however upon this reply, I might boldly deny that there is any infinity of this kind, which has been not inaptly called "infinity by section" by the Jesuits of Conimbra in their Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, lib. 6. cap. 9. p. 148. and elsewhere. Nor should I want arguments or precedents from most acute writers to support my position, and to make my opponents confess the connexion of inextricable difficulties with this kind of infinity. Perhaps if I urged nothing else than this single proposition, "The parts of a finite whole must also be finite," I should find work enough even for those whose reasoning powers in other respects I should greatly prefer to my own. But I take a plainer course, and laying aside all subtleties, I shall observe that this "infinity by section" (or, if the term be preferred, "mathematical infinity") is improperly called infinite, and widely differs from the metaphysical infinity which is here alone in question. For the metaphysical infinity is one continuous whole, and unbounded (if we may so speak) in both directions. But the infinity spoken of above differs in this, that it is not without beginning, although it may be said to have no end, and consists of innumerable parts. Thus much of *number*. It now only remains for me to speak of *time*, which Dr. Cudworth and several other learned men have denied to be capable of infinity.

It is well known that *time* and *eternity* are commonly opposed to each other. But all who so far disjoin these two as to imagine the one to be entirely opposite to the other, in so doing deny infinity to time. For eternity is infinite duration; and therefore if time be altogether different from eternity, it must in every respect be inconsistent with infinity. So that if I wished to finish the discussion in a few words, I might adduce that universal consent with which time and eternity are regarded as essentially different. But since universal agreement and common parlance are not the best preceptors of truth it will be proper for me more accurately to unfold and more clearly to explain the matter. First then, to prevent any ambiguous ideas in my readers' minds, I will plainly declare the proper point of investigation. *Time* may be regarded in a *double* aspect, either simply in itself, or as compared with those things which advance, glide, and proceed uniformly with time. *Time* considered in itself is a simple entity which is only rendered more obscure by definitions. As no one, however acute, can explain what space is apart from corporeal matter, since its nature is so simple as to elude the subtlety and comprehension of all; so also time can be the subject of no mental operation apart from those things which time contains. It is then usually called *duration;* but I could wish those who do so to consider that this word is by no means a definition of time abstractedly considered, but rather as referring to things which *endure*, or continue to exist. For *duration*, without any thing to *endure*, or to be a partaker of duration, is an empty sound, void of all signification. Let the acutest minds try their strength, whether it be equal to the task of explaining the nature of time in words that shall exclude all reference to the things that take place in time; which, if they do, I will gladly profess myself their disciple, and allow that what I have written has been rashly premature. I am not unaware that some very acute authors have been induced by this difficulty in pointing out the true nature and essence of time, to determine that time considered in itself is nothing else than a mental conception, "an entity of reason," as it is commonly called, or a mode of conceiving things. But I think they have, in order to avoid one difficulty, run into many others that are entirely inextricable. Thus it is the practice of many to reckon among mental delusions any thing that appears more simple and abstract than their own minds can comprehend. But it will, I imagine, be universally admitted, that should all men cease thinking, and even all motion come to a close, there would still be some duration in the world; whence it incontrovertibly follows, that it is a mistake to reckon it among rational entities. If *time* be regarded in connexion with the things we see or know, it is nothing else than the duration or continuance of their

soever is in God, is God, or essential to the Deity; they conceiving such an immutability to be a necessary perfection thereof, seem thereby not only to contradict all liberty of will in the

existence. But this duration comprehends a succession, and is distinguished into several intervals mutually exclusive of and separate from each other. Whence it follows that time, as related to the things which exist in time, is also divided into sections, moments, intervals, and changes; and is a certain kind of continuous existence capable of being divided and measured out into parts. In like manner, *eternity* may be considered by us under a double aspect, either abstractedly in itself or as it relates to God whom we conceive as existing in eternity. Of eternity considered absolutely and in itself we may say the same that we have of time regarded in the abstract; that we cannot tell what it is; nor do I think St. Peter or St. Paul could have given any other answer as long as they continued in this mortal life. Our minds are dazzled and, as it were, carried out of themselves, whenever they turn their view to that immeasurable duration which we call eternity; nor can they find words to express their feelings. But if eternity be viewed in connexion with God, there is no reason why we should not define it to be the unbounded and endless duration of the divine existence. But while I thus divide eternity into itself abstractedly and as viewed in connexion with God, I do not intend to enter upon the abstruse question, whether eternity considered in itself is or is not identical with the Deity. On the contrary, I leave this discussion to the consideration of those whose especial duty it is to philosophize. It will be sufficient for me at present, that the question be stated as if eternity were something distinct from God himself, in the same way as time is conveniently conceived of as existence apart from the things that take place in time.

With these explanations we will now proceed to the point. And first it will be necessary to examine what kind of time is spoken of when time is declared not to be infinite, or, what comes to the same thing, when time is opposed to eternity. If time in the abstract be meant, no account being taken of the things which endure and continue to exist, I do not see any reason why infinity should not be ascribed to time. For the very time in which we live, and in which the works of God exist, does not in its essence differ from eternity; but belongs to infinite duration, and according to our usual mode of conception is part and parcel of eternity, although, properly speaking, there are no parts of eternity or infinite duration. Those therefore who disallow the infinity of time must necessarily mean that kind of time which is connected with created things, since they deny the possibility of comparing time with infinity. But this kind of time, it is at once evident, is entirely inconsistent with infinity, if the nature of each be mutually compared. For eternity is entirely destitute of beginning and of end; but time, considered in the relation already spoken of, did not begin previously to the existence of the things of time. But the matter is not yet settled. Another most intricate question still remains, in the explanation of which many have found toil enough who have however never been suspected of dulness and stupidity; whether that kind of time which on a consideration of its limits is entirely separate from infinity, can in respect to its extent be in no possible way reconcileable with it? To put the same thing in different words: Is there an entire and absolute inconsistency between time and infinity? Is the internal measure of time the same as the measure of eternity? Does God exist in eternity in the same way as his works exist in time? Is there in eternity no succession whatever, no continuance of duration, no moments or intervals, all which are well-known to exist in time? The meaning of all these questions, if attentively examined, will be found to be one and the same; the only difference between them being that one and the same thing is presented to our notice under various aspects. In the examination of this question much labour and ingenuity has been expended during many centuries. Some have contended that the measure of eternity and that of time are altogether different; others have admitted of some succession in eternity, with a reservation however in favour of the divine immutability; others again have held that eternity is a certain fixed point or moment, which is as a whole coexistent with all the intervals of time, and has nothing prior or subsequent to it; while another class have altogether denied the truth of this, and averred that both time and eternity consist alike of successive moments.

The principal ancient philosopher who has expressly taught that eternity is not evolved by portions, but is destitute of all difference between present and future, is, so

Deity, which themselves notwithstanding contend for in a high degree, that all things are arbitrarily determined by divine decree; but also to take away from it all power of acting ad

far as I know, Plato, who has been followed by several of his own school, and, among the Jews, by Philo. Quotations of this description have been collected by Dionysius Petavius, Dogmata Theol. vol. 1. lib. 3. de Deo. cap. 4. p. 138, &c. to which, were it necessary, many more might easily be added. The only one I will mention is Chalcidius, in his comment on Plato's Timæus, sect. 25. p. 285. and sect. 199. p. 250. Equally great is the number of Christian divines who have entertained the same view; the principal of whom are also mentioned by Petavius, ubi supra. But this opinion almost universally prevailed from the sixth century after Christ, among the divines of the Christian church. In this age Boëthius acutely and ingeniously contended for the fixed and immoveable nature of eternity, in his fifth book De Consolatione Philosophiæ, p. 137, and expresses his meaning in this definition: "Eternity is the entire, simultaneous, and perfect possession of endless life." This reasoning, together with many similar doctrines of his, was so pleasing to posterity, that all subsequent schoolmen and theologians, as if by common consent, gave in their adherence to these his words. From the schoolmen this tenet passed over to those who have taught and guided the Lutheran church; and not to us only, but also to those who call themselves "Reformed" [the Calvinists]. The first founders indeed both of our own and the "Reformed" churches, though they have taught that God is eternal and infinite, have not decided on the mode of the divine eternity. Melanchthon has said nothing of it in his Commonplaces, nor Calvin in his Institutes. Nor do I recollect that Luther himself has any where expressly said aught with a view to throw light on this question. For since these great men were decidedly averse to the dry and disputatious method of treating theology which had been followed by the schoolmen, they thought they had nothing to do with certain doctrines which they saw it was scarcely possible to explain in a popular way. But their followers were compelled by the craftiness of the Socinians and other opponents of divine truth to bring this doctrine again into notice. These latter having attempted to contract all religion within the compass of their own intellect, and presuming to estimate the nature of God in accordance with their own (whence originated many pestilential and deadly errors), a more subtle and acute discussion than had previously taken place was commenced respecting the Divine attributes, and the eternity of God was also, among other things, subjected to a more rigorous examination. Servetus himself, who held the whole race of schoolmen in such detestation, could find nothing in their doctrine concerning eternity worthy of blame, a fact which I think it worth while to prove out of his own writings. For in his second book De Trinit. Erroribus, p. 53. *a*, he says, "Besides, the idiom or custom of prophetic diction makes it manifest that there is in God no difference of times; for they speak of future things as being already past, and on the other hand, sometimes put one tense for another, not only to signify the certainty of the event, but also to show that in God there are not these three differences of times, as present, past, and future; for things seen are already fixed and perpetual to him who sees them." Much more is said in the same place by this author, who had his lucid intervals and was sometimes very acute; which, for the sake of brevity, I omit. But a widely different view, as I have already observed, has been taken up by those who in other respects are great admirers of Servetus: I mean the Socinians; as well as by Conrad Vorstius, in his well-known book, De Deo et Attributis Divinis, which gave rise to so many controversies. And since the followers of Arminius have not distinctly renounced this sentiment, sharp contests have been occasioned with Vorstius and the Arminians on this account. And hence it has arisen that not only the doctrine of an unchangeable eternity, destitute of all succession, has been introduced into nearly all systems of theology, both Lutheran and Reformed, composed since that time, but also the opinion of a succession in eternity is ranked among the tenets by which the Arminians are distinguished from other Christians. See the venerable and most excellent Gustavus George Zeltner's Breviarium Controversiarum cum Remonstrantibus, quæst. 7. p. 56. I very much doubt whether all who have contended for what is called *a fixed* eternity, have been influenced simply by reason in their adherence to that opinion. It is evident that many discuss the point in so confused a manner as to make it apparent that they *are not* sufficiently aware of all the importance of the argument in dispute. But the

extra, and of perceiving or animadverting things done successively here in the world. But it will not follow from these and the like contradictions of mistaken theologers, that therefore

Platonists, unless I am much mistaken, have been compelled to embrace this opinion as much by a consideration for the immunity of their sect and of their other tenets as by the power of truth and reason. This party have laid it down as an axiom that the universe had no beginning, or that it existed from all eternity as well as the Deity. One of the principal arguments of those who opposed this doctrine was, that it either abolished all distinction between God and the universe, or that it involved the supposition of two infinite and eternal beings; both of which alternatives they affirmed to be inexcusable errors, altogether unworthy of philosophers. In order to meet this objection, it was absolutely necessary for the Platonists to discover some difference between the eternity of the universe and of the Deity; and they thought they had sufficiently supplied this by saying that the eternity of God was no other than a certain point or moment, while the perpetuity of the universe was to be regarded as a successive duration.

We have thus seen by what weighty authorities has been supported the opinion which denies all succession in eternity. It will now be proper to point out a few who consider it no error to allow that difference of times is consistent with the nature of eternity. Of all sects the Socinians have been most decided on this subject, and their opinions have been collected by John Adam Scherzer, in his Collegium Anti-Socinianum, disp. 5. thes. 4. p. 47. &c.; though even among them some are more guarded, and do not scruple to approach towards the opinion commonly received among ourselves. Those who are called Remonstrants or Arminians, have been more cautious; for though they acutely and ably dispute against those who hold eternity to be *fixed*, yet for the most part usually confess at the end of the discussion, that this is a very subtle question, on which opposite opinions may be entertained, without any grievous offence against truth. Simon Episcopius, in his Theological Institutes, cap. 9. p. 287. &c. of the first volume of his works, is the most comprehensive writer against a *simultaneous* kind of eternity, and has exhibited nearly all the resources of his genius upon the argument. But when he afterwards recurs to the same subject, cap. 14. p. 298 *a*, he thus terminates his dissertation:—"Though the method we have pointed out appears to me the safer and easier of the two, yet it is safest of all to believe in the existence of eternity, and to leave its nature to God and the disclosures of time, maintaining peace and concord among the disputants." But what, after all, will be the use of so many words in explaining the nature of eternity, if the safest way is to be entirely silent on the subject? Authors who have been more confident on this subject are Stephen Curcellæus, in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 45. of his works, and Le Clerc, Ontologia, chap. 5. p. 352. and Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 56. &c. But on the other hand, Philip Limborg, in his Christian Theology, lib. 2. cap. 5. sect. 2. &c. p. 56. closely follows Episcopius, and after an exposition of the difficulties on both sides in sect. 10. p. 57. professes his "unwillingness to determine whether eternity be fixed or successive, since the Scripture does not decide the point." Others, however, who have nothing in common with the Socinians, advocate the successiveness of eternity; as Peter Gassendi, in his Physics, sect. 1. lib. 2. cap. 7. p. 227, of his works; and the able and eloquent Archbishop Tillotson, vol. 7. serm. 13. and vol. 6. serm. 6. whose words are quoted by Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his Demonstration of the Existence and Attributes of God, chap. 6. p. 65. and Clarke himself not obscurely manifests his own tendency to the opinion that admits a succession in eternity. To these may be added, Peter Bayle, who in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 4. art. Zabarella, p. 2901, 2902. brings many arguments against those who approve of Boëthius' definition of eternity; not indeed, by affirming any thing as certain, but in his usual way showing that we know nothing on the subject; but with this peculiarity, that he pronounces the Romish dogma of transubstantiation much easier of comprehension than this definition. It is not necessary for me to name any more advocates of this opinion.

I am not so presumptuous as to think that I am able to produce any new or solid observations, after the labours of so many able men; but to fill up my plan, I will ingenuously disclose my own thoughts on an attentive consideration of what has been said on both sides; not indeed to assume a magisterial or philosophical air, but, to give

theology itself is contradictious, and hath nothing of philosophic truth at all in it; no more than because philosophers also hold contradictory opinions, that therefore philosophy itself is con-

my opinion as one individual among many, seeking after probability and truth. I. The disputants in this controversy do not seem to me to have explained their meaning as plainly and perspicuously as is usually done in the discussion of abstract subjects. Sometimes it is doubtful whether they treat of eternity absolutely and separately considered, or as it is related to God. Episcopius seems clearly to speak of the eternity of God; but Limborg on the contrary says, "We do not inquire into the divine essence, but into the nature of eternity considered in the abstract. . . . There is no reason why we should not consider the idea of eternity in the abstract, which idea involves a succession of universal duration," *ubi supra*, sect. 7. p. 57. I am afraid that if this supposition be correct, the whole controversy will be found to have in it more subtlety than truth, and will turn out at last to be not on the subject itself, but on the power of our mental faculties. In like manner, it is uncertain whether those who hold a succession in eternity, mean a succession in respect to ourselves or to God. For they often speak as if they only meant that our mental weakness is such, that we cannot at all conceive of an eternity destitute of all succession. But it is of great consequence to the discussion that this point should be previously decided; for no one perhaps will deny that eternity as related to us may in a certain sense be said to have a succession. II. If the words *succession*, *moment*, *instant*, and *point* were banished from the controversy, I am much mistaken if it would not be relieved from much of the difficulty and obscurity that attends it. For when these words, which are taken from finite things, are applied to those that are infinite, the opinions of authors are often incorrectly apprehended, because they excite in the minds of others ideas not at all accordant with perfect and eternal existences. At the mention of a *succession*, our minds immediately think of such a succession as is to be found amongst created and visible realities. In like manner, the words *space*, *point*, *instant*, *moment*, at once recall to mind the things thus denominated among mankind at large. Thus, it sometimes happens that we attribute opinions to those whom we hear or whose works we read, to which they are entire strangers; they being through the poverty of human language, and the want of proper terms to express abstract ideas, obliged to make use of words appropriated to finite and visible things, but taken in a higher and more sublime sense; while we, on the other hand, heedlessly append to their expressions, the ideas usually associated with them, and thus give rise to many subsequent errors in disputation. Certain I am that those who maintain a succession in eternity, use the word *succession* in a far more abstract sense than the common; but those who are on the contrary side, being either ignorant or unmindful of this circumstance, reason as if the point in question were such a succession as is usually so termed amongst mankind. Again, I imagine that those who call eternity a point, an instant, or a moment, have better ideas than words; which opinion I am led to entertain from the answers they give to their opponents' arguments. For if we closely attend to these, they will not appear properly to mean that eternity is nothing but a *moment* or a *point*; for if they did so, they would make an infinite existence to be finite; but they only intend, I suppose, that eternity may be compared with a point or moment, in respect to the manner of duration, and not in regard to the duration itself. In short, they seem to me simply to say, that as there is no succession in a moment, so neither is there in eternity; though, at the same time, I am aware that some of them fancied they said much more; and certainly, if this be the case, I must enrol myself amongst those who cannot see the propriety of this definition. But its opponents argue as if its advocates supposed a moment and eternity to be one and the same thing. I could therefore wish that disputants on this subject would abstain from words of this kind, which are often incorrectly understood; and most of all, I could desire that the words *point* and *moment* were entirely excluded from the controversy, as they afford no explanation, as I have already observed, but rather tend to confuse the matter. Least of all are they to be tolerated, whose presumption I have already animadverted upon, who think they have given a clear definition of eternity when they call it a point or moment, when at the same time, if they are closely pressed, they themselves are afterwards forced to confess that they do not understand the meaning of these words as applied to eternity. But since it is too much to expect that all words of this kind, calculated to perplex the

tradictious, and that there is nothing absolutely true or false, but, (according to the Protagorean doctrine) all seeming and fantastical.

mind and to introduce error, should be entirely rejected, controversialists should always be careful to distinguish between their ordinary and their special import. III. Whoever entertains a constant recollection of the nature of infinity, cannot but perceive, if they follow out the idea, that those who exclude and separate from eternity all succession, approach much more nearly to the truth than the opposite party. What is infinite is stable, destitute of all bound, origin, or beginning, a simple, continuous, indivisible unit, in which there can be no reduplication, increase, nor junction; so that it can by no means be disunited, divided, dissected, or broken up. Therefore, eternity or infinite duration admits of no division, and it necessarily follows, that it has no parts, no dimensions, and consequently no moments or subdivisions. And this will not be denied even by some of those who maintain the *successiveness* of eternity, since they grant that subdivisions of time do not exist essentially in time, but only in the human mind. If this indeed be the case, I know not how eternity can be a series of successive moments. For where no parts exist, there can be no order or succession; where there are no moments properly so called, no subdivisions of time, there no sequence or series can possibly take place. The reason why human and created things glide, flow, and pass sensibly away, is that they are circumscribed by finite bounds. Infinity, therefore, if it gradually glided and flowed away, would not be infinite, but would involve some degree of finitude. I fear, therefore, that in this controversy some learned men will fall into the same error that often happens to us in other things, namely, imagining that what arises only from our own minds and senses, exists actually in external things themselves. We do indeed mark out eternity into certain portions, and imagine to ourselves in it certain divisions of time. These imaginary portions and divisions we then conceive of as having a real existence in eternity itself, when, on the contrary, they exist only in our own minds, and since we ourselves, whether in time or in eternity, perceptibly glide and pass along, we on that account imagine that eternity itself flows, glides, and passes along with us; which, however, if it were thus fluctuating and transitory, would not be eternity, but a limited existence. We may imagine a vast, immense space, entirely quiescent and destitute of all internal motion; and in this space we may conceive of a great number of rational creatures, gradually and perceptibly proceeding and moving onwards. The space itself is entirely indivisible, but the creatures contained in it measure it out in their own minds, and by reasoning fix in it various bounds and limits. Are these boundaries then in the space itself? No one will reply in the affirmative, for it is entirely destitute of parts. Where then are they? In the understanding of the imaginary creatures already mentioned. But still they persuade themselves that what is delineated in their minds actually exists in the space of which they occupy a certain part. The space itself is quiescent, and not in any way moved or disturbed. But these creatures, because they themselves change place, and have motion, unfoundedly suppose that the space moves and proceeds in unison with themselves. The very same thing happens to ourselves as often as we regard that immeasurable space of time which we call eternity. We inadvertently transfer to eternity itself that succession and order which we have in our own minds, and fancy that what belongs solely to ourselves pertains to eternity. It will perhaps be said that this illustration does not throw any light on the nature of eternity, but leaves it still involved in irremediable obscurity. But our answer is easy; that we do not pretend to disclose the essence of eternity; for if we could do this, we should no longer be men, whose minds are confined within limits, and those very narrow. Let it be sufficient for us, during the present state of existence, to understand and know the truth of things themselves; but let us be less eager about the investigation of the mode of existence, and do not let us forget that we are human. Nothing I am sure can be plainer than this axiom: that to conceive of order and succession in what is infinite, is to abrogate its infinity; but of the internal nature of an infinity destitute of succession, I must beg permission to continue ignorant, since a kind of dizziness seizes me whenever I attempt to scrutinize this vortex. What has been already said of eternity in the abstract, applies still more forcibly to it, as regarded in relation to God. For since he is infinite, it is evident that he cannot at all exist in eternity in the same way that created beings exist in time. IV. By the good leave,

But in the next place we add, that though it be true that the nature of things admits of nothing contradictious, and that whatsoever plainly implies a contradiction, must therefore of necessity be a nonentity; yet is this rule, notwithstanding, obnoxious to be much abused, when whatsoever men's shallow and gross understandings cannot reach to, they will therefore presently conclude to be contradictious and impossible. As for example, the Atheists and Materialists cannot conceive of any

therefore, of those whom I must confess to be more highly endowed than myself, I will say that it will be of use towards the settlement of this controversy, if we distinguish eternity into that which is *abstract*, and that which is *related* to ourselves. Eternity, *relatively to us*, is not without succession, for our mental faculties are not of so high an order that we can entirely divest ourselves of all ideas of succession when reasoning about it. As it is with those on board ship, so it is with us. To them the shore seems to recede, flee, and depart when the ship is speeding on its way, and cutting through the waves; but though the land is at perfect rest and totally unmoved, yet the most ingenious mind cannot so regulate its sight and ideas, though perfectly conscious of the true state of the case, as to emancipate itself from the deception. Thus we, as we fly with rapid wing towards the close of our lives, fancy that eternity (the most fixed of all things) and even God himself have the same constant and rapid motion that is impressed on ourselves. But eternity *in the abstract* rejects all succession, order, dimension, and division; and there can be little doubt but that those who warmly contend for the immutability, immensity, and infinity of the Deity, but at the same time deny that eternity is without order and succession, only mean that if eternity be regarded by our own mental faculties, we cannot but distribute it into successive periods and moments. V. Whatever else has been said on this argument I leave to its authors. It is sufficient for me to know that the divine essence and eternity are stable; I willingly pass by as unintelligible to me the assertions, more subtle than clear, that have been made respecting the nature of this stability. Boëthius' definition has more boldness than perspicuity, and moreover offends those who in other respects have the same views of eternity that we have. Let those who define eternity to be a *point* and a *moment*, see to it how they will explain their definition, and vindicate it from objections. I am determined to leave these expressions to others, lest I should appear to implicate in fresh difficulties an argument in its own nature sufficiently embarrassed, and by obscure phraseology to involve rather than explain a matter especially intricate and difficult of comprehension. Many theologians have, in accordance with the schoolmen, asserted that "eternity completely co-exists with all beings and all intervals of time;" which I cannot persuade myself to receive, since it appears to me to be entirely repugnant to my mental nature. These authors have endeavoured by the above words to explain the nature of the stability belonging to eternity; but for my own part I must ingenuously confess that that nature is entirely unknown to me; and I think it more creditable to avow one's own ignorance than to make a great show of wisdom in words that no mortal can possibly understand. This one conclusion appears to me plain and incontrovertible: that the succession and order which appear to us to exist in eternity are not in eternity itself, but only in our own minds; just as colours are not properly in the things we behold, but only in our own eyes. With this I am content. If any one says he can see further into the question, I do not envy him the knowledge he claims, and in return beg of him not to impugn my own diffidence. Thus much I thought proper to say, in order to defend and illustrate Dr. Cudworth's opinion on the nature of infinity, in which if I have erred, as may perhaps have happened, or if I have improperly expressed my meaning, let the candid reader reflect that the matter in question is the most abstruse and difficult that can possibly come under our notice. What may be the case with others when thinking of infinity, I know not; but for my own part I seem, when attentively contemplating eternity, to experience effects similar to those occasioned by looking stedfastly at the sun. As by the latter vision is destroyed, and the eyes greatly impaired, so my mind is dazzled and blunted, and I therefore grow weary of the continued effort of attention.

other substance besides body, and therefore do they determine presently, that incorporeal substance is a contradiction in the very terms, it being as much as to say, incorporeal body:[4] wherefore when God is said by theologers to be an incorporeal substance, this is to them an absolute impossibility. Thus a modern writer: "The universe, that is, the whole mass of things, is corporeal; that is to say, body. Now every part of body is body, and consequently every part of the universe is body; and that which is not body, is no part thereof. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it, is nothing. Therefore when spirits are called incorporeal, this is only a name of honour, and it may with more piety be attributed to God himself, in whom we consider, not what attribute best expresseth his nature, which is incomprehensible, but what best expresseth our desire to honour him."[5] Where, incorporeal is said to be an attribute of honour, that is, such an attribute as expresseth only the veneration of men's minds, but signifieth nothing in nature, nor hath any philosophic truth and reality under it; a substance incorporeal being as contradictious as something and nothing. Notwithstanding which, this contradiction is only in the weakness and childishness of these men's understandings, and not the thing itself; it being demonstrable that there is some other substance besides body, according to the true and genuine notion of it. But because this mistake is not proper to Atheists only, there being some Theists also who labour under this same infirmity of mind, not to be able to conceive any other substance besides

[4] Hobbes' Leviathan, cap. 34. p. 183. "Body and substance," says he, "signify the same thing; and therefore the compound expression, *incorporeal substance*, is an unmeaning phrase, as if any one should say, *an incorporeal body*." See also, cap. 12. p. 56, and cap. 45. p. 307.

[5] I have here closely and almost literally translated Dr. Cudworth's English into Latin. For in all Hobbes' works that I have read (and I have read all that are of any consequence), I cannot point out a passage that exactly corresponds to these words. Dr. Cudworth seems here, in his usual way, to have quoted, not his words, but his meaning; and that this was Hobbes' meaning is apparent from several passages of his writings, and particularly from the thirty-fourth chapter of the Leviathan, in which are to be found many expressions similar to those here adduced. In p. 183, for instance, he says, "Body universally signifies what fills or occupies some particular place, and does not depend (as place itself does) on our own imagination, but is a real part of what we call the universe. For since the universe is an aggregate of all bodies whatever, it has no part which is not also body; nor can any thing properly be called body which is not some part of the universe." After which he proceeds to give the meaning of the word *spirit*, according to his own ideas; of which word after a review of some meanings of it taken, but with great inaccuracy, from the scriptures, he goes on to say, p. 184, "I find no other meanings of the word *spirit* in the sacred scriptures. If therefore there be any scripture text to which none of these significations will apply, that passage must be considered as being above our comprehension. Nor is this wonderful; since the nature of God is incomprehensible, and the names given to him are not so much applicable to his nature as to the honour that is due to him." In cap. 12. p. 56, there are some expressions which convey nearly the same meaning: "Some have said that God is an incorporeal spirit, perhaps not dogmatically as defining the divine nature by these words, but from a pious intention of honouring the Deity by an attribute excluding from him all the grossness of visible bodies."

body, and who therefore assert a corporeal Deity; we shall in the next place show, from a passage of a modern writer, what kind of contradictions they are which these Atheists impute to all theology; namely, such as these, that it supposes God to perceive things sensible, without any organs of sense; and to understand and be wise without any brains. "Pious men (saith he) attribute to God Almighty, for honour's sake, whatsoever they see honourable in the world, as seeing, hearing, willing, knowing, justice, wisdom, &c. But they deny him such poor things as eyes, ears, and brains, and other organs, without which we worms neither have, nor can conceive, such faculties to be: and so far they do well. But when they dispute of God's actions philosophically, then do they consider them again, as if he had indeed such facultics. This is not well, and thence is it that they fall into so many difficulties. We ought not to dispute of God's nature. He is no fit subject of our philosophy. True religion consisteth in obedience to Christ's lieutenants, and in giving God such honour, both in attributes and actions, as they in their several lieutenancies shall ordain."[6] Where the plain

[6] I have here again literally translated what is quoted by Dr. Cudworth as the very words of Hobbes. But I must once more repeat what I have just before observed, that this sentence is nowhere exactly to be found in Hobbes' writings, but is collected and arranged by our author out of several passages of his works. Nay, I rather think that some parts of it are rather deductions from Hobbes' opinions, than his own expressly recorded conclusions and determinations. I will adduce the principal passages of the English philosopher from which I suppose this quotation is made up, so that all may have a better opportunity of deciding respecting his views. In his Elementa De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 118, he thus speaks: "When we attribute to God sight and other senses, or knowledge and intellect, which in ourselves are only a tumult of the mind raised by external things pressing on our organs, it is not to be supposed that any thing of this kind is the case with the Deity; for it is a mark of a power dependent on another being for its existence; which is inconsistent with the highest perfection. Those therefore who would give God no other names than are accordant with reason, must either use negative appellations, as *infinite*, *eternal*, *incomprehensible*, or superlatives, as *best*, *greatest*, *mightiest*, &c., or indefinites, as *good*, *just*, *mighty*, *creator*, *king*, and so on, not in order to declare what he is (for that were to limit him within the bounds of our own imagination), but to acknowledge our own admiration and obedience, which is the part of humility and of a mind rendering him all possible honour. For reason dictates only one name of the Deity significant of his nature, which is *the Existent*, or simply *the Being*, and one signifying relation to us, namely *God*, in which is contained King, Lord, and Father." Clearly similar to this is the following extract from the Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170: "Those who say that God sees, perceives, knows, and understands (which faculties in mankind are nothing else than a tumult of the mind raised by external agents through the organical parts of the human body), unless by these words they understand the divine and incomprehensible power, do not give God due honour. Those who wish to give God no name but what is conformable to natural reason, must either use negative appellations, as *infinite*, *eternal*, *incomprehensible*; or superlatives, as *most high*, *greatest*; or indefinites, as *good*, *just*, *holy*, *creator*; and this, not in order to declare what God is, but how much we ought to adore and venerate him. For he has only one name of his nature—the BEING." And a little further on, p. 171, he thus proceeds: "To dispute concerning the Divine nature is contrary to the honour due to God; for it is to be remembered that nothing can be known of God's empire but by natural reason, that is by physical principles, which are so far from disclosing the Divine nature, that they cannot inform us of our own nature, or of that of the smallest thing in existence. In regard therefore

and undisguised meaning of the author seems to be this; that God is no subject of philosophy, as all real things are (accordingly as he declareth elsewhere, that[7] religio non est philosophia, sed lex, "Religion is not a matter of philosophy, but only of law and arbitrary constitution"), he having no real nature of his own, nor being any true inhabitant of the world or heaven, but (as all other ghosts and spirits) an inhabitant of men's brains only, that is, a figment of their fear and fancy, or a mere political scarecrow. And therefore such attributes are to be given to him, without any scrupulosity, as the civil law of every country shall appoint, and no other; the wise and nasute very well understanding that all this business of religion is nothing but mere

to the Divine attributes, the definitions of the words are not to be regarded, but the honorary intention that they imply." Analogous to these last sentiments are those which he has let fall in his Elementa De Cive, cap. 15. pp. 118, 119: "It is not proper to dispute respecting the divine nature. For it is to be remembered, that in the empire of God all things are to be investigated by natural reason alone, that is, by the principles of natural science. But these, so far from disclosing to us the nature of the Deity, will not even fully inform us of the properties of our own bodies, or of any created being. From discussions of this kind, therefore, nothing can result except the imposition of names on the Divine Majesty accordant with our own contracted conceptions." Here also properly belong the following words taken from his book De Homine, cap. 14. sect. 4. p. 78: "But in these disputations [respecting religion], while we seek for a knowledge of those things which do not fall within the range of knowledge, so far as in us lies we annihilate faith in God. For knowledge being supposed, faith is done away with; just as fruition being supposed, hope is done away with. . . . . Therefore questions concerning the nature of God the Creator are too full of curiosity, and are not to be accounted equal to works of piety; and those who dispute respecting God do not desire so much to inculcate faith in God (in whom all already believe) as to gain it for themselves." Nor ought I to omit the following, from the Leviathan, cap. 3. p. 12: "The name of God is not used that we may conceive of him (for he is incomprehensible, and his greatness and power inconceivable), but that we may honour him." The last part of the words here abscribed by Dr. Cudworth to Hobbes is illustrated by the following passage, among others, which is to be found in the Elementa De Cive, cap. 15. sect. 17. p. 121: "It may therefore be concluded that the interpretation of natural laws, both sacred and profane (since God reigns in nature alone), depends on the authority of the state; that is, it belongs to that person or assembly to whom is given the supreme command of the state, both that God should by his or their voice issue all his commands; and on the contrary that what is commanded by them both respecting the mode of worshipping God and respecting secular things is commanded by God." It is needless to adduce more expressions to the same purpose. I think it most evident that in all these there was concealed no small quantity of poison, and that the philosopher of Malmesbury had no other object in view than an attack and injury to the very fundamentals of religion. I must candidly confess my doubts whether it be equally clear from them that Hobbes ridiculed theologians because they said that God perceived without eyes, and understood and knew without a brain; and that he regarded this opinion as among those by which all modern theology is defaced. (See on this opinion, which some have certainly defended, Bishop Berkeley's Alciphron, vol. 1. p. 259.) Nor do I know whether the more detailed explanation of Hobbes' opinion subjoined by our author is in all respects correct, and in accordance with his meaning. For God alone can unerringly decide respecting the thoughts of particular individuals.

[7] De Homine, cap. 14. p. 78. "If religion," says Hobbes in this place "(excepting that which consists in natural piety) does not depend on private individuals, then necessarily (since miracles have now ceased) it must depend on the laws of the state; therefore religion is not philosophy but a law in every state, and on this account is not to be disputed about but practised."

pageantry), and that the attributes of the Deity indeed signify neither true nor false, nor any thing in nature, but only men's reverence and devotion towards the object of their fear; the manner of expressing which is determined by civil law. Wherefore to say that God sees all things, and yet hath no eyes; and that he hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and that he understands, and is wise, and yet hath no brains; and whatsoever else you will please to say of him, as attributes of honour, and only as signifying devotion, is thus far well enough. But when men, not understanding the true cabala, will needs go further, they mistaking attributes of honour for attributes of nature, and of philosophic truth, and making them premises to infer absolute truth, and convince falsehood from, or matters to dispute and reason upon; that is, when they will needs suppose such a thing as a God really to exist in the world, then do they involve themselves in all manner of contradiction, nonsense and absurdity; as for example, to affirm seriously that this God really sees all things in the world, and yet hath no eyes; and that he indeed hears all things, and yet hath no ears; and, lastly, that he understands and is wise, and yet hath no brains, which things are all absolutely contradictious, inconceivable, and impossible. The sum of all is this, that when religion and theology, which is indeed nothing but law and phantastry, is made philosophy, then is it all mere jargon and insignificant nonsense. And now we see what those contradictions are, which the Atheists charge upon theology: such as owe all their being only to the grossness, sottishness, and brutishness of these men's own apprehensions. From whence proceedeth likewise this following definition of knowledge and understanding,[8] that it is nothing but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things, pressing the organical parts of man's body. "O ye brutish among the people, when will ye understand? and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear (and gave men's soul a power of hearing thereby), shall not he (though himself have no ears) hear? He that formed the eye (and gave the human soul a power of seeing by it as an instrument) shall not he (though himself have no eyes) see?" Lastly, "he that teacheth man knowledge (or gave him an understanding mind, besides brains), shall not he (though himself be without brains) know and understand?"

It is certain, that no simple idea, as that of a triangle or a square, of a cube or sphere, can possibly be contradictious to itself; and therefore much less can the idea of a perfect being (which is the compendious idea of God), it being more simple than any of the other. Indeed this simple idea of a perfect being is pregnant of many attributes; and therefore the idea of

[8] Leviathan, cap. 31. p. 170, and Elementa de Cive, cap. 15. sect. 14. p. 118.

God, more fully declared by them all, may seem to be in this respect a compounded idea, or one idea and conception, consisting or made up of many; which if they were really contradictious, would render the whole a nonentity. As for example, this, a plain triangle, whose three angles are greater than two right ones, it being contradictious and inconceivable, is therefore no true idea, but a nonentity. But all the genuine attributes of the Deity, of which its entire idea is made up, are things as demonstrable of a perfect being, as the properties of a triangle or a square are of those ideas respectively, and therefore cannot they possibly be contradictious, neither to it, nor to one another, because those things which agree in one third, must needs agree together amongst themselves.

Nay, the genuine attributes of the Deity, namely, such as are demonstrable of an absolutely perfect Being, are not only not contradictious, but also necessarily connected together, and inseparable from one another. For there could not possibly be one thing infinite in wisdom only, another thing infinite only in power, and another thing only infinite in duration or eternal. But the very same thing which is infinite in wisdom, must needs be also infinite in power, and infinite in duration, and so vice versâ. That which is infinite in any one perfection, must of necessity have all perfections in it. Thus are all the genuine attributes of the Deity not only not contradictious, but also inseparably concatenate; and the idea of God no congeries either of disagreeing things; or else of such as are unnecessarily connected with one another.

In very truth, all the several attributes of the Deity are nothing else but so many partial and inadequate conceptions of one and the same simple perfect being, taken in as it were by piecemeal, by reason of the imperfection of our human understandings, which could not fully conceive it all together at once; and therefore are they really all but one thing, though they have the appearance of multiplicity to us. As the one simple light of the sun, diversely refracted and reflected from a rorid cloud, hath to us the appearance of the variegated colours of the rainbow.

Wherefore the attributes of God are no bundle of unconceivables and impossibles, huddled up together; nor attributes of honour and compliment only, and nothing but the religious nonsense of astonished minds, expressing their devotion towards what they fear; but all of them attributes of nature, and of most severe philosophic truth. Neither is the idea of God an arbitrarious compilement of things unnecessarily connected, and separable from one another; it is no factitious, nor fictitious thing, made up by any feigning power of the soul, but it is a natural and most simple uncompounded idea; such as to which

nothing can be arbitrariously added, nor nothing detracted from. Notwithstanding which, by reason of the imperfection of human minds, there may be, and are, different apprehensions concerning it. For as every one that hath a conception of a plain triangle in general, doth not therefore know that it includes this property in it, to have three angles equal to two right ones; nor doth every one who hath an idea of a rectangular triangle, presently understand that the square of the subtense is equal to the squares of both the sides: so neither doth every one who hath a conception of a perfect being, therefore presently know all that is included in that idea. Moreover, men may easily mistake things for absolute perfections, which are not such, as hath been partly already showed.

And now, whereas the Atheists pretend, in the next place, to give an account of that supposed contradictiousness in the idea and attributes of God, namely, that it proceeded principally from fear, or the confounded nonsense of men's astonished minds, huddling up together all imaginable attributes of honour, courtship, and compliment, without any philosophic truth, sense, or signification; as also, in part, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: all this hath been already prevented, and the foundation thereof quite taken away, by our showing that there is nothing in the genuine idea of God and his attributes, but what is demonstrable of a perfect being, and that there cannot be the least either added to that idea, or detracted from it, any more than there can be any thing added to or detracted from the idea of a triangle, or of a square. From whence it follows unavoidably, that there cannot possibly be any thing either contradictious or arbitrarious in the divine idea, and that the genuine attributes thereof are attributes of necessary philosophic truth; namely, such as do not only speak the piety, devotion, and reverence of men's own minds, but declare the real nature of the thing itself. Wherefore, when a modern atheistic writer affirmeth of all those who reason and conclude concerning God's nature from his attributes, "That, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, they fall from one inconvenience (or absurdity) to another, without end; after the same manner as when one, ignorant of court ceremonies, coming into the presence of a greater person than he was wont to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himself from falling, lets slip his cloak; to recover his cloak, lets fall his hat; and so, with one disorder after another, discovers his rusticity and astonishment:"[8] we say, that though there be something of wit and fancy in this, yet, as it is applied to theology and the genuine attributes of the Deity, there is not the least of philosophic truth. However,

[8] On these words of Hobbes' see my note cap. 2. sect. 4. above.

we deny not but that some, either out of superstition, or else out of flattery (for thus are they styled by St. Jerome,[10] stulti adulatores Dei, "foolish flatterers of God Almighty), have sometimes attributed such things to him as are incongruous to his nature, and, under a pretence of honouring him, by magnifying his power and sovereignty, do indeed most highly dishonour him; they representing him to be such a Being as is no way amiable or desirable.

But the Atheists are most of all concerned to give an account of that unquestionable phenomenon, the general persuasion of the existence of a God in the minds of men, and their propensity to religion in all ages and places of the world; whence this should come, if there be really no such thing in nature: and this they think to do in the last place also, partly from men's own fear, together with their ignorance of causes, and partly from the fiction of law-makers and politicians, they endeavouring thereby to keep men in civil subjection under them; where we shall first plainly and nakedly declare the Atheist's meaning, and then manifest the invalidity and foolery of these pretences to solve the forementioned phenomenon.

First, therefore, these Atheists affirm, that mankind, by reason of their natural imbecility, are in perpetual solicitude, anxiety, and fear concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune to come; and this passion of fear inclining men to imagine things formidable and fearful, and to suspect or believe the existence of what really is not; I say, that this distrustful fear and jealousy in the minds of men concerning their future condition, raises up to them the phantasm of a most affrightful spectre, an invisible understanding Being, arbitrarily governing and swaying the affairs of the whole world, and at pleasure tyrannizing over mankind. And when men's exorbitant fear and fancy has thus raised up to itself such a Mormo, or bugbear, such an affrightful spectre as this, a thing that is really no inhabitant of the world, or of heaven, but only of men's brains, they afterward stand in awe of this their own imagination, and tremblingly worship this creature and figment of their own fear and fancy, as a thing really existing without them, or a God; devising all manner of expressions of honour and reverence towards it, and anxiously endeavouring, by all ways conceivable, to propitiate and atone the same. And thus have they brought

[10] Comment. in Habacuc. lib. 1. p. 148. tom. 6. opp. This well known passage runs thus: "It is absurd to draw out the greatness of God to such a degree as to say that he knows how many gnats are born and die every moment, how many bugs and fleas and flies there are in the world, how many fishes swim in the sea, and which of the small ones are to be devoured by the larger. Let us not be such *foolish* flatterers of God Almighty as, while we bring down his power to the most insignificant objects, to be injurious to ourselves, and suppose that his providence has charge of irrational rather than of rational beings."

upon themselves a most heavy yoke of bondage, and filled their lives with all manner of bitterness and misery.

Again, to this fear of future events the Atheists add also ignorance of causes, as a further account of this phenomenon of religion, so generally entertained in the world. For mankind (say they) are naturally inquisitive into the causes of things; and that not only of the events of their own good and evil fortune, but also of the phenomena of the world, and the effects of nature: and such is their curiosity, that wheresoever they can discover no visible and natural causes, there are they prone to feign and imagine other causes, invisible and supernatural. As it was observed of the tragic dramatists, that, whenever they could not well extricate themselves, they were wont to bring in a God upon the stage: and as Aristotle[11] recordeth of Anaxagoras, that he never betook himself to Mind, or Understanding, that is, to God for a cause, but only then when he was at a loss for other natural and necessary causes. From whence these Atheists would infer, that nothing but ignorance of causes made Anaxagoras to assert a Deity. Wherefore it is no wonder (say they) if the generality of mankind, being ignorant of the causes almost of all events and effects of nature, have, by reason of their natural curiosity and fear, feigned or introduced one invisible power or agent omnipotent, as the supreme cause of all things; they betaking themselves thereto, as to a kind of refuge, asylum, or sanctuary for their ignorance.

These two accounts of the phenomenon of religion, from men's fear and solicitude about future events, and from their ignorance of causes, together with their curiosity, are thus joined together by a modern writer:[12] "Perpetual fear of future evils always accompanying mankind, in the ignorance of causes, as it were in

[11] Metaphys. lib. 1. cap. 4. p. 267. tom. 4. opp.

[12] Hobbes, Leviath. cap. 12. p. 55, &c. But Hobbes himself saw that these words were bolder than was proper, if they were taken in their naked, simple acceptation; wherefore, to meet objections, he simply adds, that he only wished them to be understood of the religion and gods of the ancients, previously to the birth of our Saviour; for that the knowledge of the one supreme God does not arise from fear, but from a contemplation of the nature of things. "This," says he, immediately after the words here quoted, "is true of the gods [that is, the numerous gods of the heathen]. But the knowledge of one eternal, infinite, omnipotent God can be more easily derived from an investigation into the causes, powers, and operations of natural bodies, than from an anxiety about futurity. For whoever, from any effect he sees, shall reason back to its proximate cause, and shall thence proceed to the proximate cause of that cause, and then profoundly dive into the succession of causes, will at length discover (with the more rational of the ancient philosophers) that there is one first mover, that is, one eternal cause of all things, which all men call God. And this will take place apart from any knowledge of his own destiny, anxiety about which both produces fear and turns off the mind from the inquiry into natural causes, and affords at the same time an opportunity for imagining almost as many gods as there are men to imagine them." Whether this cunning and crafty man said this sincerely from his heart or merely to avoid odium, God only knows; and whichever it was, it will not prevent its being true.

the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse for their evil fortune, but some power or agent invisible." Moreover, it is concluded, that from the same originals sprang, not only that vulgar opinion of inferior ghosts and spirits also, subservient to the supreme Deity (as the great ghost of the whole world, apparitions being nothing but men's own dreams and fancies taken by them for sensations) but also men's taking things casual for prognostics, and their being so superstitiously addicted to omens and portents, oracles, and divinations and prophecies; this proceeding likewise from the same fantastic supposition, that the things of the world are disposed of, not by nature, but by some understanding and intending agent or person.[1]

But lest these two forementioned accounts of that phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a Deity, so epidemical to mankind, should yet seem insufficient; the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians, who, perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publicly allowed and recommended; according to that definition of religion given by a modern writer,[2] "Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition." And that religion, thus nursed up by politicians, might be every way compliant with, and obsequious to their designs, and no way refractory to the same; it hath been their great care to persuade the people, that their laws were not merely their own inventions, but that themselves were

[1] This is levelled against Hobbes, De Homine, cap. 13. p. 78. &c. and Leviathan, cap. 12. p. 56, &c.

[2] Leviathan, cap. 6. p. 29. Dr. Cudworth's English words do not exactly correspond to the Latin I have given. [Metus potentiarum invisibilium, sive fictæ illæ sint, sive ab historiis acceptæ sint publice, religio est; si publice acceptæ non sint, superstitio.] But a careful comparison will show that the sense is the same. I think it proper to observe, that Hobbes has here again (whether to avoid odium or to declare his real opinion, I know not) added the following words to this definition: "But when the powers are really such as we have supposed them to be, true religion."

only the interpreters of the gods therein, and that the same things were really displeasing to the gods which were forbidden by them; God ruling over the world no otherwise than in them, as his vicegerents; according to that assertion of a late writer:* Deum nullum regnum in homines habere, nisi per eos, qui imperium tenent, "That God reigneth over men, only in the civil sovereigns." This is therefore another atheistic account of religion's so generally prevailing in the world, from its being a fit engine of state, and politicians generally looking upon it as an arcanum imperii, "a mystery of government," to possess the minds of the people with the belief of a God, and to keep them busily employed in the exercises of religion, thereby to render them the more tame and gentle, apt to obedience, subjection, peace, and civil society.

Neither is all this the mere invention of modern Atheists, but indeed the old atheistic cabal, as may appear partly from that known passage of the poet:[3] "That the gods were first made by fear;" and from Lucretius' so frequently insisting upon the same, according to the mind of Epicurus. For in his first book he makes terrorem animi, et tenebras, "terror of mind, and darkness," the chief causes of theism; and in his sixth, he further pursues the same grounds, especially the latter of them, after this manner:†

> Cætera, quæ fieri in terris cœloque tuentur
> Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibu' sæpe,
> Efficiunt animos humiles formidine divûm;
> Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
> IGNORANTIA CAUSARUM conferre deorum
> Cogit ad imperium res; et concedere regnum, et,
> Quorum operum causas nullâ ratione videre
> Possunt, hæc fieri divino numine rentur.

To this sense: "Mortals, when with trembling minds they behold the objects both of heaven and earth, they become depressed and sunk down under the fear of the gods; ignorance of causes setting up the reign and empire of the gods. For when men can find no natural causes of these things, they suppose them presently to have been done by a divine power."

And this ignorance of causes is also elsewhere insisted upon by the same poet, as the chief source of religion, or the belief of a God: ‡

* Tract. Theol. Polit. [Ben. Spinozæ, cap. 9. p. 214.]

[3] Petron. in Fragment. p. 676. edit. Burman. The same thing had been previously said by Statius; whom those best acquainted with these matters think Petronius imitated. But it has been observed by the learned Le Clerc, in his Sylvæ Philologicæ, appended to his edition of Æschines' Dialogues, cap. 7. sect. 10. p. 256. that the same doctrine had been taught prior to the time of either of these poets, by Democritus, and partly also by Aristotle.

† Lamb. 528. [Verse 49.]

‡ Lib. 5. Lamb. p. 500. [Verse 1182.]

Præterea cœli rationes ordine certo
Et varia annorum cernebant tempora verti;
Nec poterant quibus id fieret cognoscere causis.
Ergo PERFUGIUM sibi habebant, omnia divis
Tradere, et illorum nutu facere omnia flecti.

Moreover, when a modern writer declares the opinion of ghosts to be one of those things in which consisteth the natural seeds of religion; as also that this opinion proceedeth from the ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong fancies, from vision and sense; he seemeth herein to have trod likewise in the footsteps of Lucretius, giving, not obscurely, the same account of religion in his fifth book:[4]

Nunc quæ causa deûm per magnas numina gentes
Pervolgarit, et ararum compleverit urbes, &c.
Non ita difficile est rationem reddere verbis.
Quippe etenim jam tum divûm mortalia secla
Egregias animo facies vigilante videbant,
Et magis in somnis, mirando corporis auctu.
His igitur sensum tribuebant, &c.

That is, "How the noise of the gods came thus to ring over the whole world, and to fill all places with temples and altars, is not a thing very difficult to give an account of; it proceeding first from men's fearful dreams, and their phantasms when awake, taken by them for visions and sensations. Whereupon they attributed not only sense to these things as really existing, but also immortality and great power." For though this were properly an account only of those inferior and plebeian gods, called demons and genii, yet was it supposed that the belief of these things did easily dispose the minds of men also to the persuasion of one supreme omnipotent Deity over all.

Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of Cicero:[5] Ii, qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus, reipublicæ causâ, ut quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret; nonne omnem religionem funditùs sustulerunt? "They who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?" And the sense of the ancient Atheists is thus represented by Plato:* *Θεοὺς, ὦ μακάριε, εἶναι πρῶτόν φασὶν οὔ τοι τέχνῃ, οὐ φύσει, ἀλλά τισι νόμοις, καὶ τούτους ἄλλους ἄλλοις, ὅπῃ ἕκαστος συνωμολόγησαν νομοθετούμενοι,* "They first of all affirm, that the gods are not by nature,

[4] Verse 1160.
[5] De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 42. p. 2945. tom. 9. opp.
* De Leg. lib. 10. [P. 666.]

but by art and laws only; and that from thence it comes to pass, that they are different to different nations and countries, accordingly as the several humours of their law-makers did chance to determine." And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus[6] the philosopher, beginning to this purpose: "That there was a time at first, when men's life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which, they consented

[6] Lib. 8. Advers. Mathemat. sect. 54. p. 562. The first of these quotations from Critias is given by Dr. Cudworth only in an English translation; of the second he has given only the Greek. I shall therefore add the Greek to the first:

Ἦν χρόνος, ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
Καὶ θηριώδης, ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρέτης·
Ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἄεθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν,
Οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο.
Κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
Θέσθαι κολαστάς·

And to the second the version of Hugo Grotius, in his Excerpta Veterum Comicorum et Tragicorum, p. 402. "Therefore he introduced a reverence of the Deity; namely, that God bloomed in perpetual life, having a higher nature and an attentive mind, who knows and understands all things that are done, and immediately hears what is said by men, and sees their actions, being an infallible judge."

But it is very uncertain, whether these verses are Critias' or not. For Plutarch, De Placitis Philosophorum, lib. 1. cap. 7. p. 880. vol. 1. of his Works, and Eusebius, Præparatio Evangel. lib. 14. sect. 16. refers them to Euripides, the famous tragic poet; and Plutarch especially expressly says they are taken from a tragedy by him, called Sisyphus. The learned Peter Petit, in his Miscellaneous Observations, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 5. has not hesitated to follow Plutarch, and in support of his opinion to suppose that the manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus are corrupt and mutilated. But his arguments generally, and this supposition in particular, have been learnedly refuted by Peter Bayle, in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 1. art. Critias, note, p. 937, &c. And indeed the integrity of the manuscripts of Empiricus is evident from this single consideration: that ancient writers have spoken in a very doubtful manner respecting some other of the tragedies of Euripides, some attributing them to Critias, and others to Euripides. See Hugo Grotius' Excerpta Veterum Comicorum et Tragicorum, p. 452, and John Albert Fabricius' Bibliotheca Græca, lib. 2. cap. 18. p. 621. and cap. 19. p. 642. What wonder then is it, that there should also formerly have been some disagreement respecting the author of the Tragedy of Sisyphus? But concerning the main point in dispute, I must admit that I agree with Petit. For although I grant the unsatisfactory nature of the reasons he has adduced, yet another argument makes it very probable that these verses could not have been written by Critias, but must have proceeded from Euripides. Who can believe that Critias the tyrant, whose principal object it was to establish his own power at Athens, would have been so foolish as to have caused to be recited, in the hearing of the Athenian people, a piece of poetry admirably exposing the stratagems and tricks of tyrants? Who can suppose that he could wish the Athenians to be taught, in a tragedy, that religion was nothing but a fraudulent contrivance of wise men, invented for the purpose of keeping the multitude in check. He would have been silly indeed, and would himself have scattered the seeds of sedition, if he had with his own pen instilled such doctrines as these into the minds of those whom he wished despotically to rule. But since some have thought the opinion contained in these verses consistent enough with the character and disposition of a tyrant, and have been aware that Critias composed some tragedies, they have been easily brought to suppose that the drama whence these verses are taken was his rather than Euripides'. (Zimmermann, in his Musæum Helveticum, vol. 4. p. 422. denies that these arguments in favour of Critias are free from exception.) Thus much is sufficient upon a matter concerning which ignorance is no detriment.

and agreed together to make civil laws;" that so the disorderly might be punished. Notwithstanding which, it was still found that men were only hindered from open, but not from secret injustices: whereupon some sagacious and witty person was the author of a further invention, to deter men as well from secret as from open injuries:

> Ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσατο·
> Ὅς ἐστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
> Νόῳ τ' ἀκούων, καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶν τ'· ὑφ' οὗ
> Πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούεται·
> Ὃς δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.

Namely, "By introducing or feigning a God immortal and incorruptible, who hears, and sees, and takes notice of all things." Critias then concluding his poem in these words:

> Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἴομαι πεῖσαί τινα
> Θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος,

"And in this manner do I conceive some one at first to have persuaded mortals to believe that there is a kind of gods."[7]

[7] To these passages of the ancients, wherein the origin of all religion is ascribed to state policy, add Seneca, Quæst. Natur. lib. 2. cap. 42. p. 536. tom. 2. opp. and Sextus Empiric. lib. 8. Advers. Mathemat. p. 551. "If you ask me," says Seneca, "what I think (of thunder), I do not think that they [the ancients, who said that thunder came from Jupiter] were so stupid as to believe that Jove was of partial inclinations, or was at least unprepared. ..... What object then had they in saying this? *The wisest men thought some inevitable source of terror necessary for restraining the minds of the vulgar, that we might have a fear of something above us.* It was of great use, in the midst of such audacious wickedness, that there should be some existence, which no one should imagine himself powerful enough to resist. Therefore, to terrify those who could only by fear be kept free from crime, they placed above them an armed avenger." The passage of Sextus Empiricus is as follows: Ἔνιοι τοίνυν ἔφασαν, τοὺς πρώτους τῶν ἀνθρώπων προστάντας καὶ τὸ συμφέρον τῷ βίῳ σκεψαμένους πάνυ συνέτους ὄντας ἀναπλάσαι τὴν περί τε τῶν θεῶν ὑπόνοιαν καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου μυθευομένων δόξαν, "Some have said, that the first rulers of mankind, and the wisest men who studied what was best for human life, contrived the supposition of there being gods, and the fabulous opinion concerning the infernal regions."

For my own part, I could cite many more authors, if I thought proper to mention here those Greek and Latin writers who have not hesitated to assert that the opinions commonly received and established by law among the Greeks and Romans were only invented by wise men in order to keep the multitude within the bounds of duty. But since the question is here concerning religion universally, and as I suppose, it cannot be denied that in the formation and corroboration of false religions, great scope was given for craft and fraud, I pass over these authorities for the present. Several quotations of this sort have been collected by Bayle, in his Pensées sur les Comètes, vol. 2. sect. 71, p. 356. &c. As regards modern authorities (to say nothing of Nic. Machiavel, respecting whom particulars may be seen in the late John Francis Buddeus' Theses de Atheismo et Superstitione, cap. 1. sect. 24. p. 132. &c.), Benedict Spinoza has endeavoured, in his Tractatus Theologico-politicus, cap. 5. p. 59. &c. to prove (by arguments indeed that are foolish and destitute of reason) that religion, and particularly the Mosaic, was expressly contrived "for the preservation and strengthening of government." The same writer afterwards, in a treatise entitled De Optimâ Reipublicæ Formâ, or Tractatus Politicus, to be found among his posthumous works, plainly persuades magistrates to accommodate religion to the necessities and nature of the state; as may be manifest from an attentive consideration of the following passage, found in cap. 8. sect. 46. p. 339: "It is of great consequence [namely, to the state] that the temples dedicated to the religion of the country should be spacious and

Thus have we fully declared the sense of the Atheists, in their account of the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God; namely, that they derive it principally from these three springs or originals: First, from men's own fear and solicitude concerning future events, or their good and evil fortune. Secondly, from their ignorance of the causes both of those events, and the phenomena of nature; together with their curiosity. And lastly, from the fiction of civil sovereigns, law-makers, and, politicians. The weakness and foolery of all which, we shall now briefly manifest.[8] First, therefore, it is certain that such an excess of fear, as makes any one constantly and obstinately to believe the existence of that, which there is no manner of ground neither from sense nor reason for, tending also to the great disquiet of men's own lives, and the terror of their minds, cannot be accounted other than a kind of crazedness or distraction. Wherefore, the Atheists themselves acknowledging the generality of mankind to be possessed with such a belief of the Deity, when they resolve this into such an excess of fear, it is all one as if they should affirm the generality of mankind to be frighted out of their wits, or crazed and distempered in their brains: none but a few Atheists, who being undaunted and undismayed have escaped this panic terror, remaining sober and in their right senses. But whereas the Atheists thus impute to the generality of mankind, not only light-minded credulity and phantastry, but also such an excess of fear, as differs nothing at all from crazedness and distraction or madness; we affirm, on the contrary, that their supposed courage, stayedness and sobriety, is really nothing else but the dull and sottish stupidity of their minds, dead and heavy incredulity, and earthly diffidence or distrust; by rea-

splendid, and that none but persons noble by birth or office should be allowed to have aught to do with its worship; so that none but the aristocracy should be permitted to baptize, or to celebrate matrimony, or lay on hands, or give absolution, that they may thus be recognized as the priests of the national temples, the defenders and expounders of the national religion. For preaching, however, and the administration of the treasury and ordinary affairs of the church, plebeians might be chosen out of the parliament, as its vice-regents, and to which assembly, therefore, they should be obliged to render an account of all things." Any one must be very dull and obtuse not to perceive at once that the meaning of these words is, that magistrates should always especially take care to keep religious matters and divine worship in their own power, and make use of them to terrify the people and strike them with a kind of sacred awe.

[8] That fear is the origin of religion has been unblushingly averred by Spinoza, in his Preface to his Tractatus Theologico-politicus. For though he only inveighs against superstition, yet it is easy to perceive that the word *superstition* is used by him in the same sense as we are in the habit of using the word *religion*. It will be proper to quote his words, that it may be rendered manifest that Hobbes had, in his own day, associates in this opinion. "We see," says he, among other observations, "that those are most addicted to all kind of superstition, who have an immoderate desire after uncertain good; and that all (especially when in the midst of peril and incapable of helping themselves), with prayers and effeminate tears, implore divine aid, and call reason blind and human wisdom vain..... So much madness does *terror* inject into men. The cause, therefore, which gives rise to, preserves, and nourishes superstition, *is fear*.

son whereof they can believe nothing but what they can feel or see.

Theists indeed have a religious fear of God, which is consequent from him, or their belief of him (of which more afterwards); but the Deity itself, or the belief thereof, was not created by any antecedent fear, that is, by fear concerning men's good and evil fortune; it being certain, that none are less solicitous concerning such events, than they who are most truly religious. The reason whereof is, because these place their chief good in nothing that is ἀλλότριον, "alien," or "in another's power," and exposed to the strokes of fortune; but in that which is most truly their own, namely, the right use of their own will. As the Atheists, on the contrary, must needs, for this very reason, be liable to great fears and solicitudes concerning outward events, because they place their good and evil in the πάθος ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης, "the passion of pleasure and pain;" or at least, denying natural honesty, they acknowledge no other good but what belongs to the animal life only, and so is under the empire of fortune. And that the Atheists are indeed generally timorous and fearful, suspicious and distrustful things, seems to appear plainly from their building all their politics, civil societies, and justice (improperly so called), upon that only foundation of fear and distrust.

But the grand error of the Atheists here is this, that they suppose the Deity, according to the sense of the generality of mankind, to be nothing but a mormo, bugbear, or terriculum, an "affrightful, hurtful," and "most undesirable thing:" whereas men every where invoke the Deity in their straits and difficulties for aid and assistance, looking upon it as exorable and placable; and by their trust and confidence in it, acknowledge its goodness and benignity. Synesius affirms, that though men were otherwise much divided in their opinions, yet ἀγαθὸν τὸν Θεὸν ὑμνοῦσιν ἅπαντες ἀπανταχοῦ καὶ σοφοὶ καὶ ἄσοφοι, "They all every where, both wise and unwise, agree in this, that God is to be praised, as one who is good and benign."*

If among the Pagans there were any who understood that proverbial speech, φθονερὸν τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the worst sense, as if God Almighty were of an "envious and spiteful nature;" these were certainly but a few ill-natured men, who therefore drew a picture of the Deity according to their own likeness. For the proverb, in that sense, was disclaimed and cried down by all the wiser Pagans; as Aristotle, who affirmed the "poets to have lied in this, as well as they did in many other things;"†

* De Regno, p. 9. [Oper. edit. Petavii.]

† Metaph. lib. 1. cap. 2. [Page 263. tom. 4. opp.] Ὅυτε τὸ θεῖον φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί.

and Plutarch,* who taxeth Herodotus for insinuating, τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες, "the Deity universally (that is, all the gods) "to be of an envious and vexatious or spiteful disposition;" whereas himself appropriated this only to that evil demon or principle asserted by him, as appeareth from the life of P. Æmilius,[9] written by him, where he affirmeth, not that τὸ θεῖον πᾶν φθονερὸν, "the Deity universally was of an envious nature;" but, "that there is a certain deity or demon, whose proper task it is, to bring down all great and overswelling human prosperity, and so to temper every man's life, that none may be happy in this world, sincerely and unmixedly, without a check of adversity;" which is as if a Christian should ascribe it to the devil. And Plato[10] plainly declares the reason of God's making the world at first, to have been no other than this: Ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος, "Because he was good, and there is no manner of envy in that which is good." From whence he also concluded: Πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὐτῷ, "That God therefore willed all things should be made the most like himself;" that is, after the best manner. But the true meaning of that ill-languaged proverb seems, at first, to have been no other than what, besides Hesiod, the scripture itself also attributes to God Almighty, that he affecteth to humble and abase the pride of men, and to pull down all high, towering and lofty things, whether as noxious and hurtful to the men themselves, or as in some sense invidious to him, and derogatory from his honour, who alone ought to be exalted, and no flesh to glory before him. And there hath been so much experience of such a thing as this in the world, that the Epicurean poet himself could not but confess, that there was some hidden force or power, which seemed to have a spite to all overswelling greatnesses, and affect to cast contempt and scorn upon the pride of men:†

* De Herod. Malign. [P. 857. tom. 2. opp.]

[9] Tom. 2. opp. p. 273. In this passage, Plutarch, after observing that Æmilius was hated by no good man, adds these words: Πλὴν εἴ τι δαιμόνιον ἄρα τῶν μεγάλων καὶ ὑπερόγκων εἴληχεν εὐτυχιῶν ἀπαρύττειν, καὶ μιγνύναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, ὅπως μηδενὶ κακῶν ἄκρατος εἴη καὶ καθαρός, "Unless indeed some god has the office of detracting from singular and extraordinary felicity, and of mingling human life, so that it cannot be pure and free from evils." Plutarch indeed speaks here with sufficient caution, and seems to offer a conjecture rather than an opinion. But a little further on he shows that his mind was strongly biassed in favour of this sentiment. For when, in p. 274, he introduces Æmilius himself speaking, he makes him say that in the midst of prosperity he always feared some evil from divine powers or this malignant demon already mentioned: Ἔφη γὰρ, ὅτι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων οὐδὲν οὐδέποτε δείσας, τῶν δὲ θείων, ὡς ἀπιστότατον καὶ ποικιλώτατον πρᾶγμα, τὴν τύχην ἀεὶ φοβηθείς, "Whilst from men, said he, I have never feared aught, I have never ceased to fear from divine powers, nor that most faithless and variable thing called fortune." Æmilius in these words speaks of Τύχη, or Fortune, as of a goddess that always threatened human affairs, and rarely allowed mortals to pursue a prosperous course. Who can doubt, then, that Plutarch, as is common with historians who make speeches for their heroes, put his own sentiments into the mouth of Æmilius?

[10] In Timæo, cap. 14. p. 237. edit. Fabricii. † Lamb. 503. [Lib. 5. v. 1232.

Usque adeo res humanas vis abdita quædam
Obterit, et pulchros fasces sævasque secures
Proculcare ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.

Where he plainly reeled and staggered in his atheism, or else was indeed a Theist, but knew it not; it being certain, that there can be no such force as this, in regno atomorum, "in the reign or empire of senseless atoms."[1] And as for those among Christians who make such a horrid representation of God Almighty, as one who created far the greatest part of mankind for no other end or design but only this, that he might recreate and delight himself in their eternal torments; these also do but transcribe or copy out their own ill nature, and then read it in the Deity; the scriptures declaring on the contrary, that God is love. Nevertheless these very persons, in the mean time, dearly hug and embrace God Almighty in their own conceit, as one that is fondly good, kind, and gracious to themselves; he having fastened his affections upon their very persons, without any consideration of their dispositions or qualifications.[2]

[1] Lucretius certainly believed in the existence of a force he calls *occult* as existing in the empire of atoms, as will at once appear from a comparison of these verses with the preceding. For just before, he had been relating how naval commanders, in the midst of a raging sea and terrific tempest, often with vows and sacrifices apply to the gods, or, as he says, Divom pacem votis adire, but that most frequently no good result followed, but they were miserably overwhelmed by the waves. Then he gives the reason why this happened, namely that there was a certain occult force in human affairs against which even the highest power could not prevail. The recondite or *occult force* therefore of which this poet speaks, is opposed by him to the gods; whence it is plain, that this force of which he speaks has in it nothing of a divine nature, but lies concealed in the very nature of things. In short, this occult force of Lucretius is nothing else than a certain fortuitous concourse of atoms, the causes of which are not known to mankind. If the poet had plainly declared his opinion in accordance with the tenets he professed, apart from the poetic figures to which he was addicted, it would have been, that many commanders, notwithstanding their utmost diligence in pacifying Neptune with vows and victims, perish in the sea; and that this happened because no Neptune, no Divine Providence, was in existence; but that all events are the consequences and results of the natural impulses of certain masses of matter, and the various disturbance of atoms, the causes of which we cannot discover; for that a storm is nothing else than a certain violent excitement of invisible particles and atoms, which cannot be stopped by prayers or sacrifices. Lucretius sometimes expresses himself in a clear and philosophical manner; but at other times he adorns his master's doctrines with poetic figures; whence it happens that in some passages he seems to have a certain leaning towards religion, which was however very far from being the case. What has now been said in opposition to Dr. Cudworth applies also against Bayle, who in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 2. art. Lucrèce, not. F. p. 1804. argues against Lucretius in the same way as Dr. Cudworth does, and explains his *occult force* of some undefinable divine power.

[2] The first person who made use of this proverb: Τὸ δαιμόνιον φθονερὸν, doubtless attached to it a very bad meaning, and was imbued with the foolish errors of the ancient Greeks respecting the Divine nature. The old inhabitants of Greece, as is plainly apparent from Homer and Hesiod, had the same ideas of the gods whom they worshipped as of the kings and tyrants to whom they were themselves in subjection, and therefore did not hesitate to ascribe to these deities all the passions and vices by which they saw their own magistrates actuated. No one, however, acquainted with Grecian history can be unaware that the tyrants and petty kings of Greece were accustomed, if they perceived any one of their citizens to excel the rest in wealth or fortune,

It is true indeed, that religion is often expressed in the scripture by the "fear of God," and fear hath been said to be prima mensura Deitatis, "the first measure of the Divinity in us," or

to depress him either by fraud or force, and if they did not put him to death, at least to deprive him of all his honours and banish him from their dominions. For neither envy, nor a fear of losing their authority, would allow them to tolerate in the state a citizen equal in influence and dignity to themselves. The Greeks then conceived of their gods as of kinglings, whose power they dreaded; and thought them of such a disposition that they envied the success and prosperity of mankind, and would not suffer any one securely to retain the height of honour and dignity. On which account they used to admonish those who seemed to have all things happen according to their wish, to remember that the gods were envious, and could not endure the constant felicity of mankind; to avert whose indignation they should act as prudent citizens used to do, who wished not to offend the tyrants; and to cast away part of the prosperity they enjoyed. The truth of this is sufficiently evidenced by the exhortation which Herodotus (lib. 3. sect. 40. p. 176. ed. Gronov.) relates to have been sent by Amasis, king of Egypt, to Polycrates, the singularly prosperous tyrant of Samos: *Αἱ σαὶ μεγάλαι εὐτυχίαι οὐκ ἀρέσκουσι τῷ* ΘΕΙΟΝ *ἐπισταμένῳ* "ὩΣ 'ΕΣΤΙ ΦΘΟΝΕΡΟ'Ν.....*οὐδένα γάρ κεν λόγῳ οἶδα ἀκούσας, ὅστις ἕτερος οὐ κακῶς ἐτελεύτησε πρόῤῥιζος, εὐτυχέων τὰ πάντα,* "Your great prosperity pleases me not, since I know *how envious the Deity is*.....For I never remember to have heard of any one, who, after he had been prosperous in all things, did not at length miserably and completely perish." This passage itself may be more clearly understood from what is said by Xerxes, as related by the same author Herodotus, lib. 7. sect. 10. p. 385. where among other things he says: *Φιλέει ὁ Θεὸς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα πάντα κωλύειν· οὕτω δὴ καὶ στράτος πολλὸς ὑπὸ ὀλίγου διαφθείρεται κατὰ τοιόνδε, ἐπεάν σφι ὁ Θεὸς φθονήσας φόβον ἐμβάλῃ.....οὐ γὰρ ἰᾷ φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ Θεὸς, ἢ ἑωυτόν,* "God delights to throw obstacles in the way of whatever is most exalted; so that a great army is put to flight by a small one as often as the envious Deity injects into them a panic.....For God suffers none but himself to excel in wisdom." It would be vain, I think, to endeavour so to explain this passage as to make it contain nothing but what was honourable to the Deity. I am aware that some learned men are of opinion that Xerxes here speaks of avenging justice, and suppose him to mean that divine retribution usually punished the more powerful. But this is sufficiently refuted by the fact that Xerxes or Herodotus supposes the Deity to depress what is most exalted, because he can bear no equal to himself, or because, beside himself, he is averse to having any one excel in wisdom. To allow no equal to one's self, even when nothing is thence to be feared, is indeed the height of envy. Besides, if the subject here under discussion were the infliction of punishment upon pride by divine justice, Herodotus would have plainly accused the Deity of a fault very nearly allied to envy; for he says that God is angry with the more powerful, because he wishes no one to have the same mental affections that he has. But even those who had such absurd ideas of the gods did not deny that human affairs were ordered by them, and, as is apparent from Hesiod's Works and Days, firmly believed that they were the distributors of the good and evil that usually fell to the lot of mortals. Some therefore will perhaps deem it singular that the Greeks should think the gods capable of envying mankind the very good that the gods themselves conferred. But a more accurate examination of Grecian customs and opinions will make the explanation of this circumstance easy. First of all, it must be remembered that they believed in one supreme God, or Parent of gods and men, whom they called Jupiter; but beside him they had several minor gods, under the dominion and authority of this supreme God. They asserted that this supreme God enjoyed the power of doing good to men; nor did they deny to the inferior deities the power of rendering many good offices to mankind, and granting very great favours to their worshippers. In their opinion a person might become very fortunate by the help of Apollo, Mercury, or Pluto alone, provided only that this individual were greatly distinguished above others. Keeping this in remembrance, the meaning of the Greek proverb abovementioned will be obvious. The word *δαιμόνιον* in it signifies the supreme God; for, as has already been shown in another place by sufficient authorities, the Greeks frequently use the word in this sense, nor can it in this saying be very well taken in any other signification. Besides,

the first impression, that religion makes upon men in this obnoxious and guilty state, before they have arrived to the true love of God and righteousness. But this religious fear is not a

Herodotus, in the other passage I have adduced, calls the envious god he speaks of by the name of ὁ Θεός: so that this supreme God is said to be envious; that is, not indeed that he would prevent the minor gods from loading their worshippers and friends with great wealth and gifts, but that he could by no means endure that the felicity of these mortals should go beyond bound, or should be like his own. If therefore the fortunes of those favoured by a minor god should unduly increase, it is supposed that by his power, exceeding that of all the gods, he usually overthrew all their plans. And this view seems to me to be confirmed by the history of Polycrates in Herodotus. This person, whom the father of history relates to have had for his principal aim the dominion of the sea (lib. 3. sect. 122. p. 206.) undoubtedly in order to obtain his desire, worshipped Neptune more ardently than he did the other gods. He also, according to the same author (sect. 47. p. 178.) sent as a present a very valuable breastplate to Minerva in Lindus; whence is apparent his particular regard for that goddess. But after Polycrates had perished by a cruel death, Mæandrius, viceroy of Samos, erected a monument to Jupiter the Liberator. See Herodotus, lib. 3. sect. 142. p. 215. This monument to Jupiter the Liberator is a proof that the Samians were persuaded that the supreme god Jupiter had deprived Polycrates of his life and felicity together. But if they believed this, they could not have supposed that Jupiter himself was the author of that felicity which Polycrates had enjoyed during so many years. As therefore they held that no one could be remarkably happy without the aid of the gods, doubtless they thought that those gods whom they had well known Polycrates principally to have worshipped, Neptune and Minerva, had rewarded his piety exhibited towards themselves. But still there is no necessity for us to consider this proverb as solely applicable to the highest and principal God; for the Greeks also thought that the minor gods, as the poets taught, were inflamed with mutual enmities, and envied each other's happiness and designs, as may be proved from many examples in Homer and Virgil. Οἱ Θεοί, correctly says Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhonianarum Hypotyposis, lib. 1. cap. 14. p. 39, φθονοῦντες ἀλλήλοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγονται, "The gods are introduced by the poets envying one another." Since this was the opinion of the Greeks, it could not but happen that they should fear lest, if they gained the love and kindness of one god, they might incur the envy and hatred of another.

But in the lapse of time, when the light of philosophy had arisen among the Greeks, the wiser part of them easily perceived that envy was a vice entirely inconsistent with the dignity of the immortal gods; on which account they spoke more cautiously respecting the causes of the calamities commonly occurring to distinguished individuals. Plato, whom the later Greeks reverenced as a philosopher almost more than human, assigned the origin of the misfortunes that happened to opulent and powerful persons entirely to their pride. For he says that men abounding in prosperity are generally unduly elated, and are then deserted by the Deity; that when thus deserted they go on from one crime to another, and in this way miserably overthrow themselves and their fortunes through the just judgment of God. It is worth while to transcribe his own words, De Legibus, lib. 4. p. 600: Ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος, ἢ τιμαῖς, ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ, ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλεγομένος τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως, ὡς οὔτ' ἄρχοντος, οὔτε τινὸς ἡγεμόνος δεόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλοις ἱκανὸς ὢν ἡγεῖσθαι, καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ· καταλειφθεὶς δὲ, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλοις τοιούτοις προσλαβὼν, σκιρτῷ, ταράττων πάνθ' ἅμα, καὶ πολλοῖς τισιν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τις· μετὰ δὲ χρόνον οὐ πολὺν ὑποσχὼν τιμωρίαν οὐ μεμπτὴν τῇ δίκῃ, ἑαυτόν τε καὶ οἶκον καὶ πόλιν ἄρδην ἀνάστατον ἐποίησε, "He who is elated with pride, because he excels in wealth, or honours, or personal beauty (by which the youthful mind is inflamed with folly and pride), as if standing in need of no ruler or guide, but rather being capable of guiding others, is entirely deserted by God; and being thus deserted, and associating with others of the same description, he becomes arrogant, throwing all things at once into confusion, and to many indeed he appears to be somebody; but after a short time, being punished by the just judgment of God, he at once overthrows himself, his house, and his city." The proverb itself, indeed, which accuses the Deity of envy, was not abrogated among the Greeks, nor did

fear of God as a mere arbitrary omnipotent Being, much less as hurtful and mischievous (which could not be disjoined from hatred); but an awful regard of him, as of one who is essentially just, and as well a punisher of vice and wickedness, as a rewarder of virtue; Lucretius himself, when he describes this religious fear of men, confessing it to be conjoined with a conscience of their duty, or to include the same within itself:*

> Tunc populi gentesque tremunt, &c.
> Ne quod ob admissum fœdè dictumve superbè,
> Pœnarum grave sit solvendi tempus adactum.

And this is the sense of the generality of mankind, that there being a natural difference of good and evil moral, there is an impartial justice in the Deity, which presideth over the same, and inclines it as well to punish the wicked, as to reward the virtuous: Epicurus himself acknowledging thus much:[3] Ἔνθεν

the poets or other subsequent writers cease to attribute φθόνον, or envy, to the gods; but this they did in a widely different sense from the meaning of their ancestors. For the φθόνος which in the later Greek writings is ascribed to God, most generally signifies the anger and avenging justice of the Deity, his hatred of arrogant and wicked men. This also may be confirmed by a passage of Herodotus, to be found in the eighth book of his History, sect. 109. p. 494: Τάδε οὐχ ἡμεῖς there says Themistocles, κατεργασάμεθα, ἀλλὰ θεοί τε καὶ ἥρωες, οἳ ἘΦΘΟΝΗΣΑΝ, ἄνδρα ἕνα τῆς τε Ἀσίας καὶ τῆς Εὐρώπης βασιλεῦσαι, ἐόντα ἀνόσιόν τε καὶ ἀτάσθαλον, "It is not we who have done these things, but the gods and heroes, *who were envious* that one man should rule both Europe and Asia, who was at the same time impious and wicked." These words plainly show, I think, that the envy ascribed to the gods and heroes was not regarded as criminal or vicious, but only signified the hatred they felt towards a wicked man, a feeling most worthy of the Supreme Deity. And the words, οἱ θεοὶ ἐφθόνησαν, may be most correctly rendered, "The gods were indignant that so impious a man should rule so many countries." Other examples of the same kind have been collected by the learned Elsner in his Observationes ad Novi Testamenti Libros, vol. 2. p. 396. And the famous Ezekiel Spanheim's remarks on the word φθόνος in his Comment. ad Callimachum, p. 112. are well worthy of observation. From the heathen this mode of expression passed over to the Christian fathers, many of whom have said that God is envious, when they mean that the Deity prevents the designs of arrogant and haughty mortals, and often resists the rage and ambition of the powerful. On this subject, see Isaac Casaubon's Observations on Gregory Nyssen's Epistle to Eustathius, p. 70; L. A. Muratori's Anecdota Græca, vol. 1. p. 23; and Henry Dodwell's Fifth Dissertation on Cyprian, p. 26. ed. Brem. The best of men have followed the laws of language which prevailed in the age in which they wrote; and cannot on this account be justly accused of any great crime; but I nevertheless agree with Dr. Cudworth in thinking that this mode of speech is improper, and its repudiation safer than its use. But as it often happens in other things, so also many expressions which at first owed their origin to a bad source, have by degrees lost the disgrace attached to them, and in an improved state of popular knowledge have gradually had appended to them improved ideas corresponding to the new opinions of the people.

* P. 503. [Lib. 5. v. 1223.]

[3] Epist. ad Menœc. p. 46. Gass. [Tom. 5. opp. Vide etiam Diog. Laërtium, lib. 10. sect. 124. p. 665.] In the printed edition the passage stands thus:—Ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι αἰτίαι τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται, καὶ ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, "Hence the greatest evils are brought on bad men by the gods, and advantages on the good." But Dr. Cudworth has quoted it as emended by Gassendi: see his comment on the 10th book of Diogenes Laërtius, p. 120. vol. 5. of his Works. An attentive reader will easily perceive that this passage is corrupt and vitiated by the negligence of

καὶ μεγίστας βλάβας οἴονται τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγεσθαι, καὶ ὠφελείας τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, "Theists suppose that there are both great evils inflicted upon the wicked from the gods; and also great rewards by them bestowed upon the good." And this fear of God is not only beneficial to mankind in general, by repressing the growth of wickedness, but also wholesome and salutary to those very persons themselves, that are thus religiously affected, it being preservative of them both from moral evils, and likewise from the evils of punishment consequent thereupon. This is the true and genuine fear of religion, which when it degenerates into a dark kind of jealous and suspicious fear of God Almighty, either as a hurtful, or as a mere arbitrary and tyrannical being, then is it looked upon as the vice or extreme of religion, and distinguished from it by the name of δεισιδαιμονία, "superstition." Thus is the character of a superstitious man given by Plutarch:* Οἴεται θεοὺς εἶναι, λυπηροὺς δὲ καὶ βλαβεροὺς, "That he thinks there are gods, but that they are noxious and hurtful;" and ἀνάγκη καὶ μισεῖν τὸν δεισιδαίμονα, καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς, "a superstitious man must needs hate God, as well as fear him." "The true fear of God (as the son of Sirach speaks[4]) is the beginning of his love, and faith is the beginning of cleaving to him." As if he should have said, the first entrance into religion is an awful regard to God as the punisher of vice;

the copyists. But how it ought to be emended we can now scarcely tell, on account of the paucity of ancient manuscripts. In the codex from which Laërtius is printed, the word ἀγαθοῖς is also wanting. But since the sense itself seemed to require it, Ambrosius Camaldulensis first added it in his version, and this was so much approved by Gassendi, M. Meibomius, and Joachim Kühn, that they did not hesitate to add the word in the text itself. Nor do I feel inclined to differ from such learned men; rather I would observe, that the word αἰτίαι, which here appears to be unmeaning and superfluous, seems to me to have arisen out of ἀγαθοῖς, by an error of the copyist. But what value is to be attached to the other emendations proposed by the above critics, I do not quite understand. Kühn, in his Observationes ad Laërtium, p. 253. alters the passage thus:—Ἔνθεν αἱ μέγισται βλάβαι· ἅται (for so he reads instead of αἰτίαι) τοῖς κακοῖς ἐκ θεῶν ἐπάγονται, καὶ ὠφέλειαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, "Hence are the greatest losses. Evils are by the gods brought upon the bad, and advantages upon the good." This I must confess is ingenious and elegant; whether it be correct, I leave others to decide. Though after all, what great need is there of wasting ingenuity in the correction of this passage? Those who differ respecting the words are unanimous on the subject itself. For all confess, even Gassendi himself, a favourer of Epicurus, that this philosopher spoke not his own, but the popular opinion, and reckoned among vulgar errors the sentiment that God punished the wicked and rewarded the good. Nor will the preceding and subsequent context allow us to entertain any other supposition, any more than what is said against a providence by Epicurus in his epistle to Rythocles. Since, therefore, the sense is sufficiently obvious, it will be of little consequence whether we follow Meibomius, or Gassendi, or Kühn.

* Περὶ Δεισιδαιμ. [P. 165. tom. 2. opp.]

[4] Cap. xxv. 12. In some copies of the book of Ecclesiasticus, this text is to be found, but in the majority it is wanting. Hence it is also absent in Luther's German version. It has been inserted by John Drusius in his edition of the book, who has been followed by John Albert Fabricius, in his edition of the Apocrypha, Leipsic, 1691. 8vo. and by others. [Dr. Cudworth's translation is given from the authorized English version.]

the second step forwards therein is faith or confidence in God, whereby men rely upon him for good, and cleave to him; and the top and perfection of all religion is the love of God above all, as the most amiable being. Christianity, the best of religions, recommendeth faith to us, as the inlet or introduction into all true and ingenuous piety; for "he that cometh to God, must not only believe that he is, but also that he is a rewarder of those that seek him."* Which faith is better defined in the Scripture, than by any scholastic, to be the substance of things (that are to be) hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen; that is, a confident persuasion of things, that fall not under sight, (because they are either invisible or future) and which also are to be hoped for. So that religious fear consisteth well with faith, and faith is near of kin to hope, and the result of both faith and hope is love; which faith, hope, and love, do all suppose an essential goodness in the Deity. God is such a Being, who, if he were not, were of all things whatsoever most to be wished for; it being indeed no way desirable (as that noble emperor concluded) for a man to live in a world, void of a God and providence. He that believes a God, believes all that good and perfection in the universe, which his heart can possibly wish or desire. It is the interest of none that there should be no God, but only of such wretched persons, as have abandoned their first and only true interest of being good, and friends to God, and are desperately resolved upon ways of wickedness.

The reason why the Atheists do thus grossly mistake the notion of God, and conceive of him differently from the generality of mankind, as a thing which is only to be feared, and must consequently be hated, is from nothing but their own vice and ill-nature. For first, their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution, which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint:) as they cannot but really hate that which hinders them of their true liberty and chief good, so must they needs interpret the severity of the Deity so much spoken of against wickedness, to be nothing else but cruelty and arbitrary tyranny. Again, it is a wretched ill-natured maxim, which these Atheists have, That there is nulla naturalis charitas, "no natural charity," but that omnis benevolentia oritur ex imbecillitate et metu, "all benevolence ariseth only from imbecility and fear;"† that is, from being either obnoxious to another's power, or standing in need of his help. So that all that is now called love and friendship amongst men, is, according to these really nothing, but either a

* Heb. xi. 1.
† Cicero de Natura Deor. lib. p. 213. Lamb. [Cap. 43. p. 2948. opp.]

crouching under another's power, whom they cannot resist, or else, mercatura quædam utilitatum, "a certain kind of merchandizing for utilities." And thus does Cotta in Cicero* declare their sense: Ne homines quidem censetis, nisi imbecilli essent, futuros beneficos aut benignos, "You conceive that no man would be any way beneficent or benevolent to another, were it not for his imbecility or indigence." But as for God Almighty, these Atheists conclude that upon the supposition of his existence there could not be so much as this spurious love or benevolence in him neither towards any thing; because by reason of his absolute and irresistible power, he would neither stand in need of any thing, and be devoid of all fear. Thus the forementioned Cotta:† Quid est præstantius bonitate et beneficentiâ? Quâ cùm carere Deum vultis, neminem Deo nec Deum nec hominem carum, neminem ab eo amari vultis. Ita fit, ut non modò homines à diis, sed ipsi dii inter se ab aliis alii negligantur, "What is there more excellent than goodness and beneficence? which when you will needs have God to be utterly devoid of, you suppose that neither any God nor man is dear to the supreme God, or beloved of him. From whence it will follow, that not only men are neglected by the gods, but also the gods amongst themselves are neglected by one another." Accordingly, a late pretender to politics, who in this manner discards all natural justice and charity, determines concerning God,[5] Regnandi et puniendi eos, qui leges suas violant, jus Deo esse à solâ potentiâ irresistibili, "That he has no other right of reigning over men, and of punishing those who transgress his laws, but only from his irresistible power." Which indeed is all one as to say, "That God has no right at all of ruling over mankind, and imposing commands upon them," but what he doth in this kind, he doth it only by force and power, right and might (or power) being very different things from one another, and there being no jus or "right" without natural justice; so that the word "right" is here only abused. And consentaneously hereunto the same writer further adds:[6] Si jus regnandi habeat Deus ab omnipotentiâ suâ, manifestum est obligationem ad præstandum ipsi obedientiam incumbere hominibus propter imbecillitatem, "That if God's right of commanding be derived only from his omnipotence, then it is manifest that men's obligation to obey him lies upon them only from their imbecility." Or, as it is further explained by him: Homines ideò Deo subjectos esse, quia omnipotentes non sunt, aut quia ad resistendum satis virium non habent, "That men are therefore only subject to God,

* Cicero de Naturâ Deor. lib. 1. p. 213. Lamb. [Cap. 43. p. 2948. opp.]
† Cicero, Ibid.
[5] Hobbes, Elem. de Cive, cap. 15. sect. 4. p. 112. et alias.
[6] Ibid. sect. 7. p. 114.

because they are not omnipotent, or have not sufficient power to resist him." Thus do we see plainly how the Atheists, by reason of their vice and ill-nature, (which makes them deny all natural justice and honesty, all natural charity and benevolence) transform the Deity into a monstrous shape; such an omnipotent Being, as if he were, could have nothing neither of justice in him, nor of benevolence towards his creatures; and whose only right and authority of commanding them would be his irresistible power; whom his creatures could not place any hope, trust, and confidence in, nor have any other obligation to obey, than that of fear and necessity, proceeding from their imbecility, or inability to resist him. And such a Deity as this is indeed a mormo or bug-bear, a most formidable and affrightful thing.

But all this is nothing but the Atheists' false imagination, true religion representing a most comfortable prospect of things from the Deity; whereas, on the contrary, the atheistic scene of things is dismal, hopeless, and forlorn, that there should be no other good, than what depends upon things wholly out of our own power, the momentary gratification of our insatiate appetites, and the perpetual pouring into a dolium pertusum, "a perforated and leaking vessel;" that ourselves should be but a congeries of atoms, upon the dissolution of whose compages, our life should vanish into nothing, and all our hope perish: that there should be no providence over us, nor any kind and good-natured Being above to take care of us, there being nothing without us but dead and senseless matter. True indeed, there could be no spiteful designs in senseless atoms, or a dark inconscious nature. Upon which account, Plutarch would grant,* that even this Atheistic hypothesis itself, as bad as it is, were, notwithstanding, to be preferred before that of an omnipotent, spiteful, and malicious being, (if there can be any such hypothesis as this) a monarchy of the Manichean evil principle, reigning all alone over the whole world, without any corrival, and having an undisturbed empire. Nevertheless, it is certain also, that there could be no faith nor hope neither in these senseless atoms, both necessarily and fortuitously moved, no more than there could be faith and hope in a whirlwind, or in a tempestuous sea, whose merciless waves are inexorable, and deaf to all cries and supplication. For which reason Epicurus[7] himself confessed, that it was better to give credit to the fable of the gods,† (as he calls it) than to serve the atheistic fate, or that material necessity of all things, introduced by those atheistic philosophers, Leucippus and Democritus: Κρεῖττον ἦν τῷ περὶ θεῶν μύθῳ κατακολουθεῖν, ἢ τῇ τῶν φυσικῶν

* De Superstit. [P. 164. tom. 2. opp.]
[7] Vide Diog. Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 134. p. 659.
† Epist. ad Men. p. 49. Gass.

εἱμαρμένῃ δουλεύειν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίδα παραιτήσεως ὑπογράφει θεῶν διὰ τιμῆς· ἡ δὲ ἀπαραίτητον ἔχει τὴν ἀνάγκην, "Because there is hopes, that the gods may be prevailed with by worship and prayer; but the other [necessity] is altogether deaf and inexorable." And though Epicurus thought to mend the matter, and make the atheistic hypothesis more tolerable, by introducing into it (contrary to the tenor of those principles) liberty of will in men; yet this being not a power over things without us, but ourselves only, could alter the case very little. Epicurus himself was in a panic fear lest the frame of heaven should sometime upon a sudden crack, and tumble about his ears, and this fortuitous compilement of atoms be dissolved into a chaos:

> Tria talia texta
> Una dies dabit exitio; multosque per annos
> Sustentata ruet moles et machina mundi.[8]

And what comfort could his liberty of will then afford him, who placed all his happiness in security from external evils? Τέλος τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς, μὴ φοβεῖσθαι, (saith Plutarch),* "The atheistic design in shaking off the belief of a God, was to be without fear;" but by means hereof, they framed such a system of things to themselves, as, under which, they could not have the least hope, faith, or confidence. Thus running from fear, did they plunge themselves into fear; for they who are without hope, can never be free from fear. Endless of necessity must the fears and anxieties of those men be, who shake off that one fear of God, that would only preserve them from evil, and have no faith nor hope in him. Wherefore, we might conclude, upon better grounds than the Atheists do of theism, that atheism (which hath no foundation at all in nature nor in reason) springs first from the imposture of fear. For the faith of religion being the substance or confidence of such things not seen, as are to be hoped for; atheistic infidelity must needs, on the contrary, be a certain heavy diffidence, despondence, and misgiving of mind, or a timorous distrust and disbelief of good to be hoped for, beyond the reach of sense; namely, of an invisible Being omnipotent, that exerciseth a just, kind, and gracious providence over all those who commit their ways to him, with an endeavour to please him, both here in this life, and after death. But vice, or the love of lawless liberty, prevailing over such disbelieving persons, makes them, by degrees, more and more desirous, that there should be no God; that is, no such hinderer of their liberty;

[8] Lucretius, lib. 5. verse 95. &c. p. 238.
* De Superstit. [P. 165. tom. 2. opp.]

and to count it a happiness to be freed from the fear of him, whose justice (if he were) they must needs be obnoxious to.[9]

And now have we made it evident that the Atheists, who make religion and the belief a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, tranforming it into such a thing as can only be feared and hated; and then do they conclude concerning it, (as well indeed they may) that there is no such thing as this really existing in nature, but that it is only a mormo, or bug-bear, raised up by men's fear and fancy. Of the two, it might better be said, that the opinion of a God sprung from men's hope of good, than from their fear of evil; but really, it springs neither from hope nor fear, (however in different circumstances it raises both those passions in our minds;) nor is it the imposture of any passion, but that whose belief is supported and sustained by the strongest and clearest reason, as shall be declared in due place. But the sense of a Deity often preventing ratiocination in us, and urging itself more immediately upon us, it is certain that there is also, besides a rational belief thereof, a natural prolepsis, or anticipation, in the minds of men concerning it, which by Aristotle is called *μαντεία*, "a vaticination."[10]

[9] I am by no means disposed to deny the truth of what is here said by our author respecting the miserable and unquiet state of those who deny the existence of a God. His observation is also correct that Atheism is more the product of fear than religion and the worship of God. For most of those who have denied a Deity have been so bold because they were afraid of being forced to lay a restraint on their depraved propensities and love of vice, if they should allow the existence of a God. But properly speaking, in real Atheists, who have no motives arising from a hope of futurity, there can be no fear of losing what others hope for. For fear is nothing else than an apprehension of losing what we consider to be a part of our happiness. But an Atheist, apart from the delights and pleasures of the present life, has no source of happiness, and reckons what is said respecting the future state of souls, a vain delusive dream; so that he cannot be afraid of losing any part of these things. It may perhaps be said that Atheists are in perpetual fear of losing their temporal and only enjoyments; nor will I deny that some of them may have been so constituted and affected. But whoever reflects that these wretched men first of all believe that there is no infinite Being who can deprive them of the good things they possess, and then that it is a maxim with most of them to enjoy present pleasures and disregard the future, will perceive that they are not usually liable to suffer much from fear. So that I think Plutarch was right in saying that men embraced Atheism in order to free themselves from fear; and in my opinion, they do not altogether fail of their object. Dr. Cudworth here uses the words *hope* and *fear* in a freer sense, and means that Atheists cannot possess any true peace and joy, any tranquillity of mind, or any hope, (without which human life is truly wretched;) but are tossed and disturbed as if by continual tempests; all which is indeed entirely certain and true.

[10] Those who assert that all religion and piety are the result of fear, though using similar expressions, are not unanimous in their opinions, and therefore cannot be refuted in the same way. Some think that mankind seeing the uncertainty of human affairs and fortunes, and fearing the sudden loss of their property and enjoyments, have sought for some Being at once powerful and benign towards the human race, that might assure their fortunes against all the attacks of men and vicissi-

Thus have we sufficiently confuted the first atheistic pretence to solve the phenomenon of religion, and the belief of a God, so generally entertained, from the imposture of fear. We come

tudes of time; that therefore they imagined to themselves a nature exalted far above all visible things, and not only endowed with infinite power, but also imbued with ardent benevolence and love towards human kind; and that to this Being they betook themselves for safety, with prayers and sacrifices. But those who assign this origin to religion, are so far from thinking that God appears to men as a dreadful, terrific, sanguinary being, that they are persuaded of the exact contrary to all this, and believe the Deity is regarded by mankind as an amiable being, worthy of universal worship, on account of his benevolence to the human race. For it is impossible but that the Being to which any one looks for safety against evils and calamities, should be supposed to be possessed both of the will and power to afford assistance. Others again, who in like manner think that fear is the cause of religion, attach a widely different meaning to this tenet, and think that mankind, beholding the lightnings, earthquakes, shipwrecks, destruction of cities, and all the other ills by which we are in this life beset, through fear and ignorance of the real causes, have gone headlong into the opinion that there was a certain invisible being whence all these woes proceeded, which took delight in the misery of mankind, and had more malice to hurt than good-will to help; that therefore being full of solicitude and anxiety, they considered how this irritable and cruel Deity was to be appeased, and decided that he was to be approached with supplications to prevent him from overthrowing their means of happiness. This was the opinion of Democritus, whose words are given by Sextus Empiricus, lib. 8. adversùs Mathematicos, sect. 24. p. 554. as also of Lucretius, Petronius, and many others. The words of Petronius, in his Fragments, p. 676, &c. are as follows:—

Ardua cœlo
Fulmina quum caderent, discussaque mœnia flammis,
Atque ictus flagraret Athos, mox Phœbus ad ortus
Lustratâ dejectus humo, Lunæque senectus
Et reparatus honos: hinc signa [Deorum] effusa per orbem.

"When from high heaven
The vivid lightnings fell, and the scathed walls
And stricken mountains flamed; or when at dawn
The rising sun athwart the glistering glade
Shot forth his beams, or the moon waxed and waned
Then were the statues of the gods diffused
Over the world."

Those who supposed religion in this way to be the product of fear no doubt thought that God appeared to mankind a terrific Being, from whom there was more to be feared than hoped. These opinions are intimately allied to each other, and I think it very possible that an individual hostile to religion and to God, might unite and associate both. Yet they ought not to be confounded together, since it is possible that the one may be retained while the other is rejected, and the same consequences do not alike follow both. For my own part, though I wish not to impose laws on any, but to allow each one to enjoy his own liberty, yet I think that in all disputations respecting truth, and especially in all controversies having reference to religion, it is of primary importance distinctly to explain the ideas in question, and not inadvertently to confound things that are to some extent allied with each other. Some arguments go to demonstrate the folly and emptiness of both these views, while others only point out the absurdity of one. I. First of all, these disputants beg the question at issue, which no one will deny to be a capital error. The question is, whether there is a God or not? But they proceed in the controversy, as if all doubt on this point were done away with, and lay it down as a fundamental axiom that there is no God. For they inquire into the origin of our opinion or error, as they call it; but how could they do this, unless they had taken for granted the non-existence of the Deity. Those who wish to conduct a disputation with rationality and order, and to detract from the authority of any opinion, ought first by proper reasoning to show the trifling and false nature of the doctrine to which they are opposed. If this were done, no one could

now to the second, That it proceeded from the ignorance of causes also, or men's want of philosophy; they being prone, by reason of their innate curiosity, where they find no causes to

properly hinder them from examining into the causes and origin of error. But atheistical opposers of religion first of all omit all this, and take for granted that the only thing they have to do, is to unfold the causes of what they please to call an error; as if no doubt whatever remained in reference to the main point in dispute. Ingenious disputants truly! who like unskilful physicians begin to inquire into the causes and cure of a disease, before they know whether the disease be actually present or not. II. If they should deny that they are chargeable with this fault, and seriously wish to have what they say respecting the origin of religion being traceable to the timidity of mankind, reckoned among arguments against religion and a Deity, they will be involved in a still more flagrant error. This then would be the state of the argument:—Whatever proceeds from fear is false; religion hence originates; therefore it is a vulgar error. It will be proper then for them to prove the minor proposition of this syllogism, and to show that religion is the offspring of fear. Doubtless they will produce this new species of argumentation:—whatever always has united to it any degree of fear arises from fear; but fear is always united with religion; therefore, religion proceeds from fear. Let us imitate this acute method. Atheists wish to persuade us that their minds enjoy an ethereal serenity and peace, free from all sublunary disturbance; and that they have parted company with religion only for the sake of enjoying a gladsome freedom from all kind of terror. Let us suppose that this is the real state of the case. Proceeding then from this beginning, we will argue as follows: Whatever is united with perpetual gratification and voluptuous pleasure arises from a love of gratification and pleasure; atheism is always accompanied by gratification; therefore, atheism is entirely produced, not by reasoning, but by a fondness for pleasure. But atheists either do not or will not perceive that this argument of which they are so enamoured has no other foundation than the following most fragile one:—Whatever may possibly seem to have originated from any passion of the mind, must necessarily have had such an origin; or, in other words, whatever may in any way be traced to any weakness of our minds, must necessarily have thence originated. Does any one fancy that religion originated in fear? Oh! then, that was certainly its origin. There is nothing so well attested, certain, and evident, that it cannot be oppugned and rejected, if this method of reasoning be correct. Who will deny the existence of Alexander the Great and Julius Cæsar? Yet by the same method it will be easy to place the lives of these heroes among fabulous narratives. For I would argue thus:—There is in the human mind a certain fondness for the construction of unheard of fictions; whatever seems to have proceeded from this propensity, must have proceeded from it; the histories of Cæsar and Alexander, being full of unusual and wonderful events, may be referred to this inclination of our minds; therefore, these histories have been devised by certain individuals under the influence of an undefinable love for the singular and the marvellous. We must lay aside all the principles of reasoning handed down from wise and great men, and seek new laws of logic from the foes of religion and of God, if such conclusions as these be allowed any grade above folly and contempt. III. What, after all, is the grand boast of Atheists? Demonstration? Conclusions from principles neither doubtful nor obscure? They themselves will not assert so much. It is the mere guess and conjecture of men who would rather admit any thing than the being of a God. First of all they lay down this principle: there is no God, therefore there is no religion. Afterwards they suspect they ought to explain the origin of religion; and since they see a great part of mankind under the influence of fear, they think they have done a great thing in gravely affirming that this fear is the cause of religion. So great an advantage is it to be possessed of wisdom, and not to flit about like shadows! But in a matter of such moment as are all discussions respecting God and religion, what wise and rational man would trust to suspicions, guesses, and conjectures, the deceitful nature of which is taught us by daily experience? Let us suppose that a person were told that the whole town in which he resided was on fire, and that the conflagration was rapidly approaching his own house; let us imagine that not one or even ten persons, but all the people, with few exceptions, affirmed the truth of this; what kind of person should we think him to be, if he paid no attention to this public announcement, and conjectured that all this supposition

make or feign them; and from their fear in the absence of natural and necessary causes, to imagine supernatural and divine; this also affording them a handsome cover and pretext for their

of a conflagration arose only from a panic fear and fright? But such is the conduct of those whom we are now opposing. The whole human race, with few exceptions, (and those biassed by interest against a Deity,) declare that there is a God, and that he ought to be approached with reverence, and worshipped with devotion. But the small minority, on the contrary, think it quite sufficient for them to suspect that this opinion is the result only of the fear which is natural to mankind. IV. If religion and the belief of a God arose from fear, those, (as many we know there are) who have been endowed by nature with great and dauntless minds, so as not to dread imprisonment or death, or what to other men appears sad and wretched, would have no religion and no idea of a God. But in these boldest of mankind, there is often more piety and religion to be seen than in the timid and fearful. Wicked men themselves, whom, as Lucretius says, lib. 3. verse 1030,

> "Nor prisons, nor the dreadful precipice,
> Nor stripes, nor executioner, nor rack,
> Nor boiling pitch, nor iron heated red,
> Nor flaming torches can affright,"

though they would fain extirpate all belief of a supreme Deity from their minds, can by no means accomplish this. If fear be the cause of our worshipping God, whence did these get their religious feelings? While, on the contrary, men immersed in pleasure, who tremble at the very shadow of approaching evil, often persuade themselves there is no God. If fear be the parent of devotion, why are these without devotion, who thus superabound in fear?

We now come more particularly to those who hold that the fear of losing their possessions prompted men to imagine to themselves a great God, under whose power and goodness they might live in safety. But these give no explanation of what they mean, and do not give even a moderately probable reason of the matter in question. Their series of arguments is as follows:—Mankind are fearful of losing by some casualty their goods and possessions; hence they wish that there were some being that could defend their interests against all the assaults of adverse fortune; what is earnestly desired is easily believed to exist; therefore mankind, being very anxious that there should be such a being as God, have incautiously persuaded themselves that such is the case. Ingenious and acute, certainly! I will not indeed, deny that there are some men so irrational as to persuade themselves of the existence of what they very much desire. But, in the first place, these are very few, indeed, none but those to whom may be with propriety applied those lines of Catullus:—

> Non est sana puella: ne rogate
> Qualis sit: solet ea imaginosum
> Pati aliquid.

> "The girl's not sane—it matters not to ask
> What she may be; she often suffers thus
> From freaks of fancy."

But who can believe that a small number of foolish persons have exercised such an influence on the human race as that all, learned and unlearned, sane and insane, wise and stupid, have taken up their absurd opinions, and that the authority of a few simpletons has thus had greater power in the world than right reason? Secondly, how comes it that those who feel the utmost confidence, and fear nothing less than the ruin of their fortunes, those who are free from all depression and disorder of the mind, those whose very hands, as the comic poet says, have eyes, and who believe nothing but what they see, should yet be influenced by the highest degree of reverence towards God?

Nor is the second opinion we have mentioned above any wiser than the first. This supposes that mankind, being terrified by natural phenomena, and ignorant of the causes which gave rise to them, feigned to themselves an almighty Deity dwelling

ignorance: for which cause these Atheists stick not to affirm of God Almighty, what some philosophers do of occult qualities, that he is but perfugium et asylum ignorantiæ, "a refuge and shelter for men's ignorance;" that is, in plain and downright language, "the mere sanctuary of fools."

And these two things are here commonly joined together by these Atheists both "fear," and "ignorance of causes," as which jointly concur in the production of theism; because, as the fear of children raises up bugbears, especially in the dark, so do they suppose in like manner the fear of men, in the darkness of their ignorance of causes especially, to raise up the mormo, spectre, or phantasm of a God; which is thus intimated by the Epicurean poet:[1]

Omnia cæcis
In tenebris metuunt.

And accordingly Democritus* gave this account of the original

beyond the clouds, whom they supposed to be the efficient cause of all natural events. There is indeed no reason why we should deny that this fear, arising from ignorance, has occasionally been the source of many superstitions and errors; for to pass by other particulars, it is well known how much dismay and perverted devotion eclipses of the sun and moon have produced among certain barbarous tribes. But to suppose that all religion and belief of a God has had its origin in fear of this kind, is, I think, as correct as to think that because some individuals, under the influence of sudden fear, have fallen into a fever, therefore all diseases have proceeded only from fear, and that no one is ever ill, except through the influence of fear. The opinion under review is, in the first place, repugnant to reason; for it is incredible that all mankind should unanimously have adopted an opinion proceeding from none but ignorant, inexperienced, and timid individuals. Secondly, this opinion is contrary to experience; for this belief of a God remains after the ignorance of causes is in great part done away with, and most men are much better taught and instructed respecting the true reasons of natural events. And, to pass over many other considerations, what, pray, is the reason why those who have most diligently examined into the causes and origins of things, not only continue in the opinion common among mankind, but are by this very investigation more strongly impelled and urged to the worship of God? We are told that Anaxagoras spent so much time in the discovery of the causes of created things as even to incur the reprehension of Socrates, on account of his industry in this way, which great philosopher was offended at his always betaking himself to aerial, ethereal, and aqueous principles in accounting for any phenomenon. See Plato's Phædon, p. 393. And yet this same Anaxagoras did not doubt the existence of an eternal and almighty mind, by whose will and wisdom all things were at first made and are continually ruled. Who, within the memory of our fathers, more earnestly investigated into the secret recesses of nature than Robert Boyle, that illustrious man and immortal ornament of Great Britain? Who in our own age has shown greater sagacity in the investigation and disclosure of the hidden laws of nature than Sir Isaac Newton, that great man whose memory will never die so long as literature and learning shall have any honour among mankind? But the only result of his study and labour was to make him the more closely to adhere to the belief of a Deity, and to esteem the spread of piety and religion as of primary importance; he both himself directed his own thoughts and efforts, and taught his followers to direct theirs, against the madness of those who deny the being of a God.

[1] Lucret. lib. 2. ver. 54. 55. p. 273. tom. 1. But these words are not applied by Lucretius (as Dr. Cudworth seems to intimate) to the believers in a Deity, but to the children whom the poet here vainly imagines the professors of religion to resemble.

* Steph. Poe. Phil. 153. ex Sexto. [Vide Sextum Empir. lib. 8. advers. Mathemat. sect. 24. p. 554.]

of theism or religion: Ὁρῶντες τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καθάπερ βροντὰς, καὶ ἀστραπὰς, καὶ κεραυνοὺς, ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις, ἐδειματοῦντο, θεοῦς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους, "That when, in old times, men observed strange and affrightful things in the meteors and in the heaven, as thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and eclipses, they not knowing the causes thereof, and being terrified thereby, presently imputed them to the gods." And Epicurus declares this to have been the reason why he took such great pains in the study of physiology, that, by finding out the natural and necessary causes of things, he might be able to free both himself and others from the terror of a God, which would otherwise invade and assault them; the importunity of men's minds, whenever they are at a loss for natural causes, urging them so much with the fear, suspicion, and jealousy of a Deity.

Wherefore the Atheists thus dabbling in physiology, and finding out, as they conceive, material and mechanical causes for some of the phenomena of nature, and especially for such of them as the unskilful vulgar sometimes impute to God himself, when they can prove eclipses (for example) to be no miracles, and render it probable, that thunder is not the voice of God Almighty himself, as it were roaring above in the heavens, merely to affright and amaze poor mortals, and make them quake and tremble; and that thunderbolts are not there flung by his own hands, as the direful messengers of his wrath and displeasure; they presently conclude triumphantly thereupon, concerning nature or matter, that it doth

Ipsa suâ per se sponte omnia Dîs agere expers,[2]

"Do all things alone of itself without a God." But we shall here make it appear in a few instances, as briefly as we may, that philosophy, and the true knowledge of causes, leads to God; and that atheism is nothing but ignorance of causes and of philosophy.

For first, no Atheist, who derives all from senseless atoms, or matter, is able to assign any cause at all of himself, or give any true account of the original of his own soul or mind, it being utterly inconceivable and impossible, that soul and mind, sense, reason and understanding, should ever arise from irrational and senseless matter, however modified; or result from atoms, devoid of all manner of qualities, that is, from mere magnitude, figure, site, and motion of parts: For though it be indeed absurd to say (as these Atheists allege) that "laughing and crying things" are made out of "laughing and crying principles,"

[2] Lucretius, lib. 2. ver. 1091. p. 450.

Et ridere potest non ex ridentibu' factus;[3]

yet does it not therefore follow, that sensitive and rational beings might result from a composition of irrational and senseless atoms; which, according to the democratic hypothesis, have nothing in them but magnitude, figure, site and motion, or rest, because "laughing" and "crying" are motions, which result from the mechanism of human bodies, in such a manner organized; but "sense" and "understanding" are neither local motion, nor mechanism. And the case will be the very same, both in the Anaximandrian or Hylopathian, and in the Stratonic or Hylozoic atheism; because "sense" and "conscious understanding" could no more result, either from those qualities of heat and cold, moist and dry, contempered together; or from the mere organization of inanimate and senseless matter, than it could from the

Concursus, motus, ordo, positura, figura,[4]

of atoms devoid of all manner of qualities. Had there been once nothing but senseless matter, fortuitously moved, there could never have emerged into being any soul or mind, sense or understanding; because no effect can possibly transcend the perfection of its cause. Wherefore Atheists supposing themselves, and all souls and minds, to have sprung from stupid and senseless matter, and all that wisdom which is any where in the world, both political and philosophical, to be the result of mere fortune and chance, must needs be concluded to be grossly ignorant of causes; which had they not been, they could never have been Atheists. So that ignorance of causes is the seed, not of theism, but of atheism; true philosophy, and the knowledge of the cause of ourselves, leading necessarily to a Deity.

Again, Atheists are ignorant of the cause of motion in bodies also; by which notwithstanding they suppose all things to be done; that is, they are never able to solve this phenomenon, so long as they are Atheists, and acknowledge no other substance besides matter or body. For first, it is undeniably certain, that motion is not essential to all body as such, because then no particles of matter could ever rest; and consequently there could have been no generation, nor no such mundane system produced as this is, which requires a certain proportionate commixture of motion and rest; no sun, nor moon, nor earth, nor bodies of animals; since there could be no coherent consistency of any thing, when all things fluttered and were in continual separation

[3] Lucretius, lib. 2. ver. 985. p. 432. Some MSS. for *factus* read *aptus*; but the sense is nearly the same.

[4] Lucretius, lib. 1. ver. 686. p. 171.

and divulsion from one another. Again, it is certain likewise, that matter or body, as such, hath no power of moving itself freely or spontaneously neither, by will or appetite; both because the same inconvenience would from hence ensue likewise, and because the phenomena or appearances do plainly evince the contrary. And as for that prodigiously absurd paradox of some few hylozoic Atheists, that all matter as such, and therefore every smallest particle thereof, hath not only life essentially belonging to it, but also perfect wisdom and knowledge, together with appetite, and self-moving power, though without animal sense or consciousness: this, I say, will be elsewhere in due place further confuted. But the generality of the ancient Atheists, that is, the Anaximandrians and Democritics attributed no manner of life to matter as such; and therefore could ascribe no voluntary or spontaneous motion to the same, but fortuitous only; according to that of the Epicurean poet[5] already cited:

> Nam certè neque consilio primordia rerum
> Ordine se quæque atque sagaci mente locarunt;
> Nec, quos quæque darent motus, pepigere profecto.

Wherefore these Democritics, as Aristotle somewhere[6] intimates, were able to assign no other cause of motion than only this, "That one body moved another from eternity infinitely," so that there was no πρῶτον κινοῦν, no "first unmoved mover," ever to be found; because there is no beginning, nor first in eternity. From whence probably, that doctrine of some atheistic Stoics in Alex. Aphrodisius was derived, "That there is no first in the rank and order of causes."[7] In the footsteps of which philo-

[5] Lib. 1. ver. 1020. p. 239.

[6] Vide Physic. lib. 8. cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 796. tom. 1. opp. et sect. 27. p. 579. The first of these passages is as follows: Ὁπόσοι μὲν ἀπείρους κόσμους τε εἶναί φάσι, καὶ τοὺς μὲν γίγνεσθαι, τοὺς δὲ φθείρεσθαι τῶν κόσμων, ἀεί φασιν εἶναι κίνησιν, "As many as say there are an infinite number of worlds, and that some worlds come into existence and others perish, say that motion always exists." Here most likely the followers of Democritus are alluded to. The latter is clearer and more to the purpose; since mention is there expressly made of Democritus, and it is said that no other cause of motion is assigned by him than that it always was so. For after Aristotle had said that it was unworthy of a philosopher to give no other reason and cause for natural phenomena than this, ὅτι ἀεὶ ἢ ἔστιν οὕτως, ἢ γίνεται, "that it always was or existed so," he immediately afterwards adds that this was the custom of Democritus: Εἰς ὃ Δημόκριτος ἀνάγει τὰς περὶ φύσεως αἰτίας, ὡς οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρότερον ἐγίνετο· τοῦ δὲ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἀξιοῖ ἀρχὴν ζητεῖν, "To which (principle) Democritus refers natural causes, as that it was so at first; but that the beginning of eternity was not to be sought after."

[7] Alex. Aph. Lib. de Fato, p. [Sect. 25. p. 118. edit. Lond.] Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς αἰτίοις τὸ πρῶτον, "But there is not, according to them, any first among causes." But this is not said by this Alexander concerning a certain kind of Stoics, as Dr. Cudworth thinks, that were more prone to impiety than others of the same sect, but respecting the whole of that school. It is not however necessary on the present occasion to inquire into the meaning of this opinion, which I think is correctly attributed to the Stoics.

sophers a modern writer seemeth to have trodden, when declaring himself after this manner :[8] Si quis ab effectu quocunque, ad causam ejus immediatam, atque inde ad remotiorem, ac sic perpetuò ratiociniatione ascenderit, non tamen in æternum procedere poterit, sed defatigatus aliquando deficiet, "If any one will from whatsoever effect ascend upward to its immediate cause, and from thence to a remoter, and so onwards perpetually, in his ratiocination, yet shall he never be able to hold on through all eternity; but at length, being quite tired out with his journey, be forced to desist, or give over." Which seems to be all one, as if he should have said, one thing moved or caused another infinitely from eternity, in which there being no beginning, there is consequently no first mover or cause to be reached unto. But this infinite progress of these Democritics, in the order of causes, and their shifting off the cause of motion, from one thing to another, without end or beginning, was rightly understood by Aristotle,[9] to be indeed the assigning of no cause of motion at all: Εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν, εἰ μή τι ἔσται κατὰ φύσιν κινοῦν πρῶτον, "They acknowledging (saith he) no first mover according to nature, must needs make an idle progress infinitely;" that is, in the language of this philosopher, assign no cause at all of motion. Epicurus therefore, to mend the matter, though according to the principles of the atomic physiology, he discarded all other qualities, yet did he notwithstanding admit this one quality of gravity or ponderosity in atoms, pressing them continually downwards in infinite space. In which, as nothing could be more absurd nor unphilosophical than to make upwards and downwards in infinite space, or a gravity tending to no centre, nor place of rest; so did he not assign any cause of motion neither, but only in effect affirm, the atoms therefore to tend downwards, because they did so; a quality of gravity signifying only an endeavour to tend downwards, but why or wherefore nobody knows. And it is all one, as if Epicurus should have said, that atoms moved downwards by an occult quality, he either betaking himself to this as an asylum, a sanctuary or refuge for his ignorance; or else indeed more absurdly, making his very ignorance itself (disguised under that name of a quality) to be the cause of motion. Thus the Atheists universally either assigned no cause at all for motion, as the Anaximandrians and Democritics; or else no true one, as the Hylozoists; when, to avoid incorporeal substance, they would venture to attribute perfect understanding,

[8] Hobbes, Elem. Philosoph. part 4. cap. 26. p. 204. I cannot however but say that our author seems to me to have given more loose to his suspicions than is proper, in explaining the meaning of this passage. Certainly the words, taken in their proper sense, do not give the sense expressed by him; nor can I perceive what connexion they have with the doctrine of Democritus respecting motion. To say the truth, these words rather seem to oppose the view of Democritus.

[9] Physic. Auscultat. lib. 7. cap. 2. p. 365. tom. I. opp.

appetite or will, and self-moving power to all senseless matter whatsoever. But since it appears plainly, that matter or body cannot move itself, either the motion of all bodies must have no manner of cause, or else must there of necessity be some other substance besides body, such as is self-active and hylarchicalnor hath a natural power of ruling over matter. Upon which latter account Plato rightly determined, that cogitation, which is self-activity or autokinesy, was in order of nature, before the local motion of body, which is heterokinesy. Though motion considered passively in bodies, or taken for their translation, or change of distance and place, be indeed a corporeal thing, or a mode of those bodies themselves moving; yet, as it is considered actively for the vis movens, that "active force," which causes this translation, or change of place, so is it an incorporeal thing; the energy of a self-active substance upon that sluggish matter or body, which cannot at all move itself. Wherefore in the bodies of animals, the true and proper cause of motion, or the determination thereof at least, is not the matter itself organized, but the soul either as cogitative, or plasticly self-active, vitally united thereunto, and naturally ruling over it. But in the whole world it is either God himself, originally impressing a certain quantity of motion upon the matter of the universe, and constantly conserving the same, according to that of the scripture,* "In him we live and move" (which seems to have been the sense also of that noble Agrigentine poet and philosopher,[10] when he described God to be only "a pure or holy mind, that with swift thoughts agitates the whole world"); or else it is instrumentally an inferior created spirit, soul, or life of nature; that is, a subordinate hylarchical principle, which hath a power of moving matter regularly, according to the direction of a superior perfect mind. And thus do we see again, that ignorance of causes is the seed of atheism,[11] and not of theism; no Atheists being able to assign a true cause of motion, the knowledge whereof plainly leadeth to a God.

* Acts xvii. 28.

[10] Empedocles, cujus versus duos vide apud Ammonium, Comm. in Librum Aristot. περὶ Ἑρμενείας, p. 107. Edit. Aldinæ.

Ἀλλὰ φρὴν ἱερὴ καὶ ἀθέσφατος ἔπλετο μοῦνον
Φροντίσι κόσμον ἅπαντα καταΐσσουσα θοῇσιν.

[11] The candid and considerate reader will perceive, even without my pointing it out, that these words are not to be too closely pressed, but are to be taken in a freer sense. For, properly speaking, ignorance of the causes of things is not the producer and parent of atheism. For who was ever so insane as to reason thus:—There is no God; for the causes of mundane phenomena are to us obscure and unknown. Our author only means that many have taken occasion to deny the being of a God, because they have imagined false and insufficient causes of natural phenomena. Epicurus, for instance, denied a divine Providence because he had heedlessly persuaded himself that all events might be accounted for from the existence and fortuitous concourse of atoms. I have thought proper to say thus much, for the sake of those who sometimes discover in an author's words, which are susceptible of a sufficiently proper and satisfactory explanation, matter of complaint which they cannot find in his actual meaning.

Furthermore, those Atheists who acknowledge no other principle of things but senseless matter fortuitously moved, must needs be ignorant also of the cause of that grand phenomenon, called by Aristotle the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the well and fit in nature;" that is, of the most artificial frame of the whole mundane system in general, and of the bodies of animals in particular, together with the conspiring harmony of all. For they who boasted themselves able to give natural causes of all things whatsoever, without a God, can give no other cause at all of this phenomenon, but only that the world happened by chance to be thus made as it is. Now, they who make fortune and chance to be the only cause of this so admirable phenomenon, the most regular and artificial frame and harmony of the universe, they either make the mere absence and want of a cause to be a cause, fortune and chance being nothing else but the absence or want of an intending cause; or else do they make their own ignorance of a cause, and they know not how, to be a cause; as the author of the Leviathan[1] interprets the meaning hereof: "Many times (saith he) men put for cause of natural events their own ignorance, but disguised in other words; as when they say that fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is of things whereof they know no cause." Or they affirm, against all reason, one contrary to be the cause of another, as confusion to be the cause of order, pulchritude, and harmony; chance and fortune, to be the cause of art and skill; folly and nonsense, the cause of the most wise and regular contrivance: or, lastly, they deny it to have any cause at all, since they deny an intending cause, and there cannot possibly be any other cause of artificialness and conspiring harmony, than mind and wisdom, counsel and contrivance.

But because the Atheists here make some pretences for this their ignorance, we shall not conceal any of them, but bring them all to light; to the end that we may discover their weakness and foolery. First, therefore, they pretend that the world is not so artificially and well made, but that it might have been made much better, and that there are many faults and flaws to be found therein; from whence they would infer that was not made by a God, he being supposed by Theists to be no bungler, but a perfect Mind, or a Being infinitely good and wise, who therefore should have made all things for the best.

But this being already set down by itself, as a twelfth atheistic objection against a Deity, we must reserve the confutation thereof for its proper place. Only we shall observe thus much here by the way; that those Theists of later times, who, either because they fancy a mere arbitrary Deity; or because their

[1] Cap. 11. p. 53, et alias.

faith in a divine goodness is but weak; or because they judge of things according to their own private appetites and selfish passions, and not with a free uncaptivated universality of mind, and an impartial regard to the good of the whole; or because they look only upon the present scene of things, and take not in the future into consideration, nor have a comprehensive view of the whole plot of the divine providence together; or, lastly, because we mortals do all stand upon too low a ground to take a commanding view and prospect upon the whole frame of things; and our shallow understandings are not able to fathom the depths of the divine wisdom, nor trace all the methods and designs of providence; grant that the world might have been made much better than now it is; which indeed is all one as to say that it is not well made: these neoteric Christians (I say) seem hereby to give a much greater advantage to the Atheists than the Pagan Theists themselves heretofore did, who stood their ground, and generously maintained against them, that Mind being the maker of all things, and not fortune or chance, nor arbitrary self-will and irrational humour omnipotent, the τὸ βέλτιστον, that which is absolutely the best in every case, so far as the necessity of things would admit, and in compliance with the good of the whole, was the measure and rule both of nature and providence.[2]

Again, the atomic Atheists further allege, that though there be many things in the world which serve well for uses, yet it does not at all follow that therefore they were made intentionally and designedly for those uses; because though things happen by chance to be so or so made, yet may they serve for something or other afterward, and have their several uses consequent. Wherefore all the things of nature happened (say they) by chance to be so made as they are, and their several uses notwithstanding were consequent, or following thereupon. Thus the Epicurean poet:*

> Nil ideò natum est in corpore, ut uti
> Possemus, sed quod natum est, id procreat usum.

"Nothing in man's body was made out of design for any use; but all the several parts thereof, happening to be so made as they are, their uses were consequent thereupon." In like manner the old atheistic philosophers in Aristotle† concluded: Τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι, τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτη-

[2] There can be no doubt that this is aimed against Des Cartes and his followers, to whom our author showed very little favour. For he, in his Principles of Philosophy, where he is laying open the causes of natural phenomena, as well as in many other places of his works, plainly intimates that some parts of the universe might have been better arranged.

* Lucretius, lib. 4. p. 367. Lamb. [Verses 832. 833. p. 139. vol. 27.]

† Phys. lib. 2. cap. 8. [Page 475. tom. 1. opp.]

δείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς, καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν· ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του, "That the former teeth were made by material or mechanical necessity, thin and sharp, by means whereof they became fit for cutting; but the jaw-teeth thick and broad, whereby they became useful for the grinding of food. But neither of them were intended to be such, for the sake of these uses, but happened by chance only. And the like concerning all the other parts of the body, which seem to be made for ends." Accordingly the same Aristotle represents the sense of those ancient Atheists, concerning the other parts of the universe, or things of nature, that they were all likewise made such by the necessity of material (or mechanical) motions undirected, and yet had nevertheless their several uses consequent upon this their accidental structure. Τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά τοῦ ποιεῖν, μηδ' ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεύς, οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης; &c. "What hinders but that nature might act without any respect to ends or good and better, as Jupiter, or the heaven, raineth not intentionally to make the corn grow, but from necessity? because the vapours, being raised up into the middle region, and there refrigerated and condensed, must needs descend down again in the form of water. But this happens by mere chance, and without any intention, that the grain is made to grow thereby; as the contrary sometimes happens by the excess of it."[3]

But to this we reply, that though a thing that happens accidentally to be so or so made, may afterwards, notwithstanding, prove often serviceable for some use or other; yet, when any

[3] Aristotle, however, differently from what our author here asserts, does not say that certain philosophers of his time reasoned in this way; but uses the words as if drawn from his own cogitations. It is, however, very likely that there were philosophers in Aristotle's time who chose to reason in this way; for there were men in that age who denied the existence of a God, or of an eternal Being endued with infinite wisdom and goodness. For whoever are so imbecile as to turn the efforts of their minds against God himself, must necessarily fall into the folly of removing all natural distinctions, and holding that nothing is made and created by determinate design, but that, on the contrary, all things have happened by a kind of natural necessity. Hence Spinoza, that ringleader of the Atheists in the last century, spared no pains entirely to eradicate from the human mind the opinion which supposes that God does or has done any thing with a definite determination. For while this opinion was held he easily foresaw that his nefarious philosophy could not stand. See his Ethica Geometrico More Demonstrata, part 1. prop. 36. pp. 36. 37, where he proceeds to such a pitch of impudence and folly as to declare that this opinion "annihilates the divine perfections." But since Dr. Cudworth wrote, so many respectable authorities have placed beyond all controversy the wisdom of God as displayed in his works, both by the strongest reasoning and clearest experiments, that this disgraceful method of philosophizing is now completely trampled under foot. The principal of these authors are pointed out by J. A. Fabricius, in his very useful book entitled Delectus Argumentorum et Syllabus Scriptorum, qui Veritatem Religionis Christianæ asseruerunt, Hamb. 1725. 4to. cap. 7. p. 286. &c. and in other places.

thing consisteth of many parts, that are all artificially proportioned together, and with much curiosity accommodated one to another, any one of which parts having been wanting, or otherwise in the least placed and disposed of, would have rendered the whole altogether inept for such a use; then may we well conclude it not to have been made by chance, but by counsel and design, intentionally, for such uses. As for example, the eye, whose structure and fabric consisting of many parts (humours and membranes) is so artificially composed, no reasonable person, who considers the whole anatomy thereof, and the curiosity of its structure, can think otherwise of it, but that it was made out of design for the use of seeing; and did not happen accidentally to be so made, and then the use of seeing follow; as the Epicurean poet would fain persuade us:*

> Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
> Prospicere ut possimus,

"You are by all means to take heed of entertaining that so dangerous opinion (to atheism) that eyes were made for the sake of seeing, and ears for the sake of hearing." But for a man to think, that not only eyes happened to be so made, and the use of seeing unintended followed; but also, that in all the same animals, ears happened to be so made too, and the use of hearing followed them; and a mouth and tongue happened to be so made likewise, and the use of eating, and (in men) of speaking, was also accidentally consequent thereupon; and feet were in the same animals made by chance too, and the use of walking followed; and hands made in them by chance also, upon which so many necessary uses depend; besides innumerable other parts of the body, both similar and organical, none of which could have been wanting without rendering the whole inept or useless: I say, to think that all these things should happen by chance to be thus made in every one and the same animal, and not designed by mind or counsel, that they might jointly concur and contribute to the good of the whole; this argues the greatest insensibility of mind imaginable. But this absurd and ridiculous conceit hath been long since so industriously confuted, and the folly thereof so fully manifested by that learned pagan philosopher and physician, Galen, in his book of the use of parts, that it would be altogether superfluous to insist any more upon it.[1]

* Page 367. Lamb. [Lib. 4. verse 823. p. 136.]

[1] Vide Lactant. de Opificio Dei, cap. 6. p. 1003. "Epicurus," says he, "asserted that the eyes were not made for seeing, nor the ears for hearing, nor the feet for walking, since these members were produced before there was any necessity for seeing, hearing, and walking; but that the uses of all these arose from the organs when produced. I fear it will be thought as foolish to refute as to make such absurd and ridiculous assertions as these; but it is permitted sometimes to be foolish in dealing with a fool, lest he should be wise in his own conceit." [Prov. xxvi. 5.]

Wherefore, that the former teeth are made thin and sharp, and the jaw-teeth think and broad, by chance only, and not for use, was one of the Democritic dotages; as also, that nothing in the clouds and meteors was intended for the good of this habitable earth, within whose atmosphere they are contained, but all proceeded from material and mechanical necessity. Which conceit though Cartesius seems to have written his whole book of meteors in favour of, he beginning it with the derision of those who "seat God in the clouds, and imagine his hands to be employed in opening and shutting the cloisters of the winds, in sprinking the flowers with dews, and thunder-striking the tops of mountains;" and closing his discouse with this boast, that he had now made it manifest, there was no need to fly to miracles (that is, to bring in a god upon the stage) to solve those phenomena; yet were it easy enough to demonstrate the defectiveness of those his mechanical undertakings in sundry particulars, and to evince that all those things could not be carried on with such constant regularity by mere fortuitous mechanism, without any superior principle to guide and steer them. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that God and nature do things every where in the most frugal and compendious way, and with the least operoseness; and therefore that the mechanic powers are not rejected, but taken in, so far as they could comply serviceably with the intellectual model and platform; but still so as that all is supervised by one understanding and intending cause, and nothing passes without his approbation, who, when either those mechanic powers fall short, or the stubborn necessity of matter proves uncompliant, does overrule the same, and supply the defects thereof, by that which is vital; and that without setting his own hands immediately to every work too, there being a subservient minister under him, an artificial nature, which, as an Archeus of the whole world, governs the fluctuating mechanism thereof, and does all things faithfully, for ends and purposes intended by its director.[5]

But our atomic Atheists still further allege, that though it might well seem strange that matter fortuitously moved should, at the very first jump, fall into such a regular frame as this is, having so many aptitudes for uses, so many correspondencies between several things, and such an agreeing harmony in the

[5] He means a formative or *plastic* nature, of which he had already copiously treated. What is here said against Des Cartes will appear, I am afraid, to many more invidious than necessary. For there is a wide difference between the blasphemies of Epicurus, who maintained that nothing was created by the Deity or with a specific design, and the opinion of Des Cartes, who taught that all motion proceeds from an allwise and omnipotent Deity. I believe that Des Cartes is throughout treated with undue severity by our author, because those who then opposed and undermined religion in England were favourable to his tenets, and Hobbes, who was then justly abhorred by all wise men in Britain, did not seem widely to differ from him.

whole; yet ought it not to seem a jot strange if atoms, by motion, making all possible combinations and contextures, and trying all manner of conclusions and experiments, should, after innumerable other freaks, and discongruous forms produced, in length of time, fall into such a system as this is. Wherefore they affirm, that this earth of ours, at first, brought forth divers monstrous and irregular shapes of animals:*

> Orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim;
> Multa sine ore etiam, sine voltu cœca reperta,

"Some without feet, some without hands, some without a mouth and face, some wanting fit muscles and nerves for the motion of their members." And the old philosophic Atheists were so frank and lavish herein, that they stuck not to affirm, amongst those monstrous shapes of animals, there were once produced centaurs, and scyllas, and chimæras; βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, "mixtly boviform and hominiform," biform and triform animals. But Epicurus, a little ashamed of this, as that which must needs look oddly and ridiculously, and seeming more cautious and castigate pretends to correct the extravagancy of this fancy:†

> Sed neque Centauri fuerunt, neque tempore in ullo
> Esse queat duplici naturâ, et corpore bino,
> Ex alienigenis membris compacta potestas,

"Nevertheless, there were not then any centaurs, nor biform and triform animals;" he adding, that they who feigned such things as these, might as well fancy "rivers flowing with golden streams, and trees germinating sparkling diamonds, and such vastly gigantean men, as could stride over seas, and take up mountains in their clutches, and turn the heavens about with the strength of their arms."[6] Against all which, notwithstanding, he gravely gives such a reason as plainly overthrows his own principles:‡

> Res sic quæque suo ritû procedit, et omnes
> Fœdere naturæ certo discrimina servant,

"Because things, by a certain covenant of nature, always keep up their specific differences, without being confounded together." For what covenant of nature can there be in infinite chance? or what law can there be set to the absolutely fortuitous motions of atoms, to circumscribe them by? Wherefore it must be

* Lucretius, lib. 5. p. 476. Lamb. [Verse 838. p. 339.]
† Lucretius, lib. 5. p. 479. Lamb. [Verse 876. p. 344.]
[6] Verse 911. p. 349:—

> Trans maria alta pedum nisus ut ponere posset,
> Et manibus totum circum se vertere cœlum.

‡ Page 480. [Verse 920, &c. page 349.]

acknowledged, that, according to the genuine hypothesis of the atomic atheism, all imaginable forms of inanimate bodies, plants and animals, as centaurs, scyllas and chimæras, are producible by the fortuitous motions of matter, there being nothing to hinder it, whilst it doth—

> Omnimodis coire, atque omnia pertentare,
> Quæcunque inter se possint congressa creare,[7]

"Put itself into all kind of combinations, play all manner of freaks, and try all possible conclusions and experiments."[8]

[7] Lucret. lib. 5. verse 191. p. 250.

[8] Our author has here well observed that Lucretius deserted his own philosophical principles, when he contended that centaurs, scyllas, chimæras, and animals partly boviform and partly human could not possibly be produced at the commencement of the world; and that it was much more consistent and accordant with his other opinions to decide, as some did, that such animals both could and really did exist in the nascent world. But it did not accord with his design to point out separately the futility and inconclusiveness of the reasons by which Lucretius endeavoured to attain his object. But as I imagine it may be of some use in arresting those who are still warm admirers of this poet, and regard him as the father of all kind of wisdom, I will here make it evident that Lucretius is not a proper master from whom to derive principles of reasoning. For this poet makes use of three arguments to prove his point, that at the beginning there were no centaurs, scyllas, chimæras, or any similar animals. The first is, that one animal cannot be made up of dissimilar natures and powers; for, if this were the case, it would result that one part of this animal would be vigorous and longlived, while the other part would be shortlived and weak. That therefore a man and a horse cannot be combined, that is, a centaur cannot exist; for that the natures of a horse and of a man are entirely dissimilar; a horse after three years being in the prime of life, while a human being of three years old is still feeble and scarcely weaned. See lib. 5. verse 884, &c.:—

> Post ubi equum validæ vires ætate senectâ
> Membraque deficiunt fugienti languida vita:
> Tum demum pueris ævo florente juventas
> Occipit, et molli vestit lanugine malas.

And that the same might be said of Scylla, whom the poets feign to be a woman surrounded by rapacious dogs, and of the Chimæra, or a fabulous monster compounded of lion, dragon, and goat. For the natures of these animals are evidently so incongruous, that they can by no means be united and associated together. But this reason has nothing to do with the point Lucretius wishes to prove. It is indeed certain from it that animals compounded and made up of such different and inconsistent natures as these could not continue for long, and must necessarily soon perish; but it is impossible thus to prove that such animals might not have once existed and been produced from the fortuitous concurrence of atoms. Empedocles himself and the other ancient philosophers who thought that such animals as these were formerly produced from the surface of the earth, had no doubt respecting all that Lucretius advances against their opinion; on which account they related that these monstrous births immediately perished, because they were made up of contrary and mutually repugnant principles; yet they did not on that account think it necessarily followed that such beasts and monsters never could or never had been produced by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms flying through the void of space. In which indeed they reasoned much better than Lucretius and his master Epicurus; and even Lucretius himself shortly afterwards allows that many kinds of animals were formerly produced which could not continue long on account of the various faults and monstrous shapes of their bodies.

The Epicurean poet derives a second argument from the very absurd conclusions drawn from this opinion. For he says that there was no reason why his opponents should not maintain "that formerly flowed golden rivers, and trees blossomed with

But they pretend, that these monstrous, irregular shapes of animals, were not therefore now to be found, because by reason of their inept fabric, they could not propagate their kind by

gems," verse 905, &c., which he says is stupid and ridiculous; that the opinion therefore which is attended by this consequence is alike foolish and absurd. Lucretius was correct enough in supposing that the supposition of the former existence of many monsters gave rise to these consequences; but he was very dull not to perceive that the same consequences were also deducible from his own views. And it is puerile and entirely unworthy of a philosopher to accuse another of a crime to which he is himself obnoxious. All who maintain that the universe originated in a fortuitous concourse of atoms cannot consistently deny the possibility of the former existence of rivers of gold flowing through the earth, gems depending from trees, and similar phenomena usually assigned by the poets only to the Elysian fields. Why, pray, should not the atoms which form gold be by chance so united with those that are aqueous or igneous as that a golden river should be the result? What obstacle is there to prevent a number of the atoms that constitute gems from being united in several cases to atoms that compose trees? And if a blind fortuitous motion of atoms could produce a human being of the ordinary stature, I do not at all perceive why the same cause might not produce a man such as Atlas is supposed to be, on whose shoulders the heavens are supported. A favourer of Epicurus and Lucretius will perhaps say, that the inconsistent nature of the atoms will prevent this result. But what nature, pray, is there in atoms, which possess only the one quality of weight?—or what incongruity of nature can exist in corpuscules that have no properties except figure, magnitude, position, motion, and rest? The Epicurean must therefore cease to make use of this answer, or must betake himself to the affinity and incongruity of Empedocles, and thereby overthrow the very foundations of his own creed.

There remains a third argument of the poet, which if less trifling is certainly not more weighty than the other two. The sum of it is, that the herbs, fruits, and trees, great numbers of which are now produced by the earth, are never confounded together, or produced in mutual compounds; and that therefore the seeds of various things or different kinds of animals are never mutually aggregated and mixed (ver. 916, &c.):

> Nil tamen est signi, mistas potuisse creari
> Inter se pecudes, compactaque membra animantum:
> Propterea quia, quæ de terris nunc quoque abundant,
> Herbarum genera ac fruges arbustaque læta
> Non tamen inter se possint complexa creari.

Truly a consistent piece of workmanship! Perhaps it may soon be the good pleasure of somebody to prove by the same argument that there was never any Lucretius who put all the abstruse trifles of Epicurus into heroic verse, because at the present time no such poet exists. What if any one should first of all assert that there is a great difference between the seeds of animals and of plants; and some other person should point out the absurdity and folly of concluding that what does not at present take place never did occur? But let us take for granted what Lucretius requires, and allow him the full benefit of the argument, provided only that we have equal liberty ourselves of making use of it. Then, building upon our poet's principles, we will reason thus:—The seeds of plants are not at present confounded; therefore the seeds of animals were not so when the world was young. It is then true that what does not at the present time exist, or of which some few examples at least are not now witnessed, did not take place when the nature of things was first established. But at the present time we do not see that a concurrence of atoms produces a fly, a beetle, a butterfly, or a worm, much less a man; and therefore those who maintain that of old mankind, animals, stars, the sun, and rivers arose out of the fortuitous concourse of individual corpuscules, appear scarcely to have recovered from the effects of their yesterday's debauch. This poet, in other respects ingenious, is so incautious in his argumentation, that he often gives an opportunity to others of destroying with his own weapons the very foundations of his creed; and from this specimen his admirers may learn how great is the philosopher to whom they look up. I should be very glad if some learned man would publish an edition of this poet with notes not so much philo-

generation, as neither indeed preserve their own individuals. Thus does Lucretius declare the sense of Epicurus:*

> Quoniam natura absterruit auctum,
> Nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem,
> Nec reperire cibum, nec jungi per veneris res.

And that this atheistic doctrine was older than Epicurus, appeareth from these words of Aristotle:† Ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ καὶ ἀνδρόπρωρα, "When animals happened at first to be made, in all manner of forms, those of them only were preserved, and continued to the present time, which chanced to be fitly made (for generation) but all the others perished, as Empedocles affirmeth of the partly-ox and partly-man animals." Moreover, the ancient both Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists concluded, that besides this one world of ours, there were other infinite worlds (they conceiving it as absurd to think, there should be but one only world in infinite space, as that in a vast ploughed and sowed field there should grow up only one ear of corn, and no more); and they would have us believe, that amongst these infinite worlds (all of them fortuitously made) there is not one of a thousand, or perhaps of ten thousand, that hath such regularity, concinnity, and harmony in it, as this world that we chanced to emerge in. Now it cannot be thought strange (as they suppose) if, amongst infinite worlds, one or two should chance to fall into some regularity. They would also confidently assure us, that the present system of things, in this world of ours, shall not long continue such as it is, but after a while fall into confusion and disorder again:[9]

> Mundi naturam totius ætas
> Mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter,
> Quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit antè,

"The same wheel of fortune, which moving upward, hath brought into view this scene of things that now is, turning round, will, some time or other, carry it all away again, introducing a new one in its stead;" and then shall we have centaurs, and scyllas, and chimæras again, all manner of inept forms of animals, as before.

logical as philosophical, which might show those who are fond of his writings, and are not unfrequently allured by the elegance of his versification to embrace his errors, how little worthy is this Epicurean of the implicit faith of any wise and rational person. If I mistake not, this was formerly attempted by Barbeyrac, an excellent and highly respectable author, who if he returns to this design, which he seems to have laid aside, will do good service to literature and religion.

* Lamb. p. 476. [Lib. 5. verse 844.]

† Nat. Ausc. lib. 2. cap. 8. [Page 475. tom. 1. opp.]

[9] Lucret. lib. 5. verse 832. &c. page 337. &c.

But because men may yet be puzzled with the universality and constancy of this regularity, and its long continuance through so many ages, that there are no records at all of the contrary any where to be found; the atomic Atheist further adds, that the senseless atoms, playing and toying up and down, without any care or thought, and from eternity trying all manner of tricks, conclusions and experiments, were at length (they know not how) taught, and by the necessity of things themselves, as it were, driven, to a certain kind of trade of artificialness and methodicalness; so that though their motions were at first all casual and fortuitous, yet in length of time they became orderly and artificial, and governed by a certain law, they contracting as it were upon themselves, by long practice and experience, a kind of habit of moving regularly; or else being, by the mere necessity of things, at length forced so to move, as they should have done, had art and wisdom directed them. Thus Epicurus in his epistle to Herodotus:[10] Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑπολῃπτέον καὶ τὴν φύσιν πολλὰ

[10] Apud Diog. Laërt. lib. 10. segm. 75. p. 633. Gassendi's translation, here quoted by our author, is to be found in his Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri, sect. 3. cap. 7. p. 38. vol. 3. of his works. But in his translation of the tenth book of Diogenes Laërtius, he thus renders or rather paraphrases this passage:—"It is also to be maintained that nature has been, by the things themselves, or by a continuous series of things, in a manner taught, or compelled by a certain necessity or concatenation of motions, to produce these various and numerous effects which we call the works of nature." Respecting the meaning of this sentence Gassendi thus speaks in his comment on the place, vol. 5 of his works," p. 82:—"Epicurus seems here to have wished to reach the cause of the propagation of beings, more especially of animals, in order to lessen the wonder we rightly feel respecting that propagation and the structure of their members." The same idea is enlarged and more copiously treated and explained in his Physics, sect. 3. last part of lib. 4. chap. 3. p. 274 of the 2nd volume of his works. And Dr. Cudworth has almost adopted as his own the interpretation given of Laërtius by the ancient translators. But Meibomius, who has given great attention to the elucidation of Laërtius, strongly denies that Gassendi has rightly expounded these words, and thinks that they contain no absurdity or impiety. For he thinks that Epicurus is speaking of the nature of mankind, and merely means that men are gradually taught by custom and experience what they were before ignorant of. To support the probability of which view he conjectures that the word ἀνθρώπων or ἀνθρωπίνην has fallen out of the text after φύσιν, and thinks that the whole passage ought to be read and translated thus: Ἀλλὰ μὲν ὑπολῃπτέον καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν πολλὰ καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτὴν περιεστώτων πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, "But it is also to be supposed that human nature has been taught and compelled to many and various things by the circumstances that surround it." The word ἀνθρώπων is here Meibomius' own, who has thought proper to add it on his own authority. Whence come the words αὐτὴν περιεστώτων, which are also wanting in Gassendi, I do not know. It seems indeed to be a bold and rash action in Meibomius to insert a word in the text of Laërtius, simply on the authority of his own conjecture; but if his reasons be examined, on account of which he thinks Epicurus's words ought to be understood as above stated, his opinion will be seen to have more probability than is at first sight apparent. First of all he remarks that Gassendi's interpretation is entirely inconsistent with the immediately subsequent context; while his own as exactly agrees with it. And in this indeed he is correct. The words of Epicurus immediately following the above extract are as follows: Τὸν δὲ λογισμὸν τὰ ὑπὸ ταύτης παρεγγυηθέντα καὶ ὕστερον ἐπακριβοῦν, "And they have afterwards more fully unfolded the reasoning taught them by it [nature]." Meibomius insists that these words can be understood only of mankind; for that they alone possess λογισμὸν, or "reason;" that none can be "taught" except rational human beings; that a

καὶ παντοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων διδαχθῆναί τε καὶ ἀναγκασθῆναι, "It must be held, that nature is both taught and necessitated by the things themselves;" or else, as Gassendus interprets the words, quâdam veluti naturali necessariâque doctrinâ sensim imbuta,* "By little and little imbued with a certain kind of natural and necessary doctrine."

To which atheistic pretences we shall briefly reply: first, that it is but an idle dream, or rather impudent forgery, of these Atheists, that heretofore there were in this world of ours all manner of monstrous and irregular shapes of animals produced, centaurs, scyllas, and chimæras, &c., and indeed at first none but such; there being not the least footstep of any such thing appearing in all the monuments of antiquity and traditions of former times; and these Atheists not being able to give any manner of reason, why there should not be such produced as well at this present time, however the individuals themselves could not continue long, or propagate by generation; or at least why it should not happen, that in some ages or countries there were either all androgyna, of both sexes, or else no animal but of

"fuller unfolding" applies to none except mankind; and that therefore the preceding words, in order to accord with the subsequent, must be understood of mankind or human nature. He adds that Laërtius just afterwards introduces the words τὰς φύσεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων, by which his own emendation is remarkably sustained. This last argument is of little value; but the former appears to have considerable weight. Certainly Epicurus's meaning would be inconsistent and altogether absurd, if he intended to say that "nature had gradually accustomed itself to a particular class of motions, or had in lapse of time acquired a certain habitude of moving itself in a regular manner; and that reason, taught by nature had more fully unfolded all these things." How, pray, can reason and judgment strengthen and more accurately unfold that habit of motion which individual corpuscules have gradually acquired? Have mankind, then, by reasoning, strengthened and extended the uniformity of nature and the laws of motion now observed by atoms? Nonsense indeed! which if Epicurus had let fall from his pen he would justly have exposed himself to ridicule. But his meaning is plain and consistent, if it be supposed to be that "nature itself is first informed of many things by various casualties; which information is afterwards confirmed and dilated by mankind." Nothing can be more true than this, as is attested by the history of all ages and times. But though this is my opinion, I do not think it necessary that the word ἀνθρώπων should be taken into the text of Laërtius, or that this saying of Epicurus should be understood of human nature exclusively. For there is no reason why the word φύσις may not be taken generally for the whole universe of animated and sentient beings; and then the sense would be that "various casualties and events have informed the nature of men and animals concerning several things." Nor is the λογισμὸς, of which Epicurus immediately proceeds to speak, inconsistent with this view. For not to insist on the aptitude of this word to the nature of mankind, it is plain even from Lucretius himself that the Epicureans did not entirely deny the existence of souls and reason in the brutes. I will not however deny that Epicurus is justly chargeable with the sentiment which Dr. Cudworth, following Gassendi and others, supposes to be contained in these words For certainly he could not, except in this way, give a reason for that wonderful uniformity which we see to exist in the generation and propagation of plants, animals, and human beings. See Gassendi's Syntagma Philosophiæ Epicuri, sect. 3. cap. 7. p. 38. vol. 3. of his works; and also Thomas Stanley's Historia Philos. part 12. p. 1029. &c., who has given all the authorities omitted by Gassendi. Consult also Gassendi's Physics, sect. 3. last clause, lib. 4. cap. 3. p. 274. vol. 2 of his works.

* Page 28. Gass.

one sex, male, or female only; or, lastly, none of any sex at all. Neither is there any more reason to give credit to these Atheists, when (though enemies to divination) they would prophecy concerning future times, that in this world of ours, all shall sometime fall into confusion and nonsense again. And, as their infinity of worlds is an absolute impossibility, so to their bold and confident assertion concerning those supposed other worlds, as if they had travelled over them all, that, amongst ten thousand of them, there is hardly one that hath so much regularity in it as this world of ours, it might be replied, with equal confidence, and much more probability of reason, that were every planet about this sun of ours a habitable earth, and every fixed star a sun, having likewise its several other planets or habitable earths moving round about it, and not any one of these desert or uninhabited, but all peopled with animals; we say, were this so extravagant supposition true, that there would not be found any one ridiculous or inept system amongst them all, but that the divine art and wisdom (which being infinite can never be defective, nor any where idle) would exercise its dominion upon all, and every where impress the sculptures and signatures of itself.

In the next place we affirm, that the fortuitous motions of senseless atoms, trying never so many experiments and conclusions, and making never so many combinations and aggregate forms of things, could never be able to produce so much as the form or system of one complete animal, with all the organic parts thereof so artificially disposed (each of these being as it were a little world) much less the system of this great world, with that variety of animals in it; but least of all could it constantly continue such regularity and artificialness every where: for that the fortuitous motions of irrational, senseless, and stupid matter should in length of time grow artificial, and contract a habit of acting as regularly and methodically as if perfect art or wisdom had directed them, this is the most prodigious nonsense imaginable, and can be accounted no other than atheistic fanaticism.

It is no more possible, that the fortuitous motion of dead and senseless matter should ever from itself be taught and necessitated to produce such an orderly and regular system as the frame of this whole world is, together with the bodies of animals, and constantly to continue the same, than that a man perfectly illiterate, and neither able to write nor read, taking up a pen into his hand, and making all manner of scrawls, with ink upon paper, should at length be taught and necessitated, by the thing itself, to write a whole quire of paper together, with such characters, as being deciphered by a certain key, would all prove coherent philosophic sense; or than that we ourselves, writing down the mere letters of the alphabet, transposedly, any how,

without the least thought, either of words or sense, after our scribbling a long time together what was altogether insignificant, should at length have been taught and necessitated by the thing itself, without the least study and consideration of our own, to write this whole volume. Or, to use another instance, this is no more possible, than that ten or a dozen persons, altogether unskilled in music, having several instruments given them, and striking the strings or keys thereof, any how, as it happened, should, after some time of discord and jarring, at length be taught and necessitated to fall into most exquisite harmony, and continue the same uninterruptedly for several hours together.

Wherefore, if it be ridiculous for one that hath read over the works of Plato or Aristotle, or those six books of T. Lucretius Carus, De Naturâ Rerum, to contend, that possibly the letters of those books might be all put together by chance, or scribbled at random, without the least thought or study of the writer, he having also no manner of philosophic skill in him; or for one that hears ten or a dozen persons playing in concert upon instruments of music, and making ravishing harmony, to persuade himself, that none of those players had, for all that, the least of musical art or skill in them, but struck the strings as it happened; it must needs be much more ridiculous and absurd, to suppose this artificial system of the whole world to have resulted from the fortuitous motion of senseless atoms, without the direction of any art or wisdom, there being much more of sense, art and philosophy therein, than in any philosophic volume or poem ever written by men; and more of harmony and proportion than in any composition of vocal music. We conclude therefore with Aristotle,* ἀδύνατον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον, "that it is absolutely impossible things should have come to pass after this manner;" that is, by mere fortune and chance, and without the direction of any mind or God. The divine Mind and Wisdom hath so printed its seal or signature upon the matter of the whole corporeal world, as that fortune and chance could never possibly have counterfeited the same.

Notwithstanding all which, the ancient Atheists would undertake, by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them, in order of time and nature, before their several uses. The argument is seriously propounded by Lucretius, after this manner: †

* Nat. Ausc. lib. 2. cap. 8. [Page 475. tom. 1. opp.]
† Lamb. page 367. [Lib. 4. verse 834. p. 139. vol. 2.]

Nec fuit antè, videre, oculorum lumina nata,
Nec dictis orare, prius quàm lingua creata est;
Sed potius longè linguæ præcessit origo
Sermonem, multóque creatæ sunt prius aures,
Quam sonus est auditus; et omnia denique membra
Antè fuere, ut opinor, eorum quàm fuit usus.
Haud igitur potuere uténdi crescere causâ.

To this sense: "There was no such thing as seeing before eyes were made, nor hearing before ears, nor speaking before the tongue. But the original of the tongue much preceded speech: so likewise eyes and ears were made before there was any seeing of colours or hearing of sounds. In like manner, all the other members of the body were produced before their respective uses." The force of which argument consisteth in this proposition: That whatsoever is made for the sake of another thing, must exist in time after that other thing, for whose sake it was made: or, That, for which any thing is made, must not only be, in order of nature, but also of time, before that which is made for it. And this that Epicurean poet endeavours to prove by sundry instances:*

At contrà conferre manû certamina pugnæ,
Antè fuit multò quàm lucida tela volarent, &c.

"Darts were made for the sake of fighting, but fighting was before darts, or else they had never been invented. Bucklers were excogitated and devised for the keeping off of blows, but the declining of strokes was before bucklers. So were beds contrived for the sake of resting and sleeping, but resting and sleeping were older than beds, and gave occasion for the invention of them. Cups were intended and designed for the sake of drinking, which they would not have been had there not been drinking before." According to the force of which instances, the poet would infer, that whosoever affirms eyes to have been made for the sake of seeing, must suppose in like manner, there was some kind of seeing or other before eyes. But since there was no seeing at all before eyes, therefore could not eyes be made for the sake of seeing. And this is the atheistic demonstration, that the parts of men's bodies, and other things of nature, could not be made by any intending cause, for the sake of ends and uses.

But it is evident, that this logic of Atheists differs from that of all other mortals, according to which, the end, or that for which any thing is made, is only in intention before the means, or that which is made for it, but in time and execution after it. And thus was the more effectual way of fighting and doing execution, for whose sake darts were invented, in time after

* Lamb. p. 367. [Lib. 4. verse 834. p. 139. vol. 2.]

darts, and only in intention before them. It is true indeed, that fighting in general was before darts, sleeping before beds, and drinking before cups; and thereby did they give occasion for men to think of means for the more effectual fighting, and more commodious sleeping and drinking; men being commonly excited from the experience of things, and the sense of their needs and wants, to excogitate and provide fit means and remedies. But it doth not therefore follow, that the Maker of the world could not have at once beforehand a preventive knowledge of whatsoever would be useful, and for the good of animals, and so make them intentionally for those uses. Wherefore the argument should have been framed thus: whatsoever any thing is made for, as the end, that must needs be, in the knowledge and intention of the maker, before the existence of that which is made for it. And therefore if eyes were made for the sake and end of seeing, seeing must of necessity be in the knowledge and intention of the maker of eyes, before there were any eyes actually existing. But there could be no knowledge of seeing before there were any eyes. Wherefore eyes could not be made for the sake of seeing.

And this indeed is the genuine scope and drift of the premised atheistic argument, however it were disguised by them in their manner of propounding it. The reason whereof was, because they took it for granted that all knowledge, as such is derived by sense from the things themselves known pre-existing. From whence it follows, that there could be no knowledge of vision or seeing, before there was actual seeing and eyes; and so they think it to be demonstrated that eyes could not be made by any Deity for the sake of seeing before there was seeing; no more than spectacles by men for the sake of eyes, before there were eyes. Thus does the Epicurean poet conclude triumphantly:*

> Illa quidem seorsum sunt omnia, quæ prius ipsa
> Nata, dedere suæ post notitiam utilitatis.
> Quo genere imprimis sensus et membra videmus.
> Quare etiam atque etiam procul est, ut credere possis,
> Utilitatis ob officium potuisse creari.

That is, "The members of men's bodies, and organs of sense, were first made by themselves, and then did they afterwards give the notice or knowledge of their several utilities; none of which could have been had before. Wherefore we affirm again and again, that it is impossible these things should have been made designedly for their uses."

So that the controversy is at last resolved wholly into this: Whether or no, all knowledge and understanding, as such,

* Lib. 3. p. 368. [Lib. 4. verse 851. p. 141.]

universally does arise from things antecedently existing without the knower? Which being asserted by Atheists, they conclude from thence that the things of the world could not be made by the previous counsel, contrivance, and intention of any understanding Deity, but that they all blundered out themselves, one after another, according to the train or sequel of the fortuitous motions of matter; and that from thence knowledge and understanding, counsel and intention, sprung up afterward, as junior to things, and the world. But this being already made the eleventh atheistic argument against a Deity, viz. "That all knowledge and mental conception is the information of the things themselves known, existing before and without the knower, and a passion from them; and therefore that the world must needs be before any knowledge or conception of it, and no knowledge or conception before the world, as its cause;" we shall refer the answer to it, and confutation of it, to its proper place; where we shall plainly demonstrate that knowledge or understanding is not in its own nature ectypal, but archetypal; and that it is older than the world, and the Maker of all things.

But the Atheists yet further urge, against the proving of a God from the τὸ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "the regular frame of the whole world" in general, and the artificial structure of the bodies of animals, after this manner: That it is altogether unreasonable to suppose there should be no cause in nature for the phenomena thereof, especially for those things which are daily generated, as the bodies of animals; but (as by the tragic poets) a god should be introduced, as it were from a machine, forcibly to solve them. And indeed though there were a God, yet they think he ought not to be detruded to such mean offices as this, viz. to make the body of every the most contemptible animal, as it were with his own hands miraculously; nor ought nature or the world to be supposed so imperfect, as if it must be bungled and botched up every where after this manner. It is nature therefore, which is the cause of these natural productions and generations. Which nature, that it doth not intend nor act designedly for ends and uses, appears not only from hence, because it never consults or deliberates (which Aristotle[1] intimates to have been the reason, why some of old denied the things of nature to have been made for ends), but also because it hath no animal sense or consciousness, no understanding or appetite. Wherefore this opinion of intending, and final causality in nature, can be accounted no

[1] Vide de Nat. Auscultat. lib. 2. cap. 8. p. 477. tom. 1. opp. His words are: Ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκα τοῦ γίνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον· καί τοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ εἴη ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει, "It is absurd not to suppose that any thing is done for the sake of aught else, unless the moving agent be seen to have designed it. For even art itself does not act with design. As if in wood there were inherent ship-building, in like manner as by nature it might do."

other than an idolum specus (as some[2] affect to phrase it) or a prejudice of men's minds, when they apply their own properties to things without them, and think because themselves intend, and act for ends, that therefore nature doth the like. And they might as well say, that nature laughs and cries, speaks and walks, syllogizes and philosophizes, because themselves do so. But, as a modern philosopher[3] concludeth, "The universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention belonging to it." And accordingly, were all final causes rightly banished by Democritus out of physiology, as Aristotle[4] recordeth of him: Τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀφεὶς λέγειν, πάντα ἀνάγει οἷς χρῆται ἡ φύσις, "That he reduced all things to natural and necessary, altogether rejecting final."

To all which we briefly reply; that there are indeed two extremes here to be avoided, the one, of those, who derive all things from the fortuitous motions of senseless matter, which is the extreme of the atomic Atheists; the other, of bigotical religionists, who will needs have God αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα, "to do all things himself immediately;" as if all in nature were miracle. But there is a middle betwixt both these extremes; namely, to suppose that besides God, and in subordination to him, there is a nature (not fortuitous, but) artificial and methodical, which governing the motion of matter, and bringing it into regularity, is a secondary or inferior cause of generations. Now, this natura artificiosa, this "artificial nature," though itself indeed do not understand the reason of what it doth, nor properly intend the ends thereof, yet may it well be conceived to act regularly for the sake of ends understood and intended by that perfect Mind, upon which it depends. As the manuary opificers understand not the designs of the architect, but only drudgingly perform their several tasks imposed by him; and as types or forms of letters, composed together, print coherent philosophic sense, which themselves understand nothing of. (Upon which artificial or spermatic nature, we have largely insisted before, in the

[2] Lord Bacon in his Novum Organon, part 2. sect. 53. p. 47. This term, as is well known to those versed in modern literature, is applied by Bacon to those errors which are usually occasioned by nature, education, and custom. I must confess that better and more appropriate expressions may be found; but still every writer has the liberty of using what names he pleases, provided only he define their signification. But Dr. Cudworth was little inclined to be favourable to the memory of this great man, whom he seems to have reckoned amongst the secret patrons of atheism; on which account he rarely misses an opportunity of finding fault with his words and expressions.

[3] There can be no doubt that Hobbes is here meant, as will be apparent to any one who has read his works. But where in his writings the passage here quoted is to be found I do not know. In the Leviathan, cap. 34. p. 183, the following passage occurs: "The whole corporeal universe has no part that is not corporeal." Perhaps Dr. Cudworth thought himself at liberty to give a free version of these words, according to his usual custom.

[4] De Generat. Animal. lib. 5. cap. 8. p. 713. tom. 2. opp.

appendix to the third chapter.) And thus, neither are all things performed immediately and miraculously by God himself; neither are they all done fortuitously and temerariously, but regularly and methodically for the sake of ends, though not understood by nature itself, but by that higher Mind, which is the cause of it, and doth, as it were, continually inspire it.[5] Some, indeed, have

[5] But, unless I am mistaken, this middle way between those who refer all things to mechanical laws and those who make God the author of every individual thing, though greatly commended by our author, has as many difficulties and obstacles as are found by human reason in other things, and does not much differ from the other extreme which he wishes us to avoid. For of that productive nature which is so strongly advocated by our author, if indeed all its operations be performed under the inspiration and instigation of the Deity, itself being destitute of reason or design, all the performances are properly the performances of God himself, by whose power it is prompted and influenced. Whose faults, then, are those which we sometimes see in the universe? To whom belong the monsters we sometimes see to be produced? Do they not properly belong to the Deity? The typographical errors which occur in books are not attributed to the types themselves, but to the man by whom they are composed and put together; nor is the blame of any grand defect in a house to be assigned to the workmen who carried the materials, but to the architect; nor are the inaccuracies of a letter thought to belong to the amanuensis, but to the person by whom it is indited. So that even if we adopt this method, the difficulty which has impelled many to take refuge in mechanical causes remains the same as at first; for what difference is there between supposing that God himself, without the intervention of any other cause, brings to pass all results and events, and imagining that the Deity acts through a certain unintelligent and insensate instrumentality which he constantly guides and governs? Only as much as exists between penning a letter with one's own hand, and making use of another person's pen, though the words and diction be exactly prescribed; and how insignificant a variation is this, regarded in connexion with the causes and effects connected with it. I do not insist on this consideration, that God cannot have the excuse, sometimes made use of by man, that the amanuensis was not sufficiently careful, since nothing would be easier for him than to take care that this productive nature makes no mistake. Indeed I must candidly confess that were I compelled to choose, I would rather follow those who hold God to be the universal agent than those who unite with him a formative nature. For, in the first place, I see no reason why the supreme Deity should form a nature of such a kind as to be made use of by him in the fabrication and formation of created things. Mankind are induced partly by a fondness for ease and quiet, and partly by the weakness and insufficiency of their nature, to associate with themselves administrators of their affairs; but neither of these motives can have place with the perfect and almighty Deity. It is agreed both by those who refer all things immediately to God, and by those who associate with him a productive nature, that it would be equally easy to divine and infinite power to construct the body of an animal or a man either with or without the assistance of a nature of this description. If this be the case, I should like to know from the advocates of a productive nature, what could be the object of the Deity in dividing his work between himself and such a nature. The hypothesis, therefore, which ascribes all things to God appears to me to be by far the most simple and plain; and it is universally allowed to be the part of wisdom to use the shortest and simplest method of accomplishing an object. No one, I think, then, will deny that one who needs no assistance, and is himself equal to all requirements, will act more wisely and simply by personally performing all things, than by calling in any number of fallible assistants to his aid. Who can believe, therefore, that God, being supremely wise, and requiring no extraneous power, would perform in a circuitous and involved manner what he could himself accomplish with the utmost ease? Or who can imagine that he would devolve a part of his own duties upon a nature that is greatly liable to error? Or indeed, if any were so foolish as to say that the Deity, in order to relieve himself from trouble, called in to his assistance a productive nature, such an assertion would be quite unworthy our attention. God might perhaps have assigned some part of the toil to this nature, if he had made it provident, sagacious, wise, rational, and infallible; but such is not the case. It is destitute of

unskilfully attributed their own properties, or animal idiopathies to inanimate bodies; as when they say that matter desires forms, as the female doth the male; and that heavy bodies descend down by appetite towards the centre, that so they may rest therein; and that they sometimes again ascend in discretion, to avoid a vacuum. Of which fanciful extravagancies if the Advancer of Learning[6] be understood, there is nothing to be reprehended in this following passage of his: Incredibile est quantum agmen idolorum philosophiæ immiserit naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio, "It is incredible how many errors have been transfused into philosophy, from this one delusion, of reducing natural actions to the mode of human; or of thinking that nature acteth as a man doth." But if that of his be extended further, to take away all final causes from the things of nature, as if nothing were done therein for ends intended by a higher mind, then is the very spirit of atheism and infidelity. It is no idol of the cave or den (to use that affected language), that is, no prejudice or fallacy imposed upon ourselves, from the attributing our own animalish properties to things without us, to think, that the frame and system of this whole world was contrived by

reason, wisdom, and sagacity, and is nothing else than a kind of instrument, which ought always to be at hand when the Deity wishes to perform any of his works. But I forbear.

[6] The person here meant is Lord Bacon, whose work here alluded to is his famous treatise On the Advancement of Learning; in which this passage is to be found, lib. 3. cap. 4. p. 288. It will, I am aware, appear strange to many that Dr. Cudworth should find so many opportunities of carping at this great man, who has every where in his writings left on record his reverence and piety towards God, from whom he frequently observes all true philosophy must begin. But the wonder will cease upon a view of the following considerations. I. Bacon constantly depreciates the labours of those who strive to discover the *final causes* of things, a course which he appears almost inclined to consider as futile and vain. In his Novum Organon Scientiarum, lib. 1. part 2. sect. 65. p. 59, he plainly traces the origin of this practice to superstition. "This evil (superstition)," says he, "is also found in other departments of philosophy, by the introduction of abstract forms, *final causes*, and primary causes." And more plainly still, lib. 2. sect. 2. p. 145. "So far is there from being any advantage in the consideration of a *final cause*, that it is injurious to science, excepting in reference to human actions." See also Advancement of Learning, lib. 3. cap. 4. But the abrogation of final causes was justly regarded by Dr. Cudworth as the high road to atheism. See also a learned opponent of Bacon's on this point, Samuel Parker, in his Dissertations on God and a Divine Providence, diss. 3. sect. 16. p. 283. &c. II. Bacon universally displays his dislike to the Platonic philosophy. In his Novum Organon Scientiarum, lib. 1. part. 2. sect. 65. p. 51, after complaining that philosophy had been greatly corrupted by superstition and intellectual ambition, he thus proceeds: "A notable example of this description was displayed among the Greeks, especially in Pythagoras, but connected with a more gross and burdensome superstition; and more dangerously and subtly still in Plato and his followers." It would be tedious and unnecessary to adduce other passages of the same tenor. But Dr. Cudworth was a warm admirer of Plato, and seemed to see but little difference between his philosophy and Christianity. III. Hobbes, to whom Dr. Cudworth was strenuously opposed, often abused Bacon's discoveries and opinions, and even his expressions, to the confirmation and illustration of his own tenets. Perhaps there were other reasons than these for Dr. Cudworth's prejudice against him; which I leave others to investigate.

a perfect understanding Being or Mind (now also presiding over the same) which hath every where printed the signatures of its own wisdom upon the matter. As also, that though nature itself do not properly intend, yet it acteth according to an intellectual platform prescribed to it, as being the manuary opificer of the divine architectonic art, or this art itself as it were transfused into the matter, and embodied in it. Thus Cicero's Balbus[7] long since declared concerning it, that it was not vis quædam sine ratione, ciens motus in corporibus necessarios; sed vis particeps ordinis; tanquam via progrediens, cujus solertiam nulla ars, nemo artifex consequi potest imitando, "Not a force unguided by reason, exciting necessary motions in bodies temerariously; but such a force, as partakes of order, and proceeds as it were methodically; whose cunning or ingeniosity no art or human opificer can possibly reach to by imitation." For it is altogether inconceivable, how we ourselves should have mind and intention in us, were there none in the universe, or in that highest principle, from whence all proceeds. Moreover, it was truly affirmed by Aristotle,[8] that there is much more of art in some of the things of nature, than there is in any thing artificially made by men; and therefore intention, or final and mental causality, can no more be secluded from the consideration of natural, than it can from that of artificial things. Now it is plain, that things artificial, as a house or clock, can neither be understood, nor any true cause of them assigned, without design, or intention for ends and good. For to say, that a house is stones, timber, mortar, iron, glass, lead, &c. all put together, is not to give a definition thereof, or to tell what indeed it is, it being such an apt disposition of all these materials, as will make up the whole fit for habitation, and the uses of men. Wherefore this is not sufficiently to assign the cause of a house neither, to declare out of what quarry the stones were dug, nor in what woods or forests the timber was felled, and the like: nor, as Aristotle addeth:* Εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον γεγενῆσθαι ἐξ ἀνάγκης νομίζει, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς· διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γὰρ, "If any one should go about thus to give an account of a house from natural necessity (as the atheistic philosophers did of the world and the bodies of animals) that the heavier things being carried down of their own accord, and the lighter upward; therefore, the stones and foundation lay at the bottom, and the earth for the walls, being lighter, was higher; and the timber, being yet lighter, higher than that; but above all the straw, or thatch, it being the highest of all." Nor lastly,

[7] De Natura Deor. lib. 2. cap. 32. p. 3001. tom. 9. opp.
[8] Vide Natur. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 10. p. 476. tom. 1. opp.
* Nat. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 9. [p. 478. tom. 1. opp.]

if, as the same Aristotle elsewhere[9] also suggesteth, one should further pretend, that a house was therefore made such, ἐμπέσοντος τοῦ ὀργάνου, &c. merely because the hands of the labourers, and the axes, and hammers and trowels, and other instruments, chanced all to be moved so and so; we say that none of all these would be to assign the true cause of a house, without declaring, that the architect first framed in his mind a model or platform of such a thing to be made out of those materials, so aptly disposed into a foundation, walls, roof, doors, rooms, stairs, chimneys, windows, &c. as might render the whole fit for habitation, and other human uses. And no more certainly can the things of nature (in whose very essence final causality is as much included) be either rightly understood, or the causes of them assigned, merely from matter and mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion thereof, without design or intention for ends and good. Wherefore to say,[10] that the bodies of animals became such, merely because the fluid seed, by motion, happened to make such traces, and beget such stamina and lineaments, as out of which that compages of the whole resulted; is not to assign a cause of them, but to dissemble, smother and conceal their true efficient cause, which is the wisdom and contrivance of that divine Architect and Geometer, making them every way fit for the inhabitation and uses of their respective souls. Neither indeed can we banish all final, that is, all mental causality, from philosophy or the consideration of nature, without banishing at the same time reason and understanding from ourselves, and looking upon the things of nature with no other eyes than brutes do. However, none of the ancient Atheists would ever undertake to assign necessary causes for all the parts of the bodies of animals, and their efformation, from mere matter, motion, and mechanism; those small and pitiful attempts in order thereunto, that have been made by some of them in a few instances (as that the spina dorsi[1] came from the flexure of the bodies of animals,

[9] De Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 473. tom. 2. opp.

[10] This seems to have been levelled against Des Cartes' book, De Formatione Fœtûs. I have already observed that our author's strictures on this philosopher have in them more acuteness and boldness than truth, certainty, and wisdom.

[1] Vide Aristot. de Partib. Animal. lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 471. 472. where he gives an account of the fancies of preceding naturalists respecting the causes of the bodily members. He says Empedocles taught as follows respecting the spinal column: Διόπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς οὐκ ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε, λέγων, ὑπάρχειν πολλὰ τοῖς ζώοις, διὰ τὸ συμβῆναι οὕτως ἐν τῇ γενέσει· οἷον δὲ ῥάχιν τοιαύτην ἔχειν, ὅτι στραφέντος κατεαγῆναι συνέβη, "Wherefore Empedocles incorrectly says that many things exist in animals because they happened so at their birth; and that the spine is as it is because it happened to be broken by contortion." But Dr. Cudworth's representation of the meaning of these naturalists, that the spine was thus formed when animals first emerged from the earth, I cannot find supported in Aristotle or any where else; nor do I think it ever was asserted by any. For this method of accounting for the form of the spine would apply only to the first race of animals and not at all to those born at the present time. What follows is attributed by Aristotle to all the ancient naturalists:

when they first sprung out of the earth, the intestines from the flux of humours excavating a crooked and winding channel for itself, and that the nostrils were broke open by the eruption of breath); these, I say, only showing the unfeasableness and impossibility thereof. And therefore Democritus was so wise, as never to pretend to give an account in this way of the formation of the fœtus, he looking upon it as a thing absolutely desperate; nor would he venture to say any more concerning it (as Aristotle[3] informeth us) than ὅτι οὕτως ἀεὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται, "that it always cometh so to pass of necessity," but stopped all further inquiry concerning it after this manner: Τὸ ἐρωτᾶν τὸ διὰ τί, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων τινὸς, τὸ ζητεῖν εἶναι τοῦ ἀπείρου ἀρχήν, "That to demand about any of these things, for what cause it was thus, was to demand a beginning of infinite." As if all the motions from eternity had an influence upon, and contribution to, whatsoever corporeal thing was now produced. And Lucretius, notwithstanding all his swaggering and boasting, that he and Epicurus were able to assign natural and necessary causes for every thing without a God, hath no where so much as one word con-

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν φυτῶν γένεσιν λέγουσιν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πρῶτοι φιλοσοφήσαντες περὶ φύσεως· ὅτι ἐν τῷ σώματι, ῥέοντος μὲν τοῦ ὕδατος, κοιλίαν γενέσθαι καὶ πᾶσαν ὑποδοχὴν τῆς τε τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος, τοῦ δὲ πνεύματος διαπορευθέντος, τοὺς μυκτῆρας ἀναῤῥαγῆναι, "In like manner also spoke the ancient and primary natural philosophers. As that through the flow of water the belly and all the receptacles of the food and excrements became such as they are; and when the breath escaped the nostrils were opened." But Aristotle deservedly castigates these vain and foolish opinions; and Gassendi has also well and strenuously argued against these follies, Physics, sect. 3. last clause, lib. 2. cap. 3. p. 232. vol. 2. of his Works.

[3] De Generat. Animal. lib. 2. cap. 6. p. 629. tom. 2. opp. But I should think that this answer of Democritus is not to be understood absolutely and literally, as if that philosopher would not at all inquire into the causes for the sake of which the members of men and animals were formed in the way we see them. For Aristotle's books De Generatione Animalium, and also those De Partibus Animalium, earumque Causis, abound in causes and reasons assigned by Democritus for elucidating the origin of the bones, teeth, parts of generation, and other organs of animals; which causes indeed of Democritus, being for the most part drawn from the necessary motions of matter, are often refuted and exposed by Aristotle. Besides Aristotle himself praises Democritus, and greatly prefers him to Empedocles and Plato, because he had with singular diligence investigated the causes of the limbs, flesh, bones, &c. a branch of inquiry which the other philosophers had entirely neglected. See De Partibus Animalium, lib. 1. cap. 1. p. 475. vol. 2. of his Works, and elsewhere. There can be no doubt then that this saying of Democritus refers to a part only of this inquiry into the causes of animal members. And this is plain from the very passage of Aristotle which contains his opinion, which speaks not of the causes generally which produced individual members, but only of the reason why they are produced in the order in which they are, or why one member preceded another in its production. Democritus therefore thought that this one inquiry might be with propriety neglected, and denied that any clear explanation could be given why, for instance, the heart is produced in animals sooner than other parts; but he thought that this should be referred solely to necessity, that is to the mechanical causes of motion. In short, Democritus thought it entirely useless to dispute from what causes it resulted that animals are framed in the womb in the usual method and order; but in reference to the separate parts and their objects, he was sufficiently ingenious and well-informed.

cerning it.[4] We conclude therefore, that Aristotle's judgment concerning final causes in philosophy is much to be preferred before that of Democritus:* Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἢ τινος ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους, "That both kind of causes (material and final) ought to be declared by a physiologer, but especially the final; the end being the cause of the matter, but the matter not the cause of the end. And thus do we see plainly, that the atomic Atheists are utterly ignorant of the cause, τοῦ εὖ καὶ καλῶς, "of the regular and artificial frame of the things in nature," and consequently, the whole mundane system, the true knowledge whereof necessarily leadeth to a God.

But it is prodigiously strange, that these Atheists should, in this their ignorance and sottishness, be justified by any professed Theists and Christians of later times, who, atomizing in their physiology also, would fain persuade us in like manner, that this whole mundane system, together with plants and animals, was derived merely from the necessary and unguided motion of the small particles of matter, at first turned round in a vortex, or else jumbled all together in a chaos, without any intention for ends and good, that is, without the direction of any mind; God in the meantime standing by, only as an idle spectator of this lusus atomorum, this "sportful dance of atoms," and of the various results thereof.[5] Nay, these mechanic Theists have here quite outstripped and outdone the atomic Atheists themselves, they

[4] Nor is it precisely true that Epicurus has said nothing at all respecting generation and its causes. He has indeed made a general assertion, though it be foolish and entirely destitute of probability. For he supposes that the atoms have gradually and imperceptibly acquired a habit of arranging themselves according to the law and order in which they are now arranged in animals; on which opinion of his we have recently made some observations, when commenting on the celebrated passage extracted from his Epistle to Herodotus in Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 10. segm. 75. p. 633. (see note 8. p. 596.) Galen, the prince of Greek physicians, has well expressed this insane opinion in his book Περὶ Κουμίνων Διαπλάσεως, or De Fœtuum Formatione, when he says that the Epicureans supposed τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῆς κινήσεως γενέσθαι τεχνικὴν ὑπό τινος οὐσίας ἀλόγου, "the continual series of motions to be artificially produced by some unintelligent being." For from the words it is plain that Epicurus thought that a heedless and fortuitous concourse of atoms had in the lapse of time gradually become artificial, and that this was attributed by him to a certain unconscious and unintelligent nature. But what this nature or οὐσία ἄλογος could be, except a frequent repetition of one motion or action gradually inducing a habit, I cannot understand. Old Gargettius himself, when driven to the last extremity, still wished to preserve the appearance of reason in his madness, rather than acknowledge the baseness of the sentiments to which he was enslaved.

[5] All intelligent readers who are acquainted with these matters will at once perceive that the opinions of Des Cartes are here aimed at by our author. But perhaps the followers of this philosopher will complain that this representation is calculated only to excite prejudice against their master, while the best and noblest part of his physics, which would at once clear him from suspicion, is omitted. For one fundamental principle of the Cartesian philosophy is, that the matter of which the universe is composed was in the beginning created by God, divided into particles of a certain definite magnitude, and impressed with a certain amount of motion.

* Natur. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 9. [p. 478. tom. 1. opp.]

being much more immodest and extravagant than ever those were; for the professed Atheists durst never venture to affirm, that this regular system of things resulted from the fortuitous motions of atoms at the very first, before they had for a long time together produced many other inept combinations or aggregate forms of particular things, and nonsensical systems of the whole. And they supposed also, that the regularity of things here in this world would not always continue such neither, but that some time or other confusion and disorder would break in again. Moreover, that, besides this world of ours, there are at this very instant, innumerable other worlds irregular, and that there is but one of a thousand, or ten thousand, amongst the infinite worlds, that have such a regularity in them. The reason of all which is, because it was generally taken for granted, and looked upon as a common notion, that *τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδὲν ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται*, as Aristotle expresseth it,[6] that "none of those things, which are from fortune or chance, come to pass constantly and always alike." But our mechanic or atomic Theists will have their atoms never so much as once to have fumbled in these their fortuitous motions, nor to have produced any inept system, or incongruous forms at all; but from the very first all along, to have taken up their places, and have ranged themselves so orderly, methodically and discreetly, as that they could not possibly have done it better, had they been directed by the most perfect wisdom. Wherefore these atomic Theists utterly evacuate that grand argument for a God, taken from the phenomenon of the artificial frame of things, which hath been so much insisted on in all ages, and which commonly makes the strongest impression of any other upon the minds of men, they leaving only certain metaphysical arguments for a Deity; which, though never so good, yet by reason of their subtlety, can do but little execution upon the minds of the generality, and even amongst the learned do sometimes beget more of doubtful disputation and scepticism, than of clear conviction and satisfaction; the Atheists in the mean time laughing in their sleeves, and not a little triumphing, to see the cause of theism thus betrayed by its professed friends and assertors, and the grand argument for the same totally slurred by them; and so their work done, as it were, to their hands for them.[7]

[6] Natur. Auscult. lib. 2. cap. 4. p. 469. tom. 1. opp.

[7] Des Cartes, whom our author here places below even the Epicureans and the most virulent opposers of Deity, has been defended by so many others as by no means to stand in need of my assistance. I will rather grant that this great and ingenious philosopher, being carried away by the activity of his mind and the fervour of his thoughts, has fallen into many opinions more bold than correct, which have afterwards been used for their own purposes by the opponents of God and religion. Nevertheless I think the comparison here instituted between Des Cartes and the ancient Atheists has in it less truth than at first sight it appears to possess. For whereas the followers of Democritus and Epicurus thought that the universe came into its present state after

Now, as this argues the greatest insensibility of mind, or sottishness and stupidity in pretended Theists, not to take the least notice of the regular and artificial frame of things, or of the signatures of the divine art and wisdom in them, nor to look upon the world, and things of nature, with any other eyes than oxen and horses do; so are there many phenomena in nature, which being partly above the force of these mechanic powers, and partly contrary to the same, can therefore never be solved by them, nor without final causes, and some vital principle. As for example, that of gravity, or the tendency of bodies downward, the motion of the diaphragma in respiration, the systole and diastole of the heart, which was before declared to be a muscular constriction and relaxation, and therefore not mechanical but vital. We might also add, amongst many others, the intersection of the planes of the equator and ecliptic, or the earth's diurnal motion, upon an axis not parallel with that of the ecliptic, nor perpendicular to the plane thereof. For though Cartesius[8] would needs imagine this earth of ours once to have been a sun, and so itself the centre of a lesser vortex whose axis was then directed after this manner, and which therefore still kept the same site or

infinite and various concursions of atoms, while Des Cartes held that matter, immediately after being endued with a certain quantity of motion, fell into so well arranged a form, it is evident that the former were not more sober and circumspect than the latter, while he was more rash and foolish; but rather it is manifest that *they* were entirely devoid of common sense and reason, and that *he* was at least partly rational and not altogether absurd. For the Epicureans were forced to imagine so many and such various concursions of individual corpuscules in the immensity of space, so great a multitude of pre-existing orders of things before the present, and other similar delusions here enumerated, because they denied to material motions all wisdom and all governance of the Deity, and thought that the atoms were moved and driven by some blind and irrational force. For it was incredible that atoms not under the impulse of any intelligent or designing cause, should have immediately taken so regular and elegant a form as is presented by the existing universe. But Des Cartes stood in need of none of these idle fancies, since he held matter to be a creation of the Deity, from whom also all its motion was derived. For if matter and its motions are alike derived from God, it necessarily follows that the laws according to which it is moved and agitated must be divine. But where laws are in force proceeding from God himself, it is no wonder that order and beauty should immediately arise, and that all things should be wisely and correctly disposed of, from the very commencement of motion. So far then is the difference between Epicurus and Des Cartes from being at all to the disadvantage of the latter, that I rather think it is so far in his favour. Dr. Cudworth seems to have conceived a dislike for Des Cartes principally because, as will be seen hereafter, he wished to reject final causes entirely from his philosophy; which every one imbued with religion and piety will admit to have been on his part a rash and inconsiderate procedure.

[8] Vide Principia ejus Philosoph. part 3. sect. 155. p. 136. and part 4. sect. 2. p. 137. I should perhaps do well here to explain Des Cartes' meaning of these sentiments in his own words; but besides Dr. Cudworth several others have more fully and copiously treated of this unheard of dogma of his, of whom it will be sufficient for me to name Dr. Cudworth's fellow countrymen, Henry More, Enchiridion Metaphysices, cap. 14. p. 42. Samuel Parker, Disputationes de Deo et Providentiâ, diss. 3. sect. 28. p. 335. &c. David Gregory, Astronomia Physica et Geometrica, lib. 1. prop. 76. Sir Isaac Newton, and others. The causes which have prompted Des Cartes to entertain this opinion have been well explained by Henry More, in his Epistle on the Cartesian Philosophy, sect. 26. p. 52. ed. Lond. 1711. 8vo. at the end of his Enchiridion Ethici.

posture, by reason of the striate particles, finding no fit pores or traces for their passage through it, but only in this direction; yet does he himself confess, that because these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, would be much more conveniently made upon parallel axes, therefore, according to the laws of mechanism, they should perpetually be brought nearer and nearer together, till at length the equator and the ecliptic come to have their axes parallel to one another; which, as it hath not yet come to pass, so neither hath there been, for these last two thousand years (according to the best observations and judgments of astronomers), any nearer approach made of them to one another. Wherefore the continuation of these two motions of the earth, the annual and diurnal, upon axes different or not parallel, is resolvable into nothing, but a final and mental cause, or the τὸ βέλτιστον, because it was best it should be so, the variety of the seasons of the year depending hereupon. But the greatest of all the particular phenomena is the organization and formation of the bodies of animals, consisting of such variety and curiosity, which these mechanic philosophers being no way able to give an account of from the necessary motion of matter, unguided by mind for ends, prudently therefore break off their system there, when they should come to animals, and so leave it altogether untouched. We acknowledge indeed, that there is a posthumous piece extant, imputed to Cartesius, and entitled De la Formation du Fœtus, wherein there is some pretence made to solve all this by fortuitous mechanism. But as the theory thereof is wholly built upon a false supposition, sufficiently confuted by the learned Harvey in his Book of Generation, "that the seed doth materially enter into the composition of the egg;" so is it all along precarious and exceptionable; nor does it extend at all to the differences, that are in several animals, or offer the least reason, why an animal of one species or kind might not be formed out of the seed of another.[9]

It is here indeed pretended by these mechanic Theists, that final causes therefore ought not to be of any regard to a philosopher, because we should not arrogate to ourselves to be as wise as God Almighty is, or to be privy to his secrets. Thus in the metaphysical meditations:[10] Atque ob hanc unicam rationem totum illud causarum genus, quod à fine peti solet, in rebus physicis nullum usum habere existimo; non enim absque temeritate me puto, investigare posse fines Dei. And again likewise in the Principles of Philosophy:[1] Nullas unquam rationes circa res naturales à fine, quem Deus aut natura in iis faciendis sibi

[9] The history of this book of Des Cartes, De Formatione Fœtûs, may be seen in Adrian Baillet's Life of that Philosopher, vol. 2. lib. 7. cap. 19. p. 398. &c.

[10] Meditat. 4. p. 26. edit. Amstelod. 1685.

[1] Vide part 1. sect. 28. p. 8. and part 3. sect. 2. 3. p. 50.

proposuit, admittimus, quia non tantum nobis debemus arrogare, ut ejus consiliorum participes esse possimus. But the question is not, whether we can always reach to the ends of God Almighty, and know what is absolutely best in every case, and accordingly make conclusions, that therefore the thing is, or ought to be so; but, whether any thing at all were made by God for ends and good, otherwise than would of itself have resulted from the fortuitous motion of matter. Nevertheless, we see no reason at all, why it should be thought presumption, or intrusion into the secrets of God Almighty, to affirm, that eyes were made by him for the end of seeing (and accordingly so contrived as might best conduce thereunto) and ears for the end of hearing, and the like. This being so plain, that nothing but sottish stupidity, or atheistic incredulity (masked perhaps under an hypocritical veil of humility) can make any doubt thereof. And therefore Aristotle[2] justly reprehended Anaxagoras for that absurd aphorism of his: *Διὰ τὸ χεῖρας ἔχειν, φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον*, "That man was therefore the wisest (or most solert) of all animals, because he had hands." He not doubting to affirm on the contrary: *Εὔλογον διὰ τὸ φρονιμώτατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων χεῖρας ἔχειν· ἡ γὰρ φύσις ἀεὶ διανέμει, καθάπερ ἄνθρωπος φρόνιμος, τῷ δυναμένῳ χρῆσθαι ἕκαστον· προσήκει γὰρ τῷ ὄντι αὐλητῇ δοῦναι μᾶλλον αὐλοὺς, ἢ τῷ αὐλοὺς ἔχοντι προσθεῖναι αὐλητικήν*, "That it was far more reasonable to think, that because man was the wisest (or most solert and active) of all animals, therefore he had hands given him. For nature (saith he) distributeth, as a wise man doth, what is suitable to every one; and it is more proper to give pipes to one that hath musical skill, than upon him, that hath pipes, to bestow musical skill.[3]

[2] De Partib. Animal. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 559. 560. tom. 2. opp.

[3] I could here go to some length, were I to enumerate and explain the accusations and excuses brought against and for Des Cartes. But it is unnecessary to repeat what is already well known to all who are versed in these matters. The whole of this argument on final causes has been most laboriously and ingeniously treated by that greatest of natural philosophers of the last century, Robert Boyle, the eternal honour of Great Britain, in his book De Caussis Finalibus, London, 1688, 8vo. a book which I wish were better known at the present time than it is. In sect. 1. p. 10. &c. of this work he specifically and powerfully opposes Des Cartes. And also John Ray, the famous English naturalist, in his work entitled, The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of the Creation, part 1. p. 28, has transcribed and approved Cudworth's whole argument, p. 33. All that can be said in favour of Des Cartes has been studiously collected by Peter Poiret, in his Meditationes de Deo, Animâ, et Homine, lib. 3. cap. 15. sect. 8. 9. For my own part I will be content with a few brief observations. I. First, then, I could easily be induced to believe that Des Cartes rejected final causes from his physics, not through any innate depravity of mind or impiety towards God, but principally through his fondness for the philosophy of which he was the author. For since he put forth many conjectures and guesses concerning natural phenomena, and even made many unheard-of and marvellous assertions, he foresaw that many would inquire into the causes why God had constituted nature according to Des Cartes' suppositions. To this philosopher therefore nothing appeared of greater utility in keeping off these troublesome inquirers, and setting his doctrines free from innumerable questions, than to lay down as a fundamental principle of his physical philo-

Wherefore these mechanic Theists would further allege, and that with some more colour of reason, that it is below the dignity of God Almighty to condescend to all those mean and

sophy that attention should be given only to things in themselves, but that no great degree of research should be bestowed on those causes of phenomena which, on account of the weakness of the human mind, cannot be ascertained. He seems therefore rather to have consulted his own ease and credit than to have intended any injury to the cause of God and religion; though at the same time I will not deny that others have been opposed to final causes, only in order that they might in their absence more securely make their attacks upon the existence of a Deity. I remember that this has been already well observed by Henry More, in his Epistle on the Cartesian Philosophy, sect. 2. p. 6. But II. I can hardly persuade myself that Des Cartes had no other reason than this for entertaining the opinion in question. For it would have been sufficient for his purpose of warding off impertinent inquiries, if he had declared, what was most true, that the causes of many of the divine procedures were unknown to mankind. But Des Cartes went much further than this, and freely ventured to maintain the dangerous position that we cannot discover any cause whatever of the works of Deity. For he thus speaks in his Responsio ad Objectiones Gassendi, in Gassendi's Works, tom. 3. p. 359. " Nor can it be imagined," says he, " that any ends of the Deity are more evident than any other possible ones ; for *all* are alike concealed in the inscrutable depth of his wisdom." To which remarks Gassendi gives a good answer, ibid. p. 361. Some other motive must therefore have been present to the mind of Des Cartes to prompt him to divert the attention of his followers from the consideration of final causes ; and I think an attentive view of the method of his physics will easily show what this is. For, in accordance with the ancient boast of Strato, he dispensed with the divine interposition in the formation of the universe, and taught that all things were made by the weights and velocities inherent in the laws of motion which he had laid down. And he was apprehensive that great injury would ensue to this tenet and his other inventions, in which he had spent so much labour, if it should be admitted that all surrounding corporeal existences were created by God with a settled and fixed design. For every one must perceive that there is so wide a difference between supposing that any thing has been made with great wisdom and deep design for certain uses to the human race, and at the same time entirely separating the government and power of the great Artificer from his work, that no rational method can possibly be found of reconciling these discrepancies. A person who has no doubt that the sun was made for the purpose of giving light to the world, and rendering its surface fertile, cannot possibly avoid believing that an all-wise Being has collected together the particles which compose the sun, and has skilfully arranged and disposed them in such a manner as to be subservient to these uses. And in a similar manner we may reason about other things. As soon as we conceive of the object of any corporeal existence, whatever mental efforts we use to persuade ourselves that nothing was in existence prior to its formation except necessity and the laws of motion, yet a certain internal consciousness will still protest against this, and will not suffer us to be at rest till we have recourse to the wisdom of some intelligent cause. Des Cartes readily perceiving this, and observing that his interests were greatly endangered by this feeling of our minds, thought fit to lay down as a primary law that in his school there should be a perpetual silence observed respecting final causes, as subjects that come not within the cognizance of any. This was a dangerous measure, to say no worse. But what is too hard for an undue fondness for those opinions on the discovery of which we have bestowed long and strenuous labour. Perhaps also Des Cartes was influenced in this decision by the same consideration as Lord Bacon before him. For Bacon, having a strong desire of investigating true natural philosophy, was afraid lest, after final causes were once inquired into and settled, all research after natural causes should be entirely omitted and neglected. See the Advancement of Learning, lib. 3. cap. 4. But Bacon himself would readily confess the groundlessness of this fear, were he to return to earth and see the many excellent volumes of recent naturalists. III. If in the mean time we pay attention to the very first principles of the Cartesian philosophy, and suppose (as equity requires of us) that its acute and ingenious author really meant what he said, he cannot in any way be understood to mean that the universe was not created with a view to certain ends. For he asserted that the amount of motion which actually

trivial offices, and to do the things of nature himself immediately: as also, that it would be but a botch in nature, if the defects thereof were every where to be supplied by miracle.

exists in matter was introduced into it by the Deity, by whom also he held that matter itself was created. Nor did he, I believe, deny that God might have created matter of a different kind, or could have united to it when created a larger or smaller quantity of motion. And doubtless he granted that the Deity foresaw all that would happen through the impartation to matter of the quantity of motion which it actually possessed. But if all these principles be granted, it is most certain that God acted with a specific design in the creation and setting in motion of matter, and is to be accounted the only parent and author of all the events which that motion has produced and is still producing. Suppose that Archimedes really could have performed the imaginary feat of not only moving the earth from its place, but also of impressing on it any quantity and kind of motion that he chose; and imagine further, that he accurately foresaw the ultimate results of the motion he was about to give to the globe; would he not, if he had, after due consideration, preferred an extremely swift circular motion to all others, have acted with the highest propriety and wisdom, and have evidently appeared to be the sole cause and author of the effects produced by the motion described? IV. But I wonder how those philosophers, who with Des Cartes refer all things to mechanical causes, and yet do not deny the existence of an all-wise and omnipotent God, can persuade themselves to assert that the uses of things are known to us, but not their objects or ends. For I would draw out the argument thus:—Since the uses of things are known to us, and God has arranged material existences with the highest degree of wisdom, therefore we cannot be utterly ignorant of the design of the things which have been created by God. For instance, when God created matter which had been previously nonexistent, and endowed it with a certain quantity of motion, undoubtedly he foresaw that mankind would be produced furnished with hands, feet, ears, eyes, and other organs; he also foresaw that men would use those eyes for seeing, and ears for hearing. But if he foresaw and perceived this, did he not at the same time allow these organs to be prepared out of matter, and arranged for these uses? I do not so much wonder that a follower of Democritus or Epicurus should grant the uses of things but deny their design; this is required by the philosophy to which they adhere. But that this should be done by one who supposes that God was perfectly acquainted with all the results of the motion impressed by him upon matter, seems to me to be very inconsistent with reason and the nature of the philosophy he professes to believe. On the contrary I believe that every legitimate and rational use of any thing is to be reckoned among the designs of God. If any human architect were so powerful and so wise as to be able to arrange the materials brought by his servants in such a manner as that a compact and well-framed house should be produced from the motions he occasioned, and was at the same time well aware of the purposes to which this house would be applied by its future inhabitants, would he not with the greatest propriety be said to have built that house for those purposes and uses? What then, pray, is the reason why our mechanical philosophers, who make God to have a foreknowledge of all things, and to be the author of all motion, should so cautiously distinguish between uses and designs, and insist that the one are known and the other unknown to us? Is it some secret impiety? or a love of the science to which they are addicted? or some other undefinable reason, perhaps unknown even to themselves? V. But let these philosophers learn (if they will not allow us to have any great acquaintance with their affairs,) from a profane author, ignorant of true religion, whither the way leads in which they are going, and how small is the interval between them and professed Atheists. Plutarch in his book De Facie in Orbe Lunæ, tom. 2. p. 927. opp. so justly castigates the Stoics for admitting the existence of a God and yet attributing all things to mechanical causes, that it is worth while here to transcribe a part of his observations: *Εἰ μὲν γὰρ*, he says, *οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μερῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔσχεν, ἀλλὰ ἕκαστον ᾗ πέφυκε κεῖται, μηδεμιᾶς μεθιδρύσεως μηδὲ μετακοσμήσεως δεόμενον, μηδὲ ἐν ἀρχῇ δεηθέν, ἀπορῶ, τί τῆς προνοίας ἔργον ἐστίν, ἢ τίνος γέγονε ποιητὴς καὶ πατὴρ δημιουργὸς ὁ Ζεὺς ἀριστοτέχνης· οὐ γὰρ ἐν στρατοπέδῳ τακτικῶν ὄφελος, εἴπερ εἴδεν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἕκαστος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ τάξιν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ καιρόν, οὐ δεῖ λαβεῖν καὶ διαφυλάσσειν· οὐδὲ κηπουρῶν, οὐδὲ οἰκοδόμων, εἰ πῇ μὲν αὐτὸ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀφ' αὐτοῦ πέφυκεν ἐπεῖναι τοῖς δεομένοις καὶ κατάρδειν*

But to this also the reply is easy, that though the divine Wisdom itself contrived the system of the whole world for ends and good, yet nature, as an inferior minister, immediately executes the same; I say, not a dead, fortuitous, and merely mechanical but a vital, orderly, and artificial nature. Which nature, asserted by most of the ancient philosophers, who were Theists, is thus described by Proclus:[4*] Ἡ φύσις ἐσχάτη μέν ἐστι τῶν τὸ σωματοειδὲς τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθητὸν δημιουργούντων αἰτίων, καὶ τὸ πέρας τοῦ τῶν ἀσωμάτων οὐσιῶν πλάτους· πλήρης δὲ λόγων καὶ δυνάμεων, δι' ὧν κατευθύνει τὰ ἐγκόσμα· τοιαύτη δὲ οὖσα προελήλυθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ζωογόνου θεᾶς,

Νώτοις δ' ἀμφὶ, θεᾶς φύσις ἄπλετος ᾠώρηται·

ἀφ' ἧς πᾶσα ζωὴ πρόεισιν, ἥ τε νοερὰ καὶ ἡ ἀχώριστος τῶν διοικουμένων· ἐξηρτημένη δ' ἐκεῖθεν καὶ ἀπῃωρημένη, φοιτᾷ διὰ πάντα ἀκωλύτως, καὶ πάντα ἐμπνεῖ, δι' ἣν τὰ ἀψύχωτα ψυχῆς μετέχει τινὸς, καὶ τὰ φθειρομένα μένει διαιωνίως ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, ταῖς ἐν αὐτῇ τῶν εἰδῶν αἰτίαις συνεχόμενα·

Ἄρχει δ' αὖ φύσις ἀκαμάτη κόσμων τε καὶ ἔργων·

Φησὶ τὸ λόγιον,

Οὐρανὸς ὄφρα θέῃ δρόμον ἀΐδιον κατασύρων·

Καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς, "Nature is the last of all causes that fabricate this corporeal and sensible world, and the utmost bound of incorporeal substances. Which being full of reasons and powers, orders and presides over all mundane affairs. It proceeding (according to the Magic Oracles) from that supreme goddess, the divine wisdom, which is the fountain of all life, as well intellectual, as that which is concrete with matter. Which wisdom this nature always essentially depending upon, passes through all things unhinderably; by means whereof even inanimate things partake of a kind of life, and things corruptible remain eternal in their species, they being contained by its standing forms or ideas, as

ἐπιῤῥέον, πῇ δὲ πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα καὶ λίθοι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν χρώμενα τροπαῖς καὶ νεύσεσιν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν καταλαμβάνειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἁρμονίαν καὶ χώραν, "If no part of the universe were affected contrary to its nature, but each lie just as it was produced, requiring no motion or alteration, even from the very beginning, I wonder what is the duty of Providence, or of what the creative Father and chief Artificer Jupiter can be the maker. For in an army there would be no need of tactics, if every soldier knew his own rank, place, and station which he ought to take and keep. Nor would there be any necessity for gardeners and builders, if the water would of its own accord flow to the plants that required it, and if the bricks, timber, and stones would by natural turns and motions take their own proper place, and harmonize with each other." Those who are curious in these matters may consult Plutarch further in the context, in which are many very excellent remarks.

[4] Comment. in Timæum Platon. lib. 1. p. 4. edit. Græc.

[*] Step. Poet. Philos.

their causes. And thus does the oracle describe nature, as presiding over the whole corporeal world, and perpetually turning round the heavens." Here have we a description of one universal substantial life, soul, or spirit of nature, subordinate to the Deity: besides which the same Proclus elsewhere[5] supposeth other particular natures, or spermatic reasons, in those words of his: Μετὰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν πρώτην, ψυχαί· καὶ μετὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν, φύσεις, "After the first soul, are there particular souls, and after the universal nature, particular natures." Where it may be observed, by the way, that this Proclus, though he were a superstitious Pagan, much addicted to the multiplying of gods (subordinate to one supreme) or a bigotic Polytheist, who had a humour of deifying almost every thing, and therefore would have this nature, forsooth, to be called a goddess too; yet does he declare it not to be properly such, but abusively only (viz. because it was no intellectual thing) as he saith the bodies of the sun, moon, and stars, supposed to be animated, were called gods too, they being the statues of the gods. This is the meaning of those words: Καὶ θεὸς μὲν τῷ ἐκθεοῦσθαι, καὶ οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἔχουσα τὸ εἶναι θεός· καὶ γὰρ τὰ θεῖα σώματα θεοὺς καλοῦμεν, ὡς ἀγάλματα τῶν θεῶν, "Nature is a god or goddess, not as having godship properly belonging to it, but as the divine bodies are called gods, because they are statues of the gods."

Wherefore we cannot otherwise conclude concerning these our mechanic Theists, who will thus needs derive all corporeal things from a dead and stupid nature, or from the necessary motions of senseless matter, without the direction of any mind or intention for ends and good; but that they are indeed cousin-germans to Atheists, or possessed, in a degree, with a kind of atheistic enthusiasm, or fanaticism, they being so far forth inspired with a spirit of infidelity, which is the spirit of atheism.

But these mechanic Theists are again counterbalanced by another sort of Atheists, not mechanical nor fortuitous; namely, the Hylozoists, who are unquestionably convinced that opera naturæ sunt opera intelligentiæ, that "the works of nature are works of understanding;" and that the original of these corporeal things was not dead and stupid matter fortuitously moved: upon which account Strato derided Democritus' rough and crooked atoms, as mere dreams and dotages. But these notwithstanding, because they would not admit of any other substance besides matter, suppose life and perception essentially to belong to all matter as such; whereby it hath a perfect knowledge of whatsoever itself could do or suffer (though without animal consciousness) and can form itself to the best advantage, sometimes improving itself by organization to sense in brutes, and to

[5] Comment. in Timæum. Platon. lib. 2. p. 118.

reason and reflexive understanding in men. Wherefore, according to the principles of these Hylozoists, there is not any need of a God at all; that is, of one perfect Mind or understanding Being presiding over the whole world; they concluding, accordingly, the opinion of a God to be only a mistaking of the inadequate conception of matter in general, its life and energetic nature taken alone abstractly, for a complete substance by itself. Nevertheless these Hylozoic Atheists are no way able, by this hypothesis of theirs neither, to solve that phenomenon of the regularity and harmony of the whole universe; because every part of matter being, according to them, a distinct percipient by itself, whose knowledge extendeth only to its own concernment; and there being no one thing presiding over all, the things of the whole world (ἐν ᾧ πάντα συντέτακται, "in which all things are co-ordered together) could never have fallen into one such agreeing and conspiring harmony.

And as for those other Cosmo-plastic Atheists, who suppose the whole world to be as it were but one huge plant, tree, or vegetable, or to have one spermatic, plastic and artificial nature only, orderly and methodically disposing the whole, but without sense and understanding; these can no way do the business neither, that is, solve the forementioned phenomenon, it being utterly impossible that there should be any such artificial and regular nature, otherwise than as deriving from, and depending upon, a perfect mind or wisdom.

And thus do we see plainly, that no Atheists whatsoever can solve the phenomena of nature, and this particularly of the regular frame and harmony of the universe; and that true philosophy, or the knowledge of causes, necessarily leadeth to a God.

But besides these phenomena of cogitation, or soul and mind in animals, local motion in bodies, and the artificial frame of things for ends and uses, together with the conspiring army of the whole, which can no way be solved without a Deity; we might here further add, that the fortuitous, that is, the Anaximandrian and Democritic Atheists, who universally asserted the novity of this mundane system, were not able to give any tolerable account neither of the first beginning of men, and those greater animals, that are no otherwise begotten, than in the way of generation, by the commixture of male and female.

Aristotle, in his book of the generation of animals,* writeth thus: Περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τετραπόδων γενέσεως ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν, εἴπερ ἐγίγνοντό ποτε γηγενεῖς, ὥσπερ φασί τινες, δύο τρόπων γίνεσθαι τὸν ἕτερον· ἢ γὰρ ὡς σκώληκος συνισταμένου τὸ πρῶτον, ἢ ἐξ ὠῶν, "If men and four-footed animals were ever

* Lib. 3. c. ult. [P. 665. tom. 2. opp.].

generated out of the earth, as some affirm, it may be probably conceived to have been one of these two ways, either that they were produced, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else formed in certain eggs," growing out of the earth. And then, after a while, he concludes again:[6] Εἴπερ ἦν τις ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως τοῖσι τοῖς ζώοις, εὔλογον δυεῖν τούτων εἶναι τὴν ἑτέραν, "That if there were any beginning of the generation of all animals, it is reasonable to think it to have been one of these two forementioned ways." It is well known that Aristotle, though a Theist, elsewhere affirmeth the world's eternity; according to which hypothesis of his, there was never any first male nor female in any kind of animals, but one begat another infinitely, without any beginning: a thing utterly repugnant to our human faculties, that are never able to frame any conception of such an infinity of number and time, and of a successive generation from eternity. But here Aristotle himself seems staggering, or sceptical, about it, "if men were ever generated out of the earth," and "if there were any beginning of the generation of animals;" as he doth also, in his Topics,[8] propound it for an instance of a thing disputable: Πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἀΐδιος, ἢ οὔ; "Whether the world were eternal or no?" he ranking it amongst those, περὶ ὧν λόγον μὴ ἔχομεν, ὄντων μεγάλων, "Those great things, for which we can give no certain reason one way nor other." Now (saith he) if the "world had a beginning," and if men were once γηγενεῖς, or αὐτόχθονες, "earth-born," then must they have been, in all probability, either generated, as worms, out of putrefaction, or else out of eggs; he supposing (it seems) those eggs to have grown out of the earth. But the generality of Atheists in Aristotle's time, as well as Theists, denying this eternity of the mundane system, as not so agreeable with their hypothesis, because so constant and invariable an order in the world, from eternity, hath not such an appearance or semblance of chance, nor can be easily supposed to have been without the providence of a perfect mind presiding over it, and senior to it (as Aristotle conceived) in nature, though not in time; they therefore, in all probability, concluded likewise, men at first to have been generated one of these two ways, either out of putrefaction or from eggs; and this by the fortuitous motion of matter, without the providence or direction of any Deity. But after Aristotle, Epicurus fancied those first men and other animals to have been formed in certain wombs or bags growing out of the earth:

Crescebant uteri terræ radicibus apti;[7]

[6] Comment. in Timæum Platon. p. 666.
[8] Lib. 1. c 9. [Cap. 11. p. 265. tom. 1. opp.]
[7] Lucretius, lib. 5. ver. 806. p. 335.

And this no otherwise than by the fortuitous motion of atoms also.

But if men had been at first formed after this manner, either in wombs or eggs (growing out of the earth) or generated out of putrefaction, by chance; then could there be no reason imaginable, why it should not sometimes so happen now, the motions of atoms being as brisk and vigorous as ever they were, and so to continue to all eternity: so that there is not the least ground at all for that precarious fancy and pretence of Epicurus,[8] that the earth, as a child-bearing woman, growing old, became at length effete and barren. Moreover, the men thus at first excluded out of bags, wombs, or egg-shells, or generated out of putrefaction, were supposed by these Atheists themselves to have been produced, not in a mature and adult, but an infant-like, weak and tender state, just such as they are now born into the world; by means whereof they could neither be able to feed and nourish themselves, nor defend themselves from harms and injuries. But when the same Epicurus[9] would here pretend also, that the earth, which had been so fruitful a mother, became afterward, by chance too, as tender and indulgent a nurse of this her own progeny, and sent forth streams or rivers of milk after them out of those gaps of her wounded surface, which they had before burst out of, as Critolaus long since observed,* he might as well have feigned the earth to have had breasts and nipples too, as wombs and milk; and then what should hinder, but that she might have arms and hands also, and swaddling-bands to boot? Neither is that less precarious, when the same atheistic philosopher adds, that in this imaginary state of the new-born world, there was for a long time neither any immoderate heat nor cold, nor any rude and churlish blasts of wind, the least to annoy or injure those tender earth-born infants and nurslings. all which things being considered, Anaximander[10] seems of the

[8] Vide Lucretius, lib. 5. ver. 823. 824.

> Sed quia finem aliquam pariendi debet habere,
> Destitit, ut mulier spatio defessa vetusto.

et lib. 2. verse 1149.

[9] Vide Lucretius, lib. 5. ver. 810. p. 336.

* In Philo Quod Mund. Incorr. [P. 945.]

[10] Vide Censorinum de Die Natali, cap. 4. p. 26. Edit. Lindenbrogii. "Anaximander, the Milesian, says that it appears to him that from water and earth under the influence of warmth, arose either fishes, or animals very much resembling fishes; and that in these men grew, and embryos that were retained inwardly until mature age; that then at last, they being ruptured, men and women, now able to provide for themselves, came forth." Several opinions, or rather follies, of the ancient poets and philosophers respecting the origin of the human race, have been collected by Lambinus, in his notes on Lucretius, lib. 5. p. 335. Samuel Parker, Disputationes de Deo et Providentiâ Divinâ, disp. 5. sect. 2. p. 433. Franc. Baltus, Jugement des Saints Pères sur la Morale de la Philosophie Payenne, chap. 15. p. 111; and more recently by the late J. F. Buddeus, in his Historia Eccles. Vet. Testamenti, period 1. sect. 1. sect. 8. p. 61. &c.

two to have concluded more wisely that men, because they require a longer time than other animals to be hatched up in, were at first generated in the bellies of fishes, and there nourished up for a good while, till they were at length able to defend and shift for themselves, and then were disgorged and cast up upon dry land. Thus do we see, that there is nothing in the world so monstrous nor prodigiously absurd, which men, atheistically inclined, will not rather imagine and swallow down, than entertain the notion of a God.

Wherefore, here is dignus vindice nodus, and this phenomenon of the first beginning of mankind, and other greater animals, cannot be solved otherwise, than according to the Mosaic history, by admitting of θεὸν ἀπὸ μηχανῆς, "a god out of a machine," that is, an extraordinary manifestation of the Deity, in forming man and other animals, male and female, once out of the earth; and that not in a rude, tender, and infant-like state, but mature and adult, that so they might be able immediately to shift for themselves, multiply and propagate their kind by generation: and this being once done, and now no longer any necessity of such an extraordinary way of proceeding, then putting a stop immediately thereunto, that so no more terrigenæ, nor autochthones, "earth-born men," should be any longer produced. For all these circumstances being put together, it plainly appears that this whole phenomenon surpasses not only the mechanical, but also the plastic powers; there being much of discretion in it, which the latter of these cannot arrive to neither, they always acting fatally and necessarily. Nevertheless, we shall not here determine whether God Almighty might not make use of the subservient ministry of angels or superior spirits, created before man, in this first extraordinary efformation of the bodies of animals out of the earth, in a mature and adult state; as Plato, in his Timæus,[1] introduceth the supreme God (whom he supposeth to be the immediate Creator of all immortal souls) thus bespeaking the junior gods, and setting them a work in the fabrication of mortal bodies: Τὸ δὲ λοῖπον ὑμεῖς, ἀθανάτῳ θνητὸν προσυφαίνοντες, ἀπεργάζεσθε ζῶα καὶ γεννᾶτε, "It is your work now to adaptate the mortal to the immortal, and to generate or make terrestrial animals;" he afterwards adding:[2] Μετὰ τὸν σπόρον, τοῖς νέοις παρέδωκε θεοῖς, σώματα πλάττειν θνητά, "That after the sowing of immortal souls (the supreme God) committed to these junior gods the task of forming mortal bodies." Which of Plato's some conceive to have been derived from that of Moses, "Let us make man after our own image."

Moreover, these Atheists are no more able to solve that other common and ordinary phenomenon neither, of the conservation

[1] Sect. 27. p. 250. [2] Sect. 29. p. 252.

of the species of all animals, by keeping up constantly in the world a due numerical proportion between the sexes of male and female. For did this depend only upon fortuitous mechanism, it cannot well be conceived, but that in some ages or other, there should happen to be either all males or all females; and so the species fail. Nay, it cannot well be thought otherwise, but that there is in this a providence also, superior to that of the plastic or spermatic nature, which hath not so much of knowledge and discretion allowed to it, as whereby to be able alone to govern this affair.

Lastly, there are yet other phenomena, no less real, though not physiological, which Atheists can no way solve; as that of natural justice, and honesty, duty and obligation; the true foundation both of ethics and politics; and the τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, "liberty of will," properly so called, not that of fortuitous determination, when there is a perfect equality or indifferency of eligibility in objects; but that whereby men deserve commendation and blame, rewards and punishments, and so become fit objects for remunerative justice to display itself upon, a main hinge upon which religion turneth; (though those two be not commonly so well distinguished as they ought.) For when Epicurus, (an absolute Atheist) departing here from Democritus, pretended to solve this by his exiguum clinamen principiorum, this attempt of his was no other than a plain delirancy, or atheistic frenzy in him.

And now have we already preventively confuted the third atheistic pretence also, to solve the phenomenon of religion and the belief of a God, so generally entertained; namely, from the fiction and imposture of politicians: we having not only manifested that there is a natural prolepsis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men, as the object of their fear, preventing reason; but also that the belief thereof is sustained and upheld by the strongest reason; the phenomena of nature being no way solvable, nor the causes of things assignable, without a Deity; so that religion being founded both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians. Nevertheless, we shall speak something particularly to this also. The Atheists therefore conceive, that though those infirmities of human nature, men's fear and ignorant credulity, do much dispose and incline them to the belief of a God, or else of a rank of beings superior to men, (whether visible or invisible) commonly called by the Pagans, gods; yet would not this be so generally entertained as it is, especially that of one supreme Deity, the first original of all things, and monarch of the universe, had it not been for the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil-sovereigns, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a

kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him.

Now, we deny not but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs; which they could not do so well neither, were the thing itself a mere cheat and figment of their own, and had no reality at all in nature, nor any thing solid at the bottom of it. But since religion obtains so universally every where, it is not conceivable how civil sovereigns throughout the whole world, some of which are so distant, and have so little correspondence with one another, should, notwithstanding, all so well agree in this one cheating mystery of government, or piece of state-cozenage; nor, if they could, how they should be able so effectually to possess the generality of mankind, (as well wise as unwise) with such a constant fear, awe, and dread, of a mere counterfeit thing, and an invisible nothing; and which hath not only no manner of foundation neither in sense nor reason, but also (as the Atheists suppose) tends to their own great terror and disquietment, and so brings them at once under a miserable vassalage both of mind and body. Especially since men are not generally so apt to think that how much the more any have of power and dignity, they have therefore so much the more of knowledge and skill in philosophy and the things of nature, above others. And is it not strange that the world should not all this while have suspected or discovered this cheat and juggle of politicians, and have smelt out a plot upon themselves, in the fiction of religion, to take away their liberty, and enthrall them under bondage; and that so many of these politicians and civil sovereigns themselves also, should have been unacquainted herewith, and as simply awed with fear of this invisible nothing, as any others? All other cheats and juggles when they are once never so little detected, are presently thereupon dashed quite out of countenance, and have never any more the confidence to obtrude themselves upon the world. But though the Atheists have for these two thousand years past, been continually buzzing into men's ears, that religion is nothing but a mere state juggle and political imposture; yet hath not the credit thereof been the least impaired thereby, nor its power and dominion over the minds of men abated: from whence it may be concluded, that it is no counterfeit and fictitious thing, but what is deeply rooted in the intellectual nature of man; a thing solid at the bottom, and supported by its own strength. Which yet may more fully appear from Christianity, a religion founded in no human policy, nor tending to promote any worldly interest or design;

which yet by its own, or the divine force, hath prevailed over the power and policy, the rage and madness of all civil states, Jewish and Pagan, and hath conquered so great a part of the persecuting world under it; and that, not by resisting or opposing force, but by suffering deaths and martyrdoms, in way of adherence to that principle,[3] "That it is better to obey God than men." Which thing was thus presignified in the prophetic scripture:[4] "Why do the heathen rage, and the people imagine a vain thing? The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers take counsel together, against the Lord and against his Christ, &c. He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh; the Lord shall have them in derision. Then shall he speak unto them in his wrath, &c. Yet have I set my king upon my holy hill of Sion. I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings," &c.[5]

[3] Acts v. 29. [4] Psalm ii. 4.

[5] It is a great and almost incredible piece of folly shamelessly to affirm that religion is an invention of the lawgivers of states. For, I. such ingenious disputants as these beg the question, and take for granted that religion is a fiction and a fable. They inquire into the causes of an errror, before they have demonstrated the opinion whose rise and origin they seek to be an error at all; than which I know of nothing that can be considered more foolish and wicked. II. Their only foundation for this conjecture is that they have ascertained from ancient annals and histories, that there were formerly among kings and tyrants, some who perverted religion, or rather superstition, to the confirmation of their own power. No wise man, indeed, can deny this; and if any modern examples of this detestable fraud be required, they may be easily found in abundance among the Papists. But to suppose that this is sufficient to prove that religion is the invention of rulers, is as rational as to suppose that Pythagoras invented lyric poetry, because he taught his disciples to use music as a means for quieting and composing their minds. On the contrary, the principal force of this argument goes to show that religion was in existence before any one thought of politics. For those who wish to circumvent others, usually convert to their own purposes those feelings of the mind which they perceive already to exist, and do not introduce into the mind entirely new ones. Numa, for instance, would never have feigned his colloquies with Egeria, and have pretended that laws and ordinances were given to him by that goddess, unless he had observed in the Roman people some idea of a God, and some propensity towards religion. III. If religion were invented in order to retain the people within their duty, those wise men who easily saw through the tricks and frauds of the rulers, must have been entirely destitute of it. But these, who were best adapted for laying open all fallacies, were often the most strenuous defenders of religion. Lactantius, De Ira Dei, chap. 10, p. 929, not badly observes, "If they invented religion for the sake of deceiving us and all the human race, then they were not wise, since falsehood is inconsistent with wisdom; but if indeed they were wise, what good fortune must they not have experienced in their deception, so easily to delude not only the unlearned, but also Plato and Socrates, Pythagoras, Zeno, and Aristotle, the heads of the greatest sects." IV. If religion proceeded from the magistrates, those who live without laws, and obey only their own wills, would be without religion. But who among literary men can be so ignorant of human nature, as to be unaware that even in the minds of those tribes which are bound together by no civil or social ties, the seeds of true religion are to be found? Other observations are usually made on this subject by those who expressly set themselves to defend the truth of religion; and Thomas Wise, in particular, who made an abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's work, has inserted among that author's reflections a copious digression against these Atheistic triflings, cap. 6. p. 436—452. My only reason for not transcribing these arguments, powerful and excellent as they are, is that Dr. Cudworth's own discussion of

But that theism, or religion is no gullery or imposture, will be yet further made unquestionably evident. That the generality of mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of one supreme Deity, as a Being eternal and necessarily existent, absolutely perfect and omnipotent, and the maker of the whole world, hath been already largely proved in the foregoing discourse. To which purpose is this of Sextus, the philosopher:[6] Κοινὴν γὰρ πρόληψιν ἔχουσι πάντες ἄνθρωποι περὶ Θεοῦ, καθ' ἣν μακάριόν τί ἐστι ζῶον καὶ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ ἀνεπίδεκτον, "All men have this common prolepsis concerning God, that he is a living Being incorruptible, perfectly happy, and incapable of all manner of evil." And the notion of that God, which Epicurus opposed, was no other than this, "An understanding Being, having all happiness, with incorruptibility, that framed the whole world."[7] Now, I say, that if there be no such thing as this existing, and this idea of God be a mere fictitious thing, then was it altogether arbitrarious. But it is inconceivable how the generality of mankind (a few Atheists only excepted) should universally agree in one and the same arbitrarious figment. This argumentation hath been formerly used by some Theists, as appeareth from the forementioned Sextus:* Τελέως δ' ἔστιν ἄλογον, τὸ κατὰ τύχην πάντας τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν ἰδιώμασιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ φυσικῶς οὕτως ἐκκινεῖσθαι, "It is altogether irrational to think that all men should by chance light upon the same properties (in the idea of God) without being naturally moved thereunto." Neither is that any sufficient account, which the Atheists would here give, that statesmen and politicians every where thus possessed the minds of men with one and the same idea; the difficulty still remaining, how civil sovereigns and law-makers, in all the distant parts of the world, and such as had no communication nor intercourse with one another, should universally jump in one and the same fictitious and arbitrarious idea.

Moreover, were there no God, it is not conceivable how that forementioned idea should ever have entered into the minds of men, or how it could have been formed in them. And here the Atheists again think it enough to say, that this notion or idea was put into the minds of the generality of mankind by law-makers and politicians, telling them of such a Being, and per-

the subject is abundantly conclusive. Besides, now every one possesses books which learnedly and acutely defend religion from all kinds of antagonists.

[6] Lib. 1. Advers. Physicos, sive lib. 8. Advers. Mathemat. sect. 1. sect. 33. p. 556. Ed. Fabricii.

[7] Epicurus has nowhere said that he opposes this definition of a Deity; but as much as this may be easily collected from his arguments and reasonings against a Divine Being, which may be found collected together in Lucretius.

* Advers. Mathemat. p. 314. [Page 557.]

suading them to believe his existence; or that it was, from the first feigner or inventor of it, propagated all along and conveyed down by oral tradition. But this argues their great ignorance in philosophy, to think, that any notion or idea is put into men's minds from without, merely by telling, or by words; we being passive to nothing else from words but their sounds and the phantasms thereof, they only occasioning the soul to excite such notions, as it had before within itself (whether innate or adventitious), which those words, by the compact and agreement of men, were made to be signs of; or else to reflect also further upon those ideas of their own, consider them more distinctly, and compare them with one another. And though all learning be not the remembrance of what the soul once before actually understood, in a pre-existent state, as Plato somewhere would have it, according to that of Boetius:[8]

> Quod si Platonis musa personat verum,
> Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur:]

yet is all human teaching but maieutical, or obstetricious; and not the filling of the soul as a vessel, merely by pouring into it from without, but the kindling of it from within; or helping it so to excite and awaken, compare and compound its own notions, as whereby to arrive at the knowledge of that which it was before ignorant of: as the thing was better expressed by the forementioned philosophic poet, in these words,

> Hæret profecto semen introrsum veri,
> Quod excitatur ventilante doctrinâ.

Wherefore the mere telling of men, there is a God, could not infuse any idea of him into their minds; nor yet the further giving this definition of him, that he is a being absolutely per-

[8] De Consolat. Philos. lib. 3. p. 79. 80. The passage itself of Plato quoted by Boetius may be found in his Phædon, where Socrates, just before his death, explains this opinion, p. 382. &c. See also his Menon, p. 18, where a boy is introduced giving apt and correct answers to the various questions of Socrates respecting the measurement of the square, which Socrates says was owing to the ἐννοίας, or ideas implanted in human minds. Dr. Cudworth has with great propriety abandoned this opinion of Plato, which is supremely adapted to foster fanatic delusion and folly. For if you can firmly persuade any one that there were in his mind, long before he was born, the impressed images of all truths, he will neglect his reason and the education to be derived from others, and will give himself up solely for instruction to the emotions and fancies of his own mind, receiving without hesitation all its products, however false and foolish, for divine verities. Nevertheless many, who deny the existence of any innate ideas, may perhaps think Dr. Cudworth here more attached to the Platonic dogmas than truth will permit. This controversy I will not pretend to decide; since it is not at all to the present purpose, and this subject has been touched upon in some degree several times already. I will merely observe that I think those who dispute respecting internal and innate ideas do not generally express their opinions with sufficient plainness and perspicuity, but make use of words and expressions which are very ambiguous, from which if they were to abstain perhaps there would be less difference between them than at first sight appears.

fect, eternal, and self-existent, make them understand any thing of his nature, were they not able to excite notions or ideas from within themselves, correspondent to those several words. However the difficulty still remains, how those civil sovereigns and law-makers, or how Critias' very first inventor of that cheat of a God, could form that idea within themselves; since upon supposition of his non-existence, it is the idea of nothing, or of a nonentity. And this was judiciously hinted also by the same Sextus:* Οἱ δὲ διαμφοδοκοῦντές, φασὶν, ὅτι νομοθέται τινὲς ἐνεποίησαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὴν περὶ Θεοῦ δόξαν, μὴ εἰδότες ὅτι τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ἄτοπον αὐτοὺς περιμένει, ζητήσαντος ἄν τινος, πόθεν δὲ οἱ νομοθέται, μηδενὸς πρότερον παραδόντος, ἦλθον εἰς ἐπίνοιαν Θεοῦ, "The Atheists affirming, that certain law-makers first put this notion of a God into the minds of men, do not consider that they still remain entangled in the difficulty, if any one further demands of them how those law-makers themselves could first form that idea?" From whence it is afterwards concluded:[9] Οὐ τοίνυν θέσει, οὐδὲ κατά τινα νομοθεσίαν, παρεδέξαντο οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, εἶναι Θεόν, "That therefore the notion of a God sprung not from the arbitrarious fiction of law-makers and politicians."

But some Atheists will yet further reply, that there is a feigning power in the human soul, whereby it can frame ideas or conceptions of such things as actually never were or will be, as of a centaur, or of a golden mountain; and that by such a feigning power as this the idea of a God, though there be no such thing existing, might be framed. And here we deny not but that the human soul hath a power of compounding ideas and things together, which exist severally and apart in nature, but never were, nor will be, in that conjunction: and this indeed is all the feigning power that it hath. For the mind cannot make any new cogitation, which was not before, but only compound that which is. As the painter cannot feign colours, but must use such as exist in nature; only he can variously compound them together, and by his pencil draw the figures and lineaments of such things as nowhere are; as he can add to the head and face of a man the neck, shoulders, and body of a horse. In like manner that more subtle painter or limner, the mind and imagination of man, can frame compounded ideas of things which nowhere exist, but yet his simple colours, notwithstanding, must be real; he cannot feign any cogitation which was not in nature, nor make a positive conception of that which is absolutely nothing; which were no less than to make nothing to be something, or create something out of nothing. And though the whole of these fictitious ideas (as of a golden mountain) does not

* Advers. Mathemat. 313. 314. [Page 556.] [9] Ibid. p. 557.

any where actually exist, yet forasmuch as it doth not absolutely imply a contradiction for it so to do, therefore hath it also a possible entity too, and otherwise it could not be conceivable. As a triangular square, for example, being a contradictious thing, hath not so much as a possible entity, and therefore is not conceivable as such (though both a triangle and a square severally be conceivable); it being mere nonsense, nothing, and no idea at all. Nay, we conceive, that a Theist may presume with reverence to say, that God Almighty himself, though he can create more or fewer really existent things, as he pleaseth, and could make a whole world out of nothing, yet can he not make more cogitation or conception, than is, or was before contained in his own infinite mind and eternal wisdom, nor have a positive idea of any thing, which hath neither actual nor possible entity.

But the idea of God is not a compilement or aggregation of things which exist scatteredly and apart in the world; for then would it be a mere arbitrarious thing, and it might be what every one pleased, one adding more things together, and another fewer, but each of them writing the name or title of God, as bungling painters did, under these their several figments;[10] whereas we have already proved that the idea of God is one most simple idea of an absolutely perfect Being, though having several partial and inadequate conceptions, so that nothing can be added to it, nor detracted from it, there being nothing included therein but what is demonstrable of a perfect Being, and therefore nothing at all arbitrarious.

Moreover, many of those partial conceptions contained in the entire idea of God are nowhere else to be found in the whole world, existing singly and apart; and therefore, if there be no God, they must needs be absolute nonentities; as immutability, necessary existence, infinity, and perfection, &c. So that the painter that makes this idea, must here feign colours themselves, or create new cogitation and conception out of nothing, upon the atheistic supposition.

Lastly, if there be no God now existing, it is impossible that ever there should be any, and so the whole idea of God would be the idea of that which hath no possible entity neither; whereas those other fictitious ideas, made by the mind of men, though they be of such things as have no actual existence, yet have they all a possible entity, as was said before.

But that we may conceal nothing of the Atheists' strength, we must here acknowledge that some of them have yet pretended further, that besides this power of compounding things together, the human soul hath also another ampliating, or increasing and

[10] See Ælian, Variæ Historiæ, lib. 10. cap. 10. p. 184, who says that the old painters used to depict animals so badly that they were obliged to write under their pictures, "This is an ox," "That is a horse."

improving power; by both which together, though there be no God existing, nor yet possible, the idea of him may be fictitiously made; those partial ideas, which are nowhere else to be found, arising, as they say, from a *μετάβασις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, "a transition and gradual procession from men, in way of amplification, augmentation, and improvement." Thus do we read in Sextus:* *Τὸ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεὸν, καὶ ἄφθαρτον, καὶ τέλειον ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ, παρῆλθε κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μετάβασιν· ὡς γὰρ τὸν κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον αὐξήσαντες τῇ φαντασίᾳ, νόησιν ἔχομεν Κύκλωπος· οὕτως ἄνθρωπον εὐδαίμονα νοήσαντες καὶ μακάριον καὶ συμπεπληρωμένον πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, εἶτα ταῦτα ἐπιτείναντες, τὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἄκρον ἐνοήσαμεν Θεόν· καὶ πάλιν πολυχρόνιόν τινα φαντασιωθέντες ἄνθρωπον οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἐπηύξησαν τὸν χρόνον εἰς ἄπειρον, εἶτα ἐντεῦθεν εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀΐδιον παραγενόμενοι, ἔφασαν καὶ ἀΐδιον εἶναι τὸν Θεόν*, "The ideas of the eternity, incorruptibility, and perfect happiness of the Deity, were fictitiously made by way of transition from men: for as, by increasing a man of an ordinary stature in our imagination, we fictitiously make the phantasm of a Cyclops; so when beholding a happy man, that aboundeth with all good things, we amplify, intend, and, as it were, swell the same in our minds higher and higher, we then arrive at length to the idea of a Being absolutely happy, that is, a God. So did the ancients, taking notice of a very longeve man, and increasing this length of age further and further infinitely, by that means frame the notion or idea of eternity, and attribute the same to God."

But to this we reply, first, that according to the principles of the Atheists themselves, there could not possibly be any such amplifying and feigning power of the soul, as whereby it could make more than is; because they suppose it to have no active power at all, but all our conceptions to be nothing but mere passions from the objects without; according to that of Protagoras in Plato's Theætetus:† *Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα, παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ*, "It is neither possible for a man to conceive that which is not; nor any more or otherwise than he suffers." Again, as Sextus[1] the philosopher also inti-

*Adv. Math. p. 317. [Lib. 8. seu adv. Physic. lib. 1. sect. 2. sect. 46. p. 559. 560.] But Dr. Cudworth has not quoted this passage entire; but has omitted some words without which it cannot be clearly understood.

† Page 167. Serr.

[1] Vide lib. 8. adv. Mathemat. sect. 2. sect. 47. p. 560. Since Dr. Cudworth goes on here to paraphrase the passage he refers to out of Sextus Empiricus, it will be only fair here to give Sextus' own words, so that his opinion may be the more plainly apparent. *Οἱ δὲ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες, πιθανῆς μὲν προΐστανται δόξης· ἠρέμα δὲ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτουσι τρόπον, ὃς ἔσται ἀπορώτατος· ἵνα γὰρ πρῶτον εὐδαίμονα νοήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ μετάβασιν τὸν Θεὸν, ὀφείλομεν νοῆσαι, τί ποτέ ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία, ἧς κατὰ μετοχὴν νοεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων· Ἀλλ' ἤν γε εὐδαιμονία κατ' αὐτοὺς δαιμονία τις καὶ θεῖα φύσις, καὶ εὐδαίμων ἐκαλεῖτο ὁ εὖ τὸν δαίμονα διακείμενον ἔχων· ὥσθ' ἵνα μὲν λάβωμεν τὴν περὶ*

mates, the Atheists are here plainly guilty of that fallacy or error in ratiocination, which is commonly called a circle, or δι' ἀλλήλων. For whereas they could not otherwise judge the

ἄνθρωπον εὐδαιμονίαν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν νόησιν Θεοῦ καὶ δαίμονος· ἵνα δὲ τὸν Θεὸν νοήσωμεν, πρότερον ἔχειν ὀφείλομεν ἔννοιαν εὐδαίμονος ἀνθρώπου· τοίνυν ἑκάτερον περιμένον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου νόησιν, ἀνεπινόητον γίνεται ἡμῖν, "Those who say these things have indeed a probable opinion to defend, but gradually they fall into the way of proving one thing by another, a way which is most doubtful. For if first of all we are to imagine a happy man, and thence by transition form an idea of God, what is the felicity in the participation of which he is to be esteemed happy? But felicity is according to them a certain superhuman and divine nature, and is called in Greek εὐδαιμονία because it possesses a well disposed demon [or god]; wherefore in order to conceive of human felicity we must first have an idea of God and of a demon. But in order to form an idea of God we must first have a conception of a happy man. Each idea therefore reciprocally depending on the other, both become incomprehensible to us."

I have already fully explained my opinion respecting that idea of supreme perfection which is supposed by Dr. Cudworth to be innate in the human mind; nor do I perceive any thing said here which should move me from that opinion. I. Why our author should deny the faculty of augmenting and amplifying, I do not at all perceive. A faculty of this description certainly exists in our minds, nor is the admission of it injurious, but rather advantageous to the cause of God and of religion. For as soon as we perceive any thing to possess a particular perfection or power, we immediately, under the express guidance of nature itself, conclude that it is produced by some cause, and does not exist necessarily of itself. But when we think of this cause, we cannot refrain from attributing to it a greater degree of perfection than we perceive to exist in what is produced by it, or from amplifying and increasing the perfection found in the effect. From this cause we again ascend to another and different cause, the attributes of which we amplify, until we arrive by meditation at a cause of such a kind as can have nothing added to it. Every one who has only moderately attended to the operations of their own minds will perceive the correctness of these statements. II. But how the existence of this mental faculty of increase and amplification can in any way serve the cause of Atheists, I can indeed by no means discover. Suppose any one to reason thus: Mankind, from the contemplation of imperfect existences, gradually, through dint of reasoning, attain to the formation of the idea of a supremely perfect being: therefore there is no being of this supremely perfect description. How are we to class such a reasoner? among the wise or the foolish? For my own part I think he ought to be made perpetual mayor of Gotham. It would be as wise and rational to conclude that all the clocks of a city have been their own makers, because all who see such machines attribute greater ability and skill to the maker than to the machine itself. What kind of reasoning, pray, is this? Because all mankind feel certain that nothing can take place without a cause, and infer that the cause must be of a more exalted nature than its effect, therefore no cause whatever exists! How can the advocates of such an argument as this claim for a moment a place among the wise? III. I am rather of opinion that the power our minds possess of exalting the perfections and attributes that we encounter is no slight confirmation of religion. For it is plain from it that we have an idea of supreme and infinite perfection which no human being, with his utmost efforts, can possibly expel. For as when any one, after a view of many clocks, skilfully and ingeniously constructed, still desires a higher degree of elegance and finish, he has undoubtedly by some means or other in his mind an inward idea of a firstrate timepiece, so also when a person, after a contemplation of the best and most perfect existences in the universe, still amplifies and exalts the perfections he sees, he must necessarily be endued with the image and idea of a supremely perfect nature. IV. But yet it is not necessary that we should suppose, with our author and the Platonists, that this idea of a supremely perfect Being is innate in all men, and brought with them at their birth into the world. As respects the cause of religion, it is perfectly indifferent whether it be supposed innate or adventitious. It is sufficient to maintain the incontrovertible fact that mankind, as soon as they obtain the use of reason, cannot refrain from adopting this opinion, that there is some supremely perfect Being, unless they be more influenced by their own prejudices than by the doctrines.

greatest perfection and happiness, which ever they had experience of in men, to be imperfect, than by an anticipated idea of perfection and happiness, with which it was in their minds compared (by virtue of which idea also it comes to pass that they are able to amplify those lesser perfections of men further and further, and can take occasion, from imperfect things, to think of that which is absolutely perfect); that is, whereas these Atheists themselves first make the idea of imperfection from perfection; they, not attending to this, do again go about to make up the notion or idea of that which is absolutely perfect (by way of amplification) from that which is imperfect. But that men have a notion of absolute perfection in them, by which, as the rule or measure, they (comparing other things therewith) judge them to be imperfect, and which is therefore in order of nature first, may appear from hence, because all theologers, as well Pagan as Christian, gave this direction, for the conceiving of God, that it should principally be done per viam remotionis, "by way of remotion of all imperfection from him." Thus Alcinous:[2] Πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νόησις ἡ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, "The first way of conceiving of God is by remotion or abstraction." We add, in the last place, that finite things put together can never make up infinite, as may appear from that instance of human longevity proposed; for, if one should amplify that never so much, by adding of more and more past time or years to it, yet would he never thereby be able to arrive at eternity without beginning. God differs not from these imperfect created things in degrees only, but in the whole kind. And though infinite space may perhaps be here objected, as a thing taken for granted, which being nothing but extension or magnitude, must therefore consist, or be made up, of finite parts, as it was before declared, we have no certainty of any more than this, that the finite world

and dictates of correct reason. But we have already touched upon this more fully above. V. Nor is the opinion of the Platonists more correct, that there is actually in all minds an innate idea of supreme perfection, proving it by the same argumentation which Dr. Cudworth here uses in the investigation of the divine attributes by the method of exclusion. This "method of exclusion," which is very generally followed by theologians, proves indeed that they are certain of the existence of a supremely perfect and eternal Being, and that they themselves have some idea or notion of such a Being; but it can in no way be thence inferred that this idea is actually existent in the infant mind immediately after birth. Let it be supposed that an individual on beholding a book defaced by certain faults, should make use of this "method of exclusion" to discover the idea of an absolutely perfect book, or to conclude that none of these faults existed in an immaculate volume, it would certainly be correct to say that that person had an idea of an immaculate and perfect book; but you can never thence prove that he possessed the idea of a faultless volume from the very time he was first born. I know not how it comes to pass that the Platonists usually confound these two widely different things, the having in the mind an idea of any thing, and the bringing with one into the world an innate notion of it. On this subject our preceding observations may be referred to.

[2] Introduct. in Doctrin. Platon. cap. 10. p. 602, printed at the end of Dan. Heinsius' edition of Maximus Tyrius.

might have been made bigger and bigger infinitely, or without end; which infinity or magnitude is but like that of number, potential; from whence it may be inferred as well of the one as the other, that it can never be actually infinite. Wherefore, were there no infinitely perfect being in nature, the idea thereof could never be made up by any amplifying power of the soul, or by the addition of finites.[3] Neither is that of any moment which Gassendus[4] so much objecteth here to the contrary, that though there were no God, or infinite Being, yet might the idea of him as well be feigned by the mind, as that of infinite worlds, or of infinite matter, was by some philosophers: for infinite worlds, and infinite matter, are but words ill put together, infinity being a real thing in nature (and no fiction of the mind), as well as the world or matter, but yet proper to the Deity only. But it is no wonder, if they, who denied a God, yet retaining this notion of infinity, should misapply the same, as they did also other properties of the Deity, to matter.

To conclude this; our human soul cannot feign or create any new cogitation, or conception, that was not before, but only variously compound that which is; nor can it ever make a positive idea of an absolute nonentity, that is, such as hath neither actual nor possible existence; much less could our imperfect beings create the entity of so vast a thought, as that of an infinitely perfect Being, out of nothing; this being indeed more than for God Almighty, or a perfect Being, to create a real world out of nothing; because there is no repugnancy at all in the latter, as there is in the former. We affirm therefore, that were there no God, the idea of an absolutely or infinitely perfect Being could never have been made or feigned, neither by politicians, nor by poets, nor philosophers, nor any other. Which may be accounted another argument for a Deity.[5]

But that religion is no figment of politicians, will further

[3] Here may be consulted our previous copious observations on the nature of infinity (note 3. p. 541). Dr. Cudworth here follows Des Cartes, who has followed precisely the same line of argument in his Responsiones ad Gassendi Dubitationes, p. 324. vol. 3. of Gassendi's works.

[4] In Disquisit. Metaphys. seu Dubitationibus et Instantiis ad Cartesii Metaphys. Dubit 4. p. 336. tom. 3. opp.

[5] Many remarks might be made here in confirmation, illustration, and qualification of our author's reflections; but since this whole subject of the nature and origin of conceptions and ideas has been already treated of by those who are far superior to myself in ability and learning, and even the wisest can scarcely escape unblemished and uninjured from this strife, I have thought it better to leave the reader to an unbiassed decision on the whole question. I am almost ready to believe, that if all the discussions that have taken place among authors, respecting the idea of God being adventitious or innate, were accurately examined with a view rather to real meaning than to words and phrases, there would be found much less difference than is at first apparent. But if this matter be discussed by those whose contests are like the battles of the pigmies and the cranes of old, destitute of order and method, it is no wonder that mutual misunderstandings take place, and that discord is increased and inflamed rather than extinguished.

unquestionably appear from that which now shall follow. As the religion of an oath is a necessary vinculum of civil society; so obligation in conscience, respecting the Deity as its original, and as the punisher of the violation thereof, is the very foundation of all civil sovereignty: for pacts and covenants (into which some would resolve all civil power) without this obligation in conscience, are nothing but mere words and breath; and the laws and commands of civil sovereigns do not make obligation, but presuppose it, as a thing in order of nature before them, and without which they would be invalid. Which is a truth so evident, that the writer De Cive could not dissemble it (though he did not rightly understand this natural obligation) but acknowledgeth it in these words:* Obligatio ad obedientiam civilem, cujus vi leges civiles validæ sunt, omni lege civili prior est.——Quòd si quis princeps summus legem civilem in hanc formulam conciperet, non rebellabis, nihil efficeret. Nam nisi prius obligentur cives ad obediendum, hoc est, ad non rebellandum, omnis lex invalida est: et si prius obligentur, est superflua, "The obligation to civil obedience, by the force of which all the civil laws become valid, is before those civil laws. And if any prince should make a law to this purpose, that no man should rebel against him, this would signify nothing, because unless they to whom it is made were before obliged to obey, or not to rebel, the law is invalid; and if they were, then is it superfluous."[6] Now this previous obligation to civil obedience cannot be derived (as the forementioned writer De Cive, and of the Leviathan supposes) from men's private utility only; because every man being judge of this for himself, it would then be lawful for any subject to rebel against his sovereign prince, and to poison or stab him, whensoever he could reasonably persuade himself that it would tend to his own advantage, or that he should thereby procure the sovereignty. Were the obligation to civil obedience made only by men's private utility, it would as easily be dissolved by the same. It remaineth therefore, that conscience, and religious obligation to duty, is the only basis, and essential foundation, of a polity or commonwealth: without which there could be no right or authority of commanding in any sovereign, nor validity in any laws. Wherefore religious obligation cannot be thought to be the fiction or imposture of civil sovereigns, unless civil sovereignty itself be accounted a fiction and imposture, or a thing which hath no foundation in nature, but is either wholly artificial or violent.[7]

* Imper. cap. 14. sect. 21. [Page 109.]

[6] These last words are quoted by Dr. Cudworth a little differently from what they are to be read in Hobbes, whose expressions are, "All law is invalid; but an obligation which binds to what was already an obligation is superfluous."

[7] Unless I am much mistaken, this argumentation is not of force against all who

Moreover, had a religious regard to the Deity been a mere figment or invention of politicians, to promote their own ends, and keep men in obedience and subjection under them, then

suppose religion to be a figment of rulers, but only against some who hold this opinion. Our author's reasoning, if I rightly understand it, is as follows:—Religion is not a crafty invention of the first founders of states and governments, for before governments could be established, there must have been in men's minds a strong conviction that they were under an obligation to obey and be submissive to laws. But this strong conviction could arise only from religion. Therefore religion must have been prior to all governments, and if so, it cannot have been invented by rulers. I willingly grant that all real and permanent obligation arises from religion, nor, apart from religion, can any government continue safe and uninjured. But the argument deduced from these premises does not seem to me to be of sufficient force at once to overthrow all the reasoning of those who prate of the frauds and tricks of legislators, in discussing the origin of religion. An Atheist will grant, when opposed in this way, that religion is necessary for the firm establishment of governments, and that magistrates cannot depend upon the obedience of their citizens except in so far as their minds are imbued with a reverence for some Deity, the punisher of wickedness and crime. But he will add that this very thing induced statesmen to instil the principles of religion into the minds of ignorant men; that certain chief men plainly foresaw this previously to the foundation of governments, and therefore took care of religion before politics, and assumed the guise of fanatics before they put on the robes of kings and magistrates. That this was the case with Mohammed, who is well known to have laid the foundations of his empire after he had inculcated into the minds of his followers the opinion that he was a prophet sent from God, whose commands it was wicked to resist. That a like part was played in England by Oliver Cromwell, who opened his way to power by fanaticism rather than by virtue or courage. That therefore there is nothing to prevent religion from preceding government, and yet at the same time being nothing but a deceitful invention of magistrates, and of those who were desirous of power. Perhaps Atheists will say that they do not mean that all religion proceeded from magistrates; that there existed in the minds of most people an amount of superstition which was produced by a fear of futurity and an ignorance of causation, previously to their coalescing in civil societies; and that this superstition was only nourished, amplified, and confirmed by certain laws, through the influence of rulers. But neither will they admit it to be necessary that religion must have preceded government in the history of the human mind; but will assert that fear and other natural causes first induced mankind to give up their personal liberty and submit themselves and their property to the will of a single individual; that these new societies did not at first require the aid of religion, but that the agreements entered into by the magistrates and the people, the sense of past inconveniences, the fear of punishment, and other methods, for a time restrained the people within the bounds of duty; but that in the lapse of time, when ambitious persons, more studious of their own advantage than of the public weal, excited disturbances in the state, rulers then foresaw that a stronger tie was needed for curbing the minds of their citizens; on which account, perceiving the dispositions of the multitude to be prone to receive the belief of a certain unseen Deity, they made use of this propensity, and availed themselves of religion as a defence and protection against seditions and tumults. Nor will the deniers of a Deity be much affected by our author's final observation, that those who reckon religion among the frauds and tricks of rulers, cannot have a better opinion of that government which is supported by religion. For some of this party will be foolhardy enough to assent to the truth of this, and will include to a certain extent opposition to civil institutions in their hostility against religion. All these considerations I admit to be the nonsense and vain fancies of senseless men, which will at once lose all their speciousness and value with any individual possessing the least discernment and furnished with Dr. Cudworth's other arguments; but still they greatly weaken the force of our author's argumentation in this place. Therefore I think it better not to use it against atheists without great caution, more especially since there is more than sufficient force in other arguments to refute all their cavils, as here referred to. Long experience has taught me, that there is never greater need of prudence and wisdom than when disputing against those who employ their talents, to the utmost of their

would they doubtless have so framed and contrived it, as that it should have been every way flexible and compliant; namely, by persuading the world, that whatsoever was commanded by themselves, was agreeable to the divine will, and whatever was forbidden by their laws was displeasing to God Almighty, and would be punished by him; God ruling over the world no otherwise than by and in these civil sovereigns as his vicegerents, and as the only prophets and interpreters of his will to men. So that the civil law of every country, and the arbitrary will of sovereigns, should be acknowledged to be the only measure of just and unjust (there being nothing naturally such) the only rule of conscience and religion: for, from religion thus modelled, civil sovereigns might think to have an absolute power, or an infinite right of doing or commanding whatsoever they pleased, without exception, nothing being unlawful to them, and their subjects being always obliged, in conscience, without the least scruple, to obey.

But this is but a mere larva of religion, and would be but a mocking of God Almighty; and indeed this is the only religion that can be called a political figment.[8] Neither could the generality of mankind be ever yet thus persuaded, that the arbitrary will of civil sovereigns was the only rule of justice and conscience; and that God Almighty could command nothing, nor reveal his will concerning religion to mankind otherwise than by these, as his prophets and interpreters. True religion and conscience are no such waxen things, servilely addicted to the arbitrary wills of men, but immorigerous, stiff, and inflexible; they respecting the Deity only, his eternal or everlasting laws, and his revealed will; with which whensoever human laws clash (a thing not impossible), they conclude, that then God ought to be obeyed, and not men. For which cause the profane politicians declare open war against this religion, as a thing utterly inconsistent with civil sovereignty; because it introduces a fear greater than the fear of the Leviathan, namely, that of

power, in carrying on opposition against God and religion. For since most of them have fallen into this madness not so much through reasoning as through a love of lusts and pleasures, and cannot feel certain that there is no God, but only desire to ascertain this supposition for a truth, in order the more securely to indulge in sin, they therefore eagerly catch at the smallest slip of the advocates of religion, and absurdly judge of the merits of the whole question from one weak point of argumentation. For men believe nothing more readily than what they perceive to correspond with their own wishes and desires. Other observations would have to be made here if the doctrine of civil obedience were now under discussion; but the present is plainly an entirely different question. Some remarks on this passage of Dr. Cudworth have been made by Le Clerc, Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 101. who has shown, first, that religion and the fear of God is not opposed in the administration of civil government to the advantage of mankind, and secondly, that public and not private advantage is the chief end of civil government.

[8] This is aimed at Hobbes, who both in his Leviathan and in his Elementa de Cive, commends that kind of religion here called by Dr. Cudworth a larva of religion.

him who can inflict eternal punishments after death; as also because it clashes with that monstrous, infinite, and unlimited power of theirs, which is such a thing as is not attributed by genuine Theists to God Almighty himself; a power of making their mere arbitrary will the rule of justice, and not justice the rule of their will. Thus does a modern writer of politics condemn it for seditious doctrine, tending to the dissolution of a commonwealth:* "That subjects may make a judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, or have any other conscience besides the law of the land." As also this:† "That subjects may sin in obeying the commands of their sovereign." He likewise adds:‡ "That it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where any other than the sovereign hath a power of giving greater rewards than life, and of inflicting greater punishments than death. Now, eternal life is a greater reward than the life present, and eternal torment than the death of nature." Wherefore, God Almighty being the dispenser of eternal rewards and punishments, this is all one as if he should have said, it is impossible a commonwealth should stand, where the belief of a God, who can punish with eternal torments after this life, is entertained.[9] Thus does the same writer declare,§ that if the "superstitious fear of spirits"[10] (whereof God is the chief) and things depending thereupon, were taken away, men would be much more fitted than they are, for civil obedience:" and that they who assert the immortality of souls, or their capability of receiving punishments after death,‖ "fright men from obeying the laws of their country, with empty names, as men fright birds from the corn, with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick." And accordingly he concludes, that civil sovereigns do not only make justice, but religion also; and that no scripture or divine revelation can oblige, unless it be first made law, or stamped with their authority. Now, since that which can make religion and gods, must itself needs be greater than all gods, it follows, according to the tenor of this doctrine, that the civil sovereign is in reality the supreme Numen; or else at least, that the Leviathan (the king

* Leviathan, p. 168. [Cap. 29. p. 152. ed. Batav.]

† De Civ. cap. 12. sect. 2. [Page 83.] ‡ Leviathan, cap. 38. p. 238.

[9] This monstrous conclusion is correctly deduced from Hobbes' doctrines. But that author himself draws a widely different consequence, which I will express in his own words: "It is therefore worthy the utmost attention of those who desire by civil obedience to avoid confusion and the calamities of civil war, to investigate what is meant in the scriptures by eternal life and eternal torments, and also to inquire into the crimes on account of which, and the persons on account of injuries to whom, eternal torments are denounced, as well as into the deeds which ensure everlasting life."

§ Leviathan, page 8.

[10] The word "spirits" does not occur in the Latin edition of Hobbes; but instead of it the word "spectres;" which gives a much less objectionable turn to the whole sentence.

‖ Page 373.

over all the children of pride) is the highest Deity, next to senseless omnipotent matter; the one of these being the Atheists' natural, the other their artificial god. Nevertheless we shall here observe by the way, that whilst these atheistic politicians thus endeavour to swell up the civil sovereign, and to bestow upon him an infinite right, by removing to that end out of his way natural justice, conscience, religion, and God himself, they do indeed thereby absolutely divest him of all right and authority, since the subject is now no longer obliged in conscience to obey him; and so instead of true right and authority, they leave him nothing but mere brutish force. Wherefore, since theism and true religion are thus plainly disowned and disclaimed by these politicians, as altogether inconsistent with their designs, they cannot be supposed to have been the figments of civil sovereigns, or the mere creatures of political art. And thus have we abundantly confuted those three atheistic pretences to solve the phenomenon of religion; from fear, and the ignorance of causes, and the fiction of politicians.

But since, besides those ordinary phenomena before mentioned, which are no way solvable by Atheists, there are certain other phenomena extraordinary, that either immediately prove a God and Providence, or else that there is a rank of understanding beings, invisible, superior to men, from whence a Deity may be afterwards inferred; namely, these three especially, apparitions, miracles, and prophecies (where the Atheists obstinately denying matter of fact and history, will needs impute these things, either to juggling fraud and knavery, or else to men's own fear and fancy, and their ignorance how to distinguish dreams, and other strong imaginations, from vision and sense; or lastly, to certain religious tales or legends, allowed by the public authority of civil sovereigns, for political ends): we shall here suggest something briefly, to vindicate the historic truth of those phenomena against Atheists.

First, therefore, as for apparitions, though there be much of fabulosity in these relations, yet can it not reasonably be concluded, that there is nothing at all of truth in them; since something of this kind hath been averred in all ages, and many times attested by persons of unquestionable prudence, and unsuspected veracity. And whereas the Atheists impute the original of these things to men's mistaking both their dreams, and their waking fancies, for real visions and sensations; they do hereby plainly contradict one main fundamental principle of their own philosophy, that sense is the only ground of certainty, and the criterion of all truth:[1] for if prudent and intelligent

[1] These remarks are principally levelled at Hobbes, who, in his Leviathan, cap. 2. p. 6. 7. after affirming that it is very difficult to distinguish dreams and other phantasms from real appearances, plainly says, p. 8. "From this ignorance of the distinction

persons may be so frequently mistaken, in confounding their own dreams and fancies with sensations, how can there be any certainty of knowledge at all from sense? However, they here derogate so much both from sense, and from human testimonies, as that if the like were done in other cases, it would plainly overthrow all human life.

Wherefore other Atheists, being apprehensive of this inconvenience, of denying so many sensible appearances, and testimonies, or relations of fact, have chose rather to acknowledge the reality of apparitions; nevertheless concluding them to be things caused and created by the power of imagination only: as if the strength of imagination were such, that it could not only create fancies, but also real sensible objects, and that at a distance too from the imaginers, such as whereby the sense of others shall be for the time affected, though they quickly vanish away again.[2] From which prodigious paradox, we may take

of dreams and other vivid hallucinations from actual sense and vision, principally originated the religion of the ancient Pagans, satyrs, fauns, nymphs, and other imaginary beings, and the modern opinion entertained by ignorant people of ghosts and spectres." But a little afterwards he seems not absolutely to deny all such appearances whatever. "There is however no doubt," says he, "but that supernatural appearances can be produced by the Deity; but that he has done this so often is not an article of Christian faith."

[2] Henry More, a friend of Dr. Cudworth, quotes this same opinion with just severity in his "Antidote against Atheism," lib. 3. cap. 16. p. 137; but no one has, like Dr. Cudworth, mentioned the author of so marvellous, portentous, and unheard of a sentiment. Thomas Wise, who has made an abridgment of Dr. Cudworth's work, in cap. 6. p. 460. confounds this opinion with that of Democritus explained by our author a little further on. Le Clerc, who is well known to have made pretty copious extracts from this book, has entirely omitted it, Bibliothèque Choisie, vol. 5. p. 107. as if it were incredible that any one should have entertained so absurd an opinion. It is indeed difficult to believe that any one possessing the least spark of reason should have been so mad as to dream that real and sensible existences could be produced by our own cogitations. I could therefore wish that the writers had been named who have chosen to philosophize in so absurd and silly a manner. I wonder, however, that Atheists have taken so much pains to explain the origin of visions and spectres, that in order to defend themselves they have not feared to descend to the lowest depths of folly. For if they be willing to tread in the steps of their chosen masters, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Democritus, they may easily by a much shorter way and method free themselves from these embarrassments. For these, as is related by Lucian in his Pseudomantis, p. 758 of the 1st vol. of his works, had an "adamantine" mind against things of this description, which they felt themselves unable to explain; and when they could no longer find an answer they nevertheless boldly averred that every thing alleged by their opponents was false: Τὸ δὲ οὖν πᾶν ψεῦδός ἐστι καὶ γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον, "Whatever it might be it was false and impossible." An audacity certainly worthy of this set of persons, who care neither for God nor man, and which, if it had been imitated by those who in modern times represent their philosophy or rather their impiety, would free them from many troubles, and from the necessity of refuting the arguments of Theists. In reference to the general question, I think the argument against atheism drawn from visions and spectres cannot be made use of by any wise man without great caution and circumspection. For, not to mention the great difficulty there is in freeing narrations of this description from all controversy, and that those who are obstinately incredulous will never want exceptions against the authority and veracity of witnesses, some of the doctrines of atheism are of that description that from them some kind of explanation can be given of visions and spectres. The Epicureans, for instance, who maintain that the human race is made up of chance atoms,

notice of the fanaticism of some Atheists, and that there is nothing so monstrously absurd, which men infected with atheistic incredulity will not rather entertain into their belief, than admit of any thing that shall the least hazard or endanger the existence of a God. For, if there be once any invisible ghosts or spirits acknowledged as things permanent, it will not be easy for any to give a reason why there might not be one supreme ghost also, presiding over them all and the whole world.

In the last place therefore we shall observe, that Democritus was yet further convinced by these relations of apparitions, so as to grant that there was a certain kind of permanent beings, and independent upon imagination, superior to men, which could appear in different forms, and again disappear at pleasure, called by him idols or images; he supposing them to be of the same nature with those exuvious effluxes that stream continually from the surface of bodies; only he would not allow them to have any thing immortal at all in them, but their concretions to be at length all dissolvable, and their personalities then to vanish into nothing. Thus Sextus the philosopher:* *Δημόκριτος εἴδωλά τινα φησὶν ἐκπελάζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν εἶναι ἀγαθοποιὰ, τὰ δὲ κακοποιά· ἔνθεν καὶ εὔχεται εὐλόγων τυχεῖν εἰδώλων· εἶναι δὲ ταῦτα μεγάλα τε καὶ ὑπερμεγέθη, καὶ δύσφθαρτα μὲν, οὐκ ἄφθαρτα δὲ: προσημαίνειν τε τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, θεωρούμενα καὶ φωνὰς ἀφιέντα,* "Democritus affirmeth, that there are certain idols or spectres, that do often approach to men, some of which are beneficent, and some maleficent. Upon which account he wisheth, that it might be his good hap to meet with fortunate idols. And he addeth, that these are a vast bigness, and very longeve, but not incorruptible; and that they sometimes do foresignify unto men future events, both visibly appearing to them, and sending forth audible voices." Now, though Democritus were much blamed for this concession of his by his fellow Atheists, as giving thereby too great an advantage to

might safely allow that the lighter and subtler atoms sometimes so cohere as to present before the human eye a form such as of men, animals, and other things, and again suddenly vanish and disappear. If, from the fortuitous concourse of atoms in past times bodies were produced such as those of men and animals, why should not bodies of the same shape, but of greater tenuity, and less stable and lasting, be produced at the present time from the same blind coalition? See the observations of Bayle on this subject, in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 2. art. Lucretius, note F. p. 1804. 1805. some of whose remarks, however, have less real solidity than at first view they seem to possess. He has also endeavoured to prove that neither Hobbes nor Spinoza could give any probable reason for denying the existence of visions, ghosts, and spectres. See vol. 2. art. Hobbes, note N. p. 1481. and vol. 3. art. Spinoza, note Q, p. 2642. I do not make these remarks in order to concede anything to those who entirely ridicule and reject all visions and spectres. They appear to me like children, who cannot understand that air is a substance, because they cannot see it. My design is merely to recommend prudence to those who take upon themselves to dispute against atheism.

* Adv. Math. p. 311. [Lib. 8. adv. Physic. sect. 19. p. 552.]

Theists; yet, in his own opinion, did he sufficiently secure himself against the danger of a God from hence, by supposing all these idols of his to be corruptible, they being indeed nothing but certain finer concretions of atoms, a kind of aërial and ethereal animals, that were all body, and without any immortal soul, as he supposed men also to be: so that a God could be no more proved from them, than from the existence of men. For thus he adds in Sextus: Ὅθεν τούτων αὐτῶν φαντασίαν λαβόντες οἱ παλαιοὶ ὑπενόησαν εἶναι Θεὸν, μηδενὸς ἄλλου παρὰ ταῦτα ὄντος Θεοῦ, τοῦ ἄφθαρτον φύσιν ἔχοντος, "Men, in ancient times, having a sense of these apparitions or idols fell from thence into the opinion of a God, although there be, besides these idols, no other God that hath an incorruptible nature. However, though Democritus continued thus grossly atheistical, yet was he further convinced than our modern Atheists will be, that the stories of apparitions were not all fabulous, and that there are not only terrestrial, but also aërial and ethereal animals; nor this earth of ours alone peopled and inhabited, whilst all those other vast regions above lie desert, solitary and waste.[3] Where it may be

[3] I think it worth while to make a few remarks on this opinion of Democritus, especially since I perceive that some worthy and eminent writers, both ancient and modern, have fallen into a mistake respecting it. If no other result should follow from what I am about to say, it will at least prove that the doctrines of the ancient philosophers, and especially of Democritus, are not so well understood by us at the present time that we can dispute about them without fear of mistake; and perhaps it may also be hence apparent, that verbal ambiguities have prevented many from correctly explaining the doctrines of the ancients.

I. Our first object will be to give the whole opinion of Democritus, which is not recorded by Sextus with entire perspicuity. From the passage of Sextus, as given by Dr. Cudworth, it appears that Democritus thought, 1. That there were certain beings composed of very thin and subtle atoms, who appeared to mankind only at certain times, and principally in the dark. There can be no doubt that he supposed that the very nature of these beings prevented their being seen at all times by mankind, but that a certain condition of their bodies and certain affections of our eyes were required in order to their being perceived by us. No doubt much was taught by Democritus concerning these things, of which, since his writings are lost, we are at present ignorant. 2. He supposed that these beings were of large size, greatly exceeding the human stature. 3. That it was much more difficult to dissipate and destroy them than it was the bodies of men; but that after a long time they perished and were dissolved. 4. That they uttered certain sounds and voices, doubtless resembling the human voice and language. For Democritus adds that these spectres informed men of future events; but this they could do in no other way than by a faculty of expressing their thoughts in the words used by those among whom they dwell or to whom they appear. Whence it would seem that Democritus allowed to them a knowledge of human languages, and the use of speech as ordinarily current in the world. 5. He takes for granted that they foresee future events, and sometimes predict and prognosticate them to mankind before they happen. 6. That they were of two kinds, some beneficent and others malevolent, and that the latter possessed the power of injuring mankind. On this account the philosopher wished that benign apparitions might appear to him. To these particulars may here be added what is specified in other places respecting these spectral beings of Democritus. Sextus himself, lib. 8. Adv. Mathemat. sect. 42. p. 559. gives two other characteristics of these beings, viz. 7. That Democritus imagined them to exist and dwell in the circumambient air; and, 8. That they possessed the figure and form of human beings. Τὰ δ' εἴδωλα εἶναι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι ὑπερφυῆ καὶ ἀνθρωποειδεῖς ἔχοντα μορφὰς, καὶ καθόλου τοιαῦτα, ὁποῖα βούλεται αὐτῷ ἀναπλάττειν Δημόκριτος,

observed again, that divers of the ancient fathers, though they agreed not so far with Democritus, as to make the angelical beings to be altogether corporeal, yet did they likewise suppose

πανταλῶς ἐστι δυσπαράδεκτον, "That there are in the surrounding air huge apparitions possessing the human form, in short such as Democritus chose to imagine to himself, is very difficult to believe." Most of these particulars are confirmed by Cicero, although, as will be presently apparent, he is not entirely to be trusted when speaking of Democritus' opinion. He adds, however, 9. that "Democritus thought that some of these beings were of such a size that they could externally comprehend the whole world." How this is to be understood I confess I do not know. Perhaps Cicero, as often happens, did not understand the opinion of Democritus. However this may be, it appears to me obviously ridiculous, and quite inconsistent with the character of so acute a man as Democritus is represented to be, to suppose that there are beings larger and taller than the whole world. Compare St. Augustine's observations against this opinion, Epist. 118. ad. Dioscor. sect. 29. p. 258. vol. 2. of his works. In the mean time I will transcribe the whole passage of Cicero, De Naturâ Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 43. p. 2948. vol. 9. of his works: "Democritus supposes that there are in the universe forms endowed with divinity; he both calls the principles and minds which are in the universe gods, and also animated forms, which are either beneficial or injurious to us, as well as certain shapes so large as externally to comprehend the whole world." To which he adds, in my opinion very justly: "All which things are more worthy of Democritus' country than of himself." I am aware that Bayle, in his Dictionary, vol. 2. art. Democritus, note P. p. 984. has objected to this censure of Cicero's, and has contended, on the other hand, that these opinions are rather the marks and proofs of a great and excellent genius. But at the same time I am not ignorant that this author, out of a love for disputation, often calls things great and excellent which wiser men rightly reckon among the refuse of genius. Yet Democritus would still more justly have deserved the censure if he had indulged as many opinions respecting the nature of God as Cicero here recounts, and had been as slippery and inconstant, as he is by him reported to have been in explaining the natures of the gods. But it will be obvious on a comparison of the passages here quoted from Sextus Empiricus with the remarks of Cicero (to say nothing of other ancient authorities), that one and the same opinion of Democritus is by him divided and torn into several tenets. For these "forms endowed with divinity," "principles and minds," "animated" and "huge forms" of which Cicero speaks as if they were different kinds of beings, are only one description of beings after all, namely what are called by Democritus εἴδωλα, or "apparitions." Perhaps here as in other cases, Cicero has designedly perverted the opinion of this philosopher, in order the more eloquently and with better effect to confute and ridicule him; or perhaps he fell into this error through negligence, or trusted more than was proper to his memory. Another passage of his is extant, De Naturâ Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2896. in which he speaks with no greater accuracy respecting this tenet of Democritus, and moreover falls into another error, which we shall presently point out. This is well worthy of being observed by those who receive as oracular the account given by Cicero of the doctrines of the ancient philosophers. Leibnitz gives an example in the case of Aristotle, Epistles, vol. 11. p. 116.

II. The steps by which Democritus was brought to this opinion are not difficult to discover. It appeared to him bold and rash to repudiate and reject all the relations which have been given with so universal a consent of all nations respecting visions and spectres; nor could he easily persuade himself that the opinion he perceived existing among all mankind originated out of nothing. He therefore thought it devolved upon him to find out a tenet that might so explain both these facts as at the same time to afford no support or confirmation to religion, and to do no injury to the fundamental principles of his own philosophy. But how this opinion agreed with the fundamental principles of his doctrine is not easy to understand, since only a few fragments of his works remain to us. The ancients all agree that the primary principles of his physical philosophy consisted of a vacuum and atoms destitute of all qualities; and that the doctrine of Epicurus subsequently was almost exactly the same. I am not unaware that Augustine and some others suppose that he allowed his atoms to possess some qualities. But I can hardly persuade myself that this is correct, and I prefer to trust to so many ancient authorities who had read the volumes of Democritus, rather than to

them to have their certain subtle ethereal or aërial bodies. In which respect St. Austin in his 115th epistle,[4] calleth angels, æthereos, and devils, aëreos animantes. Thus Psellus, in his

Augustine, whom I shall presently have occasion to show was not over accurate in the explanation of Democritus' philosophy, and blindly followed Cicero. The question therefore is, how the reception of the abovementioned tenets and opinions can be rendered consistent with a fundamental belief of the origination of all things from the fortuitous concourse of atoms. I will therefore try whether in any way it can be shown that, without injury to his atomic theory, Democritus might defend this tenet. And if in this I should err, it will not be easy to convict me of the error, since the numerous monuments of Democritus' genius which once existed have perished by the lapse of time.

In the first place, then, it is nothing extraordinary or incredible that any who circumscribes all nature within the empire of atoms should at the same time maintain that there are certain atomic concretions more subtle than those which are called men and animals, and that these aggregations might bear the human form and figure. For what reason is there to deny that there are atoms much lighter and subtler than those of which we ourselves are composed? And if the heavier and grosser have so coalesced as to form men and animals, why should not the more ethereal have had the same good fortune? Nor is it inconsistent with the atomic hypothesis to endow these more subtle and ethereal concretions with life, reason, and language. For if the heavier and grosser atoms chanced to fall together so fortunately as to produce reason, mind, will, sense, and speech in men and in animals, I see no reason why the same may not be supposed true of the lighter and subtler ones. I will go further, and assert that it is not inconsistent with the philosophy of Democritus to attribute divination and a foreknowledge of future events to his ghosts and apparitions. For without doubt the lighter and subtler atoms might generate senses much more accurate and acute than our own; and if this be the case, these beings might of course see much that was hidden from every human eye, nor is there any reason why they should not inspect the very vessels of our bodies, and perceive the interior motions of the blood and animal fluids. It would not therefore be wonderful if these beings could predict events that were to take place long after. Suppose that any being had so acute a vision as to be able to perceive the interior state of the body of Alexander the Great, and the internal motions of his blood, then certainly, according to the philosophy of Democritus, it could understand his thoughts respecting the Persian war from the motions of the atoms. It might therefore prophetically predict, if it chose, that Alexander would attack Darius; and in the same way it could at its pleasure signify an impending doom to culprits and malefactors, loss of royal favour to courtiers, disease and death to individuals. For the internal motions

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[4] Epist. 9. ad Nebridium, p. 9. tom. 2. opp. edit. Benedict. Augustine's words are to the following effect: "Whence it may be conjectured that our thoughts, though not apparent to ourselves on our own bodies, may yet be visible to *aerial* or *ethereal beings*, whose senses are more acute, and in comparison with which our own are scarcely to be esteemed senses." In these words Dr. Cudworth supposes the "aerial beings" to mean good angels, but the "ethereal," demons or bad angels; and that these names were thus assigned to each by Augustine because they had bodies composed of air and of ether. But I think this interpretation seems more ingenious than correct, and should rather suppose (1) that the "aerial and ethereal beings" signify only one kind of creatures, namely malignant genii or demons; and (2) that these were so called by Augustine not from the material of their bodies, but from their habitation and dwelling-place. For almost all the ancient fathers, on the authority of St. Paul, held that demons lived in the air. This interpretation of the passage is corroborated by another of the same author, analogous in every respect to this, adv. Academicos, cap. 7. sect. 20. p. 194 of the first vol. of his works: "And therefore, since such things occur to our memories, it is no wonder that they can be perceived by certain abominable *creatures of the air*, who are called demons, by whom I grant we may be surpassed in acuteness and subtlety, but not in reason." I shall perhaps have occasion presently to make some remarks respecting the bodies which were supposed by the ancients to be possessed by spirits, both good and bad.

Dialogue:* Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων· Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀσώματον, ὦ γενναῖε, τὸ δαιμόνιόν ἐστι φῦλον, μετὰ σώματος δέ γε καὶ ἀμφὶ σώματος διατέτρυφε· Καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι μὲν καὶ παρ' αὐτῶν μαθεῖν

of bodies being known, it could easily know and foresee the effects of those motions. In like manner such beings as these, on perceiving the agitations of the air and the various concursions of atoms in it, could easily, if they so pleased, foretell tempests, lightning, thunder, and storms, to sailors or to husbandmen. To this it may be added that the other senses of these genii, hearing, touch, smell, and taste, must necessarily be more perfect and excellent than our own, and it will therefore be less a matter of astonishment if we find Democritus attributing to them a power of divination. Nor will it be more difficult to explain, upon the atomic hypothesis, how it is that these beings should be more longæval than others, though they could not pretend to immortality. For the more ethereal and subtle atoms are, the more closely do they cohere, so that a long time is requisite before such beings as these can be dissolved and dissipated. Perhaps Democritus also gave some reasons, drawn from the shape of the atoms, and of which we are at present ignorant, why his apparitions lived much longer than men or animals. Nor is it again difficult to reconcile the different beneficent and malevolent dispositions assigned to these apparitions and spectres with the philosophy of Democritus. For if individual atoms, of which, according to the theory of this philosopher, all mankind are exclusively composed, could go so far as to form men of wonderful diversities of genius, manners, nature, and propensities, some good and others bad, why should not the lighter and more subtle atoms be supposed to follow a similar course? It will not, I presume, be inquired why Democritus assigned the air to these beings for a habitation. The very necessity of the case required it. It only remains therefore to speak of the lofty stature and gigantic size of the apparitions; and in this there is nothing repugnant to the doctrine of Democritus. For there is no reason why atoms that can produce a pygmy should not also generate a giant if accident and fortune should so order it. But it would be difficult to prove out of his philosophy that he supposed all these spectres to be large and gigantic, and not some to be of a taller and some of a more diminutive stature. I therefore suspect that Democritus, who does not appear to have entirely rejected the popular opinions, here followed the ordinary belief; for it was an ancient opinion, both among the Greeks and Romans, that gods, genii, and heroes usually appeared of a much taller and larger stature than mankind.

III. But until lately this tenet of Democritus has neither been correctly understood nor accurately distinguished from his other doctrines. Before I explain this, I will in the first instance point out the first cause and origin of the error. In the philosophy of Democritus there are two kinds of apparitions, or more properly speaking he called two very different things by the common name of εἴδωλα. In the first place, he called by this term those beings or spectres of which we have already treated; and secondly, he used the same designation for the spectra which he supposed to be given off from all things and to reach our eyes. Diogenes Laërtius, lib. 9. segm. 44. p. 573. says: Ὁρᾶν δ' ἡμᾶς κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις, "That Democritus taught that we see by means of spectra falling upon us." Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, lib. 2. ep. 4. p. 1012. vol. 7. of his works, observes: "For if we see κατ' εἰδώλων ἐμπτώσεις, the εἴδωλα will be in great straits." In which passage he evidently alludes to this tenet of Democritus. Another passage of his is still more to the purpose. Epist. ad. Familiar. lib. 15. ep. 16. p. 864. vol. 6. of his works, he says that the opinion of Epicurus was the same as that of Democritus, and observes that these εἴδωλα were in Latin called *spectra*. "For let it not escape you that Catius Insuber, the Epicurean, who died lately, calls by the name of *spectra* what Gargettius, even before Democritus, had called εἴδωλα." For Democritus, in explaining the nature of vision, affirmed that from the surface of bodies were always flowing off images of the bodies themselves, and that these reached our eyes, and produced the sense of vision. See Cicero, De Nat. Deor. lib. 1. cap. 38. p. 2940. The same opinion was afterwards entertained by Epicurus, whose meaning has been explained, among others, by Lucretius, De Naturâ Rerum, lib. 4. line 238. &c. p. 40. &c. These images or representations, called *exuviæ* by others, continually flowing off from the

* Page 29. [Vet. p. 44. 45. edit. Gaulmini.]

τῶν σεμνῶν πατέρων· καὶ Βασίλειος δὲ ὁ θεῖος, οὐ δαίμοσι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀχράντοις ἀγγέλοις ἐνεῖναι σώματα διατείνεται, οἷά τινα πνεύματα λεπτὰ καὶ ἀερώδη καὶ ἄχραντα, καὶ ἑξῆς, "But you

surfaces of bodies to our eyes, he also called εἴδωλα. There are therefore these two kind of *spectra*, which will be seen at once to be entirely distinct, and to have nothing in common. But unless I am much mistaken, both ancients and moderns who have expounded Democritus' doctrines, misled by the identity of the name, have confounded these two different sorts together, and what Democritus said of one they have inadvertently understood of the other. This error was committed in particular by Cicero himself, who, as I have already observed, did not explain with sufficient accuracy the tenets of Democritus respecting the gods. "What of Democritus," says he, "who reckons both images and their circuits, and also the being that gives off these images, among the number of the gods?" De Naturâ Deorum, lib. 1. cap. 12. p. 2896. The "images" spoken of in this passage by Cicero are the εἴδωλα, which were called by the Roman Epicureans *exuviæ* and *simulacra*. This is evident not only from the circumstance that he speaks of a certain being or body which gives off these images, which will not at all agree with the other kind of Democritus' εἴδωλα, but also because he attributes "circuits" to them. For these "circuits" are no doubt the very same as Democritus in Greek called ἐμπτώσεις. But it is altogether incorrect to say that Democritus reckoned those *exuviæ* of bodies which he supposed to meet our eyes, among the number of the gods; which if he had done, not even among his own stupid citizens of Abdera could he have retained the least standing. For what could be more egregiously foolish than to say that the spectra given off from the body of a horse or an ass were gods? But the first kind of εἴδωλα, of which we have more copiously treated above, were considered by Democritus to be the same as what men called "gods." Whence it is evident that Cicero incautiously and irrationally transferred what had been said by this philosopher of one sort of spectra to the other. Augustine has fallen into this mistake even more grossly than Cicero; and (as his words here quoted will show) followed Cicero as his chief guide in explaining the philosophy of Democritus. For, in his 118th Epistle to Dioscorus, sect. 27. p. 257. vol. 2 of his works, he says: "For how much better would it have been that I should not have even heard the name of Democritus, than that I should reflect with sorrow on one who was strangely esteemed a great man in his own day, who thought that the images given off from solid bodies were gods, but that the solids themselves were not so; and that the former by circulating to and fro with their own peculiar motion, and gliding into the minds of men, cause the belief of there being a divine power; while at the same time the body from which the image proceeds, as it is more solid, so it is more worthy of being esteemed excellent." Augustine's method of exposing the madness and folly of Democritus would have been weighty and important, if indeed he had been correct in his ideas of the philosopher's opinions. For even schoolboys can understand that a man must be crazy to deny that an ass is a god, and then to allow that the shadow of an ass is worthy the title of a deity. For why should not the ass itself with much greater propriety be held a god, if the image or spectrum flowing from its body, and striking on our eyes, ought to be considered divine? But I am certain that nothing of this kind ever entered the imagination of Democritus. He did not suppose the images flowing from solid bodies to be gods, but spectra, or beings of quite a different kind, more dignified and excellent, longer-lived, and endowed, among other properties, with the faculty of divination. Previously to Augustine Irenæus seems to confound together these two different kinds of the spectra of Democritus; at least he very confusedly explains this tenet of the philosopher, Adv. Hæreses, cap. 14. p. 133. ed. Masset. "Democritus," says he, "first says that many and various figures, expressed from the universe, have descended into this world." Irenæus is here controverting the Valentinians, who drivelled about some undefined resemblances of celestial things, and maintains that they derived this opinion from Democritus and Plato. Which kind of Democritus' spectra he had in mind when he wrote this passage is not immediately apparent from his words; but whichever way we take it, there will still be a difficulty in accommodating the expressions to either, which is a proof that the good father was not sufficiently acquainted with Democritus' philosophy, and confounded together in his thoughts things entirely distinct. If it be supposed that the "figures" here spoken of are the εἴδωλα which Democritus supposed to inhabit the air, and sometimes to

are to know, that demons or devils are not altogether incorporeal, but that they are joined to bodies, and so converse with bodies; which may be learned also from the fathers, the divine Basil contending that there are bodies, not only in devils, but also in the pure angels themselves, as certain subtle, airy, defecate spirits." Where afterwards he shows how the σύμφυες ἀγγέλοις σῶμα, that "body which is connate with angels," differs from that which devils are united to, in respect of the radiant splendour of the one, and the dark fuliginous obscurity of the other. Moreover, that devils are not without bodies, he endeavours further to confirm from the words of our Saviour, that

predict future events to mankind, it is certainly a mistake to associate these with the "*species*," or "*ideas*" of Plato; since there is a wide difference between these εἴδωλα and Plato's "ideas." But if the *exuviæ* flowing from corporeal surfaces to our eyes be intended, I know not how it can be said that these "figures, expressed from the universe, have descended into the world;" an expression which can in no sense be understood of those representations by whose ἐμπτώσεις, or "circuits," Democritus supposed the sense of vision was occasioned. If such errors as these were made by the ancients, who lived nearer to the philosopher's own times, and while his works were still extant, it is no wonder that the moderns have erred in the same way. The learned Fabricius, in p. 553 of his notes on the passage of Sextus Empiricus quoted by Dr. Cudworth, influenced, as would appear, by the authority of Cicero, compares the εἴδωλα of Democritus with the forms supposed by Epicurus to flow to us from the gods. With all deference to this great man, who I am well aware was thoroughly versed in ancient philosophy, I think this is hardly correct. There are, I admit, in the philosophy of Epicurus such forms as are found in the doctrine of Democritus; and this I have already observed: but those εἴδωλα of Democritus mentioned by Sextus are widely different from the forms supposed by Epicurus to reach us from the gods and other objects. A still greater error has been committed by Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, vol. 2. art. Democritus, note P. p. 984; where he explains the opinion of Democritus respecting the gods as if he not only supposed the representations, but even the notions of things, which we have in our minds, to be gods. "He allowed," he there says, "the name of god to the images and ideas of objects, and to the act of understanding by which we become acquainted with them." In which there are two errors: first that Democritus supposed the images of things to be gods, and, secondly, that he thought the same honour due to the notions of our minds. Both these suppositions are evidently wide of the philosopher's meaning. But Bayle goes still further than this, and proceeds to observe that the opinion of Malebranche, who taught that all things were seen *in* the Deity, was identical with the doctrine of Democritus, and only a further development of it. "I know not," says he, "whether any one has observed, that the opinion of one of the subtlest geniuses of the age, viz. that we see all things in the Infinite Being, in God, is only a development and revival of Democritus' doctrine." But this is mere dreaming. For, as will be evident from what has already been observed, there is greater affinity between the wolf and the lamb than between Democritus and Malebranche. But, not content with this, Bayle pertinaciously contends that the opinion which he supposed Democritus entertained could not have proceeded but from a most perspicacious and finished genius. "I venture to say," he writes, "that this error will never be the product of a small mind, and only great geniuses are capable of producing it." And the comparison he makes is thought a good one by D'Argens, Nouvelle Bibliothèque, vol. 7. p. 191. Yet though I bow to the superior sagacity and acuteness of Bayle, I will freely confess that if any one should bid me believe that the shadows and forms of a horse, a cock, or an ass, and even the notions of my own mind, were gods, I should imitate the example of the Abderites, who sent their citizen Democritus to be cured and purged of his madness by Hippocrates. The greatest blunder of all has been made by Feuardentius, who in his notes on Irenæus, p. 141. ed. Grab. confounds the images of Democritus mentioned by Irenæus, with his indivisible corpuscules or atoms. But it would be tedious any longer to battle with the spectra of Democritus.

they shall be punished with fire; which (saith he) were a thing impossible, were they all of them incorporeal. And some perhaps will attempt to prove the same concerning angels too, from those other words of our Saviour, where, speaking of the resurrection state, he affirmeth that they who shall be accounted worthy thereof, shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, but be ἰσάγγελοι,[5] "equal to the angels:" which comparative expression of men, as to their bodies with angels, would be thought not so proper were the angels absolutely devoid of all body.[6] But of this we determine not.

To this phenomena of apparitions might be added those two others of magicians or wizards, demoniacs or Energumeni; both of these proving also the real existence of spirits, and that they are not mere fancies, and imaginary inhabitants of men's brains only, but real inhabitants of the world. As also, that among those spirits there are some foul, unclean, and wicked ones (though not made such by God, but by their own apostacy), which is some confirmation of the truth of Christianity, the scriptures insisting so much upon these evil demons or devils, and declaring it to be one design of our Saviour Christ's coming into the world, to oppose these confederate powers of the kingdom of darkness, and to rescue mankind from the thraldom and bondage therefore. As for wizards and magicians, persons who associate and confederate themselves in a peculiar manner with

[5] Luke xx. 34. 36.

[6] Dr. Cudworth here did not hazard a mere conjecture. For since his day John Christian Loerse, a learned divine of Duisburg, who thought fit lately to revive the ancient opinion respecting the bodies of genii, and defended it with a great deal of ability, placed one chief foundation of his argument on this comparison instituted by our Saviour between spiritual beings and mankind after the resurrection. See his "Dissertation on the Bodies of Angels," Duisburg, 1719. 4to. sect. 16. p. 33. &c. But I do not think this comparison of sufficient weight to prove all that some authors think it capable of proving. The laws of sound intrepretation forbid that any comparison should be pushed beyond the limits which the author intended to assign to it, or beyond its "common third," as it is often termed. Before we attempt therefore to prove any thing from this expression of our Saviour's, we ought to endeavour to find out the precise point he had chiefly in view when he compared celestial intelligences with risen men. But this he has plainly expressed in Luke xx. 36, while in the other passages, Matt. xxii. 23, and Mark xii. 18, in which the same comparison is found, his language is concise, and therefore not so plain and perspicuous. In the gospel of Luke, after Jesus Christ has said that there would be no marriages among the inhabitants of heaven, he adds the reason why such unions would not be necessary: Οὔτε γὰρ ἀποθανεῖν ἔτι δύνανται, "Neither can they die any more." For where death reigns, there marriages are requisite to prevent the entire extinction and extirpation of the human race. But from heaven, the habitation of the blessed, death will be for ever excluded, and therefore that holy community will require no marriages for its preservation. He then proceeds to assign a fresh reason why they should not die: Ἰσάγγελοι γάρ εἰσι, "For they are equal to the angels," equally immortal and perpetual with the angels. From this it is plain that the immortality of the angels was their only attribute that the Saviour had in view in making this comparison. We ought not therefore to overstep these limits, and to compare angels and saved men together in other respects, about which Christ himself has maintained silence.

these evil spirits, for the gratification of their own revenge, lust, ambition, and other passions, besides the scriptures, there hath been so full an attestation given to them by persons unconcerned in all ages, that those our so confident exploders of them, in this present age, can hardly escape the suspicion of having some hankering towards atheism. But as for the demoniacs and Energumeni, it hath been wondered, that there should be so many of them in our Saviour's time, and hardly any, or none, in this present age of ours. Certain it is, from the writings of Josephus, in sundry places, that the Pharisaic Jews were then generally possessed with an opinion of these δαιμονιζόμενοι, demoniacs, men possessed with devils, or infested by them. And that this was not a mere phrase or form of speech only amongst them for persons very ill affected in their bodies, may appear from hence, that Josephus[7] declares it as his opinion

[7] De Bello Judaico, lib. 7. cap. 6. sect. 3. p. 417. tom. 2. edit. Havercampii. Josephus there treats copiously of the virtues of the root Baaras, betraying no small degree of superstition, and among other things says it was good for driving away demons: Τὰ γὰρ καλούμενα δαιμόνια, ταῦτα δὲ πονηρῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα, ταῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδυόμενα καὶ κτείνοντα τοὺς βοηθείας μὴ τυγχάνοντας, αὕτη ταχέως ἐξελαύνει, κἂν προσενέχθῃ μόνον τοῖς νοσοῦσι, "For what are called demons are the spirits of wicked men, and enter into living persons, and kill those who do not obtain help; these it quickly drives away if it only be brought near to those thus afflicted." I think it worth while to make a few observations in illustration of these words.

I. I know not how it can be proved that the opinion contained in these words was that of all the Pharisaical Jews. Josephus held many peculiar sentiments, which were approved of perhaps by none of his nation. Besides it is very evident the Pharisees held a variety of tenets among themselves.

II. But neither does it appear to me probable that we have here the opinion of Josephus himself. And indeed I almost think that the words ταῦτα δὲ πονηρῶν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα are not Josephus's own, but were at first written by some one in the margin, and afterwards interpolated by some unskilful copyist into the text. The sentence will certainly read quite as well without them. Josephus, as is well known, was of the sect of the Pharisees; and in other places he gives an account of the state of the soul after death, according to the Pharisaical doctrine, quite inconsistent with what he here says about demons. In this passage he says that demons are the souls of wicked men, transferred into other bodies, but elsewhere he writes that, according to the Pharisees, transmigration was a privilege granted only to the souls of the good. As in his Antiquities of the Jews, lib. 18. cap. 1. sect. 3. p. 871: Ἀθάνατόν τε ἰσχὺν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πίστις Φαρισαίοις εἶναι καὶ ὑπὸ χθονὸς δικαιώσεις τε καὶ τιμάς, οἷς ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας ἐπιτήδευσις ἐν τῷ βίῳ γέγονε· καὶ τῶν μὲν εἱργμὸν ἀΐδιον προστίθεσθαι, τῶν δὲ ῥᾳστώνην τοῦ ἀναβιοῦν, "The Pharisees also believe in the immortality of souls, and that they are rewarded or punished under the earth, according as they have addicted themselves to virtue or vice in the present life; and that some are shut up in an eternal prison, while others have an opportunity of living again;" that is, as appears from another passage, of transmigration into other bodies; for in his Wars of the Jews, lib. 2. cap. 8. sect. 14. p. 166, he says: Ψυχὴν δὲ πᾶσαν μὲν ἄφθαρτον, μεταβαίνειν δὲ εἰς ἕτερον σῶμα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν μόνην, τὴν δὲ τῶν φαύλων ἀΐδιῳ τιμωρίᾳ κολάζεσθαι, that the Pharisees believed "that all souls are immortal, but that only the souls of the good pass into other bodies, while those of the wicked are afflicted with everlasting punishment." If then the souls of the wicked had no opportunity of returning to the present state of existence, how could the demons who possessed the bodies of mankind possibly be the souls of wicked men? If therefore Josephus entertained such an opinion as is expressed in the words in question, that demons were the souls of wicked men, he differed widely from the Pharisees and other Jews of his own day.

concerning the demons or devils, that they were πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων πνεύματα τοῖς ζῶσιν εἰσδυόμενα, "the spirits or souls of wicked men deceased getting into the bodies of the living." From hence it was that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, were not at all surprised with his casting out devils, it being usual for them also to exorcise the same; an art which they pretended to have learned from Solomon. Of whom thus Josephus:* Παρέσχε δ' αὐτῷ μαθεῖν ὁ Θεὸς, καὶ τὴν κατὰ τῶν δαιμόνων τέχνην εἰς ὠφέλειαν καὶ θεραπείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἐπῳδάς τε συντάξαμενος, αἷς παρηγορεῖται τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ τρόπους ἐξορκώσεων κατέλειπεν, οἷς ἐνδούμενα τὰ δαιμόνια ὡς μηκέτ' ἐπανελθεῖν, ἐκδιώκουσι. Καὶ αὕτη μέχρι νῦν ἡ θεραπεία πλεῖστον ἰσχύει, "God also taught Solomon an art against demons and devils, for the benefit and cure of men; who composed certain incantations, by which diseases are cured, and left forms of exorcisms, whereby devils are expelled and driven away. Which method of curing prevails much amongst us at this very day." Notwithstanding which, we think it not at all probable what a late atheistic writer[3] hath asserted, that the heads of the Jews were then all of them so full of demons and devils, that they generally took all manner of bodily diseases, such as fevers and agues, and dumbness and deafness, for devils. Though we grant that this very thing was imputed by Plotinus afterward to the Gnostics, that they supposed all diseases to be devils, and therefore not to be cured by physic, but expelled by

III. And this is more apparent from the writings of the New Testament, in which the opinions of the Jews and Pharisees about demons are often mentioned. There can be no doubt that the Pharisees with whom our Saviour disputed had a very different opinion about demons, and firmly believed that they constituted a peculiar community under the government of a chief. Among other charges, they accuse our Saviour of expelling malignant spirits from human bodies by the power of the chief of the devils. Jesus answers them that this was an absurd accusation, for that it was most improbable that evil spirits would oppose and war against themselves; while at the same time, he does not deny that the chief of the demons possessed considerable power, which, however, he was to terminate by his advent. See Matt. xii. 25, &c. Every impartial person will at once see that our Saviour could not argue in this way against the Pharisees, if they had believed the demons by whom men were possessed to be the spirits of wicked men. But Antony Van Dalen, De Divinationibus Idololatricis sub Vet. Testam. cap. 5. p. 518. bitterly inveighs against Josephus on account of this opinion, and suspects that he spoke so absurdly about demons in order to bring the miracles of Jesus Christ into contempt. I cannot at all agree with this learned author's conjecture; and if he had taken into consideration what we have already observed, he would perhaps rather have supposed that this opinion is incorrectly attributed to Josephus.

* Ant. Jud. lib. 8. cap. 2. p. 419. 420.

[3] Hobbes. See Levinthan, cap. 40. p. 306. The passage is to the following effect: —"The Jews considered every thing remarkably excellent to be the Spirit of God, and every thing extraordinarily evil to be a demon or devil. They therefore called demoniacs those whom we call madmen, insane persons, lunatics, or epileptics, as well as those who spoke unintelligibly. They also said that an unclean man had in him an unclean spirit, and a dumb man a dumb spirit." This opinion, by the way, has been copiously defended by an anonymous writer, respecting whom see Bibliotheca Britannica, vol. 8. part. 2. p. 313, &c.

words or charms. Thus he, Ennead 2. lib. 9. cap. 14:[9] Νῦν δὲ ὑποστησάμενοι τὰς νόσους δαιμόνια εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐξαιρεῖν λόγῳ φάσκοντες δύνασθαι καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, σεμνότεροι μὲν ἂν εἶναι δόξαιεν παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς, οἳ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς μάγοις δυνάμεις θαυμάζουσι, τοὺς μέντοι εὐφρονοῦντας οὐκ ἂν πείθοιεν, ὡς οὐκ αἱ νόσοι τὰς αἰτίας ἔχουσι, ἢ πλησμοναῖς, ἢ ἐνδείαις, &c. δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ αἱ θεραπείαι αὐτῶν· γαστρὸς γὰρ ῥυείσης ἢ φαρμάκου δοθέντος, διεχώρησε κάτω τὸ νόσημα· καὶ αἵματος ἀφῃρημένου καὶ ἐνδείᾳ δὲ ἰάσατο· ἢ πεινήσαντος τοῦ δαιμονίου καὶ τοῦ φαρμάκου ποιήσαντος τήκεσθαι, "Now, when they affirm diseases to be demons or devils, and pretend that they can expel them by words, undertaking to do the same, they hereby indeed render themselves considerable to the vulgar, who are wont not a little to admire the powers of magicians. But they will not be able to persuade wise men, that diseases have no natural causes, as from repletion, or inanition, or putrefaction, or the like; which is a thing manifest from their cure, they being oftentimes removed by purgation, and bleeding, and abstinence; unless perhaps these men will say, that the devil is by this means starved, and made to pine away." Nor can we think that the Jews, in our Saviour's time, either supposed all madmen to be demoniacs, or all demoniacs madmen (though this latter seems to be asserted by an eminent writer of our own) we reading of devils cast out from others besides madmen; and of a woman which had a spirit "of infirmity only, and was bowed together, and could not lift up herself," which is said by our Saviour Christ to have been "bowed by Satan." Wherefore, the sense of the Jews formerly seems to have been this, that when there was any unusual and extraordinary symptoms in any bodily distemper, but especially that of madness, this being looked upon as something more than natural, was imputed by them to the possession or infestation of some devil. Neither was this proper to the Jews only at that time, to suppose evil demons to be the causes of such bodily diseases as had extraordinary symptoms, and especially madness; but the Greeks, and other Gentiles also, were imbued with the same persuasion; as appeareth from Apollonius Tyanæus' curing a laughing demoniac[10] at Athens, he ejecting that evil spirit by threats and menaces, who is said, at his departure, to have tumbled down a royal porch in the city with great noise; as also,[1] from his

[9] Page 212. opp.

[10] Vide Philostrat. de Vitâ Apollonii Tyanæi, lib. 10. cap. 20. p. 157. But the ejected demon did not, as Dr. Cudworth has it, overturn the whole royal portico, but only destroyed one of the statues that stood round it.

[1] Id. Ibid. lib. 4. cap. 10. p. 147. &c. Both these tales prove Apollonius to have been grossly superstitious, and utterly unworthy of the character of a sage. If the last story be true, I have no doubt that this madman caused a harmless old man to be

freeing the city of Ephesus from the plague, by stoning an old ragged beggar, said by Apollonius to have been the plague, which appeared to be a demon, by his changing himself into the form of a shagged dog.[2]

stoned, for the sake of his own credit among the ignorant vulgar, and after this worthy deed persuaded the mob that he had taken the form of a dog that accidentally passed by. If the other event really happened, the demon that overthrew the statue in the royal portico was no doubt Apollonius himself, who being full of craft and cunning, and anxious to deceive the people, had previously so undermined the figure, that it must necessarily fall at a certain moment, and thus produce in the minds of the vulgar a high opinion of the magic powers of Apollonius. But this is a rude and clumsy trick compared to some of those by which certain professing Christians have endeavoured, by means of feigned miracles, to obtain for themselves a faith which they could not claim for their arguments.

[2] I think it very possible to make a few observations on these subjects, if with less learning and ability, at least with rather more distinctness and perspicuity.

I. It is agreed among learned men that the eastern nations, as the Chaldeans, Egyptians, and others, referred natural causes and phenomena to demons. Nor was the natural philosophy prevalent among these nations any thing else, properly speaking, than a doctrine about demons, their various kinds, properties, powers, and offices. For of every event, some demon was supposed to be the author. An endless number of demons were by them supposed to be set over herbs, trees, animals, the human body and its several parts, and what not besides. The Egyptians, according to Celsus, in Origen, lib. 8. adv. Celsum, p. 416. assigned the human body and its various members to the care of no fewer than thirty-six demons. Hence, these nations had no hesitation in ascribing all the diseases that happened to afflict the human body, entirely to the power of malignant demons. If, for instance, they saw any one afflicted with a fever, they did not think it worth while to inquire particularly into the cause and origin of the disease; for they imagined that a demon concealed in the body of the patient was the original source of all the calamity, whose power could be broken only by hymns and incantations, and barbarous words. And similar opinions were entertained respecting many other, especially internal, complaints.

II. From this foolish notion, which anciently pervaded a great part of the east, originated, I think, the very ancient and gross superstition, which was evidently derived from the Chaldeans to the Jews, and from them to the Christians, that diseases could be cured and expelled by certain names, words, verses, gems, and other similar trifles. Many instances of this are given by Robert Keuchen, in his Observationes ad Serenum Sammonicum, p. 54, &c.; William Spencer, ad Origenem contra Celsum, p. 17; Antony Van Dalen, De Divinationibus Idololatricis sub Vet. Test. cap. 5. p. 508. &c. and others. But they have not pointed out the prime origin of so stupid an error, which therefore I shall briefly explain. Almost all superstitious rites and customs are derived from certain popular opinions; and often after the opinions themselves have become obsolete and extinct, through lapse of time, yet the rites and customs which result from them still remain. Thus it comes to pass that the things themselves are well understood, while the causes that gave rise to them are not equally apparent. There was an opinion amongst ancient nations, especially in the east, that certain names and sounds, for the most part of a horrid and barbarous description, were very grateful and acceptable to demons, while others were equally unpleasant and hateful. This opinion is attested by all the ancient authors who touch upon magic and the art of conciliating or expelling demons; Origen, Jamblichus, Synesius, Psellus, and others, the passages from whom, for brevity's sake, I omit. Nor is it worth while to inquire into the causes of this belief, lest we should wander too far from the subject in hand. This persuasion, however, could not but produce a belief that demons could be pleased and attracted by the pronunciation of certain names and words, and could be put to flight, expelled, and affrighted by certain others. Hence arose exorcisms, incantations, excantations, magic verses, and similar follies. For those who desired the favour and help of the demons composed their verses of words supposed to be pleasing to that kind of beings; while those who wished to drive them away from themselves or others, made use against them of words which they had been taught to believe were terrible to them. Those therefore who were persuaded that diseases could be cured by divine names, and obsolete and

But that there is some truth in this opinion, and that at this very day evil spirits, or demons, do sometimes really act upon the bodies of men, and either inflict or augment bodily distempers

barbarous words, or who ordered such names, engraven on gems, or written on paper, to be tied about the necks of invalids, did so, I think, on account of the opinion that some demon was the cause of the disease, to whom such a name was so hateful that upon hearing or seeing it he would immediately depart. Serenus Sammonicus, whose "medical precepts" we have extant in hexameter verse, thought that the word "Abracadabra," written on paper, was a specific for the double-tertian ague, while Marcellinus thought nothing was better than the word Καριάγκων for allaying pain in the heart. Another instance may be seen in Cato, De Re Rusticâ, cap. 160. p. 121. I have no doubt that the first inventors of these excellent cures were of opinion that some demon was the cause of the ague and the heartburn, and that Abracadabra and Καριάγκων were names and sounds which he could not endure to see or hear. But perhaps the physicians themselves who prescribed these remedies were ignorant of this first origin of them; since in their times the absurd philosophy of the Chaldeans had less authority than previously. Superstitious persons are indeed mad and senseless; but still their madness is such as always to have causes for it, however vain and futile they may be. From the same source originated, I think, the profane custom, some vestiges of which are still to be found among Christians, of having fastened to the necks or beds of the sick, words taken from the Scriptures, the beginning of John's gospel, and little gospels, as amulets to expel the disease; a practice universally condemned by the ancient fathers. For they thought that the demons who tormented mankind would immediately take to flight on a sight of these sacred words. A superstition of this kind is still to be found amongst the Jews, a nation which is well known to have retained from the ancient barbaric philosophy several ridiculous and noxious tenets.

III. It is well known that Pythagoras transferred many parts of the ancient oriental philosophy into his own doctrine. Therefore he and his followers adopted the opinion that many, if not all diseases, were occasioned by indwelling demons. This is not only evident from what is here said by Dr. Cudworth out of Philostratus about Apollonius Tyanæus, who mimicked Pythagoras, and adopted all his tenets; but also from what is said by his biographers, that many diseases were cured by the incantations of himself and his disciples. For there can be no doubt that diseases curable by magic verses must have been caused by demons. Jamblichus, in his Life of Pythagoras, sect. 164. p. 129. says of the Pythagoreans: Χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπῳδαῖς πρὸς ἔνια τῶν ἀῤῥωστημάτων, "That some also cured diseases by incantations." This he repeats again, sect. 243. p. 195. Porphyry, who also wrote a Life of Pythagoras, still extant, gives a similar account, sect. 30. p. 35: Κατεκήλει δὲ ῥυθμοῖς καὶ μέλεσι καὶ ἐπῳδαῖς τὰ ψυχικὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ σώματα, "He soothed the sufferings of the mind and body by songs, melodies, and incantations." And a little further on he says that this method of cure was chiefly used by Pythagoras for diseases of the mind: Καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς δὲ νοσοῦντας παρεμυθεῖτο, τοὺς μὲν ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ μαγείαις, τοὺς δὲ μουσικῇ, "He soothed those who were mentally diseased, some with incantations and magic songs, and some with music." Whence it appears that not only bodily diseases, but also mental perturbations, as melancholy madness, lust, &c. were considered by him to proceed from demons. The distinct mention of music among the remedies of Pythagoras also in some degree corroborates this view of the matter. For it is well known that the ancients attributed great power to music in putting demons to flight. Very similar things are also related of Empedocles, a well-known leader among the Pythagoreans. Of him it is said by Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, lib. 6. p. 754: Παρακολουθεῖν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔλεγον τοὺς μὲν μαντοσυνῶν κεχρημένους, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ νοῦσον σίδηρον δὴ χαλεποῖσι πεπαρμένους, "And they said that some followed him who needed divinations, and others who had been long afflicted with severe diseases." And that Empedocles was supposed to have power over demons is more copiously related by Clemens in the same place. The more recent Platonists, being very favourably disposed towards Pythagoras, argued more subtly than he did respecting the powers and various sorts of demons; so that, as may be easily collected from Jamblichus and others, they also inclined to favour this opinion of his. So that I wonder the more that Plotinus so severely reprehended this opinion in the Gnostics,

and diseases, hath been the judgment of two very experienced physicians, Sennertus and Fernelius. The former in his book De Maniâ, lib. 1. cap. 15. writing thus: Etsi sine ullâ corporis

when at the same time his own disciple Porphyry was not far from holding it, as is evident from his book On Abstinence.

IV. There is, however, no reason to wonder that the Gnostics were addicted to this superstition, and had many tenets about the incantations of demons, amulets, and other similar things. For the whole of this sect, though cut up into several subdivisions, followed the Oriental philosophy, that is the dreams of the Chaldeans, Babylonians, and Egyptians; and their only care was to establish some kind of consistency between this philosophy and the Christian religion. On which account the Extracts of Theodotus, appended to Clemens Alexandrinus, and which are plainly of this description, are entitled "Extracts from the Oriental Philosophy." I will illustrate this by a remarkable passage from the author of the book called the Clementine, a work apparently of the third century. For though he did not approve of the Gnostic doctrine, but formed for himself a singular and unique system of religion, he yet drew from the same impure sources as the Gnostics themselves, namely, the absurd fictions of the Egyptians and Orientals respecting demons and other matters, which it is very evident from the whole of the volume he united with the sacred tenets of Christianity. In homily 9. sect. 12. p. 689. he thus remarks: *Ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτῶν ἐνδομυχούντων δαιμόνων ἐπιτίθονται αὐτοῖς ἐνθυμεῖσθαι, ὡς οὐ δαίμονος ἐνοχλοῦντος, ἀλλὰ σωματικῆς νόσου· οἷον ἢ ὕλης ῥιμείας, ἢ χολῆς, ἢ φλέγματος, ἢ αἵματος ἀμετρίας, ἢ μήνιγγος φλεγμονῆς, ἢ ἄλλου τινος· εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἦν, οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ἀπήλλακται δαίμονος εἶδος εἶναι.* "Therefore it is given them to understand by the demons latent in their minds, that they are not troubled by a demon, but by a bodily disease; as for example by some acrid matter, or bile, or mucus, or an overflow of blood, or inflammation of the brain, or something similar. But even if this were the case, it would not the less on that account be a kind of demon." If Christians then believed this, they would have utterly renounced medical advice, and have sought aid and cure from God alone, the supreme Ruler of demons, for all kinds of diseases.

V. Nor did this opinion remain solely among corrupt heretics, but found several followers and friends among the doctors of the purer part of the church. A few instances will suffice. Tertullian, in his Apology, cap. 22. p. 217. writes thus: "The object of demons is the overthrow of mankind . . . . . Therefore they also inflict corporeal diseases and severe accidents, as well as sudden and extraordinary passions of the mind." And Lactantius, Institut. Divin. lib. 2. cap. 15. p. 253: "Demons, since they are subtle and intangible spirits, insinuate themselves into human bodies, and working secretly in the intestines, spoil the health, excite diseases, terrify the mind with dreams, and bring on madness." The ancient fathers used to avail themselves of this method of accounting for diseases, in order to meet the argument derived by the Pagans from the cure of maladies by the aid of the gods, which was then supposed to be of some force against the Christians. For they granted the correctness of the heathen's premises on this subject, that many had been and then were apparently cured by the gods; but they added that cunning and crafty demons usually excited these diseases, and afterwards, upon vows being made by the sick in the temples of the gods, spontaneously departed; in order that the gods might be believed to be the authors of the cures, and that the nations might be confirmed in their superstitious feelings towards them. Thus Tertullian, in his Apology, cap. 22. p. 222: "They are plainly poisoners even in their cures: for they first of all injure, and then order certain miraculously new or contrary remedies; after which they withdraw their injurious influence, and are believed to have effected a cure." And Minucius Felix, Octavius, cap. 27. p. 275: "Demons draw downwards from heaven, and call off from the true God to matter, disturb the life, disquiet the sleep, and secretly creeping, as subtle spirits, into bodies, *bring on diseases*, terrify the mind, distort the limbs, in order to compel persons to worship them, ... and afterwards relaxing what they have bound, seem to have effected a cure." A similar passage occurs in Cyprian, De Idolorum Vanitate, p. 226 of his Works, ed. Baluz. Tatian, in his Oration against the Greeks, sect. 30. p. 69. says: *Ὁ θαυμασιώτατος Ἰουστῖνος ὀρθῶς ἐξεφώνησεν, ἐοικέναι τοὺς προειρημένους λῃσταῖς· ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔθος ἐστὶ ζωγρεῖν τινας, εἶτα τοὺς αὐτοὺς μισθῷ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἀποκαθιστᾷν· οὕτω καὶ οἱ νομιζόμενοι θεοὶ*

morbosâ dispositione, Deo permittente, hominem obsidere et occupare dæmon possit, tamen quandoque morbis, et præcipuè melancholicis, sese immiscet dæmon; et forsan frequentiùs hoc accidit, quàm sæpè creditur, "Although the devil may, by divine permission, possess men without any morbid disposition, yet doth he usually intermingle himself with bodily diseases, and especially those of melancholy; and perhaps this cometh to pass oftener than is commonly believed or suspected." The other in his De abditis Rerum Causis, where having attributed real effects upon the bodies of men to witchcraft and enchantment, he addeth: Neque solùm morbos, verùm etiam dæmonas, scelerati

τοῖς τινων ἐπιφοιτῶντες μίλεσιν, ἔπειτα δι' ὀνείρων τὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς πραγματευόμενοι δόξαν, δημοσίᾳ τε τοὺς τοιούτους προϊέναι κελεύσαντες, πάντων ὁρώντων, ἐπειδὰν τῶν ἐγκοσμείων ἀπολαύσωσιν, ἀποπτάμενοι τῶν καμνόντων, ἣν ἐπραγματεύσαντο νόσον περιγράφοντες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἀποκαθιστῶσιν, "The most admirable Justin has rightly compared the before-mentioned [demons] to robbers. For as it is the custom with them to take some persons alive, and then upon the payment of a ransom to restore them to their friends; so also those who are thought to be gods, insinuating themselves into the members of certain individuals, afterwards, for the sake of their own glory, command them to go forth into public; and when they have obtained mundane things according to their desires, fly away from the sick, and obliterating the disease produced by their own fraud, restore the persons to their former condition." In subsequent ages, when the minds of most Christian teachers were freed from the corruption of the ancient oriental and Platonic philosophy, we do not find by any means so many to believe that diseases were the tokens of demoniacal possession; but perhaps no age was entirely destitute of some who had a tendency to this sentiment. Not all the light which after the revival of letters was thrown upon the study of medicine, could entirely extinguish this opinion. The memory is still fresh in England, of Valentine Greatrix, an Irishman, who in the last century pretended that all kinds of diseases were produced by demons afflicting mankind, and that he possessed the power of expelling them by his words; and his folly has been condensed by Henry Stubbs, a physician of some standing, into a work of his own. See Œuvres Melées de St. Evremont, vol. 2. p. 219. &c. where the history of this man is well narrated.

VI. To come, after all this circuit, to the Jews, I have no doubt that in the time of our Saviour the common people were considerably imbued with the opinion, that if not all, at least acute and extraordinary diseases were the tokens of demons concealed within mankind, and on this account there existed in that nation so many magicians and impostors, who professed to be able by roots, sacred names, and other similar follies, to destroy the power of diseases, that is, of demons. For, not to mention what has been already quoted from Josephus and others, the Jews brought with them, on returning from the Babylonish captivity, all the oriental absurdities about good and bad spirits, which were wonderfully nourished and strengthened by the frequent communication they held with Egypt. But how this being admitted should prove that all the demoniacs whom our Saviour delivered were only afflicted with natural diseases, I confess I do not understand. What kind of logic, pray, would this be? The Jewish nation erroneously supposed that many diseases proceeding from natural causes were occasioned by demons, therefore there were none in those days really possessed by a devil. It would appear to me to be equally rational to syllogize thus: The Stoics vainly and stupidly believed all that differed from them to be foolish; therefore, none of those who opposed the Stoics were foolish. But except this argumentation, I know not what ground there is for concluding that because the Jews assigned an undue power to demons, therefore no power at all was ever possessed by them over the bodies of mankind. Supposing there was such a superstitious notion among the Jews as is maintained by Hobbes, who is here chiefly aimed at by Dr. Cudworth, it might indeed follow from hence that various errors were prevalent in that nation, but never that all that has been recorded respecting demoniacs is fabulous.

homines in corpora immittunt. Hi quidem visuntur furoris quâdam specie distorti; hôc uno tamen à simplici furore distant, quòd summè ardua obloquantur, præterita et occulta renuntient, assidentiumque arcana reserent, "Neither do these wicked magicians only inflict diseases upon men's bodies, but also send devils into them; by means whereof they appear distorted with a kind of fury and madness, which yet differs from a simple madness (or the disease so called) in this, that they speak of very high and difficult matters, declare things past and unknown, and discover the secrets of those that sit by. Of which he subjoins two notable instances of persons, well known to himself, that were plainly demoniacal, possessed, or acted by an evil demon; one whereof shall be afterwards mentioned. But when maniacal persons do not only discover secrets, and declare things past, but future also, and, besides this, speak in languages, which they had never learned; this puts it out of all doubt and question, that they are not mere madmen, or Maniaci, but demoniacs or Energumeni. And that since the time of our Saviour Christ there have been often such, may be made evident by the records of credible writers. Psellus in his book Περὶ Ἐνεργείας Δαιμόνων, De Operat. Dæm. avers it of a certain maniacal woman, that though she knew nothing but her own mother tongue, yet, when a stranger, who was an Armenian, was brought into the room to her, she spake to him presently in the Armenian language: Ἡμεῖς δὲ τεθηπότες ἤμεν, ὅτι κατ' Ἀρμενίων ἐφθέγγετο, γυνὴ μηδέποτε μηδ' εἰς ὄψιν ἀφιγμένη τούτοις, μηδὲ κερκίδος εἰδυῖα πλέον οὐδέν,* "We all stood amazed, when we heard a woman, that had never seen an Armenian before in all her life, nor had learned any thing but the use of her distaff, to speak the Armenian language readily." Where the relater also affirmeth the same maniacal person to have foretold certain future events, which happened shortly after to himself:† Σὺ δὲ, στραφεὶς πρὸς ἐμὲ, μεγάλων ἐν χρῷ συμφορῶν ὑποστήσῃ· χολᾷ γάρ σοι δεινῶς τὰ δαιμόνια παραλύοντι τὰς αὐτῶν λατρείας· ἀμέλει τοι καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐπιῤῥάψουσι καὶ βαρεῖς κινδύνους, οὓς οὐκ ἂν διαφεύξασθαι δυνηθείης, εἰ μή τις δύναμις κρείττων, ἢ κατὰ δαίμονας, ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἐξέλῃ, "Then looking upon me, she (or rather the demon) said, Thou shalt suffer wonderful pains and torments in thy body, for the demons are extremely angry with thee, for opposing their services and worship; and they will inflict great evils upon thee, out of which thou shalt not be able to escape, unless a power, greater than that of demons, exempt thee from them. All which things (saith he) happened shortly after to me, and I was brought very low, even near to death by them; but was by my Saviour wonderfully delivered." Whereupon Psellus concludes: Τίς

* Page 69. [Page 105.] † Page 65. [Page 99.]

οὖν ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρησμὸν ἑωρακὼς, ἐρεῖ τὰς μανίας πάσας, ὕλης πλημμελοῦς κινήσεις, ἀλλὰ πάθη τραγικὰ δαιμόνων, "Who is there therefore, that considering this oracle or prediction, will conclude (as some physicians do) all kind of madnesses to be nothing but the exorbitant motions of the matter or humours, and not the tragic passions of the demons." But because this instance is remoter from our present times, we shall set down another remarkable one of a later date, out of the forementioned Fernelius, who was an eye-witness thereof. A young man of a noble family, who was strangely convulsed in his body, having sometimes one member, and sometimes another, violently agitated, insomuch that four several persons were scarcely able to hold them; and this at first without any distemper at all in his head, or crazedness in brain. To whom Fernelius, with other skilful physicians, being called, applied all manner of remedies; blisters, purgations, cupping-glasses, fomentations, unctions, plasters, and strengthening medicines, but all in vain. The reason whereof is thus given by the same Fernelius: Quoniam omnes longe aberamus à cognitione veri, nam mense tertio primùm deprehensus dæmon quidam totius mali auctor, voce, insuetisque verbis ac sententiis tum Latinis tum Græcis (quanquam ignarus linguæ Græcæ laborans esset), se prodens; is multa assidentium maximaque medicorum secreta detegebat, ridens, quòd irritis pharmacis corpus hoc pænè jugulassent, "Because we were all far from the knowledge of the truth; for in the third month, it was first plainly discovered to us, that it was a certain demon who was the author of all this mischief; he manifesting himself by his speech, and by unusual words and sentences, both in Greek and Latin (though the patient were altogether ignorant of the Greek tongue): and by his revealing many of the secrets of those who stood by him, especially of the physicians, whom also he derided for tormenting the patient in that manner with their frustraneous remedies." Here therefore have we an unquestionable instance of a demoniac in these latter times of ours, and such a one who at first, for two months together, had no manner of madness or mania at all upon him, though afterwards the demon possessing his whole body, used his tongue, and spake therewith. Fernelius concludes his whole discourse in this manner: "These things do I produce, to make it manifest that evil demons (or devils) do sometimes enter into the very bodies of men, afflicting and tormenting them after an unheard-of manner; but that at other times, though they do not enter into, and possess their whole body, yet partly by exagitating and disturbing the profitable humours thereof, partly by traducing the noxious into the principal parts, or else by obstructing the veins and other passages with them, or disordering the structure of the members, they cause innu-

merable diseases. There are many other instances of this kind, recorded by modern writers unexceptionable, of persons either wholly demoniacal, and possessed by evil demons (this appearing from their discovering secrets, and speaking languages which they had never learned) or else otherwise so affected and infested by them, as to have certain unusual and supernatural symptoms; which, for brevity's sake, we shall here omit. However, we thought it necessary thus much to insist upon this argument of demoniacs, as well for the vindication of Christianity, as for the conviction of Atheists; we finding some so staggering in their religion, that from this one thing alone of demoniacs (they being so strongly possessed that there neither is nor ever was any such) they are ready enough to suspect the whole gospel, or New Testament itself, of fabulosity and imposture.[3]

[3] Some great admirers of their own wisdom have lately classed among vulgar errors all the stories of demoniacal possession. The Platonists and those addicted to oriental ideas, both before and after Christ, related wondrous tales of the cunning of demons, and their strong desire of entering into human bodies. Whenever any were addicted to flagrant vices, avaricious, libidinous, revengeful, and vindictive, they were considered to be the prisons and homes of malignant spirits. It is a wonder that these sagacious demon-hunters did not look for them also in animals possessing properties resembling human vices, lions, swine, foxes, and others; for if demons were the authors of human vices, why should they not be believed to be equally so of bestial? The Japanese, indeed, are not far from holding this sentiment; for Kaempfer relates in his History of Japan, that they believe foxes to be possessed by crafty and malignant demons. Nor had they in ancient times a more favourable opinion, as we have already seen, of the sick and deformed. But all were not quite so stupid as to suffer themselves to be persuaded into an approbation of this doctrine. The philosophical emperor, Marcus Antoninus, gratefully acknowledges that he was taught by Diognetus to despise these delusions, and to believe none of the fictions περὶ ἐπῳδῶν, περὶ γοήτων, καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων ἀποπομπῆς, "about incantations, magicians, and the expulsion of demons," lib. 1. ad Se Ipsum, sect. 6. p. 4. ed. Gataker. Lucian unhesitatingly referred to the senseless delusions of the vulgar all that was said about the art of exorcism; and facetiously observes that he did not at all wonder that the Platonists could see the demons quitting human bodies, when their vision was so acute that they could see the representations or "ideas" of things fly off from surfaces, Philopseudes, tom. 2. p. 337. 338. opp. There can be no doubt at the present day that the ancient fathers transferred many tenets out of Platonism and its cognate systems into Christianity. On which account nearly the same views are found in their works respecting the power of evil spirits over the bodies of mankind, as are to be met with in the writings of the Platonists; nor was there any kind of diseases or vices the blame of which they did not lay upon some demon; a fact that could easily be proved, were it necessary, by innumerable instances and quotations. The "Pastor" of one Hermas, written in the first century, may be consulted on this point, and also Archbishop Potter on Clemens Alexandrinus, p. 174. On due consideration, however, I feel unable to maintain the truth of all that has been written by the Apologists and other ancient Christian writers respecting the power of exorcism, and such multitudes of demons ejected by the words of Christians. Nor can I agree with those who think all the examples given in ancient writings, of persons set free by Christians from the power of demons, are wholly fictitious; an opinion entertained, among others, by Basnage, Antiquités Judaïques, tom. 2. cap. 8. and by Le Clerc, Bibliothèque Choisie, tom. 13. p. 219. For I fear that this being admitted would not only undermine the authority of all the primitive Christians, but would also open the way to profane persons of perverting and corrupting the history of our Saviour himself. But I do not think it inconsistent with truth, or with the reverence due to the ancient Christians, to say that it is probable that among those whom, in accordance with the errors and opinions of their own times, they

thought to be possessed by demons, there were some under the influence of natural calamities and severe diseases; nor is this any derogation from the importance of the miracles recorded to have been done by the ancient Christians. For, as respects the confirmation of the truth of Christianity, it is the same thing whether by the name of the Saviour, inveterate, fatal, and incurable diseases were cured by Christians, or demons were ejected from the bodies of the possessed. [The author of a work, De Dæmoniacis Nov. Test., Bibliotheca Britann. tom. 8. p. 314. seems here to have ploughed with my heifer.] Both these performances exceed human ability, and are a proof of divine interposition. Nor does this error of the Christians, derived from the opinions of their own age, detract from the authority of the religion they professed; for it is evident that some remains of superstition and error might still remain in the minds of those who were imbued with the holiest doctrines. I have, however, no doubt that there were among the Christians wise and respectable men, who perceived that the common opinion was not entirely correct, and that all were not really demoniacs who were vulgarly esteemed so. Certain it is, that in following ages there were some Christians who entirely disbelieved the traditions about the power and dominion exercised by demons over mankind, and were bold to declare that diseases incorrectly ascribed to demoniacal power arose from natural causes. Psellus relates with indignation that some physicians were of this opinion, De Operatione Dæmonum, p. 84.: *Ἀλλ', ὦ Μάρκε, εἶπον, ἕτερ' ἄττα πείθουσιν ἡμᾶς φρονεῖν ἰατρῶν παῖδες οὐ δαιμόνων ἔκγονα τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγοντες εἶναι. Χυμῶν δὲ καὶ αὐχμῶν καὶ πνευμάτων μοχθηρῶν ἐχόντων, ἀμέλει φαρμάκοις καὶ διαιτήμασιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπῳδαῖς καὶ καθαρμοῖς ταῦτα θεραπεύειν, ἀποπειρῶνται,* "But, O Mark, I say, physicians endeavour to persuade us other things than these, saying that these affections are not the results of demons; but that the humours, joints, and spirits being affected, they endeavour to cure these maladies by medicine and diet, not by incantations and purifications." But yet I should not suppose that these physicians, and other Christians who herein agreed with them, entirely denied all power of the devil over the human body, or imagined that those who were cured by our Saviour were only diseased persons falsely supposed by the people to be possessed. In the last century the opinion just named was publicly and undisguisedly put forth, and, through the immoderate freethinking of the day, eagerly taken up. To pass over Vaninus, Hobbes, Spinoza, and others, who have evidently seemed desirous of overthrowing all religion, there was published at London in 1676 an octavo volume entitled, The Doctrine of the Devils, whose author, a clergyman of the Church of England, strongly opposed to Socinianism (according to Des Maizeaux, Notes to Bayle's Letters, tom. 2. p. 435), both denies altogether the power of demons, and maintains that the demoniacs of the New Testament were persons diseased and mad. Subsequently the able and learned Benjamin De Daillon, a minister among the French refugees, proceeded further than this, and in his book entitled Examen de l'Oppression des Reformés en France, Amsterdam, 1687. 12mo. held that there is only one devil, and that the demons said to be ejected by our Saviour were simply diseases. Respecting this book consult Le Clerc, Bibliothèque Historique et Universelle, tom. 7. p. 339. And the brother of this Daillon entertained a similar opinion, on which he copiously expatiated in a singular book entitled *Δαιμονολογία*, or a Treatise of Spirits, London, 1723. 8vo. I pass over Balthazar Becker, who deliberately attacked the power of demons; nor is there any necessity of saying much respecting those who have more recently suffered themselves to be drawn into the same opinion, since it is well known that some of them have been well affected towards religion. A number of learned works are extant confuting this rash sentiment; and therefore I do not think it worth while to spend much time about them. Nor shall I undertake to examine and explain the stories and controversies about demoniacal possessions in more modern times; or the discussions among medical men respecting magical diseases. It will be sufficient if, omitting all else, I make the following observations.

I. To refer all that is said in the New Testament respecting the ejection of demons to ordinary diseases or vulgar error, appears to me very dangerous and inimical to the Christian religion. For if this opinion be correct, I think it evident that our Saviour and his apostles and witnesses can scarcely claim the character of wise men, while using language which no sensible person would make use of, if desirous of being understood by his readers. To make this plain, I shall first of all remark that Christ and his disciples were under no necessity of expressing themselves thus. (See Saurin, Discours sur Le Bible, tom. 4. p. 422. and 493.) Jesus Christ, in the twelfth chapter of Matthew, and other places, is disputing against the Pharisees who accused him of per-

forming his miracles by the power and aid of demons; and he answers them just as if all the opinions of the Pharisees at that time about demons were correct. If however all the traditions about demoniacal possession were false, our Saviour would have replied with the utmost truth and propriety that the stories about the craft and power of demons were vulgar errors and old wives' fables. Nor do I see any reason to prevent him from freely avowing this. Such an avowal would not have been unprecedented among the Jews, nor so hateful to them as not to be tolerated. For the Sadducees, who were allowed to speak their sentiments in the supreme council, and to fill the most honourable posts, publicly professed that there were no such beings as demons, and considered it the extreme of folly to believe in their existence; nor did they on this account incur the execrations of the common people. Christ could therefore without invidiousness, or injury to his sacred mission, have opposed and rejected the vulgar fables respecting demons. And our adversaries themselves shall be judges what kind of person he could be, who, urged by no necessity, should not only tolerate in the minds of his hearers the most ridiculous and pestilential errors, but even confirm and strengthen them by his expressions and argumentation. And the same reasoning applies to those sent forth by our Saviour to propagate his religion. There were indeed among the common people, among the Platonists, and among the Jewish doctors, not a few who would have been offended by the apostles' declaring to be false all that was said respecting the nature and power of demons, and their possession of mankind. [For a reply to this, see Bibliotheca Britannica, tom. 8. part 2. p. 326.] But there was a larger rather than a smaller number of philosophers, who gave no credit to any of these tales; such as the Epicureans and Aristotelians, whose systems had very many followers in the time of Christ amongst the nobility and great men, who did not however on that account incur any danger to their safety or reputation. And perhaps many of the wise men of that day would have been gained over by the apostles, had they freely declared their dissent from the popular opinions respecting evil spirits. What wise man then, who foresaw no danger in opposition to vulgar errors, but on the contrary an accession of converts to his cause, would adopt as his own and confirm by his authority the fanatical fancies of the common people?

II. But even supposing that much danger and opposition were the result of a free profession of the truth respecting demons and their nature, I can never persuade myself that our Saviour and his disciples were so timid as on this account not only to tolerate but even openly to approve false and childish tenets. It is well known that the Mosaical rites and ceremonies, so fondly cherished by the Jews, the gods in whom the heathen placed their only trust, and many other popular prepossessions inordinately beloved, were boldly and in spite of all perils by our Saviour and his followers oppugned and condemned. How can it be believed then that men endowed with such courage to attack the strongholds of impiety and superstition, would not have dared to oppose opinions which were neither approved by all, nor even by their admirers reckoned among the fundamental principles of religion? Much more probably would Hercules, after braving Cerberus, have fled at the sight of a boar or a lion.

III. Our opponents will perhaps say that prudence required our Saviour and his disciples not to refute and reprehend all the errors of the people; that Christ in his wisdom bore for a time with certain errors in the minds of the Jews which he perceived to be not altogether opposed to the increase of true religion; and that his apostles followed his example. In a certain sense I would not deny the truth of this; but then this remark throws no light on the matter in hand. Our Saviour indeed bore for a time with some erroneous opinions of his friends and of the multitude; but he neither commended them publicly nor adopted them as his own by his words and phrases. But how evident is it that the opinions of the Pharisees respecting demons and their possessions were by our Saviour adopted, illustrated, and emended? See Matt. xii. 17—30, 43—45; and Luke xi. 24. How can this be attributed to prudence? It is, I allow, the duty of a wise physician to prepare remedies for more serious diseases, and to leave to time the cure of those that are less important, and of a prudent man first to assail the most dangerous errors and to be less concerned about the more trifling; but it must be a mark of folly to provide against the extinction of slighter evils, and to fortify secondary errors with fresh defences. It would have met the requisitions of prudence had our Saviour been entirely silent, and neither openly rejected, adopted, nor approved the false ideas of the Jews about evil spirits, if he perceived any just cause why they should not at that time be confuted.

IV. But, to descend to lower ground, I will grant (but only for the sake of the argument) that prudence required our Saviour to speak according to the popular opinion,

and act in accordance with the errors of the vulgar. I hope it will then be granted by my opponents that it is the part of wisdom to take care that silly errors, while spared for the purpose of avoiding offence, do not become perpetual and descend to the latest generations. Was this then done by our Saviour? The contrary, on their supposition, is apparent. Neither the historians of his life, nor the messengers of his religion, who explained it fully in their epistles, have let fall a word to imply that our Saviour's discourses respecting demons and possessions contained the opinion of the Jews and not his own, and were only adapted to the superstitious commonalty. Therefore if the opinion of the non-existence of any power of demons be correct, I must remain in very great doubt and uncertainty what to think respecting our Saviour's love towards mankind, in leaving them under the influenceof a noxious error, what to think respecting his wisdom and prudence, and even respecting the Christian religion itself.

V. In short, those who entertain these opinions seem to me entirely to abrogate the authority of the sacred writings. For to agree with them we must confess that our Saviour uttered falsehoods when speaking of the power of demons or commanding evil spirits to come out of human bodies; and his discourse, for instance, in Matt. xii. 17—30, 43—45. is a series of empty sounds destitute of import or meaning; we must admit that Paul when saying, Eph. vi. 12. that Christians "wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places," makes use of empty sounds under the appearance of a solemn admonition; lastly, we must allow that the sacred writers sometimes speak so perversely and corruptly that they can be read without danger of error only by those who under the guidance of reason can separate the gold from the dross. But if these things be so, if some parts of the Scriptures contain popular errors under the semblance of truth, if others consist of mere sounds destitute of sense, they can scarcely be esteemed worthy of our entire confidence with reference to our salvation, or our implicit faith in matters of belief. For if the sacred writers depart so far from the common usage of language as Becker and other deniers of the reality of demons and demoniacs maintain, there would be reason to fear that they also used popular and not strictly correct language in parts wherein we imagine to exist the mysteries of salvation and the most sacred doctrines.

VI. Finally, the arguments made use of by those who so strenuously deny the existence of demons seem to me to be self-contradictory. They assume that our Saviour and his disciples accommodated themselves in their speeches and writings to popular opinions, and spoke of demons and their power over the human body, as well as other particulars, just as if there was no doubt on these points, though they well knew that the popular belief was entirely unfounded. And no doubt they think that our Saviour and his followers in this respect acted with prudence and wisdom. I should therefore like to inquire why they will not themselves imitate this example, and not rather depart from the sacred precedent set by Christ and his apostles. At the present day there are perhaps quite as many as in the time of Christ, who believe in the existence of demons and their occasionally inhabiting the human frame. As much offence may be occasioned at the present time by a denial of this opinion, as could be during the days of our Saviour and the apostles. And, after all, this tenet is not one involving peril of eternal salvation; for if it were, there can be no doubt that our Saviour would have taken care wholly to extirpate it from the minds of men. What reason, then, is there why they should not act in the same manner as they maintain that Christ and the apostles did, and speak like the multitude, while they think with the wise? Why attack with so many objections and cavils an opinion not only shown by our Saviour to be harmless, but even corroborated by him? Unless I am mistaken there will be reason to suspect some occult mischief must be hidden here. Perhaps those who so pervert the words of Christ and his apostles as to suppose they spoke inconsistently with their own sentiments, act by them as they suppose they acted by the demons and the possessed, and speak of them according to popular opinion, while their secret sentiments are far different. I am not so uncharitable as to suppose this to be the case with all who entertain these opinions; but I should wish all persons of this description seriously to consider whither the tenets lead which they so boldly propound and defend.

END OF VOLUME II.

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